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


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# SUPPLEMENTARY

# DESPATCHES, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

# ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,

DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

37226 ae Vol XI

## VOLUME THE ELEVENTH.

OCCUPATION OF FRANCE BY THE ALLIED ARMIES;
SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON;
AND
RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

[ JULY, 1815, TO JULY, 1817. ]

VV. d. 6

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# NOTICE.

THE documents in this volume refer to various subjects: among them may be mentioned:—

The entry of the British Army into Paris, 7th July, 1815.

Louis XVIII. reinstated on the throne of France.

The surrender of Napoleon, 15th July, 1815, and the selection of St. Helena as the place of his Exile.

The correspondence respecting Marshal Ney.

The settlement of the French Military Frontier.

The Allies subsidized by England.

The restoration of the Works of Art taken by the French.

Origin of, and correspondence respecting, the Holy Alliance.

The Duke of Wellington appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army of Occupation.

The construction of Netherlands Fortresses.

The escape of Lavalette and trial of Sir Robert Wilson.

Sir Pulteney Malcolm's interview with Napoleon, 5th July, 1816.

War threatened between Spain and Portugal.

Plan for dim... ing the expenses of the French Government and for the general reduction of the Army of Occupation.

The reversion of the Italian Duchies.

The ensuing Volume (XII.) will close the Supplementary Series of the 'Wellington Despatches' with the final withdrawal of the Allied Army of Occupation from France, and the termination of the military career in the field of the Duke of Wellington.

A copious Index of the Supplementary Series will be given in a small separate Volume.

*London, May*, 1864.

# SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES.

## OCCUPATION OF FRANCE BY THE ALLIED ARMIES; SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON; AND RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

### ARRANGEMENT FOR THE BRITISH ARMY TO TAKE PLACE ON THE 7TH JULY. [914.]

Neuilly, 6th July, 1815.

The cavalry of the 2nd corps to canton at Boulogne.

The infantry of the 2nd corps to camp with its left upon Neuilly, occupying that place, excepting the park, and its right extending into the Bois de Boulogne.

The cavalry of the 1st corps to be cantoned at Auteuil.

The infantry of the 1st corps to camp with its left upon the Porte Maillot (Bois de Boulogne), and its right extending into the Bois de Boulogne, as far as to behind La Muette if necessary.

The Netherland infantry are to be in cantonments in Passy and Auteuil, if accommodations can be found for them; otherwise, camped.

The reserve, viz., the 5th and 6th divisions and the Brunswick corps, is to camp, its right occupying the park at Neuilly, and its left extended to St. Ouen.

The Brunswick troops to be put into cantonments in Villiers, Clichy, and St. Ouen, if possible.

The reserve will occupy St. Denis with one battalion.

The reserve artillery, reserve ammunition, and spare pontoons and hawser bridges to move and canton at St. Denis.

The cavalry will occupy cantonments and be camped in the villages on the left of the Seine, Asnières, Colombes, Villeneuve, Genevillier, Canton, Nanterre, Ruel, Mont Valérien, Suresne,

Putaux; and on the right of the Seine, Epinay, Villetaneuse, Stains, Pierrefitte, Denil, and Mont-magny if necessary.

The cavalry will move to the cantonments on the left bank of the Seine by Argenteuil, in order to keep clear of the infantry.

The reserve artillery with the cavalry should be ordered from Garges to join the brigades of cavalry, or be disposed of in the manner which Major-General Sir J. O. Vandeleur may deem best.

The troops to be put in motion to-morrow the 7th July at 4 A.M.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Assistant Quartermaster-General to Major-Gen. Sir J. O. Vandeleur.*

Neuilly, 7th July, 1815.

An order has been sent to Colonel Sleigh, commanding your brigade of cavalry, to send one regiment of the brigade this morning into Paris. The regiment is to accompany a brigade of infantry of the 2nd division, which has orders to camp in the Champs Elysées, and near to the Place Louis Quinze, where the Duke of Wellington will have his head-quarters to-day. Colonel Sleigh is requested to relieve the regiment of cavalry daily. The infantry remains camped till further orders. I have also requested Colonel Sleigh to attach to the 2nd division the brigade of artillery at present with him, informing Sir H. Clinton of his doing so.

The Duke of Wellington has ordered that a party of cavalry should be placed at each of the Barrière gates when the guards amount to 100 or to 50 men. I have requested the corps of infantry to furnish to those Barrière guards a squadron of cavalry each, the cavalry so furnished being of that attached to the corps. Perhaps it would be right to have some cavalry on the side of Belleville: I request you will therefore place a brigade between Belleville and Montmartre. The Prussians come on our left up to Belleville.

When your arrangements are made for the placing of the cavalry, be so good as to let me have a distribution.

The 3rd brigade will move to-morrow morning, the 8th instant, from Ruel by the bridge of Neuilly to the village of La Chapelle, situated on the road from St. Denis to Paris, and between Montmartre and Belleville, and either occupy or encamp near that place.

The Prussians occupy Belleville.

Any adjacents unoccupied in the line between Montmartre and Belleville which may afford a better bivouac than La Chapelle, or better accommodation, may be taken by the 3rd brigade, reporting accordingly as soon as possible to the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

The heavy cavalry may occupy Ruel in addition to Nanterre to-morrow morning, the 8th instant.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 8th July, 1815.

You will perceive Fouché has played us a shabby trick at starting; but we must forgive him, as I believe he has been of essential use to the King. I was amused with Talleyrand's apology for him. After abusing him violently, he said he had no doubt his defence would be, "Have not I done what you wished? why inquire as to the means?" but as we cannot take the same liberties as M. Fouché, I have thought it material to furnish you with the means of contradiction. I understand Carnot drew the paper, probably to compromise Fouché with the King and the Allies. It is a most unjustifiable transaction, but not one which ought to induce us, having prevailed on the King to use Fouché, now to quarrel with him.

I understood from the King this evening that he had given orders to Fouché to use every exertion to arrest Bonaparte. I apprised both His Majesty and Talleyrand that I conceived the policy of Europe towards France must be materially influenced by Bonaparte's being left at liberty to return again to the charge when a new complot could be arranged.

I have written to my brother and Lord Cathcart to press the arrival of the Sovereigns.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

---

*General Baron Müffling to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUC, Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai été chargé hier de la part du Prince Blücher d'annoncer à Votre Grâce que le Prince a imposé à la ville de Paris une contribution de 100,000,000 de francs, et l'habillement complet pour 110,000 hommes, sauf les contributions que Votre Grâce trouverait bon d'imposer pour votre armée ou votre gouvernement.

Agréez, Monseigneur, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

BARON DE MÜFFLING.

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*General De Reede to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUC, Quartier-Général, Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer ci-joint à votre Excellence quelques rapports fait à Bonaparte sur l'état de plusieurs places fortes Françaises de la seconde et troisième ligne, trouvés parmi les papiers d'un de ses secrétaires, le Baron Fain, lors de la déroute de l'armée Française, par un officier des Pays-Bas, prisonnier de guerre à Charleroi, et qui fut délivré à cette occasion.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec respect, my Lord Duc,

De votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

DE REEDE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

RAPPORT fait à Sa Majesté l'EMPEREUR sur la Place de ST. VALERY, et le Cours de la Somme jusqu'à Abbeville.

SIRE, St. Valery, ce 9 Juin, 1815.

La place de St. Valery n'est fermée que par un mauvais mur; mais sa position sur un plateau élevé, qui domine la plaine et l'embouchure de la Somme, est très importante. Cette position occupée peut servir de point d'appui à une armée destinée à défendre le passage de la Somme, et à s'opposer aux débarquemens que l'ennemi pourroit facilement exécuter du côté de Cayeux pour éviter de passer la rivière.

La Somme, depuis son embouchure jusqu'auprès d'Abbeville, est guéable presque partout. On a creusé un canal en ligne droite, pour y faire entrer la Somme, et la rendre toujours navigable d'Abbeville à St. Valery. Ce canal n'est point achevé. Quelques batteries construites en avant arrêteroient l'ennemi qui entreprendrait de le traverser. Des marais qui séparent le lit actuel de la Somme de ce canal sont d'ailleurs un obstacle qui rassure contre toute entreprise de ce genre.

Il y a sur le canal deux ponts en bois faciles à détruire; ils sont aux villages de Finchefalaire et Boisemont; les voitures peuvent y passer. Quelques autres petits ponts en planches servent au passage des piétons.

L'entrée de la Somme est défendue par deux batteries, dont les feux se croisent. Elles sont armées de deux pièces chacune, et ont huit cent coups.

Il n'y a pas de garnison à St. Valery, point d'approvisionnemens.

Le chef de bataillon Grisel fait les fonctions de commandant de place à St. Valery. Les habitans sont tranquilles. Le contingent de la Garde Nationale est à peu près parti en totalité.

Je suis, avec le plus profond respect,
Sire, de Votre Majesté
Le très humble et très dévoué sujet,
CHIAPPE.

II.

RAPPORT fait à Sa Majesté l'EMPEREUR sur la Place d'ABBEVILLE, et le Cours de la Somme jusqu'à Amiens.

SIRE, Amiens, ce 10 Juin, 1815.

La place d'Abbeville n'est point bonne; cependant avec les inondations que l'on prépare, et les petits ouvrages que l'on fait, elle sera à l'abri d'un coup de main, et jusqu'à la saison des glaces il faudra y déployer des moyens de siége pour la prendre.

On peut y former deux inondations, l'une provenant de la Somme, l'autre des divers ruisseaux de la vallée de Ricquier. Cette dernière ne peut être saignée; la première peut l'être à 800 toises de la place, à l'extrémité de la chaussée de Rouvray. Je pense qu'un petit ouvrage que l'on fait en cet endroit pour empêcher l'ennemi de venir détruire le barrage est trop isolé et éloigné pour pouvoir être protégé par la place. Il faudroit qu'il fait soutenu par des ouvrages intermédiaires.

Le palissadement est achevé aux endroits les plus importants.

On a absolument besoin d'argent pour continuer les travaux. Le Ministre a promis 50,000 fr. Si on les envoyoit, la place seroit en état avant quinze jours.

L'artillerie a trente bouches à feu en batterie, et six pièces de bataille disponibles. Chaque pièce a en projectiles 340 coups. Il manque 8500 kil. de poudre. Les cartouches d'infanterie sont insuffisantes; il n'y en a que 101,000. On attend des mortiers de la côte.

La garnison doit se composer de cinq bataillons de Gardes Nationales de Calvados; il n'en est encore arrivé que 440, officiers compris.

Les approvisionnements commencent à se faire.

Le Major Herrenberger commande la place; un major le génie; un autre major l'artillerie. Il y a dans la ville trois dépôts d'infanterie, trois de cavalerie.

Abbeville est une bonne tête-de-pont, à laquelle peuvent s'appuyer les troupes destinées à la défense des passages de la Somme.

Les habitans y sont tranquilles, mais fort mal disposés. Ceux de la ville seront toujours maintenus; dans les villages on peut facilement les exciter à la révolte. Quelques anciens Seigneurs indiquent leurs châteaux comme point de ralliement pour les insurgés. La police n'est pas assez active et secrète; elle ne peut atteindre un certain Comte de Boubert et quelques autres qu'elle a ordre d'arrêter, quoiqu'ils soient dans le pays. Une bonne mesure à prendre seroit celle d'obliger tous les Seigneurs châtelains à habiter leurs maisons de ville: les paysans n'ayant personne pour les exciter seront tranquilles et obéissants.

Depuis Abbeville jusqu'à Amiens la Somme n'est pas guéable; un seul gué pour la cavalerie existe au-dessous d'Amiens, encore est-il fort dangereux.

Il y a huit ponts d'Abbeville à Amiens, aux villages de l'Epagne, Pont Rémy, Long, l'Etoile, Gouy, Piquigny, Ailly, Dreuil. Celui de Pont Rémy est le seul en pierre: sa position ne peut être défendue. Il faut le préparer et le faire sauter à l'approche de l'ennemi, couper la chaussée, et barrer deux petits bras de la Somme qui sont à la gauche du bras principal pour former une inondation dans la vallée de la rive gauche, et avoir derrière des troupes pour la défendre.

Piquigny est susceptible d'être bien défendu. Le village, situé sur la gauche de la Somme, domine bien la rive droite. En avant il y a un canal, qui est un obstacle de plus. Il faut couper le pont sur le canal (il est en pierre), la chaussée, et le pont en bois de Piquigny; puis avoir dans le village des troupes pour rattacher cette position à celles de Pont Rémy et d'Amiens. Tous les autres ponts doivent être détruits.

Quoique entre Abbeville et Amiens les bords de la Somme soient presque partout marécageux, il est des points où l'on peut facilement arriver, et une rivière large de 8 à 10 toises n'est pas un long obstacle. Il faut donc avoir à Pont Rémy et à Piquigny des troupes retranchées dans ces villages, qui avec celles d'Abbeville et d'Amiens se porteroient partout où l'ennemi tentera un passage.

Je suis, avec le plus profond respect, Sire,

De Votre Majesté le très humble et très dévoué serviteur,

CHIAPPE.

III.

*Lieut.-Gen. Baron Dejean to the Emperor Napoléon.*

SIRE, Dunkerque, le 11 Juin, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Majesté de la situation des places d'Amiens, Doullens, Aire, St. Omer, Ardres, Calais, Gravelines, et Dunkerque.

*Amiens.*

Cette ville ne peut être considérée que pour sa citadelle, et comme tête-de-pont sur la Somme. L'ennemi ayant passé cette rivière, il faudrait d'immenses travaux pour mettre la partie sur la rive gauche seulement à l'abri d'un coup de main. On a commencé à relever les parapets de la citadelle, et à établir une communication jusqu'à la Somme. Cela ne va pas très vite ; il serait nécessaire d'y envoyer un officier du génie. M. le Capitaine Descroix, qui y commande cette arme, n'est pas très actif, et il est d'Amiens.

Il y a 12 bouches à feu, dont deux de bataille ; huit autres sont annoncées du Havre. On a 200 coups par pièce. Il y a douze canonniers. On a formé une compagnie bourgeoise de 120 hommes. Il y a quatre mille fusils. L'approvisionnement a été déterminé pour 400 hommes pendant 45 jours ; il doit être terminé dans ce moment.

Il n'y a à Amiens que des dépôts qui font partir leurs hommes à fur et à mesure qu'ils sont disponibles. Il serait nécessaire d'y avoir une garnison fixe.

M. le Préfet de la Somme, Alexandre Lameth, nommé Pair de France, allait partir pour Paris. Il avait remis ses fonctions à M. de Monthozon, sous-préfet d'Amiens. Quoique ce sous-préfet ait l'entière confiance de M. Lameth, il paraît qu'il n'est pas tout-à-fait dans le sens de la chose actuelle. Il est nécessaire d'envoyer à Amiens un bon préfet.

J'ai trouvé M. de Lameth extrêmement contrarié de ce que l'on avait mis la ville d'Amiens en état de siége. Il prétendait qu'on n'aurait dû y mettre que la citadelle. Il m'a paru que la véritable raison de son mécontentement était de voir par cette mesure les autorités civiles sous les ordres des militaires. Je crois que les choses en iront beaucoup mieux ; mais comme il n'y a à Amiens pour commandant supérieur qu'un colonel, et que sa population la rend une ville très importante, il serait nécessaire d'y envoyer un bon officier général. M. le Général Gazan venait d'arriver à Amiens lors de mon passage.

*Doullens.*

La citadelle est en assez bon état, et bien à l'abri d'un coup de main. On travaille à raser d'anciens ouvrages entre la citadelle et la ville, derrière lesquels l'ennemi pourrait s'établir. Les bois demandés n'arrivent pas. Il y a quinze pièces de canon, dont deux de campagne ; on en attend deux autres du Havre, ainsi que 500 fusils. On a 300 coups par pièce, et 150 mille cartouches. Il y a 250 obuses, mais point d'obusier pour les utiliser. Il y a 15 canonniers ; on a formé une compagnie bourgeoise de 67 hommes. M. Laplace, ancien officier d'ordonnance de Votre Majesté, commande l'artillerie. Ce jeune officier, plein d'activité, de zèle, et de dévouement, désirerait beaucoup d'être employé d'une manière plus active.

Il n'y a pour toute garnison qu'une compagnie de vétérans de 74 hommes. L'approvisionnement a été fixé pour 400 hommes pendant trois mois. Il n'y a encore rien.

M. le Chef de Bataillon Sabathier, commandant supérieur, paraît un officier vigoureux. Il sort de la Garde.

Il n'y a que 65 fournitures de lit. On en a demandé plusieurs fois; on n'a pas eu de réponse.

*Aire.*

Cette place est en fort bon état, mais il n'y a personne pour la garder. Il y a 27 bouches à feu en batteries; 47 sont sur chantiers ou en réparations. On construit des affûts, et on en répare. Dans huit jours 13 pièces seront disponibles. Il n'y a que 17 milliers de poudre, dont 13 milliers sont en munitions confectionnées depuis très longtems, et qu'on sera obligé de démolir. Il y a 247 fusils d'infanterie et 350 de rempart. Il y a une compagnie d'artillerie de 44 hommes, et une bourgeoise de 120, qui, ainsi que les habitans, n'est point animée d'un bon esprit, et sur lesquels on ne peut pas compter. M. Baude, chef de bataillon, commandant l'artillerie, ne s'entend pas bien avec M. l'Adjudant Commandant Dunoyer, nommé maréchal de camp par le Roi, et non-confirmé, commandant supérieur de la place. Pour le bien du service il n'est pas à désirer qu'ils restent ensemble.

L'approvisionnement a été déterminé pour 1200 hommes et 50 chevaux pendant six mois; il sera terminé dans huit jours.

La garnison consiste seulement dans un bataillon du Pas de Calais, qui n'a encore que 170 hommes. Il est nécessaire d'y envoyer du monde, d'autant plus que l'esprit de la ville et des environs est extrêmement mauvais.

*St. Omer.*

La principale force de cette place consiste dans ses inondations, mais elles ne dépendent pas de la place, et, maître du pays, l'ennemi peut les saigner. Les inondations peuvent jouer un grand rôle pour la défense de toute cette partie, et former une ligne continue en liant ensemble les places de Dunkerque, Bergues, St. Omer, et Aire. Pour cela il faudrait fortifier quelques points, particulièrement Watten, entre Bergues et St. Omer, et avoir quelques troupes disponibles pour se porter où il serait nécessaire. Il faudrait aussi avoir un officier-général, chargé en chef de la défense, et qui peut en former un système général, et donner des ordres aux différens gouverneurs, qui sans cela se contrariéraient toujours les uns les autres.

Il y a à St. Omer 74 bouches à feu en batteries, et 61 sur chantiers. On construit et on répare des affûts. On espère que tout sera en état dans un mois. Il n'y a que 31 milliers de poudre, et 300,000 cartouches. Il y a 1700 fusils, dont 1200 sont en réparations. Il y a une compagnie d'artillerie de 63 hommes, une de canonniers vétérans de 59 hommes. On a formé deux compagnies bourgeoises fortes de 195 hommes.

L'approvisionnement a été fixé à 4000 hommes et 150 chevaux pour six mois. Il n'y en a pas encore la moitié.

A l'exception des troupes d'artillerie désignées ci-dessus, il n'y a pas un seul homme dans la place, et on est obligé de faire faire la garde aux portes par la garde urbaine. M. le Général Darnaud, commandant supérieur, est un très bon officier; mais que peut-il faire seul dans une grande ville, dont l'esprit est extrêmement mauvais? Il est réellement urgent d'y envoyer promptement quelques troupes.

*Ardres.*

Cette petite place ne peut être considérée que comme un poste. Elle est à peu près à l'abri d'un coup de main.

Il y a 10 bouches à feu en batteries, et deux mortiers sans affûts; 2100 kilogrammes de poudre, 100,000 cartouches, 335 fusils de rempart, et 83 fusils étrangers. Il n'y a point de plomb. Il n'y a point de canonniers, ni militaires ni bourgeois. L'approvisionnement a été fixé à 1000 hommes et 25 chevaux pour trois mois; il est à peu-près complet. La garnison consiste en 35 hommes du 105e régiment, qui sont désignés pour la réforme. M. Hochet de la Terrie, chef de bataillon, est commandant supérieur.

*Calais.*

Les travaux de cette place sont entièrement suspendus, faute de fonds; et si on n'y envoie point de suite de l'argent, on n'y fera plus rien.

Il y a 96 bouches à feu en batteries, et 64 sur chantiers. On travaille à faire des plateformes pour mortiers. Il y a 25 milliers de poudre en baril, et 13 milliers en munitions confectionnées, dont 700,000 cartouches. Il y a 1100 fusils, dont moitié sont à réparer. Il y a une compagnie d'artillerie de 54 hommes, et une de canonniers vétérans de 36 hommes. On a formé deux compagnies bourgeoises, formant 240 hommes.

L'approvisionnement a été fixé à 3000 hommes et 100 chevaux pour trois mois. Il est à peu-près complet.

La garnison consiste en un bataillon de Seine-et-Oise, de 546 hommes, et le 1er régiment de marins, fort de 521 hommes, mais on ignore s'il est destiné à rester dans la place. M. le Général Charrières, commandant supérieur, est un homme extrêmement vigoureux, et bien ce qu'il faut pour commander à Calais; mais cette ville a besoin d'une bonne et forte garnison, car l'esprit y est bien mauvais, et on ne doit pas se dissimuler que ce serait un point extrêmement important pour les Anglais, et que s'ils parviennent à s'en emparer, en tendant les inondations de la mer, et étant appuyés par des vaisseaux, il serait presque impossible de les en chasser.

Depuis mon premier passage les autorités civiles ont été changées. On est très content du nouveau maire, M. Leveux.

*Gravelines.*

Cette place est en fort bon état, ainsi que je l'ai trouvée lors de mon premier passage, mais depuis cette époque on n'y a rien fait. Il n'y est pas encore arrivé un seul arbre, malgré toutes les demandes qui ont été faites.

Il y a 55 bouches à feu en batteries, et 16 en magasin. On a 10 milliers de poudre. Il y a 24 canonniers.

L'approvisionnement a été fixé à 1200 hommes et 100 chevaux pour six mois: à l'exception du grain il est très peu avancé.

Il n'y a pour toute garnison que 50 hommes d'un bataillon colonial, qu'on avoit eu ordre de dissoudre, mais qu'on a gardé, n'ayant pas autre chose. On est obligé de faire monter la garde par les bourgeois. L'esprit de la ville est passable, mais celui des campagnes est très mauvais; et dans l'état actuel les Anglais pourraient très aisément s'emparer de la place en faisant débarquer les équipages de quelques péniches. M. le Colonel Kail est commandant supérieur.

*Dunkerque.*

L'esprit de cette ville est toujours aussi mauvais, mais il est un peu comprimé par la présence des troupes, et par le caractère du gouverneur, M. le Général Leval. Il y a dans ce moment neuf bataillons de Gardes Nationales, un de la Seine Inférieure, un du Loiret, un d'Eure et Loir, un de Seine et Marne, deux de Pas de Calais, et trois de l'Aube. Leur situation est ci-jointe. Ceux de l'Aube sont excellents, et animés du meilleur esprit ; ceux du Pas de Calais sont mauvais : il en déserte beaucoup de monde. Les autres sont passables. D'après une lettre du Général Frère, reçue hier, on fait craindre au Général Leval qu'on ne lui retire plusieurs bataillons pour les envoyer dans d'autres places. Cela produirait le plus mauvais effet. Dans une ville aussi grande que Dunkerque, qui n'est à proprement parler qu'un camp retranché, et où on a toute la population contre soi, il faut nécessairement une très forte garnison. Je regarde celle qui s'y trouve maintenant comme n'étant même pas suffisante, et si on la diminue on ne pourra plus répondre de la place ni contre l'extérieur ni contre l'intérieur. On n'a pas encore pu parvenir à former la Garde Nationale. Je crois qu'on fera très bien de ne pas l'organiser, car je craindrais qu'elle ne fut plus nuisible qu'utile.

Il continue à arriver toujours ici des smogleurs Anglais, et nécessairement beaucoup viennent comme espions, et les habitans de la ville communiquent par eux avec l'ennemi. Il serait nécessaire de leur fermer le port. Le gouverneur a écrit plusieurs fois pour cet objet ; il n'a pas reçu de réponse.

Les travaux du génie vont bien ; le Colonel Pinot y met beaucoup d'activité. Les bois arrivent lentement : l'administration forestière et les ponts et chaussées y mettent beaucoup d'entraves.

Il y a à Dunkerque, tant dans la place que dans les forts, 134 bouches à feu en batteries. Il n'y a que 69 milliers de poudre. Il en faudrait encore 107 milliers.

L'approvisionnement a été fixé pour 4000 hommes et 300 chevaux pendant six mois. A l'exception du grain, il n'est pas très avancé ; mais en cas de siége on pourrait se procurer dans la place un grand nombre des objets nécessaires.

Voici, Sire, le résumé de ce que je crois le plus essentiel de dire à Votre Majesté.

Les départemens du Pas de Calais et du Nord continuent à avoir un esprit détestable et entièrement en opposition avec la chose actuelle. Cela mérite plus d'attention qu'on ne croit ; et si on les laisse sans troupes, il pourrait finir par s'y organiser une Vendée.

Il ne faut nullement compter sur les Gardes Nationales de ces deux départemens : elles sont plus nuisibles qu'utiles.

Il faut de suite former des garnisons à Aire, St. Omer, Gravelines, augmenter celle de Calais, et au moins laisser telle qu'elle est celle de Dunkerque.

Il faut dans chaque place compléter l'approvisionnement de poudre, qui est partout trop faible.

Il faut faire donner des ordres à l'administration forestière pour hâter l'arrivée des bois, au lieu de l'entraver comme elle le fait.

Sire, de votre Majesté Impériale

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur et fidèle sujet,

BARON DEJEAN.

ETAT SOMMAIRE de la Situation des Troupes à DUNKERQUE à l'Epoque du 10 Juin, 1815.

| Désignation des Corps. | Présens. | | Observations sur l'Habillement, Equipement, et Armement. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Officiers. | Troupe. | |
| 1er bat. de la Seine Inférieure | 19 | 529 | Ce bataillon a reçu à compte sur l'habillement, équipement, et armement, 462 capotes, 467 bonnets de police et schakos, 468 gibernes, 498 fusils. |
| 1er bat. du Loiret .. .. .. | 21 | 556 | Ce bataillon a reçu 145 schakos, 116 gibernes, et 556 fusils. |
| 3e bat. d'Eure et Loir .. .. | 20 | 448 | Ce bataillon a reçu 316 schakos, 100 bonnets de police, et 401 fusils. |
| 4e bat. de Seine et Marne .. | 20 | 647 | Ce bataillon a reçu 34 capotes, 76 schakos hors de service, 183 gibernes, 634 fusils. |
| 7e bat. du Pas de Calais .. | 22 | 410 | Ce bataillon a reçu 200 capotes, schakos, et bonnets de police, 200 gibernes, et 427 fusils. |
| 8e bat. du Pas de Calais .. | 21 | 376 | Ce bataillon a reçu 207 capotes et schakos, 245 bonnets de police, 205 gibernes et portes gibernes, 419 fusils. |
| 1er bat. de l'Aube .. .. .. | 22 | 671 | Ce bataillon a reçu 671 capotes et bonnets de police, et 671 fusils. |
| 2e bat. de l'Aube .. .. .. | 20 | 664 | Ce bataillon a reçu 664 capotes et bonnets de police, et 664 fusils. |
| 3e bat. de l'Aube .. .. .. | 5 | 222 | Ces compagnies ont reçu 222 capotes et bonnets de police, 222 fusils en mauvais état. |
| 3e comp. du 6e régiment d'artillerie à pied .. .. .. | 3 | 56 | |
| 15e comp. de Vétérans Canonniers .. .. .. .. | .. | 15 | |

IV.

*A Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.*

SIRE, Thionville, le 11 Juin, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Majesté de la situation de la place de Thionville.

*Travaux du Génie.*

Ils avancent avec rapidité, et dans 8 à 10 jours tout sera terminé et palissadé. Il n'y a point de personnel de cette arme. M. le chef de bataillon Lanternier, qui la commande, sollicite vivement pour qu'on mette à sa disposition un des cadres des compagnies du 2e régiment de Sapeurs, qui est à Metz, et il de-

mande en outre un détachement de douze Mineurs. Il désire aussi qu'il soit envoyé de la poudre de mines.

*Artillerie.*

Le nombre de bouches à feu qui existent dans la place est de 108 pièces sur affûts. 71 sont déjà en batterie, et les autres seront placées aussitôt que les travaux du génie seront achevés.

Il n'y a dans la place que 2 obusiers de 6 po., et il en faudroit au moins 6.

Il existe assez de projectiles pleins, mais il manqueroit 2000 obus de 6 po., si l'on accordoit les 4 obusiers qui y sont nécessaires. D'après l'approvisionnement des projectiles qui a été calculé à 500 coups par pièce, et celui de 2,100,000 cartouches d'infanterie, il faudroit 158,634 kilos. de poudre. Il n'en existe que 74,671 kilos., et le manquant est de 83,963 kilos.

Il y a 553,000 cartouches d'infanterie, et il en manque 1,547,000 pour compléter l'approvisionnement de 2,100,000, calculé à raison de 600 par homme pour la garnison de 3500 hommes.

Le personnel de cette arme se compose de deux compagnies d'artillerie de Garde Nationale de la Moselle et de la Meurthe, et d'un détachement de 29 hommes de la 20ème compagnie du 5e d'artillerie à pied. Le tout forme un total de 250 hommes, non compris 10 officiers.

Le Major Delemud, commandant l'artillerie, supplie avec instance pour qu'on ne lui enlève pas les 29 hommes d'artillerie de ligne, qui lui sont d'autant plus nécessaires qu'il se trouve dans ce nombre quatre artificiers, qui sont indispensables pour la place.

*Garnison.*

La garnison de la place se compose des 3e, 4e, 5e, et 12e bataillons de la Garde Nationale de la Moselle, et des 1er, 4e, et 6e bataillons de la Meurthe, formant ensemble un total de 3800 hommes. Il y a de plus 2 compagnies d'artillerie des mêmes départemens, et 29 canonniers de ligne.

Il y a pour l'armement de ces troupes 3725 fusils, dont 1500 sont à réparer. De ce nombre sont compris les fusils de rempart.

Le Général Hugo, qui se distingue par son dévouement et son énergie, désireroit beaucoup qu'il fut envoyé dans la place un détachement de troupes de ligne pour les postes avancés et les sorties.

En parlant de la garnison, je ne dois point omettre de faire part à votre Majesté qu'elle a dans 1500 douaniers employés dans cette direction un pareil nombre de sujets entièrement dévoués, et qui la serviront d'autant plus utilement qu'ils ont à leur tête le Directeur des Douanes Clerget, qui a su leur donner de l'élan et exciter leur enthousiasme.

L'esprit de la garnison est bon; peu ou point désertion, excepté dans les bataillons de la Moselle, qui sont trop près de leurs familles et de leur domicile.

*Approvisionnement.*

Les objets manquant sont le vin, l'eau de vie, le riz, et les légumes secs. Le riz manque entièrement; le vin les $\frac{2}{3}$; l'eau de vie la moitié. Cet approvisionnement a été calculé pour 3300 hommes, 150 chevaux, pendant 180 jours.

*Esprit Public.*

L'esprit public est bon, mais il y a très peu d'enthousiasme; cependant, point de doute que les habitans s'opposeront de toutes leurs forces à toute invasion.

Le sous-préfet, Rolly, a des moyens, mais point d'énergie ni de vigueur.

Le maire, Tailleur, ne paraît pas doué de grands moyens, mais il travaille beaucoup, et est animé de beaucoup de zèle et de dévouement pour le service de Votre Majesté.

L'organisation de la Garde Nationale va lentement, et il est absolument nécessaire que les autorités remuent l'esprit public, et lui donnent l'élan qui manque maintenant. Parmi les fonctionnaires publics beaucoup attendent les événemens, et ces gens-là, en remplissant mal leur devoir, sont aussi dangereux que les ennemis de Votre Majesté.

*2e Division de Gardes Nationales d'Elite, commandée par le Lieutenant-Général Rouyer.*

Cette division est cantonnée entre Metz et Thionville, et a son quartier-général à Richemont.

La force de cette division est de 5500 hommes. Elle a perdu 205 hommes, mais le Général Rouyer compte qu'il rentrera un grand nombre de ces déserteurs.

4000 hommes de cette division ont des capotes, mais on manque des gibernes, et il est important qu'il en soit fourni incessamment pour la conservation des munitions.

M. le Général Rouyer a appris que le préfet de la Meurthe avoit fait suspendre les confections d'habillement et d'équipement. Cette circonstance a produit un très mauvais effet sur l'esprit des Gardes Nationaux, qui sont persuadés qu'ils courent beaucoup plus de risques en ne portant pas d'uniforme. L'esprit de cette division est d'ailleurs excellent, et l'on peut compter sur eux.

L'artillerie est dans le meilleur état, et les hommes sont complètement habillés et équipés. Elle est servie par la 4e compagnie du 5e régiment d'artillerie à pied.

Les chevaux du train d'artillerie sont en bon état.

Il n'y a point eu de mouvemens parmi les troupes ennemies qui sont dans les environs de Luxembourg.

Daignez agréer, Sire, l'hommage du profond respect avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être de Votre Majesté

Le très humble, très obéissant, et fidèle sujet,

F. L. SAINTJACQUE,
Officier d'Ordonnance.

V.

*A Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.*

SIRE, Longwy, le 12 Juin, 1815.

Le rapport qui suit fera connoître à Votre Majesté la situation de la place de Longwy.

*Génie.*

La place est en état de défense, et peut soutenir un siége dans son état actuel, mais il faut encore dix jours pour terminer entièrement le palissadement et les améliorations qui ont été commencées.

Comme il n'y a point de personnel de cette arme, il seroit nécessaire d'y envoyer le cadre d'une compagnie de Sapeurs, qui seroit complétée par les Gardes Nationaux.

La place étant dans un parfait état de défense, le chef de bataillon du génie,

Girardin, commandant cette arme, et au zèle duquel on doit tout ce qui s'est fait dans Longwy, supplie Votre Majesté de l'employer à l'armée active.

*Artillerie.*

Il y a dans la place 62 bouches à feu sur affûts, qui suffisent pour son armement; mais dans ce nombre il n'existe que deux obusiers, tandis qu'il en faudroit au moins six à cause des ravins qui entourent la ville. Je crois qu'il est très important pour la défense de la place qu'on y envoye ces quatre obusiers.

Il y a suffisamment de poudre et de projectiles, ainsi que de cartouches d'infanterie. Cet approvisionnement est calculé à raison de 800 à 900 coups par pièce et 600 cartouches par homme, en supposant une garnison de 2000 hommes.

Le personnel de l'artillerie se compose de 28 canonniers de la 14e compagnie du 5e régiment d'artillerie à pied, de 120 hommes de la compagnie d'artillerie de la Garde Nationale d'élite, et de 63 hommes de la Garde Nationale Sédentaire.

*Garnison.*

La garnison se compose de deux bataillons de la Garde Nationale de la Moselle, d'un bataillon du département des Vosges, et d'un bataillon de militaires retraités, fort de 450 hommes. Le tout forme une force de près de 2000 hommes, quantité suffisante pour la défense de la place.

Ces bataillons sont animés d'un bon esprit; ils exercent et manœuvrent d'une manière satisfaisante.

Depuis deux jours 60 hommes des bataillons de la Moselle ont déserté; ce sont tous des hommes mariés, dont la rentrée est très incertaine.

Il y a en outre un détachement d'artillerie de ligne, une compagnie d'artillerie de la Garde Nationale active, et une de la Garde Nationale sédentaire, en tout 211 hommes.

*Approvisionnement.*

La place est approvisionnée dans ce moment pour plus de 4 mois, et sous peu elle le sera pour 6 mois.

*Esprit Public.*

L'esprit public de la ville et de l'arrondissement est très bon. Le sous-préfet et le maire de la ville sont animés du plus grand zèle, et ont tout le dévouement qui est nécessaire dans les circonstances actuelles. Il en est de même des autorités militaires, mais les forces physiques de M. le Colonel Arnaud de Gros, commandant la place, ne répondent pas à ses bonnes intentions. Cet officier supérieur pourroit être employé très utilement dans l'intérieur, mais il n'est point propre au poste qu'il occupe dans ce moment, et le conseil de défense désire qu'il soit remplacé.

Daignez agréer, Sire, l'hommage du profond respect avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être de Votre Majesté

Le très humble, très dévoué, et très fidèle sujet,

F. L. Saintjacque,
Officier d'Ordonnance.

VI.

RAPPORT fait à Sa Majesté l'EMPEREUR sur les Places d'AMIENS, PÉRONNE, HAM, ST. QUENTIN, et le Cours de la Somme depuis Amiens jusqu'à St. Quentin.

St. Quentin, ce 12 Juin, 1815.

*Amiens.*

La citadelle d'Amiens, située sur la rive droite de la Somme, en défend le passage. Les travaux de génie ont pour but de fermer la ville, et de la rattacher à la citadelle par une espèce de chemin couvert et des batteries. Des parapets, de fortes palissades, et de petits ouvrages devant les portes, mettront Amiens à l'abri d'une surprise; l'approche d'une partie de la ville sera même défendue par une inondation. La citadelle a des remparts tellement élevés et épais qu'elle est à l'abri d'un coup de main. On travaille à préparer des emplacemens pour l'artillerie. Tous les travaux d'Amiens sont fort bien entendus, mais ils sont à peine commencés, et vont lentement.

L'armement de la citadelle est incomplet: on attend du Havre 4 pièces et 2 obusiers. Il y a 10 pièces en batterie et 2 de campagne disponibles; chacune est approvisionnée à 200 coups. Dans le magasin 300,000 cartouches d'infanterie. Les approvisionnemens de vivres de siége ne sont pas faits; le préfet les promet chaque jour.

Le Colonel Sergent commande à Amiens.

La garnison d'Amiens doit se composer de 4 bataillons du Pas de Calais. Il n'est pas encore arrivé un homme. Les dépôts font le service de la place. Une compagnie de canonniers de la ville et 30 canonniers de ligne font celui de la citadelle.

L'esprit des habitans est généralement mauvais. Les commandans militaires accusent les autorités civiles de ne pas être dévoués à Votre Majesté.

*Péronne.*

Péronne est la place la plus forte de la ligne de la Somme. Une immense inondation garantit la moitié de son enceinte contre toute espèce d'entreprise; l'autre moitié offre encore beaucoup de difficultés. On se propose de défendre seulement l'enceinte, et d'abandonner les ouvrages extérieurs, parcequ'il faudroit une trop forte garnison pour les conserver tous. Les travaux qu'on fait servent à améliorer la place; mais telle qu'elle est on peut s'y défendre.

Les ouvrages de la fortification dans toutes les places de la Somme vont s'accélérer; le Général Gazan ayant obtenu du préfet des hommes de réquisition dans chaque commune du département.

La place de Péronne n'est pas armée. Il n'y a que quatre pièces de 4 sur affûts et une sans affût.

L'approvisionnement de munitions consiste en 310 coups pour les cinq pièces, 10,000 cartouches d'infanterie, et un millier de boulets de 16, qui ne pourront pas servir parceque les pièces qu'on envoit sont de 12. Son armement est fixé à 34 pièces.

Les approvisionnemens de vivres de siége ne sont pas encore commencés.

Le Major Petiet commande la place.

Sa garnison est fixée à 2500 hommes. Il n'y a actuellement que 293 hommes d'un bataillon de l'Oise, une compagnie de vétérans, une de canonniers de la ville, et 30 canonniers de ligne.

Il règne un bon esprit parmi les habitans.

*Ham.*

La place de Ham touche à la rive gauche de la Somme, et au bord droit du Canal de St. Quentin. Cette place étoit autrefois revêtu d'une enceinte, qui est en partie détruite. On y fait les travaux indispensables pour la fermer. On construit devant les portes des tambours et des parapets partout où l'ennemi pourroit s'introduire. Une partie des dehors peuvent être inondés. Ils sont d'ailleurs très marécageux.

La place est dominée par le château, qui depuis longtems n'étoit plus destiné à être défendu. Il est en mauvais état; cependant, les ouvrages qu'on y fait le mettront à même de résister longtems. Sa position n'est pas favorable pour défendre le passage de la Somme, parceque la ville se trouve entre la Somme et lui.

L'armement du château consiste en 2 pièces de 6, approvisionnées de 150 coups chacune. Il n'y a pas un fusil, pas une cartouche.

L'approvisionnement des vivres de siége est commencé.

Le chef de bataillon Balson commande la place. Sa garnison doit être d'un bataillon de Gardes Nationales, qui n'est pas encore arrivé. Il y a une compagnie de vétérans, une demie compagnie de canonniers de la ville, et 10 canonniers de ligne.

*St. Quentin.*

Les fortifications de St. Quentin ont été presqu'entièrement démolies par les habitans. On se sert de ce qui reste, et l'on travaille pour fermer la place. Partout où il n'y a plus de fortifications on plante de fortes palissades, avec un fossé devant. Aux portes il y aura des tambours en arbres jointifs. Les routes seront coupées, et les communications établies avec des ponts volants. Une petite inondation couvrira une partie de la ville; quelques marais et le canal en défendent l'approche d'un autre côté; et plus que tout cela, la bonne volonté qui anime les habitans empêchera l'ennemi d'y entrer.

Il n'y a pas de canon; quelques pièces seroient nécessaires. 500 fusils ont été distribués au bataillon de Gardes Nationales, qui s'est formé dans l'arrondissement, et qui reste pour la garnison de la place. Ce bataillon est de 620 hommes, qui tous ne sont pas armés. L'inconvénient d'avoir pour garnison un bataillon du pays est fort grand. Souvent à l'appel il manque les trois quarts des hommes, qui reviennent le lendemain. Une compagnie de 30 chasseurs à cheval, montés et équipés, s'est aussi formée dans la ville. Les habitans sont tous pleins de zèle pour le service de Votre Majesté. La ville a donné 20,000 fr. pour les travaux du génie.

Le chef de bataillon Alan commande la place.

*Cours de la Somme d'Amiens à St. Quentin.*

J'ai reconnu que les postes de Corbie et Bray ne sont pas assez avantageusement situés pour défendre le passage de la Somme. Entre Amiens et Péronne il y a seize ponts en bois. Plusieurs on servent qu'au passage des hommes; les voitures peuvent passer sur ceux de Camons, Dours, Feuilloy, Corbie, Sally, deux à Bray, Capy, Frise, Feuillère, Vaux, et Cléry. Il faudroit dès à présent couper ceux qui ne sont pas d'une nécessité absolue pour les communications, et dégrader les chaussées en terre qui y conduisaient. Les autres ponts auxquels aboutissent des chaussées pavées, tels que Dours, Corbie, Bray, et Capy, il faudroit les garder par de petites postes, qui se retrancheroient dans les villages et sur les chaussées, défendroient successivement les uns et les autres, et finiroient par se retirer et couper les ponts s'ils y étoient forcés. Entre Bray et

Péronne il y a trois gués formés par des barrages de moulins près le village de Feuillère. Il seroit difficile de les détruire : d'ailleurs ceux-là n'existant plus, il s'en formeroit d'autres. L'abord de ces gués est difficile et marécageux ; avec de très-petits postes on pourroit les défendre.

Entre Péronne et Ham il y a sept ponts en bois, qu'il faudroit couper. Ils sont à Brie, St. Christ, Epenancourt, Falay, Bethancourt, Voyenne, Offois. Ces ponts détruits on ne peut plus passer la Somme, à cause de la grande quantité d'étangs qu'on a formés sur ses bords. Les gués connus sont ceux de Voyenne. Il faudroit les défendre aussi comme ceux de Feuillère. Le canal qui va de Ham vers Péronne est un second obstacle. Enfin, entre Ham et St. Quentin la Somme est très fréquemment guéable ; mais le canal, plein d'eau, qui unit ces deux villes, ne peut être passé par l'ennemi qu'après qu'il y aura jeté des ponts. Il est indispensable de détruire tous ceux qui existent, et qui sont presque tous en maçonnerie.

*Résumé.*

Pour défendre autant que possible le passage de la Somme, il faut donc garder les places de St. Valery, Abbeville, Amiens, Péronne, Ham, et St. Quentin ; couper tous les ponts sur la Somme auxquels on arrive par des chaussées en terre, et dégrader ces chaussées ; garder par de petits postes retranchés les villages de Pont Rémy, Piquigny, Dours, Corbie, Bray, Capy, Feuillère, Voyenne, et Offois ; et si ces postes étoient forcés, ils couperoient les ponts préparés d'avance, et se retireroient sans danger par la rive gauche de la Somme, dans la place la plus voisine.

Je suis, avec le plus profond respect, Sire,

De Votre Majesté le très humble et très dévoué sujet,

CHIAPPE.

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*The Duc d'Otrante to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, 8 Juillet, 1815.

Par l'article 7 de la convention du 3 de ce mois, Votre Seigneurie s'est engagée à respecter et faire respecter par ses subordonnés les autorités alors existantes tant qu'elles subsisteraient.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Seigneurie que la commission de gouvernement a cessé d'exister ; que le gouvernement est entre les mains du Roi ; et de la prier de s'adresser dans tous ses rapports avec le gouvernement Français aux ministres respectifs de Sa Majesté, et de faire donner des ordres en conséquence.

Agréez, My Lord, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

LE DUC D'OTRANTE.

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*Prince de Talleyrand to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence que les autorités qui régirent la ville de Paris ayant été dissoutes, l'intention du Roi est de se

rendre à Paris aujourd'hui, et de partir à trois heures de St. Denis. Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire les dispositions que sa sagesse lui suggérera dans une circonstance que le changement subit des choses rend assez délicate.

Agréez, My Lord, l'assurance de l'attachement respectueux avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

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*Prince de Talleyrand to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Roi est entré aujourd'hui dans sa capitale.

Tous les vœux, toutes les espérances des bons habitans de cette grande cité se sont portés au devant de Sa Majesté, dont le plus beau cortège se composait des rangs fidèles de la garde nationale. Le Roi accepte la tâche noble à la fois et pénible qu'il a plu à la Providence de lui imposer : tous ses efforts tendront à adoucir les maux qu'il n'a pas été en son pouvoir de prévenir, et qu'il ne pourra pas encore réparer. Son amour inaltérable pour ses sujets soutiendra son courage ; une impulsion générale des esprits et des cœurs vers le retour de l'ordre et de l'union le secondera ; et la France, rendue à toutes ses vertus nationales, reparaîtra dignement dans la confédération générale de l'Europe.

Le Roi, My Lord, se trouve heureux d'avoir pour témoin de ses intentions et de ses sentimens celui dont l'admirable conduite et le caractère magnanime ont achevé en si peu de jours un si grand ouvrage. Elevé au dessus des rivalités nationales, vous vous êtes montré dans cette circonstance le représentant de l'humanité ; et l'Angleterre, votre belle patrie, n'a jamais paru plus grande qu'en votre personne. Au milieu des remercimens que vous décernent votre nation, la France et l'Europe, vous compterez aussi pour quelque chose la reconnaissance du Roi, sa confiance entière dans votre généreux concours, et la haute estime que Sa Majesté vous a vouée.

Agréez, je vous prie, My Lord, les expressions réitérées de la considération respectueuse avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, My Lord,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

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*Prince de Talleyrand to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence que les autorités qui régirent la ville de Paris lors de l'entrée des troupes Alliées n'existent plus, et que par conséquent l'article neuf de la convention qui leur promettait protection tant qu'elles existeraient n'a plus d'application.

Le Roi a nommé le Lieutenant-Général Dessolles pour commander la garde nationale de Paris, et le Lieutenant-Général Maison pour commander la première division militaire, dont le chef lieu est à Paris.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner des ordres pour que ces nouvelles autorités soient reconnues. Les personnes nommés par Sa Majesté ont l'ordre de prendre en toutes choses les directions de Votre Excellence, persuadée que c'est la meilleure manière d'assurer les intérêts de sa capitale.

Agréez, My Lord, l'attachement respectueux avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

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*Marshal Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 8th July, 1815.

I cannot refrain from offering you my sincere congratulations on the glorious and most decisive victory, both militarily and politically, which you gained on the 18th ult. I enter into your feelings, and join with you in the regret you must have in the loss of so many of your own family and those you have so long treated with friendship and affection. I very sincerely hope that Lord FitzRoy Somerset will recover from his very severe wound, and that for him you will not have more to lament than the severe loss he has had of his arm. I see I have a great many friends to lament. You must, I think, have had as hard work as you had ever witnessed; but our regret for valuable individuals is softened by the honourable cause in which they fell, and the glory of the day that marked it, and by the immensity of the object gained by that one victory. If I am not too sanguine, I think there never was any one victory from which so great a result was derived as will be from that of the 18th June.

I am here, as you may suspect from the various letters I have written to you. The governors have, however, at last taken so decisive a part that I can no longer bear it; and get rid of them, or out of their way, I must. You will have seen their determination to take no part whatever in the war: on the contrary, they have done everything in their power, and still continue to do, to destroy their army; and their object was to avoid entering into the war, should it even have continued. In short, all is put into the greatest confusion; and, previous to my coming from Caldas, I had determined, as a last effort, to go to the Brazils, to bring this question to a decision, and to be able to join you, either with or without the Portuguese army, the next campaign, should the war last so long. However, I believe you have settled that. Still the question remains the same in what respects me; and I propose to go to the Brazils, though my going is not so urgent, as the period of my return is not of so much consequence. I proposed to be back, in or out of the Portuguese service, in the beginning of December.

It is totally impossible to come to any arrangement or understanding with these people, as the Principal Souza completely governs the Regency, Dom Miguel siding with him, and his nephew the Marquess

of Borba; and they have fairly driven out the Marquess of Olhão and Ricardo Raymundo, who no longer frequent the Regency. I, of course, you will easily believe, have no influence whatever, and the army is going to ruin; for as nothing but fair words come from the Brazils, and no decision on any question, the Regents here act as they please; and they are most hostile to their own army, and are only more so to all that is British; but they have the comfort that in upsetting the latter they most completely succeed against the former. The cause of their showing themselves latterly so openly is the accounts that are come of the very bad flavour in which the British stand at the Rio, and the general discontent there against them; and they consider it a favourable opportunity to attempt their favourite object, the getting rid of British influence. They now go to it openly. They do not, however, like my going to the Rio, and will not, they tell me, sanction it, still less give me any conveyance: but I can stand the business here no longer; and I wish to bring the whole question to a decision one way or other, and to get rid of so disagreeable a concern, if it does not show a better promise for the future. I need scarcely wish you further success, as I believe you have finished the business; and I expect to hear every hour of your being in your hotel at Paris.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

BERESFORD.

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*M. de Breteuil to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Paris, ce 9 Juillet, 1815.

Votre Excellence ne permettra pas que l'un des plus fidèles sujets de Louis XVIII. soit victime des vexations que l'on se permet, lorsque l'on croit qu'elles ne parviendront pas aux oreilles de ceux qui n'ont pour guides que la justice.

Non seulement un château et ses dépendances que possède Madame la Comtesse de Breteuil, à 3 lieues de St. Quentin, vient d'être pillés, mais en outre, le Sieur Pawlawski, Commissaire des Guerres, a frappé sur la ville de St. Quentin une contribution de 1,200,000 francs, par suite de laquelle nous nous trouvons taxés pour 20,000 f., payables de suite, pour une seule maison que nous possédons à St. Quentin, qui ne rapporte rien, et qui tout au contraire est pleine de soldats.

La ville de St. Quentin a toujours eu un très mauvais esprit; mais ce ne peut être un motif pour ruiner ceux qui pensent bien, et qui comme moi ont donnés au Roi des preuves de dévouement.

J'ose donc, Monseigneur, réclamer votre justice. Veuillez ordonner que je ne sois pas compris dans la répartition d'une contribution qui n'a pu être imposée par des troupes Alliées que sous forme de punition, ce qui dès lors ne devrait pas atteindre ceux qui n'ont jamais déviés des bons principes, et sont toujours restés fidèles et dévoués au Roi.

Soyez assez bon, Monsieur le Duc, pour prendre une prompte décision,

et me la faire connaître, car je suis menacé d'avoir des garnisaires à 5 francs par heure et par homme.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec un très profond respect, Monseigneur,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

BRETEUIL,
Maître des Requêtes au Conseil d'Etat du Roi.

[MONSIEUR,

Je reçois votre lettre. Je n'ai pas de troupes à St. Quentin ; je n'en ai jamais eu dans cette ville. Je crois que vous devriez vous adresser au Maréchal Prince Blücher.

WELLINGTON.]

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*Cadet Chambine to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 9 Juillet, 1815.

Je me suis présenté à votre hôtel pour avoir l'honneur de voir Votre Excellence de la part de M. le Prince de Talleyrand et de M. le Duc de Duras, et pour vous prier, Monsieur le Duc, d'interposer votre crédit pour empêcher que les soldats Prussiens ne fissent sauter le pont de Jéna, auquel ils ont déjà fait pratiquer des fougades.

On pourrait donner à ce pont de Jéna le nom désiré de Louis XVIII., ce qui satisferait à la fois la nation Prussienne et la nation Française.

J'ai eu l'honneur de voir ce matin un de vos aides-de-camp, qui m'a promis de vous faire part de mes représentations.

Je vous supplie, Monsieur le Duc, de vouloir bien vous entendre avec le Général Blücher pour éviter un pareil malheur sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Louis XVIII.

Votre Excellence fera une chose utile aux arts et au commerce ; elle ajoutera à la générosité de la nation Anglaise.

Je suis, avec respect, Monsieur le Duc, votre très humble serviteur,

CADET CHAMBINE,
Chef de la Division des Ponts et Chaussées.

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*Prince Blücher to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

A St. Cloud, 9 Juillet, 1815.

La destruction du pont de Jéna est une affaire nationale. L'opinion publie s'est prononcée sur elle trop hautement pour que je pourrai ôser d'y contrevenir et de m'attirer les reproches de la nation et de l'armée. C'est pourquoi je ne peux pas changer ma résolution.*

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., pp. 549, 552 : letters dated 8th July (midnight), and 9th July, 1815.

Que Votre Altesse même n'a pas prononcé dans sa lettre très honorée le nom du pont de Jéna, vraisemblablement pour menager nous Prussiens, quoique elle doit connaître ce nom, pourrait déjà être une cause pour moi d'ordonner la destruction de ce pont.

Si dans la dernière guerre d'Amérique le général commandant les troupes Britanniques à Washington y aurait trouvé un pont nommé Saratoga, et ne l'aurait pas détruit, n'aurait-il pas mérité les reproches de la nation Britannique?

Je regarde la lettre de Votre Altesse comme le produit des importunités des autorités Françaises, et je suis convaincu qu'elle la regarde du même point de vue.

Mon empressement de venir au devant des souhaits de Votre Altesse comme fidèle compagnon d'armes vous est connu, et c'est pourquoi qu'elle me justifiera que je ne peux pas céder à cette demande des autorités Françaises.

Agréez, Monseigneur, l'assurance de mon fidèle dévouement.

BLÜCHER.

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*Prince de Talleyrand to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, ce 9 Juillet, 1815.

Le Roi a formé ce matin son ministère; et présumant qu'il peut être agréable à Votre Excellence d'en connaître la composition, attendu les rapports que les ministres peuvent être dans le cas d'avoir avec elle, j'ai l'honneur de lui en adresser la liste.

Agréez, My Lord, l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

[ENCLOSURE.]

LOUIS, par la grâce de Dieu, Roi de France et de Navarre.

Voulant donner à l'administration de notre royaume un caractère d'unité et de solidarité qui inspire à nos sujets une juste confiance, Nous avons ordonné et ordonnons ce qui suit:

Le Prince de Talleyrand, Pair de France, est nommé Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au département des Affaires Etrangères.

Le Baron Louis Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au département des Finances.

Le Duc d'Otrante Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au département de la Police Générale.

Le Baron Pasquier Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au département de la Justice, Garde des Sceaux.

Le Maréchal Gouvion St. Cyr, Pair de France, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au département de la Guerre.

Le Comte de Jaucourt, Pair de France, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au département de la Marine.

Le Duc de Richelieu, Pair de France, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au département de notre Maison.

Le portefeuille de l'Intérieur sera provisoirement confié au Ministre de la Justice.

Donné à Paris le 9me. jour du mois de Juillet, l'an de grâce mil huit cent quinze, de notre règne le vingt-unième.

(Signé) LOUIS.

Par le Roi :

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

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*The French Commissioners to the Allied Commissioners.*

Paris, le 9 Juillet, 1815.

Les Commissaires soussignés ont l'honneur de représenter à Messieurs les Commissaires Anglais et Prussien que les travaux qui se font dans ce moment au dernier pont de Paris du côté de Sèvres, et qui paraissent avoir pour but de faire sauter le pont, sont une violation à l'Article 11 de la convention du 3 Juillet, ainsi conçu : "Les propriétés publiques, à l'exception de celles qui ont rapport à la guerre, soit qu'elles appartiennent au gouvernement, soit qu'elles dépendent de l'autorité municipale, seront respectées, et les Puissances Alliées n'interviendront en aucune manière dans leur administration et dans leur gestion."

L'armée Française continue son mouvement sur la Loire, et aucunes dispositions hostiles ne peuvent nécessiter une mesure de ce genre. Ce pont est une propriété municipale, qui au terme de l'article cité doit être sous la protection des armées Alliées.

Les soussignés observent en outre que la navigation de la Seine ne serait plus libre, et que l'arrivage des subsistances éprouverait de grandes difficultés, si ce projet recevait son exécution.

Ils ont l'honneur de renouveler à Messieurs les Commissaires Anglais et Prussien l'assurance de leur haute considération.

Les Commissaires Français :

Le Maréchal de Camp GRUNDLER.
Le Lieut.-Général CORBINEAU.
Le Lieut.-Général CUIRREAU.

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*Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Dickson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Mons, 9th July, 1815, 6 P.M.

By my letter of the 7th I had the honour to report to your Grace the arrangements I had made in consequence of my interview with His Royal Highness Prince Augustus of Prussia; and yesterday morning the first division of ordnance, 38 pieces, arrived at the camp before Maubeuge, with two days' firing. To-morrow the remaining 22 pieces will be taken to the same place, with a similar quantity of ammunition; and I have made such

arrangements for bringing forward the supplies as will, I trust, secure the operation going on properly, and without the smallest interruption.

The Prussians opened the trenches last night against a redoubt within the intrenched camp, situated at a little distance from the river, which it is necessary to take ere the main attack on the left bank of the Sambre can be pushed forward. They were not discovered in their work, which was very successful, having been pushed to within 36 toises of the redoubt, with good cover, ere morning, according to the commanding engineer's report, which I saw. Six of our 5½-inch mortars have been placed in battery against the redoubt to protect the work during the day, and the engineer expects to make himself master of the redoubt this night.

These mortars made very good practice; but I must add that the shells were fixed, and tables for the practice furnished, by my people to the Prussian Artillery.

I was at His Royal Highness's head-quarters both yesterday and to-day, and I intend to visit the siege every day, the better to provide for all that may be wanted.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
Your Grace's most obedient servant,
A. DICKSON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 10th July, 1815.

Lord Arthur Hill informed me that the army under your Grace's command lived upon requisitions. Since that I have been informed that we pay for everything; and the instruction which goes by the messenger is written under this uncertainty.

The feeling for France to pay for the maintenance of our army is so very general and so strong in this country that we could not continue to act upon a different principle, especially as the prospect of our being able soon to withdraw our troops does not appear, at present, very promising.

If you have adopted any measures for this purpose already, the instruction goes for nothing; but if you have not done so, you will do your best to satisfy the country in this particular. If I were to give an opinion, I should think a composition would be the most advisable way. The French government need not be called upon to make an immediate advance, if such were thought very embarrassing to them at present; and the amount of our whole demand might thus become a subject of subsequent arrangement. I am aware that this would still expose us to all the severe loss upon the exchange which must follow our paying in the first instance for everything; but it is possible that we had better expose ourselves to this than think of doing anything which might add to the difficulties of the King's situation. You ought, however, to be aware that the people here will be very dissatisfied if, in some way or other, the burden is not made to fall upon France.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,
BATHURST.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, War Department, London, 10th July, 1815.

It being deemed highly expedient that the maintenance of the force under your Grace's command should be at the expense of France during the time that circumstances shall render their continuance in that country necessary, I am commanded by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to direct your Grace's attention to the adoption of such measures for that purpose as may most effectually obtain the object required, in the manner most conducive to the discipline of the army under your command and the least oppressive to the inhabitants.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 10th July, 1815.

I received this morning your letters of the 7th, and Sir Charles Stuart's of the 6th.

The account of the state of Paris, and, indeed, of a large part of the interior of France, appears to us by no means favourable. Though the general disposition may be in favour of the King, in many quarters it is quite clear that he has no party to support him, and that the most able and active members of the community are against him.

It will be a Herculean task, I think, to give any real strength to his government. For what is a King unsupported by opinion, by an army, or by a strong national party? I am glad, upon the whole, that he has determined to employ Fouché. He may betray him; but he may likewise feel it his best interest to save him. In a desperate state of affairs we must try desperate remedies. The more I consider the present internal state of France, and the little chance there is of security to Europe from the character and strength of the French government, the more I am satisfied that we must look for security in frontier, and in really weakening the power of France. This opinion is rapidly gaining ground in this country; and I think, even if Bonaparte were dead, there would now be considerable disappointment at any peace which left France as she was by the Treaty of Paris, or even as she was before the Revolution.

Bathurst will write to-night to the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the system for supplying our army. It is quite right to prevent plunder of every description, but France must bear a part of the expenses of the war. This was, indeed, understood when we agreed to the Convention at Ghent, and we shall not be able to justify the system which we adopted last year, either to our own country or to our Allies. We do not exactly know what course in this respect the Duke of Wellington has been following, for we have received no information in regard to it since he entered France. I trust, however, that you will be able to satisfy him that the

French nation ought to bear a part of the expense; and we should take care that this part of the charge is defrayed before we leave the country, for otherwise we shall certainly gain nothing.

We have our Council to-morrow for the Prince Regent's Speech, and Parliament will be prorogued on Wednesday.

I conclude we shall hear by the next courier whether the Allied Sovereigns intend coming to Paris, or what place is fixed for the general discussions on political affairs.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*Count Pozzo di Borgo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 10 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence que Sa Majesté l'Empereur mon auguste maître se rendra ce soir à Bondy, et qu'il entrera demain dans Paris.

D'après ces instructions qui me sont parvenues de la part du Chef de l'Etat Major Impérial, Sa Majesté désirerait trouver des escortes de cavalerie Anglaise depuis Meaux jusqu'à Bondy, et une garde à Bondy même. Je serais infiniment reconnaissant à Votre Excellence si elle voulait bien donner ses ordres en conséquence.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération, My Lord,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

POZZO DI BORGO.

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*Prince Frederic of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Curgies, le 11 Juillet, 1815.

Votre Seigneurie me permettra, j'espère, de vous offrir mes félicitations bien sincères sur votre arrivée à Paris à la tête de votre armée victorieuse, et cela avec cette vitesse vraiment sans exemple.

Ici tout est encore dans le même état, le Général Rey n'ayant voulu entendre aucune proposition quelconque de la part de qui elle vienne aussi. Depuis que le Général Lauriston l'a sommée le 29 Juin, comme j'eu l'honneur de faire rapport à Votre Seigneurie, il y a encore été deux fois ici un Colonel Baron de Tschudy, envoyé du Général Bourmont pour sommer Valenciennes au nom du Roi de France; mais il a été tout aussi peu reçu que plusieurs que j'y avais envoyés. Cependant j'ai trouvés des moyens pour les informer de tout ce que je savais de nouveau; et presque journellement il vient des déserteurs de la garde nationale, et d'après ce qu'ils dirent il paraît aussi en effet qu'ils sont instruit de l'état des choses. La garnison paraît être forte de 4000 hommes, dont la plus grande partie gardes nationales. Les bourgeois de la ville sont très bien disposés, et le 2 de ce mois il y a eu une petite révolte; mais ils sont contenus par des canons

chargés à mitrailles qui sont braqués à différens endroits en ville. J'ai fait un feu assez vif sur Valenciennes; et presque tous les jours le feu a pris dans la ville; quelques petits magasins à foin et à paille ont brûlés. L'ennemi répondit très vivement, mais nous fit peu de mal; car je n'ai eu qu'une douzaine d'hommes tués et blessés, et quelques chevaux. Le 3 et le 4 ils ont mit le feu par des hobus depuis la ville au village de Marlis, qui forme un des faubourgs de Valenciennes, dans lequel j'avais un poste avancé, et qui masquait une de mes batteries: il est entièrement réduit en cendres. Le 4 je reçus une lettre du Général Fagel dans laquelle il me pria au nom du Roi de France de cesser le feu sur Valenciennes, ce que je fis aussitôt; et j'envoyais encore quelqu'un pour sommer la ville, mais qui fut tout aussi peu reçu que les précédens. L'ennemi ne discontinua pas le feu contre nous, et le redoubla au contraire; et je crois qu'ils ont crus que nous ouvrions la tranchée. Le 8 enfin je fis tirer 100 coups de canon en réjouissance de l'entrée à Paris. Sur cela j'envoyais encore une fois un officier, qu'on n'accepta pas; mais il sortait un officier avec une garde, et à ceux-ci il dit tout ce qu'il y avait de nouveau, et que ces 100 coups de canon avaient été en réjouissance pour l'entrée à Paris, et qu'on leur proposait d'envoyer un officier pour s'en assurer, et que si le soir ils n'avaient envoyés personne on commenceraient le feu avec double vigueur. En effet, j'avais fait placer pendant ces jours quelques pièces de 16 et quelques mortiers de plus en batterie. Le soir à 10 heures je fis commencer le feu à boulets rouges, bombes et hobuses, comme ils n'avaient envoyés personne. Ce feu a eu un assez bon effet; et depuis ce tems ils sont tranquilles, et je ne fais aussi tirer que quand eux le font; d'ailleurs j'ai à présent 22 pièces en batterie. La dernière et avant-dernière nuit nous avons eu de fausses alertes, les avant-postes croyant remarquer que l'enhemi fit des sorties.

Le Commandant de Condé ne veut aussi rien entendre et accepter, et est absolument un enragé. Il a fait une chose affreuse, dont je dois faire rapport à Votre Seigneurie: c'est-à-dire, il a fait fusiller un Colonel Gordon, qui lui était envoyé par le Général Bourmont pour sommer la place au nom du Roi Louis XVIII. Il est vrai que ce Colonel s'y est mal pris, ayant renvoyé le trompette qu'on lui avait donné avec, et s'étant comme cela approché seul de la forteresse, où l'on l'a fait entrer, et a été fusillé, sans même tenir un conseil de guerre. La garnison de Condé fait quelquefois de petites sorties, mais qui sont de peu de conséquence, et toutefois immédiatement repoussées. Le Général Anthing, qui cerne une partie de Valenciennes et observe Condé, étant un peu foible vers le dernier côté, j'avais engagé le Général Behr, Commandant de Mons, comme cette place n'a rien à craindre à présent, de détacher quelques troupes de sa garnison pour aider à observer Condé, ce qu'il a aussi fait; et j'espère que cela aura l'approbation de Votre Seigneurie; car je l'ai fait sans votre connaissance, mais il me paraît que cela ne pourrait avoir de mauvaises suites.

Le Roi m'a chargé de demander à Votre Seigneurie si vous pourriez le trouver bon que je renforce ce corps-ci en tirant à moi une partie des garnisons de Mons, Tournay, et Gand, pour bloquer alors aussi entièrement Condé, et peut-être bombarder cette place avec des moyens que je tirerai des trois places fortes nommées ci-dessus. Peut-être que cette mesure serait inutile actuellement, vus les circonstances. J'ai aussi encore un bataillon appartenant à la première division à Audenarde, que j'ai envoyé là sur l'ordre de

Lord Hill, au moment que nous marchions de Sotteghem vers Enghien et Hall; et je voudrais bien pouvoir le retirer à moi si Votre Seigneurie le permettait. Tous les ordres que Votre Seigneurie m'a envoyés pour les places fortes dans les Pays-Bas ont été expédiées.

Le Prince Auguste de Prusse fait de fortes réquisitions dans l'arrondissement d'Avesnes, auquel appartiennent des cantons que j'occupe avec mes troupes, tels que Quesnoy, etc., et qui sont aussi battues de réquisitions par l'intendant d'Avesnes, au nom des Prussiens; mais j'ai retenues ces réquisitions, puisqu'il me paraît bien naturel que ces cantons fournissent aux troupes qui les occupent, et non aux autres. Mais j'ai à chaque moment sur cela des petites querelles avec le Prince Auguste, qui prétend que le Maréchal Blücher lui a ordonné de faire ces réquisitions dans ces contrées d'après un arrangement fait entre l'armée de Votre Seigneurie et l'armée Prussienne. Mais moi je tiens toujours ferme, disant qu'il me paraît que c'est bien naturel que mes troupes soient pourvues des cantons qu'ils occupent. Cependant il me serait bien agréable si Votre Seigneurie voudrait me faire connaître ses intentions sur ce point. Les Prussiens se font aussi donner contre des quittances l'argent qui se trouve dans les caisses publiques pour compte de gouvernement. On m'a fait la proposition de prendre cette même mesure pour payer de cela la solde des troupes, et de le faire vite, parceque d'ailleurs les Prussiens le feraient aussi dans ces cantons-ci: cependant je n'ai voulu faire ceci sans savoir sur cela les intentions de Votre Seigneurie, et si de pareilles démarches correspondent avec celles que l'armée sous vos ordres prend là où elle se trouve.

Dans ce moment je reçois un rapport que cette nuit il y a eu une petite affaire d'avant-postes sous les murs de Valenciennes, entre la ville et Marlis, où nous avons eu un homme de blessé par une balle de mitraille.

J'ai un petit corps de cavalerie posté à Denaing, qui observe Bouchain, pousse ses patrouilles jusque vers Douai, et éclaire tout le pays entre ces deux places et vers Cambrai.

Je demande pardon à Votre Seigneurie de l'incommoder par cette longue lettre tandis qu'elle a tant de choses importantes à faire; mais j'ai cru de mon devoir de vous faire ce rapport.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la plus haute considération, My Lord Duc,

De Votre Seigneurie le très humble et obéissant serviteur,

FRÉDÉRIC, PRINCE DES PAYS-BAS.

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*Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 13 Juillet, 1815.

J'aurai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner des ordres afin que la gendarmerie qui se trouve dans les départemens occupés maintenant par les troupes de Sa Majesté Britannique, ne soit ni enlevée, ni démontée, ni désarmée. C'est dans ce moment la seule force publique qui soit à la disposition entière du gouvernement, et il est essentielle qu'elle soit conservée; car c'est par elle seule que l'on peut assurer l'exécution des réquisitions qui sont faites pour la subsistance et les fourrages des troupes Alliées

qui sont envoyées dans l'intérieur des départemens. Veuillez donc bien, Monsieur le Duc, en prévenir Messieurs les Généraux Anglais, cette mesure étant nécessaire pour entretenir et maintenir la bonne intelligence entre les sujets du Roi mon maître et ses Alliés.

J'ai donné des ordres pour que la gendarmerie qui avait été forcée de suivre l'armée au delà de la Loire retourna à son poste. J'ai l'honneur d'en informer Votre Excellence en la priant de vouloir bien en prévenir qui de droit, afin qu'on laisse passer cette troupe, qui se rendra dans les brigades qui lui sont assignées dans les départemens.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Guerre,

COMTE GOUVION ST. CYR.

[Compliments; et le Duc peut lui assurer que la gendarmerie n'a été ni désarmée ni démontée.

WELLINGTON.]

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 14th July, 1815.

As far as we have gone, I believe the principles laid down by the government have been strictly adhered to, and we shall keep them in view; but there will be much circumspection required to combine what we may owe ourselves with what is due to the King, whose authority will not be respected by the nation if we degrade it. Yesterday a letter from Lord Bathurst called my attention confidentially to the propriety of combining the Duke in the negotiations here. We had already made considerable progress in settling the course of business here. There never can be a difficulty, I trust, between the Duke and myself; and I hope it will not be less amicably arranged with the other Powers. I send you a copy of my answer to Lord Bathurst, which will give you the outline of what has been agreed upon, which I hope you will approve.

I send you a letter just received from the Duke.* You will see his opinion of the necessity of restraining our Allies. He already begins to feel embarrassment in his supplies from the irregularity of the other armies. Whilst he was moving on his own line, the army was supplied with as much facility, giving only receipts, as if they had paid ready money. The principle of free subsistence has been invariably adhered to since the British army entered France.

I have a letter from my father to-day, who apprises me that he has written to you to accept the honour for which you proposed so kindly to recommend him. As I see no adequate motive for making any alteration in my present designation or nominal rank, I should be much obliged to

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* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 558: letter of 14th July, 1815.

you to confine the creation to the title of Londonderry, leaving the Viscountcy as the second title as at present.

Believe me, dear Liverpool, ever sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

I hope you will contrive to pay us a visit here.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.*

DEAR LORD BATHURST, Paris, 14th July, 1815.

I hope we are going on as you wish us; but you must give us time, and we must do nothing to destroy the King's authority, which it is our first object to create. The question of securities is not the first in order: it is, in fact, the last. It is enough now to keep the principle sufficiently open: nothing can be decided at present upon its application; nor can it indeed be properly judged of till the moment arrives for retiring our armies. It is upon the then state of things this question can alone be negotiated; and so long as we have five or six hundred thousand men in France, we need not be afraid of not having sufficient means to enforce any proposition which we should deem it wise or becoming to propose for the King's adoption.

I have the satisfaction of assuring you that the Duke and I are perfectly agreed upon the mode in which the business shall be conducted here. Whilst the war is going on, notwithstanding our amicable relations with the *de jure* Sovereign, we are of opinion that the military and political authorities should be kept quite distinct, and the armies, with their chiefs, be controlled by their respective cabinets. This control is very unimportant as applied to the Duke and his army, which is a model of conduct as well as bravery, and is considered as such by all the Powers; but it is everything to restrain others. When the moment comes that we may venture to proceed to frame that act, which, if not an actual treaty of peace with Louis XVIII., with whom we are already both at peace and, to a certain degree, in alliance, is to regulate the future relations of France with Europe, the Duke has consented that his name should be included with mine in the full powers for signing, in conjunction with the Allies, this settlement. This will produce no confusion in our ordinary relations, and it will afford me not only the most important assistance, but I shall feel it an additional honour to have my name associated with the Duke's in winding up what he has achieved. In the mean time I shall not be deprived of the aid of his important assistance, as the Duke will assist at our conferences whilst his military duties do not call him from Paris.

Believe me to be, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

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*The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 14th July, 1815.

I congratulate you most heartily upon your splendid victory, which has gratified every body here more than I could have believed. We have

since heard of your entrance into Paris; and I am longing most anxiously for a letter from you. We know not what the public feeling may be at Paris; for all our accounts come from Bayonne and Bordeaux, and of course they state nothing favourable to the King.

The British government has consented to subsidize 20,000 Spaniards, who, I believe, will enter France immediately. Accounts have been received here of Marseilles, Cette, Avignon, Toulouse, and other towns having hoisted the white flag. The intelligence was so favourable that I began to doubt whether it would be desirable to send the Spanish troops into France; but as the intelligence from Paris is not of the same description, I thought it better to let the troops march, as well to try the public feeling in the southern and western provinces as because they might in some degree occupy the attention of the French force assembling upon the Loire. I have, however, written to the Duke of Angoulême, who is still in Spain, to ask his opinion with respect to the propriety of their entering France.

I am going home immediately upon leave of absence, and am only now waiting to see if it will soon be possible to go through France, which I shall prefer to going by Coruña. If this is not decided in ten days, I shall be off. Do you know whether there are to be any diplomatic changes?

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

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*Captain Frederick L. Maitland to J. W. Croker, Esq.*

SIR, H. M. S. *Bellerophon*, Basque Roads, 14th July, 1815.

For the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty I have to acquaint you that the Count Las Cases and General Allemand this day came on board H. M. ship under my command with a proposal for me to receive on board Napoleon Bonaparte, for the purpose of throwing himself on the generosity of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

Conceiving myself authorised by their Lordships' secret order, I have acceded to the proposal, and he is to embark on board this ship to-morrow morning. That no misunderstanding might arise, I have explicitly and clearly explained to the Count Las Cases that I have no authority whatever for granting terms of any sort, but that all I can do is to convey him and his suite to England, to be received in such a manner as His Royal Highness may deem expedient.

At the request of Napoleon Bonaparte, and that their Lordships may be in possession of the transaction at as early a period as possible, I despatch the *Slaney*, with General Gourgaud, his aide-de-camp, directing her to put into the nearest port, and forward this despatch by the First Lieutenant; and shall, in compliance with their Lordships' orders, proceed to Torbay, there to await such directions as the Admiralty may think proper to give me.

Enclosed I transmit a copy of the letter with which General Gourgaud is charged from Napoleon Bonaparte to His Royal Highness the Prince

Regent; and request you will acquaint their Lordships that the General informs me he is entrusted with further particulars which he is anxious to communicate to His Royal Highness.

I am, Sir, &c.,

FREDERICK L. MAITLAND.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Napoleon to the Prince Regent.*

ALTESSE ROYALE,— Rochefort, ce 13 Juillet, 1815.

En butte aux factions qui divisent mon pays et à l'inimitié des plus grandes Puissances de l'Europe, j'ai terminé ma carrière politique, et je viens, comme Thémistocle, m'asseoir sur le foyer du peuple Britannique. Je me mets sous la protection de ses lois, que je réclame de votre Altesse Royale, comme du plus puissant, du plus constant, et du plus généreux de mes ennemis.

NAPOLÉON.

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*The Prince de Condé to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Palais de Bourbon, le 15 Juillet, 1815.

Le Prince de Condé présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Duc de Wellington. Il le prie de réduire, s'il est possible, le nombre des militaires Anglais qui sont en quartier à Chantilly, et celui de leurs chevaux, porté jusqu'à neuf cents.

Le Prince de Condé s'était proposé d'aller rétablir sa santé dans cette campagne, qui lui appartient; mais l'état actuel des logemens de guerre ne lui laisse pas la facilité d'exécuter ce projet.

Il a déjà reçu de Monsieur le Duc de Wellington assez de marques d'obligeance pour ne pas insister si sa demande souffroit des difficultés. Il est persuadé que Monsieur le Duc de Wellington éprouveroit lui-même de la peine de ne pas se trouver en mesure de les faire lever, et la privation qui seroit alors imposée au Prince de Condé ne pourrait affaiblir ni sa reconnaissance ni les sentimens de haute considération dont il est pénétré pour M. le Duc de Wellington.

LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

[Let an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department be sent down to Chantilly to see if it is possible to keep the cavalry depôt there and to make the room necessary for the Prince de Condé and his family.

WELLINGTON.]

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 15th July, 1815.

We have had a long sitting this day on the several despatches which have been received from you since your arrival at Paris.

It is satisfactory to find that the Emperor of Russia is in so reasonable a state of mind, and so likely to cooperate with us cordially in the great objects we must all equally have in view.

The more we consider the various circumstances which have attended the return of the King of France to Paris, the more strongly are we impressed with the opinion of the impossibility of giving that strength to his government which can afford any real security to the Allies or to Europe. The forbearance manifested at the present moment can be considered in no other light than as weakness, and not mercy; and though the King may follow the advice which has been given to him by disbanding his army, I am afraid that very little dependence will be to be placed on any army formed out of the same materials: and if an army could even be otherwise constituted, what dangers might not be apprehended from 40,000 officers unemployed, men of desperate fortunes, and possessing a large proportion of the talents and energy of the country! A severe example made of the conspirators who brought back Bonaparte could alone have any effect in counteracting these dangers; but this is not now to be expected, and perhaps would have been very difficult, considering the share in the government which the King has been obliged to assign to some of the members of the Jacobin party.

In this state of things we must look to other measures for our security, and we shall never be forgiven if we leave France without securing a sufficient frontier for the protection of the adjoining countries. The prevailing idea in this country is that we are fairly entitled to avail ourselves of the present moment to take back from France the principal conquests of Louis XIV. It is argued with much force that France never will forgive the humiliation which she has already received; that she will take the first convenient opportunity of endeavouring to redeem her military glory; and that it is our duty therefore to take advantage of the present moment to prevent the evil consequences which may even flow from the greatness of our own success. It might have been not unwise last year to try the effect of a more magnanimous policy; but in the result of that we have been completely disappointed, and we owe it to ourselves now to provide in the best manner we can for our own security.

These, I can assure you, are the generally received opinions in this country at present, and I think it is material that you should sound our Allies with respect to them.

If, however, you should find them not disposed to proceed to such lengths, we think we are completely entitled to an arrangement upon the principle which I am about to state; and indeed their interests will be found as much involved in it as our own.

Supposing Bonaparte to be dead, or a prisoner in the hands of the Allies, we might be induced to waive any permanent cession of territory on the part of France upon the following conditions:—

1st. That a considerable part of the northern barrier of France, including

Lille, should be placed in the hands of the Allied Powers until such time as a sufficient barrier for the Netherlands was completed, and the expense thereof defrayed by the French government. The period of seven or five years, as the Duke of Wellington might judge necessary, might be definitively fixed as the time for completing this barrier, and the sum of five millions as the expense.

The French fortresses to be restored at the time fixed, and as soon after as the money should be paid, to Louis XVIII., or to his descendants in line direct, but to no other sovereign of France.

2ndly. The same principle to be applied, in such degree as the Allies may think proper, to the eastern frontier of France.

If Bonaparte should escape, and should therefore be alive and at liberty, the French frontier above alluded to should be retained during his life, as well as during the time necessary for erecting the new frontier, and for the liquidation of the expense of it.

These propositions appear to be founded upon a principle perfectly equitable. The French nation is at the mercy of the Allies in consequence of a war occasioned by their violation of the most sacred treaties. The Allies are fully entitled under those circumstances to indemnity and security. We might not unreasonably claim a security that was permanent, such as France has so frequently enforced, under similar circumstances; but we are contented to limit the extent of the security to the necessity of the case: and having delivered the adjoining territories from invasion, and being in occupation of a considerable part of the kingdom of France, we feel that we have a right to retain such part of the kingdom of France as is necessary for the security of the adjoining countries until that security shall have been provided for in another manner, and the enemy has defrayed the expense of it.

This arrangement would have the advantage likewise of affording some security to the government of the King of France, as the restoration of the fortresses would be limited to him and to his legitimate successors.

I sincerely believe that this proposition would be far short of the expectations of the country at this time; but I state it to you on the part of the Cabinet as one which we are convinced under all the circumstances is reasonable in itself, as the lowest point to which we ought to go, and as one to which we have little doubt, after all the expense they have incurred, and the dangers to which they may hereafter be exposed, our Allies may be reconciled.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 15th July, 1815.

Amongst other matters, I have been particularly directed by the Prince Regent to call your attention to the collections of statues and pictures of which the French plundered Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries. Whatever it may be fitting to do with them, whether to restore them to

the countries from which they have been taken, or to divide them amongst the Allies, the Allied armies have the same title to them by conquest as that by which the French authorities acquired them. It is most desirable, in point of policy, to remove them if possible from France, as whilst in that country they must necessarily have the effect of keeping up the remembrance of their former conquests, and of cherishing the military spirit and vanity of the nation.

I recommend this matter likewise to your serious and early consideration. You will let me know at a proper time what appear to be the sentiments of the other Allied Sovereigns with regard to it.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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[915.] G. O. Paris, 18th July, 1815.

8. The Field Marshal has been informed that the officers of the army force the doorkeepers of the theatres to open the doors of the private boxes, which is contrary to rule, and to the good order so creditable to the British army, of which it is the example.

9. The boxes of the theatres are in general private property, and nobody can enter those thus situated, or those which are hired, excepting the proprietors, or those who have hired them.

10. The Field Marshal is convinced that it is only necessary to give this information to the officers of the army to induce them to refrain from conduct which cannot be justified.

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, War Department, London, 18th July, 1815.

I do myself the honour to acquaint your Grace that a fleet has arrived at Portsmouth, bringing from Quebec thirteen battalions of infantry and two companies of artillery. Seven of the battalions (as specified in the margin) * are very strong, and have been ordered to proceed immediately to Ostend in order to reinforce your Grace's army. Major-General Sir T. Brisbane accompanies these troops; and in case you consider it desirable that another General officer should join this division immediately, I have to request that your Grace will either give your orders to some General officer

* 1st batt. Royal Scots, 1st batt. 3rd Regiment, 1st batt. 5th, 3rd batt. 27th, 1st batt. 39th, 1st batt. 41st, 1st batt. 88th.

already upon the Staff of your army, or inform me if you wish that one or more should be sent from this country to Ostend.

Two companies of artillery are with the seven battalions; and two more companies are expected by a second fleet from Canada, which is likely to arrive in the course of a fortnight. This second fleet will bring home more infantry; and I am to request your Grace would let me know if it is your desire that more of these troops should be sent over to join your army.

I have further to acquaint your Grace that a brigade of heavy cavalry (composed of the regiments named in the margin)* is in course of embarkation, and may be expected to be assembled at Ostend in a few days. Your Grace will be pleased to send such orders as you may see fit for their further proceeding.

In consideration of the increasing numbers of your Grace's army, I have desired that a proportion of Commissariat officers who have returned from Canada should proceed forthwith to the Low Countries.

I have the honour to be
Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

[Let the Quartermaster-General order these regiments to march as soon as equipped: short marches at first, and very early in the morning.
WELLINGTON.]

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*The Rev. John Norcross to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Rectory House, Framlingham, Suffolk, 19th July, 1815.

If your Grace will do me the honour to nominate any one of my brave countrymen who fought under your Grace's banners in the late tremendous but glorious conflict, I shall have great pleasure in settling upon him for the continuance of my life an annuity of ten pounds, which I humbly request your Grace will permit to be entitled "The Wellington Pension."

On the receipt of your Grace's commands, the first payment shall be immediately advanced; and in future the pension, with your Grace's approbation, shall be paid on each anniversary of the memorable 18th of June.

I will not add more than that, with the exalted sentiments which I entertain of your Grace's transcendent merits, and appreciating as I do your splendid and unparalleled achievements, were my means commensurate to my inclinations, I would cheerfully centuple the sum I have mentioned.

I remain, my Lord Duke, your devoted and faithful humble servant,
JOHN NORCROSS.†

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* 2nd Dragoon Guards, 3rd ditto, 3rd Dragoons.

† For the replies to this letter see *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii, pp. 578, 617; letters dated 31st July and 24th Aug., 1815.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, War Department, London, 19th July, 1815.

As the state of affairs in France may now admit of a regular intercourse between Paris and the South-Eastern coasts, I have addressed instructions to Lieutenant-General M'Farlane and to Major-General Sir Hudson Lowe, by which the British forces serving at Genoa and on the coasts of France will be placed under your command.

Your Grace has been already informed of the instructions under which Sir Hudson Lowe proceeded to Genoa. The restoration of His Sicilian Majesty to the throne of Naples has since allowed of Lieutenant-General M'Farlane's evacuating Sicily altogether, and proceeding with the whole of his division to the Genoese territory. I apprehend therefore that the British force in that quarter will consist of the troops named in the margin.*

In addition to the troops, there will be (whenever Gaeta shall have surrendered) a very respectable flotilla, which has belonged to our army employed in the defence of Sicily, and which is now to be collected at Genoa.

I enclose for your Grace's information copies and extracts of all the material correspondence which has taken place latterly between this Department and the British commanders in the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to be
Your Grace's most obedient servant,
BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Earl Bathurst to Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane.*

SIR, War Department, 1st June, 1815.

Upon the 13th ultimo I addressed a despatch to Lord William Bentinck by which his Lordship was instructed to authorise you (in the event of the re-establishment of Ferdinand IV. upon the throne of Naples) to withdraw the whole of the British forces from Sicily, and to proceed with these troops to

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* *Division acting under Major-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Artillery, Sappers, &c. | 330 |
| 2nd batt. 14th Regiment | 1000 |
| Italian Levy | 2770 |
| Total | 4100 |

*Division acting under Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Artillery, &c. | 250 |
| Brunswick Hussars | 200 |
| 31st Foot | 1000 |
| 6th batt. German Legion | 700 |
| 7th " | 750 |
| Total | 2900 |

Genoa. Previously to the date of the above order, and at a time when the rapid successes of the Austrian arms could not be anticipated, I had tendered to Major-General Sir Hudson Lowe the command of His Majesty's troops in Genoa, which garrison would have been constituted an independent command. The subsequent instruction (by which your arrival at Genoa becomes no improbable event) alters very materially the situation to which Sir Hudson Lowe has been appointed; and as I am willing to hope that whenever the Allied armies shall have been collected and have begun their operations against France, a small garrison would be sufficient for the security of Genoa, I look forward to the opportunity of employing 4000 or 5000 men in conjunction with Lord Exmouth's fleet as likely to operate a valuable diversion in favour of the Austrian and Piedmontese forces, and to revive the hopes and support the efforts of the Royalist forces in the South of France.

Under this expectation I have addressed to Sir Hudson Lowe an instruction of which a copy is enclosed for your information (together with the copy of an explanatory letter with regard to the maritime expedition which I caused to be written by my Under-Secretary). You will observe that I look to the possibility of employing the whole of the troops which are now at Genoa in operations upon the French coast as soon as your division shall have arrived and have taken their places in Genoa; and I rely with confidence upon your zeal and judgment to give every assistance and facility to Lord Exmouth and Major-General Sir Hudson Lowe, so that the views of His Majesty's government may be realized and the cause of the Allies may be usefully assisted by the British forces in the Mediterranean.

I have, &c.,

BATHURST.

II.

*Extract of a letter from Earl Bathurst to Major-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe, dated 29th May, 1815.*

"It is, however, to be observed that in case Murat should be completely subdued, and His Sicilian Majesty be reinstated upon the throne of Naples, the whole of the British forces which are now in Sicily will be withdrawn from that island, and will proceed under the command of Lieutenant-General M'Farlane to Genoa. The arrival of the Lieutenant-General would of course supersede your command in that city; but under such circumstances it is probable that a portion of our troops might be employed advantageously in co-operation with Lord Exmouth's fleet upon the southern coasts of France, and in this case it is my intention that you should have the command of the troops which may be thus detached upon active service.

"With a view to this eventual employment, it appears advisable that you should cause the troops now at Genoa (which are understood to consist of the troops named in the margin)* to be provided with everything that may be necessary for a coast expedition.

"Authority has been already given to augment the Italian levy as far as 5000 men. It is not to exceed that number, and only the most unexceptionable recruits are to be received.

"In case the King of Sardinia should offer to place any of his troops under your command, you are at liberty to accept His Majesty's offer; with the understanding that you are to be mainly guided by your instructions from England, with the leading principles of which no partial considerations must be allowed to interfere.

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* Detachment of Artillery; 14th Regiment, 2nd battalion; Italian Levy.

"You are authorized to draw a table allowance at the rate of 1500*l.* per annum, in order to cover the extraordinary expenses to which your situation will expose you, from this date up to the day on which you may be superseded in your command at Genoa."

III.

*Major-Gen. Sir H. Bunbury to Major-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Downing Street, 29th May, 1815.

With reference to that part of Lord Bathurst's instructions to you bearing this date which relates to the eventual employment of a corps under your command in the South of France, I am desired by Lord Bathurst to give you the following more particular explanation. It is not his Lordship's intention that any regular operation upon land should be undertaken by our trifling force; and you will decline all invitations which may be made to you by the Austrian or Piedmontese commanders to induce you to cross the Alps or to march in conjunction with their forces into France: at the same time you will declare the utmost readiness to favour their movements as much as may be in your power by demonstrations from the sea. You will take the earliest opportunity of communicating with Lord Exmouth upon this subject, and of combining in perfect concordance with his Lordship's views any operation of this nature which circumstances may admit. Lord Exmouth has a considerable quantity of arms at his disposal; and in case the Royalist party should again show itself in the South of France (and more particularly at Marseilles or Toulon), no application of your force is likely to be so useful and effectual as the proceeding under countenance of a formidable squadron to support the exertions which the Royalists might make, and to secure for them the possession of some important place upon the coast. In this way your corps would be of infinitely more use to the Austrian army than by engaging so weak a column in the regular operations of the campaign. It might even become desirable to spare some troops for the immediate support of Marseilles or Toulon, if either should declare against Bonaparte, without waiting for General M'Farlane's arrival, provided that all things were going on well in Italy, and that the King of Sardinia would consent to a diminution of the British force in Genoa.

In answer to the question you have put regarding Corsica, I am desired to say that all your views must be directed towards France, and all your means applied to the main object. If a party should declare itself in Corsica in favour of Louis XVIII., maritime support may be afforded them, and some arms may be sent, if they can be spared without prejudice to the Royalists in the South of France. There is no intention to form fresh corps of Corsicans for His Majesty's service, and the concerns of that island must be regarded (for the present at least) as a very secondary consideration.

I have, &c.,

H. BUNBURY.

IV.

*Earl Bathurst to Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane.*

SIR, Downing Street, 7th June, 1815.

As the glorious termination of the war in Italy will at once set at liberty that part of the Austrian army which had marched on Naples, and as there

is reason to believe that a disposition exists to direct a part of it to co-operate with Lord Exmouth in a conjoint expedition in the South of France in support of the Royalists in that part of France, you are hereby instructed to place the detachment of troops under the command of Major-General Sir Hudson Lowe, under the command of the Austrian General to whom may be given the command of this expedition (provided his rank in the army be superior to that of Sir Hudson Lowe, or that he be senior to the Major-General in a corresponding rank), reserving, however, to Sir Hudson Lowe the internal economy and discipline of his own troops; with which reserve in the instruction on the part of your government you will not fail to make the Austrian commander immediately acquainted.

You will understand this instruction to be confined to a conjoint expedition by sea and land.

I am, &c.,

BATHURST.

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*Lieut.-Col. Sir H. Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, St. Cloud, 19th July, 1815.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter written to Lord Stewart; and though it is of no particular interest, I have thought your Lordship might wish to hear upon my arrival the feeling and sentiments of this head-quarters on the points treated of.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

H. HARDINGE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Lieut.-Col. Sir H. Hardinge to Lieut.-Gen. Lord Stewart.*

MY LORD, St. Cloud, 19th July, 1815, 5 P.M.

In observance of your Lordship's instructions, I shall not fail in endeavouring to procure information of the conduct and discipline of the Prussian troops towards the inhabitants of the country, as connected with the interests of the common cause.

Since my arrival my means of information having been confined to Prussian accounts of their own proceedings, I cannot pretend with any fairness to enter into this question, having hitherto had no opportunity of inquiry through French authorities. It may, however, be worth while to give your Lordship the Prussian sentiments on this and other points. I am assured that the discipline of the troops has much improved since they have been stationary, and that in most instances safeguards have been given where required: at the same time it is acknowledged that the conduct of their soldiery towards the inhabitants, when contrasted with that of the British troops, must bear a disadvantageous comparison, resulting from the difference of system in feeding the troops.

Besides, the Prussian corps have received no pay for three months, which of course much prejudices the best attempts to enforce discipline.

On the general question of the propriety of their measures everything is justified on the plea of retaliation, and which they assert the French who

were in Prussia will admit to be moderate retaliation. The policy of immediate requisitions and strong measures at the outset they state to be necessary, because the experience of last year proved that there was no confidence to be placed in the promises of the new government when once re-established; that in every instance of promised restitution the faith of the French government was evaded or broken. With much admiration and cordiality towards the British during military operations, they are not well pleased that every French protest against Prussian measures finds advocates and protectors against them among the British authorities.

I ought to mention as being the impression of this head-quarters, and of the General officers of the army, the dislike with which the re-establishment of the Bourbons is viewed, and which it is here considered was precipitated by Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington; and the alleged motive is the opinion of the impossibility of keeping the family on the throne: on this point, but particularly on British interference in moderating Prussian measures, there is a good deal of growing dissatisfaction.

The four corps in Flanders at the opening of the campaign last month were 112,000 men, and about 82,000 were the numbers that reached Paris; the operations having caused a deficiency of 30,000, of which it is calculated the dead and men permanently unserviceable from wounds may amount to 12,000 or 14,000.

Every corps has been ordered to enter France excepting the 5th, which remains on the Saxon frontier. The new levies in the districts lately ceded to Prussia are also to complete their organisation in France, and in the course of a month it is estimated the Prussian forces within the French frontier will exceed 200,000 men.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient servant,
H. HARDINGE.

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*Princess Pauline de la Lippe to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Detmold, 19 Juillet, 1815.

Votre Altesse permet que j'accrédite auprès d'elle mon Chargé d'Affaires, le Conseiller d'Etat de Treitlinger, et la supplie de lui accorder audience. Je l'ai chargé d'offrir à Votre Altesse les expressions de ma haute admiration, et de la considération inviolable et très distinguée avec laquelle je ne cesserai d'être

De Votre Altesse la très humble et très obéissante servante,
PAULINE, PRINCESSE RÉGENTE DE LA LIPPE,
Née Princesse d'Anhalt.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, La Haye, le 19 Juillet, 1815.

Les négociations qui vont avoir lieu à Paris pour rasseoir l'Europe si essentiellement ébranlée par le séjour que Bonaparte a fait en France et

le mouvement qu'il y a imprimé aux esprits sont importantes sous un point de vue général; mais elles le seront surtout pour le Royaume des Pays Bas. Je ne puis remettre ses intérêts les plus chers en de meilleures mains qu'en celles qui l'ont déjà protégé avec tant de gloire et délivré de son plus formidable ennemi.

Personne d'ailleurs ne peut mieux juger que vous de la nécessité de renforcer notre frontière. Nous ne pouvons nous exposer à des batailles annuelles aux portes de Bruxelles. Nous le pouvons d'autant moins que les armées Anglaises et Prussiennes ne seront pas toujours, comme à Waterloo, prêtes à nous soutenir contre une nation cinq fois plus nombreuse que nous. Cette supériorité numérique n'est pas même le plus grand inconvénient. La turbulence du caractère Français et la versatilité ordinaire de son gouvernement ne permettent jamais de compter sur un système pacifique momentanément adopté, et nous aurons à nous en plaindre plus d'une fois avant que la construction des forteresses, qui, au prix d'une dépense énorme, doivent couvrir nos frontières, puisse être achevée. Rien n'est plus délicat que la question des sûretés et des garanties que l'Europe sera dans le cas de demander pour que la France ne l'oblige pas périodiquement à courir aux armes et à se livrer toute entière pour la liberté commune. Je suis très éloigné d'anticiper sur ce qui sera jugé convenable à cet égard par les Puissances prédominantes; mais en attendant, et non obstant une grande confiance dans leurs décisions, le sentiment de ses propres besoins se fait impérieusement sentir. C'est ce qui m'engage à vous en écrire, et à vous demander une communication confidentielle de vos idées. Faut-il travailler à faire ajouter à mes états quelques districts et places fortes appartenant actuellement à la France? Faut-il au moins les mettre en dépôt jusqu'à ce que les Pays-Bas soyent pourvus d'une enceinte de fer pareille à celle dont Louis XIV. et le grand Vauban ont entouré la France? Par l'établissement de ce nouveau royaume l'Europe a voulu créer un boulevard respectable de la sûreté générale. La Grande Bretagne, d'où cette idée est originaire, est aujourd'hui dans la plus belle position pour perfectionner l'ouvrage qu'elle a si heureusement commencé. Sans parler de l'épargne des millions qu'exigerait la construction des forteresses, elle réaliserait une grande vue politique en prenant sur son ancien ennemi les moyens d'assurer l'existence de son allié naturel, et en mettant celui-ci en état de concourir puissamment à la garantie dont les Rois de France auront encore longtems besoin contre leurs propres sujets. Je recommande ces importantes questions à votre attention particulière et à ces sentimens de bienveillance que mon pays peut vous avoir inspirés; et je vous renouvelle avec bien du plaisir, my Lord Duc, l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle je suis,

My Lord Duc, votre affectionné,

GUILLAUME.

*Colonel Jones to Colonel Hervey.*

SIR, Bruxelles, 20th July, 1815.

I have the honour to inform you that on the 19th General Cambronne and three other superior officers were brought to my house by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Niel Campbell, by the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Waters, Assistant Adjutant-General, who was to send me directions about them. Receiving none, and not knowing where to place them but among the wounded in the church of St. Augustine, I directed them to be conveyed to the military prison of the town until further orders were given for their being sent to Ostend. At various periods I was also necessitated to send to the same prison several other officers. I beg leave to represent to you that there was no other *locale* of security where they could be placed; and as I had previously sent to this prison all persons who required to be kept in custody, I felt myself justified in sending there these French prisoners of war.

I should wish to receive your instructions relative to the payment of the enclosed demand, which is correct as to numbers and dates.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
LESLIE GROVE JONES.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Ville de Bruxelles, Prison Militaire, Porte de Gallc.

| Noms. | Grades. | Date. Entrée. | Date. Sortie. | Nombre des Jours. | Taxe par Jour. F. C. | Sommes à payer. F. C. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Juin. | | | | |
| Cambronne | Général | 19 | 22 | 4 | 5 50 | 22 50 |
| Jounin | Colonel | 19 | 22 | 4 | 2 12 | 16 48 |
| Roul | ,, | 19 | 22 | 4 | 4 12 | 16 48 |
| Duchesne | Capitaine | 19 | 22 | 4 | 2 74 | 10 96 |
| Carré | Colonel | | 21 | 2 | 4 12 | 8 24 |
| | | Juillet. | | | | |
| Sevin | Capitaine | 27 | 3 | 7 | 2 74 | 19 12 |
| De le Cour | ,, | 27 | 3 | 7 | 2 74 | 19 12 |
| | | Juillet. | | | | |
| Broz | ,, | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 74 | 10 96 |
| Thomas | ,, | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 74 | 8 22 |
| Bommont | ,, | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 74 | 8 22 |
| Alphonse | Lieutenant | 10 | 13 | 4 | 1 87 | 9 48 |
| | | | | | | 149 78 |

(Etoit signé) SACUSIN, Gardien.

*The Deputy Judge Advocate-General to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord Duke, Head Quarters, Paris, 20th July, 1815.

I am emboldened to trust your Grace may not deem me premature in taking the liberty of submitting to your consideration the mortification I have experienced in understanding that I am forthwith to be superseded from England in the situation of Deputy Judge Advocate to the army under your Grace's command.

From the length of time I have discharged these duties, from the flattering approbation I have been occasionally favoured with from your Grace in the performance of them, together with the apparently unqualified satisfaction my efforts in the discharge of them have received from home, I cannot but feel myself called upon most respectfully to lay before your Grace the peculiar hardship of my case.

Should your Grace be pleased to conceive that the duties I am entrusted with are too important for me to discharge, I cannot but bow with most perfect resignation to your Grace's pleasure; but I firmly trust, on the other hand, that, should your Grace be pleased still to consider me equal to the charge which I have so long executed, the very peculiar hardship of injuring my future prospects by superseding me in the duties of my office at so late a period of the campaign may appear to your Grace to call for and to merit your Grace's intercession, and to prevent or ameliorate what I cannot avoid feeling both a hardship and an injustice to me.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,
Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,
S. A. Goodman.

[Adverting to the opinions given by the Attorney and Solicitor General upon the construction of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, and to the attention of the public having been drawn in a great degree of late years to this subject, it has long been my opinion that it was necessary that the officer at the head of a large army should have the assistance of a legal gentleman to be Judge Advocate-General, and I have more than once given that opinion to government.

With every respect for your talents, I do not consider you better qualified than I am to form a judgment upon these subjects without such assistance; and no later than yesterday an instance occurred of the want of it.

I am upon all occasions ready to attend to the fair claims of officers; but I cannot admit that I have been guilty of injustice to you, or of inflicting a hardship upon you, because I have called upon government to make provision for the performance of the

duties of a legal office by appointing to fill it a gentleman of the learned profession.

WELLINGTON.]

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*The Marquess of Anglesey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Surbiton, 20th July, 1815.

I sadly fear that my poor Staff have lost a good chance by my not being with you at Paris. I am assured that all Lord Hill's aides-de-camp have got a step. Now if I had known that this could be done by application, I should most conscientiously have recommended them to your notice, for a braver or more zealous and intelligent set of officers were never collected.

I now, therefore, throw myself upon your kindness. I do not wish to urge anything for which there is not a precedent; but if it comes within your rules, I shall be greatly obliged by your taking care of them. I hope you are quite well after all your exertions. I am going on as well as possible, and have the honour to remain, my dear Lord Duke,

Your faithful humble servant,

ANGLESEY.

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*Private Intelligence from Paris.*

18th July, 1815.

In consequence of the disturbances which took place on the Boulevard and in the suburbs last evening and the evening before, an order has been published to the National Guard respecting the *red pinks*. They are to invite people wearing them to take them off, but arrest them if they comply not.

The red pinks, the chosen sign of anti-Bourbonism, had caused the displeasure of some of the Gardes du Corps. Words ensued; a mob collected of 2000 to 3000 people; blows followed; the Gardes du Corps were beat off and pursued.

Numerous gendarmes are placed at the corners of the streets, and are patrolling through them.

The King will go to Péronne to avoid being present in town when a number of arrestations and prosecutions are to take place.

The idea is confirmed of Fouché's secret plans and his predilection for another than the present chief.

19th July.

A review of Austrian troops took place on the Boulevard. The three Sovereigns were followed by a numerous staff. Among them scampered Monsieur; hardly noticed by the Sovereigns, not at all by the people. He looked most mean.

In the Faubourg St. Marceau a large hog was paraded through the streets, with a white bunch of flowers under his tail and two similar ones fastened to the ears. At each winehouse they stopped, drinking to the health of "the gros Papa!"

The Allied Sovereigns have asked three guarantees: for Napoleon, for the army, for the future tranquillity. The first is taken, the second ordered to disband. To insure tranquillity, the Sovereigns have handed in a list of 200 persons to be banished France, some others only the capital. The Council has reduced this list to 80. Whether that will be satisfactory is not yet known. Alexander seems particularly anxious and impatient respecting this point.

It is said that two of the Sovereigns have demanded the death of Napoleon, Francis his imprisonment for life.

A general contribution has been demanded by the Allied Powers of 800 millions of francs, payable in four annual instalments. 200,000 men, foreign troops, are to remain in the country at fixed stations. The French standing army is not to exceed one regiment for each department, or 80,000 men.

Six thousand English troops have landed at Marseilles. The port of Bordeaux is blockaded. General Clausel refuses taking down the national colours and obeying Louis XVIII., saying the latter is not free.

A caricature is made of the King. He is walking between a Prussian and an English soldier, up to his middle in blood.

The King's prefects have returned from several departments, the military governors declaring they could administer the departments themselves.

A new commotion took place respecting the red pinks this night, which was appeased with difficulty.

The three Sovereigns have appointed a censor for each newspaper published in this city.

The last number of the 'Nain Jaune' contains many pithy anecdotes. A sunburnt officer of the King's suite was asked, "Vous étiez sans doute de l'affaire de Mont St. Jean?"—"Non, Monsieur; mais j'étois de celle de Montensier" (the breaking of the windows and looking-glasses some nights ago at the coffeehouse "Montensier," formerly a noted meeting place of Bonapartist officers, now shut up). The transmission of the 'Nain Jaune' into the departments has been stopped.

20th July.

So empty is the treasury, and so poor the King, that he sent to-day for 100,000 francs which were at the police, in the chest where the licence-money is put, paid by the women of the town.

General Le Courbe has capitulated with the Austrian General Colloredo, who invested Béfort with 40,000 men. Le Courbe marches out with his 12,000 men, and "tout le matériel," to join the army of the Loire.

Lefebvre Desnouettes, of that army, has attacked and beaten a corps of Austrians.

The army under Eckmühl (Davoust), which, it is now clear, has not submitted and will not submit, is at present 120,000 men strong. It will be 200,000 strong after the corps of Rapp, Albufera, Le Courbe, and Clausel have joined. A sanguinary partisan war has broken out in Alsace,

Champagne, and Lorraine. The peasantry in the South show the same disposition.

The Gardes du Corps are no longer permitted to wear uniform, except when on duty, in order to prevent them being thrashed (as they have been recently) by the populace.

The King's people, in public places, as the Palais Royal, affect to lay about them with "la canaille" and other pre-revolution, aristocratic expressions. They talk of vengeance and extermination: they preach the doctrine which Ferdinand of Spain puts in practice.

The 'Nain Jaune' has been stopped to-day. The 'Indépendant' will be stopped to-morrow. These two papers were the only ones written with some freedom and in the spirit of opposition.

It is affirmed by people who ought to know, that the Emperor of Austria has not yet been at the Tuileries.

All the Prussians speak with a loud and marked contempt of the Bourbons.

The Duke of Berri, at a late audience, grossly insulted General Rogniat (a meritorious officer du Génie), which the latter relates with humour and acrimony in all public places.

Every means are taken to get a new House of Representatives in the King's interest. The colléges électoraux d'arrondissement, which is the popular branch, can only choose the candidates. From these the deputies are chosen by the colléges électoraux de départemens, an aristocratic body, and of which the King appoints the president. No deputy can be chosen who pays not 1000 francs taxes, which requires an income of about 6000 francs. In many departments there will be but very few individuals duly qualified.

Great efforts are made to get Lafayette in again. Some say he is one of the proscribed, as well as Masséna.

Marshal Masséna, who is most avaricious and has many British officers quartered upon him at his country house, complains most bitterly of the expense he is put to. They eat and drink, he says, enormously. In coffee alone it takes six cups each per day.

The British in general acquire the greatest credit for their most exemplary conduct.

The beautiful Sèvres china at the manufactory is sold off at mean prices for Prussian account.

The revolting occurrences and shocking scenes in the country round, caused by the disorderly conduct of many of the troops, are multiplying constantly. Every indignity witnessed or experienced is blended with the Bourbons. They themselves feel most uneasy. Talleyrand shakes his head, and says "Ça va mal!"

The Vendeans join with the army on the Loire. A Spanish, national war may break out, and cause France to become the grave of the Germans and Russians, &c., now in the country.

Yet nothing would now be so easy as to restore, in a durable manner, order and tranquillity to France. The steps pursued are not the right ones. That they are wrong is not perceived because the secret aim is wrong. Faults in the life, as the poet says, breed errors in the brain, &c. What would have been the true conduct will be discovered and acknowledged too late.

*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 21st July, 1815.

I have this moment received your letter of the 17th inst., with the intelligence of the surrender of Bonaparte, of which I wish you joy.

When your letter was written you had evidently not received mine of the 15th, which will explain to you the sentiments of government on the subject of his detention.

We are all decidedly of opinion that it would not answer to confine him in this country. Very nice legal questions might arise upon the subject, which would be particularly embarrassing. But, independent of these considerations, you know enough of the feelings of people in this country not to doubt that he would become an object of curiosity immediately, and possibly of compassion in the course of a few months; and the very circumstance of his being here, or indeed anywhere in Europe, would contribute to keep up a certain degree of ferment in France.

Since I wrote to you last Lord Melville and myself have conversed with Mr. Barrow on the subject, and he decidedly recommends St. Helena as the place in the world the best calculated for the confinement of such a person.

There is a very fine citadel there, in which he might reside; the situation is particularly healthy; there is only one place in the circuit of the island where ships can anchor, and we have the power of excluding neutral vessels altogether if we should think it necessary.

At such a distance and in such a place all intrigues would be impossible; and being withdrawn so far from the European world, he would very soon be forgotten.

We are very much disinclined to the appointment of commissaries on the part of the other Powers. Such an arrangement might be unobjectionable for a few months; but when several persons of this description got together in a place in which they had nothing to do, and of which they would very soon be tired, they would be very likely to quarrel amongst themselves, and the existence of any disputes amongst them might seriously embarrass the safe custody of the prisoner.

To conclude, we wish that the King of France would hang or shoot Bonaparte as the best termination of the business; but if this is impracticable, and the Allies are desirous that we should have the custody of him, it is not unreasonable that we should be allowed to judge of the means by which that custody can be made effectual.

LIVERPOOL.

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*Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Dickson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Marolles, near Landrecy, 21st July, 1815, 6 P.M.

I have the pleasure to inform your Grace that Landrecy capitulated this day, on terms pretty much the same as those of Maubeuge.

The trenches were opened the night of the 19th on the left bank of the Sambre against La Basse Ville, and pushed forward to within 120 yards

of the ravelin of the hornwork; this operation being intended as a false attack, and also to establish batteries for enfilading and taking the enemy's works in reverse.

These batteries were constructed and armed last night with ten 24-pounders and eleven mortars, and the trenches were opened at the same time on the side of the town towards Avesnes for the real attack, and advanced with such activity that before morning a parallel was established from 1200 to 1400 yards in length, and not more than 300 yards distant from the salient angles of the outworks.

The twenty-one pieces in the false attack opened about 10 o'clock this morning, and after firing half an hour the enemy beat the chamade.

Prince Augustus of Prussia informs me that he has proposed in the strongest manner to undertake the siege of Philippeville instead of Givet. I have therefore agreed with His Royal Highness to move my equipments upon Philippeville, which being in the direction of Givet, and at no great distance from it, I shall be ready to act against either place as it may be determined.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

Your Grace's most obedient servant,

A. DICKSON.

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*Prince Augustus of Prussia to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Marolles, devant Landrecy, le 21 Juillet, 1815.

Je m'empresse d'annoncer à Votre Altesse que je viens de prendre la forteresse de Landrecy après un siége de deux jours, commencé à 300 pas du corps de la place. L'artillerie, les munitions, et les vivres seront remises à nos troupes, qui occupent déjà ce soir une porte de la forteresse. Comme c'est à Votre Altesse que je dois les moyens d'assiéger cette place, vous voudrez bien permettre que je vous en témoigne de nouveau ma vive reconnoissance.

Je suis, avec la plus haute estime et un bien sincère dévouement, de Votre Altesse

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

AUGUSTE, PRINCE DE PRUSSE.

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*Baron de Vitrolles à M. le Général Chef d'Etat Major de S.E. Lord Duc de Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Paris, le 21 Juillet, 1815.

Depuis plusieurs jours le service des télégraphes est interrompu parceque les troupes Alliées ont brûlé les deux premières stations après Paris sur la route de Lyon, et que dans quelques autres parties de la France elles renversent ces machines et s'opposent au rétablissement de celles endommagés.

Dans les circonstances actuelles l'utilité des télégraphes est plus grande

que jamais, puisqu'ils offrent au Roi le moyen le plus prompt de faire parvenir les ordres et les nouvelles qui doivent et peuvent arrêter le sang qui coule peut être encore dans quelques parties de la France, et qu'ils présentent aux Généraux étrangers eux-mêmes la facilité de transmettre à leurs corps, avec la plus grande célérité possible, les ordres que quelques cas imprévus nécessiteroient de donner rapidement.

Je pense donc, Monsieur le Général, qu'il suffit de fixer là dessus l'attention de S.E. Lord Duc de Wellington pour qu'il s'empresse de donner des ordres afin que sès troupes ne s'opposent point au rétablissement des télégraphes détruits, et qu'elles protègent ceux qui existent encore intacts.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Général, avec les sentimens de la considération la plus distinguée, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE BARON DE VITROLLES.

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G. O. Paris, 22nd July, 1815. [916.]

1. His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia will see the Allied army, under the command of the Field Marshal, on Monday at 10 o'clock, and it must be formed for the purpose in the following order:

2. The British cavalry, with the artillery attached, with their right to the Champs Elysées, and their left to the Barrière de l'Etoile.

3. The infantry, with the artillery attached, with their right to the triumphal arch, their left to the bridge of Neuilly. The reserve artillery will be on the left of the infantry.

4. The cavalry attached to the corps of infantry to be formed in line behind the infantry: that is, Colonel Estorff's brigade behind the 2nd corps; the cavalry of the Netherlands behind the 1st corps; and the Brunswick cavalry behind the 5th and 6th divisions.

5. The British cavalry will be formed in two lines, and the artillery attached to the cavalry on the right of each brigade. The guns will be formed as close to each other as possible; and the ammunition waggons immediately in their rear, and close.

6. The infantry will be formed in close columns of battalions, with their right in front, with the artillery attached to each division formed at close order on its right. The ammunition carriages, including those for musket ammunition, must be formed likewise at close order, immediately in rear of those of the artillery.

7. The bands and drums of each battalion are to be formed at close order on the right of each battalion.

8. The 2nd corps must be on the right; then the 1st corps, and then the 5th division, the 6th division, Colonel Greville's brigade, and infantry of the Brunswick corps.

9. The reserve artillery will likewise be formed at close order.

10. On the arrival of the Emperor in front of the cavalry, swords will be drawn, and the general salute will be given in the usual manner. Swords and arms are to be carried when His Imperial Majesty will pass down the line; the bands, &c., playing "God save the King," or the national tune of the nation the troops belong to.

11. The troops will afterwards march past in quick time, and nobody salute excepting the General, Field, and Staff officers.

12. Those battalions which are of the strength of 350 men, and under that number, are to form for this occasion 6 divisions; those battalions of the strength from 350 men to 550 are to form for this occasion 8 divisions; those of above 550 will form 10 divisions.

13. Those battalions of above 900 men will form 20 divisions.

14. The British cavalry are to march to their ground by the bridge of Neuilly, and will keep the pavement on their right till they come to the triumphal arch, where they will proceed to take up their ground.

15. Lord Combermere will take care that their rear shall have passed Neuilly by 7 o'clock in the morning.

16. The 5th and 6th divisions, and Brunswick infantry, and reserve artillery, will be ready to cross the road and take up their ground as soon as the British cavalry will have passed Neuilly.

17. The Netherland infantry will camp to-morrow evening in the Bois de Boulogne.

18. The 2nd corps will move out of the Bois de Boulogne by the gate of Passy, and thence to its ground.

19. The 1st corps will move out of the Bois de Boulogne by the Porte Maillot.

20. All guards will be relieved to-morrow, and all safeguards are forthwith to be called in.

21. The Field Marshal begs that the officers may be dressed uniformly, and, if possible, according to the King's orders.

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cheltenham, 22nd July, 1815.

I have received your Lordship's letter of yesterday, and I beg you will accept my congratulations upon Bonaparte being in safe custody.

There is only one *enclosed* fortification in St. Helena, and which has but limited pretensions to the *dignified* appellation of a citadel. It is called *High Knoll*, and is placed upon a very commanding and healthy situation. But it is, in fact, little more than a round tower, built upon the plan of a block-house on a large scale, and contains accommodation for two or three officers and from fifty to a hundred men, but certainly not more than the latter. Without any further description, I think your Lordship will be convinced that it is not the place for the permanent confinement of any person. But I may add, that as the utility of this fortress in such a place consists in its compact strength and capability of being defended by small numbers, the accommodation I have alluded to is arranged in proportion to its limited dimensions, and would certainly be unhealthy in any other than that salubrious climate.

But the whole island is a fortress, and appears admirably adapted to the confinement of the ex-Emperor, provided he be guarded by intelligent and vigilant commissioners. The surf is almost constantly so high all round the island as to render the approach of a vessel next to an impossibility anywhere but at St. James's Harbour itself; and indeed it is difficult to embark even in a boat in any other situation. A house or houses might be purchased for Bonaparte and his cortége in the country. He should never be allowed to approach the town of St. James's, where there is a constant assemblage of American traders, and from whence he could escape with the greatest facility. The island being within the tropics, the wind is fair *for India* at *all* times; and a ship, cutting her cable at night, would drift out of the bay with amazing rapidity, and be quite out of sight in the morning. While I was at St. Helena, a vessel left the harbour in this manner, in defiance of all the guns of the garrison.

It appears to me, however, that he might be easily kept in the country without being allowed to come within the reach of any of these means of escape; and, from the situation of the town and the habits of the garrison, no person can go into the country without a passport, and therefore all intercourse with foreigners could be easily controlled. The place where the Lieutenant-Governor's country-house is situated being in the most distant part of the island from the town, surrounded by a very strong coast and a constant surf from being to windward, which renders it impossible to put even a boat to sea, appears the best calculated spot for the lodging.

But by the bye, if you allow him many attendants, the house will not hold him and those who guard him.

Forgive this prolix account, and believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever most sincerely yours,

H. TORRENS.

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[917.] G. O. Paris, 23rd July, 1815.

1. The Field Marshal begs that the troops may march from their several camps at such hour to-morrow morning as to be formed on the ground allotted to them at 9 o'clock. (*Reviewed by the Emperor of Russia.*)

2. When the infantry will move from their ground in order to march past, they must move in columns at quarter distances, till they arrive at a place which will be pointed out to them.

3. They are there to take their regular distances; and the officers commanding companies must take care to take them up accurately, recollecting that it is from the front rank of the company or division preceding them that the distance is to be preserved.

WELLINGTON.

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*Prince Frederic of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Curgies, le 23 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de faire rapport à votre Seigneurie que depuis que j'eus l'honneur de vous écrire le 19 tout est en parfaite tranquillité. Le commandant de Condé n'a pas encore arboré le drapeau blanc, ce qu'il s'est refusé à faire jusqu'à ce que les commissaires qu'il a envoyés à Paris soient revenus. Depuis avant hier les troupes sous mes ordres sont cantonnées dans les villages entourant Valenciennes et Condé, dont je prendrai la liberté d'envoyer un tableau à votre Seigneurie dès qu'il sera fait. Les troupes doivent se garder tout à fait militairement dans leurs cantonnemens, et se tenir à pouvoir être rassemblés à chaque moment. Ceux qui sont dans les villages les plus proches des deux forteresses ont leurs postes avancées, et doivent tout observer et se tenir tout à fait sur leur garde contre tout ce qui pourroit se tenir hors des places fortes. Condé est observé de plus près et plus vigoureusement que Valenciennes, puisque le drapeau tricolore flotte encore toujours sur la tour. Valenciennes et Condé sont par là au fond encore tout à fait cernées et bloquées, et rien ne peut en sortir ou y entrer sans ma permission. Il y a quelques vieux militaires qui sont

sortis de Valenciennes pour retourner dans leurs foyers, et que j'ai fais passer: d'ailleurs rien n'est sorti de la ville, et je n'y fais rien entrer. J'attends à chaque moment le retour de l'aide-de-camp avec les deux Messieurs de Condé envoyés à Paris, et que sur cela le commandant de Condé arborera aussi le drapeau blanc.

Le Général Rey a voulu que je devois me retirer avec mes troupes à deux lieues à la ronde de Valenciennes, et de ne pas avoir un homme dans ce rayon de deux lieues de la place. Je lui ai fait donner une réponse à cette demande telle qu'elle le méritoit, et depuis il est devenu assez poli.

Voilà l'état des choses comme il est présentement, et à la première occasion j'aurai l'honneur d'envoyer le tableau des cantonnemens.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec les sentimens de la considération la plus distinguée, my Lord Duc, de votre Seigneurie

Le très humble et obéissant serviteur,

FRÉDÉRIC, PRINCE DES PAYS-BAS.

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*General Baron Müffling to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, le 23 Juillet, 1815.

Le service intérieur de Paris et le maintien de l'ordre sont confiés à la Garde Nationale; la garnison des armées Alliées occupe les grandes places de la ville, et doit être regardée comme sa réserve. Cependant comme dans plusieurs cas la Garde Nationale pourroit se refuser à reprimer de grandes émeutes, les ordres suivants régleront le service de la garnison.

*Réunion de la Garnison sur les Places d'Armes.*

L'ordre pour la réunion de la garnison de Paris sera donné par le gouverneur: il fera tirer trois coups de canon à la demi-lune aux Champs Elysées près la Seine; ils seront répétés par une pièce braquée près du pont des Tuileries, et ceux-ci par une pièce au pont du Jardin des Plantes. Ces signaux donnés, de jour ou de nuit, les troupes se rendront sur leurs places d'armes.

Puisqu'il se pourroit qu'un temps orageux empêcheroit d'entendre les coups de canon, Messieurs les chefs et commandants des brigades prendront les mesures nécessaires pour se trouver informés si les coups de canon sont partis de la demi-lune, afin que dans une telle réunion générale il ne manque aucune partie des troupes.

*Occupation de Paris par les Troupes Alliées et leurs Places d'Armes.*

1. La brigade des troupes de S.M. Britannique se formera dans l'Avenue de Neuilly, la tête vers la Place Louis XV.: elle fera occuper la Place Beauveau par un bataillon; elle placera un second bataillon à l'endroit où le Boulevard de la Madeleine traverse la Rue St. Honoré.

2. La brigade des troupes de S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche occupera la Place Vendôme avec deux bataillons et une batterie: un bataillon sera formé en colonne devant l'Hôtel de S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, et un quatrième bataillon sera placé où le Boulevard des Capucines est séparé de celui des Italiens par la Rue du Montblanc.

La cavalerie se formera sur le Boulevard de la Madeleine.

3. La brigade de la Garde de S.M. le Roi de Prusse occupera l'esplanade des Invalides avec deux bataillons; le quarré allongé formé par la Rue Bellechasse, le Quai d'Orsay, la Rue Bourgogne, et la Rue de l'Université, avec un bataillon; le Pont Royal, un bataillon; le Pont Neuf, un bataillon; le Luxembourg, un bataillon.

Le Champ de Mars sera occupé par un bataillon et par la cavalerie et l'artillerie de la brigade.

4. La brigade des grenadiers de S.M. le Roi de Prusse fera occuper la Place de la Bastille d'un bataillon; le Pont du Jardin des Plantes, d'un bataillon; le Quai de la Tournelle, de deux bataillons; la Place du Panthéon, d'un bataillon; l'Île du Palais et ses ponts, de deux bataillons.

La Place Walhubert, vis-à-vis du Jardin des Plantes, sera occupée par l'artillerie et la cavalerie de cette brigade.

Les gardes de l'intérieur et aux barrières resteront à leurs places.

La garnison du Montmartre aura une instruction particulière.

Le Gouverneur de la ville se trouvera sur la Place Vendôme.

Le commandant de la partie septentrionale sur la Place Louis XV.

Le commandant de la partie méridionale au Pont Neuf.

Dans ces positions les troupes entretiendront par des patrouilles la communication avec les postes voisins; ils se défendront dans le cas d'une attaque jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Le Gouverneur de Paris,

BARON DE MÜFFLING.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 24th July, 1815.

I send you such intelligence as has accumulated in the last two or three days. I have nothing to complain of, on the contrary, much to acknowledge, in the spirit of conciliation hitherto shown by the Emperor of Russia; but I think you must not expect him to go all your lengths, especially on the subject of the Gallery and the statues. Indeed, I doubt the latter proposition being relished even by the Austrians; and I doubt still more the possibility of the King's holding his ground in France if, after holding himself out to the nation as a means of appeasing the Allies, they disavow him so far. The Duke of Wellington, I know, doubts very strongly the prudence of this measure. The French Commissioners wanted an article in the Convention on this subject: this the Duke refused, telling them they must trust, as before, to the *bienveillance* of the Sovereigns.

The Emperor of Russia, in expressing his wish to act in concert with the Prince Regent in consolidating the peace of Europe, asked me, in confidence, whether anything had passed, when he was in England, on his part which had given umbrage to His Royal Highness, expressing himself at the same time in very proper terms on the subject. I told him that if any misinterpretation of His Imperial Majesty's sentiments had taken place, I was convinced that the wish on His Majesty's part to remove them would at once be effectual to the object. I beg you will mention this conciliatory

overture to the Prince; and as any personal coolness between such personages can be productive of no advantage, perhaps His Royal Highness will authorise me to say something civil on his part to the Emperor, who takes great pains to show attention to the Duke of Wellington and to the British army here.

I should also wish to receive the Prince's commands upon the invitation to be given to the Emperor of Austria. In obedience to His Royal Highness's orders, I mentioned to the Emperor in my first audience that the Prince hoped to see him in England; but I delayed the more formal invitation till I knew whether the Prince would wish anything to be said to the other Sovereigns. I can venture to say positively that all will decline. The Emperor of Austria is most impatient to go to Italy, and the Emperor of Russia not less so to return home.

I am impatient to receive the notification of Bonaparte's arrival in England, and to be informed of the steps you have thought it advisable to adopt both towards himself and his suite, which contains two very flagrant criminals, viz., Savary and L'Allemand. I have written to procure, if possible, before the messenger goes, a copy of the ordonnance which the King has or is about to issue against the principal conspirators. Lucien Bonaparte has been taken, and is confined in the citadel of Turin.

You will receive by this courier the official notification of a mark of favour conferred by the King of the Netherlands on Clancarty for the share he has borne as our ambassador in his restoration.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

I forgot to mention that I believe there will be no sort of difficulty in leaving the unrestricted custody of Bonaparte's person to the British government, under, perhaps, some engagement with the other Powers not to turn him loose without their consent. The idea of commissaries was a party suggestion of my own, which, upon reconsideration, appears to be open to much objection.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 24th July, 1815.

I enclose, for your Grace's information and Lord Castlereagh's, a copy of Captain Maitland's letter of the 14th, with its enclosure, received this morning.

We have nearly determined, subject to what we may hear from Paris in answer to Lord Liverpool's letter a week ago, to send Bonaparte to St. Helena. In point of climate it is unobjectionable, and its situation will enable us to keep him from all intercourse with the world without requiring all that severity of restraint which it would be otherwise necessary to inflict upon him. There is much reason to hope that in a place from whence we propose excluding all neutrals, and with which there can be so little communication, Bonaparte's existence will be soon forgotten.

It is intended to appoint Sir Hudson Lowe as the officer attached to him.

I do not believe we could have found a fitter person of his rank in the army willing to accept a situation of so much confinement, responsibility, and exclusion from society. We propose sending out the 13th Regiment. It is not by any means a strong regiment, but it is strong enough for the object, and is commanded by Sir W. Williams, an intelligent officer. It will not, however, be ever right to let any one regiment be long resident with Bonaparte.

The messenger is to take the order for Sir Hudson Lowe, and I send your Grace a duplicate, which, having read, I shall feel obliged to you to forward with all speed. You will exercise your own judgment as to sending a General officer to Marseilles.

I am yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Zieten to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Noyon, ce 24 Juillet, 1815.

J'apprends à mon arrivée à Noyon que votre Altesse a dans les environs d'Avesnes deux batteries de 24 et deux de mortiers, les mêmes qui servoient au siége de Landrecy.

Comme il me paraît que les commandans de La Fère et de Laon ne veulent se rendre de bonne manière, et comme probablement je ne parviendrai que par la force, je supplie votre Altesse d'avoir la bonté de permettre que j'employe une batterie de 24 et une de mortiers, de celles qui se trouvent à Avesnes, pour le siége de ces deux endroits.

Je porterai tous mes soins pour ménager les deux batteries autant que possible, et je supplie votre Altesse de se convaincre que je n'ôse faire cette demande que connaissant les bontés infinies dont votre Altesse m'a toujours honoré, et le zèle distingué qu'elle a toujours manifestée pour la cause commune.

Daignez agréer en bonté les assurances des sentimens respectueux avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Monseigneur, de votre Altesse

Le très humble et obéissant serviteur,

ZIETEN.

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*General Baron Müffling to the Members of the Military Conferences.*

Paris, le 24 Juillet, 1815.

Le soussigné a l'honneur de présenter à LL. EE. Messieurs les membres des Conférences copie de la disposition qu'il a cru devoir à la garnison de Paris, pour être à l'abri des événements.

Pour s'assurer parfaitement de Paris, le soussigné devoit encore donner l'ordre suivant aux habitans de Paris.

Au moment où des coups de canon se font entendre, et la générale est battue par la garnison de Paris, les habitans de Paris fermeront leurs

maisons, et personne ne doit se faire voir dans les rues, excepté les Gardes Nationales, sans peine d'être arrêté, &c., &c.

Comme le soussigné ne connoit pas assez les relations entre LL. EE. et le gouvernement actuel de la France, et comme il ne sait pas si c'est contre les conventions faites, il attend des instructions, si cette mesure militaire peut être exécutée.

BARON DE MÜFFLING.

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*Major-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Cujes, near Marseilles, 24th July, 1815.

I do myself the honour to inform your Grace that the white flag has been hoisted at Toulon, and that Marshal Brune, with all the Generals and Admirals on that station, have signed their acts of submission to the King. A report to Earl Bathurst, which I have entrusted to the charge of the Honourable Captain Arden, will inform your Grace of all the particulars connected with this event.

As the white flag is now flying in every part of Provence, and as there is no avowed enemy in this part of France, the object for which our aid was required by those who were in opposition to Bonaparte's power no longer now exists; and I have, therefore, in concert with Lord Exmouth, resolved on re-embarking the troops, and proceeding to the execution of another service, which your Grace will find detailed in another letter for Lord Bathurst, also in Captain Arden's possession. Hoping the intended movement may meet your Grace's approbation, I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Your Grace's most obedient and most devoted servant,

H. LOWE.

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*Major-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Marseilles, 25th July, 1815.

Having consulted again with Lord Exmouth as to the propriety of carrying into effect the operation spoken of in my letter of yesterday to Earl Bathurst (transmitted under an open cover for your Grace's information), we have thought it advisable to defer anything of this kind until instructions are received from Paris, to obtain, in the first instance, a knowledge of the precise intentions of His Majesty's government as to the best line of proceeding for the conjunct force in this quarter, now that the white flag is everywhere flying. We have addressed a joint letter to Lord Castlereagh, of which, for your Grace's particular information, a copy is enclosed. I transmit also a return of the force acting under my orders. A battalion of marines, which was landed during the movement in front of Toulon, is re-embarking.

The French papers announce that two columns of the army of the Loire

are directing their march upon Limoges and Bourges. I know not how far this may be regarded as affecting our situation here.

The troops I have are quartered partly in the town of Marseilles, partly in the Forts of St. Nicholas and St. John, on each side of the harbour; and I have a detachment in the only remaining fort (Notre Dame de la Garde). Fort St. Nicholas, which commands both the town and harbour, is the most important one, but it has been dismantled. It might be easily restored; not, however, without creating great jealousy.

Your Grace will observe what is stated in the letter to Lord Castlereagh respecting the Austrian movements. I had not thought it likely they would advance after the armistice signed at Lyons, and am, therefore, the more solicitous for your Grace's and Lord Castlereagh's opinion as to the best line to be pursued.

The reinforcements I wrote for to Genoa have not yet arrived, nor have I any assurance they will be sent. It is, however, possible they may be on their way; and in such case would consist probably of the flank companies of the 31st Regiment, part of a German battalion, and a detachment of the Brunswick Hussars.

This letter will be delivered to your Grace by Lieutenant Smith, of the Royal Engineers, who can give any further information that may be required respecting our military position here, and who can be the bearer of your Grace's reply.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,

H. LOWE.

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*Admiral Viscount Exmouth and Major-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Marseilles, 25th July, 1815.

Upon a review of the subject of our despatches of yesterday to Lord Melville and Lord Bathurst (transmitted by Captain Arden), which were left under open covers for the Duke of Wellington's and your Lordship's information, and after a conversation this morning with the Marquis de Rivière upon the present posture of affairs in this province, we have, upon mature consideration, thought it advisable to refer to your Lordship's authority for our further proceedings before we remove from a situation which we cannot always command after having once abandoned; but it is our intention to give immediate increased naval assistance to the operation which we have been informed by Lord Burghersh was about to be carried on against Elba.

We have thought it advisable to follow our former despatch with as much celerity as possible, to prevent any expectation that might have been formed from the intended movements.

We request the honour of your Lordship's early instructions on the following points:

1st. Whether it is your Lordship's wish we should continue to occupy this position, or that you would approve of our undertaking the operation already suggested.

2ndly. Whether, in the event of hearing of the fall of Elba, your Lordship would still recommend our remaining at Marseilles.

We think it right to apprise your Lordship that information has arrived this day of Major-General Count Nugent having crossed the Var and demanded a passage through Antibes, where the white flag was flying; and that another Austrian column is advancing against Draguignan, both apparently with a design of moving upon Toulon. No information could have been received by these columns of the submission of Toulon to the authority of Louis XVIII., which, however, has since been communicated to them by express.

We have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,

EXMOUTH.
H. LOWE.

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*General Carnot to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

No. 17, Rue St. Florentin, Paris, le 25 Juillet, 1815.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Sans avoir l'honneur d'être connu de Votre Excellence, je crois devoir à sa haute réputation et à sa grandeur d'âme de m'adresser à elle dans la circonstance grave où se trouve mon frère, le Lieutenant-Général Carnot, porté sur la liste fatale publiée aujourd'hui.

Jamais, Monsieur le Duc, mon frère n'a conspiré; cela est entièrement opposé à son caractère bien connu.

En servant sous les divers gouvernemens qui se sont succédés en France il n'a jamais eu pour but que de se rendre utile à sa patrie. Il a toujours été dans ses principes de se soumettre, sans réserve, à celui existant, pour éviter de plus grands déchiremens.

Jamais il n'a été un homme de parti: ses opinions ont pu être erronées, mais il a toujours agi avec bonne foi et loyauté.

Il n'a en aucune manière contribué au retour de l'homme qui a fait tous les malheurs de la France; qui d'ailleurs était son ennemi personnel et celui de sa famille.

Comment peut-il donc se faire que de tous les Ministres il soit le seul qui soit compris dans une liste qui paraît devoir ne frapper que sur ceux qu'on suppose avoir été ses plus dévoués partisans?

Ce ne peut être, Monsieur le Duc, que par erreur, ou par l'insinuation de quelques ennemis particuliers.

La réputation de lumières et de probité dont jouit généralement mon frère ne doit laisser aucun doute sur sa conduite, passée et future.

Veuillez me permettre, Monsieur le Duc, de donner de vive voix à Votre Excellence tous les renseignemens et toutes les explications qu'elle pourrait désirer à cet égard, et m'indiquer en conséquence le jour et l'heure d'un mo-

ment d'audience particulière, que je la prie de m'accorder: j'en serai on ne peut pas plus reconnaissant.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec respect, Monsieur le Duc,

Votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

Le Maréchal de Camp, Inspecteur-Général du Génie,

CARNOT DE FEELINS.

[Compliments. Le Duc regrette beaucoup que le Général Carnot ait été ordonné de quitter Paris. Il n'a rien à dire à cette disposition, et ne peut pas s'en mêler.

WELLINGTON.]

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*The Earl of Buckinghamshire to Charles Grant, Esq.**

SIR, East India Board, 25th July, 1815.

From the conversation I had with you and the Deputy Chairman this morning, you will have been prepared for the communication I have now the honour to make.

In the examination of the several points which have presented themselves to the consideration of His Majesty's ministers with a view to the selection of a situation for the safe custody of Bonaparte, the island of St. Helena has appeared to them the most eligible; and under that impression I have been desired to signify to you their wish that you would immediately intimate to the Court of Directors the sentiments of the Prince Regent's government upon that subject.

It is intended that the charge of the person of Bonaparte, and all arrangements with reference to him, should be confided to a General officer in His Majesty's service, in whose hands they are decidedly of opinion the government of the island of St. Helena should be placed.

It is proposed also that all correspondence and instructions respecting every matter connected with the security of the person of Bonaparte, and the conduct of those individuals who may be allowed to accompany him to the island of St. Helena, be carried on by the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India through the Secret Committee, and the ordinary business of the island through the usual channel of the Court of Directors; that every expense incurred on account of the measures connected with the confinement of Bonaparte be at the charge of the public; and that whatever compensation may be made to Colonel Wilkes in consequence of his removal from the government be included in that charge.

I think it proper at the same time to signify to you, that as the arrangements in question must be looked upon as temporary, being limited to the period of Bonaparte's continuance at St. Helena, it is desirable that the existing system should be disturbed as little as circumstances will admit of, in order that everything may be replaced with the more facility

* Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

upon its accustomed footing whenever the circumstances under which the proposed arrangement has been made shall cease.

You will be aware that the details of the measures arising out of it must be numerous, and require immediate execution. I have therefore to suggest the expediency of your being authorized by the Court of Directors to complete them in communication with me without further reference to the Court.

It is scarcely necessary for me to add, that in a matter which so deeply concerns not only the public interests of this country, but of the European world, His Majesty's ministers can entertain no doubt of the readiness with which the Court of Directors will afford every aid in their power towards the effectual accomplishment of such measures as may be judged advisable with reference to so important an object.

I am, Sir, your most obedient faithful humble servant,

BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.

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*Charles Grant and Thomas Reid, Esqrs., to the Earl of Buckinghamshire.*

MY LORD, East India House, 26th July, 1815.

We have laid before the Court of Directors the letter with which we were honoured by your Lordship, dated yesterday, on the subject of rendering St. Helena a place of safe custody for Bonaparte.

We lose not a day in replying to your Lordship on the part of the Court, that as the Company have been at all times ready to render whatever means and resources they possess subservient to the national interests, so on this occasion their executive body, though sensible that the proposition brought before them by your Lordship calls upon them to make sacrifices which they cannot but feel with regard to the servants and the management of the island of St. Helena, yet, believing that considerations of far higher import and value, not to this country only, but to the world, require their acquiescence in the plan adopted by His Majesty's ministers, they are ready to receive the recommendation of the Prince Regent's government to appoint a General officer of His Majesty's service governor of St. Helena, with the same extraordinary powers which are confided to the governors of the Indian Presidencies. They consent also that all orders to be transmitted to him on political subjects, having any relation whatever to the conduct, custody, or disposal of the State prisoners there, shall pass through the Secret Committee. And they further agree to the employment of King's troops in the island. But they distinctly understand and stipulate that the Company are to incur no expense on account of this arrangement; that it is to be only temporary, and limited to the residence of Bonaparte in that island; that the Court are to be charged with no degree of responsibility for the security of the island or the safety of the State prisoners placed in it; and that when Bonaparte shall by any event be removed from it, the frame and conduct of the government shall revert wholly to the Company and their servants, as fully as it is now administered by them.

With regard to the many measures of detail which must necessarily grow out of the arrangement now in question, the Court have empowered

us to transact with your Lordship, making only such occasional references to them in their secret department as it would be our own wish to observe.

We have the honour to be, My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,
CHARLES GRANT.
T. REID.*

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*The Sous-Préfet of Pontoise to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, 26 Juillet, 1815.

Je reconnais que j'ai eu tort de ne point exécuter les ordres qui m'avaient été donnés au nom de Votre Excellence, et je la supplie d'excuser ce tort involontaire, et de vouloir bien me rendre ma liberté.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec un profond respect, my Lord,
De Votre Excellence le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,
CHARLES GARNIER.

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*Lieut.-Col. Sir H. Hardinge to Lieut.-Gen. Lord Stewart.*

MY LORD, Château de Rambouillet, 26th July, 1815.

Marshal Blücher removed his head-quarters to Rambouillet yesterday. The change, I understand, may be attributed to his determination of entering Paris as seldom as possible whilst in command of the army. When affairs are more settled, I hear he intends resigning the command.

The army (that is, the four corps under his orders) are to receive from him a gratification of two months' pay, exclusive of their usual pay, and new clothing for the officers and men, furnished from the requisitions which have been realised.

I have been privately informed of this intention, as well as the following circumstance:—Since the march of three brigades of the 1st corps upon Laon, Soissons, and La Fère, the Marshal has received a positive order from the King to counter-order the projected operations. This order, added to the dissatisfaction already existing on the measures adopted at Paris, has induced the Prince in his reply to express his desire of resigning the command of the army, in consequence of finding the military measures disapproved of and countermanded, after having received His Majesty's sanction, in a manner that renders his further continuance in command useless and irksome during the period of the Paris negotiations. I remarked to the person with whom I had the conversation, that the King might probably accept the offer. He said, the army and the Prussian nation would so unanimously approve of the Marshal's view of things, that the King would be embarrassed to accept the resignation. I have not been able to ascertain whether this reply to the King's letter has been counselled by any military persons at present at Paris.

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* Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the East India Company.

The very unusual spirit of political interference existing in this army, and its reported intimate connexion with popular feeling in Prussia, render it, as a military body, rather awkward to deal with, more particularly as during the late campaigns the energies of the King have never or seldom been personally exerted with his army, and that the popularity of the successes rests exclusively with those who have commanded in the field.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
H. HARDINGE.

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*General Morgan to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, No. 108, Rue de Richelieu, Paris, le 26 Juillet, 1815.

Les sentiments les plus honorables m'ont attachés pour jamais à Votre Excellence. C'est en leur nom que je l'adjure de donner une attention sérieuse à la lecture du mémoire ci-joint.

Vous êtes, my Lord, le plus grand, le plus noble caractère dont votre heureuse nation puisse s'enorgueillir. La grandeur des circonstances dans lesquelles vous avez apparu attache votre illustre nom au sort du monde civilisé. Le bien, le mal qui résulteront des événements actuels, de ceux qui vont se développer, influera également sur le jugement que vos contemporains et l'impassible postérité porteront de vous.

Enorgueilli d'avoir eu l'honneur de vous voir de près, d'avoir eu même quelque part à votre confiance, je regarde pour moi comme une dette sacrée, comme le seul moyen de vous prouver ma reconnaissance et mon dévouement, d'appeler un moment l'attention de Votre Excellence sur un état de choses qui ne peut lui être indifférent, puisque les résultats de ces événements pourraient amener sur le caractère de Votre Excellence des ombres que sa noble moralité repousse, mais que le mécontentement public, et des espérances déchues, paroîtroient autoriser.

Il me semble, my Lord, que Votre Excellence n'a pas une donnée bien positive de la situation actuelle de la France, de son gouvernement, et du discrédit effrayant dans lequel tombent rapidement les intérêts de notre bon et vertueux Monarque.

L'Europe écrase dans ce moment-ci de tout le poids de ses armées le sol Français, mais une telle compression n'est pas cette force politique et morale à laquelle une nation se soumet, parceque tout en la trouvant sévère, elle ne peut ne méconnoître la justice; mais ici, my Lord, il y a violation entière de tous les principes de la part des Puissances Alliées, et de la part du gouvernement Français foiblesse au moins, et oubli des devoirs les plus saints. Les droits du Roi sont méconnus ou abandonnés; la nation indignée fait retomber sur ce Prince infortuné les malheurs, l'inconduite dont il n'est que le premier victime.

De cet état de choses, my Lord, à une insurrection générale la pente est imperceptible, et le succès de cette insurrection ne seroit pas longtems douteux, croyez-moi, malgré les six cent mille baïonnettes dont il a plu à la Providence de nous châtier...

Les yeux de la France, my Lord, se portent avec anxiété mais aussi avec espérance sur votre nation, sur vous personnellement, et sur Lord Castlereagh. En assurant la tranquillité, la prospérité de votre patrie, vous pourrez aussi vous acquérir notre éternelle reconnoissance en nous faisant jouir d'un pareil bienfait. Et quel autre genre de gloire, my Lord, pourroit être de quelque prix à vos yeux? Votre Excellence n'a-t-elle pas dépassé de bien loin tout ce que l'antiquité et le moyen âge nous ont montré de grand dans la carrière des armes?

Pardonnez, my Lord, à l'excès de mon zèle, à mon attachement pour ma malheureuse patrie, et au dévouement d'admiration que je vous porte; mais j'ai dû parler à Votre Excellence le seul langage qu'il lui convienne d'entendre, celui de la vérité et de l'honneur. Je vous réitère, my Lord, l'offre de mes foibles moyens: ils vous ont paru quelquefois agréables. J'offre le même hommage, mais sous vos auspices, à My Lord Castlereagh, dont je n'ai pas l'honneur d'être connu.

Puisse la Providence, my Lord, continuer à vous combler de ses bienfaits, en détournant de Votre Excellence les pièges dont on cherche à la circonvenir, et qu'elle guide vos pas dans une suite d'opérations tout autrement difficiles que la carrière sanglante dans laquelle vos succès et votre humanité ont attaché à votre nom d'immortels lauriers.

Veuillez, my Lord, accueillir avec bonté la mémoire que je vous adresse, et le communiquer même à Lord Castlereagh, si vous croyez qu'il le mérite, et agréez l'hommage de mon respect et de mon éternel dévouement.

LE GÉNÉRAL MORGAN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Note sur la Situation Politique, Extérieure et Intérieure, de la France au 25 Juillet*, 1815.

L'Europe a dû s'armer de nouveau pour venger la violation du Traité de Paris, et faire une guerre à mort à l'ennemi du genre humain.

La cause n'existe plus, mais les suites s'aggravent et se multiplient d'une manière effrayante.

400,000 hommes ont envahi le royaume: d'autres armées sont en marche, et ne tarderont pas à se réunir à celles qui déjà nous accablent. Il est tout naturel que la France, qui n'a pas su se faire elle-même justice du tyran qui l'avait asservi, paye les frais d'une guerre à laquelle elle a forcée les Puissances Européennes. La nourriture, l'entretien d'armées aussi fortes, ne seroient nullement au-dessus des ressources de la France; mais le gaspillage, le pillage, la destruction des campagnes, des monuments publics, ne produirent aucuns avantages réels aux Alliés, ils ne feront que diminuer les ressources et exaspérer les esprits.

Les Puissances Alliées font administrer, chacune en leur nom, les provinces qu'occupent leurs troupes; elles se font non-seulement fournir par la voie de réquisition tout ce dont elles ont besoin, mais encore bien au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire à l'effectif des troupes. Les revenus publics sont saisis dans les caisses des receveurs, de manière que le gouvernement est d'une nullité absolue, et n'existe pas. Cependant les déclarations des Puissances Alliées annoncent formellement qu'elles sont venus pour rétablir Louis XVIII. et sa famille.

Les armées Autrichiennes, Prussiennes, et Russes tiennent partout la même conduite dans les provinces qu'elles occupent: elles prennent les revenus de l'état, et exercent partout en leur nom le droit de Souverain, de telle manière que la

France, surchargée d'autorités qui se méconnoissent et se contrarient, est livrée à une anarchie qui fera perdre à ses vainqueurs les avantages de leur position.

Du moment où les Puissances Alliées ont eu la volonté de reconnaître Louis XVIII., elles doivent le faire d'une manière franche et loyale protéger de leurs moyens militaires l'établissement du gouvernement Royal, qui seul sous sa responsabilité eut été chargé du soin de faire fournir régulièrement aux armées Alliées les fournitures qui leurs étoient dû. Ces mêmes moyens militaires eussent mis le Roi en mesure de faire arriver au trésor Royal la recette des revenus publics, et garantir par là aux Puissances l'exactitude du payement des contributions extraordinaires qu'elles auroient crû devoir exiger pour indemnités.

Telle était la marche que la justice, d'accord avec la saine politique, traçoit naturellement : au lieu de cela, le pillage, la dévastation paroissent les seuls éléments d'administration qu'ayent jugé à propos d'employer les chefs des armées Autrichiennes, Russes, et Prussiennes. Le résultat inévitable d'une pareille aberration des principes n'est que trop facile à préjuger.

En dissolvant tous les liens de l'état politique en France, les Puissances Alliées espèrent-elles arriver au résultat de la Pologne, elles se tromperoient étrangement dans ce calcul. Les ressources de la France, l'esprit d'orgueil et de fierté qui animent ses habitans, les lumières répandus dans toutes les classes de la nation, sont des barrières contre lesquelles viendroient échouer des projets aussi impolitiques; et il en résulteroit le malheur éternel de l'auguste famille à laquelle le salut public est attaché.

Une déclaration franche et loyale des prétentions des Puissances Alliées eut mis la France en état de juger sa position, et de se décider aux sacrifices qu'exige l'état de choses où son imprudence l'a précipitée. Cette déclaration calmeroit l'inquiétude générale, et rendrait au gouvernement les moyens de s'entourer de la confiance nationale, qu'il est loin de posséder dans ce moment, et sans laquelle il ne peut exister qu'à l'appui et sous la protection des baïonnettes étrangères, situation politique fausse et monstrueuse, qui met le vertueux Monarque dans l'impossibilité de faire le bien, et qui ajoute à son impuissance malheureuse le plus grand malheur encore d'être regardé par la nation comme la cause des calamités dont elle est accablée, tandis que ce Prince en est le premier victime.

La nation Anglaise a montré jusqu'à ce moment une générosité d'autant plus honorable que l'ancien gouvernement Français s'était prononcé contre elle de la manière la plus révoltante et la plus déloyale. La France aujourd'hui est réduite à faire des vœux pour que les autres Puissances coalisées imitassent la conduite qu'elle tient dans ce malheureux pays. L'influence de la Grande Bretagne devra être du plus grand poids dans les décisions à intervenir. Cette influence s'est puissamment exercée déjà dans l'intérieur pour la formation d'un ministère qui est loin de réunir les suffrages des partisans du Roi et de la grande majorité des Français. Elle s'est chargée par là d'une grande responsabilité morale; il est à craindre qu'elle ne se repente mais trop tard de s'être prêtée à des mesures mal calculées pour amener les résultats qu'elle s'en promettoit, le parfait rétablissement de la maison régnante.

Telle est la situation dans laquelle la France se trouve en rapport avec les Puissances Alliées. En jetant un coup d'œil rapide sur son intérieur on s'apercevra sans peine combien les Puissances ont été trompées sur la situation de ce pays, et combien il leur importe de revenir à un système qui, en rétablissant la tranquillité en France, garantisse l'Europe de nouvelles convulsions politiques, dont les germes sont prêts à se développer, et qui la replongeroient dans de nouveaux malheurs.

*Situation Intérieure de la France à la Suite de la Bataille de Waterloo et de la Capitulation du 3 Juillet.*

Le départ de Bonaparte à la suite de la bataille de Waterloo amena les débris de l'armée vaincue sous les murs de Paris. La patrie doit une éternelle reconnoissance aux hommes qui débarassent Paris de ce terrible voisinage d'une armée qui se considèrent comme la nation toute entière, et la capitale comme un repaire d'ennemis.

La capitulation du 3 Juillet, celles des autres corps d'armées détachées, ont réuni sur la gauche de la Loire tout ce qui a survécu aux horribles boucheries du dévastateur de l'Europe. Les armées de la Vendée, de Lyon, de Bordeaux, y ont fait leur jonction: Cette réunion se compose d'hommes qui depuis longtems font la guerre, qui, étrangers à tout sentiment qui ne tient point à l'état militaire, ne peuvent supporter l'idée de se voir asservis par l'étranger, qui repoussent avec mépris et ne reconnoîtraient jamais franchement le Souverain revenu dans sa capitale sous la protection des Alliés.

Cette armée, qu'on n'est pas dû laisser grossir pour les réunions qu'elle a effectuées, possède un matériel imposant. On l'estime à mille pièces de canon, toutes attelées, et des caissons et munitions en proportion. Cette armée à la vérité a arboré la cocarde blanche, mais n'en est pas plus soumise pour cela. Ses projets sont connus; son chef, le Prince d'Eckmühl, l'a quitté; mais il lui reste des hommes tout autrement dangereux pour le commander, et de talens bien supérieurs à ceux de ce Maréchal.

Sans doute les Puissances Alliées se proposent d'attaquer cette armée dans le cas où elle continuerait à ne vouloir pas se dissoudre ni abandonner son matériel. Les armées nombreuses des Puissances mettent les chances favorables de son côté, mais il ne faut pas se dissimuler aussi que l'armée Française en a de bien favorables pour elle. Elle est composée en presque totalité de vétérans, pour qui le nombre n'est rien. Elle est commandée par des officiers bien convaincus d'avance que la victoire ou la mort sont leur unique partage. Si cette armée a des revers, elle se dispersera dans les montagnes, fera la guerre de partisans, et désolera la France par une Vendée universelle.

Si elle avoit des succès, ils seroient incalculables; les pertes en hommes seroient rapidement remplacées par de nombreux enrôlements volontaires, et les vexations des armées Alliées dans les provinces du royaume feront accourir à cette armée tous les hommes ruinés, chassés de leurs propriétés, que la soif de la vengeance et le besoin d'exister réuniront sous ses drapeaux.

A ces mouvements militaires se rattacheroient les mouvements de tous les départements, qui, mécontents des étrangers, mécontents du Roi et de son gouvernement, préféroient les chances d'un changement quelconque à un ordre de choses aussi insupportable que celui sous lequel ils gémissent.

La rentrée du Roi à Paris, sous l'influence des forces Alliées, a fait perdre à cet excellent Prince un grand nombre de partisans, et renforcé le parti opposé d'une manière formidable. La formation monstrueuse du Ministère a aliéné du Roi les hommes qui lui étoient les plus dévoués, et n'a ramené à ce malheureux Prince aucun de ceux qui dans des opinions très opposées n'ont voulu voir dans les nouveaux Ministres que des transfuges et des traîtres.

Deux partis bien différents en force et en énergie divisent la nation: celui du Roi, en minorité absolue par le nombre et les talens, ne battroit pour 24 heures contre l'autre sans l'influence éphémère de la présence des armées Alliées.

Ces mêmes armées Alliées ne peuvent séjourner éternellement en France. La désunion finira même par s'élever dans une association qu'un danger commun a rendu nécessaire, mais la cessation du péril fera naître mille éléments de discorde dont la France profitera. Supposons seulement qu'une des quatre Grandes

Puissances se séparat de l'union, que deviendroient alors des trois autres? Et quel parti la nation Française ne tirerait-elle pas d'un pareil événement, qui un peu plus tôt ou un peu plus tard ne peut manquer d'avoir lieu?

Ces germes de discorde entre les Puissances fermentent déjà avec activité. On connait publiquement l'opinion de la Russie et de la Prusse sur la composition du Ministère Français. Les Souverains ne l'ont pas caché. L'Empereur d'Autriche lui-même ne s'en est pas tû; et le Roi, forcé à un choix qui ne pourroit être le sien, se voit reproché par son peuple même des mesures auxquels il a été contraint et forcé par l'influence d'un gouvernement illustre, dont néanmoins il est impossible de mettre en doute l'attachement réel qu'il porte à Sa Majesté et à son auguste maison.

A quoi aboutira la liste tardive de proscriptions qui a paru le 24 de ce mois? C'étoit dès le jour de son entrée que le Roi devoit expulser du territoire Français ou livrer aux tribunaux des hommes éminemment dévoués à la vindicte publique. Loin de là, on a donné des passeports aux plus criminels, et ce n'est que lorsqu'on les a vu en sûreté qu'on a eu l'air de sévir contre eux. Mais en effet devoit-on demander à un Ministère qui compte dans son sein les complices de ces mêmes hommes, et leurs chefs, que ces derniers pussent sévir sérieusement contre eux?

Il résulte de cet état de choses un mécontentement universel, dont les intérêts devenus communs se réunissent contre l'intérêt du Roi. Ce Prince a perdu par ces fausses mesures une forte partie de ses partisans, et la durée de son règne ne peut être portée au delà du séjour des armées Alliées en France, dont il sera forcé de suivre le mouvement de retraite, pour s'éviter à lui et aux siens les plus horribles malheurs.

Les Souverains Alliés se doutent peu de la situation actuelle des esprits dans la capitale, des complots qui s'y trouvent, des projets sinistres qui s'y préparent, même malgré leur présence et les nombreuses baïonnettes qui les entourent. Qu'ils daignent s'occuper un moment de cet examen terrible, ils reconnoîtront facilement qu'ils reposent sur un volcan, et que la plus légère étincelle peut amener une catastrophe telle qu'il n'en existait jamais.

### *Récapitulation de ce Mémoire.*

Après avoir établi les rapports de la France avec les Puissances Alliées, et sa situation intérieure, il reste, en rapprochant ces deux états de choses, d'en saisir l'ensemble et d'en tirer les conséquences inévitables.

La France a provoqué par sa foiblesse l'invasion que les Puissances de l'Europe viennent une seconde fois de faire sur son sol. Il est juste qu'elle paye les frais d'un événement qui, quoique désastreux pour elle, la délivre, cependant, pour jamais d'un tyran détesté. Mais aussi il faut que les Puissances Alliées y mettent de leur côté la dignité et la justice que tous leurs manifestos ont énoncé et promis.

Il faut mettre un terme à ce brigandage qui nous fut longtems reproché quand nous étions vainqueurs, brigandage qu'à leur tour les Puissances Alliées exercent avec une très grande supériorité sur leurs modèles. On excepte, cependant, l'armée Anglaise, qui jusqu'à ce moment s'est comportée avec une noblesse digne de la première nation du monde civilisé.

Il faut que les Puissances se pénètrent bien d'une grande et terrible vérité: c'est que jamais la tranquillité, la stabilité de l'Europe ne sera assurée tant que le Roi de France ne jouira pas de la plénitude de puissance nécessaire au Monarque d'une grande nation, et que l'avilissement où les Puissances le tiennent, la nullité dont ils l'ont frappé, nuit autant à leurs intérêts particuliers qu'à ceux de ce Monarque; que c'est une très fausse combinaison que celle de croire que la présence de 600,000 baïonnettes est une raison suffisante pour gouverner; que ces armées ne peuvent rester éternellement en France; et qu'en supposant même

que les Puissances laissassent en France un corps de 150,000 hommes, ce seroit exposer inutilement ces hommes à *des Vêpres Siciliennes!*

Il faut également que les Puissances Alliées employent tous leurs moyens pour rendre au Roi son armée, ou, si elle persistait dans une rébellion obstinée, le forcer à se dissoudre. Ce dernier moyen feroit couler des torrents de sang, et aliéneroit, sans retour du Roi, des hommes qui appartiennent à toutes les classes de la société. Il faut appeler toute la sévérité des loix sur la tête des chefs, qui ne méritent aucun pardon; mais il faut en même tems que la clémence du Monarque pardonne aux égarés, et que des loix constitutionnelles à l'abri des atteintes d'un ministère corrompu garantissent à la nation la jouissance certaine des droits pour lesquels elle a fait trop de sacrifices pour jamais y ramener. En garantissant à la nation les droits qu'elle réclame à si juste titre, on assure, on établit sur des bases inébranlables ceux du Monarque; on fond et rend communs aux siens les intérêts de son peuple; et l'Europe alors pourrait compter sur une tranquillité qui ne pourrait être de longtemps menacée.

Si ces mesures, commandées par l'intérêt général de l'Europe, n'étoient pas adoptées, si on continuoit à suivre celles qui jusqu'à ce jour ont eu des résultats si décourageants, il faut s'étendre à voir la France entière se porter à un soulèvement général. La majeure partie des Français a porté les armes; l'orgueil national, les intérêts particuliers offensés dans tout ce que l'honneur a de plus cher, allumeroient un incendie qui, sans dévorer la France, se communiquera aux autres parties du continent. Les chances de ce futur contingent sont incalculables, et pourroient amener tels événements qui rendroient à la France la cruelle influence avec laquelle elle a pesé sur l'Europe pendant les premières années de sa révolution.

C'est aux hommes d'état à méditer sur le tableau que l'on vient de mettre sous leurs yeux. Cet appel est plus particulièrement adressé aux Ministres de la Grande Bretagne, soit en raison de leur influence actuelle sur les délibérations Européennes, soit aussi, et plus particulièrement, par la confiance qu'inspire leur moralité. Ils doivent penser que des décisions prochaines à intervenir sur le sort de la France résultera, ou la tranquillité générale de l'Europe et l'affermissement solide et inébranlable de Louis XVIII. sur le trône, ou une série de malheurs, des crimes, de soulèvements, et finalement, selon toutes les apparences, une catastrophe qui, en couvrant l'Europe de deuil, en pourroit être reproché qu'à ceux-là seuls qui, ayant pû le prévenir, s'en sont rendus volontairement les provocateurs.

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*General Baron Müffling to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUC, Paris, le 26 Juillet, 1815.

Dans une conversation que j'avois il y a peu de jours avec le Préfet de Police sur l'approvisionnement de Paris, je l'informais des intentions bienveillantes de votre Grâce de permettre aux soldats de faire la récolte au compte des cultivateurs, aussitôt que les circonstances le permettoient.

J'ai l'honneur de joindre une lettre qu'il vient de m'écrire, et votre Grâce jugera s'il est possible d'accéder à ses vœux.

Agréez, my Lord Duc, les assurances de ma considération distinguée.

MÜFFLING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*M. de Cazes to General Baron Müffling.*

MONSIEUR LE BARON, Paris, le 26 Juillet, 1815.

Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de me dire il y a deux jours que lorsque les inquiétudes que pouvoit donner l'armée de la Loire seroient appaisées, les soldats des troupes Alliées seroient autorisés à aller travailler aux moissons pour le compte des cultivateurs des pays où ils se trouveroient cantonnés.

Messieurs les Sous-Préfets de St. Denis et de Seeaux me font observer que tous les ans la récolte des grains se fait dans leurs arrondissemens par des moissonneurs qui viennent des départemens de la Bourgogne, que les circonstances les ont empêché de venir, et que les cultivateurs craignent de manquer de bras.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien me faire savoir si elle ne jugeroit pas à propos d'employer dès ce moment aux travaux de la campagne les militaires Alliés cantonnés dans les environs de Paris, et particulièrement dans les arrondissements de St. Denis et de Sceaux.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération,

Monsieur le Baron, de Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

DE CAZES.

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*General Dumouriez to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER DUC, Le 26 Juillet, 1815.

Mes lettres doivent vous fatiguer, car vous n'avez sûrement pas le tems d'y répondre, peut-être même pas celui de les lire. En voici, cependant, encore une dont je ne peux me dispenser. C'est pour vous prier de remettre à mon fidèle Morgan ma réponse à une longue lettre que j'ai reçu de lui hier, et pour vous parler de lui. Il est extrêmement dégoûté de sa carrière militaire, qui l'associe à une quantité des scélérats devenus encore plus dangereux par l'impunité dont ils sont assurés, et n'attendant que le départ des Alliés pour faire éclater de nouvelles rébellions, dont ils ourdissent la trâme partout où ils sont rassemblés, et dans Paris même, non plus pour Napoléon, qu'ils savent perdu pour toujours, mais par l'esprit de Jacobinisme et d'anarchie que perpétue l'impunité de l'armée.

Le pauvre Morgan, qui vous est singulièrement attaché, désire que je vous prie de lui accorder votre protection auprès du Roi pour lui faire avoir une préfecture. J'imagine qu'il vous en parlera, et vous mettra sur la voie de lui faire obtenir un pareil emploi. C'est un homme d'honneur, plein d'esprit et de connaissances, vraiment attaché au Roi et à sa patrie. Son âge, ses infirmités, et surtout son expérience désignent qu'il est convenable à ce genre de service. Voyez ce que vous pourrez faire à cet égard pour le tirer de presse.

Les détails de sa longue lettre sont très funestes, et tout ce que je reçois de Paris est du même genre. On a sans doute rejeté mon avis sur la cassation subite et la recomposition de l'armée. On a traité avec les Davoust, Vandamme, Masséna, Rapp, Grouchy, Suchet, Clausel, etc., avec tous ces vils gladiateurs qu'il falloit poursuivre à outrance après la chute de leur

Spartacus. Le mal est fait, les remèdes seront tardifs. Il fallait faire marcher de front cette marche sévère et juste avec l'arrestation et le jugement des grands coupables, que j'avais conseillé dans ma note du 6 au Lord Castlereagh, dont les confiscations auraient suffi pour indemniser les émigrés, auraient appaisé toutes les jalousies entr'eux et les possesseurs des biens nationaux, et auraient rassuré la nation sur ce point important qu'on n'a pas d'autres moyens de résoudre.

Je n'y vois plus de remède, ni personne auprès du Roi qui ait le courage et la bonne foi de le bien conseiller, car tous sont intéressés à le tromper, les uns par malice, les autres par insouciance. Je ne peux pas m'expliquer plus clairement sur tout cela. Les détails seraient inutiles, et me jeteraient dans des personnalités qu'il est prudent d'éviter.

Votre vieux et fidèle serviteur et ami,

DUMOURIEZ.

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*Marshal Davoust to Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr.*

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, Bourges, 27th July, 1815.

There has just appeared here an ordinance of the King, to which there is added a list of proscription, publicly sold at Paris. I cannot forget all that you have declared to Generals Gérard, Haxo, and Kellermann. Your own expressions were, "Let the army make its simple and unconditional submission, and rely upon it the King will do more than you desire." The same assurances were confirmed by the different officers whom you sent to me, namely, M. Vasin, your Aide-de-Camp, who assured me, as well as all the General officers at my head-quarters, that your Excellency had commissioned him to announce to us that the reports in circulation relative to proscriptions were altogether false; that no persecution would take place; that, in existing circumstances, some persons only would be for a short time deprived of the liberty of remaining at Paris, or approaching the King. I made it a point to circulate these details through all the divisions of the army, to destroy the bad effect which had been produced by lists of the nature alluded to coming from Paris, and the reports received by several officers from their families relative to searches made at their houses in the capital. After these positive declarations, I am bound to suppose that the list of proscription is false, and has only been invented by malevolence. The official discourses are reassuring: but there are too many indications that they are destitute of foundation; that the government does your Excellency the justice to believe in the necessity of deceiving you; and that they are going to add to all the calamities which oppress our unfortunate country, vengeance and proscription. Against the injustice of such measures I must personally raise my voice. I see, in the first list, the names of the Generals Gilly, Grouchy, Clausel, and Laborde. If they are placed there for their conduct at the bridge of St. Esprit, Lyons, Bordeaux, and Toulouse, it is the greatest mistake, since they only acted on these occasions according to my orders, communicated to them in my capacity as Minister of War. My name ought, therefore, to be substituted for theirs. The same observation applies to General Alix, if he is proscribed, for his conduct at Lisle; to Colonel Marbot, for his conduct at Valenciennes; to General

Lamarque, who can have nothing against him but the reduction of La Vendée. I find in this list the name of Dejean the son. I know not if it refers to General Dejean, the son of the Inspector-General of Engineers. If we see such a name on the lists of proscription, there can be no reason why all are not placed there, since this General was even not in service at the epoch of the 20th of March, and has not been distinguished by an act that should expose him.

Do not receive these reflections, Marshal, as dictated by any sentiment of caprice; they are the expressions of the profound sorrow which I feel for the evils which must fall on our country. As for the army, it has now submitted, and I dare answer that all the orders which you will transmit to it in the name of the King will be executed with as much disinterestedness as devotion. You know too well the French army, Marshal, to be ignorant that the greatest part of the Generals who are included in the ordinance of the 24th of July are distinguished by their great talents and brilliant services. General Drouet, who figures in the list, has obtained by his character and his virtues general esteem. Let these reflections, Marshal, decide your Excellency, as I hope they will, to make the most pressing representations to the King. It only remains for me to repeat that I deliver definitively my resignation as General-in-Chief of the army; and to reiterate the request that I have made, to send here commissioners to carry into execution the orders which you have given, or may yet give, for the disbanding of the army. May I be able to draw on myself alone all the effect of this proscription: this is a favour that I request for the interest of my King and country. I call upon you, Marshal, under your responsibility to the King and to France, to lay this letter before His Majesty.

I have the honour to be, with high consideration, &c.,

PRINCE D'ECKMÜHL.

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*Count Einsiedel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Dresde, 27 Juillet, 1815.

M. le Lieutenant-Général de Funk vient de soumettre au Roi mon auguste maître la convention signée avec Votre Excellence par rapport aux subsides accordés par la Grande Bretagne au corps de troupes Saxon près les armées Alliées.

Sa Majesté, reconnaissant l'effet de vos bontés dans cette affaire, et désirant vous témoigner la vive part qu'elle prend aux exploits glorieux qui viennent d'ajouter, si possible, à l'enthousiasme et à l'admiration que Votre Excellence inspire à l'Europe entière, m'a chargé de vous remettre de sa part la décoration du Grand Ordre de sa maison, et de l'accompagner de son portrait.

Elle désire vous réitérer en même tems ses regrets de ce qu'un concours de circonstances malheureuses a privé ses troupes de l'avantage d'entrer plutôt en activité, et de donner sous vos yeux des preuves de valeur et de zèle.

Agréez, My Lord, l'hommage de la plus haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, My Lord,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE COMTE DERLEV EINSIEDEL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 27th July, 1815.

I have communicated to the Prince Regent that part of your private letter which relates to the honour and reward proposed to be conferred on Lord Clancarty by the King of the Netherlands, and I have likewise had an opportunity of conversing with my colleagues on the subject. We are all of opinion that the spirit of the rule laid down applies full as much to titles as to Orders; and the Prince Regent would feel himself placed in the most embarrassing situation, if, after what passed last year in the instances of individuals personally connected with himself, he should now agree to what has been proposed. You are, perhaps, aware that several individuals have been seriously offended by the refusals they have met with, and that one very powerful interest was estranged from the government in the last session principally on this account.

Independent, however, of these considerations, the principle appears to be a most important one, that no person acting in a civil capacity under the CROWN should be allowed to receive honours or rewards from any Sovereign but his own. This has been recently extended to all British subjects; but if there was a distinction to be made, there would surely be no case in which the rule would apply with half as much reason and strength as in that of persons employed on foreign missions.

The Prince desired me to say that he had originally doubted the necessity of the rule as a general rule, but he was thoroughly convinced of its necessity as to ministers employed abroad; and being admitted with respect to this class of His Majesty's subjects, he had acquiesced in it as a general rule. I am sure you have had too much experience not to see that if the rule is wise and necessary, the only security is adhering to it generally, and not allowing it to be departed from on nice shades of distinction, which every person interested will suppose he can find in his own case.

The cases of the Duke of Richmond and Lord Cowper only prove that such instances have formerly occurred and been allowed, as instances did occur till very lately, of permitting foreign Orders to be worn by civil subjects of His Majesty; and with respect to the permission granted to Lord Malmesbury to insert some memorial in his coat-of-arms, that is a circumstance of a very different description, and I should think void of objection.

With respect to the example of presents granted to ministers on signing of treaties, this usage has subsisted from time immemorial amongst all the European Courts. The presents are always reciprocal, and it would be difficult for one Court to abolish them unless there was a general agreement upon the subject. Though they vary in value as respects different Courts, they are pretty much the same as to each particular Court; and I should not have the least hesitation in saying, that if any Courts should be disposed to extend them capriciously materially beyond the understood and fixed value, they ought to be abolished altogether, or at least subject to some regulation.

I have great satisfaction in feeling that in the present instance the refusal cannot operate in any way to the prejudice of Lord Clancarty, as

he has for these very services received from his own Sovereign the highest honours the Crown is in the habit of bestowing—the Order of the Bath and an English peerage.

LIVERPOOL.

P.S.—I send you enclosed an extract which will show you what Queen Elizabeth's sentiments were upon British subjects taking foreign Orders.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Lord Arundel.*

But the year after his return home, a dispute arising among the Peers, whether that dignity so conferred by a foreign potentate should be allowed here, as to place and precedence, or any other privilege, it occasioned a warm dispute, which Camden mentions in his 'History of Queen Elizabeth;' and that the Queen being asked her opinion in the case, answered, "that there was a close tie of affection between the prince and the subject; and that, as chaste wives should have no glances but for their own spouses, so should faithful subjects keep their eyes at home, and not gaze upon foreign crowns: that she, for her part, did not care her sheep should wear a stranger's marks, nor dance after the whistle of every foreigner." Whereby it passed in the negative.

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G. O. Paris, 28th July, 1815. [ 918. ]

1. The Field Marshal begs that the officers of the army, when they appear in the city of Paris with any part of their regimental dress, may be properly dressed, and with their side arms.

2. He also requests that the officers of the army will not resist the search made, at the barriers of Paris, for contraband articles on the postilions and others who drive the carriages coming into the town.

3. The Field Marshal is desirous of giving every assistance in his power to reap the harvest, and accordingly authorises the commanding officers of regiments to allow the soldiers to assist in reaping it, upon the application of the inhabitants.

4. The owners of the harvest will make their own bargains with the soldiers for the payment they are to give them; but the commanding officers of regiments are not to allow any soldiers to go to work at the harvest excepting the application is signed by the mayor of the district in which the inhabitants may reside.

5. The commanding officer must likewise know exactly where

to find the soldier; and he must return to his regiment every night, if possible, or at all events twice a week.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of Orleans to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Palais Royal, 28th July, 1815, at 9 o'clock.

I am just arrived in fifty hours from London, and I lose no time in informing you of it, and asking at what time I may find you at home to-morrow. You are aware, of course, that I will be obliged to go to the Tuileries: I do not know yet at what time, as I have only just now written to the King to solicit His Majesty's permission to wait upon him to-morrow; but it is in general between eleven and twelve, or between one and two. There was no other news in London but Bonaparte's arrival at Torbay.

I remain, with the highest consideration, my dear Lord,

Your most affectionate

LOUIS PHILIPPE D'ORLÉANS.

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## MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE ISLAND OF ST. HELENA, BY MAJOR-GENERAL BEATSON.

28th July, 1815.

It is presumed that the following observations and suggestions, which are the result of more than five years' experience in the government of St. Helena, may be of some use in forming a judgment upon the expediency of sending Napoleon Bonaparte to that island.

There are undoubtedly several local circumstances, peculiar to the island of St. Helena, which seem to render it preeminently suitable to the purpose of confining a state prisoner. Its remote situation from all other parts of the globe—its compact form and size—the small number of its inhabitants, amongst whom no stranger can introduce himself without immediate detection—together with the extraordinary formation of the island itself, being encompassed on all sides by stupendous and almost perpendicular cliffs, rising to the height of from 600 to more than 1200 feet, and through which formidable barrier there are but few inlets to the interior—are collectively such a variety of natural advantages for the purpose in question, that perhaps they are not to be equalled nor surpassed in any other part of the British dominions.

The only accessible landing places are James's Town, Rupert's Bay, and Lemon Valley on the north, and Sandy Bay on the south. All these points are well fortified and powerfully protected by *fleur d'eau* batteries, furnished (excepting Sandy Bay) with furnaces for heating shot; and as cannon are also placed upon the cliffs in their vicinity, far above the reach of ships, it may be readily imagined, if a martello tower with one gun could beat off a 74-gun ship in the Mediterranean, how much more

efficacious would be those preparations for defence on the island of St. Helena. In short, it appeared to be the opinion of several experienced naval officers, who have recently visited that island, that no ships could possibly stand the fire of the defences which protect the anchorage and the whole of the northern coast; and in regard to the southern landing place, Sandy Bay, it is equally secure against a naval attack.

Besides the principal landing places, already mentioned, there are several small paths from the interior leading down the precipices to the sea, which are frequented by fishermen; but they are so very difficult of access, that persons unaccustomed to such frightful roads would find it extremely difficult, if not impracticable, and particularly in the night, to ascend them. All these paths should of course be attended to, and guarded; and they might very easily be defended by rolling stones from the heights.

In addition to this natural strength of the place, and its numerous batteries, it may be proper to mention that a great acquisition has lately resulted from an admirable establishment of telegraphs. These are placed on the most commanding heights, some of which are 2000 feet above the level of the sea, and are so connected one with another, and so spread all over the island, that no vessel can approach without being descried at the distance of sixty miles. The vast utility of such an establishment may be easily imagined. Nothing can pass in any part or even in sight of the island without being instantly known to the governor; and equally can he convey his orders, wherever they may be necessary, either during the day or night. From the telegraph stations, signals of all sorts are made with flags by day, and lights by night; and in some cases by the firing of guns. In short, the whole island can be under arms at a moment's warning, and reinforcements can be sent, or posts occupied, or any other military operation directed, simply by a code of signals.

This concise view of the nature of the island and its defences, together with the recent topographical survey, will be sufficient for determining how far a state prisoner would be secured against all external attempts for effecting his release.

It must be obvious, after what has been stated, that the present established arrangements for the defence of St. Helena form an excellent basis for any additional regulations that may be required for the safe custody of a state prisoner.

It may be proper to remark that it is another of the many advantages of the island of St. Helena, that a state prisoner may be permitted in that place to have a greater scope of personal liberty than he could have with safety in any other place; and consequently the Governor might have opportunities of showing him attentions, and of treating him with kindness and respect, by granting him as much freedom as he might in his discretion think proper: and as none of the defences on the coast can be seen from the interior, it does not appear that in such a place there could be the smallest objection to permitting Bonaparte to take the exercise of riding upon the upper part of the island, provided he is accompanied by the Governor or a confidential staff-officer and orderlies.

Such precautions, together with having three gates and barriers to pass between the town and the wharf, would, it is supposed, be sufficient to prevent the possibility of escape. Many other regulations would naturally

occur to the Governor on the spot. But above all it seems essentially necessary that one or two of His Majesty's ships of war (a frigate and a brig) should be attached to the station for the express purpose of speaking or bringing in any vessels of suspicious appearance that may come in sight, or of chasing or bringing back any boats or vessels that may have attempted to sail from the island. With such arrangements as above hinted at, it must be evident that all ideas of escape from St. Helena would be entirely hopeless.

Having now discussed in a general manner the subject of securing a prisoner against the possibility of escape, or of holding intercourse with his partisans, it may be proper to say a few words on the subject of the troops that may be sent to reinforce the present garrison, for the purpose of guarding the person of Bonaparte, and occupying certain posts.

A greater reinforcement than 500 appears to be unnecessary. They should consist of very select men. Their duties should be confined to James's Town, Ladder Hill, High Knoll, and to the guard about the person of Bonaparte. The present garrison, consisting of about 700 artillery and infantry, could take the duties of the outposts and batteries, and should be cantoned at a centrical spot, for which it may be necessary to send barracks in frame for about 200 men. This arrangement would prevent those disagreements that usually take place in a mixed garrison. Notwithstanding the troubles in December, 1811, it is but justice to state that there are some good men belonging to the establishment, who might be selected (if they should be required) for assisting in the duties suggested for the reinforcement.

The garrison, when thus reinforced, would consist of 1200 or 1300 effectives, all of whom, according to the established rule of the island, should be trained to the exercise of artillery. This force, together with about 300 volunteer infantry and artillery, when added to the seamen of the proposed ships of war, would make the total strength at St. Helena about 2000, which would be sufficient to defend it against the most powerful attacks by sea or land.

The next point for consideration is the accommodations for Bonaparte and his suite. Upon his first arrival, the only house he could have is the Lieutenant-Governor's in James's Town, in which, although the rooms are smaller, there is even more accommodation than in the Governor's town residence. The area behind that house being formed of buildings, or enclosed by a high wall, would be equally secure as the castle, and its situation is not distant from the main guardroom.

If, however, it should be finally determined that Bonaparte is to remain at St. Helena, it will be absolutely necessary to erect a suitable building and offices for his accommodation. All the materials for building, except timber and slate, are to be found in the island; but for want of a sufficient number of artificers, and the difficulty of transporting lime, and the tediousness of quarrying and preparing stones, it would require at least two years to finish a suite of stone buildings proper for his accommodation.

In regard to the size of those buildings, it seems that if they were upon the scale of the plantation house, it would make a comfortable abode for Bonaparte, and sufficient also for three or four of his family, not including

his servants. The annexed sketch will convey a more accurate idea of the plantation house than any written description.

If a house upon the scale suggested should be considered as sufficient for the purpose, it might be erected, if composed of wood, and weather tiling on the walls, and a slate roof, in a very short time, perhaps in three months; but in this case the frame and all the materials, excepting lime, must be sent from England, with an adequate number of carpenters and masons for setting it up.

The most proper situation for Bonaparte's residence on the island of St. Helena is Francis Plain, which is a beautiful flat of about twenty-five acres, situate within cannon shot of the strong tower of High Knoll; and being only a short distance from the plantation house, the Governor, who might always reside there, would have opportunities of seeing him frequently, and by having his important charge thus so much under his own eye, he would be greatly relieved from that anxiety which he would otherwise feel if he were at a greater distance.

ALEX. BEATSON.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 28th July, 1815.

We have received and considered your despatch of the 24th instant.

We are not at all surprised at the different shades of opinion which subsist among the Allied Powers as to the measures which it may be proper to adopt respecting the frontier of France.

It is quite natural that the Powers bordering on France should look to their own security in some permanent reduction of the territory of that country. It is quite intelligible likewise that the Emperor of Russia should be desirous of being considered as a protector of the French nation. But this disposition on the part of His Imperial Majesty should be kept within reasonable bounds. He should recollect that those who are near to France, and consequently in the post of danger, have the deepest interest in the issue of the contest; and though it may be very proper that he should so far act the part of a mediator as to keep down extravagant and unreasonable pretensions, he ought not to be allowed to sacrifice what may be necessary for the security of his Allies to the unfounded pretensions of the French nation, particularly as that nation has never acted upon those principles of permanent territorial integrity with respect to other countries when the fortune of war has placed the power in its own hands.

With regard to the two alternatives of dismantling the French fortresses, or their occupation for a given number of years by the Allied Powers, there appears to us to be no question which of these propositions is the most advantageous to Europe, and even to France.

In the first place, the dismantling of fortresses has rarely ever been completely effected. The works are partially destroyed, and may be restored for a small part of the expense at which they had been originally constructed.

In the second place, though dismantling the fortresses on the frontier of France would uncover that country, and expose it for a time more easily to

invasion (an advantage as far as it goes), it would not materially protect the neighbouring countries, which had no fortresses, and the contest, if it should arise, would depend in that case upon which Power could bring into the field the superior army; whereas, if the French fortresses were occupied by the Allied Powers till such time as a barrier could be created, the Allies would have the advantage of the security of the French frontier till such time as they had been enabled to create one of their own.

In the third place, the occupation of the French fortresses by the Allies, to be restored at a given period to the King and his legitimate successors, would be some security for the continuance of his government; whereas the dismantling the fortresses could not be productive, at least in any thing like the same degree, of such an advantage.

If, therefore, the principle of security ought to be the rule of our conduct, the option between these alternatives is clear.

We do not feel that we should discharge our duty if we did not urge this opinion upon you with all possible earnestness, and desire you to urge it upon the Allies.

We are strongly impressed with the idea that the continuance of the King of France's authority and government after the evacuation of the country by the Allies must be very problematical; and if his government should then be overturned, and be followed by a Jacobin or revolutionary system, though not that of Bonaparte, what will be thought of those who, with France at their mercy, had left that country entire in point of territory, enriched by all the plunder of Italy, Germany, and Flanders, and had provided no additional security for the rest of Europe, though in the instance of the Low Countries such security is admitted to be indispensably necessary?

With respect to the management of this important question, you must certainly be the best judge of the time when it may be most proper to bring it forward; but we cannot but see the most serious inconvenience in delay. The French Ministers will use all their arts to gain an influence over the Emperor of Russia; and we think it may be of the utmost importance that there should be some understanding among the great Powers, on the principle at least which it is intended to adopt, before His Imperial Majesty or any of the other Powers have committed themselves to the French government.

We think it likewise of great consequence that our policy in this respect should be decided before the meeting of the new Assemblies at Paris, and before, indeed, there can have been time for any serious agitation of the question in any way among the French public.

The first act of the new Assemblies will, I have no doubt, be to commit themselves upon some national questions. They will find it much more easy to do this with respect to points on which the Allies have decided nothing than on those on which they have already pronounced themselves; and the Allies, on the other hand, will find it much more difficult to resist such declarations as to matters on which they have announced no intention than as to those on which they have already decided.

LIVERPOOL.

*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 28th July, 1815.

I read to the Prince Regent that part of your letter which relates to the conversation His Imperial Majesty had with you relative to what passed on his visit to this country last year.

The Prince wishes you to express to the Emperor of Russia that His Royal Highness is perfectly satisfied that if there was any misconception, it was perfectly unintentional, and that he can never entertain any sentiments but those of cordiality and friendship towards His Imperial Majesty.

The Prince leaves it to you to take such measures as you may think proper for inviting the Sovereigns to come to this country. The reason which induced His Royal Highness to desire you particularly to intimate his wishes to the Emperor of Austria, arose from the circumstance of his not having had the pleasure and satisfaction of seeing and receiving that Sovereign when the other Royal visitors came to England in the spring of last year.

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 28th July, 1815.

The measures which the French government have adopted for the purpose of disbanding the armies appear to be very slow in their progress, and by no means satisfactory in their result. We feel it necessary, therefore, to desire that you will direct the attention of the Allies to the very important question of denouncing the armistice as to all those corps which remain embodied. We ought not to forget that the season of the year is advancing, and that military operations will not be as easy two months hence as they are at present: besides, the French nation will begin to recover from its first panic, and may find the means of more effectual resistance, particularly when supported by a national representation, and assisted by long nights and wet or cold weather. Whatever, therefore, is to be done for dispersing the army, should be done without loss of time. We shall send the Duke of Wellington reinforcements as if he were going immediately to take the field. The return of the troops from America has been most opportune, and he will certainly soon have, if he has not already, an army considerably more numerous and efficient than that with which he fought the battle of Waterloo.

I have no doubt that you have been seriously considering with him all the different contingencies which may occur in the course of the next few months, and that he will be prepared for events as they may arise. It is very material that you should look sharply after the northern fortresses: if the means were in our power of occupying them in case of necessity, I should not dread anything that could happen.

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 28th July, 1815.

We have completed all the arrangements for conveying Bonaparte to the Island of St. Helena. Melville writes to Lord Keith to-night, to desire he will announce to him his destination. Sir George Cockburn is to have charge of him, and to convey him in a line-of-battle ship.

Bathurst has written to Sir Hudson Lowe, to offer him the military government of the island. It will be garrisoned by King's troops, and all ships of every description will be excluded, excepting ships of war and those of the East India Company.

The Court of Directors have shown every disposition to accommodate in every part of the business. The question of the security of the station has been most fully discussed. We have taken the best opinions upon it, and listened to all those who had any objections to make to it. It is, however, now generally admitted that, provided neutrals are excluded, it is the safest station that could be found for such a purpose. St. Helena is, perhaps, the only place in the world from which neutrals can be excluded without any material inconvenience.

We entirely concur with you in opinion that it would be advisable that a convention should be signed between us and the Allies, by which Bonaparte is to be considered as a common prisoner, though in our custody, and that we should not give him up or release him except by joint consent. You will, perhaps, employ somebody to draw up the draft of such a convention.

LIVERPOOL.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 29th July, 1815.

I have thought it desirable to inform you without delay of the accession of the Allied Sovereigns to your proposal of sending Bonaparte to St. Helena. I believe it is the best arrangement that could have been made for his secure custody.

We shall have considerable difficulty yet in framing our plan of European guarantee against France. I am inclined, however, to believe that the Emperor of Russia will be reasonable, and that he has no plan of working to the westward. I have suggested the advantage of stipulating the restitution of whatever we may hold to the King and his successors, so as to interest the nation in respecting the succession. The Emperor will, I believe, agree to this.

I have seen the Duke of Orleans. He arrived yesterday evening, and notified himself to the King. His Majesty instantly sent for him, and the Duke assured me that his reception of him was everything he could wish, and more than he expected. It is well thus to have obviated all personal awkwardness. I have advised him not to stay long, if he does not feel that he can cordially support.

The King feels considerable difficulty on the slave-trade point—first,

because the colonists are his warm adherents; secondly, because Bonaparte has, in some degree, made the abolition his measure. You may, however, consider the point as carried, and we owe considerable obligations to the Emperor of Russia for the manner in which he has supported us in this object.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Dickson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Daussoit, near Philippeville,
30th July, 1815.

MY LORD,

In my last of the 21st I notified to your Grace the capture of Landrecy, and of my intention to put the park in motion towards Philippeville in readiness to act either against that place or Givet; and by the 26th I had assembled here my first division, forty-four pieces, with a good proportion of ammunition; but from the heavy and continued rain the roads have become impassable, being for a considerable distance without causeway, which has obliged me, with the approbation of the Prince, to assemble my transport at Barbençon until the weather settles.

In the mean time His Royal Highness proposed the reduction of Marienbourg, and agreeably to his wish I sent nine 8-inch mortars and six 5½-inch ditto on the 27th to bombard that place. Trenches were opened, and the mortars put in battery on the night of the 27th, and the bombardment commenced on the morning of the 28th: the enemy appearing obstinate, six 24-pounders were ordered up, but they capitulated in the afternoon before the guns could arrive.

I believe as soon as the weather permits, His Royal Highness intends to undertake the siege of Philippeville, during which preparations for the siege of Givet will be going on.

I have had a good deal of conversation with His Royal Highness with regard to the siege of Givet, which he considers as an undertaking requiring great means; and he talked to me of 150 pieces, a number I conceive much more than necessary, and should think 100 heavy pieces, with the small mortars 5½-inch in addition, quite ample for the attack of any of the French fortresses in their present state: I shall, therefore, showing all proper deference to the Prince's opinion, avoid bringing up more ordnance than I deem absolutely necessary; but I beg permission to call the attention of your Grace to the ammunition of the train, which has not been sent from England in such proportion as it ought:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The guns, 24-pounders, being a nominal | 1000 | rounds each. |
| The mortars | 500 | " |
| The howitzers and small mortars | 400 | " |

But in these quantities, spherical, grape, and case shot are included, by which the 24-pounders for instance are reduced one-fifth of substantial ammunition, that is to say, to 800 round shot each, and so on.

I enclose a memorandum of the state of the Bruxelles battering train ammunition, and have to observe that for a protracted siege of magnitude

the whole or the greatest part may be called into use, which I think it my duty to explain to your Grace, that other views may not be disappointed from want of ammunition.

The Antwerp proportion, however, is not included in this calculation.

I beg your Grace will give orders to the Commissary-General for my being furnished with such additional transport as circumstances may require for the operation against Givet.

I have the honour to be your Grace's most obedient servant,

A. Dickson.

[Enclosure.]

State, in Round Numbers, of Ammunition belonging to Battering Train brought to Bruxelles in Schuyts June, 1815.

Daussoit, near Philippeville, 30th July, 1815.

| | 24-pr. Round Shot. | 18-pr. Round Shot. | 12-pr. Round Shot. | 10-inch Shells. | 8-inch Shells. | 5½-inch Shells. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Remaining at Bruxelles .. .. .. | 17,000 | 9,900 | 4000 | 1800 | 2300 | 200 |
| At Mons .. .. | 14,500 | .. | .. | 1500 | 2200 | .. |
| In activity and collecting at Daussoit .. .. .. | 16,000 | .. | .. | 6000 | 5400 | 6000 |
| | 47,500 | 9,900 | 4000 | 9300 | 9900 | 6200 |

Grape, case, and spherical, not included.

A. Dickson.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

My dear Castlereagh, Fife House, 31st July, 1815.

I enclose two private letters received from Canning by Casamajor, and one from Lord Beresford, which his brother delivered to me two days ago, and desired me to open. The first were written before they could know of the battle of Waterloo; the latter after the knowledge of it.

I confess I doubt very much, under present circumstances, the expediency of Lord Beresford going to the Brazils; and I am strongly inclined to the opinion that, small as is the expense to this country of the Portuguese army, we cannot recommend the continuance of it after what has passed. To contribute to pay an army during peace of which you are not to have the advantage during war can hardly be justified on any public principle, especially when it is considered that this war was not a merely British war, but was a war in which all other countries, and Portugal amongst them, were as much interested as ourselves. I feel moreover that the British officers at present employed in the Portuguese service might be very useful in the Hanoverian service; and if the country is to be at

any expense for the maintenance of foreign troops, we shall, under present circumstances, be more likely to profit by contributing to keep a Hanoverian than a Portuguese force. I wish, however, you would talk the matter fully over with the Duke of Wellington and with Hamilton, who will reach Paris nearly as soon as this letter.

I understand from Casamajor that Canning will be well pleased not to receive his letters of recall. I shall write to him, however, by the next mail, and explain to him what my feelings are respecting our relations with the Portuguese government at the present crisis.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 31st July, 1815.

I have the satisfaction to send you the Abolition complete. In reply to a succession of inquiries from Wilberforce, I have by this messenger referred him to you for information, apprising him that the point has been conceded.

You will see by the enclosed that your decision upon Clancarty's point is entirely acquiesced in by him, and with the best grace. I think it quite right, and have told him so.

My letters by yesterday's messenger will have satisfied you that I shall do my best to bring things here to an early issue.

The protocol is in itself a species of convention on the point of Bonaparte. I shall, however, consult the Allies upon reducing it into a more formal shape.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Earl of Clancarty to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 31st July, 1815.

Your note of this date, with Lord Liverpool's of the 28th enclosed therein, require very little reply from me. You will doubtless do me the justice to state to him that I have never been unreasonable enough to require that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent should be advised to depart from any adopted principles on my account, or that these should be placed even in a doubtful position in matters relating to me.

In my letter to you of the 23rd,* written in consequence of your kind desire to be made acquainted with whatever arguments I might be enabled to allege on my own behalf, I was fully aware that I was reasoning in the dark, and consequently urged the points therein contained, not as matters of opinion on a subject upon which I professed my ignorance, but as an advocate making the best case he could for his client.

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* In reference to the intention of the King of Holland to confer the Marquisate of Heusden on the Earl of Clancarty, the title of which has since been conferred, and accepted with the consent of the British government.

I can with truth assure you, that though I should have been well pleased, if circumstances had permitted, to have accepted the title and dotation granted by the King of the Netherlands, I am not the less convinced of the soundness of Lord Liverpool's reasoning; and far from having any hesitation in admitting, that I am anxious to embrace the opportunity he has furnished of cordially coinciding with him in opinion, and most gratefully acknowledging that for any services which I may have been made the humble instrument of rendering, I have been amply and munificently rewarded by my own Sovereign.

I have said enough, I hope, to convince you that I am fully sensible of the justice and propriety of the late decision, notwithstanding its opposition to my interests.

Yours, my dear Lord, with sincere gratitude, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

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EXTRACT from the INSTRUCTIONS of the FRENCH to their GOVERNORS of FORTRESSES.

July, 1815.

Tout commandant d'une place assiégée, qui, sans avoir pris l'avis ou contre le vœu de la majorité du conseil militaire de la place (auquel devront toujours être appelés les officiers en chef de l'artillerie et du génie), aura consenti à la reddition de la place avant que l'ennemi y fait brèche praticable, ou qu'elle ait soutenu un assaut, sont réputés coupables de trahison.

Le gouverneur ou commandant consulte les commandans des troupes, de l'artillerie, et du génie, l'inspecteur aux revues et le commissaire des guerres, seuls ou réunis en conseil de défense.

Dans ce dernier cas le secrétaire-archiviste tient la plume et constate dans le registre des déliberations du conseil l'avis commun ou les opinions respectives de ses membres, qui peuvent y consigner, sous leur signature, tous les développemens qu'ils jugent à propos d'ajouter au procès-verbal.

Mais le gouverneur ou commandant décide seul, et contre les avis du conseil ou de ses membres, lesquels restent secrets.

Faisons au conseil et à ses membres défense expresse de laisser transpirer aucun objet de déliberation, ou leur opinion personnelle sur la situation de la place.

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*Admiral Viscount Exmouth to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Marseilles, 1st Aug., 1815.

My note of yesterday not having departed, I opened the cover to say a few words before I part from my colleague Sir Hudson Lowe. I have to thank your Lordship for my knowledge of him; it will ever be a source of pleasure to me to have served with him; and it is justice only to say that I never felt greater pleasure in serving with any one; and am quite sure the operations of this small force, or one ten times as large, would have proved to the country what important advantages would have arisen

to the cause by the employment of a force so constituted. Sir Hudson's activity, zeal, and resource of every kind, are above my praise. I have only to lament that the career of our operations closed so soon for us, although never too soon for our country.

Your faithful and obedient humble servant,

EXMOUTH.

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*The Mayor and Corporation of Cateau to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Cateau, le 1er Août, 1815.

Nous avons été assez heureux pour nous trouver placés sur la ligne qu'ont parcourue jusqu'ici les troupes sous vos ordres. Comme c'est à leur protection et à leur bonne discipline que nous devons notre tranquillité et la conservation du peu de propriétés qui nous reste après les immenses fournitures que nous avons faites, oserions nous espérer, My Lord, qu'au moment où il paraît que le passage va se terminer, que vous daignerez nous accorder une petite garnison, forte de 100 à 150 de vos braves Anglais, pour nous mettre à l'abri de toutes vexations et réquisitions illégales, telles que celles qui se font dans les pays qui nous avoisinent.

Nous vous supplions de daigner nous accorder cette faveur, et de nous croire avec le plus grand respect,

De Votre Excellence, My Lord, les très humbles et très obéissans serviteurs,

*[Here follow the signatures.]*

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*Charles Long, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Duke, Army Pay Office, 1st Aug., 1815.

I have attended to both the points upon which you wrote to me some time since. Mr. Herries undertook to do the best he could for Mr. Popleton, as in the arrangement of the departments I had not the means; and with respect to Mr. Hunter, from the communications I have had with the Treasury, I hope I shall be able to satisfy his expectations: indeed, the immense responsibility which has attached to the officers of my department from the very large sums which they have had under their charge during the war certainly deserves a fair and liberal remuneration, if they have conducted themselves well and entirely to your satisfaction.

I brought a Bill into Parliament in the last session, the nature of which, I think, must have been much misstated to you from what Pole said to me of your wishes respecting it; but as soon as he communicated to me those wishes, I told him I should suspend proceeding further with it. The object of the Bill was not to affect the emolument of the agents, but to take the distribution of the prize-money into the hands of government, instead of leaving it with the London prize agent, from the conviction that the government have the means of distributing more quickly and with less

danger of fraud than any individual London agent can possibly have; the agents appointed by the Commander-in-Chief making out the lists, &c., and receiving their percentage, as at present. The measure appears to me to be very beneficial to those entitled to receive prize-money, but particularly to the agents appointed by the Commander-in-Chief upon any expedition where prize agents are appointed, as it would relieve them from the necessity of appointing an agent in London to make the payments, and who has always been supposed to receive the greatest part of the emoluments derived from the agency. You are probably aware that, after the distribution of the London agent has continued four months, the sum remaining undistributed is paid over to the Commissioners at Chelsea for further distribution. The effect of the Bill would have been to give them the distribution in the first instance.

I cannot conclude without congratulating you most sincerely on all your glorious and unrivalled successes.

Ever yours,

CHARLES LONG.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 3rd Aug., 1815.

I send you an official memorandum in consequence of the Russian paper transmitted in your despatch No. 21.

Although our reasoning in some respects differs from that of the Russian minister, I trust it will be found that there will be no practical difference in our conclusions; but I am convinced that we have not overstated the just pretensions arising out of our situation, and that it will be by not underrating them that we shall have the best chance of bringing the French government to agree to the arrangement which is proposed, and which is as advantageous for the permanent authority of the King of France as for the general security of Europe.

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

There is so much obscurity in some parts of the Russian memorandum, and many of the points which are brought forward are stated with such little precision, that the Prince Regent's servants are not satisfied that they rightly understand the bearing of them.

Some of the reasoning in the early part of the paper appears to be liable to very serious objection.

If the French nation had answered to the call which was made upon them by the declarations which were issued from Vienna in the months of March and May, and had materially contributed to the overthrow of the system of Bonaparte, the Allied Powers might fairly have been held to be bound by the Treaty of Paris, and could certainly not have claimed any permanent acquisition from France on the principle of conquest; but when it is considered how great has been the sacrifice of blood and treasure with which the operations of the Allies have been attended, that the King of France has in fact been established in his capital by the Allied arms, that almost every fortress continued its resistance as

long as any hope of relief could have existed, and that the occupation of the country by the Allied armies north of the Loire is really an occupation in consequence of conquest, there can be no doubt that within just limits the Allies are entitled to the fruits of conquest, and therefore to such permanent acquisitions as they might deem necessary for their own security.

Whether they will act up to this principle is a question of policy and prudence; but it is desirable that this should not be considered as a mere abstract distinction: for though they may not be disposed to press the application of the principle of permanent acquisition, if the French government are ready to agree to a satisfactory arrangement upon other principles, it is very material that it should be held out as that to which the Allies have a right to revert in case the unreasonable expectations of the French government should leave them no other alternative.

To come, however, to the practical result of the paper, the Prince Regent's government have no difficulty in acquiescing in the Russian propositions, provided they are correctly understood in the following sense:—

First. In the present convulsed state of France, no government whatever, not even that of Louis XVIII., can in itself afford to the Allies and to Europe that security which they are entitled to expect.

Secondly. This security must in part be obtained, therefore, by diminishing the means of aggression possessed by the French nation, either through permanent acquisitions of territory by the Allies, or by the temporary occupation of a military line within the country.

Thirdly. If the Allies are willing, under all the circumstances, to waive the demand of any permanent cession of territory, and consequently to acknowledge the integrity of the kingdom of France as it existed before the Revolution, or as it was settled by the Treaty of Paris, it must be on the express condition that the French government agrees to the occupation by the Allies of a part of the frontier of France, including some of the fortresses of the first and second order, until such time as a barrier can be created for the protection of the neighbouring countries, and until the expense of it had been defrayed by the French government.

Fourthly. It is not unreasonable that the French government should expect that the contribution which they are to pay should be fixed in its amount, and that provided it is duly paid, the time for the occupation of their frontier should be limited.

It might be stipulated, therefore, that the amount of the contribution should be ;* and that the time for occupying the frontier, provided the contribution was paid, should not exceed seven or five years.

Fifthly. In order to secure, as far as possible, the continuance of the legitimate authority in France, it should be provided that the Allies were only bound to restore the parts of the frontier of France which they were admitted to occupy to Louis XVIII. and his successors by rightful inheritance.

Sixthly. The French frontier should be occupied by the forces of the neighbouring Powers, but the French government should have the advantage of the guarantee of those Powers which do not occupy the frontier that the territory will be restored at the time limited, upon the conditions which have been stipulated being duly performed.

The Prince Regent's servants are inclined to believe (notwithstanding the ambiguity which pervades the Russian paper) that the summary of principles above laid down is conformable to the intentions of the Emperor of Russia, as meant to be set forth in that paper.

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* This sum should be sufficient to pay for the expense of the new frontier and the occupation of the French fortresses in the mean time.

If they are not mistaken in this respect, an arrangement, founded upon a fair application of these principles, will, as far as regards the question of territory, be perfectly satisfactory to the Prince Regent's government; but the value of the arrangement will essentially depend on the strength of the military positions which the Allies are to occupy. As the arrangement, after being agreed to in principle, might be defeated in detail by providing military positions inadequate for the three great objects for which they were intended, viz., security for the neighbouring countries against fresh aggression, indemnity for the expense of the new barrier, and the more effectual maintenance of the legitimate monarchy of France, it appears to be very desirable that there should be, as soon as practicable, an understanding with the Allies as to the mode in which it was intended to carry these principles into effect.

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MEMORANDA relative to ST. HELENA. By Captain CHARLES DIXON, Royal Engineers. Presented to Lieut.-Gen. MANN, Inspector-General of Fortifications, &c. &c.

London, 3rd Aug., 1815.

*Situation and Extent.*

The Island of St. Helena is situated in 15° 55′ south latitude, 5° 49′ west longitude, from the Observatory at Greenwich.

Its extreme length, from Prosperous Bay on the east to High Hill on the west, is 10¼ miles. The extreme breadth, from Flag Staff Hill to the northern point of Deep Valley, is 6½ miles. Breadth from James Valley to Sandy Bay (nearly north and south), 5¾ miles. The circumference of the island, 28 miles. Surface in acres, 30,300.

*Division.*—The island is divided into three districts or parishes: namely, East, West, and South (or the Sandy Bay District).

*Population.*—White inhabitants, exclusive of the garrison, 550; blacks (of whom 340 are free), 1560: total, 2110.

*Farms, Plantations*, and *Country* or *Garden Houses*, as they are called, amount to between 80 and 90.

*Military Force.*—Agreeably to the latest return I had an opportunity of seeing—namely, for the year 1812—the military force is composed of the following description of troops:—Artillery, 400 men; 1 Island Regiment, 600; 1 ditto ditto (Black Riflemen), 500. Besides the above enumerated force, I believe there are three or four companies of Island Militia.

*Note.*—The Artillery have the guard of all the batteries situated on the coast.

*Military Posts.*

*James Town.*—James Town and the roadstead off James Valley are defended by a line of parapet extending the whole breadth of the valley, on which 20 guns (twelve 18 and 24-pounders) are mounted; besides guns of the same nature placed on the edge of the rock (called Ladder Hill) on depressing carriages. They are disposed so as to command the road and anchorage entirely. Ships may anchor within a cable's length of the shore. The best anchorage is from 8 to 25 fathoms on the bank, which if

missed, by not keeping sufficiently close to Munden's Point in coming in, may require a week's beating on and off ere it can be again approached, owing to the strength of current setting to the westward, and the south-east breeze, which almost constantly prevails. The landing-place is inconvenient, and, owing to the heavy surf which rolls on the rugged beach composed of volcanic fragments (if beach it can be called), the landing of baggage, &c., is always attended with considerable difficulty.

Fresh water is conveyed in leaden pipes to the wharf, from a spring two miles distant, which affords a plentiful supply.

*Ladder Hill.*—Independent of the guns already mentioned as being mounted on depressing carriages for the defence of the anchorage, Ladder Hill is considered as the grand depôt of the artillery and stores; and contains on its summit, besides barracks for the officers and men, thirty or forty pieces of cannon of different calibre, mounted and dismounted, six of which are placed so as to look into the Lemon Valley (situated on its western side), and add considerably to the defence of that post.

*High Knoll.*—High Knoll has a large blockhouse on its summit, on which eight 24-pounder carronades are mounted: formerly they were 24-pounder guns, but it has been deemed proper to remove the latter. The blockhouse is used as a signal station, and seems best adapted for that purpose, its situation being too retired to afford any effectual protection to James Town.

*Sampson's Battery.*—On the eastern side of James Valley, and on the crest of the hill above Munden's Point, lies Sampson's Battery, similarly situated, though not so much retired as the Blockhouse at High Knoll. There are four guns mounted on this work; I think 12-pounders.

*Munden's Fort and Rupert's Valley.*—Munden's Fort is situated on a projecting point of rock, and completely commands the approach to the anchorage off James Valley. Ten or twelve heavy guns are mounted in the fort. At this point all vessels are obliged to heave-to and send a boat ashore for the purpose of obtaining permission to proceed to the place of anchorage off James Valley. Should this ceremony be omitted, a red-hot shot is the inevitable consequence.

*Rupert's Valley.*—Rupert's Valley is defended by a line of parapet extending nearly its whole breadth, with a strong flank on its western side. I am not positive as to the exact number of guns mounted, but believe between ten and fourteen, from 12 to 24-pounders, besides carronades. Rupert's Valley is considered one of the easiest spots to effect a landing, though, in my humble opinion, the difficulties attending the same would be great, and the probability of success very dubious, if the batteries are well defended.

*Buttermilk Point and Battery.*—This battery is similarly situated to Munden's Fort, but to the eastward of Rupert's Valley, on a rock which terminates in the Sugarloaf Point. It is almost inaccessible. There are six or eight guns (12-pounders, I believe) mounted on the battery.

*Prosperous Bay Valley.*—There are five long 9-pounders mounted at Prosperous Bay (a signal post). From the very exposed situation of this

post on the south-east side of the island, and the tremendous surf constantly breaking on its shores, independent of the confined landing-place, little apprehension can reasonably be entertained for the safety of this part of the coast.

*Sandy Bay Valley.*—The entrance of this bay is defended by Crown Point on the east, and Horse's Head Battery on the west; whilst a parapet of masonry, extending the whole breadth of the valley, with flanks on its eastern and western sides, adds considerably to the defence of this important post. The Lines are called Mitchell's, from an officer of artillery of that name, who traced them out.

A heavy surf rolls into this bay, which is very confined, and much exposed to the prevailing wind. A rock on the eastern side of the bay tends greatly to increase the difficulties of entering or coming to anchor off this port: in fact, I believe, it has scarcely ever been attempted. The only landing-place for boats is at the foot, and in rear of the Horse's Head Battery: it can only be attempted in fine weather. The battery is placed on an insulated rock projecting into the sea, on the western side of the bay. The ascent to it is by means of rope-ladders: consequently, if required, it can at any time be rendered inaccessible.

STATEMENT of GUNS mounted on the Batteries at Sandy Bay Valley.

*Crown Point.*—One long 9-pounder.

*Horse's Head Battery.*—Four 24-pounder carronades. There is a small magazine and storehouse in the battery.

*Mitchell's Lines and Flank.*—Six long 9-pounders, one 12-pounder carronade. Flank, two 12-pounder carronades.

In rear of the Lines are quarters and barracks for the officers and men, the principal powder-magazine, solitary prisons, and storehouses in an unfinished state.

At a very short distance from the bay, lime is met with in great abundance, and there are lime-kilns of considerable extent close to the port. Sandy Bay lime (I was informed) partakes of the quality of Pozzuolana, and hardens in water: it appears a concretion of sand and shells.

Beach Hill, on the eastern flank of the Lines, and retired about 250 yards, formerly had two guns mounted on it: they have, however, been lately withdrawn. There was also another battery enfilading the road leading from Sandy Bay to James Town, on which four long 9-pounders were intended to have been placed. One only is mounted: its position is very commanding.

*Lemon Valley,* I am told (for the short period of my stay at St. Helena, five days, did not allow me to visit the post at Lemon Valley), is defended on its eastern and western sides by two batteries, and strengthened by a line of parapet extending nearly the whole breadth of the valley: there are good barracks for the troops. The same difficulties in effecting a landing must be encountered here as at James Valley, from their similarity of situation on the north-west side of the island.

The additional protection afforded to the post at Lemon Valley by the guns planted on the top of Ladder Hill has already been noticed.

*Heights of the most remarkable Mountains.*

The island of St. Helena is irregularly divided by a lofty ridge of hills running nearly east and west: from this principal chain various inferior ridges and valleys branch off in different directions, north and south. Diana's Peak, at the eastern point of the ridge, is the most elevated spot in the island, and is most commonly enveloped in clouds, but commands an uninterrupted view of the ocean, and in fact of the island, in clear weather.

| | Height above the Level of the Sea, in Feet. |
|---|---|
| Diana's Peak | 2697 |
| Cuckold's Point | 2672 |
| Coward's Height | 2660 |
| Halley's Mount | 2460 |

These mountains form the principal ridge.

| | |
|---|---|
| Flag Staff Point | 2272 |
| The Barn | 2015 |
| Alarm House, near Long Wood Farm | 1956 |
| Plantation House (the Governor's Country Residence) | 1973 |
| High Knoll | 1960 |
| Ladder Hill (the principal signal-station) | 800 (nearly). |

Heights of less remarkable points near the shore vary from 800 to 1200 and 1400 feet.

The heights of the several mountains already enumerated I obtained from Captain Barnes, Town Major, and Captain in the H. E. I. Company's St. Helena Artillery; a most intelligent and active officer, who also very obligingly favoured me with the sight of a survey of the island which he had made between three and four years ago. The original, I am given to understand, is at present in the possession of the Company, and, if I may judge from the rough plan, must be a most valuable and interesting document.

*Names of the different Signal Posts, with the Chain of Communication round the Island.*

From
1, Ladder Hill to
2, High Knoll,
3, Plantation House (Governor's),
4, Cason's Gate (summit of Central Ridge),
5, Sandy Bay Signal Post.

[These form the northern and southern chain of posts between James Town and Sandy Bay.]

From
Sandy Bay to
6, Man and Horse,
7, High Hill,
Cason's Gate,
High Knoll,
Ladder Hill.

[These form the chain on the western coast of the island.]

From
Ladder Hill to
High Knoll,
Cason's Gate,
6, Long Range,
Stone Top (I believe abandoned),
9, Prosperous Bay,
Long Wood (Lieutenant-Governor's), back to High Knoll and Ladder Hill.
[These form the chain on the eastern coast.]

Or, from
Prosperous Bay to
10, Barn Point,
11, Flag Staff Point (I believe abandoned),
12, Sugar Loaf Point to
Ladder Hill.
[These form the chain on the northern coast.]

*Note.*—All the signal-posts have alarm-guns (generally long 9-pounders).

*Look-out Posts.*—One at Thompson's Wood Hill; one at the head of James Valley.

*Temperature.*

In James Valley the thermometer is said not to rise above 84° in the shade, but the reflected heat from the naked mountains encompassing the valley is very oppressive, and when there is little wind almost insupportable.

The general difference of temperature between the high interior parts of the island and the valleys near its shores cannot be less than from 15° to 20°. The thermometer is even said to range from 54° to 84° in the course of the year between James Valley and the central ridge of mountains.

The medium heat of the thermometer is 69°, according to the best information I had it in my power to procure.

The *Climate* is esteemed remarkably salubrious.*

*Soil and Products.*

The soil in the upper parts of the island is generally a fine rich mould from 8 to 12 inches in depth. The shores, on the contrary, present to the view only barren masses of volcanic rock, which like a belt encompass the island.

The mountains of the central ridge are well wooded. The cabbage-tree is most commonly met with in moist situations, and chiefly used for fuel. The red and gum wood are employed in building, but the latter (the largest plantation of which, covering 1500 acres, is at Long Wood Farm), I am told, must not be exposed to the weather. It is generally from twenty to thirty feet in height.

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* See *Supplementary Wellington Despatches*, vol. iv., pp. 507-9, for letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley, dated St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805: "The interior of the island is beautiful, and the climate apparently the most healthy that I have ever lived in."—Ed.

Fruits, such as plantains, bananas, figs, oranges, and limes, ripen best in valleys near the sea.

All kinds of vegetables, particularly potatoes, thrive well, but suffer very considerably from the depredations of numberless insects. Corn, in like manner, is destroyed by rats, with which the island is infested.

Upwards of seventy different species of fish are caught on the coast, chiefly mackerel, albicore, congers, soldiers, old wives, bulls' eyes, &c. To the three last I have given the names by which they are distinguished on the island. Rock oysters are also plentiful.

*Water.*

Fine springs of water issue from the sides of almost every mountain in the interior (if so it may be called) of the island. The vicinity of Long Wood Farm is the least favoured in this respect, but the deficiency will in some measure be supplied by a canal, or rather conduit, which is now forming and nearly completed, and which will convey water from the superabundant streams near the Central Ridge to the Long Wood.

At Plantation House (the Governor's country residence) there are a great variety of trees and shrubs from the four quarters of the globe, most of which seem to thrive uncommonly well.

*Remarks.*

The roads, or rather ramps, are for the most part very narrow and steep. The principal one, leading from James Valley to Plantation House on the west, passes in rear of the batteries at Ladder Hill, is considerably wider than the rest, and always kept in excellent order. The ascent from the valley to Ladder Hill is by a well-formed ramp of four returns, having a slope of nearly 1-12, with a parapet-wall of 3½ feet in height. At the top of the third return, two 18-pounders have been placed, which completely command the approach to Ladder Hill.

The road called Side Path, on the east, leading to Long Wood Farm and Sandy Bay, is also kept in good repair; but the ascent in many parts is difficult, and on the Sandy Bay side the descent is still more dangerous, and for carts impracticable; few of the numerous ramps exceeding 150 feet in length, besides having no parapet to protect them. They are, however, as well constructed as the nature of the country would permit.

The road communicating between Plantation House and Long Wood Farm is practicable for waggons.

The transport of provisions, stores, and the products of the different farms to James Town (from the nature of the country) is obliged to be performed by manual labour, and for this purpose slaves are principally employed. Their value, from 50*l.* to 150*l.*, depends much on character.

The foregoing memoranda are unavoidably deficient in many particulars which a longer residence on the island might have enabled me to correct; and I could never have presumed to offer them in their present unconnected and incomplete state were it not for the singular event likely to take place, and which at the present moment renders St. Helena the object of general inquiry.

Having said thus much in apology for their numerous imperfections, I

venture to rely with full confidence on the indulgence of Lieutenant-General Mann, Inspector-General of Fortifications, to whom they are respectfully submitted by

CHARLES DIXON, Capt, Royal Engineers.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, War Department, London, 3rd Aug., 1815.

I do myself the honour to acquaint your Grace that the regiments of foot noted in the margin,* having arrived at Spithead, returning from America, I have directed that they should proceed immediately to Ostend, and there receive your Grace's commands.

The 2nd battalions of the 6th, 57th, and 82nd regiments are now in Jersey and Alderney, and will be ordered immediately to detach to Ostend as many of their men as are required to complete the 1st battalions.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to the Right Hon. G. Canning.*

MY DEAR CANNING, Fife House, 4th Aug., 1815.

It is a long time since I have written to you. I have been intending writing every week for some time, but I knew Huskisson kept you *au fait* of events as they were passing; and when I heard Casamajor was on his way to England, I was desirous in the first instance of learning your sentiments and wishes from him.

As he left Lisbon, however, before the account of the victory of Waterloo had been received there, I am not at all clear that your sentiments after the knowledge of that event would be the same as they were before it. The Regency of Portugal have much to answer for, not to Great Britain and Europe, for our success could not have been more complete if we had had their assistance, but to their own country. For if the Portuguese army had been joined to that of the Duke of Wellington, the Portuguese nation would have partaken of the glory of his great victory; and if they had even been employed on the Garonne, they might have contributed most usefully to the success of the campaign. But they stand now as the only Power belonging to the Alliance which refused to co-operate with their forces; and as to the excuse that they had no authority to send the army out of the country, and that they must wait, therefore, for instructions from the Brazils, it is quite frivolous. Such authority must be considered as inherent in their situation, when the circumstances which rendered the exercise of it

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* The 1st battalions of the following regiments:—6th, 9th, 16th, 57th, 82nd, and 90th.

necessary could not have been foreseen, and when it was impossible to wait for instructions without altogether defeating the object itself.

I perceived by a letter from Lord Beresford to Castlereagh, that he is desirous of going to Rio de Janeiro to settle all matters in dispute with the government there. I see no use in this expedition. However small the expense of the Portuguese army may be to this country, I am satisfied after what has passed we shall never be able to persuade Parliament to incur it. They will never agree to pay an army during peace, from which they are to have no advantage during war, and especially during a war in which all Europe, and Portugal as a part of it, were as much interested as Great Britain. I have written my sentiments on this subject to Castlereagh, and have desired him to talk the matter over with the Duke of Wellington before he returns an answer to Lord Beresford's letter. I have not sent out your letter of recall, which has been prepared in the office, but I suppose you would wish now to receive it. Indeed, I do not know what pretence we can have for keeping any minister at Lisbon above the rank of a Chargé des Affaires. Let me, however, know your feelings on this point.

The result of the victory at Waterloo must have surprised you nearly as much as the magnitude of the victory itself; for I know of no instance in the history of the world, at least in that of modern times, of one battle producing such decisive effects. Our difficulties, however, are not over. Though Bonaparte is fortunately so circumstanced as to render it very little likely that he should ever be able to disturb the peace of the world again, it will be no easy matter to establish the authority of Louis XVIII. in France. And we are involved with our Allies in this very embarrassing alternative:—By demanding considerable sacrifices from France for the security of Europe, we unavoidably lower the character of the government, which it is our wish to uphold. On the other hand, the stability of that government, after the Allies shall have evacuated France, is so very problematical, that we should not do our duty by Europe if we looked to no other security than that which the legitimate government of the King of France could in itself hold out to us. You will have heard the appointment of Fouché much abused, and will, perhaps, partake in this sentiment yourself. I admit it was a desperate remedy, and even a humiliating one under the circumstances under which it was taken; but some of the most right-headed men in France were of opinion that it was absolutely necessary.

It has certainly for the time paralysed the Jacobin party; and as all idea of gaining the army, or any part of it, was entirely hopeless, this was an object of no small importance: at the same time one never can feel that the King is secure upon his throne till he has dared to spill traitors' blood. It is not that many examples would be necessary; but the *daring* to make a few will alone manifest any strength in the government. It is a curious circumstance that, after the sanguinary scenes which we recollect at the beginning of the French Revolution, all parties appear now to have an insuperable repugnance to executions. This arises not from mercy, but from fear. Every government that has been recently established in France has felt its own situation so weak and uncertain, that the persons composing it have not ventured to make examples of their enemies for fear of retaliation.

Nothing can be more gratifying than the account of the appearance and

conduct of the British army in France. The return of the troops from America has enabled us to reinforce it, and it is now far more numerous and efficient than it was at Waterloo.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON COUSIN, Bruxelles, le 4 Août, 1815.

Le Général de Fagel m'a remis votre lettre du premier Août; et je vous rends bien des remercimens de la manière dont encore en cette occasion vous vous exprimez au sujet des intérêts que concernent mes états dans la crise actuelle. Je ne puis mieux faire que de les commettre ultérieurement à vos soins, étant persuadé que vous leur assurerez tous les avantages compatibles avec les principes généraux adoptés, ainsi qu'une juste part aux conditions qui seront accordés aux puissances belligérantes. Je suis de plus dans le cas de faire à Votre Altesse une communication confidentielle d'une autre nature, mais également d'un intérêt majeur, et sur laquelle je crois devoir ne pas garder le secret vis à vis d'elle, puisqu'il pourrait être considéré comme une réticence déplacée. Il s'agit des propositions directes que j'ai reçu de l'Empereur de Russie pour effectuer un mariage entre la Grande Duchesse, sœur cadette de S.M.I., et mon fils aîné. Vous les trouverez consignés dans la lettre dont copie ci-jointe. Je n'ai pu me dispenser de la porter à la connaissance de la Reine et de Guillaume, et n'avait pas de motifs à entraver l'effet que je prévoyais qu'elle ferait sur mon fils, tout espoir de voir jamais se réaliser les premiers projets de mariage formé pour lui étant entièrement évanouis, et n'ayant formé aucun autre engagement, celui d'attendre l'issue du Congrès de Vienne étant également entièrement écoulé. Je ne saurais d'ailleurs me cacher les avantages que peuvent résulter pour mes états de semblable mariage, qui, en intéressant la Russie à la conservation de l'intégrité de mon royaume, coincide dans ses effets avec les vues de Lord Castlereagh de nous assurer la bienveillance et le secours de cet empire par les arrangemens pris au sujet de la dette Russe. Un refus ou même seulement le témoignage d'éloignement aurait pu au contraire indisposé l'Empereur dans un moment où je dois désirer captiver toutes les opinions en ma faveur. Dans ces circonstances je n'ai pu que soumettre à mon fils lui-même les réponses à donner et le part de prendre dans une affaire qui l'intéresse d'ailleurs plus que personne. Elles ont été comme je les avais présumé d'après ce que je croyais être son opinion, et en conséquence je suis dans le cas d'accepter la proposition de mariage faite, fesant dépendre le moment de la conclusion, ainsi que le degré de publicité à y donner, des opinions de S.M.I. J'ai cru cependant que les relations d'amitié existantes avec le Prince Régent ne me permettaient pas de remettre d'un moment à l'informer d'un événement qui, prévu en partie, doit être porté immédiatement à sa connaissance. Je ne crois cependant pouvoir entrer dans tous les détails, qui, en donnant une idée exacte de ce qui s'est passé, explique le part que j'y ai eu, et l'impossibilité d'une autre conduite. J'ai

préféré de vous en entretenir, avec prière de faire connaître au Prince Régent et aux ministres du Roi ce que vous jugerez nécessaire pour leur faire juger exactement de l'état de cette affaire; et d'après la connaissance que vous avez eu de ce qui précédemment a eu lieu, je m'assure qu'elle ne vous surprendra pas, et que vous vous convaincrez aisément que ma conduite se trouvait tracé. Je désire beaucoup que le gouvernement en Angleterre juge les choses de la même manière; et que l'amitié existante avec la Russie permettra de me flatter avoir un plus grand degré d'intérêt de la part de cette dernière Puissance, tout en me conservant et m'assurant la bienveillance de la Grande Bretagne, dont les effets seront toujours l'objet de ma sollicitude.

Je suis, mon Cousin, votre affectionné

GUILLAUME.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Emperor of Russia to the King of the Netherlands.*

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE, Paris, le 23 Juillet, 1815.

J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Majesté a bien voulu m'adresser de la Maison du Bois le 19 Juillet, et je la remercie infiniment pour les félicitations qu'elle contient sur les heureux succès de cette campagne. Je prie Votre Majesté de croire que je ne négligerais aucune occasion pour lui prouver toute la part que je prends à ses intérêts.

Je saisis cette occasion pour lui parler avec une entière franchise d'un sujet qui me tient infiniment à cœur. Depuis longtems j'ai su apprécier les qualités éminentes qui distinguent le Prince Royal son fils. Il vient de les rehausser encore par toute la gloire dont il s'est couvert dans les journées mémorables du 16 et 18 Juin. Tant que j'étais dans l'incertitude si ses anciens engagemens envers la Princesse Charlotte de Galles subsistaient encore, j'ai cru devoir m'abstenir de toute démarche formelle envers Votre Majesté; mais ayant acquis par ma mission d'Angleterre la certitude qu'ils étaient entièrement finis, je me crois autorisé de parler sans réticence à Votre Majesté d'un projet de mariage pour le Prince Royal avec ma sœur cadette, dont la réalisation causerait beaucoup de contentement à ma mère et à moi. J'ai mieux aimé aborder ce sujet sans intermédiaire avec Votre Majesté, préférant cette manière d'agir à toute autre. Je n'ai pas même voulu en dire un mot au Prince Royal, avant de connaître là-dessus l'opinion de Votre Majesté. Il me semble qu'un lien pareil, indépendamment de l'espoir de bonheur qu'il donnerait pour le futur ménage, pourrait devenir essentiellement utile pour consolider les rapports d'intime amitié entre nos deux pays.

Je prie Votre Majesté de me rappeler au souvenir de Sa Majesté la Reine, et d'agréer l'expression de l'attachement bien sincère que je lui ai voué, ainsi que les sentimens de haute considération avec lesquels je suis

De Votre Majesté le bon frère,

ALEXANDRE.

[919.] G. O. Paris, 5th Aug., 1815.

1. The Field Marshal begs that the Commanding officers of regiments will prevent the soldiers from cutting the trees which form the avenues in the Bois de Boulogne.

2. He also desires that orders may be given to the sentries at the gates not to allow any persons to pass taking firewood away.

3. The Field Marshal has great satisfaction in publishing the following letters from the Secretary-at-War, for the information of the officers and soldiers of the army; and he desires that the returns required may be forwarded to the Adjutant-General by the several regiments without loss of time.

*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

War Office, 29th July, 1815.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, having taken into his most gracious consideration the distinguished gallantry manifested upon all occasions by the officers of the British army, and having more particularly adverted to the conspicuous valour displayed by them in the late glorious victory gained near Waterloo by the army under your Grace's command, I am commanded to acquaint your Grace that, the Prince Regent being desirous of testifying the strong sense entertained by him of their devotion to His Majesty's service, His Royal Highness has been pleased to order:

1st. That the regulation under which pensions are granted to wounded officers shall be revised, and that the pensions which have been, or may be, granted to officers for the actual loss of eye or limb, or for wounds certified to be equally injurious with the loss of limb, shall not be confined to the amount attached by the scale to the rank which the officer held at the time when he was wounded, but shall progressively increase according to the rank to which such officer may from time to time be promoted: the augmentation with regard to the pensions of such officers now upon the list being to take place from the 18th June last, inclusive.

2nd. That every subaltern officer of infantry of the line, who served under your Grace's command in the battle of Waterloo, or in the actions which immediately preceded it, shall be allowed to count two years' service, in virtue of that victory, in reckoning his service for the increase of pay given to Lieutenants of seven years' standing; and every such subaltern will therefore be entitled to the additional shilling a day whenever he shall have served five years as a Lieutenant.

And 3rdly. That this regulation shall be extended to every subaltern of cavalry, and to every Ensign of the regiments of Foot Guards, who served in the above-mentioned actions; and every such subaltern and Ensign will, therefore, be entitled to an additional shilling a day, after five years' service as a Lieutenant in the cavalry, or as an Ensign in the Guards.

I have to request that your Grace will make known this the Prince Regent's pleasure to the British army under your Grace's command; and that you will, at your earliest convenience, transmit to me regimental

returns of the subaltern officers to whom this gracious order of His Royal Highness may, by your Grace, be considered to apply.

*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

War Office, 29th July, 1815.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent having taken into his most gracious consideration the distinguished bravery displayed by the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the British forces in the glorious victory lately gained near Waterloo by the army under your Grace's command, and His Royal Highness being desirous of testifying in a marked manner the sense entertained by him of their services upon that occasion, has been most graciously pleased to order that henceforward every non-commissioned officer, trumpeter, drummer, and private man, who served in the battle of Waterloo, or in the actions which immediately preceded it, shall be borne upon the muster rolls and pay lists of their respective corps as "Waterloo men;" and that every "Waterloo man" shall be allowed to count two years' service, in virtue of that victory, in reckoning his service for increase of pay, or for pension when discharged.

It is, however, to be distinctly understood that this indulgence is not intended in any other manner to affect the conditions of their original enlistment, or to give them any right to their discharge before the expiration of the period for which they have engaged to serve.

I request that your Grace will communicate these His Royal Highness's gracious orders to the British army under your command, and that you will at the earliest opportunity transmit to me a list of the several corps to which this order may be considered by your Grace to apply; together with accurate muster rolls, containing the names of all the "Waterloo men" in each corps, such muster rolls to be preserved in this office, as a record honourable to the individuals themselves, and as documents by which they will at any future time be enabled to establish their claims to the benefits of this regulation.

* * * * *

6. The Field Marshal hoped that his orders of the 20th June last, regarding the mode of drawing subsistence from the country, were sufficiently clear, and that it would be unnecessary to repeat them.

7. The military commanding officers have nothing to say to the requisitions made by the Commissaries; and the Field Marshal again forbids those under his command to give any orders whatever upon the subject, either by way of preventing provisions from passing or from leaving a certain district, or with any other view.

8. The Field Marshal particularly adverts to orders lately given upon these subjects by the commanding officer at Rouen.

WELLINGTON.

*Thomas Rowcroft, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord Duke, Stockwell Park, Surrey, 6th Aug., 1815.

The subscriptions for the widows, orphans, and relatives of the killed, and for the wounded and disabled soldiers of the brave and meritorious army under the command of your Grace at Waterloo, are supported by the general public with an alacrity and liberality of spontaneous feeling very pleasing to observe, and honourable to the character and spirit of the country. Already, at this day, the general subscription is not less than 180,000*l.* round the country, and only *opening* in many parts, and in Scotland and Ireland. It was begun and is continued for the "British Army" only; in that expression, perhaps properly, including all the troops under your Grace's command that were in British pay and formed the British part of the Allied forces.

It has required time, and still demands more consideration, to conceive and comprehend a small part only of the patient, firm, and heroic merit of the troops, and of all the securities, advantages, and glory acquired for these countries by your Grace's influence, gallantry, military skill, and high good fortune, in those arduous, hardly contested, and well fought days.

The Prince Regent has granted the King's letter to the Archbishops to authorise and require all the regular churches of the Establishment to excite their flocks to the good work, and has included in the recommendation the army of Prince Blücher with that of your Grace. This will, therefore, be a distinct and separate collection for this united and "Allied" appropriation. In 1805 all the churches, of all persuasions, after the victory of Trafalgar, collected 120,000*l.* I hope the present, under the care and direction of the Archbishops, will exceed half that sum at this time. This day determines it nearly. Most of the churches, by reading the King's letter or preaching, prepare the parishioners for this collection in the week from house to house.

The foreign destination, "mixed" with the domestic and national appropriation, will not, it is probable, increase the feeling, or swell the collection; though the cause, interest, and merits are so equal and united, and the Prussian expense of life and cost of suffering so much the greater in these furious and dreadful conflicts.

It may be that the general sympathy and liberality on this unparalleled occasion of merit, suffering, and success, may raise the subscription so high that properly the whole, or nearly, of the distinct church collection can be offered for the Prussians; a noble, generous, and proud national offering to brave Allies, and worthy companions in the field of death, glory, and victory. I must not presume to promise or anticipate anything, and am indulging only in a pleasing conjecture of anticipation. When we know what Ireland will do, and Scotland, so justly proud of her brave Highlanders, from her thousand presbyteries, and the colonies of the Western hemisphere, and the noble and liberal dependencies of Asia, where your Grace is so well known and remembered, it will be easier to determine what arrangements are proper, possible, and suitable to all the claims and circumstances.

A Mr. Giese, Prussian Consul here, will in a few days, at Paris, be able to explain all these circumstances to Prince Blücher, on whom the Committee do not intrude; judging your Grace best able to determine on all such communications.

I have the honour to be,

With most sincere and high admiration and respect,

My Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS ROWCROFT.

*Private*; there being no opportunity to communicate with the Committee this day.

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*The Mayor and Corporation of Roye to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Roye, le 6 Août, 1815.

Les membres du conseil municipal et les principaux habitans de la ville de Roye, département de la Somme, qui ne peuvent oublier les témoignages de bienveillance qu'ils ont reçu de Votre Excellence à son passage en cette ville, s'empressent de lui adresser leurs hommages, et de lui exprimer, au nom de tous leurs concitoyens, la satisfaction et le contentement que leur ont fait éprouver les troupes de S.M. Britannique qui sont passées ou sont encore en garnison dans cette ville, particulièrement du brave militaire qui en a le commandement (le Major Breyman, du 8me. régiment de ligne Allemande); du Commissaire Basnett, etc., qui ont su par leur fermeté et leur justice se concilier l'estime de tous les habitans de cet arrondissement. Ils les recommandent à la bienveillance de Votre Excellence, et la supplient d'obtenir des Souverains Alliés que des troupes Anglaises restent en cantonnement dans leur arrondissement, et que la ville de Roye jouisse de la faveur de posséder l'état major des troupes qu'il plaira à Votre Excellence de cantonner dans son arrondissement.

Cette ville se met sous la protection immédiate de Votre Excellence, et ne perdra jamais de vue la reconnaissance qu'elle lui devra.

[*Here follow the signatures.*]

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*The Countess Delaborde to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 7 Août, 1815.

Si les miraculeux événemens dans lesquels vous avez figuré d'une manière si éminente depuis quelques années n'ont point effacé de votre mémoire le nom d'un général Français qui n'a d'autres recommandations auprès de Votre Excellence que de s'être trouvé quelquefois opposé à vos armes, notamment dans les campagnes de 1808 et 1809 en Portugal; si vous conservez encore quelque souvenir du Lieutenant-Général Comte Delaborde, aux talens militaires et au caractère loyal duquel vous vous êtes souvent plu à rendre justice dans vos rapports officiels, vous n'aurez pas

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vu sans étonnement dans l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet dernier son nom signalé à l'univers comme celui d'un traître.

Souvent cité par vous avec les éloges qu'il ne pouvait recevoir que d'un ennemi généreux autant que brave, mon mari n'attendit pas les étonnants succès de vos armes pour apprécier les hautes qualités de Votre Excellence. Votre estime conquise sur les champs de bataille était pour lui un triomphe. Il y attache un prix inestimable, et je serais coupable envers lui, envers moi-même, si je n'employais tous les moyens possibles de la lui conserver.

My Lord, l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet fait peser sur la tête de mon mari le soupçon d'un crime dont il n'est point coupable. Si la religion du Roi a été égarée par quelques circonstances, sa justice est là qui veille, et sa magnanimité me répond qu'il ne livrera point aux horreurs d'une procédure criminelle celui qui fut toujours généralement estimé, et comme militaire et comme homme de bien.

Le mémoire dont j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une copie a été présenté au Roi le 2 de ce mois; mais en attendant son résultat favorable, je m'estimerais bien heureuse si Votre Excellence daignait en prendre lecture. Les faits que j'y avance sont d'une évidence matérielle, et je puis produire à l'appui les pièces et les témoignages les plus authentiques.

J'ai encore une grâce à solliciter de Votre Excellence. Daignez, My Lord, m'accorder un instant d'audience particulière: permettez moi de vous exposer de vive voix des détails qui, bien que fort importans, n'ont pu trouver place dans un aperçu aussi succinct. J'aurai atteint le but que je me propose, si, comme je l'espère, après avoir démontré l'innocence de mon mari, je lui conserve votre estime, My Lord, et si j'obtiens l'assurance que vous daignerez porter quelqu'intérêt à son sort.

J'attends que Votre Excellence veuille bien me faire connaître le jour et l'heure où je pourrai être admise à son audience; et je suis avec respect,

My Lord,

De Votre Excellence la très humble et très obéissante servante,

Comtesse Delaborde.

[Enclosure.]

*The Countess Delaborde to the King of France.*

Sire, Présenté le 2 Août, 1815.

Votre Majesté a solennellement promis de pardonner, à l'égard des Français égarés, tout ce qui s'est passé depuis le jour où elle quitta Lille au milieu de tant de larmes, jusqu'au jour où elle rentra dans Cambrai au milieu de tant d'acclamations.

Sire, une épouse éplorée, prosternée au pied de votre trône, ose réclamer l'effet de cette Royale promesse.

Si le Lieutenant-Général Comte Delaborde a trahi Votre Majesté avant le 23 Mars; s'il a attaqué la France et le gouvernement à main armée; s'il s'est emparé du pouvoir par violence, que mon époux subisse son sort! Sa triste famille ne sollicite rien, ni de votre justice ni de votre clémence.

Mais telle ne fut pas la conduite de mon époux.

Je ne parle ni de ses services ni de ses blessures. Je n'en appelle ni aux Portugais ni aux Bretons; je ne rétrace ni sa gloire ni son désintéressement. Hélas! des mouvemens d'orgueil seoiraient mal à celle qui supplie!

Le Général Delaborde était à Toulouse conformément aux ordres de Votre Majesté lorsque Napoléon Bonaparte débarqua au fonds de la Provence. Dans une proclamation du 11 Mars mon mari s'indigna contre les entreprises d'un homme que le délire aveuglait ; et dans une proclamation subséquente, tandis que cet homme s'avançait sur Paris, le Général rappelait aux soldats le serment qui les liait à la personne sacrée du Roi, aux membres de son auguste famille.

C'était peu de parler ; il fallait agir. Le Général Delaborde active le départ pour le Midi du 69me. régiment d'infanterie de ligne, et d'une partie du 3me. d'artillerie. Il encourage la formation, l'armement de plusieurs corps Royaux ; et ceux qui surent apprécier la franchise de son caractère reconnaîtront que mon mari n'avait alors aucune arrière pensée.

Que dis-je ? Il sait le départ de Votre Majesté, et l'entrée de Bonaparte à Paris. Le 1er. Avril il reçoit des mains d'un officier général les ordres du Prince d'Eckmühl. Il sent dès lors qu'une soumission forcée peut seule préserver la France d'une horrible anarchie ; et pourtant il retarde de quelques jours cette indispensable soumission.

Mais déjà le drapeau tricolor flottait à Auch, à Bordeaux, à Agen, à Cahors, à Rodez, à Carcassonne. Déjà les troupes de Bonaparte marchaient vers le Languedoc. C'est alors, et seulement le 4 Avril, que le Général Delaborde exécute les ordres du Prince d'Eckmühl.

Sire, Votre Majesté a considéré avec raison que ce Prince dût céder à l'empire des circonstances ; mais quand aucune mesure fâcheuse ne frappe celui qui ordonna, un sort plus rigoureux serait-il réservé à l'officier subalterne qui ne fit qu'obéir ?

Le Général Delaborde ne signala cette obéissance par aucune mesure de rigueur, par aucune voie de fait, par aucune destitution.

Je sais qu'il prescrivit l'arrestation de MM. de Vitrolles et de Damas. Pouvait-t-il s'en dispenser quand il était spécialement chargé d'exécuter les décrets de Lyon ?

Mais quand M. de Damas demanda des passe-ports pour des officiers qu'atteignaient aussi ces décrets, mon mari les refusa-t-il ? Chercha-t-il à multiplier les arrestations ? M. de Damas voulut être escorté par un officier. Mon mari lui refusa-t-il cette distinction, que le choix de l'officier supérieur rendit plus agréable encore ?

Quant à M. de Vitrolles, le Général savait qu'instruit des dispositions faites pour le lendemain, le commissaire de Votre Majesté préparait son départ. Aucun ordre ne fut donné pour l'empêcher. Trop de lenteur dans les préparatifs livra à mon mari ce personnage, dont il désirait surtout l'éloignement ; mais il ne s'empressa point de le livrer aux tribunaux ; mais il voulut adoucir sa position en autorisant la remise de ses papiers domestiques ; mais il se garda de l'envoyer à Paris ; mais on ne l'entendit pas réclamer, et se plaindre lorsqu'il sut qu'une main bienfaisante et cachée conservait à Votre Majesté un fidèle sujet.

Enfin, Sire, daignez faire mettre sous vos yeux la proclamation que le Général Delaborde publia le 4 Avril. Loin d'imiter ceux qui, emportés par un zèle coupable, prodiguaient les offenses à votre auguste famille, le Général y témoigne assez qu'il eut volontiers cédé à d'autres le soin de prévenir ou d'exécuter les ordres du Prince d'Eckmühl.

Sire, une pareille conduite doit trouver grâce devant vous. Le Général Delaborde n'a rien devancé, n'a rien outré, n'a rien usurpé. Il a obéi. Il l'a fait à une époque qui, d'après vos ordonnances, suffit pour l'excuser.

Ne le livrez donc pas à l'horreur d'une procédure criminelle. Ordonnez, Sire, que son nom soit rayé des listes comprises dans l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet.

Rendez à trois jeunes enfans un père leur unique soutien, leur seul espoir. Un jour viendra, où, par leur amour, par leur dévouement, ils acquitteront envers le meilleur des Rois la dette la plus chère !

Je suis, avec la plus profonde vénération, Sire,

De Votre Majesté la très humble, très obéissante servante et fidèle sujette,

COMTESSE DELABORDE.

Pour copie conforme à l'original.
COMTESSE DELABORDE.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Marshal Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 8th Aug., 1815.

You desire me to give you my opinion as to the present state of the relations between Great Britain and the Portuguese Monarchy, and to suggest the points which it might be most useful to urge, and the language which it might be most expedient to hold, if the Prince Regent should (as it is probable that he may) invite you to the discussion of such matters.

I will fulfil your wish as far as I can; distinguishing what I know to be the sentiments of our government, and what is merely opinion or inference of my own.

In the first place, the enclosed copy of a note which I send to Dom Miguel to-day will show you that my mission here is virtually at an end, and that it is not intended to replace me by any Minister with a regular character.

The private letter which accompanied the despatch announcing the acceptance of my resignation informed me that it was determined to place the business of the mission here as nearly as possible in the same sort of course as at Rio de Janeiro, where Mr. Chamberlayne the Consul is also Chargé d'Affaires.

The Consul-General here I do not think likely to be selected as the person to take charge of the business; and I think it not impossible that Casamajor, if he is not sent specially to Brazil, may after all return hither; which if he does, he must, after having been Secretary of Embassy, be invested with the character of Minister Plenipotentiary instead of Chargé d'Affaires.

This, though it could not alter the substance, would lessen the effect of the new system. The people here being used to Casamajor, and seeing him in a higher character than he had during the last interval, would not be altogether so sensible of the intended discontinuance of regular missions as if the Chargé d'Affaires were a new person, or one not hitherto known in the diplomatic career.

The intention, however, I am assured, is substantially to discontinue all regular diplomatic missions, both here and at the Rio, until the government of Brazil shall change its tone and conduct towards us, and until there shall be a government here capable of acting for itself, and of making some return for the prodigal support which Portugal demands and has received at our hands.

What are the grounds of complaint against the Court of Rio de Janeiro,

distinct from those which relate to Portugal, I am not competent to inform you. Much irritation has existed there for some time past; and the general impression that the leading Minister there, M. d'Araujo, is inveterately hostile to the British name and nation, I suppose can hardly be altogether without foundation: but I know nothing of what has been passing at that Court with sufficient accuracy to hazard any opinion upon it.

The grounds of complaint against this government are: 1st. Its evident disposition to get rid of British connexion, manifested in the whole tone and temper of its discussions with you, and in the general tenor of its conduct and language in civil matters. 2ndly. What swallows up every other consideration, and is in itself the immediate and originating motive of the resolution to break off all intercourse with the Portuguese monarchy, the late refusal of the Regency to furnish any part of the Portuguese contingent for service against the common enemy.

Upon this point the Regency defend their conduct (and I have urged the defence for them in England as far as it would go) by stating that they could not help themselves; that they had no authority to act in matter of such deep import without the commands of the Sovereign; that even the treaty which stipulated the contingent was not binding until ratified by the Sovereign; that, when ratified, they could not carry it into effect until ordered so to do; but that to have anticipated both the orders and the ratification would have been to assume the power of the Sovereign to themselves, &c. To all this the obvious answer is, that we and Europe have nothing to do with the internal distribution of authorities in the Portuguese Monarchy. Portugal, as Portugal, as a member of the Commonwealth of European states, was admitted to the Congress of Vienna; and, as such, not only took her part in the arrangements of the peace, but her full share in the deliberations which preceded the renewal of the war. Is it to be tolerated, is it to be imagined that England or Europe will ever tolerate again, that a state thus assuming to itself an equality with the most leading Powers in deciding the question of immediate war, shall claim for itself, at the same time, a six months' exemption from all the risks and exertions of that war, on the pretext of consulting a distant branch of its dominions? "But in that distant branch resides the Sovereign power." Then it must reside there no longer, if Portugal is to pretend to a rank among European States. This is the one, plain, obvious conclusion to which the whole argument tends.

Whether the evil is to be remedied by the Prince Regent's immediate return to Europe, or whether, remaining himself in Brazil, he can make up his mind to erect a delegated but substantive and independent government here, is an alternative upon which he alone can decide; but of this he may be perfectly assured, that after the flagrant proof which has been given, in the refusal of the troops, of the utter insufficiency of the present frame of government in Portugal to the first purposes and duties of a government, there is an end of all respect and consideration for Portugal in Europe, unless the conduct of the Regency be either disavowed by the Prince Regent, or atoned for, and unless the causes or pretexts of it be forthwith removed.

Such I know to be the soreness created in the mind of the government at home by this refusal, such I believe to be the universal impression

throughout the English nation, that if Portugal were at her utmost need, and a Spanish army (which some of the Regents affect to dread, notwithstanding the projected marriages, and notwithstanding the cajolery about Olivenza) were on the frontier, professing to claim the government of Portugal for the Crown of Spain, there would not be a voice lifted in the Parliament or among the people of England for saving Portugal from subjugation. And, in truth, why should there? What is Portugal, as now administered, to England? In war, as we have just seen, no help; in peace, as we have seen, and shall soon see again, a restless, impatient, unthankful ally, meditating only how to throw off the burthen of our alliance.

These are not the sentiments of the Sovereign; but they are the feelings and the views upon which his government here is conducted.

The only cure is his personal presence; the only palliative would be a renovation of the government; but no renovation of the same limited power can be effectual for the object which has been thrown away this year, the maintaining Portugal as a state among the States of Europe. For this purpose a substantive power is essential, and whom could he trust with such a power? That is for his consideration. But with the government of Portugal remaining as it is, and with the late acts of that government unatoned for in the face of the world, I am morally certain that there can be no renewal of amicable intercourse between Great Britain and the Portuguese Monarchy, either in America or in Europe.

This is all that occurs to me as material to be stated to you in answer to your questions.

The determination to suspend all diplomatic intercourse, and the immediate grounds of that determination, I give you just as I receive them from home. What I say of the best or only means of remedying the mischief which has been done, and of the probable or certain effect of that mischief, if left unremedied, upon the rank and character of Portugal among the states of Europe, is on no other authority than my own.

My opinions, however, are formed as much with a view to the welfare of Portugal herself, and to the stability and consistency of the Portuguese Monarchy, as to the resentment which Great Britain must naturally feel, and the atonement which she has a right to expect, for the manner in which Portugal has turned her back upon her and upon Europe in a moment the most critical in the history of the world.

It appears to me that this is the point which you may probably urge with most effect upon His Royal Highness's mind; declaring your conviction that if he had been in Portugal, his troops would have had a large share in the glory of the late campaign; and pointing out the extreme cheapness and facility with which, on the second proposal, that of Bordeaux, such glory would have been acquired; and contrasting the station which His Royal Highness, or his representative, would have held among the assembled Sovereigns and states after having taken a part in the labours of the day, with the figure which Portugal now makes in Europe as the single Power which has refused to act with the Alliance.

I am, my dear Lord, &c., &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

*Private Intelligence from Paris.*

8th Aug., 1815.

The letter herewith was ten minutes too late last night for Lord Castlereagh's messenger. I give it a chance of reaching you through a correspondent at Calais.

I hope next week to have the pleasure of seeing you, unless you should be determined to keep me here by making me His Majesty's Consul-General in France, which would attach me, as I have always wished to be, to Great Britain, and make me all your own.

Yours sincerely,

E. B.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Paris, 7th Aug., 1815.

I enclose a copy of the Report of the Minister of the Interior, respecting the internal situation of France, mentioned in my last. I had the original from the office itself. You will perceive that a great proportion of the 87 departments are ruined, or in a state of revolt.

The letter from the King of the Tuileries to Talleyrand, of the 22nd July, mentioned in one of my former despatches, in which the King threatens to retire to Spain, has been much circulated in the town, in manuscript copies, during the last five days; for what object I know not, but certainly on purpose. It is said the circumstance has been noticed by the ministers of the Allied Sovereigns in a manner which has caused the measure to be disavowed and regretted. I presume you are already in possession of this document, or else should send it.

It is said that the Emperor Alexander joins with those who wish Fouché to be removed from office, and manœuvre to that effect.

The massacres of the Protestants have extended from Nismes to the neighbouring villages. All that country is in a dreadful situation.

Some disturbances have also taken place at Amiens.

The Duke d'Angoulême has arrived in town this morning, in consequence of the King's order. Whether Louis XVIII. will join the Duke, or the Duke share the King's insignificance and disgrace, remains to be known.

The paid-for dances and rejoicings in the garden of the Tuileries continue, but are more and more frequently interrupted by the seditious cry of "à bas les Bourbons!" so that the rejoicings generally terminate by some arrestations, and the clearing of the garden.

There was information lodged with the commandant of the town, Colonel Pfuel, on the 1st, of some plot against the lives of the Sovereigns and some of the principal officers who were to be assembled at Lord Wellington's, in consequence of which he took various measures of precaution.

There were new alarms to-day. Cannon were planted on the flower-market yesterday. There are all sorts of dull forebodings of some catastrophe. Justus Gruner, the Prussian gentleman high in office, and intended to be placed at the head of some police establishment (an absurd idea), told me two days ago, "I am convinced, if we go on in this way, and do not come

soon to some clear determination respecting what we are to be about, that we shall all be massacred; but Fouché writes a soothing note to Prince Hardenberg, or to some of the other gentlemen, and all is thought to be well."

Prince Hardenberg, in a new note, has again brought forward the idea of separating Alsace and Lorraine from France, and has urged it much. There has been a conference on the subject to-day. England and Russia, and I believe also Austria, have decidedly declared themselves against it. The Prussians say out of doors, "Instead of negotiating about it, let us take possession, and hold fast." More Prussian troops continue to march in.

Upwards of two-thirds of France are now occupied by foreign troops, which the King of the Tuileries (as he is now generally called) does not at all think brotherly on the part of his dear Allies. Indeed, the whole business is a sad mockery. He seems to be put up merely that he may be knocked down.

Labédoyère will be tried this week. The editor of the 'Indépendant,' who had ventured to make some exculpatory remarks respecting that officer, is at issue with the police.

A Prussian gentleman, discussing some political question before the Emperor Alexander, said, "Nous avons les baïonnettes." "Et moi aussi," said the Emperor irritated, "j'ai des baïonnettes!" and left the room.

The newspapers, no doubt agreeably to order, endeavour to kill the Duke of Orleans politically, by always publishing that he is gone or going to Naples. He is, however, still here, and never, I believe, thought of such a journey.

The sequester laid by Bonaparte on the property of the French Princes was three days ago not yet removed from the property of the Duke of Orleans.

The green cockade (Monsieur's) is worn in La Vendée and in Brittany; the white and green along the Garonne.

Mademoiselle Mars, the celebrated actress, who had given offence by appearing with "violets," and then withdrew for some weeks from the stage, has reappeared with great *éclat*. Being obliged, however, in her character to change dresses three times, she appeared first ornamented with red flowers and ribands, then with white, then with blue, which, being an "adroit" disclosure of her sentiments, afforded much amusement.

It is true that Carnot, one of the proscribed, wrote to Fouché "Où veux tu que je me retire, Traître?" who replied "Où tu voudras, Imbécile!"

The times are almost too serious to write such things. Will no great idea, no judicious project, come from your side of the Channel? Will Great Britain not use her ascendency in the public councils of Europe to cause the other Powers to take a new view of things, and of men, and of their own situation, and make them do what is wise and right? They are now four weeks here, and there is nothing done. There is neither concert nor plan. A little chat about the "rayons" takes up all the time. However, the Countess Sagan (chère amie of Metternich) is coming on from Vienna. More ladies are coming. "Ils (les diplomates) paraissent vouloir s'installer pour longtems." Mr. Gentz will also be here on the 11th or 12th.

E. B.

## II.

## Report of the Minister of the Interior on the Internal Situation of France.

| Departments. | Chief Towns. | |
|---|---|---|
| Ain | Bourg | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Aisne | Laon | Ravagé. |
| Allier | Moulins | Id. |
| Alpes, Basses | Digne | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Alpes, Hautes | Gap | Id. |
| Ardèche | Privas | Id. |
| Ardennes | Mézières | Mauvais. |
| Arriège | Foix | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Aube | Troyes | Passable. |
| Aude | Carcassonne | Mauvais. |
| Aveyron | Rodez | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Bouches du Rhône | Marseilles | Passable. |
| Calvados | Caën | Ravagé. |
| Cantal | Aurillac | Rien. |
| Charente | Angoulême | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Charente Inférieure | La Rochelle | Passable. |
| Cher | Bourges | Ruiné. |
| Corrèze | Tulle | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Corse | Ajaccio | Id. |
| Côte d'Or | Dijon | Ruiné. |
| Côtes du Nord | St. Brieuc | Id. |
| Creuse | Guéret | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Dordogne | Perigueux | Id. |
| Doubs | Besançon | Tranquille. |
| Drôme | Valence | Id. |
| Eure | Evreux | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Eure et Loir | Chartres | Ruiné. |
| Finisterre | Quimper | Révolté. |
| Gard | Nismes | Id. |
| Garonne, Haute | Toulouse | Partagé. |
| Gers | Auch | Id. |
| Gironde | Bordeaux | Id. |
| Hérault | Montpellier | Id. |
| Ille et Vilaine | Rennes | Révolté. |
| Indre | Châteauroux | Révolté. |
| Indre et Loire | Tours | Id. |
| Isère | Grenoble | Tranquille. |
| Jura | Lons le Saulnier | Rien. |
| Landes | Mont de Marsan | Révolté. |
| Loir et Cher | Blois | Tranquille. |
| Loire | Montbrison | Révolté. |
| Loire, Haute | Le Puy | Id. |
| Loire Inférieure | Nantes | Id. |
| Loiret | Orléans | Id. |
| Lot | Cahors | Id. |
| Lot et Garonne | Agen | Id. |
| Lozère | Mende | Rien. |
| Maine et Loire | Angers | Révolté. |
| Manche | St. Lo | Id. |

| Departments. | Chief Towns. | |
|---|---|---|
| Marne | Châlons | Partagé. |
| Marne, Haute | Chaumont | Tranquille. |
| Mayenne | Laval | Id. |
| Meurthe | Nancy | Révolté. |
| Meuse | Bar le Duc | Id. |
| Mont Blanc | Chambery | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Morbihan | Vannes | Révolté. |
| Moselle | Metz | Révolté. |
| Nièvre | Nevers | Tranquille. |
| Nord | Lille | Révolté. |
| Oise | Beauvais | Ruiné. |
| Orne | Alençon | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Pas de Calais | Arras | Tranquille. |
| Puy de Dôme | Clermont | Id. |
| Pyrénées, Basses | Pau | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Pyrénées, Hautes | Tarbes | Id. |
| Pyrénées Orientales | Perpignan | Id. |
| Rhin, Bas | Strasbourg | Révolté. |
| Rhin, Haut | Colmar | Id. |
| Rhône | Lyons | Partagé. |
| Saône, Haute | Vesoul | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Saône et Loire | Mâcon | Ruiné. |
| Sarthe | Le Mans | Tranquille. |
| Seine | Paris | Mauvais. |
| Seine Inférieure | Rouen | Tranquille. |
| Seine et Marne | Melun | Mauvais. |
| Seine et Oise | Versailles | Ruiné. |
| Sèvres, Deux | Niort | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Somme | Amiens | Ruiné. |
| Tarn | Alby | Pas de nouvelle. |
| Tarn et Garonne | Montauban | Partagé. |
| Var | Draguignan | Tranquille. |
| Vaucluse | Avignon | Mauvais. |
| Vendée | Bourbon Vendée | Id. |
| Vienne | Poitiers | Tranquille. |
| Vienne, Haute | Limoges | Id. |
| Vosges | Epinal | Révolté. |
| Yonne | Auxerre | Id. |

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*Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Dickson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Daussoit, near Philippeville, 9th Aug., 1815, 9 A.M.

I have the honour to inform your Grace that the trenches were opened against Philippeville on the night of the 7th, and advanced with such vigour that an extensive parallel was established within about 400 yards ere morning, embracing the greatest part of the two fronts towards Beaumont; and in support of this operation, 21 mortars and 6 howitzers, which were placed in battery the same night, opened in the morning against the place, and continued their fire with such activity during the day, that the enemy beat the chamade late in the evening, and agreed to surrender on the same terms as Landrecy.

His Royal Highness Prince Augustus immediately afterwards communicated to me his intention of attacking Rocroy previous to commencing against Givet, and requested the assistance of part of the train for that operation.

Late last night I had the honour to receive your Grace's letter of the 5th August, in answer to which I beg to state I understood from His Royal Highness that the order of operations pursued was in conformity to the plans of the Allies: I therefore felt unwilling, after what passed with respect to Landrecy, to throw any impediment in the way of them, the more so having notified to your Grace His Royal Highness's intentions against Philippeville in my letter of 22nd July, reporting the fall of Landrecy. And with respect to either of the fortresses of Marienbourg or Philippeville having been attacked after submitting to His Most Christian Majesty, or hoisting the white flag, I can assure your Grace that it has not been the case, as both were defended in the name of the Emperor, and the troops continued to wear the tricoloured cockade. Indeed, had it been otherwise, I should have conceived it my duty to make the same particularly known to your Grace.

Under the circumstances I am placed I will not withhold from His Royal Highness the necessary equipment for the siege of Rocroy, provided it still holds out against Louis XVIII.; but as some little delay will arise in consequence of the battering-train transport being in course of payment at Barbençon, together with its afterwards coming up here, loading, and moving to Rocroy, time will be afforded for me to receive your Grace's orders previous to commencing the operation, should it be contrary to your wish to employ the battering-train against that place.

Your Grace may depend that the instructions in your letter of the 5th shall be communicated to His Royal Highness, and most implicitly attended to by me.

I have the honour to be your Grace's most obedient servant,

A. Dickson.

P.S.—I have since communicated the instructions to the Prince, who assures me Rocroy has not acknowledged the King.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

My dear Castlereagh, Fife House, 11th Aug., 1815.

We have received your despatch (No. 27) of the 3rd instant, with the enclosed memorandum from the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the military proposition to be made by the Allies to the French government.*

With respect to the two projets contained in this memorandum for the occupation of the French frontier, we are disposed on every account to place entire confidence in whatever may be the ultimate military judgment of the Duke of Wellington upon them.

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* See "Memorandum to Viscount Castlereagh on the temporary occupation of part of France," *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 622; dated Paris, 31st Aug., 1815.

However desirous we may be of seeing the government of Louis XVIII. popular in France, we do not feel that we should be justified in endeavouring to accomplish that object by the sacrifice of anything which is judged important for the general security of Europe.

We doubt very much whether forbearance on the part of the Allies would really have the effect, under the present circumstances, of rendering the King popular; and we are decidedly of opinion that we may thereby deprive ourselves of the means of giving that support to him on which for some time his authority must essentially depend.

We wish, therefore, that this question may be considered on military principles, and decided according to the best view that can be taken of what is likely to contribute most to the general security.

Whilst we are ready to leave it to your discretion not to insist on the occupation of Lille, if it shall be the opinion of the Duke of Wellington that the object of the Allies can be better or as well accomplished without it, we are nevertheless of opinion that Lille should in the first instance be demanded from the French government, and that we ought only to give up our claim to it upon the French government consenting to an arrangement which shall be considered in other respects as entirely satisfactory.

As we have not yet seen the Austrian or Prussian projets, we do not know the extent of the views of those governments; but we are informed that they propose to a certain degree the principle of permanent cessions by France, at least as far as regards the external line of fortresses. We ought not to forget that these governments have more of common interest with us in the whole of this question than the government of Russia; and though we must all have deeply at heart the consolidation of the legitimate government in France, we should consider that our success in this object must necessarily be very uncertain, and that the security of the neighbouring countries against France may be much more easily attained than the rendering France orderly and pacific.

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 11th Aug., 1815.

I am obliged to call your serious attention to the state of our foreign expenditure.

I am sure you will do us the justice to acknowledge that no Treasury has ever made such considerable financial exertions as the present, or has ever manifested so fixed a determination to overcome all minor difficulties when the public service has required great and unexampled sacrifices.

We must not, however, conceal from ourselves that the country cannot go on for any length of time at its present scale of expense. The accumulations of our sinking fund, on which we relied so confidently, are nearly all exhausted by the efforts of the present year. We shall have considerable difficulty in reconciling the country to the continuance of any part of the property-tax in time of peace, and yet without the property-tax it would now be impossible to keep up the necessary peace establishment. If the

present war should continue, or a new one should arise in the course of a few years, I am at a loss to know where we are to find taxes to defray the interest of our loans.

On the other hand, if external and internal peace could be acquired by France, her financial situation is prosperous beyond that of any country which, perhaps, ever existed. The revenue is about 600,000,000 of livres, the interest of her debt not more than 80,000,000, her peace expenditure at the utmost 420,000,000; so that with a debt, the interest of which is little more than 3,000,000*l.* sterling, the French government would have in time of peace a surplus revenue of more than 4,000,000*l.* sterling.

I have gone into these particulars not from any desire of proposing to economise our exertions where exertions are really of importance, but in order to induce a reduction of expense where every one must see on reflection that we have no chance of receiving money's worth for our money.

Since the battle of Waterloo more than 20,000 British troops have been sent to the Continent, and, in my judgment, wisely sent, because we cannot render the British army too strong and formidable in the present critical state of our relations towards France; but I cannot see any adequate reason for our entering into new subsidiary engagements, particularly with respect to those Powers whose armies have not yet taken the field, and from which in any case, perhaps, no considerable advantage could be expected.

You will recollect that previous to the battle of Waterloo I most reluctantly acquiesced in the Spanish subsidy, but I never expected that any part of it would have been granted after the Allies were known to be in possession of Paris. Indeed, I doubt very much whether the entrance of a Spanish army into the southern provinces of France can have any other effect than that of serious prejudice to the Royal cause, which is certainly popular in that part of the country.

The same observation applies in some degree to the Danish subsidy; and, indeed, I know that the Danish government had no expectation that a subsidiary engagement would have been concluded with them after the battle of Waterloo.

I must beg of you, therefore, seriously to revise these different engagements. If the troops have marched, we must certainly make them the allowance of the subsidy for a certain time; but I think that those corps which we really do not want should be informed that we have no further need of their services, and that some arrangement should be made by which the subsidies should be discontinued as early as is consistent with justice.

I trust likewise that measures have been long since taken for preventing the advance of the Russian army of reserve.

We must expect to meet in Parliament with considerable difficulties on the subject of the subsidiary treaties already concluded and acknowledged to Parliament. It will be said with some reason, that those subsidies were granted on the principle that the Powers to whom they were given could not have taken the field without them; but that now that they are not only subsisting, but proposing to levy contributions in France, the amount of those contributions ought in part, at least, to be set off against the subsidies; and I confess I think it would be very difficult to find a good answer to this statement. I call your attention, however, to it in order that when we come to the period of settling the amount of force which is to remain in France or on the frontier, Great Britain may not unneces-

sarily be burthened with an expense which we are little able to bear, and which I am satisfied, if it is to continue for some years, Parliament will be very unwilling to sanction.

In your despatch (No. 27) where you speak of the fortifications to be erected in the Low Countries, you refer to the 4,000,000*l.* for this purpose, 2,000,000*l.* of which you suppose to be already provided by Parliament. No provision for this sum has yet been made, and I really think that both the government of the Netherlands and that of this country have a right to expect that the whole of this sum shall be defrayed by France, unless France is disposed to cede fortresses which may render the expense itself unnecessary; for we must not go upon the principle that whatever our success may be, we are to remain just in the same situation as if we had never gone to war.

Having been involved in the war by the act of France, and having expended so large a treasure and the best blood of the country in the prosecution of it, we have a right to expect a fair indemnity for our losses; and if the French government are unwilling to pay that indemnity by sacrifices of territory, we must require it of them in such means as may render the territories of our Allies secure against future aggression.

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Lisbon, 11th Aug., 1815.

I have not broken in upon you or upon Lord Castlereagh with any private letter for the last month, having had nothing to say to you of sufficient interest to be mixed with the astonishing events which every day was producing.

Amidst such events it is not at all surprising that the despatch which announced the acceptance of my resignation, and informed me that I should receive by the next mail my letters of recall, &c., should not yet have been followed by any further communication on the same subject.

Letters of recall, indeed, may not be necessary in my case, my letters of credence never having been delivered; but I cannot take any measures for divesting myself of my public functions without knowing into whose hands the daily business of the mission is to be transferred.

I have not thought it right to give any opinion upon this point, because I would not on any account run against Casamajor's interests or wishes; and I think it possible that, if not sent to Brazil, or otherwise employed, he might wish to come back here in any character rather than be out of employment. But undoubtedly (supposing him otherwise provided for) I should say that a minister plenipotentiary (which he must be, having been secretary of embassy) would be too considerable an establishment here for the system upon which you have very properly determined to act towards this government.

That system is precisely the one which I had in contemplation in my letter to you of the 28th of April, when I said that, "Supposing (what is now, I fear, not very probable) a state of profound peace, I am not sure that

to withdraw altogether from our intimacy with Portugal might not be the best way of ultimately confirming our influence."

To give the experiment full effect, the "withdrawing" cannot be too marked and ostentatious.

The consul here, as at Rio de Janeiro, would have been the natural depositary of the little ministerial business that ought to be carried on; but Jeffery, I am afraid, would be an unsafe functionary, and instead of keeping things quiet and stagnant, would speedily get himself into some violent quarrel, and perhaps enable the government to put him in the wrong.

If it were left to me to devolve the business into such hands as I could find here, I should not hesitate to choose Mr. Croft, whom Castlereagh gave me as Portuguese secretary. The only objection to him (it is one) would be that he would be too agreeable to the Portuguese; but he would be sure to keep himself out of scrapes and difficulties, into which any new person might very innocently fall.

I have no personal wish or feeling upon this matter. I do not let Croft know that I mention him, and I mention him only in case any part of the delay in making the arrangement should have arisen from the supposed difficulty of finding a proper person on the spot.

As to Casamajor, I still think that his destination ought to be to the Rio. It is the only point in which I differ from Castlereagh's view of the whole subject. He seems to think that whatever impression he may wish to convey to Brazil, will be conveyed directly and in its full force through Palmela. I do not know Palmela personally, at least not well enough to form any opinion of him individually. But I totally distrust any Portuguese as a channel for conveying any thing to the Court or the Ministry which the Ministry or the Court would rather not hear. As to our friend Funchal, he is to be safely trusted so far as Funchal's own interest happens to go with yours, but I doubt how much further.

Lord Beresford sailed yesterday. It is a step which no one could have advised, but I think he did right in determining on it. The discussions between him and the government were too far advanced when I arrived here for me to be able to pronounce a decisive opinion as to their origin; but I cannot entertain a doubt but that this government has been all along labouring to get rid of Lord Beresford and all belonging to him; and, in the state to which things were brought, he had no option but between an appeal to the Prince or a voluntary resignation.

I do not write to Castlereagh, conceiving him to be still at Paris, and with his hands sufficiently full of concerns more pressing than those of Portugal. You will judge whether to communicate to him what I have written to you.

Our last accounts from England leave Bonaparte still on board the *Bellerophon*.

From Paris we have nothing authentic later than through the English papers; but we hear by mercantile letters of the surrender of fortresses and the payment of millions to the Allies, all which I hope the next mail will confirm.

Believe me ever, my dear Liverpool, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Dickson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Daussoit, near Philippeville, 11th Aug., 1815.

In consequence of your Grace's letter of the 5th, I thought it requisite to inform myself relative to the situation of Givet and Rocroy, and therefore yesterday sent officers to both these places to ascertain if possible the political state of their garrisons.

Captain Lempriere, who went to Givet, informs me that the white flag is flying both on Charlemont and Givet, and that the garrisons are understood to have acknowledged the King: the place, however, is still blockaded by the Prussians.

Captain Bourchier, who went to Rocroy, has informed me that the garrison of Rocroy has not submitted to the King, nor has it any colours flying, and that the garrison still wear the tricoloured cockade: this place is also blockaded by the Prussians.

Under these circumstances I will move the first division of the battering train, consisting of thirty-six pieces, with a proportion of ammunition, so as to arrive near Rocroy on the 14th and 15th inst., by which time I may receive any orders your Grace may be pleased to send me.

As, in conformity to your Grace's instructions, the present state of Givet will render it unnecessary that I should move the battering train to that place, I beg therefore orders relative to the further employment of the battering train, to enable me to act, in the event of His Royal Highness Prince Augustus proposing other sieges.

I have the honour to be your Grace's most obedient servant,

A. Dickson.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Lord, Paris, 12th Aug., 1815.

The enclosed is just come. I send it in case you should wish to look over the details before our conference to-morrow.

The answer is also come accepting our proposition about the revenues.

I have seen Prince Hardenberg, and promised him our memoranda.

Count Nesselrode seems to like the principle of the old frontier. It is a line that does something which will make Germany reasonable without doing violence to France.

Ever yours,

Castlereagh.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Lord, Paris, 12th Aug., 1815.

It appeared to me desirable to put in on the part of Great Britain an opinion conformable to our view of the question, and calculated, as far as

is consistent with the view we have formed, to reconcile the disparity observable in the views of the other Powers.

I send you the draft of what has occurred to me for your correction.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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G. O. Paris, 13th Aug., 1815. [920.]

1. The Field Marshal begs that horses may not be tied to the trees in the Champs Elysées.

2. Notwithstanding the orders which have been given upon the subject, some of the cavalry of the army under the command of the Field Marshal have been foraging in the village of Belleville, the cantonment of the Russian troops.

3. The Field Marshal again forbids this practice, and he holds the commanding officers of regiments responsible for obedience to his orders.

WELLINGTON.

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*Supplément au Mémoire du Soussigné du 4 Août*, 1815.

Paris, le 13 Août, 1815.

I.—On a objecté que par la ligne désignée comme nécessaire pour la sûreté de l'Europe la France ne conserveroit depuis la Franche Comté jusqu'à Calais que des forteresses du second rang, et seroit privée de toutes les places fortes du premier rang. Cela est vrai.

Lille, Metz, Strasbourg, sont de ce côté-là les grands dépôts de guerre de la France.

Mais Lille, Metz, Strasbourg se trouvent aussi précisement sur les frontières, ce qui prouve qu'elles tiennent au système offensif de cet empire contraire à la sûreté des autres états.

Ce n'est donc que par l'application du principe de sûreté nécessaire pour la tranquillité de l'Europe, et non par son abus, qu'on prétend que la France doit y renoncer.

Voilà pourquoi on ne lui demande ni Besançon, ni Grenoble, ni Toulouse, puisque ces places, quoique aussi de grands dépôts, et du premier rang, sont plus éloignées de la frontière, et contrebalancées par les chaînes de montagnes qui font face contre elles, ce qui ne les rend que défensives et moins menaçantes pour les états voisins.

II.—Mais dit-on encore :—

Est-ce que le principe adopté comme règle pour la France sera aussi suivi comme telle pour les états voisins de ce royaume? et ces places dont il s'agit et qu'on leur rendroit, ne seroient-elles pas placées alors à l'extrémité de leurs frontières, et ne deviendroient-elles pas de leur côté offensives contre la France?

La même situation n'auroit-elle pas les mêmes suites?

Sans doute elle les auroit, si la situation étoit la même; mais elle ne l'est point.

1. Les états voisins de la France forment, de Nice jusqu'à Dunkerque, cinq états différentes, au lieu que la France forme contre eux une masse consolidée.

2. Chacun de ces états séparément, comparé avec la France, n'en offre que le tiers ou le cinquième, donc aucun n'est capable de lui faire une guerre offensive à lui seul.

3. Encore sont-ils situés sur l'étendue du cercle, dont la France forme le centre, et deux d'entre eux, qui pourroient être compté parmi les Puissances du premier rang; n'ont sur les frontières de la France que des provinces détachées, ayant leurs grands corps d'état loin de là.

La situation de ces états n'est donc pas offensive contre la France, mais défensive, et ces places rentrent chez eux dans la catégorie de la situation des états dont ils font partie.

Elles cessent donc d'être des places offensives ou des grands dépôts militaires, et deviennent des places défensives, nécessaires pour leur sûreté et pour les mettre à même de résister aux forces prépondérantes avec lesquelles la France pesera toujours sur eux.

III.—Mais ne suffiroit-il pas de les raser, et de les faire sauter?

Sans doute ce seroit beaucoup, mais pas assez; et pour les faire sauter il faudroit encore en être le maître, ou renoncer que cela se fasse. Car jamais la France ne s'y résoudra sans y être forcée.

Chacune de ces places est pour elle d'une si grande importance qu'elle risquera plutôt de faire la guerre avant d'en faire sauter une seule; tandis qu'elle y consentira peut-être aujourd'hui, puisqu'elle ne verra pas la possibilité de resister; mais elle n'exécutera jamais les stipulations qu'on pourroit faire à cet égard.

Il faudroit donc toujours lui faire la guerre pour obtenir l'exécution de cette stipulation; et comme on ne court pas un plus grand danger que celui-ci en lui demandant ces places pour toujours, il vaut mieux de risquer une guerre pour les obtenir que pour les faire sauter dans la suite.

IV.—Tout le monde convient d'ailleurs que les états voisins manquent de places fortes contre la France, et n'ont pas jusqu'ici une défensive contre elle; mais on craint de les demander à la France pour éviter la chance d'une nouvelle guerre; et on propose donc de faire bâtir de nouvelles places par les nations voisines, en gardant les forteresses Françaises jusqu'à ce que les premières pourroient remplacer celles-ci.

Si les états voisins avoient provoqués la guerre, ce principe seroit juste; mais la France l'ayant provoquée, et sa situation étant offensive et menaçante pour la sûreté des autres états, c'est à elle à en porter la charge et les inconvéniens.

Changeons donc la thèse; et si des nouvelles forteresses devroient être nécessaires, que ce soit la France qui les fasse bâtir, et non les nations tranquilles et paisibles qui l'environnent.

Vouloir faire tomber cette charge sur celles-ci, ce feroit une injustice terrible à l'innocent, au lieu de frapper le coupable.

V.—Mais dit-on encore, si l'on demande tous ces sacrifices de la France, la nation se soulevera, on risquera une guerre d'Espagne, l'odieux de cette

mesure tombera sur le gouvernement, et les Bourbons ne se maintiendront pas.

Voici ce que je réponds :—

1. Un soulèvement est possible, mais on le risquera toujours aussi longtemps que cette génération existera, qui est élevée dans les principes de la Révolution.

Doit-on le craindre lorsque l'Europe est en France avec 600,000 hommes? Est-ce une raison de ne demander aucune sûreté de la France, et doit-on courir la chance de se trouver en guerre avec elle, aussitôt que l'Europe ne sera plus réunie, et d'avoir alors cette guerre dans nos propres foyers?

Laquelle de ces chances est la plus risquante?

2. Pour ce qui regarde le danger d'une guerre comme celle d'Espagne, il faut observer :

*a.* Que le caractère des deux nations y admet une grande différence.

*b.* Que l'Espagne avoit un grand soutien dans l'alliance avec la Grande Bretagne, qui lui a fourni des armes, des munitions, et des troupes; qu'au contraire la France se trouveroit abandonnée de toute part et en même tems affaiblie, et dépourvue d'armes et de munitions.

*c.* Que la situation physique du pays est extrêmement différente entre les deux pays. L'Espagne favorise beaucoup plus une guerre nationale que la France, tant par de plus grandes montagnes dans l'intérieur du pays que par l'infertilité des grands districts qui s'y trouvent.

*d.* Que toute l'Europe est dans ce moment assemblée en France, et qu'en Espagne ce n'étoit seulement qu'une partie de l'armée Française qu'y faisoit la guerre, pendant que la plus grande partie de cette armée étoit occupée loin de là, en d'autres pays.

*e.* Il faut encore peser que si, effarouché par la possibilité d'une telle guerre, on ne prenoit que des demies mesures, on se trouveroit dans le cas d'avoir tout fait pour éveiller la haine et la vengeance dans les cœurs, et rien pour leur ôter l'avantage de porter cette haine chez nous; donc qu'on pourra être sûr d'avoir à soutenir dans peu d'années une guerre terrible, et dans une situation désavantageuse, pour avoir voulu éviter le risque d'une guerre sous des chances favorables pour nous. Qu'on pèse donc bien de quel côté le danger sera plus grand?

3. La question, si les Bourbons se maintiendront en France ou non? ne dépend absolument pas du plus ou moins de mesures de sûreté qu'on demandera d'elle, mais tient aux garanties politiques, sur lesquelles il faudra convenir.

Pour le prouver, je changerai la question, et je demanderai : Si l'on peut croire qu'ils se maintiendront, supposé qu'on ne demande rien à la France?

Certes, personne n'osera l'affirmer!

VI.—Comme cette question nous mène aux garanties politiques, qu'il me soit permis de dire en peu de mots mes idées sur cet objet.

Puisqu'il n'est pas douteux que la tranquillité de l'Europe dépend de la tranquillité de la France, et ne peut résulter que de ses institutions politiques, l'Europe a sans doute le droit de demander de la France des garanties politiques, sans lesquelles toutes les garanties militaires ne suffiroient pas pour assurer le repos de l'Europe.

En quoi donc ces garanties peuvent-elles consister? Veut-on se borner à s'assurer de la personne de Bonaparte à le mettre sous la surveillance et la

garde de l'Europe, et à ramener la France à son point de ralliement légitime, ou veut-on étendre plus loin les droits de s'immiscer de la part de la grande société Européenne dans les affaires d'un de ses membres?

1. En soutenant le Souverain légitime durant sa vie;

2. Ou en étendant ce principe à la dynastie;

3. En garantissant à la nation une Constitution, qui, loin de tout principe révolutionnaire, lui assure les droits libéraux contenus dans la Charte du Roi.

4. En se constituant médiateur et conciliateur entre la nation et le Souverain, pour tous les justes vœux que la nation formeroit, pour obtenir des changements dans la Charte du Roi; ou voudra-t-on se contenter de ce qu'on a fait jusqu'ici, et ne pas immiscer directement ni indirectement dans les affaires intérieures de la France?

Sur toutes ces questions il faudra prendre des décisions.

Si on ne veut pas s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures, alors les garanties politiques ne peuvent pas avoir lieu.

Si on le veut, et il me semble qu'on le devra, il faudrait écouter les vœux de la nation; et voici sur quoi ces vœux semblent rouler:—

*a.* Monarchie constitutionnelle.

*b.* Garantie de l'Europe pour une telle Constitution, fondée sur des principes libéraux, comme la Charte du Roi les exprime.

*c.* Maintien de la personne du Roi jusqu'à son mort; puis,

*d.* Changement de dynastie en faveur de la maison d'Orléans, qu'on croit plus susceptible des idées du tems présent, plus libre de préjugés, et n'étant pas liée par des promesses et assurances données dans des temps passés; enfin, plus faite pour régner sur la France que les autres Princes de la maison de Bourbon.

Si on donne ces garanties à la nation Française, on pourra espérer qu'elle restera tranquille; si non, on ne peut pas s'enflatter. Les troubles éclateront aussitôt que les armées Alliées se seront éloignées, et si leur séjour en France duroit pendant dix ans.

Il me semble donc que c'est un devoir de l'Europe de se prononcer sur ces questions, et de prendre le rôle de médiateur entre la nation et le Roi.

La nation ne peut pas prononcer ces vœux devant le Roi; elle se trouveroit peut-être dans une contradiction directe avec lui.

Le Roi, peut-il se placer entre la nation et sa famille, qui lui a donné tant de preuves de son attachement et de son dévouement, qui a partagé ses malheurs, et souffert avec lui? Non, sans doute; cela ne peut pas être; ni le Roi ni la nation ne le peuvent. Il faudroit donc un tiers.

Le tiers c'est l'Europe, puisque le bonheur et la tranquillité de la France et de l'Europe en dépendent.

Si l'on pourroit parvenir à cela, on auroit des garanties politiques, et ces garanties contribueroient beaucoup à adoucir les prétentions des garanties militaires qu'il faudrait exiger de la France, puisqu'on lui rendroit en bonheur domestique ce qu'on lui ôteroit en vain éclat et bonheur imaginaire.

VII.—De ces garanties politiques pourroient résulter alors des garanties morales, mais pour le moment il n'y en pas en France.

Une génération qui a tellement confondu toutes les idées qu'aucun sens de vérité ne s'attache plus à aucune, n'est pas capable de donner des garanties morales.

Cette génération, élevée dans la Révolution, restera révolutionnaire.

L'arrogance et la suffisance ont pris chez elle la place de l'énergie et du

caractère; la valeur celle de l'honneur; la licence celle des idées libéraux; et la fidélité aux sermens n'est qu'un jeu de mots, auquel elle se dit elle-même que les autres nations ne peuvent y ajouter aucun prix.

Avec une telle nation les garanties morales n'existent pas, et il faut avoir recours à d'autres mesures pour pouvoir espérer qu'elle restera tranquille.

KNESEBECK.

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MEN Recommended for PENSION given by Rev. JOHN NORCROSS.

15th Aug., 1815.

Lance Serjeant Graham, Coldstream Guards, who assisted Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell in closing the gate which had been left open for the communication, and which the enemy were in the act of forcing. He shot the leading man. His brother, a corporal in the same company, was lying wounded in a barn on fire. Serjeant Graham removed him to a short distance secure from the fire, and returned again to his duty. Three years and two months in the regiment.

Private Joseph Lister, 3rd Guards. His conduct was noted for particular bravery during the whole day. When our troops were driven from a hedge in the orchard, Lord Saltoun and Captain Hesketh wished, from its importance, to recover it. Lister was the first to come forward; spoke to and encouraged his comrades to do so. They did, and succeeded in recovering the ground they had lost. He shot the man who knocked down Captain Hesketh, and who was about to bayonet him. He has been above eight years a soldier, was three years and a half in the Peninsula, and was noted for brave conduct at Burgos.

[Let me see the letter from the clergyman who offered to settle 10*l.* per annum on a soldier.*

WELLINGTON.]

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.*

DEAR LORD B., Paris, 17th Aug., 1815.

I should be glad to know how we stand at this moment with the government of Louis XVIII. as to the execution of the Treaty of Paris, and what yet remains *en dépôt* in our hands. The occupation of Martinique stands upon distinct grounds, and, in point of honour, ought not to be withheld upon any ground which might bring into doubt the good faith of our conduct; but before we fulfil all the remaining stipulations of the treaty, we are fairly entitled, after the attempts made to defeat the claims of the creditors, to exact some improved security for the fulfilment of that particular article of the Peace.

I am, dear Lord Bathurst, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

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* See page 35.

## PRÉCIS OF CORRESPONDENCE ON SETTLEMENT WITH FRANCE.

Précis, &c., of most Secret and Confidential Despatch No. 16.

*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

Paris, 24th July, 1815.

Prevailing disposition exists to unite the (French) army, Vendéans, &c., in support of the cause of France against the foreign troops.

The want of order in some of the Allied troops has given birth to this sentiment of fraternization amongst parties otherwise rancorous against each other.

It may be expected to increase as the pressure of the Allied armies shall continue to operate.

Order and discipline in these, the only mode of keeping it within bounds.

With this view system of administration agreed upon.

As an estimate of the pressure, not less than 800,000 men of all arms already in France, subsisted, clothed, and equipped at the charge of the country. At an average of two livres per man per day, total charge not short of 70,000*l.* per day (exclusive of pecuniary contribution), or 2,000,000*l.* per month. Too soon to give any decided opinion of policy which Allies may adopt towards France, as yet only tendency of their respective dispositions can be traced. Amongst the Powers which border on France there is an evident desire for strong measures, even to the extent of partial dismemberment. This is the tone of the King of the Netherlands; of the Prussians loudly; of the Bavarians, Wurtembergers—all probably influenced by the double motive of securing their frontiers and augmenting their respective possessions.

Russia, on the contrary, being remote, rather inclines to protect France: the Emperor's principles naturally lead him to this line; he may also be inclined to keep up a connexion, and not to see France reduced too low. In a long conversation with him the day before yesterday, could perceive he was averse to any permanent reduction of the territory of France, and that as a measure of security he looked with more favour to dismantling than temporarily occupying certain of her fortresses. Austria is nearer our mode of viewing this question; but the Austrian Minister fears, moreover, to give Russia so much the lead in point of conciliating the French government as to produce between France and Russia too close a connexion.

In mean time French ministers not idle in taking advantage of these shades of difference amongst the Allies. Talleyrand has hinted that whilst they are prepared for pecuniary sacrifices within certain bounds, neither the King nor his ministers will ever consent to sacrifice the smallest portion of French territory. As this declaration reached me through the Russians, as a counter principle I protested against that of a simple pecuniary sacrifice; that security, not money, was the object of the war; and that unless concessions of this description were combined with a satisfactory system for securing and permanently covering Europe by a counter-line of defence against France, the Allies would never be forgiven by their own subjects. Unfortunate that the Prussians cannot be restrained, as their

conduct tends to unite the French and divide the Allies. Requests that what has been stated may be received with caution, as they are not yet sufficiently advanced to speak with confidence as to the final judgment of the parties.

PRÉCIS, No. 21, Secret and Confidential.

*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

Paris, 29th July, 1815.

Refers to letter of the 14th, No. 8.

In this state it appeared most desirable, if possible, to come to some understanding in the first instance with the Emperor of Russia.

Accordingly had another interview with His Imperial Majesty, in which he entered fairly into the question, and seemed disposed to concert his measures with the British government before he should commit himself in any other quarter. If His Imperial Majesty could be brought to adopt the principles for which Lord Castlereagh had contended, thought highly desirable that he should be prevailed upon to take the initiative in proposing them to the other Powers; that by giving him the lead, it would pledge him the more completely to enforce them upon France; whilst the measure being thus made his own, the British negotiators would not have the task thrown upon them alone of repressing the eagerness of the *limitrophe* Powers, who desired to profit by the present state of things to aggrandize themselves at the expense of France.

The paper now enclosed was prepared by His Imperial Majesty's command, and has been since modified, after full discussion between the Russian ministers, the Duke of Wellington, and Lord Castlereagh. In this shape it is agreed to be communicated to the Austrian and Prussian ministers; and that whilst the general principle is thus brought under consideration, the same parties should frame together a projet upon the two important practical questions, viz., the military positions to be occupied by the Allies in France for a time to be limited, and the amount and appropriation of the contribution to be required.

Will lose no time in concert with the Duke of Wellington in endeavouring to bring the Emperor of Russia to a satisfactory decision on these points, in which if we succeed, the difficulties in other quarters may be comparatively easy to surmount.

PRÉCIS, No. 27, Secret and Confidential.

*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

Paris, 3rd Aug., 1815.

May be desirable to be informed of progress in settling plan of the Allies, preparatory to a negotiation with the French government.

Austrian minister has prepared a memorandum explanatory of the sentiments of the Court on the Russian paper, which adopts substantially the integrity of France as the basis of the arrangement; adheres to the principle of occupying a line of fortresses for a period of years, but reinforces the Prussian views by giving countenance to the permanent separa-

tion of the exterior line of fortresses on the side of Flanders from France; or if that should not be thought expedient, it recommends that Lisle should be absolutely dismantled. To the southward it proposes to give Landau to Germany, and to dismantle Strasburg and Huningen.

The Prussian paper is in preparation: it will, of course, go beyond the Austrian in some points; but I have reason to believe Prince Hardenberg's views do not essentially differ from those of the other Allied ministers. Sends a memorandum of the Duke of Wellington, prepared by his Grace for discussion, on the military proposition to be made to France. Thinks his own opinion is in favour of the concentrated position in the North, rather than taking up the more extended line of fortresses along the whole frontier, including Lille. In examining this question, adverts to the force of 100,000 men which the Duke proposes should be kept up for the first year to watch France, and to hold the fortresses retained. Both attach much importance to the military attitude of the Allies being rendered at the outset imposing. If it is, France may subside into inaction; if not, their pride may be encouraged to some new effort to wipe away their disgrace, reseize their fortresses, and liberate themselves from other onerous stipulations required in our ultimate treaty. To counteract the impression in France that the Allies would never give up these fortresses, it is proposed to occupy them with the troops of the remote Powers.

If Russia, and Austria, and Great Britain, including Hanover, should furnish the 100,000 men, these, supported *en seconde ligne* by the armies of the Netherlands, of Prussia and Bavaria, would render any sudden offensive project on the part of France hopeless.

If such a plan is adopted, and a force of 70,000 men be concentrated in the seven or eight fortresses in front of the valleys of the Scheldt and Meuse, all Europe would have sufficient time, roused by the preparations of France, before she could bring forward a sufficient force to venture into Flanders, &c.

Thinks the Duke inclines the rather to this mode of occupying the frontier, from considering that Belgic towns in West Flanders, even with their present works and inundations, were recently found to present sufficient impediments to compel the French to attack on the side of the Meuse; when these works are improved, the debouching from Lille upon West Flanders will be more impracticable; and if the attack of the enemy is thus naturally driven to the southward, the force expended in garrisoning Lille would be less available, as being thrown too much to the flank. If the Duke, on military grounds, should think that Lille may be left with the King, it would be a great political facility to the negotiation, and would render the concessions which he must make less injurious to his popularity in France.

The prudence may also be doubted of insisting both upon the cession of Landau and the demolition of Strasburg. The latter is no doubt a menacing point to Germany, but so are Luxembourg and Mayence to France. If Landau could be permanently secured to cover the Duchy of Deux Ponts and the Palatinate, and Huningen be razed, as inconsistent with the security of Basle, it seems unreasonable to deprive France ultimately of Strasburg, it being always understood that other fortresses are to be constructed on the German side of the Rhine during the period the

Allies are to hold the French fortresses. The Duke of Wellington attaches less importance to Strasburg, as he considers the irruption into Germany improbable whilst the Low Countries are unconquered.

As doubts exist whether Lille should be insisted upon, and as this place was expressly pointed out in the instruction as essential, desires to bring this point again under consideration, and to request from the Cabinet such a latitude as it may be deemed expedient to entrust to the Duke of Wellington and him, acting in concert with the other ministers.

Upon the question of contribution less progress made; has claimed a due appropriation of what may be demanded for fortifications. The amount will probably be half a year's * revenue, and has suggested that half of the whole should go for the purposes of defence. If out of this 2,000,000 for the Low Countries are obtained, with the 4,000,000 already provided, the Duke calculates we shall have a tolerably good provision.

### Précis of No. 30.

*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

10th Aug., 1815.

Announcing the approaching marriage of His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange with the Grand Duchess Anne; his conversation with the Emperor thereon, in which he stated "that he hoped the approaching connexion with the Sovereign of the Netherlands would give His Imperial Majesty an additional interest in watching over the independence of that most important part of Europe;" that "the Emperor expressed in strong terms the pleasure he should feel in cooperating with the Prince Regent in promoting the security of the Netherlands."

### Précis of No. 31.

*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

Paris, 12th Aug., 1815.

Forwards Austrian and Prussian remarks on the Russian note; also the opinions which have been given in on the part of Great Britain by the Duke of Wellington and him. Not yet had answer to No. 27. Question of Lille, however, still remains open in the alternative of places. The Duke appears to prefer the concentrated position, and in this believes Prince Schwarzenberg concurs.

Has sounded the Ministers upon the principle of restraining France within the frontiers of 1790; assigning the *enclaves* to the territory in which they are enveloped. This would restore to Sardinia and the King of the Netherlands the districts severed by the Peace of Paris, and to Germany the important fortress of Landau. These acquisitions, with the dismantling of Huningen and possibly Condé, seem as much as can be attempted without changing the complexion of the measure.

The objection to his proposed measure is the difficulty of execution: is certain it cannot be well executed in other hands than those of the Duke of Wellington. This is the decided opinion of both Emperors: the Emperor

* Query, one whole year's?

of Russia is disposed even to make it a condition *sine quâ non* of his leaving a Russian contingent. The Duke is willing to accept the chief command: his only reluctance is a doubt whether he can manage the Prussians, and whether they will be willing parties to the arrangement. His Grace having the command will render the plan less unpopular in France, and less injurious to the King.

As the charge will be borne by France, no objection will probably arise to our furnishing our quota in British troops: they will be particularly acceptable in France.

Forwards Knesebeck's Memoir, with explanatory map, which leaves France without one fortress of the first order, whence it may be judged what prospect there would be of forcing the King to assign away for ever all the great places of the monarchy. Thinks he had better leave the country.

Has reason to hope the Emperor of Russia will go as far as the Duke of Wellington's proposition; and if so, how much better it is for Europe to rest its security upon what all the Powers will stand to, than to risk the Alliance by aiming at measures of *extreme* precaution!

PRÉCIS in answer to No. 27, Private and Confidential.

*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

Fife House, 11th Aug., 1815.

Acknowledges the receipt of No. 27, with the Duke of Wellington's Military Memorandum on the proposition to be made by Allies to French government. With respect to the two projets in the Memorandum, the Cabinet disposed to place entire confidence in whatever may be the ultimate military judgment of the Duke.

However desirous of seeing Louis XVIII.'s government popular in France, does not feel that they should be justified in sacrificing for this object anything deemed important for the general security of Europe. Doubts whether forbearance on the part of the Allies would have the effect of rendering the King popular, and decidedly of opinion that government may thereby deprive themselves of the means of affording him that support on which his authority must for some time essentially depend. Wishes, therefore, that this question should be decided on military principles, according to what may best contribute to general security.

While ready to give discretion on the non-demand of Lille, if the Duke of Wellington shall be of opinion that the object can be better or as well accomplished without it, the Cabinet is nevertheless of opinion that Lille should in the first instance be required, and that we should only give up our claim upon the French government consenting to such arrangement as shall be considered entirely satisfactory.

Not having yet seen the Austrian and Prussian projets, ignorant of the extent of the views of these governments; but informed that they adopt the principle of permanent cessions by France, at least as far as regards the external line of fortresses. We should not forget that these governments have more of common interest with us in the whole of this question than the government of Russia; and though we have all at heart the consolidation of the legitimate government in France, we should consider that

our success in this object must necessarily be very uncertain, and that the security of the neighbouring countries against France may be much more easily attained than the rendering France orderly and pacific.

PRÉCIS, Private and Confidential.

*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

Paris, 17th Aug., 1815.

Refers to No. 31, in which mention made that he had sounded the Allies on leaving France with the frontier of 1790, &c. Has reason to be assured of Emperor of Russia's support in this demand, as well as of the other two Powers. The Emperor of Russia thought it the more reasonable as resting on a principle, and thus precluding arbitrary selection, by which local pretensions might stand in competition, or the general be swelled by the collective demands.

In reference to former suggestion of the probability of the Emperor of Russia putting himself forward as the protector of Louis XVIII., thinks it due to His Imperial Majesty to state that he has not found him disinclined, after fair discussion, to adopt such measures of salutary precaution as have been proposed, and still thinks that by the course he (Lord Castlereagh) had adopted, as reported in a former letter, he had deprived His Imperial Majesty of that character of being the exclusive protector of the King of France (a position which, for the general politics of Europe, it is of great importance he should not occupy), but that also he had gradually brought His Imperial Majesty to adopt all the principles of the other Allied Powers as his own, and to push them as far as it is at all clear they can be pushed without hazard of reaction.

Concurs in the remark (in Lord Liverpool's of August 11) that the true interests of Great Britain are much more identified with those of Austria and Prussia in the present crisis than with those of Russia, but observes that both the former Courts require to be watched at the present moment with respect to the mode in which they pursue their particular views, to prevent Great Britain from being involved in a course of policy in which she has no principle of common interest with them, but the reverse.

The first point is that neither Austria nor Prussia may, and certainly none of the smaller Powers have, any sincere desire to bring the present state of things to a speedy termination, so long as they can feed, clothe, and pay their armies at the expense of France, and put English subsidies into their pockets, of which last nothing can deprive them previous to the 1st of April, 1816, but the actual conclusion of a treaty with France.

The Austrians, it is true, have latterly halted a corps of 15,000 men in Lower Austria; but they have brought the whole of Bianchi's army into Provence, to feed upon that poor and loyal country.

The Prussians have not only brought an entire new *corps d'armée* of 40,000 men forward, much to the annoyance of the King of the Netherlands, on whom they have been feeding by the way, but have reinforcements to an equal amount in full march to fill up their other corps, making their force in France, according to their own returns, 280,000, for which they draw rations.

The Bavarians also, not to lose time, have forwarded troops from Munich

to the Loire in waggons, at a moment when their service in the field was out of the question.

The Prussian Minister of Finance, Bülow, told him yesterday that he calculated the Allied force now in France at 900,000 men, and their expense, including forage and waste, at not less than three livres per man per day, which is about 112,000*l.* per day, or 36,000,000*l.* per year, exclusive of pay and clothing, the latter being provided by distinct requisitions, the former by the revenues of the department occupied.

To this must be added the final contribution to be demanded, which, from what he can gather, is not likely to fall short of 600,000,000 of livres; and if to this is added the charge of 100,000 men to occupy the intended positions in France for a number of years, the pressure is likely to be as heavy in a pecuniary shape as the country can be expected quietly to submit to.

2nd. Position in which the two Powers above alluded to will probably have views not altogether in unison with ours: namely, in the appropriation of a considerable proportion of this contribution to fortifications. States that Lord Liverpool reasons on the justice of throwing upon France the expense of providing those defences which her conduct has rendered indispensable to the security of the neighbouring states. Austria and Prussia urge as strongly and preferably the right of being indemnified for the expenses of the war, and for former contributions levied on them by France. Quite clear that France cannot meet all these demands; that the charge on her must be limited in amount; and that it will be a question amongst the Allies, in appropriating this fund, which pretension is to give way. Much opposition apprehended from Prince Hardenberg on this point, and Prince Metternich found more impracticable upon it than on any other: hopes, however, he has made some impression; but this must not be supposed a question between the Allies and France; it is one between us and the Allies, in which he foresaw, before he left England, that they should have to contend on grounds of remote precaution against the immediate pressure of avarice and poverty.

Has, in addition to support, received assurances from the Russian Minister that the Emperor will agree to his proposition of appropriating one-third of the contribution to fortification, which, considering the remote interest of Russia, is a very liberal proceeding.

In the management of his troops, the Emperor has been as little open to reproach. His second army was put in motion without any bargain, and previous to the assurance of any assistance from us; and their march was stopped, and orders sent for their return, upon a representation from Lord Castlereagh. His Imperial Majesty now urges (and for the economy of our subsidies we must be anxious for the same) that a prompt settlement should be made with France, being anxious to march his army back as early in the next month as the state of the negotiations will permit.

Another point in which we must be guarded with those Courts is the impulse they receive from the public sentiment in Germany, from the temper of the smaller Powers, and the desire each feels not to yield to the other the influence in Germany which belongs to what is most popular.

The prevailing sentiment in Germany is favourable to the territorial reduction of France. After what the people have suffered, this is not

wonderful; but it is one thing to wish a thing done, and another to maintain it when done. None of these Powers can for any time keep up war establishments, or, having laid them down, easily resume them: if, then, this course increases the chance of early war, the acquisitions may be of short duration; and whilst the chances of peace diminished, we may be obliged, in order to keep France within due bounds, to take the weight of the war on ourselves.

Impressed with the opinion that the possession of a certain number of French fortresses for an extended period is preferable to their actual cession, and this for the obvious reason that the one is compatible with French connexion, the other leads to unite all Frenchmen against us, or rather against the Power in possession of their spoils, and as the King of the Netherlands would probably be the first to be attacked, we ought to weigh well the course to be pursued.

In stating that a temporary occupation is not incompatible with preserving a useful influence in France, does it from knowing that the King and his Ministers do not wish to see France without foreign troops, and that they admit these cannot be left without the security of a certain number of fortresses. Belief and hope then is that if the arrangement made with attention to the feeling of the country, the King, his government, and the loyal party will ally themselves with us, and, thus sustained, the King will gradually be able to establish his authority—a security valuable beyond all others we can acquire. If he fails, we shall have nothing with which to reproach ourselves; whereas, if we now push things to extremity, he has no resource but to disavow us, and, once committed, will soon be obliged either to lead the country himself into war, or be set aside to make way for some one more bold.

The whole of this view of the subject turns on the conviction that the King's cause is not hopeless, and that the European alliance can be made largely instrumental to his support, if the securities demanded shall not be ultimately hostile to France, after she shall have given *protracted proof* of having ceased to be a revolutionary state.

Knows not the impression which the Austrian and Prussian papers may have made in England; but if you should deem it necessary to demand securities against which all Frenchmen would protest, my advice then would be to have no reserve with France: you can then only calculate on her submission for the shortest interval; and the objection against General Knesebeck's plan is that it does not go far enough, leaving France nearly entire in population and resources, whilst it deprives her of those objects which will revive in every Frenchman a desire for war.

We must, therefore, make up our minds whether to play a game with any portion of France, or against France collectively: if the former, as much security only need be demanded as is compatible with that object; on the contrary, if the other, the Cabinet ought to instruct the Duke of Wellington and him not to secure a fortified town the more or the less, but to confer with the other Allies how France may be effectually disqualified for any future attempt to assail Europe. Has no doubt the middle line would be attended with most *éclat*; but it is not our business to collect trophies, but to bring back the world to peaceful habits. Does not believe this to be compatible with an attempt materially to affect the

French territory as settled at the Peace of Paris, neither does he think it clear (if by taking France into guardianship for a number of years she can be restored to ordinary habits, and weighing the growth of other States, particularly of Russia) that France, even with present dimensions, may not be found a useful member of the European system.

But all this the Cabinet is to weigh. They now have all the materials; know the Duke of Wellington and his opinions; and if they wish to alter the view taken by these, no time is to be lost. As far as things have gone, the securities proposed exceed in amount (Bonaparte being in our hands) those required by original instructions, even in the event of his being at large; but this is no objection, if the thing is right in itself.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

My dear Castlereagh, Fife House, 18th Aug., 1815.

We have received your letters of the 12th inst., enclosing the Prussian and Austrian projets on the terms to be proposed to France, and your memorandum and that of the Duke of Wellington upon them.

I entirely concur with you and the Duke of Wellington in your opinion as to the extravagance of the Prussian propositions under all the present circumstances. I certainly think that the reduction of the power of France proposed in their projet would be more beneficial to Europe than it would be disadvantageous to France; and I should not be surprised if events were now to take such a turn as might render it just and expedient for the Allies to insist on the Prussian demands to their full extent. But the contest must in that case assume a new character. The projet in question is in no way consistent with the relations in which we stand at present to Louis XVIII.

On the other hand the Austrian projet does not appear to us unreasonable. It is founded on no principle of dismemberment, nor on that of reducing the power of France or violating the integrity of their territory beyond what is absolutely necessary for the security of the neighbouring states. I confess I think that, under all the circumstances, the most wise arrangement would be a combination of the Austrian projet with that of the Duke of Wellington.

Suppose, for example, that the Duke of Wellington's second projet was taken as to temporary occupation, and it was moreover stipulated that on the side of Germany, Strasbourg and Nimeguen should be dismantled (the latter never to be refortified), and Landau to remain permanently with Germany.

On the side of the Low Countries, Lisle should be dismantled, and Condé, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Philippeville, and Givet should be permanently annexed to the kingdom of the Netherlands. Or this might be still further modified by Valenciennes being allowed to revert to France, the fortifications being destroyed, and only Condé, Maubeuge, Philippeville, and Givet being permanently retained.

An arrangement on this principle would have nothing in it which could really be considered as humiliating to France. The proposition for tempo-

rary occupation, on which we are agreed, is in fact more humiliating than what it would be proposed to retain. We should ask no more than what a successful war on the frontiers might entitle us to demand, and I doubt very much whether the French expect to be let off more easy than they would be by a proposal of the nature of that above stated.

You have, however, been apprised in the memorandum of the 3rd August of the arrangement in which we are ready to concur if nothing further can be obtained. But I think that while we attend so much to what is due to the feelings of the French government, we ought not to be insensible to what we owe to Austria, Prussia, and our other allies, and likewise to the public feeling in this country, which I cannot conceal from you will be grievously disappointed by the acknowledgment without qualification of the integrity of the French territory.

I must again call your attention to the question regarding the statues and pictures which have been withdrawn from other countries. I do not feel on this subject as strongly as many others. I am of opinion that it is very desirable in principle that they should be all restored to the states to which they originally belonged; but I am aware that this cannot be effected, especially after the inconsiderate arrangements of last year, without some prejudice to the King of France and his government.

If, therefore, we are to call upon the King of France to make other sacrifices for the more important object of the security of Europe, I can understand the repugnance which may naturally exist to pressing him too far on a point of this nature; but if we are to acknowledge the integrity of the French territory in all respects, and to satisfy ourselves with the temporary occupation of the fortresses, I am sure it will be felt that he ought to give up the plunder of the French Revolution. If he stands upon the principle of old France, it ought not to be old France with the revolutionary plunder. If, on the other hand, he claims the advantages of which he is in possession without regard to the title, but as being in possession, it is not unjust or unreasonable in that case that the state of possession should be considered with respect to other matters, and that France should make some sacrifices to the security and even to the convenience of the Allies.

I have only to add that the intention of conferring on the Duke of Wellington the command of the force to be kept on the frontier of France appears to be highly judicious, and that there will be no objection to furnish a quota of British troops upon the principle stated in your letter.

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 18th Aug., 1815.

I have directed the ratifications to be prepared of the convention respecting Bonaparte; but it is material that I should call your attention to the expense which will be incurred by confining him in St. Helena.

I do not believe that this expense will be less than 100,000*l.* a-year. As he is the common prisoner of the Allies, it appears by no means just that the whole expense should fall on this country. In the sum to which I

have referred I of course include the additional naval and military expense which Bonaparte's confinement in St. Helena will render necessary, some proportion of which, as well as of his maintenance and support and that of those of the persons who attend him in the island, should be defrayed in just proportions between France and the other Allies.

This object in itself may be thought to be one not of much importance, but it really is so in appearance, particularly as we cannot keep the subject out of Parliament, as some awkward questions may arise respecting it, and as it may be of consequence to show that Bonaparte is not only a common prisoner nominally, but that all the great Powers feel a common interest in his fate, and are ready to submit to some sacrifice, however small, for the security of his person.

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 18th Aug., 1815.

I believe I have hardly adverted in any of my former letters to the relations between France on the one hand and Savoy and Switzerland on the other. It is thought very important that the errors which were committed in the Treaty of Paris should if possible be rectified by restoring to the King of Sardinia on the side of Savoy what was then taken from him. It may likewise be of material consequence that some rectification should take place as to the frontier of France and Switzerland. Such an arrangement, it is conceived, might be made without any material sacrifice on the part of the French government; and as Switzerland is so much the weaker power, and can never, in point of fact, be expected to act offensively against France, no collateral inconvenience could arise to the latter from any reasonable concession which it might be called upon to make in that quarter.

I would suggest likewise whether the principle of the temporary occupation of fortresses which is applied to the rest of the frontier of France should not be applied to that part of the territory of France opposite to Savoy, and whether it should not be stipulated that Grenoble should be occupied for the same time as the other fortresses.

As far as I recollect, Grenoble surrendered by capitulation to the Allies, not having previously hoisted the white flag.

LIVERPOOL.

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[ 921. ] *To His Royal Highness the Duke of York.*

SIR, Paris, 19th Aug., 1815.

My brother has made me acquainted with the particulars of the conversation which he had had with your Royal Highness regarding the appointment of Lord FitzRoy Somerset to be one of the Regent's aides-de-camp, and I beg leave to return

your Royal Highness my thanks for the favourable manner in which you have received this application from my brother.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset has long served me with the greatest zeal and ability, and at last has received a wound which has disabled him for the moment. He has distinguished himself upon every occasion, and I shall be very happy if he is promoted to be aide-de-camp to the Prince Regent when a vacancy may occur.

Knowing how low down he is among the Lieutenant-Colonels, and your Royal Highness's desire to avoid making promotion which might injure the feelings of others, I hope you will believe that I should not have made this application if I had not received from Mr. Pole the information that it would not be disagreeable to your Royal Highness.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Prince Talleyrand to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 19 Août, 1815.

Je reçois à l'instant de M. de Chabrol, Préfet de la Seine, un rapport sur les réquisitions de subsistance que fournit journellement la ville de Paris. Je l'adresse directement à Votre Excellence plutôt qu'aux ministres réunis des quatre Cours, parcequ'il concerne plus particulièrement l'armée Anglaise, et j'en recommande instamment l'objet à votre attention, dans la confiance entière qu'il suffira toujours de faire connaître à Votre Excellence les abus qui se commettent pour qu'elle soit empressée de les faire cesser.

Agréez, My Lord, l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

[Refer to the Commissary-General, and beg he will inquire into the abuse, and give me an answer without loss of time.

WELLINGTON.]

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TABLEAU GÉNÉRAL représentant la QUANTITÉ de MUNITIONS et FOURRAGES requise de l'Administration Française journellement pour l'Armée de son Excellence le Maréchal DUC DE WELLINGTON.

Paris, 21st Aug., 1815.

| Noms des Dépôts. | Noms des Commissaires donnant les Récépissés. | Kilogrammes. | | | Litres. | | Kilogrammes. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Pain. | | Viande. | Vin. | Eau de Vie. | Avoine ou Orge. | Foin. | Paille. | Bois. |
| | | Blanc. | De Munition. | | | | | | | |
| Paris .. .. | D. C. G. Purcell .. | 1300 | .. | 844 | 422 | 141 | 8,784 | 8,784 | 4,392 | .. |
| | D. A. C. G. Hall .. | 100 | 140 | 160 | 80 | 27 | 1,740 | 1,740 | 870 | 967 |
| | D. A. C. G. Rodney .. | 75 | 60 | 90 | 45 | 15 | 768 | 768 | 384 | 665 |
| | Mr. Reid, C. C. .. | 65 | 100 | 109 | 55 | 19 | 852 | 852 | 426 | 1,140 |
| | Mr. Malcolm, C. C. .. | 100 | 174 | 183 | 92 | 31 | 1,554 | 1,554 | 777 | 503 |
| | D. A. C. G. Bowman | 600 | 1,893 | 1,662 | 830 | 277 | 2,040 | 2,040 | 1,020 | 13,000 |
| | Mr. Dee, C. C. .. .. | 700 | 2,038 | 1,826 | 913 | 304 | 1,750 | 1,750 | 875 | 15,000 |
| St. Denis .. | D. A. C. G. Schaumain | 3800 | 20,400 | 16,100 | 8,810 | 2940 | 52,475 | 52,475 | 17,175 | 83,750 |
| Neuilly .. | D. A. C. G. Davidson | 2300 | 23,511 | 17,180 | 8,590 | 2860 | 67,305 | 67,305 | 33,653 | 95,792 |
| | | 9040 | 48,316 | 38,154 | 19,837 | 6614 | 137,268 | 137,268 | 59,572 | 210,817 |

T. DUMARESQ, Dep. Com. Gen.

STATEMENT of the Quantities of BISCUIT, MEAT, and SPIRITS issued out of the Supplies brought from the Belgian Provinces, to make up for the deficiencies in the Supplies from the French Administration.

Paris, 22nd Aug., 1815.

| Date. | Issued from the Dépôt at Neuilly. | | | Issued from the Dépôt at St. Denis. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pounds of Biscuit. | Head of Cattle. | Pints of Spirits. | Pounds of Biscuit. | Head of Cattle. | Pints of Spirits. |
| July 13 | 21,351 | 140 | .. | .. | 100 | .. |
| 14 | 8,344 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 15 | 8,288 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 17 | 3,360 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 18 | 4,316 | 199 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 19 | .. | .. | .. | 17,942 | .. | .. |
| 20 | .. | .. | .. | 10,000 | .. | .. |
| 21 | 8,288 | .. | .. | 2,000 | .. | .. |
| 22 | 14,786 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 23 | 8,224 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 24 | 3,334 | 137 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 25 | 11,312 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 26 | .. | .. | .. | 7,600 | .. | .. |
| 27 | .. | .. | .. | 16,969 | .. | .. |
| 28 | 1,904 | .. | .. | 4,378 | .. | .. |
| 30 | 3,024 | 50 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 31 | 2,912 | .. | .. | .. | 7 | .. |
| Aug. 1 | 2,240 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 2 | 2,240 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 4 | .. | .. | .. | 2,912 | .. | .. |
| 6 | .. | .. | .. | 3,136 | 11 | .. |
| 10 | .. | .. | .. | 10,006 | .. | .. |
| 11 | .. | .. | .. | 5,438 | .. | .. |
| 15 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. |
| 16 | .. | .. | .. | 5,838 | .. | .. |
| 17 | .. | .. | .. | 5,800 | 1 | .. |
| Spirits issued during the above periods | .. | .. | 88,128 | .. | .. | 28,193 |
| Total | 103,923 | 526 | 88,128 | 92,019 | 120 | 28,193 |
| Total issued at Neuilly | | | | 103,923 | 526 | 88,128 |
| General Total | | | | 195,942 | 646 | 116,321 |

T. DUMARESQ, D. C. G.

*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 23rd Aug., 1815.

I have laid before the Prince Regent and the Cabinet your very able letter, marked private and confidential, of the 17th inst.

Under all the difficulties which unavoidably attend our present relations with the French government, we are prepared to concur in the alternative stated in your letter, to which both the Duke of Wellington and yourself give so decided a preference; and, instead of urging the permanent cession of any part of the French territory by the French government, we shall be satisfied with an arrangement which secures to the Allies, for a time sufficiently extended, the military occupation of certain of the French fortresses according to the projets in the Duke of Wellington's paper, and which provides at the same time for the rectification of the French frontier by restoring France to the situation in which she stood in the year 1790, and giving the fortresses *enclavés* in the neighbouring territories to the states to which those territories belong.

We cannot conceal from ourselves and from you that an arrangement on this principle (which I believe to be entirely novel in its character) may be subject to many serious inconveniences; and we should be most desirous that there should be added to it, therefore, a stipulation for the dismantling of Lille and Strasbourg.

Such a stipulation need not, in our judgment, mortify the pride of the French nation. It would in no way affect the permanent interests of France, while it would add considerably to the temporary security of the Allies. And we are of opinion that this object is the more deserving of attention as the other part of the arrangement might in a great measure fail, in the event of differences unfortunately arising amongst the Allies, from any change in the policy of their respective Courts, by which any one of the considerable Powers might separate itself from the Alliance during the period specified for the occupation of the fortresses, and might thereby throw the whole arrangement into confusion, or defeat the purpose of it altogether.

In short, the principle of temporary occupation must necessarily be so complicated in its nature, that we feel all the importance of annexing to it something which may afford security to the neighbouring states independent of the contingencies above stated, till such time as measures can be adopted for placing their own frontiers in a respectable state of defence.

You will understand me as not bringing this proposition for dismantling Lille and Strasbourg forward as a *sine quâ non*, but as wishing it to be urged with all the weight which we feel is due to it; and considering how very short our propositions fall of the Austrian and Prussian projets, I cannot but entertain the confident hope that when the French government are aware, as they must be, of the extent of sacrifice which would have been demanded from them if it had not been for the moderation of Great Britain and Russia, they will not feel it possible to make any serious resistance to a concession of this nature.

We are fully sensible of the great importance of bringing our negotiations with France to a speedy issue. We understand that the Emperor of Austria has announced his intention of quitting Paris about the 10th of September, and that the Emperor of Russia will leave it about the same time. It is very material that the arrangements with France should be concluded before their departure, as it is impossible to say what difficulties may not occur after the separation of the Sovereigns. The public in France may consider it as an epoch, and may be disposed, as well as some members of their government, to create embarrassments and to take the chance of misunderstanding on which they will not venture to calculate as long as so many of the Sovereigns of Europe or their immediate representatives are united at Paris.

There are a great many points of detail relative to the temporary occupation of the fortresses to which it will be necessary particularly to direct your attention :—

1. How is the combined army which is to be left in France, in the first instance, to be paid? It must be clearly understood that the troops which are not British, or directly in British pay, must in no case look to be paid by us. If the British government were once to make an advance for this purpose, it is obvious that the whole expense would very soon fall upon them.

2. In order to obviate inconveniences which may arise from any delay in the payment of the Allied troops, it should be provided that the French government should assign a certain sum quarterly or half-yearly for this purpose; and if the sum should not be supplied within a time to be specified, the officers commanding the corps of the Allied troops should in that case, and not otherwise, be empowered, with the permission of the Commander-in-Chief, to raise the sum due to them upon a district of country to be agreed upon, in the neighbourhood of the fortresses which they may be called upon to garrison.

I have stated these ideas upon the definitive arrangement as they have occurred to me at present. I may have other suggestions to make of the same nature; but I cannot too strongly impress upon you and the Duke of Wellington the importance of providing beforehand distinctly for the different contingencies which may arise, in order that there may be hereafter as few matters of dispute and contention as possible in the execution of so new a system.

LIVERPOOL.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

PRÉCIS.

Paris, 24th Aug., 1815.

Lord Castlereagh requests express instructions to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. Despatches Lord Stewart to England. Hoped to have sent a paper of Prince Metternich's upon the idea of Lord Liverpool's letter

of the 18th. Prince Hardenberg has not explained himself. Difficulties of restraining the Prussian army, which Prince Hardenberg describes as Prætorian bands. Believes Prussia will agree with England in the end. Refers to his own paper, with "Principles" and "Observations," and encloses Count Nesselrode's vote of the Emperor of Russia. Views of Prussia. Councils wholly military. Spirit of vengeance against France. Dangerous spirit in the Prussian army *quoad* Europe and their own government. Prussia meditates change in her position. Knesebeck, when he brought his projet to Lord Castlereagh, &c., professed moderation; but it was clear he thought of extension on the side of Hanover and the Pays de Liège; Hanover to be indemnified by the Duchy of Luxembourg, and the King of the Netherlands by part of French Flanders. The Prussian object is to augment their possessions; put Hanover and the Pays Bas between them and France, for their own security; and involve Hanover and the King of the Pays Bas so irreconcileably with France as to render them dependent on Prussia for support, and then to demand her own terms for her support. Lord Castlereagh advises strongly against such a state of things as can produce this result. It is said France will covet Belgium; Lord Castlereagh says the Revolutionary party in France will; but if you take part of old France and add it to Belgium, all France will, as a point of honour, be anxious to regain it. Lord Castlereagh thinks the King of the Pays Bas had better trust to Europe for seven years, and to his fortifications afterwards, for protection. The same principle operates respecting all the small states bordering upon France: it is bad policy to encourage them to endeavour to get a small line of territory, which will only offend France and give them no security. Views of Austria right: desirous of peace; inclined to court popularity at our expense in Germany; to give fortresses in France to the King of the Pays Bas; to secure more of contribution to themselves, as less will be necessary to complete the frontier line of the Pays Bas. She will agree finally with England. Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington wish for decision upon these points. Language of the British here and British newspapers do the King's government great harm. Requests the consideration of the Cabinet on the means of preserving the peace of Europe, and destroying revolutionary spirit in France. Seven years' peace necessary for England. Wishes to share with the Emperor of Russia the credit of supporting the King of France, and prevent the too great union of France and Russia, which would be a serious evil. The difficulties of settlement are becoming daily greater. Prussia has made a requisition for 58,000,000 of livres and 24,000 horses.

[Enclosures.]

I.

*Principles upon which the proposed Negotiation with France ought to be considered.*

1. The demands which the Allies have to make upon France, and the arrangement upon which they proposed to rest the future peace and security of Europe, should be opened to the French government without loss of time, so

as to admit of a final arrangement before the 15th of September, on which day the Assemblies are to meet.

*Observations.*

1. It is impossible to conceal from ourselves the awkward position in which the Allies stand (more especially after the assurance given in their late note to Prince Talleyrand), when day after day they are either unable or unwilling to state to the French government what their ultimate object is.

2. This appearance of hesitation, from which disunion will be inferred, must essentially impair their real influence; and if the arrangement is not finally concluded before the Assemblies meet on the 15th of next month, the difficulties of a peaceful settlement may be seriously increased. It would be of importance that the King's Ministers should have some days to prepare the public mind for the arrangement before it can be brought into question before these Assemblies.

3. The Emperor of Russia has represented that he cannot keep his army in France after the middle of September without exposing them to a march in winter. It is unnecessary to observe to what pernicious misrepresentations their returning before an arrangement was actually signed would give rise, not only in France, but throughout Europe.

*Principles.*

2. In deciding upon any arrangement, the first object to attend to is, that it shall preserve unimpaired the alliance to which Europe already owes its deliverance, and on the permanence of which union it ought in wisdom to rely above every other measure of security for its future peace and preservation.

*Observations.*

In looking to the conservation of the alliance as the great measure of European security, it is presumed that, so soon as the treaty is signed with France, the Four Powers will renew amongst themselves (inviting their Allies to accede) the defensive branch of the Treaty of Chaumont, with such additions and alterations as the existing circumstances may require, as, for instance—

1st. An engagement by which the family of Bonaparte shall be for ever excluded from the throne of France.

2ndly. An engagement to furnish a contingent of troops to compose the European force to be stationed in France, constituting a unity of command, &c. &c.

3rdly. To furnish a further contingent in case that force should be at any time menaced or attacked, and generally to repel any attack which France may unjustly make upon the territories of any of the contracting parties.

4thly. To concert together and to take such measures as the security of Europe may require in the event of the stipulations contained in the treaty with France for the retrocession of the fortresses at a given period being rendered null and void by a convulsion affecting the succession, and generally to act in concert against any danger resulting from the interior state of France that may menace Europe.

*Principles.*

3. That the security to be required from France should be framed upon such principles, political and military, as shall afford to Europe an extraordinary and adequate protection against the revolutionary danger of France, so long as that particular danger may be presumed likely to exist.

The retrocession of the fortresses occupied to be stipulated in favour of Louis XVIII. and his lawful successors, so as to enable the Allied Powers, in the event of any new convulsion in France, to provide anew for their own security, according to the exigency of the case.

*Observations.*

This object seems sufficiently secured by an European force of 100,000 men occupying the central and fortified position on the northern frontier between Valenciennes and Givet, as proposed by the Duke of Wellington, whilst both flanks of Alsace are secured by the occupation of Landau, Bitche, and Huningen.

This position is both offensive and defensive in its character.

It is too menacing and powerful to be passed, and it cannot be forced without a succession of sieges, whilst the army that occupied it is within ten marches of Paris, without an intervening fortress.

The army that is to occupy it represents Europe. To menace or to attack that army is to declare war against Europe, the effects of which France will hereafter understand.

The proposed arrangement gives to the Allies an efficient army always assembled for field service in a commanding and fortified position. France cannot assemble a force capable of taking the offensive against it without her preparations being long known, and giving to this army full time to be supported.

It is true this measure is temporary; but in politics and in war security for seven or ten years is as much as human foresight can provide for.

It must be admitted that for the period it is to endure, no Powers in alliance ever took so effective a security against an opponent, and no State was ever placed more completely at the mercy of its adversaries.

Can it be asserted that the occupation of either Lille or Strasburg is necessary to render the Low Countries and Germany secure against attack from France whilst this arrangement subsists?

If not necessary to the main object of the Allies, may not their being demanded either drive the King to a refusal, or disqualify him for being the instrument to effectuate the great object the Allies ought to have in view, namely, the putting down and closing for ever the revolution in France?

If the King is to be stripped of three out of the four great fortresses of the monarchy, may he not be rendered odious on his throne as the mere instrument of a foreign supremacy?

Can the demand to occupy Strasburg in addition to Landau, Bitche, and Huningen be considered in any other light than as a demand of Alsace? and can any Frenchman suppose, with the known sentiments of Germany and the principle avowed that the defences of France should be the line of the Vosges, and not the valley of the Rhine, that this fortress will be quietly restored at the expiration of the term?

There is no doubt that both Strasburg and Lille are points of great value; and if it were a matter of choice, there could be no hesitation in the decision: but the true question is, at what price are they now to be obtained? At what increased risk of war are they to be held? What is their value at a distant day as a means of security? And subject to all these chances, is it wise for such a Power as the Netherlands, or even for so disjointed a confederacy as the Germanic body, for the remote advantage incident to such possessions, to commit themselves to maintain conquests of this nature against such a Power as France, or is it wise for Great Britain and Prussia, on whom must fall the burthen of supporting the House of Orange, to encourage the King to do so?

*Principles.*

4. That the required security should be studiously combined with the re-establishment of the Royal authority in France, which object, next to the continuance of the European alliance, is calculated above all other expedients to protect other States against the revival of those dangers from which they have been recently delivered.

It is, in truth, the only real and effectual cure for the evil.

If the Royal authority is not re-established in France, the presumption is that some revolutionary order of things of a character decidedly military will arise, against which one or two fortresses the more or the less in such hands will tell for little in the balance.

If, after every support the Allies can give him, the King shall fail to establish his authority, it will be a great satisfaction to them to have done nothing which may be supposed to have precipitated his fall, whilst they will hold in their hands for an extended period of years an adequate number of French fortresses as pledges for their own security, with the power in that case of retaining them permanently without the possibility of reproach.

5. That to provide against the extraordinary danger which Europe has to apprehend from the present state of the army and political parties of France ought to be considered as the first if not the exclusive object of our alliance and of the measures to be taken. The ordinary danger that may arise at the end of seven or ten years from the power of France, supposing it restored to its natural relations with Europe, cannot in wisdom justify the adoption of any measure at the present moment which is either inconsistent with the unity of the alliance, or which may render the efforts of the Allies inoperative in conjunction with the government of Louis XVIII. to suppress the revolutionary spirit and to consolidate the King's power in France.

The period of seven or ten years is mentioned as that for which the military occupation of the Allies is presumed to last, and within which time the Allies will have their securities in their own hands, should any new convulsion occur.

6. To effectuate the preceding principle, the demand ought to be framed, not against France as a State, but against a dangerous faction in that State.

Although imposed by the presence of the Allied armies, it ought to be felt by the King, his Ministers, and the sound part of the nation, as an *appui* and a protection.

If it be so degrading in its terms as to leave the King no other alternative but to refuse it or to remain without influence at the head of a nation universally discontented, and in the mass, loyal as well as disloyal, prepared to renew the contest at the first favourable occasion, danger, and not security, will have been produced by such an indiscreet demand.

7. The arrangement should not be such as to reopen the labours of Congress by giving occasion to a fresh distribution of territory, in which, although the pretensions of the several Powers cannot all be gratified, all may be either directly or collaterally to be considered.

Whatever is required of France in direct cession should be taken upon some obvious and general principle, as, for example, the frontier as it stood in 1790, assigning the *enclaves* to the country in which they are situated rather than upon a consideration of insulated points; and the line to be drawn ought not to alter essentially the character of the arrangements or to defeat the policy already contended for.

8. In the existing posture of the Allied Powers towards Louis XVIII., the proceeding on their part ought not to take the shape of an ordinary negotiation. The Powers of Europe stand sufficiently in the relation of Allies to the King

to make it unbecoming in them to put forward strong demands for the purpose of reducing them. It is more consistent with their character and dignity to have voluntarily reduced their pretensions as low as a sense of duty would permit, and to adhere peremptorily to them, rather than to invite opposition by partial concessions.

When once the demand is made, the Allies cannot keep their armies inactive in France till the King submits. They must be prepared, upon a refusal, to denounce the armistice and to have recourse to arms.

To be so maintained without impairing the alliance, the case ought to be a clear one in the eyes of Europe, such as each and every Power is prepared in consequence to maintain to the extremity of war.

The minimum of the Allied demands should, in fact, constitute a species of ultimatum on their part.

9. The arrangement being once made, and the number of troops which is to constitute the European corps to remain in France being settled, the double of this force might remain until a fixed proportion of the whole contribution to be levied, say two-thirds, shall be discharged; the rest of the Allied forces to be withdrawn forthwith. It is material to secure, at as early a period as is financially practicable, the heavier payments, else they might become at a future period a motive for a new war.

A proportion of the contribution, not less than one-third, to be assigned, under proper regulations, to erect, during the period the French fortresses shall be held by the European Powers, an adequate defence for Belgium and for Germany; one-half to be expended on the line north of Luxembourg, the other half to the southward between Luxembourg and Basle.

II.

*Résultat de l'Opinion de S.M.I. l'Empereur de Russie.*

Après avoir pris en mûre considération les idées développées dans les différents mémoires qui ont été remis sur l'état des négociations actuelles avec la France, S.M. l'Empereur de Russie est d'avis que le projet suivant sera le plus propre à concilier ce qu'exige la sûreté future de l'Europe avec les ménagements que les Puissances doivent au gouvernement du Roi, dont le rétablissement et la solidité sont à considérer, comme les premières garanties d'un état de paix et de tranquillité.

1. Occupation temporaire des places désignés par le Duc de Wellington pour cinq années.

2. Cession de Landau comme enclave de l'Allemagne.

3. Cession à la Suisse ou démolition de Huningue.

4. Restitution au Roi de Sardaigne de la partie de la Savoie réunie à la France par la paix de Paris, contre des cessions de sa part pour la rectification des frontières de Genève.

5. Restitution des districts détachés des Pays-Bas par la paix de Paris.

6. Contribution équivalente à une année de revenus de la France, savoir, six cent millions de francs.

7. Comprendre dans cette contribution les cinquante millions exigés actuellement, et le montant des objets d'équipement qui ont été fournis.

8. Employer le tiers de cette contribution à la construction de quelques points fortifiés en Belgique et dans le midi de l'Allemagne.

9. La contribution sera payable dans trois ans.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 25th Aug., 1815.

I understand that there are at Paris (at the École Militaire, if I am not mistaken) several English colours; particularly one belonging to the Coldstream Regiment, taken at the Battle of Fontenoy. I hope your Grace will have the goodness to make inquiries about these trophies, if they shall have been removed, and that you will take the proper measures for their restoration.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

Bathurst.

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*Count Münster to Colonel Hervey.*

Sir, Paris, 25th Aug., 1815.

Being at present occupied in having the Hanoverian subsidiary treaty drawn up, I find two points on which it will be necessary to take his Grace the Duke of Wellington's opinion.

1. The term from which the payment is to begin. Respecting this subsidiary corps, this term ought to be the expiration of the latter treaty; but in regard to the contingent of 10,000 men the term ought to be fixed. The ratification, as fixed in treaties with other corps, cannot be affirmed here, since our treaties are not usually ratified, and since the drawing up of the treaty has been delayed by circumstances after the principle had been agreed upon.

2. His Grace having rejected the charge for the depôt, and substituted a certain sum for each recruit, doubts arose yesterday about the sum to be fixed. His Grace proposed 5*l.* per man. On examining my papers I find the estimate, which my Secretary will have the honour to lay before you. This proves clearly that 5*l.* would not cover the clothing of the men, much less their march. Pray inquire if his Grace objects to the estimates as contained in the paper just mentioned.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

Münster.

[I object entirely to the estimates. The treaty will run from the 25th of May for the whole number. The payments will be made where they please.

We can exchange a note saying that if 5*l.* does not cover the expense of the recruit, we will agree upon the sum to be fixed after seeing the estimate of the expense.

Wellington.]

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*The Duc d'Otrante to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Paris, ce 25 Août, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à Votre Seigneurie une copie des lettres que je lui ai promises.

Je regrette, pour le repos du monde, qu'on n'ait pas suivi mes conseils.

Recevez, my Lord, l'assurance de ma plus haute considération,

Le Duc d'Otrante.

[Enclosures.]

I.

*Copie d'une Lettre écrite par le Duc d'Otrante à S.A.R. Monsieur, le 23 Avril, 1814.*

Monseigneur,

J'ai voulu rendre un dernier service à l'Empereur Napoléon, dont j'ai été dix ans le Ministre. Je crois devoir communiquer à V.A.R. la lettre que je viens de lui écrire. Ses intérêts ne peuvent être pour moi une chose indifférente, puisqu'ils ont excité la pitié généreuse des Puissances qui l'ont vaincu; mais le plus grand de tous les intérêts pour la France et pour l'Europe, celui auquel on doit tout sacrifier, c'est le repos des peuples et des Puissances après tant d'agitations et de malheurs. Et le repos, même alors qu'il serait établi sur de solides bases, ne serait jamais suffisamment assuré, on n'en jouirait jamais, tant que l'Empereur Napoléon serait dans l'Ile d'Elbe. Napoléon sur ce rocher serait pour l'Italie, pour la France, pour toute l'Europe, ce que le Vésuve est à côté de Naples. Je ne vois que le Nouveau Monde et les Etats Unis auxquels il ne pourra pas donner de secousses.

II.

*Copie de la Lettre écrite par le Duc d'Otrante à l'Empereur Napoléon, le 23 Avril, 1814, incluse dans la précédente.*

Sire,

Lorsque la France et une partie de l'Europe étoient à vos pieds, j'ai osé vous faire entendre constamment la vérité. Aujourd'hui que vous êtes dans le malheur, je crains bien davantage de vous blesser en vous parlant un langage sincère; mais je vous le dois, puisqu'il vous est utile, et même nécessaire.

Vous avez accepté pour retraite l'Ile d'Elbe et sa souveraineté. Je prête une oreille très attentive à tout ce qu'on dit de cette souveraineté et de cette île. Je crois devoir vous assurer que la situation de cette île dans l'Europe ne convient pas à la vôtre, et que le titre de Souverain de quelques arpens de terre convient moins encore à celui qui a possédé un immense empire.

Je vous prie de peser ces deux considérations, et vous sentirez combien l'une et l'autre sont fondées.

L'Ile d'Elbe est assez voisine de l'Afrique, de la Grèce, de l'Espagne; elle touche presque aux côtes de l'Italie et de la France. De cette île la mer, les vents, et une félouque peuvent transporter rapidement dans tous les pays les plus exposés à des mouvemens, à des événemens, et à des révolutions. Aujourd'hui il n'y a encore nulle part de stabilité. Dans cette mobilité actuelle des nations un génie tel que le vôtre donnera toujours des inquiétudes et des soupçons aux Puissances. Vous serez accusé sans être coupable, mais sans être

coupable vous ferez du mal, car des alarmes sont un grand mal pour les gouvernemens et pour les peuples.

Le Roi qui va régner sur la France ne voudra régner que par la justice, mais vous savez combien de passions environnent un trône, et combien les haines sont habiles à donner à une calomnie les couleurs d'une vérité.

Les titres que vous conservez, en rappelant à chaque instant ce que vous avez perdu, ne peuvent servir qu'à rendre vos regrets plus amers. Ils ne paraîtront pas un reste, mais une représentation bien vaine de tant de grandeurs évanouies. Je dis plus, sans vous honorer ils vous exposeront davantage. On dira que vous ne gardez ces titres que parceque vous gardez toutes vos prétentions. On dira que le rocher d'Elbe est le point d'appui sur lequel vous placerez les leviers avec lesquels vous chercherez encore à soulever le monde.

Permettez-moi de vous dire ma pensée toute entière; elle est le résultat de mûres réflexions. Il serait plus glorieux et plus consolant pour vous de vivre en simple citoyen; et aujourd'hui l'asile le plus sûr et le plus convenable pour un homme tel que vous, ce sont les Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Là vous recommencerez votre existence au milieu de ces peuples assez neufs encore. Ils sauront admirer votre génie sans le craindre. Vous y serez sous la protection de ces lois égales et inviolables pour tout ce qui respire dans la patrie de Franklin, de Washington, et de Jefferson; vous prouverez à ces peuples que si vous aviez reçu la naissance au milieu d'eux, vous auriez senti, pensé, et voté comme eux; que vous auriez préféré leurs vertus et leurs libertés à toutes les dominations de la terre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

[Compliments, et lui est bien obligé pour les lettres qu'il lui a communiqué: elles sont bien intéressantes.

WELLINGTON.]

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 28th Aug., 1815.

Your brother, Lord Stewart, arrived in London yesterday morning, and came down to me soon after to Coombe Wood.

I had the opportunity there of a long conversation with him on all the points contained in your despatches, and we have had a cabinet this morning, at which he has attended, in order that such of our colleagues as were in town might be correctly apprised of your sentiments and those of the Duke of Wellington upon the present state of our negotiations.

I was inclined at first to hope that my letter of the 23rd instant, which must have reached you after your brother left Paris, would have relieved you from all difficulties, inasmuch as it distinctly gives up all idea of permanent cession from France, except as far as such cession had been suggested by yourself; and although we recommend the proposal being made for dismantling Lille and Strasburg, it is distinctly stated that this demand should not be brought forward as a *sine quâ non*; nor was it our intention that it should be urged in such a manner as might materially retard the conclusion of an arrangement between the different Powers.

The explanations, however, which we have since had with Lord Stewart have convinced us that considerable embarrassment might arise from a

proposition of this nature being even brought forward under the present circumstances and in the existing state of the negotiation; that it is far better in the situation in which we now stand to advance no demand to which we are not determined to adhere; and that it is most expedient therefore to confine our proposition to the principle of temporary occupation and to that of the rectification of the frontier according to the suggestion contained in your despatch, and approved by the Emperor of Russia in the Memorandum delivered by Count Nesselrode.

We have been the more inclined to concur in this opinion from feeling the importance, and even the urgency, of bringing the negotiation to some issue before the period at which the Emperors will leave Paris, and before the new Assemblies shall have met.

These two events cannot fail to form a crisis in the relations of the Allies with the French government: and it appears to be essential that before it shall arise, the intention of the Allied Powers with respect to France should be distinctly made known; that they should have committed themselves to each other as to the points which they were determined to press; and that they should, if possible, have succeeded in bringing the French government to agree to the arrangement which shall have been proposed to them.

Lord Stewart has been so fully apprised of our sentiments on some of the details of the proposed arrangement, that I feel it unnecessary to trouble you by detailing them in this letter.

You will understand, however, that we attach great importance to the precise nature of the stipulation by which the fortresses which are to be temporarily occupied by the Allies are at the period agreed upon to revert to France.

The terms "of the King or his legitimate successors" may be open to cavil, as it may be contended that any successor approved by the nation is a legitimate successor. It was to avoid this objection that the Chancellor suggested in the Memorandum of the 3rd of August the terms "Louis XVIII. or his successors by rightful inheritance;" and we wish you would attend to the adoption of this phrase or designation in the instrument which may be to be signed.

We are further of opinion that it cannot be too clearly expressed that the fortresses are not in any case to revert to France except it shall be under the government of Louis XVIII. or his successors by rightful inheritance.

The explicit recognition of this principle, whilst it explains the motives which have actuated the councils of the Allies, affords one of the best securities for the continuance of the King's authority.

I am not aware that I can have anything further to add on this most important branch of your negotiations.

I trust that the explanations which I have given in this letter, and those which you will further receive from your brother, will enable you to bring the negotiations to a conclusion; for whatever evils the French nation are at present suffering, they must be augmented in an infinite degree by their uncertainty as to their future fate.

I am likewise firmly convinced that the same uncertainty has a most unfavourable impression in this country and throughout Europe.

Whatever may be the first popular impression on the result of the negotiation according to the principles which have been agreed upon, your

brother will be authorised to assure you that you will be most cordially and zealously supported and upheld by all your colleagues in this country.

I am, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 28th Aug., 1815.

I take the opportunity of Lord Stewart's return this evening to Paris to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's letter of the 23rd instant, and to inform you that I did not fail to make known to the Prince Regent your Grace's anxiety that he would appoint Lord FitzRoy Somerset one of his Aides-de-Camp, when the Prince was pleased to express his satisfaction and readiness to meet your Grace's wishes upon every occasion, and to mark the high regard which he has for you, and commanded that Lord FitzRoy Somerset's appointment should be made out immediately.

I am ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

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MEMORANDUM.

31st Aug., 1815.

In examining the confidential notes delivered in by the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian ministers, it appears that all are agreed in the necessity; 1st, that some military securities should be required from France; 2ndly, that these securities should be framed as far as possible in favour of the King; 3rdly, that they should be sought either in the permanent or temporary maintenance of certain military holds rather than in the territorial dismemberment of France.

The questions that remain to be decided are, what are the positions and fortresses to be required?

Are these fortresses to be ceded permanently to the Allies, or occupied for a term of years?

Or is it necessary that some of the fortresses should be demanded in sovereignty, whilst others are to be restored at a fixed period?

What should be the period and what the conditions of their retrocession; and lastly, in what manner and with what troops, if ceded for a fixed period, to the Allies, ought they to be occupied?

As far as these questions have yet been considered, the prevailing opinion seems to be that in the present state of France the extent of security immediately required considerably exceeds what, in point of justice, policy, or prudence, the King can be required permanently to concede; that the actual cession or demolition of fortresses, if at all insisted upon, should be confined to points peculiarly menacing in their character; and that the more extended occupation should be limited to a fixed number of years, the retrocession being stipulated in favour of Louis XVIII. and his lawful successors alone. It is peculiarly important, if a temporary occupation is the principle to be acted upon, that the exceptions to the general rule should not in their nature or extent be such as to call the rule itself in question.

This arrangement appears to satisfy every principle. It combines the security of Europe with the ultimate integrity of France: it further holds out a strong motive to the French nation to preserve peace, and to be faithful to their lawful Sovereign; whilst it leaves the Allies, in case of the King and his successors (in themselves the best pledges of peace) being overthrown by some new convulsion, free to act with respect to those places as the safety of Europe may require.

The execution of this plan presents, perhaps, the principal difficulty to its adoption.

Temporary occupations keep alive hostile feelings (especially where the troops are pregnant with them already), perhaps even more than absolute cessions. Were the extent of cession to be required from France small, this consideration would be entitled to great weight; but where the demand is necessarily large, the effect is otherwise. Instead of producing merely irritation, a permanent cession of such magnitude becomes a deliberate motive for new wars at the first practicable opportunity, and thereby creates the evil which it is intended to provide against.

If the object is to make France sit down quietly under either description of sacrifice, it is material, for a certain time at least, that her frontier should be observed by a strong allied force; and that this corps may have all the authority of the alliance, it is desirable that it should in its composition be an European and not a local force.

To have this character, it should be formed by contingents from all the Powers who were parties to the treaty of the 25th of March, those of the Peninsula excepted; but to give it solidity and union, it must be placed under one head.

Such a corps must for a considerable time be essential to the King's security on his throne; but he cannot avowedly receive it into his own service, either in the character of a subsidiary or an auxiliary force. It must be imposed on him by the Powers of Europe with a view to their own peace and security, so repeatedly compromised by France; and the aid it may render him must grow out of the particular circumstances of the occasion.

It is quite obvious, if 80,000 or 100,000 men had been placed in the fortresses between Valenciennes and Givet when Napoleon landed at Cannes, that the King need never have quitted Paris, and that the countenance alone of such a force would in all probability have secured to His Majesty the fidelity of such a proportion of the troops of the line of France, aided by the National Guards, as would have enabled him to suppress the rebellion without the necessity of calling for the interference of foreign Powers.

It is under the protecting influence of such aid that the King can alone expect gradually to correct the corruption of his own troops and subjects.

If such is the system upon which Europe is to rely for its security till the particular danger resulting from the present revolutionary and military spirit in France shall have subsided, it appears that it cannot better be carried into effect than according to the suggestions contained in the accompanying memorandum prepared by the Duke of Wellington.*

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 622 (for Memorandum of 31st August, 1815).

Strong reasons may no doubt be alleged to prove that the military power of France has long been too great for the peace and security of Europe; that the principles of the Peace of Paris are not strictly obligatory under existing circumstances; and that Europe owes to itself now to repel the encroachments made by France upon its limits for a century past. Were it clear that what Europe could now reclaim would in itself constitute security, and not provoke new wars by affording to the military temper of France, at no distant period, fresh motives for enterprise, it might be politic to incur the hazard of creating disunion amongst the Allies themselves by the difficulties to which these new distributions of territory would infallibly lead: but as the influence of such a measure is at best problematical; as the spirit of the treaty of the 25th of March, if not the formal acts since executed with Louis XVIII., place that monarch so far in the character of an ally as to limit the demands which the Powers of Europe can honourably make upon him within the principles *of a sound necessity*; as the occupation of a commanding position on the French frontiers for an extended period of years carries with it most of the advantages, whilst it obviates many of the evils, incident to the more hostile course of policy, it seems upon the whole to be the wisest principle upon which the Powers of Europe can now act.

It may be stated as an additional motive in favour of this system, that it necessarily preserves Europe in a continued state of alliance for the surveillance of France by imposing upon the Allied Powers as a common duty the occupation and defence of what is ceded for a fixed period to all; whereas, were the cessions final in their nature, when once melted down into the sovereignties of other states, the probability of uniting all to maintain the point which might be attacked by France would be infinitely diminished, and the question would thus cease to be European.

The continued excesses of France may, no doubt, yet drive Europe at a future day to a measure of dismemberment; and Europe will effect with vigour and preserve with unanimity such a change in its constitution in proportion as it shall become in the view of mankind a measure of clear and admitted necessity. To effectuate a change so fundamental was certainly not the end or purpose contemplated when the Allies entered France: it has rather grown out of the rapidity and extent of their successes.

The overthrow of the French army, the capture of Bonaparte, the continued union of Europe, and the protracted occupation of a military position in France, seem to provide adequately for the immediate danger, and at the same time to avoid the agitation of any new question which might disturb the settlement so happily effected at Vienna. Let the Allies then take this further chance of securing that repose which all the Powers of Europe so much require, with the assurance that if disappointed in this their primary object by the military ambition of France, they will again take up arms, not only with commanding positions in their hands, but with that moral force which can alone keep such a confederacy together, and which has hitherto proved its greatest strength.

CASTLEREAGH.

## Abstract of the Report of the Committee of British Engineers on the Fortresses of the Netherlands.

Bruxelles, 31st Aug., 1815.

| Places. | Numbers of Garrison. | Pieces of Ordnance. | | | Calculated Period of Resistance. | Estimated Expense. | Time required to complete the Work. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Heavy. | Light and Howitzers. | Mortars. | | | | |
| | | | | | Days. | £. | Years. | |
| Nieuport | 3,000 | 60 | 60 | 18 | 28 to 30 | 85,784 | 3 | |
| Ypres | 5,000 | 75 | 80 | 25 | 30 | 153,561 | 4 | |
| Menin (Redoubt) | 300 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 6 to 7 | 31,925 | 4 | Should Menin be preferred to Courtray, the expense would be 255,519l., the garrison 4000 men, and the defence 28 days. |
| Courtray | 6,000 | 85 | 85 | 25 | 32 to 34 | 457,579 | 7 | |
| Tournay (Town) | 1,500 | .. | .. | .. | 8 to 10 | 78,391 | 2 | |
| Tournay (Citadel) | 3,500 | .. | .. | .. | 30 to 32 | 98,835 | 2 | |
| Oudenarde | 2,500 | 48 | 48 | 15 | 16 | 190,128 | 4 | |
| Ghent (Citadel) | 1,800 | 34 | 30 | 12 | 10 | 39,975 | 2 | |
| Dendermonde | 3,500 | 65 | 65 | 18 | 34 to 36 | 230,670 | 5 | |
| Ostende | 5,000 | 90 | 90 | 28 | 36 | 115,507 | 2 | |
| Antwerp | 9,000 | .. | .. | .. | 30 | 36,386 | 2 | |
| Inundations of the Dender | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. .. | 160,000 | .. | |
| Grammont | 2,500 | 30 | 30 | 10 | 18 | 167,256 | 4 | |
| Ath | 3,500 | 60 | 60 | 18 | 22 to 24 | 143,599 | 3 | |
| Mons | 7,000 | 90 | 100 | 30 | 34 to 36 | 340,288 | 7 | |
| Binch (Redoubt) | 300 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 25,000 | 2 | |
| Charleroi | 4,500 | 65 | 65 | 18 | 26 | 178,123 | 4 | |
| Namur (Citadel) | 4,000 | 65 | 65 | 25 | 28 to 30 | 117,135 | 3 | |
| Huy | 900 | 20 | 20 | 10 | 7 | 42,777 | 8 | |
| Liège (Citadel) | 2,500 | 36 | 30 | 12 | 20 | 99,530 | 4 | |
| | 66,300 | 835 | 835 | 270 | .. .. | 2,792,449 | .. | |
| Add 6 per cent. to cover any increase of prices occasioned by the extraordinary demand for workmanship and materials .. .. | | | | | | 167,546 | | |
| Total .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | | | £2,959,995 | | |

Alexander Bryce, B.-Gen. and Pres.
John T. Jones, B. Lt.-Col. Royal Eng.

*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, War Office, 31st Aug., 1815.

The Prince Regent having been pleased to determine that, in order to remedy the inconvenience and delay experienced in the adjustment of the claims of soldiers, a book should be kept by every non-commissioned officer, trumpeter, drummer, fifer, and private man of His Majesty's regular forces, calculated to show the actual state of his accounts, I am commanded by His Royal Highness to send enclosed for your information half a dozen forms of the said book, and a copy of a circular letter, No. 289, which has been addressed to the commanding officers of regular regiments on the subject of this arrangement.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,
Your very obedient humble servant,
PALMERSTON.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 1st Sept., 1815.

In consequence of the regulations which appear to have been adopted on the face of the protocols relative to the proscribed persons in France, and which appear to us in general to be very wise and proper, it is necessary that you should be enabled to give some explanation as to our situation with respect to the two great culprits Savary and L'Allemand.

We at first exempted them from the number to go to St. Helena, with a view of leaving it open for consideration whether they might not be delivered up to the French government. They were received on board the *Bellerophon* as well as Bonaparte unconditionally; but it appeared that Captain Maitland had in his conversation held out the strongest expectations to them that they would in no case be delivered up to the French government.

Upon further consideration some of us even doubted, and I will confess I was one of the number, whether, independent of the conversation to which I have alluded, we should under all the circumstances be justified in delivering them up to the French government for the purpose of being tried for their lives.

If they had fled to this country under a feigned name, and had afterwards been discovered, I should have had no doubt that we should have been fully justified in restoring them to the French government; but it appeared to me doubtful whether the act of receiving them on board a British ship of war, with the knowledge of who they were, did not amount to an implied condition that they should not be delivered back to France against their own consent, though in all other respects we were fully at liberty to impose any conditions upon them we might think proper.

Under these difficulties, and aware of the inconvenience which might arise from detaining such persons even as prisoners in England, we determined to send them to Malta as prisoners of war; and when the arrange-

ments for the peace are concluded, we should be desirous of allowing them to escape to the United States of America.

I wish you would let me know whether you think there will be any objection to the course of proceeding thus proposed.

LIVERPOOL.

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*Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Genoa, 1st Sept., 1815.

I have the honour to annex a report from Colonel Robinson, commanding the flotilla attached to the service of the army in the Mediterranean, by which your Grace will observe that the fortress of Gaeta has surrendered. I annex the Articles of Capitulation; and I have the greatest satisfaction in adding that the intrepidity and perseverance of Colonel Robinson, the officers and men of the flotilla, during a series of almost daily attacks against the place for upwards of two months, have obtained the unqualified approbation of the superior officers charged with the blockade of Gaeta.

I have the honour to be, My Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

ROBERT M'FARLANE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Colonel Robinson to Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane.*

SIR, Gaeta, 9th Aug., 1815.

I have the pleasure to enclose for your Excellency's information a copy of the submission of this fortress to His Majesty Ferdinand IV., which was concluded yesterday by the officers authorised on the part of the Allied forces, and the commandant and superior officers of the garrison. The gates were immediately occupied by the Allied troops, agreeably to the 5th Article; and the garrison, consisting of 1800 men, marched out this day for their destination.

The mortar-boats have received so much damage from the heavy and continual fire kept up, that I have deemed it necessary to send them to Naples, to be given up to that government, discharging their crews and landing their mortars, until I can procure the necessary transport.

I have adopted this measure to reduce the present expense of the flotilla, and trust it will meet your Excellency's approbation; repeating my report of the general good conduct and gallantry of the combined English, Sicilian, and Neapolitan flotilla.

I have the honour to be your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

W. ROBINSON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [922.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 6th Sept., 1815.

I enclose the sketch of our subsidies, which I believe is quite correct.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*List of Powers with whom Treaties have been made, and for what number of Men.*

| | Men. |
|---|---|
| Bavaria | 60,000 |
| Wurtemberg | 20,000 |
| Baden | 16,000 |
| Sardinia | 15,000 |
| Denmark | 15,000 |
| Hanover | 10,000 |
| Saxony | 8,000 |
| Hesse Darmstadt | 8,000 |
| Hesse Cassel | 7,500 |
| Brunswick | 3,000 |
| Nassau | 3,000 |
| Hanseatic Towns | 3,000 |
| Ducal Houses of Saxony | 1,600 |
| | 170,100 |
| Treaties are to be made with Powers for troops serving with the Prussians for | 17,430 |
| Total | 187,530 men. |

At 11*l.* 2*s.* per man make 2,181,583*l.* sterling.

*Note.*—This is besides the actual expense to Hanover of 16,400, and to Brunswick of 4000.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 11th Sept., 1815.

In addition to what I have stated in my despatch and note on the subject of the works in the Louvre, I think it right to mention that Mr. Hamilton, who is intimate with Canova, the celebrated artist expressly sent here by the Pope with a letter to the King to reclaim what was taken from Rome, distinctly ascertained from him that the Pope, if successful, neither would, nor could as Pope, sell any of the *chefs-d'œuvre* that belonged to the See, and in which he has, in fact, only a life interest.

The French, when they plundered the Vatican, ignorantly brought away some works of little or no value. These Canova has authority either to cede to the King or sell, to facilitate the return of the more valuable objects; but it is quite clear that no sum of money could secure for the Prince Regent any of the distinguished works from His Holiness's collection. The other claimants would be still less likely to sell. In taking, therefore, the disinterested line, we have in truth made no real sacrifice, whilst we shall escape odium and misrepresentation; and if, through the weight of the Prince Regent's interference, the Pope should ultimately recover his property, His Royal Highness would probably feel it more consistent with his munificence to give this old man a small sum out of the French contribution, to enable him to carry home his gallery, than to see him exposed to the reproach of selling the refuse without any strict right to do so, in order to replace what is really valuable in the Vatican.

I cannot yet judge what turn this business will take. Russia wishes for a composition between the King and the claimants, but, as you will see by Count Nesselrode's note, will not insist upon it, but will rather insist, as far as a protest goes, against any force being used. This is a little too late, after having patiently witnessed their particular allies, the Prussians, remove by force, not only all the works of art taken away from the Prussian dominions, but those plundered from Cologne and other towns on the left bank of the Rhine—possessions which have since been acquired by Prussia. The Prussians have also assisted the Grand Dukes of Hesse, Mecklenburg, and other of the minor Powers in the North of Germany, to recover in like manner what belonged to them.

This proceeding of the Prussians makes it almost indispensable for the King of the Netherlands to replace in the churches of Belgium the pictures of which they were despoiled. His Majesty, I believe, feels this so strongly, that he would rather sacrifice his own family collection now in the Louvre than fail in this act of political duty to his new subjects, who, devoted to their religion, would receive such a mark of favour from their Protestant Sovereign with sentiments of peculiar gratitude. I do not see, therefore, the possibility of the Duke of Wellington, as the military commander of the troops of the King, doing otherwise than giving his aid to remove, by force if necessary, these objects; and it becomes Great Britain not less to see the same measure of justice distributed to her immediate Ally as that which has been obtained by the adjacent States.

The protection of the Pope and the other Italian Princes more immediately belongs to the Emperor of Austria; and although His Imperial Majesty is alive to the subject, I think he will be very reluctant to use force: and yet, without force, I do not believe the thing can be done, as the King, whatever he may feel of remorse as to the mode in which these works came into his possession, will be very reluctant, by any act of cession, or even of composition on his part, to take upon himself any of the responsibility of their removal from Paris.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

*A S.A. le Prince de Metternich; S.E. le Comte de Nesselrode; S.E. le Vicomte Castlereagh; S.A. le Prince Hardenberg.*

Paris, le 11 Septembre, 1815.

Le soussigné Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Saxe, ayant assisté sur l'invitation du Conseil administratif des armées Alliées à la conférence qui a été tenue aujourd'hui chez S.E. M. le Baron de Baldacci, par rapport à l'arrangement à conclure avec le gouvernement Français au sujet de l'indemnité de la solde ainsi que de l'habillement des troupes Alliées, y a vu à sa plus grande surprise que le contingent Royal Saxon qui doit participer à ces indemnités n'a été porté qu'au nombre de 8000 hommes dans le tableau que les ministres respectifs ont fourni au dit Conseil Administratif, en date du 24 d'Août.

Comme par l'Article 3 du traité d'accession de la Cour Royale de Saxe à l'alliance du 25 Mars dernier, conclu à Vienne le 23 Mai, 1815, ce contingent a été fixé expressément au nombre de 16,000 hommes, dont 8000 hommes de troupes de ligne et 8000 hommes de Landwehr, outre la réserve nécessaire pour tenir ce corps au grand complet; et comme d'ailleurs il est constaté et notoire que ce nombre de 16,000 hommes organisé au mieux se trouvent depuis plusieurs mois dans la Haute Alsace, sous le commandement de S.A. le Prince de Schwarzenberg, le soussigné se croit obligé de réclamer contre la disposition ci-dessus mentionnée. Il peut attendre des sentimens de justice et d'équité des hautes Puissances Alliées qu'elles se refuseront d'autant moins à faire droit à cette réclamation, et à faire participer la Saxe, conformément aux traités, et en raison de l'effectif d'un contingent, pour 16,000 hommes aux indemnités de solde et d'habillement dont il s'agit, que les autres Puissances accédantes au traité d'alliance du 25 Mars paraissent toutes dans le tableau mentionné avec le nombre de troupes stipulées par la traité, et que ce principe a été en outre reconnu de la manière la plus explicite dans la note des Cabinets des quatre Puissances réunies, du 8 de ce mois.

Le soussigné saisit cette occasion, &c.

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*Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Genoa, 11th Sept., 1815.

In my letter No. 6, 3rd September, I had the honour of informing your Grace of the steps I had pursued in consequence of the information I had received of Joachim Murat having taken refuge in Corsica. I now beg leave to acquaint you that Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, Assistant Quarter-master-General, whom I sent to Corsica, returned here this morning, and has brought the intelligence contained in the annexed report.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

ROBERT M'FARLANE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Lieut.-Col. Gordon to Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane.*

SIR, Genoa, 11th Sept., 1815.

In compliance with the orders contained in your letter of the 3rd instant, I proceeded to Bastia in His Majesty's ship *Tuscan*, where I arrived on the 7th instant, and where I immediately addressed myself to the Mayor, Mr. Vannucci, whom I found invested with the chief civil authority of the place. From him I learnt that Murat had arrived there on the 25th of last month, alone in the French packet, by which he had been picked up off Toulon from an open boat in a sinking state. He further stated that he had landed at Bastia without being known, and had retired to a village called Vescovato, about 18 miles from thence, for which the master of the boat had been imprisoned; but that in the present state of Corsica, without a military force, and where party spirit still runs high, it was impossible to secure Murat's person after his escape from Bastia, especially as he had been joined by several people formerly in his service. His arrival had been reported to the Marquis de la Rivière at Toulon, but no answer as yet received.

Everything contained in this statement was afterwards confirmed to me by Mr. Venier, Colonel of Artillery commanding *ad interim* in Corsica.

As I could now obtain no further information at Bastia, I proceeded to Vescovato, where I found Murat, and put to him the questions you desired, and to which he answered nearly as follows: that he had merely retired to Corsica to escape assassination, of which he ran the *greatest* risk in France; that he was astonished his stay in that island could give you the least anxiety; that he had given his word of honour not to undertake anything to disturb Corsica, which he now renewed; that all he wanted were passports to retire to any country that might be pointed out to him as an asylum; and that if I had brought him a passport he would have been ready to accompany me, but that he did not wish to be sent to St. Helena like the Emperor.

I saw with him about a dozen of officers and some armed men, which he could increase if he wished, for the defence of his person, as I understand that considerable numbers of discharged officers and soldiers visited him daily from every part of the island.

I re-embarked at Bastia for this place the same day, where I arrived this morning, after touching at Leghorn, to leave some despatches from Lord Exmouth for Sir J. Rowley.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

G. H. GORDON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, War Department, 11th Sept., 1815.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset having mentioned to my Under-Secretary that the services of General Alava had been highly approved by your Grace during the long time he was attached to your Staff in the Peninsular War, and that it would be highly gratifying to that officer, and satisfactory to your Grace that the Second Class of the Bath should be conferred upon him, it is my intention to submit to the Regent the propriety of appointing General Alava to be an Honorary Knight Commander of the Bath, in

testimony of the sense which is entertained of his long and zealous services while attached to the British army under your Grace's command.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever very sincerely yours,

BATHURST.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 14th Sept., 1815.

I forward by the present courier a private letter relative to the Louvre which ought to have gone with my despatch on the same subject sent on Sunday. I also send you a letter I have just received from Arbuthnot, with his note accompanying it. You are acquainted with his correspondent. His remarks in this, as in many of his former communications, appear to me deserving of attention, and you will observe his impression of the state of parties in France agrees pretty nearly with those I sent you a few days since. His opinion coincides with mine: that the King, by firmness, keeping the Royalists back, and a direct policy, may create out of the men whom the Revolution has bred a party capable of governing; but that out of the Court Party and the Highflying Royalists he can extract nothing at the present conjuncture but weakness and confusion.

There seems no doubt that an excellent spirit of loyalty will prevail in the new Representation. If this could be moderated, instead of goaded, by the Court, the Ministers would be strong enough for every exertion, and they could hardly venture to fall short of their duty, thus supported and watched. The Bonapartists and Jacobins would sink into insignificance. But I am afraid the game will be otherwise played. The Court,—that is, Monsieur and the Duchess d'Angoulême—will probably excite the Royalist members to run first at Fouché as the most odious object, and next at the government generally. In both these efforts they will be assisted by the Jacobins, who wish nothing so much as to see the Royalists committed in the government, which will soon concentrate all the weight of the Revolution against the Court, and thus render their chance of overturning the Bourbons infinitely greater, or at least of setting aside this branch of the family: in fact, they appear to me to be creating an Orleans party, which, with a little more management, would soon die away, as the Duke has no great following from personal consideration; he is only looked to as a resource against the known or supposed views of other branches of the family. As I stated in a former letter, I look with the more alarm to this state of things because I am convinced it will lead to internal disturbance and a desultory warfare, which will soon turn to the disadvantage of the Royal cause, unless the Allied troops are brought forward; and although one of the great objects of a strong army on the side of Flanders undoubtedly is to support the King in the event of a new convulsion, yet it is another thing by intemperate management on the part of the Court to be mixed in the police of the country. The force that would be amply adequate to the first object, as well as to cover Europe

from attack, would dwindle to nothing if spread over the interior of France.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 15th Sept., 1815.

I entirely approve of your memorandum on the question of the restoration by France of the works of art which have been plundered from other countries. I think all the principles you have adopted are sound and correct; and I have no doubt that if this paper shall become public, it will meet with universal approbation.

I am only fearful that the very lukewarm support given to you on this subject by the Emperor of Russia may defeat the object altogether.

I am very glad that the removal of Fouché under present circumstances has been given up. I am certainly one of those who do not believe that the present Ministers in France can, or perhaps ought, to continue long in power; but I am persuaded that the King would judge very ill in making any change whatever without looking forward to all the consequences, and without being prepared to support the change when made.

The King's line appears to me to be so far plain, that whether he has hitherto decided right or wrong, he has nothing now to do but to wait for the meeting of the Assemblies, in which the different parties will assume their respective characters and be able to show their relative strength. A few months, and perhaps even a few weeks, will put him in possession of the real strength of these parties, and of the disposition of the country towards them. Till then, my opinion is, the King should make no change. He ought not to make it till he can do it deliberately, upon a better knowledge of the state of the country and its parties than he can at present possess, and until he can make such a selection of persons as he may afterwards be able to support without difficulty. The change in his government, if it should then be expedient, would be considered as brought about not by a Court intrigue, nor by any predilection for or aversion to any particular individuals, but upon public principles and in compliance with the general sentiment of his Assemblies and of the country. Even those who may be sacrificed will in such case have no right to complain of the King. They must allow that he has acted upon the principle with which he set out, of choosing a constitutional administration, and of conforming his government, as far as was proper, to the will and sentiment of the country.

I cannot conclude without expressing my most anxious hope that our negotiations with the French government will be brought to some issue before the meeting of the Assemblies.

Among other reasons against any change in the administration at present, I feel very strongly the importance of this negotiation being concluded

with the present Ministers. The High-Royalists by this means will be saved all the odium of it, which would certainly fall upon them if they were now to replace Fouché and Talleyrand, and they will at the same time enjoy all the advantages which must result to them from the presence of a foreign force within the French territory for a limited time.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 15th Sept., 1815.

I can assure you that I am fully sensible of the injurious effect which must result from the general line on present politics taken by our daily papers, and particularly by those which are supposed to be government papers. You know, however, full well, that though there are papers which are vulgarly called government papers in consequence of the support which they give to the government rather than to the opposition of the day, there are no papers over which we have any authority, or even any influence on which we can depend.

It is supposed by many at home, and, I have no doubt, generally believed on the Continent, that these papers are in the pay of government, whereas no paper that has any character, and consequently any established sale, will accept money from government; and, indeed, their profits are so enormous in all critical times, when their support is the most necessary, that no pecuniary assistance that government could offer would really be worth their acceptance. The only indirect means we possess of having any influence over the editors is by supplying them occasionally with foreign intelligence and by advertisements: but, with respect to the former, it is notorious that some of the papers which are not connected with government have always had the earliest foreign intelligence; and with regard to the latter, they know full well that the public offices will necessarily be obliged sooner or later to insert their advertisements in the papers which have the greatest sale, and they hold in consequence very cheap any measure to deprive them of this advantage. It may be difficult to make foreign governments understand many of these circumstances; but a very little inquiry ought to satisfy them that even as to our domestic politics we never can rely on what are called the government papers on those points where their assistance would be most necessary. The 'Courier,' at that time, as now, a government paper, took, as you will recollect, a most decided and mischievous part against the Duke of York in the year 1809; and we could not get any public print to support us last year, either upon the question of the Property Tax or the Corn Bill. The truth is, they look only to their sale. They make their way, like sycophants, with the public by finding out the prejudices and prepossessions of the moment, and then flattering them; and the number of *soi-disant* government or opposition papers abound just as the government is generally popular or unpopular. There can be no doubt that the line which has been lately taken by the daily papers in this country respecting France has been in unison with the public

feeling; and if you ask me the cause of this public feeling, I have no difficulty in ascribing it almost exclusively to the *impunity* which has hitherto attended, with only one exception, all those who deserted the standard of the King of France to join Bonaparte. I enter not into the question how far this was or was not unavoidable; but I am persuaded that if, in the first fortnight or three weeks after the return of the King, a proper military tribunal could have been established for the trial of the commanders of corps who had joined Bonaparte before the King quitted the French territory, or even Paris, and that six or seven examples had been made of the most flagrant offenders, the public feeling as to France would have been as different as possible from that which we have experienced, not only with respect to the King's government, but likewise as to all the questions relative to the reduction of the power and territory of France. I should further add that the publication of Fouché's reports has done incalculable mischief. I enter not into the propriety of his having made such reports to the King: in that he may be justified; but it was a most flagrant indignity to the Allies that he should allow them to be circulated, and that his agents should have sent them over to this country for publication before they had been communicated to you, and under circumstances which induced us to represent them generally as gross forgeries.

You will make what use of this explanation you may judge proper. I have thought, however, that you would not dislike to have the ideas which have occurred to me on the whole of this subject brought into one point of view.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Duc d'Otrante to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, le 15 Sept., 1815.

Le Duc d'Otrante a l'honneur de prévenir Lord Wellington qu'il vient de donner l'ordre de faire les plus sévères perquisitions pour découvrir l'auteur d'un libelle infame, qui ne circule encore qu'avec mystère.

Ce libelle, dont le titre n'est point connu, est d'environ 8 pages d'impression. Les trois dernières surtout sont un tissu d'horreurs contre le Roi et ses Alliés: l'Angleterre y est particulièrement maltraitée.

Les personnes entre les mains de qui ce libelle a été vu ont, par la nature de leurs emplois, accès à la Cour, et auprès des Princes.

L'exagération des opinions de ces personnes, et leur haine bien connue contre quelques ministres, font naître le soupçon qu'elles pourraient bien n'être pas étrangères à la publicité de cet horrible écrit.

Quoiqu'il en soit, toutes les mesures ont été prises pour saisir et l'ouvrage et l'auteur.

Le Duc d'Otrante s'empressera de faire connaître à Sa Seigneurie le résultat des recherches de la police.

Lord Wellington est prié de ne voir dans cette communication qu'un hommage rendu à la noble conduite de Sa Seigneurie, et au désir qu'a le ministère de prévenir, par les moyens qui sont en son pouvoir, tout ce qui

pourrait troubler l'harmonie qui règne entre la France et les Hautes Puissances Alliées.

Le Duc d'Otrante saisit cette occasion de renouveler personnellement à Lord Wellington l'hommage de ses sentimens d'estime et de haute considération.

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*La Duchesse de ——— to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

AIMABLE DUC, Ce 16 Sept., 1815.

Quand j'eus l'honneur de vous écrire de Caen en faveur de ——— ———, Esq., je déchirai sa lettre, de sorte que je ne vous expliquerai pas avec autant d'exactitude quelle est la place qu'il sollicite. What I know is, it is in the Excise, dans les Fiacres, &c. Il désire une place pour le moment qui rapporte de 300*l.* à 500*l.* sterling. Il lui est égal quoi; c'est de l'argent dont il a besoin; et il remplira parfaitement celle qu'on lui donnera. Il a du talent, de l'esprit, du génie même. Il a servi dans la marine. Je suis à les pieds de Votre Excellence: je sollicite avec ardeur de votre générosite naturelle, et de votre obligeance pour moi, votre protection pour ———. Dites à Lord Castlereagh, ou daignez écrire à quelqu'un in good old England, pour leur recommander de placer Mr. ———. Veuillez bien me nommer la personne à qui vous le recommanderez, et je lui écriverai de s'y présenter; car il sera mieux qu'on sache à quoi il est propre. Dearest Duke, do take him under your valuable protection. Comme je n'ai jamais le bonheur de vous voir qu'en passant, soyez assez gracieux pour me donner à dîner un jour en famille; alors nous parlerons de mon protégé, que je désire vivement qui aie le suprême bonheur d'être le vôtre.

En attendant cet honneur et plaisir, je suis pour la vie

De Votre Grâce l'admiratrice et l'amie,

———, DUCHESSE DE ———.

[MADAME LA DUCHESSE,

Je reçois votre lettre. Ce n'est pas si facile que vous croyez d'obtenir une place en Angleterre, surtout une place qui vaut 400 à 500 livres sterling par an. Je vous prie d'en faire la demande à un autre. J'ai tout le désir de vous être utile, ainsi qu'aux intérêts de ceux pour lesquels vous vous intéressez; mais vous devez sentir qu'ayant commandé des armées pendant quinze ans, il se trouve quantité de personnes qui m'ont servi auxquels je dois tout ce que je peux faire pour qui que ce soit.

WELLINGTON.]

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*Count Hardenberg to the Prince Regent.*

Paris, le 18 Sept., 1815.

Partant de mon dernier très humble rapport, en date du 14 courant, les négociations entre les cabinets des grandes Puissances Alliées ont à la vérité avancées, mais lentement. La commission militaire, qui à la demande de la Prusse avait dû prononcer sur la question si Saarlouis devait sous le point de vue militaire être détaché de la France, n'a pu se rassembler qu'avant hier, 16 de ce mois, et conséquemment les grandes conférences ont également dû être ajournées. Le comité militaire composé du Duc de Wellington, des Princes de Schwarzenberg et Volkonsky, et des généraux Prussiens Gneisenau et Knesebeck, ayant dans la séance du 16 opiné à l'unanimité pour la cession de Saarlouis, il reste à voir maintenant si les considérations politiques ne l'emporteront pas en faveur de la France sur les raisons militaires. Il paraît au reste que l'accord entre les Cours Alliées ne dépend plus que de la décision de la question de Saarlouis, la Prusse ayant attaché son consentement à ce que l'on ne demande que 600 millions de francs à la France, et au partage que Lord Castlereagh en a proposé, à la condition que dans celles que l'on demanderait à la France l'on fasse de la cession de Saarlouis une des conditions *sine quâ non*. J'espère pouvoir encore avant le départ de ce très humble rapport informer V.A.R. du résultat de la conférence dans laquelle l'on a dû définitivement s'occuper de cet objet.

Les revues Autrichiennes à Dijon que l'on croyait être remises indéfiniment auront cependant lieu, à ce que le Prince Metternich m'a dit, vers la fin de ce mois. Le jour ne peut pas être fixé encore, S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche voulant attendre ici l'issue de l'arrangement avec la France pour pouvoir ensuite de Dijon se rendre directement en Italie. S.M. compte, entre Milan, Venise, et la tournée qu'elle a le projet de faire dans la Basse Italie, y rester environ six mois. Le corps diplomatique, à ce que je tiens du Comte Metternich, ne sera pas formellement invité de suivre S.M.I., mais elle recevra avec plaisir ceux des ministres étrangers accrédités près d'elle. Ceci étant, j'attends les ordres de V.A.R. si je dois me rendre immédiatement près de S.M.I. en Italie, ou retourner à Vienne, quoique certainement il n'y aura rien à y faire pour la diplomatie pendant une absence si profongée de la cour et du cabinet; ou bien, si V.A.R. ne daignerait pas s'en remettre à mon zèle pour son service, et m'autoriser à me rendre en Italie, si et lorsque je le croirai utile pour ses intérêts.

Les ministres des Cabinets Alliés ayant dans la conférence du 17 courant examiné le rapport du comité militaire dont il a été fait mention plus haut, se sont enfin arrangé définitivement sur le projet du traité de paix avec la France. Le comité militaire est unanimement tombé d'accord sur la première question qu'on lui a proposé, relativement à la construction de nouvelles forteresses hors du territoire Français: il a été d'avis qu'il n'y avait hors des frontières de la France aucun point sur lequel on peut construire des fortifications qui autant que Saarlouis puisse bien défendre ces frontières contre la France, et aussi bien lier ensemble la ligne de défense entre Condé, Givet, Philippeville, Luxembourg, et Landau. Quant à la seconde question, combien, si l'on demandait la cession des quelques places fortes à la France, l'on pourrait rabattre des 200,000,000 que l'on avait voulu lui

demander pour la construction de nouvelles forteresses, le comité militaire a été d'avis que la possession de Saarlouis, de Givet avec Charlemont, et de Condé, était d'une telle importance pour les Alliés, que pour en obtenir la cession ils pourraient diminuer la somme de 200,000,000 à demander à la France, de 50,000,000 pour Saarlouis, d'autres 50,000,000 pour Givet et Charlemont, et de 12,000,000 pour Condé. En conséquence de cette opinion du comité, les ministres d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, et de Russie ont accédé à l'avis de la Prusse, de ne pas demander les 200,000,000 en laissant le choix à la France de payer ou de racheter cette somme par la cession de forteresses, mais de demander la cession de Saarlouis, de Givet et Charlemont, et de Condé (Philippeville, Marienbourg, et Landau doivent être cédé comme enclaves), et de demander une somme moins forte pour la construction des fortifications encore nécessaires pour compléter la ligne de défense contre la France. Par contre, la Prusse a accédé à l'avis de ses co-alliés, de se borner à la demande de 600,000,000 de contributions de guerre.

Dans la même conférence d'hier on est convenu de la rédaction du projet du traité qui doit être présenté au gouvernement Français, et il devait lui être remis aujourd'hui ou demain. La distribution des dits 600,000,000 doit être faite ainsi qu'il a été dit dans mon très humble rapport dernier; mais les Pays-Bas et la Sardaigne, en égard de l'augmentation de territoire qui leur revient, ne devant pas participer à ce partage, leur lot du cinquième à diviser entre les états qui ont accédés à la grande alliance doit non pas, comme il aurait été peut-être plus juste, servir à augmenter le lot des autres Puissances de la même catégorie, mais être divisé à parties égales entre l'Autriche et la Prusse.

Le projet de traité va être communiqué aux autres Puissances, et l'on demandera même leur assentiment; mais comme en même tems elles seront prévenues que les observations que peut-être elles voudraient faire ne sauraient attaquer les principes qui en font la base, il est assez évident que cette communication n'est qu'une affaire de forme.

Comme on est convaincu de la nécessité d'appuyer par des démonstrations les communications que l'on va faire à la France des conditions de paix dont les Puissances Alliées sont convenues, l'on s'occupe dans ce moment des mesures militaires à prendre pour le cas où le gouvernement Français refuserait de les accepter. Ces mesures sont d'autant plus nécessaires que les négociations ne peuvent pas traîner, les Souverains faisant leurs arrangemens pour quitter Paris vers la fin de la semaine.

E. HARDENBERG.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 19th Sept., 1815.

I received yesterday your despatches of the 14th instant, together with your private letter of the 11th, relative to the restoration of the works of art.

Upon the former I have little to say in addition to what has been already communicated to you in my former letters.

I think your negotiation is proceeding as well as we could desire; and

I only hope that the objections of the Prussians will be speedily overcome, and that you will be able without further loss of time to bring your propositions before the French government.

I am satisfied that the pretensions of the Prussians on the score of contributions are so unreasonable, that if persisted in they will defeat their own object.

The idea you have suggested of stipulating for seven years' temporary occupation of the fortresses, with a power to reconsider the question at the end of four years, so as to make the occupation cease at the end of five, if the security of Europe will then allow of it, is, in my judgment, a great improvement, and far preferable, upon the principle on which we profess to act, to a simple stipulation for seven years' absolute occupation.

Now as to the works of art. I differ very much from Arbuthnot as to the expediency of any consideration of the French feelings on this subject. I think it is very just and natural to consider these feelings, and to give them all due weight, upon the question of the integrity of their territory, the dismantling their fortresses, and even upon that of the temporary occupation of them; because their feelings on all these points are natural and laudable, and should be consulted as far as is consistent with the security of their neighbours: but I confess I have no regard whatever for their feeling with respect to the plunder they have taken from other countries. This feeling is altogether one of vanity, and of the worst description; and by permitting it, we are only encouraging a sentiment which will hereafter prove hostile to the just rights of other countries.

You will have observed that amongst the very different opinions which prevail on other points, there is but one sentiment amongst all parties in this country as to the justice and expediency of the restoration of the works of art.

I think the King of the Netherlands is quite right in pressing for the restoration of the pictures taken from the churches in Flanders in preference to those belonging to his own family.

I wish you to consider whether, in case the King of France can be brought to no agreement upon the subject, and it shall be necessary therefore to take away the works of art by force, it is not less dangerous to take away the whole which have been plundered than only to remove those belonging to our Allies.

It appears to me that the first proposition would rest upon a general principle, and that it would be too much for France hereafter to engage in war for the general purpose of recovering all her plunder; but by leaving any part, you acquiesce in her right to a certain degree, and you furnish her with a pretence for endeavouring to recover the remainder, and make the attainment of the object less difficult.

With these observations I am contented to leave the matter in your hands. I quite agree with you, that if the treasures of the Vatican are to be restored, this country ought to give every facility for transporting them in safety.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

*Sir C. Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Paris, 21st Sept., 1815.

The language of the Prince Talleyrand and his friends, from the moment of the arrival of M. Laisné, so little encouraged the re-establishment of union among the different members of the French Cabinet, that the interests of M. Fouché were virtually estranged from his colleagues, and that Minister was placed in a situation of embarrassment which could only cease by his retirement from public affairs.

He therefore addressed a letter to the King the day before yesterday, requesting His Majesty to accept his resignation; and, sensible of the inconvenience which may result from his continuance in France, he requested the mission to Saxony.

I understand that his retirement will be followed by a reorganization of the Ministry, and that the Police will be placed under the control of the Minister of the Interior. As the new Ministers will be selected from the Chamber of Deputies, the definitive appointments will not, however, take place at present.

The attention of the public is diverted from this important change by the expectation that at the period when the Chambers are assembled the King will make known the extent of the sacrifices which will be expected of this country, and their feelings have been considered in the communications of the Allied Ministers to M. Talleyrand.

The language of M. Talleyrand, both yesterday and to-day, induces me to think that the King will place the propositions he has received before the Chambers, and, by a reference to their opinion, that he will endeavour to avert the unpopularity to which the concessions the Allies require may give rise.

The Sovereigns finally quit Paris on Sunday next, leaving the Ministers who are charged with the conduct of the negotiations. The Emperor of Russia will, in the first instance, go to Bruxelles, and from thence he will proceed to Dijon.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY LORD, Paris, 21st Sept., 1815.

In my despatch No. 54 I informed your Lordship that Prussia stood out upon three points: 1st. The demand of 1200 millions, under the head of contributions, instead of 600 millions; 2nd. The transfer of Luxembourg to Prussia; and 3rd. The cession by France of Saarlouis to the same Power.

The importance of preserving harmony amongst the Four Powers, and a desire to be enabled at last to make our proposition to France before the

Assemblies met, made us all desirous of sacrificing somewhat to procure unanimity. It was accordingly agreed, after much discussion, that Prussia should reduce her pecuniary demands to the level of the other Powers; and that they, in return, should undertake to press the point of Saarlouis upon France, and to use their good offices with the King of the Netherlands as to Luxembourg. The King of Prussia urged the cession of Saarlouis with the more earnestness, as the Military Council were of opinion that no equivalent position for a fortress presented itself within his own frontier.

This concession to Prussia necessarily entailed an extension of our demand beyond the ancient frontier in other quarters. Having once opened the principle, we could not, in justice to the King of the Netherlands, omit to demand Condé and Givet as points immediately interesting to him. It was also thought right to include an improved frontier for Switzerland, and the military possession of Monaco for the King of Sardinia, in our proposition to the French government.

I have reason to believe that the Plenipotentiaries on the part of France will reject the principle of making any cession whatever of the ancient territory; that they will admit the principle of ceding their late acquisitions; that they will admit the principle of temporary occupation; and that they will admit the principle of pecuniary indemnity. Beyond this I do not believe the King will go without the express advice of the Assemblies; nor will his Ministers, in the present posture of the government, be disposed to make themselves responsible for any measure which does violence to the national prejudices.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 21st Sept., 1815.

We are here rather in an anxious predicament. The Assemblies meet on Monday, and no arrangement made, or, I fear, likely to be made. You have been enabled to observe the causes that have so long retarded a decision amongst ourselves to bring the question to a close. I certainly made a considerable sacrifice of my own judgment to Prussia, in which decision, however, Russia entirely concurred. We declared at the same time *in confidence* to Prussia, that whilst we were ready, if she insisted, to press Saarlouis, we could not make that place and its appendages (I mean the Belgic, Swiss, and Piedmontese places) demands *sine quâ non*, as we should have been ready to do the fortresses *enclavés* extra the old frontier. This has given, I think unfortunately, both a character of less decision and of more exigence to our demands, and changed the form of our negotiation from one of peremptory demand to one of barter.

But what has rendered our situation more difficult is the infirm state of the government. The King had no sooner decided to keep Fouché than the Family effort revived, and the Royalist party returned to the charge.

Talleyrand showed no energy, and now it seems very doubtful whether the administration, generally weakened, will not fall. I mentioned in my last letter that I had positive knowledge that Monsieur was the first mover in this business, and that the first views went to the removal of the government. This idea was narrowed, but not abandoned; and the King, the day before yesterday, told the Emperor of Austria that he had it in contemplation to change the administration generally, and to appoint the Duc de Richelieu his first Minister. The King asked the Emperor his opinion. The latter very naturally said he had heard the Duc de Richelieu well spoken of, but that he could form no opinion of his ability to conduct His Majesty's affairs. Talleyrand, I understand, last night tendered his resignation, which was neither accepted nor declined. Fouché, probably in fear of being pursued hostilely, it is understood, takes the mission to Dresden; and Talleyrand, yesterday evening, was regretting that the embassy to Vienna was filled up, as he should have wished to make it his retirement.

It is lamentable weakness to take Ministers, give them the filling up of all the departments, allow Talleyrand to name eighty or ninety new peers, after making all the old peerages hereditary, and to break them up on the eve of a session, with the advantage of taking to themselves the popularity of refusing to concede what the Allies have demanded. Yet such is the result of the conflict within the palace, urged on by the Royalists without.

The spoliation of the Louvre is begun. The King of the Netherlands is hard at work; Austria begins immediately; and I believe the three Powers, that is, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain, if called on by the Pope's Commissioner, will unite to enable him to remove his master's property. The Emperor of Russia will not, I hope, take any further part in opposition to the sentiments of his allies. The French of all parties are very sore: they were foolish enough at Madame de Duras's, the other night, to resent it to the Duke of Wellington in the most pointed manner; but we are going straight forward.

I hope in a few days to move about more actively. As yet, I can only get on with a stick, but I think all danger of any permanent inconvenience is gone by.

I am, dear Liverpool, in haste, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Rear-Admiral Sir P. Malcolm to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Ostend, 24th Sept., 1815.

I have received orders to return to England. Should events occur to render a naval co-operation again necessary with the army under the command of your Grace, I shall be most happy if it is intrusted to me; but I do hope that your present endeavours to restore peace and tranquillity to Europe may be crowned with success.

Captain Hill, the senior officer of the Transport Service employed on this station, is a most deserving officer, and particularly well qualified to carry on that service. I beg to recommend him to your Grace; I have done so also

to the Admiralty; and I trust that when he has re-embarked your army he will obtain the promotion that he merits. Captain Delafons, who is at Antwerp, is well known to your Grace: he served with me in America. I have always found him a most valuable officer. I must also mention to you Lieutenant M'Donald, who is employed with Captain Hill.

If these officers continue to perform their duties as they have done, I do trust that on your return to England you will recommend them for promotion. They are now in a manner belonging to your Grace, as they will be no longer under my orders.

My address is No. 2, Upper Harley Street.

If I can be in any way useful in England, let me know. I have already explained everything respecting the different ports. I hope to hear that you have taken possession of Dunkerque.

With every wish for a speedy termination of your labours,

Believe me to be, with great esteem, yours most faithfully,

PULTENEY MALCOLM.

[I have received your letter in which you have informed me of your return to England. I beg leave to return you my best thanks for the cordial and useful assistance I have invariably received from you in all the situations in which we have been placed together, and to assure you that it will always give me the greatest satisfaction to be placed in a situation to be in communication on service with you.

WELLINGTON.]

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*Thomas Roweroft, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

City of London Tavern, 25th Sept., 1815.

His Grace the Duke of Wellington will have pleasure to observe the free and liberal consideration of the country in a prompt contribution, which in all will not fall short of the unexampled sum of 400,000*l.* Only such sympathy and expression of admiration and of gratitude could deserve such an exertion of bravery and fortitude, of skill, discipline, and patriotic devotion, as it is proposed to reward in a *small* degree.

Mr. Roweroft begs to submit to the notice of his Grace the *projection* of a scale of distribution at this time. The fund may perhaps admit more. Is it well begun with the privates and sergeants? and after them does it advance enough, with a due regard of proportion to pay, rank, service, command, purchase of commission, &c. &c.?

The Committee will be glad to attend to every proper suggestion for their information or correction, wishing to ensure all the content and all the benefit the proceeding can reach.

THOMAS ROWCROFT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Projection.*

25th Sept., 1815.

| Rank. | Killed. | Disabled—Wounded. |
|---|---|---|
| Lieutenant-Generals and other Generals .. | £.500 | £.250? |
| Colonels .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 400 | 200 |
| Lieutenant-Colonels, Adjutants-General, and Quartermasters-General .. .. .. | 350 | 200 |
| Deputy-Adjutant-General, &c. .. .. .. | 350 | 200 |
| Major, &c. &c. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 300 | 150 |
| Are not all the above *below* their proportion of rank? | | |
| Captains, Aides-de-camp, Chaplains, &c. &c. | 250 | 100 |
| First Lieutenants and Adjutants .. .. | 200 | 70 |
| Second Lieutenants, Cornets, Ensigns, &c. | 150 | 60 |
| Sergeant-Majors .. .. .. .. .. .. | 100 | 50 |
| Sergeants .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 80 | 40 |
| Corporals .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 60 | 30 |
| Privates .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 40 | 20 |

The mode of *annuity* to be preferred and practised as far as possible.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 25th Sept., 1815.

I send you a bulletin from our correspondent to Arbuthnot. It is, I am persuaded, greatly exaggerated; but there certainly is a great degree of violence on one side, and of alarm of reaction on the other. It is a sad moment to set all this agoing, and I understand Monsieur is in the highest intoxication of delight. The Duke de Richelieu is very temperate in his own view of things, and is endeavouring to form his government with the same materials; but he meets with difficulty in filling up his offices. Laisné of Bordeaux declines to leave the chair of the Assembly, and Barbé Marbois has refused to be Minister of Justice. These two men would have been of great value. He finds it equally difficult to replace Louis.

The Duke has very good sense, and would be a most valuable Minister in an honest country, but he was never in public life except as Governor of the Crimea. He told me last night he did not know the face of one of his colleagues, and has not been in France since 1790. You may therefore judge of the difficulties he has to encounter. The Assembly, I understand, will support the Court: if they can be kept in order, matters may go on whilst we stay here, and they may mend; but the great difference between the new and the former government is, that with the dismissed ministers the King might have stayed in Paris, with the Allies on the frontier. With his new servants there seems but one opinion, that if the Allied troops were withdrawn, His Majesty would not be on his throne a week. This may all come round, but it is a serious experiment to force upon us, who were the guardians of his Royal person.

The Duke of Richelieu's connexion with the Emperor of Russia, and Pozzo's being mixed in all that is passing, give naturally to the new government a strong Russian tinge, and it is already attacked on this ground. Hitherto, notwithstanding the tone of protection which is a favourite one with the Emperor, I do not think that we have had any reason to complain of His Imperial Majesty's conduct in any part of our negotiation ever since the change, and he bears our operations at the Louvre very quietly. The whole will soon disappear. The King of the Netherlands is finished; the Emperor of Austria far advanced; and the Pope going to begin.

Talleyrand played me a very shabby trick on this business. I promised to show him privately my note, and sent it to him with a few lines marked "private." Though evidently not addressed to him, he made the note the peg to hang a popular answer upon. Not choosing to sanction so shabby a breach of confidence, I sent him a very short answer for the purpose of telling him he had done an unworthy act, and that it had made no impression. I shall write as soon as I can give you any daylight.

Yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 25th Sept., 1815.

I have been here a fortnight. Italy was of no real service to me; but I hope the sulphur baths of Aix have been effectual in removing, what I believe has been the cause of my illness, the disorder in my liver. I have not, however, thought of resuming my official labours yet, if indeed I ever can.

You will be much distressed by the despatches, yet I should hope some *mezzo termine* will be found for accommodation on their leading subject.

The state of affairs here is certainly alarming. After an interval of three months, the King has neither been able to raise a force, nor to feel such a reliance on the public temper as to be able to trust the security of his family and capital to anything but a foreign force. The general language of Paris is decidedly against the Bourbons. General officers and others of the most respectable description hold that language openly, and they say that were the foreign troops removed the Bourbons could not last ten days. I fear the irritation is very general, and the bad spirits take advantage of it, and spread all kinds of unfavourable reports.

Should, however, an accommodation take place with the Court and the Allied Powers, and should the new ministry determine to act upon a comprehensive scheme, discourage the cabal of the Princes and the ultra Royalists, and act on the conviction that men may be honest who were in office under Bonaparte, and may become useful instruments of the state, and that the advocates of free principles and a free monarchy are not therefore Jacobins and rebels, something might be hoped for.

Be assured, my dear Lord, that the facts stated in Fouché's second report

are generally and essentially true. It is a faithful picture, perhaps in parts too highly coloured, of the state of the kingdom; and you may consider his data as good to reason upon.

Your Lordship will observe the King's difficulty to form an administration. He has been forced to appoint De Cazes (the Prefect of Police, a mere subaltern) Minister of the Interior. They have not been able to get a Minister of Justice. Marbois, who is at the head of their Bench, has declined; and they are equally at present at a loss for a Minister of Finances. Laisné of Bordeaux also refused coming into the Ministry.

As I go not into evening society, it is difficult for me to get much private information, and I have lost some of my old channels.

The run is beginning at the Duc de Richelieu; and they say the Emperor of Russia is appointed to be President of the Cabinet.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever your Lordship's most faithful and humble servant,

E. Cooke.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 26th Sept., 1815.

The accounts from Paris yesterday make things look rather critical. If the terms be referred to the Chambers, the Royalists, Republicans, and Orleanists will unite in advising their rejection, none of them conceiving it to be their interest to advise an acquiescence in them. This may give rise to a brush; and I have suggested to Sir George Murray that the sooner he gets off his couch the better.

If matters are not settled, think twice before you go to Dijon, for a *coup de main* on your person would be thought a brilliant re-commencement of hostilities.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

Bathurst.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 26th Sept., 1815.

I have suspended the insertion in the 'Gazette' of General Alava's appointment to the Second Class of the Order of the Bath, in consequence of hearing of an application for the Grand Cross to the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors present at the battle of Waterloo.

If these two diplomatists are to have the Grand Cross for having been at that battle, I do not see why General Alava, who is also a diplomatist and was also at the battle, should not have the Grand Cross also.

In proposing that he should have the Second Order, I had reference to his military services with you in the Peninsula, and certainly did not con-

sider his presence, any more than I do the presence of the two other diplomatists at the battle of Waterloo, as calling for military distinction; but if they are to be thus distinguished for their presence at the battle, I certainly think that General Alava's former military services give him an additional claim to that which he in common with them would then have a right to claim.

It is surely very impolitic to place the military services of General Vincent and Pozzo di Borgo on a level with those of the four Field Marshals on whom we have so recently conferred the First Class; and we shall degrade the Order if we make it so. If the two others have it, General Müffling must also have it, for he is also named by you as having been present. If General Vincent and Pozzo di Borgo look to it as Ambassadors, the answer is plain, that it is a military Order, given to military men only; if as General officers mentioned by your Grace in your despatch, the answer is, that we do not confer it on any General officers on foreign service except Field Marshals. If they will like to have the Second Class, I have no objection; though I should think that more than was necessary.

Pray speak to Lord Castlereagh about it. It was at Carlton House that I first heard of the application, and I do not know by what channel it came.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I send you what was to have been inserted in the Gazette about General Alava.

[ENCLOSURE.]

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, has been graciously pleased to nominate and appoint Lieutenant-General Don Miguel Alava to be an Honorary Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, in consideration of the long and zealous services of that officer while attached to the British army under the command of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

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*Mr. Denys to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

54, Rue des Tournelles, Faubourg St. Antoine, 26th Sept., 1815.

Mr. Denys hopes the Duke will excuse his availing himself of this opportunity to make a few remarks respecting a report which hourly gains ground in Paris, and is insidiously circulated with a view to abate the high veneration which is so universally felt and expressed by the respectable inhabitants for that liberality they have experienced by the influence of his Grace's counsels, viz.:

The general remark is, "that the Duke of Wellington's glory has much suffered by his sanctioning the spoliation of the Musée, contrary to treaty, and that his Grace *intends sending several pictures and statues to England.*" Their invariable reply to Mr. Denys expressing his disbelief of such an

intention is, that "a paragraph denying such intention, properly authenticated, would remove all odium, and tend greatly to confirm a national respect for the English."

Mr. Denys will not further obtrude as a stranger than to hope his Grace will excuse his having so far trespassed on his time.

[The Duke is very much obliged to Mr. Denys for his advice regarding the false reports in circulation on the subject of the specimens of the arts in the Museum. The Duke has long learnt to despise this description of report, which he never considers sufficiently deserving of his attention to contradict. These reports originate with those who know they are false; and as soon as contradicted, others would be circulated of the same description. The Duke, therefore, considers it best to leave the public to discover the truth as they best can.

WELLINGTON.]

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*Major-Gen. Sir J. O. Vandeleur to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Neufchâtel, 26th Sept., 1815.

The kindness with which you have interested yourself for me on former occasions encourages me to call to your Grace's recollection the situation in which I have lately served in this army.

On the 18th of June last I was the senior Major-General of the army being a British subject; and by the casualty of the Marquis of Anglesey being wounded, the command of the cavalry devolved upon me, and continued in my hands till the arrival of Lord Combermere in Paris. I was also the senior Knight Commander of the Bath with the army. I need scarcely observe that in the army under your Grace's command the riband of that Order (now called Grand Cross) had been heretofore always given to the British General officers according to seniority, with the exception only of the chiefs of the military departments, who received it out of their turn. That a deviation from this system should have taken place in favour of a junior officer for the first time, when I happened to occupy so conspicuous a situation as senior Major-General commanding the cavalry and senior Knight Commander, cannot fail to be as injurious to my reputation as it is mortifying to my feelings, and as it is honourable to the very deserving officer who has obtained that distinction. The wound which it has inflicted can never be healed, but it may still be palliated by the kind interposition of your Grace; otherwise the having been present at the most important of your many glorious achievements, instead of being to me a circumstance of pride and exultation, will become a source of shame and regret never to be obliterated.

To obviate this calamity I appeal to your Grace's well known kindness, and once more implore your generous protection.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord Duke,
With the highest respect, esteem, and gratitude,
Your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,

J. O. VANDELEUR.

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(TRANSLATION.)

*H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal to Marshal General Duque da Victoria.*

Rio de Janeiro, 27th Sept., 1815.

Honoured Duque da Victoria, Marshal General of my Armies, Friend, I, the Prince Regent, send you much greeting, as one whom I love and value.

When the letter which you addressed me, dated 16th April, this year, reached this Court, I had already given my ratification to the Act of Accession to the Treaty of Alliance of the 25th March last, signed at Vienna by my plenipotentiaries, and referred to in your already mentioned letter; and in conformity with the stipulation of the 5th article, I sent the necessary full powers to proceed on my part with the subsequent convention, which was to regulate the employment and the operations of the Allied armies; and I immediately ordered the Governors of the Kingdom of Portugal to engage themselves in getting ready, with the greatest activity, the contingent to which I had bound myself by the said accession; everything remaining necessarily dependent on what might be stipulated by the common agreement of the Powers coalesced for the great object which they had in view, and for the sake of which I would with pleasure make every sort of sacrifice.

Unexpectedly, however, did your remarkable victory of the 18th June anticipate the effects of this alliance, putting at once an end to the calamities with which Europe was again menaced; and by your gallantry the connexion and the prowess of the greatest armies that could ever have been raised became no longer necessary. Consequently, at the present moment I have only to congratulate you with unexpressible satisfaction on this last crowning of your military glory; though I have, nevertheless, the regret that the Portuguese troops, with whom you have always shared the laurels of your former triumphs, had not taken that part which their fate seemed to prepare to them in this, above all others, the most important and memorable action. With this so grateful an object to me, I have also to convey to you the esteem and the consideration which every day you deserve more, and I pray to God to have you in his holy keeping.

PRINCIPE.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 28th Sept., 1815.

Things have tranquillized here to a certain degree, in consequence of the Duke de Richelieu showing a disposition to conciliate the moderate party. You will be surprised to find Talleyrand Grand Chambellan: I understand he asked for the office, notwithstanding his wounded dignity. I am very glad of it: I think it will strengthen the King's government, and keep things in a moderate line. The Duke de Richelieu has conducted his intercourse with us with good sense, and fought his battle with considerable address. I presume from Talleyrand's accepting office, and Louis offering to assist Cervetto in the Finance department, that it will end in a union with the party of the former, if such a thing as a party can be said to exist in France. There is a considerable feeling here upon the Russian influence being so predominant at the Tuileries.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Emperor left Paris this morning for Bruxelles. He returns to Dijon to review the Austrians, and then goes to Berlin, where he expects to celebrate the battle of Leipzig on the 18th of next month.

You may apprise the Prince Regent that the Emperor of Austria proposes to send the Archduke John to make his excuses to His Royal Highness for not making him a visit. The Archduke is a very sensible, respectable man, and proposes to stay some months in England: he is very fond of farming, and wishes to be received without form, and to be allowed to go about *en bourgeois*.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 28th Sept., 1815.

You will receive enclosed a *lettre autographe* from the three Allied Sovereigns addressed to the Prince Regent, which I have been desired to transmit. It was delivered to me by Prince Metternich, the communication being understood to be made to His Royal Highness through the medium of the Emperor of Austria, as the senior Emperor.

To explain the nature of this rather novel proceeding, I have obtained copies both of the letter and its enclosure, deeming it material to accompany it with such explanations as may assist His Royal Highness in making to it a suitable reply. I have, then, to acquaint you that although the Emperor of Austria is the ostensible organ, the measure has entirely originated with the Emperor of Russia, whose mind has latterly taken a deeply religious tinge. Since he came to Paris he has passed a part of every evening with a Madame de Krudener, an old fanatic, who has a considerable reputation amongst the few highflyers in religion that are to be found at Paris. The first intimation I had of this extraordinary act was from the Emperor himself; and I was rather surprised to find it traced back to a conversation with which I

was honoured with the Emperor when leaving Vienna. You may remember my sending home a projet of Declaration with which I proposed the Congress should close, in which the Sovereigns were solemnly to pledge themselves in the face of the world to preserve to their people the peace they had conquered, and to treat as a common enemy whatever Power should violate it. The Emperor told me that this idea, with which he seemed much pleased at the time, had never passed from his mind, but that he thought it ought to assume a more formal shape, and one directly personal to the Sovereigns; that he had communicated that morning to the Emperor of Austria his sentiments upon this subject, and that he would speak to me further upon it in a few days.

Prince Metternich, the following day, came to me with the projet of the treaty since signed. He communicated to me in great confidence the difficulty in which the Emperor of Austria felt himself placed; that he felt great repugnance to be a party to such an act, and yet was more apprehensive of refusing himself to the Emperor's application; that it was quite clear his mind was affected; that peace and goodwill was at present the idea which engrossed his thoughts; that he had found him of late friendly and reasonable on all points; and that he was unwilling to thwart him in a conception which, however wild, might save him and the rest of the world much trouble so long as it should last. In short, seeing no retreat, after making some verbal alterations the Emperor of Austria agreed to sign it. The Emperor of Russia then carried it to the King of Prussia, who felt in the same manner, but came to the same conclusion.

As soon as the instrument was executed between the Sovereigns, without the intervention of their Ministers, the Emperor of Russia brought it to me, developed his whole plan of universal peace, and told me the three Sovereigns had agreed to address a letter to the Prince Regent, to invite him to accede, of which intended letter His Imperial Majesty delivered to me the enclosed copy. The Duke of Wellington happened to be with me when the Emperor called, and it was not without difficulty that we went through the interview with becoming gravity.

Foreseeing the awkwardness of this piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense, especially to a British Sovereign, I examined with Prince Metternich every practicable expedient to stop it; but the Emperor of Austria, with all his sobriety of mind, did not venture to risk it. When it reached me, in fact, the deed was done, and no other course remained than to do homage to the sentiment upon which it was founded, and to the advantages Europe might hope to derive from three such powerful Sovereigns directing all their influence to the preservation of peace; that I was confident the Prince Regent would unite, *cœur et d'âme*, with his august Allies in making this the basis of all his policy, and that I would lose no time in laying before His Royal Highness this solemn pledge of the pacific and moderate spirit which actuated their councils.

I ventured to express to the Emperor my satisfaction that the Sovereigns had not given to this instrument an official character; that this might have rendered its production as a State document necessary; that it was better it should pass as an autographic communication of sentiment between Sovereign and Sovereign, binding upon their own consciences in the general management of their affairs, than that it should be exposed to public dis-

cussion as an act advised by their Ministers. I had, in truth, taken pains, through Prince Metternich, to keep it, if it must go forward, in this channel; foreseeing that, as Wilberforce is not yet in possession of the Great Seal, even if I should receive the Prince's command to countersign it, it might find some difficulty in passing through the ordinary course of office.

Upon the whole this is what may be called a scrape; and yet in the long run it may be attended with more beneficial results than many of the acts which are in progress, and which are of a character better to suit the eye of Parliament. The fact is, that the Emperor's mind is not completely sound. Last year there was but too much reason to fear that its impulse would be to conquest and dominion. The general belief now is, that he is disposed to found his own glory upon a principle of *peace* and *benevolence*. Since the point of Poland was disposed of, there has been nothing in his political conduct in the progress of arrangements which indicates another purpose, and he really appears to be in earnest. It is, at all events, wise to profit by this disposition as far as it will carry us; and this is peculiarly the feeling of Austria and Prussia, who hope to keep down, "now that they are compatriots," much of the spirit of frontier jealousy which has hitherto embarrassed them.

With the letter and treaty you will also receive a projet for the Prince's accession, which the Emperor sent me this morning, before his departure. I am desired by the Emperor of Austria, through Metternich, to express his earnest hope that the Prince will not refuse himself to this overture, however much he may feel, with him, the embarrassment of the proceeding; that he thinks good may come of indulging the Emperor, and that real danger might result to the alliance from a refusal. My own opinion very much concurs with that of His Imperial Majesty; and in weighing difficulties on both sides, I think no person will blame the Prince for not refusing himself to *a proposition so made to him*, where the objection lies rather against the excessive excellence than the quality and nature of the engagement: but then, I think the Prince must take it upon himself, and sign it without the intervention of his Ministers, as an autographic avowal of sentiment between him and the Sovereigns his Allies, tending to preserve the tranquillity of Europe. To decline doing so, after a late explanation, might produce very unpleasant consequences.

The Emperor told me with great delight that there was nothing had given him so much satisfaction as to affix his signature to this bond of peace in, he believed, the most *irreligious* capital in Europe.

I confide this communication to your management, and hope the Prince Regent may find himself enabled to avoid disturbing the harmony which at present subsists between him and his Allies,

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*The Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia to H.R.H. the Prince Regent of England.*

MONSIEUR NOTRE FRÈRE ET COUSIN, Paris, le 14 (26) Sept., 1815.

Les événemens qui ont affligé le monde depuis plus de vingt ans nous ont convaincus que le seul moyen d'y mettre un terme se trouvoit dans l'union la plus franche et la plus intime entre les Souverains que la Divine Providence a placé à la tête des peuples de l'Europe. L'histoire des trois années mémorables qui viennent de s'écouler atteste les effets bienfaisans que cette union a produit pour le salut de l'humanité. Mais afin d'assurer à ce lien la solidité que réclame impérieusement la grandeur et la pureté du but vers lequel il tend, nous avons pensé qu'il dût être fondé sur les principes sacrés de la religion Chrétienne. Profondément pénétré de cette importante vérité, nous avons conclu et signé l'acte que nous soumettons aujourd'hui à la méditation de Votre Altesse Royale. Elle se persuadera qu'il a pour objet de raffermir les rapports qui nous unissent, en formant de tous les peuples de la Chrétienneté une seule et même famille, et en leur assurant par là, sous la protection du Tout Puissant, le bonheur, le salut, les bienfaits de la paix, et des liens de fraternité à jamais indissolubles. Nous avons vivement regretté que Votre Altesse Royale n'ait point été réuni avec nous dans le grand moment où nous avons conclu cette transaction.

Nous l'invitons, comme notre premier et plus intime allié, à y accéder et à compléter une œuvre uniquement consacrée au bien de l'humanité, et que nous devons dès lors considérer comme la plus belle récompense de nos efforts.

Nous réiterons à Votre Altesse Royale les assurances du sincère attachement et de la haute estime avec lesquels nous sommes

De Votre Altesse Royale

Les bons Frères, Cousins, et Alliés,

FRANÇOIS.
FRÉDÉRIC GUILLAUME.
ALEXANDRE.

II.

*Treaty of Alliance between the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia.*

Au nom de la Très Sainte et Indivisible Trinité.

Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de Russie, par suite des grands événements qui ont signalé en Europe le cours des trois dernières années, et principalement des bienfaits multipliés qu'il a plu à la Divine Providence de répandre sur les états dont les gouvernements ont placé leur confiance et leur espoir en elle seule, ayant acquis la conviction intime qu'il est nécessaire d'asseoir la marche à adopter par les Puissances dans leurs rapports mutuels sur les vérités sublimes que nous enseigne l'éternelle religion du Dieu Sauveur :

Déclarant solennellement que le présent acte n'a pour objet que de manifester à la face de l'univers leur détermination inébranlable de ne prendre

pour règle de leur conduite, soit dans l'administration de leurs états respectifs, soit dans leurs relations politiques avec tout autre gouvernement, que les préceptes de cette religion sainte, préceptes de justice, de charité, et de paix, qui, loin d'être uniquement applicables à la vie privée, doivent au contraire influer directement sur les résolutions des Princes, et guider toutes leurs démarches, comme étant le seul moyen de consolider les institutions humaines et de remédier à leurs imperfections:

En conséquence leurs Majestés sont convenus des articles suivants:—

ARTICLE I.

Conformément aux paroles des Saintes Ecritures, qui ordonnent à tous les hommes de se regarder comme frères, les trois Monarques contractants demeureront unis par les liens d'une fraternité véritable et indissoluble; et se considérant comme compatriotes, ils se prêteront en toute occasion et en tout lieu assistance, aide, et secours: se regardant envers leurs sujets et armées comme pères de famille, ils les dirigeront dans le même esprit de fraternité dont ils sont animés, pour protéger la religion, la paix, et la justice.

ART. II.

En conséquence le seul principe en vigueur, soit entre les dits gouvernements, soit entre les sujets, sera celui de se rendre réciproquement service, de se témoigner par une bienveillance inaltérable l'affection mutuelle dont ils doivent être animés, de ne se considérer tous que comme membres d'une même nation Chrétienne. Les trois Princes Alliés, ne s'envisageant eux-mêmes que comme délégués par la Providence pour gouverner trois branches d'une même famille, savoir, l'Autriche, la Prusse, et la Russie, confessant ainsi que la nation Chrétienne dont eux et leurs peuples font partie n'a réellement d'autre Souverain que celui à qui seul appartient en propriété la puissance, parcequ'en lui seul se trouvent tous les trésors de l'amour, de la science, et de la sagesse infinie, c'est-à-dire Dieu notre Divin Sauveur Jésus Christ, le Verbe du Très Haut, la parole de vie: leurs Majestés recommandent en conséquence avec la plus tendre sollicitude à leurs peuples, comme unique moyen de jouir de cette paix, qui naît de la bonne conscience et qui seule est durable, de se fortifier chaque jour davantage dans les principes et l'exercice des devoirs que le Divin Sauveur a enseignés aux hommes.

ART. III.

Toutes les Puissances qui voudront solennellement avouer les principes sacrés qui ont dicté le présent acte, et qui reconnoîtront combien il est important au bonheur des nations trop longtems agitées que ces vérités exercent désormais sur les destinées humaines toute l'influence qui leur appartient, seront reçues avec autant d'empressement que d'affection dans cette sainte alliance.

Fait triple et signé à Paris, l'an de grâce 1815, 14 (26) Septembre.

FRANÇOIS.
FRÉDÉRIC GUILLAUME.
ALEXANDRE.

III.

*Projet d'Acte d'Accession.*

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, nous ayant fait part d'un acte conclu

et signé entre leurs dites Majestés, à Paris, le * Septembre, 1815, portant l'engagement solennel d'une alliance et fraternité indissoluble, tant entre la personne des Souverains qu'entre leurs sujets respectifs, laquelle a pour but de se conformer aux divins préceptes de la religion Chrétienne, et d'en faire l'application aux rapports politiques et sociaux; et leurs dites Majestés nous ayant invités à fortifier par notre accession les liens sacrés que le présent acte a pour but d'établir et de cimenter entre les peuples Chrétiens: Nous nous sommes plus à reconnoître l'utilité et la sagesse de cette œuvre importante.

En conséquence nous avons donné et donnons par la présente notre pleine et entière adhésion au dit acte d'allianee et de fraternité, et nous promettons de le tenir pour obligatoire envers leurs Majestés Impériales et Royales, et de l'observer en toute occasion.

En foi de quoi nous avons signé le présent acte d'accession, et l'avons fait munir du sceau de nos armes.

Fait à l'an de grâce, &c.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 29th Sept., 1815.

There are two points in your projet upon which we are all agreed in principle, but which will require more attention than appears to have been given to them in the draft you forwarded to us before the projet is reduced into the form of a treaty for signature. The first point is, that there appears to be no stipulation for not evacuating the fortresses which we are to occupy temporarily till such time as the full amount of the contribution agreed upon shall be paid. A provision to this effect has always been understood as reasonable, and should be made as clear as possible.

The other point is of equal importance: the terms on which the restitution is to be made to the King of France and his lawful heirs. We are all agreed that the restitution should be stipulated only in favour of the King and his lawful heirs. Indeed such a stipulation will be one of the best securities of His Majesty's throne, and to it therefore he cannot object. The words in your projet, "héritier et successeur," may certainly be ambiguous; and I can recommend no words so likely to answer the purpose as those which the Chancellor suggested, "Louis XVIII. or his successors by rightful inheritance."

I have, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 29th Sept., 1815.

We have received this morning your letters of the 25th instant, and most entirely approve all your proceedings.

The want of judgment of the King in changing his administration at

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* Blank in manuscript.

this particular moment is most truly to be lamented. I could not resist saying to the Prince Regent yesterday that if his father had been in a situation to be obliged to make an humiliating peace, and at the same time was desirous to get rid of his Ministers, he would have taken care to make the Ministers whom he was anxious to turn out the instruments of the peace, and not have thrown the inevitable unpopularity and odium of such a transaction on those who were to succeed them.

The answer of the French Plenipotentiaries to the projet of the Allies is very much what we expected. I do not think, however, that you seem to be aware of one argument which may be of essential service to you in the view you have taken of the principles on which the negotiation ought to be conducted.

If the French government insist upon the principle of the integrity of France as it stood in 1789, before the French Revolution, they ought to restore certain *enclaves* within their own territory, viz. Avignon, the Comtat Venaissin, and Montbelliard, to their former sovereigns. If they are allowed to keep these territories as *enclaves*, nothing can be more reasonable than that they should cede to the Allies the *enclaves* which they claim as compensation. By this mode of viewing the question their honour might be completely saved, as the condition of the cession of the several *enclaves* might be made reciprocal.

If they should, however, say "We would rather restore Avignon, &c., than cede Landau, Philippeville, &c.," we might fairly reply that our proposition must in reality be more advantageous to both parties; that in the situation in which we are placed we have fairly a right to make the option between two alternatives not very unequal in their value and amount; and that we cannot admit that from any motive of perverseness, or from the endeavour to advance a principle inconsistent with the whole public law of Europe, they should defeat an arrangement which would be highly advantageous to Europe, and not prejudicial to France.

We have been most truly gratified with reading the Duke of Wellington's letter to you on the subject of removing the pictures, &c., from the Museum. It is a most satisfactory statement in all respects, and will, I trust, sooner or later meet the public eye.

I shall be most happy to hear that the statues and pictures belonging to the Vatican are packed up. It is become now of the utmost importance that our principle should be carried through consistently. We cannot irritate the French more by completing our work than we have by beginning it; and, as I have stated to you in a former letter, there is more safety in my judgment in a general removal of the whole plunder than in one which is only partial.

I have, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Edward Cooke, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, Fife House, 2nd Oct., 1815.

I had the greatest pleasure and satisfaction a few days ago on seeing again your handwriting, and am most happy to find the sulphur baths of Aix have been of service to you.

You have got into a troubled sea again, but I trust all will end well, though the unaccountable conduct of the King in removing his ministers at so unseasonable a moment makes me sometimes despair of his having the good sense, steadiness, and consistency to carry on such a government in such times. It is most extraordinary that the French Princes after living so many years in this country should remain as ignorant of all the principles and practice of a popular or mixed government as if they had known no atmosphere but that of Versailles under its former Sovereigns.

I trust Lord Castlereagh will be able to bring our negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion; and if the Emperor of Russia acts upon the advice of the Military Council and halts his army, I have little doubt of it. On the other hand, the departure of the Sovereigns from Paris and the march of the Russian army across the Rhine, if it actually takes place, will give considerable confidence to the French government, and will, I fear, prevent matters being brought to an adjustment without some new conflict.

I am going to-morrow to Walmer Castle. If you think of returning to England, I hope you will pay us a visit on your way to London.

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Fife House, 2nd Oct., 1815.

I have received your memorandum respecting Sir Alexander Campbell's application to have his Baronetage in default of heirs male continued to his daughters or their heirs male.

I do not know whether you are aware that the Baronetage cannot (as a Peerage may) be conferred upon a woman, and consequently cannot pass through a woman. If Sir Alexander Campbell's daughters have any sons born, his Baronetage might, in default of heirs male, be continued to them by name; and if you can put the business in this shape, and are desirous that it should be done, I will certainly recommend it to the Prince Regent.

With respect to Sir Robert Kennedy, I had never any wish to put off the conferring the honour of the Baronetage upon him till the accounts of his sub-accountants had been passed, but only till his personal accounts had been reported upon. I understand that they are before the Auditor, and will not take any considerable time in passing; and I am advised that it would not be proper to recommend Sir Robert Kennedy for the honour he solicits till this part of the proceeding is closed.

I had the greatest satisfaction in reading your letter to Lord Castlereagh on the measures which had been adopted with respect to the pictures and statues in the Museum at Paris. The case is complete, and I trust your letter will, sooner or later, meet the public eye.

I hope you will not have much difficulty, with the latitude given to you, in bringing the negotiation with the French government to a conclusion upon all the other points. I have suggested to Castlereagh what does not appear to have occurred to him, that if the French government stand upon the principle of the integrity of old France, they are bound to restore Avignon, the Comtat Venaissin, and Montbelliard.

If these territories are allowed to remain under *their* sovereignty as *enclaves* (which I believe to be for the general interest), it is not unreasonable, even on their own principle, that they should give up as equivalents the *enclaves* in Germany and in the Low Countries.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke,
Yours very sincerely,
LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Fife House, 2nd Oct., 1815.

I send you a letter which I have received from Wilberforce on the subject of the last communication between Mr. Vaughan and the Spanish government respecting the slave trade.

I wish you would write to Vaughan on the subject as soon as other more pressing business may permit. It can only be from ignorance and perverseness that the Spanish government continue the trade north of the Line; and if they even persist to decline agreeing to the general abolition in less than eight years, I should hope they might be induced to concur in a limited proposition, which can be of no real detriment to them, and is of such incalculable importance as to the civilization of Northern Africa.

I have suggested to Wilberforce the advantage which might arise from his sending Mr. Macaulay or some person conversant in these African concerns to Madrid to assist Mr. Vaughan in the negotiation on this subject

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Walmer Castle, 3rd Oct., 1815.

I have received your letter with the enclosures,* containing an autograph letter from the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia to the Prince Regent; the copy of a treaty signed by their Majesties at Paris on the 26th of September; and the projet of an Act of Accession by the Prince Regent.

I have laid the same before the Prince Regent, and we have had a cabinet to consider what is fit to be done in consequence.

I forbear discussing the question how far it might not have been more advisable, on every account, to prevent such a proceeding altogether. The work is done; and it is one thing to wish it not to have been done, at least in such a manner, and another to refuse being a party to it after it is done.

It is quite impossible, however, to advise the Prince to sign the Act of Accession which has been transmitted to him. Such a step would be in-

* See p. 175.

consistent with all the forms and principles of our government, and would subject those who advised it to a very serious responsibility.

A treaty is an act of State, and this treaty (if it is of any use) is obviously meant to be so. Now nothing is more clear than that the King or Regent of Great Britain can be a party to no act of State personally: he can only be a party to it through the instrumentality of others, who are responsible for it.

The Sovereign, therefore, never signs any treaty in the first instance. He negotiates, concludes, and signs by plenipotentiaries whom he empowers to do those acts. He afterwards ratifies whatever they have done, if he approves of it; but this ratification must have the Great Seal affixed to it.

If the Sovereign cannot sign a treaty personally, neither can he accede to it personally. He must therefore authorise you or some other plenipotentiary to accede to it in his name and on his part. But independent of all other objections to such a course, it would be an incongruity for the Sovereign or Regent of Great Britain to accede to a treaty through a plenipotentiary which the other Sovereigns had thought proper to sign personally. We are bound to suppose that such a personal act is not inconsistent with the forms and principles of their governments, though it is repugnant to those of ours.

After much consideration, we have been of opinion that the best course for the Prince to adopt is to write an autographical letter to the three Sovereigns according to the enclosed draft. It will obviate all the objections above stated, and will make (it is to be hoped) the Prince Regent as much a party to the proceeding as the Emperor of Russia and his two allies could desire. At all events it obviates all the objections which would arise to the Prince refusing to be a party in any way to the act in question. The Prince, by this letter, gives his full sanction to all the principles which the other Sovereigns are desirous of consecrating; and if it is thought fit to publish the treaty, I see no objection to the Prince's letter being published with it.

The enclosed draft was to be laid before the Prince this morning, and I hope to be able to send to you the three letters by the mail of Friday.

In transmitting them you can explain fully the reason why it has been necessary for the Prince to adopt this course instead of signing the proposed Act of Accession. I trust they will prove satisfactory, and relieve you from all further difficulty in this business.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Proposed Draft Letter from the Prince Regent to the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia.*

I have had the honour of receiving your Imperial Majesty's letter, together with the copy of the treaty signed by your Majesty and your august Allies, at Paris, on the 26th of September.

As the forms of the British Constitution, which I am called upon to administer in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty my father, preclude me

from acceding formally to this treaty in the shape in which it has been presented to me, I adopt this course of conveying to the august Sovereigns who have signed it my entire concurrence in the principles which they have laid down, and in the declaration which they have set forth of making the Divine precepts of the Christian religion the invariable rule of their conduct in all their relations, social and political, and of cementing the union which ought ever to subsist between all Christian nations; and it will be always my earnest endeavour to regulate my conduct in the station in which Divine Providence has vouchsafed to place me by these sacred maxims, and to co-operate with my august Allies in all measures which may be likely to contribute to the peace and happiness of mankind.

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*The Duc d'Otrante to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Bruxelles, le 3 Oct., 1815.

Je n'ai point encore de secrétaire auprès de moi: je suis obligé de me servir de la main de ma femme, qui va vous écrire sous ma dictée.

Je vous dois des remercimens pour la courageuse amitié que vous m'avez témoigné: elle vous a attiré quelques injustices; mais l'estime de la nation vous venge, et l'avenir justifiera vos sentimens pour moi.

J'ai quitté avec regret ma patrie: elle va devenir une source de nouveaux troubles pour elle-même et pour l'Europe.

Un parti domine déjà dans plusieurs départemens de la France: ce parti a plus de passions que de lumières: la nation ne supportera pas patiemment son joug.

Sans doute on laisserait subsister nos institutions; mais c'est dans la marche du gouvernement que serait l'oppression. J'ai fait tous mes efforts pour arrêter les progrès du mal, et pour établir le Roi à la tête de la nation entière. J'ai lutté seul avec persévérance; je lutterais encore si les passions que je voulais enchaîner n'eussent pris le ton exclusif de la fidélité.

La France agitée ne pourrait plus être compté au nombre des élémens nécessaires à l'équilibre de l'Europe: nos troubles nuiront à la fois aux peuples et aux Souverains. En effet, la France comme parti n'a point d'intérêts généraux; elle n'a aucun poids comme nation, puisqu'elle manque de sphère politique régulière, et qu'elle est hétérogène à l'Europe.

Dans cette hypothèse elle serait forcée pour suppléer à la stabilité de se livrer à l'influence exclusive de celui des Souverains qui voudrait soutenir en France le parti dominant.

Je développerai dans un mémoire particulier toute ma pensée à ce sujet: l'intérêt de parti a déjà eu une funeste influence au Congrès de Vienne; j'en démontrerai toutes les conséquences.

Dans l'état actuel des choses en Europe c'est bien moins l'étendue du territoire que la nature du gouvernement qui importe à la France, à sa prospérité, et à son bonheur. Le premier besoin du peuple Français aujourd'hui est une sécurité pleine et entière pour la liberté et l'honneur.

Je prie Votre Seigneurie de recevoir l'assurance de ma profonde gratitude et de ma haute considération.

Le Duc d'Otrante.

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*General Dumouriez to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER ET RESPECTABLE DUC, Le 4 Oct., 1815.

Rien n'était moins nécessaire, d'après l'opinion que j'ai de vous, que la franche et noble justification dans laquelle vous avez la complaisance d'entrer par votre lettre du 26 Septembre * sur la nomination et le renvoi de Fouché. La première mesure était commandée par les circonstances, et a sauvé beaucoup de sang ; la seconde, quoique indispensable, a l'inconvénient d'être faite mal à propos. Il est fâcheux qu'un Roi de soixante ans se laisse guider par de jeunes téméraires, qui veulent absolument remettre la décision de leur procès à Dieu et à leur épée.

Les conséquentes sont aisées à prévoir. Les représentants, qu'il eut été si sage et si adroit de consulter, pour gagner leur confiance et les mettre de moitié dans le résultat, seront choqués de la précipitation de ce renvoi irréfléchi, qui met à découvert les projets violents qu'ils soupçonnaient déjà, d'après les propos indiscrets des *purs* et la conduite peu ménagée des agents de cette faction dans les départements du Midi, et partout où ils ont les coudées franches. La Cour vient de recharger la mine creusée sous ses pas, et tient la mèche allumée pour la faire jouer contr'elle même.

C'est sous ces terribles auspices que va se faire l'ouverture des Chambres. Le premier moment présentera peut-être une unanimité illusoire, effet de l'activité des intrigues de la Cour dans les élections. Mais les premiers débats signaleront bien vite les différents partis. Les métaux se sépareront, et la lutte commencera avec acharnement. Les Souverains ne seront plus là pour contenir et concilier, et l'intervention des ministres et des généraux, dont l'autorité ne sera que secondaire, et dont les opinions seront divergentes, ne fera qu'augmenter la confusion, et rendre le secours du glaive nécessaire pour trancher ce nœud Gordien que le bon Louis XVIII. n'a pas eu l'adresse de délier.

Alors, mon cher Héros, il est malheureusement à prévoir que vous serez forcé de rentrer dans vos fonctions militaires, ainsi que votre vieux compagnon d'armes, que je suis fâché de voir faisant votre avant-garde autour de Paris, d'après ce que je crains de sa disposition et de celle de son armée.

En fait de prévoyance sur les événements résultants d'une révolution, il faut caver toujours au plus fort, surtout quand on voit que les individus les plus intéressés à ramener le calme portent tout à l'extrême. Certainement votre prudence vous a suggéré les précautions préliminaires pour être compromis le moins possible, ainsi que l'armée, dont la dislocation et les mouvements dépendent de vous directement.

Je souhaiterais qu'avant l'hiver qui approche vous occupassiez par des garnisons Calais, Boulogne, Montreuil, Gravelines, et Dunkerque, au moins la première et la dernière de ces places : 1°. Pour assurer la communication avec Paris et avec votre résidence personnelle, quelle qu'elle soit ; car si cette communication se trouvait coupée, ou même simplement interceptée pour peu de tems, cela ferait un très mauvais effet. 2°. Pour assurer la retraite de vos nombreux compatriotes des deux sexes et de toutes les classes que la curiosité, l'oisiveté, ou des spéculations en tout genre ont rassemblé en

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 649.

France, et surtout dans la capitale, qui en cas de réaction risqueraient de devenir victimes, ou ôtages, et au moins gêneraient vos mouvements.

Continuez, mon cher Duc, à témoigner votre estime et votre confiance à votre fidèle serviteur et ami

DUMOURIEZ.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON COUSIN, Lacken, le 6 Oct., 1815.

C'est avec une bien grande satisfaction que j'ai appris la manière dont vous avez fait valoir les réclamations adressées au gouvernement Français pour la restitution des objets d'art et autres que les gouvernemens précédens avaient enlevés dans les villes de mes états, et la suite que vous avez donné à cette affaire. Non seulement vous vous attirez par là des nouveaux droits à ma reconnaissance, mais je peux vous assurer que celle-ci est nationale, et que le prix attaché à la récuperation des objets volés occasionne une joie générale. En songeant à cette restitution tout le monde paye volontiers le tribut de reconnaissance à celui à qui nous le devons à tous égards.

Ayant vu approcher la conclusion des négotiations dont le résultat fixe la position de l'Europe vis-à-vis de la France, et particulièrement celle des frontières de mes états, j'ai cru le moment arrivé de songer à mettre en exécution les divers projets formés l'année dernière et pendant l'hiver pour assurer celles-ci, et les mettre en état de défense. J'ai en conséquence fait venir le Général Krayenhoff ici, et après avoir conféré ensemble nous sommes convenus du principe qu'il fallait immédiatement s'occuper des objets préparatoires, afin de pouvoir entreprendre avec le commencement de la saison de 1816 tous les travaux requis, et que ceux-ci devaient être dirigés de façon à nous donner un résultat en trois années, de manière à avoir achevé tout ce qui était indispensable, sauf à remettre à une époque plus éloigné l'érection des bâtimens intérieurs, comme casernes et autres, qui, quoique également nécessaires, peuvent être remis sans inconvénient pour la sûreté des forteresses. Charleroi et Namur, dont les projets existent, seraient entièrement remis à neuf; et à l'égard de cette dernière place on s'occuperait d'abord du château, et d'assurer la possession des rivières, en remettant l'érection des forts destinés à couvrir la ville à la gauche de la Sambre jusqu'à ce que l'entre Sambre et Meuse fut assuré. De plus, le Général Krayenhoff adapterait à Mons, Ath, Tournay, Ypres, Nieuport, et Ostende, les projets de défense aux travaux faits l'année actuelle; et utilisant ceux-ci, tout sera réglé pour mettre ces places dans une situation qui les mette à même de soutenir un long siége en règle. Menin est aussi une place qui sera rétablie; et de cette manière nous nous flattons avoir une première ligne de forteresses en état de défense à la fin de l'année 1818. Pour compléter la seconde ligne, que Maestricht, Anvers, et Vlissingue forment, l'intention est de bâtir une forteresse que puisse servir de place d'armes sur le Demer, aux environs d'Aerschot ou de Diest; et quoique le point le plus avantageux n'a pas encore été choisi, il est néanmoins résolu de s'occuper également de cet objet dès ce que les divers reconnaissances et levées préparatoires permettront de fixer les idées sur cet objet. La ligne

de forteresses vers la Basse Meuse formerait une troisième rangée qui arrêterait encore un ennemi avant qu'il rencontrât les obstacles que les passages des fleuves lui opposeraient, pour pouvoir percer dans le cœur de la Hollande. Je me flatte, mon Cousin, que ce plan, dont l'exécution donnerait des résultats au bout de trois ans, mais qui pourrait être entièrement perfectionné après cinq années, aura votre approbation. Je prends cependant la liberté de le soumettre à vos considérations, et vous prie de me faire connaître vos idées sur cet objet, attachant infiniment de prix à agir d'après les vues du plus grand Général de l'Europe, qui certainement juge mieux que personne des obstacles que peuvent le plus longtems empêcher l'invasion de nos provinces entre la Meuse et la mer. Les frais qu'occasionneront l'érection et le perfectionnement de toutes ces forteresses seront extrêmement considérables; et indépendamment de ces travaux, leurs dotations et les magasins à y former coûteront bien des millions. Il nous est permis de compter qu'une partie des millions payables par la France seront déterminés pour nous aider à supporter cette charge; mais nous ne savons et pouvons aussi pas encore juger combien sera mis à ma disposition, non plus que les époques auxquelles on peut compter que les payemens s'effectueront. En outre de ce qui nous sera bonifié de cette manière, les traités existans me garantissent le payement de 2,000,000 livres sterling comme prix d'une partie de nos colonies, mais que le gouvernement Britannique a fixé de voir être employé pour l'établissement d'un système de défense dans nos provinces méridionales. Il vous est connu, mon Cousin, que ces sommes sont intactes; et vous voudrez même vous rappeler m'avoir conseillé de ne point songer à les obtenir, au moins en partie, pour couvrir les frais extraordinaires que les armemens de la présente année ont occasionné, afin de les conserver pour leur but primitif. Je me suis pour lors réglé d'après votre opinion, comme je me fais toujours un plaisir de le faire, et serai bien heureux de connaître maintenant vos idées sur la manière d'obtenir les payemens qui me misent en état d'exécuter le plan et système que je soumets à vos considérations. Nous n'avons pas besoin d'avoir en une fois la somme totale; et des payemens successifs à des termes réglés, mais de manière à pouvoir y compter, pour satisfaire aux engagemens que nous sommes à même de contracter, est tout ce que je désire. Je vous aurais une double obligation si vous vouliez contribuer à régler cette affaire, ou appuyer au moins les démarches qui vous sembleront conseillable en cette occasion auprès du gouvernement Britannique.

Je suis avec une très haute considération,

Mon Cousin, votre affectionné

GUILLAUME.

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*Marshal Prince Blücher to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Quartier-Général, Versailles, le 8 Oct., 1815.

Sa Majesté le Roi mon maître m'a ordonné de concentrer les troupes de mon commandement plus près de la frontière, pour qu'elles puissent, à l'exception du corps d'armée qui va rester en France lors de la conclusion de

la paix, continuer à retourner dans les états Prussiens. Il est en général mon idée de diriger le 1er. corps et le 6me. corps, qui se trouvent dans ce moment dans les départements de l'Eure, du Calvados, et de la Manche, par les Pays-Bas au grand duché du Bas Rhin; et de faire marcher le 3me. et le 4me. corps, qui se trouvent à présent dans les départements de Seine et Oise, et d'Eure et Loir, par la Champagne et la Lorraine au Rhin. Vu cette disposition générale, il devient nécessaire de commencer à porter le 1r. et le 6me. corps sur la rive droite de la Seine. Je me prends l'honneur d'informer Votre Altesse de mon intention. Pour la pouvoir exécuter je dois souhaiter que quelques arrondissements qui se trouvent sur la droite de la Seine servent pour la concentration de mes troupes. Je prie donc Votre Altesse de les vouloir faire évacuer pour le moment et pour ce but par les troupes de S.M. Britannique qui pourraient s'y trouver. Il est mon idée que le 1er. corps doit se concentrer dans les arrondissements de Beauvais et de Clermont, du département de l'Oise, et dans celui de Montdidier, du département de la Somme: le quartier-général de ce corps serait à Beauvais. Le 6me. corps occuperait les arrondissements de Rouen, Neufchâtel, et Gournay, du département Seine Inférieure, et les arrondissements Andelys, Louviers, et Evreux, du département de l'Eure: son quartier-général serait à Rouen. J'ai donné ordre que ces corps sortent le 11 de ce mois des cantonnements qu'ils occupent à présent, pour effectuer leur concentration dans les arrondissements que j'ai eu l'honneur de nommer à Votre Altesse, et je me flatte que Votre Altesse donnera les ordres nécessaires aux troupes de son commandement pour que les troupes de l'armée Anglaise et de l'armée Prussienne ne se croisent pas dans les cantonnements que celles-ci vont prendre, pour continuer, après la paix conclue, leur marche vers la frontière.

Je profite de cet occasion pour renouveler à Votre Altesse l'assurance de ma haute considération.

BLÜCHER.

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*Colonel M. Burrows to Colonel Hervey.*

SIR, Marseilles, 9th Oct., 1815.

I have the honour to request you will inform his Grace the Duke of Wellington (although his Grace will probably receive earlier information) that accounts were last night received by Admiral Lord Exmouth of General Murat having left Corsica, accompanied by about 100 men. It is not known what direction he has taken.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

M. BURROWS.

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ETAT détaillé du Corps séparé de Troupes Russes restant en France sous le Commandement en Chef de son Excellence le Maréchal DUC DE WELLINGTON.

Commandant du Corps, le Lieut.-Gén. Comte WORONZOW.
Chef d'Etat Major, le Général-Major PONCET.
Colonel de Service, ABSCHEROUMOFF.
Quartiermaître-Général, le Colonel SCHOUBERT.
Chef des Ingénieurs, le Colonel FEDOROFF.
Commandant l'Artillerie du Corps, le Colonel LIEBSTEIN.

Adjudants-Commandants à l'Etat Major. { Le Major POPOFF. / Le Capitaine KAZNATCHEIEFF. / Le Lieutenant-Capitaine FRANK. / Le Lieutenant BOUTTLER.

Intendant, Mr. BREM.
Directeur des Postes, Mr. POL.
Auditeur du Corps, Mr. ANDRÉEFF.
Docteur du Corps, Mr. BOUTKOFF.

Quartier du Corps, Nancy, le 27 Sept. (9 Oct.), 1815.

3ME DIVISION DE DRAGONS—Le Lieutenant-Général ALÉXEIEFF. Quartier de Division, Pont-à-Mousson.

| Régiments. | Nombre de Bataillons. | Nombre d'Escadrons. | Combattants. Présens sous les Armes. Officiers-Majors. | Officiers. | Bas-Officiers. | Musiciens. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | Surnuméraires et dans la Cavalerie à pied. Bas-Officiers. | Soldats. | Non combattants. | Total Général. | Noms des Commandants de Régiments et des Compagnies d'Artillerie. | Commandants des Brigades. | Dislocation. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dragons: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| De Smolensk | .. | 6 | 3 | 31 | 95 | 18 | 860 | 1,007 | .. | 125 | 81 | 1,213 | Colonel Dekonski | Le Général Major Balabine | Clermont. |
| De Twer | .. | 6 | 2 | 35 | 96 | 18 | 942 | 1,093 | 8 | 35 | 108 | 1,244 | Colonel Nabel | | Briey. |
| Kinbourn | .. | 6 | 3 | 34 | 92 | 19 | 913 | 1,061 | 5 | 56 | 104 | 1,226 | Colonel Lessovski | Le Général Major Kabloukoff | Blamant. |
| Courlande | .. | 6 | 2 | 34 | 96 | 18 | 862 | 1,012 | 6 | 115 | 101 | 1,234 | Lieut.-Col. Comte Goudovitch | | Saarbourg. |
| Total | .. | 24 | 10 | 134 | 379 | 73 | 3,577 | 4,173 | 19 | 331 | 394 | 4,917 | | | |
| Cosaques: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| De Tagodin | .. | 5 | 2 | 14 | 7 | .. | 297 | 320 | 1 | 21 | 16 | 358 | Général Tagodin | Général Tagodin | Bouzonville. |
| De Grevzoff | .. | 5 | 1 | 7 | 12 | .. | 495 | 515 | .. | 1 | .. | 516 | Major Grévzoff | | Touy. |
| Gendarmes | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 2 | .. | 40 | 44 | .. | .. | 2 | 46 | Lieut. Essen, 1er. | | Nancy. |
| Total de Cavalerie | .. | 34 | 13 | 157 | 400 | 73 | 4,409 | 5,052 | 20 | 353 | 412 | 5,837 | | | |
| Compagnie d'Artillerie à Cheval, No. 25 | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 23 | 1 | 222 | 251 | .. | .. | 44 | 295 | Capitaine Falkenberg | .. | Estain. |

## 9ME DIVISION D'INFANTERIE—Le Général-Major OUDOM. Quartier de Division, Bar le Duc.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D'Infanterie: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| De Naschenbourg | 2 | .. | 3 | 28 | 120 | 47 | 1,632 | 1,830 | 35 | 109 | 121 | 2,095 | Colonel Tokhoff | Général Polto-ratzki | Vaucouleurs. |
| D'Apschewnsk | 2 | .. | 3 | 29 | 120 | 50 | 1,632 | 1,854 | 39 | 150 | 102 | 2,125 | Col. Cte. Poiigniac | | St. Mihiel. |
| Riajsk | 2 | .. | 3 | 30 | 120 | 45 | 1,632 | 1,830 | 33 | 124 | 104 | 2,091 | Colonel Medinzoff | Colonel Medint-zoff | Thieblemont. |
| Takoutsk | 2 | .. | 3 | 39 | 120 | 48 | 1,632 | 1,842 | 35 | 102 | 105 | 2,084 | Lt.-Col. Ougrumoff | | Vassy. |
| Chasseurs: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10me | 2 | .. | 2 | 36 | 120 | 48 | 1,632 | 1,838 | 35 | 163 | 114 | 2,150 | Lt.-Col. Melnikoff | Général Ivanoff | Bar le Duc. |
| 38me | 2 | .. | 1 | 32 | 120 | 48 | 1,632 | 1,833 | 33 | 131 | 102 | 2,099 | Lt.-Col. Tischatzki | | Revigny aux Vaches. |
| Total | 12 | .. | 15 | 194 | 720 | 286 | 9,792 | 11,007 | 210 | 779 | 648 | 12,644 | | | |
| 9me Brigade d'Artillerie: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Compagnies de Position, No. 9 | .. | .. | 1 | 5 | 17 | 12 | 230 | 265 | .. | .. | 47 | 312 | Capitaine Seslavine | Le Colonel Tchérémissi-noff | Commercy. |
| Légère, No. 17 | .. | .. | 1 | 4 | 18 | 2 | 156 | 181 | .. | .. | 37 | 218 | Lt.-Col. Pouvtoskine | | Vitry. |
| ,, No. 18 | .. | .. | 1 | 7 | 16 | 2 | 146 | 172 | .. | .. | 33 | 205 | Lieut.-Col. Lavroff | | Ligny. |
| Total | .. | .. | 3 | 16 | 51 | 16 | 532 | 618 | .. | .. | 117 | 735 | | | |

## 12ME DIVISION D'INFANTERIE—Le Général-Major LISSANÉVITCH. Quartier de Division, Nancy.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D'Infanterie: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| De Smolensk | 2 | .. | 4 | 34 | 120 | 48 | 1,632 | 1,838 | 26 | 147 | 133 | 2,144 | Col. Tissenhausen | Général Bogda-nofski | Nancy. |
| Narva | 2 | .. | 4 | 39 | 120 | 48 | 1,632 | 1,843 | 35 | 146 | 147 | 2,171 | Col. Kamenski | | Nancy. |
| Alexiopol | 2 | .. | 5 | 35 | 120 | 46 | 1,632 | 1,838 | 34 | 137 | 150 | 2,159 | Lt.-Col. Petriguin | Général Gou-rieff | Luneville. |
| Nouvelle-Ingrie | 2 | .. | 6 | 33 | 120 | 47 | 1,632 | 1,838 | 33 | 130 | 157 | 2,158 | Col. Toukoff | | Bayon. |
| Chasseurs: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6me | 2 | .. | 3 | 37 | 120 | 50 | 1,632 | 1,842 | 36 | 146 | 131 | 2,155 | Lt.-Col. Bonjean | Général Pant-zenbitter | Thiancourt. |
| 41me | 2 | .. | 3 | 34 | 120 | 45 | 1,632 | 1,834 | 31 | 132 | 136 | 2,133 | Col. Laschkevitch | | Thiancourt. |
| Total | 12 | .. | 25 | 212 | 720 | 284 | 9,792 | 11,033 | 195 | 838 | 854 | 12,920 | | | |
| 12me Brigade d'Artillerie: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Compagnies de Position, No. 12 | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 21 | 13 | 234 | 272 | .. | .. | 54 | 326 | Capitaine Lineff | Le Lieut.-Col. Zenitch | Nancy. |
| Légère, No. 23 | .. | .. | 1 | 5 | 18 | 2 | 149 | 175 | .. | .. | 37 | 212 | Lieut.-Capt. Kasine | | Perbevilliers. |
| ,, No. 24 | .. | .. | 1 | 5 | 16 | 2 | 155 | 179 | .. | .. | 32 | 211 | Lt.-Col. Sinetnikof | | Domèvre. |
| Total | .. | .. | 2 | 14 | 55 | 17 | 538 | 626 | .. | .. | 123 | 749 | | | |
| Compagnie de Pionniers du Capitaine Rosliakoff | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 9 | 2 | 138 | 153 | .. | .. | 6 | 159 | Capitaine Rosliakoff | | Nancy. |
| Parcs d'Artillerie: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| No. 2 | .. | .. | .. | 6 | .. | .. | .. | 6 | .. | .. | 293 | 299 | Capitaine Lasberg | | Mareuil. |
| No. 4 | .. | .. | .. | 5 | .. | .. | .. | 5 | .. | .. | 329 | 334 | | | |
| Total général. | 24 | 34 | 58 | 613 | 1978 | 679 | 25,423 | 28,751 | 425 | 1970 | 2826 | 33,972 | | | |

*Pièces de Canon.*

| | |
|---|---|
| A Cheval | 12 |
| De Position | 24 |
| Légères | 48 |
| Total | 84 |

LE LIEUT.-GÉN. COMTE WORONZOW.

MEMORANDUM from LORD CASTLEREAGH on the Means of increasing the FRENCH REVENUE.

10th Oct., 1815.

Suppose the French government to impose an extraordinary contribution of 25 per cent. on the existing taxes for five years:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The old revenue .. .. .. .. | 600,000,000 | francs. |
| Addition .. .. .. .. .. | 150,000,000 | ,, |
| Total .. .. | 750,000,000 | ,, |

Suppose the public expenditure in peace 500 millions, including charge of debt, that is, 100 millions savings, there will remain 250 millions a year applicable to the charge of the war, or 1250 millions in five years.

Suppose 800 millions contribution and 800 millions expense of European force for five years, total 1600 millions, which is to state the charge at the highest calculation. France has only 350 millions to raise in five years by adding to the capital of her debt, by far the smallest in Europe in proportion to her revenues and resources as a state.

Or she has the means of relieving the amount of extraordinary taxes to be laid on, or loan to be raised, by the sale of her forests, of which she is calculated still to have to the value of 300 millions. If the temporary occupation continues only three years, there will be a saving of above 300 millions.

The sum above supposed to be added to the capital of the debt, viz. 350 millions, or about 14,000,000*l.*, is really nothing as an operation of finance. The French government may fund the double of that sum in a shorter period with advantage to the stability of the King's government, and without producing an annual charge of interest which can be really prejudicial or embarrassing to their finances.

It remains to be discussed within what period of time the 800 millions contribution shall be acquitted by the government of France. Should the period of three years be agreed on, it will only require to vary the operation, as above suggested, by issuing obligations as repayable out of the extraordinary taxes, or other funds, as they come into the Treasury.

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CONVENTION relative à l'Occupation d'une LIGNE MILITAIRE en FRANCE par une Armée Alliée.

ART. I.

La composition de l'armée de 150,000 hommes, laquelle, en vertu de l'Article V. du traité de ce jour, doit occuper une ligne militaire le long des frontières de la France, la force et la nature des contingens à fournir par chaque Puissance, de même que le choix des généraux qui commanderont ces troupes, seront déterminés par les Souverains Alliés.

ART. II.

Cette armée sera entretenu par le gouvernement Français de la manière suivante:—Le logement, le chauffage, l'éclairage, les vivres, et les fourrages

doivent être fournis en nature. Il est convenu que le nombre total des rations ne pourra jamais être porté au delà de 200,000 pour hommes, et de 50,000 pour chevaux, et qu'elles seront délivrées suivant le tarif annexé à la présente convention.

Quant à la solde, l'équipement, l'habillement, et autres objets accessoires, le gouvernement subviendra à cette dépense, moyennant le payement d'une somme de 50,000,000 par an. Cependant les Puissances Alliées, pour concourir autant que possible à tout ce qui peut satisfaire S.M. le Roi de France et soulager ses sujets, consentent à ce qu'il ne soit payé dans la première année que 30,000,000 sur la solde, sauf à être remboursées dans les années subséquentes de l'occupation.

ART. III.

La France se charge également de pourvoir à l'entretien des fortifications et bâtimens militaires et d'administration civile, ainsi qu'à l'armement et à l'approvisionnement des places qui, en vertu de l'Article V. du traité de ce jour, doivent rester à titre de dépôt entre les mains des troupes Alliées.

Ces divers services, pour lesquels on se réglera d'après les principes adoptés par l'administration Française de la Guerre, se feront sur la demande qui en sera adressée au gouvernement Français par le Commandant-en-Chef des troupes Alliées, avec lequel on conviendra d'un mode de constater les besoins et les travaux propres à écarter toute difficulté, et à remplir le but de cette stipulation d'une manière qui satisfasse également aux intérêts des parties respectives. Le gouvernement Français prendra, pour assurer les différens services énoncés dans cet article et l'article précédent, les mesures qu'il jugera les plus efficaces, et se concertera à cet égard avec le Général-en-Chef des troupes Alliées.

ART. IV.

Conformément à l'Article V. du traité principal, la ligne militaire que les troupes Alliées doivent occuper s'étendra le long des frontières qui séparent les départemens du Pas de Calais, du Nord, des Ardennes, de la Meuse, de la Moselle, du Bas Rhin, et du Haut Rhin, de l'intérieur de la France. Il est de plus convenu que ni les troupes Alliées ni les troupes Françaises n'occuperont (à moins que ce ne soit pour des raisons particulières et d'un commun accord) les territoires et districts ci-après nommés, savoir: Dans le département de la Somme tout le pays au nord de cette rivière, depuis Ham jusqu'à son embouchure dans la mer; dans le département de l'Aisne, les districts de St. Quentin, Vervins, et Laon; dans le département de la Marne, ceux de Rheims, St. Menehould, et Vitry; dans le département de la Haute Marne, ceux de St. Dizier et Joinville; dans le département de la Meurthe, ceux de Toul, Dieuze, Sarrebourg, et Blamont; dans le département des Vosges, ceux de St. Diez, Brugères, et Remiremont, le district de Lure dans le département de la Haute Saône, et celui de St. Hypolite dans le département du Doubs.

Nonobstant l'occupation par les Alliés de la portion de territoire fixée par le traité principal et la présente convention, Sa Majesté très Chrétienne pourra entretenir dans les villes situées dans le territoire occupé des garnisons dont le nombre toutefois ne dépassera pas ce qui est déterminé dans l'énumération suivante:—à Calais, 1000 hommes; Gravelines, 500;

Bergues, 500; St. Omer, 1500; Bethune, 500; Montreuil, 500; Heselin, 250; Ardres, 150; Aire, 500; Arras, 1000; Boulogne, 300; St. Venant, 300; Lille, 3000; Dunkerque et ses forts, 1000; Douai et Fort Scarpe, 1000; Verdun, 500; Metz, 3000; Lauterbourg, 200; Weissenbourg, 150; Lichtenberg, 150; Petite Pierre, 100; Strasbourg, 3000; Schelstadt, 1000; Neuf Brisach et Fort Mortier, 1000; Béfort, 1000.

Il est cependant bien entendu que le matériel du génie et de l'artillerie, ainsi que les objets d'armement qui n'appartiennent pas proprement à ces places, en seront retirés et transportés à tels endroits que le gouvernement Français jugera convenable, pourvu que ces endroits se trouvent hors de la ligne occupée par les troupes Alliées, et des districts où il est convenu de ne laisser aucunes troupes, soit Alliées soit Françaises. S'il parvenait à la connaissance du Commandant-en-Chef des armées Alliées quelque contravention aux stipulations ci-dessus, il adresserait ses réclamations à cet égard au gouvernement Français, qui s'engage à y faire droit.

Les places ci-dessus nommées étant en ce moment dépourvues de garnisons, le gouvernement Français pourra y faire entrer aussitôt qu'il le jugera convenable le nombre de troupes tel qu'il vient d'être fixé, en en prévenant toutefois d'avance le Commandant-en-Chef des troupes Alliées, pour éviter toute difficulté et retard que les troupes Françaises pourraient éprouver dans leur marche.

ART. V.

Le commandement militaire dans toute l'étendue des départemens traversés par la ligne militaire que formeront les troupes Alliées appartiendra au Général-en-Chef de ces troupes; mais il est bien entendu qu'il ne s'étendra pas aux places que les troupes Françaises doivent occuper en vertu de l'Article IV. de la présente convention, et à un rayon de mille toises autour de ces places.

ART. VI.

L'administration civile, celle de la justice, et la perception des impositions et contributions de toute espèce, resteront entre les mains des agens préposés à ces branches par S.M. le Roi de France. Il en sera de même par rapport aux douanes. Elles resteront dans leur état actuel; et les commandans des troupes Alliées n'apporteront aucun obstacle aux mesures prises par les employés de cette administration pour prévenir la fraude; ils leur prêteront même en cas de besoin secours et assistance.

ART. VII.

Pour prévenir tout abus qui pourroit porter atteinte au maintien des réglemens de douane, les effets d'habillement et d'équipement, et autres articles nécessaires destinés aux troupes Alliées, ne pourront être introduits que munis d'un certificat d'origine, et à la suite d'une communication à faire par les officiers commandants les différens corps au Général-en-Chef de l'armée Alliée, lequel à son tour en fera donner avis aux employés de l'administration des douanes.

ART. VIII.

Le service de la gendarmerie étant reconnu nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquillité publique, continuera à avoir lieu, comme par le passé, dans les pays occupés par les troupes Alliées.

ART. IX.

Les troupes Alliées, à l'exception de celles qui doivent former l'Armée d'Occupation, évacueront le territoire de France en * jours après celui de la signature du traité principal. Les territoires qui d'après ce traité doivent être cédés aux Alliés, ainsi que les places de Landau, Sarre-Louis, et Versoix, seront évacués par les autorités et les troupes Françaises en * jours, à dater de la signature du traité.

Ces places seront remises dans l'état où elles se trouvaient le 20 Septembre. Des commissaires seront nommés de part et d'autre pour vérifier et constater cet état, et pour délivrer et recevoir respectivement les munitions de guerre, plans, modèles, et archives, appartenant tant aux dites places qu'aux différens districts cédés par la France, selon le traité de ce jour.

Des commissaires seront également nommés pour examiner et constater l'état des places occupées encore par les troupes Françaises, et lesquelles d'après l'Article V. du traité principal doivent être tenues en dépôt pendant un certain tems par les Alliés. Ces places seront de même remises aux troupes Alliées en * jours, à dater de la signature du traité. Il sera nommé aussi des commissaires d'une part par le gouvernement Français, de l'autre par le Général Commandant-en-Chef les troupes Alliées destinées à rester en France, enfin par le Général Commandant les troupes Alliées qui se trouvent aujourd'hui en possession des places d'Avesnes, Landrecy, Maubeuge, Rocroy, Givet, Montmédy, Longwy, Mézières, et de Sédan, pour vérifier et constater l'état de ces places, et des munitions de guerre, cartes, plans, modèles, &c., qu'elles contiendront au moment qui sera considéré comme celui de l'occupation en vertu du traité.

Les Puissances Alliées s'engagent à remettre à la fin de l'occupation temporaire toutes les places nommées dans l'Article V. du traité principal, dans l'état où elles se seront trouvées à l'époque de cette occupation, sans mettre cependant en ligne de compte les dommages causés par le tems, et que le gouvernement Français n'aurait pas prévenu par les réparations nécessaires.

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## PROCÈS-VERBAL DE LA CONFÉRENCE DU 13 OCTOBRE, 1815.

*Bases des Arrangemens Pécuniaires.*

1. Les arrangemens pécuniaires entre la France et les Puissances Alliées se feront d'après le principe que, dans les trois premières années, à dater du 1er. Décembre, 1815, la France ne payera pas au delà de 270,000,000.

2. Sur ces 270,000,000 la somme annuelle de 140,000,000 sera employée au payement successif de l'indemnité pécuniaire (dont par ce moyen la totalité se trouvera acquittée en cinq ans) et celle de 130,000,000 à l'entretien de l'Armée d'Occupation, avec les conditions à réserves spécifiées dans les articles suivans.

3. Quoique la France ait pris l'engagement général de se charger de tout ce qui compose l'entretien complet de l'Armée d'Occupation, les Puissances,

* Blank in manuscript.

pour la soulager autant que possible, ont l'intention d'opérer, si les circonstances le permettent, une réduction progressive d'année en année dans le nombre des troupes destinées à l'occupation militaire, et de rétablir par cette mesure le niveau entre les 130,000,000 à fournir par la France et les frais réels de l'entretien de leur armée, lesquels, d'après des calculs admis de toutes parts, monteront à 150,000,000.

4. Si la situation intérieure de la France ne permettait pas aux Puissances de réaliser cette réduction, la France serait obligée de leur rembourser le déficit entre les 130,000,000 à fournir par elle et les frais réels de l'entretien des troupes. Ce déficit ne l'élévera au delà de 20,000,000 par an.

5. Comme on est d'accord que la somme à payer par la France dans les trois premières années ne peut excéder 270,000,000, le remboursement du déficit, lequel, dans les suppositions les plus défavorables, ne s'élévera pas au delà de 100,000,000, se fera dans les quatrième et cinquième années, ou, si le gouvernement Français ne se croyait pas en état de dépasser pour cet objet le payement annuel des 270,000,000, le dit remboursement serait remis à la sixième année, sauf à régler les garanties nécessaires pour assurer ce remboursement.

6. Si, au bout de trois ans, la situation des choses est telle que les Puissances ne se trouvent pas dans le cas de prolonger l'occupation militaire par des motifs politiques, cette occupation sera réduite à une échelle proportionnée aux sommes qui resteront encore à acquitter sur l'indemnité pécuniaire, et France pourra la faire cesser entièrement, en acquittant le restant de l'indemnité, soit en valeurs réelles, soit par des arrangemens qui seraient jugés par les Alliés l'équivalent du payement effectif.

7. Les Cours Alliées remettront au gouvernement Français les chefs de réclamation rentrant dans les articles non exécutés du traité de 1814, et le gouvernement Français fera ses propositions sur les moyens de parvenir le plutôt possible à la liquidation définitive et au remboursement effectif des sommes réclamées.

*Ajouté du 15 Octobre.*

En vertu de la signature du Protocole du 13, MM. les Ministres, d'accord avec M. le Duc de Richelieu, sont convenus d'accélérer la plus que faire se pourra l'évacuation du territoire Français. Pour cet effet il sera nommé sur-le-champ des commissaires de part et d'autre, afin de régler les marches d'après le principe ci-dessus énoncé, et de leur demander immédiatement un rapport sur les termes à fixer pour l'évacuation finale du royaume, sauf le corps d'occupation temporaire.

| | |
|---|---|
| METTERNICH. | RASUMOFFSKY. |
| CASTLEREAGH. | WISSEMBERG. |
| HARDENBERG. | CAPO D'ISTRIAS. |
| HUMBOLDT. | RICHELIEU. |

## REMARKS ON THE PROCÈS-VERBAL OF 13 OCTOBER, 1815.

§ 1-4.—Le Protocole du 13 Octobre, 1815, porte expressément que dans les trois premières années la France ne payera pour l'entretien de l'Armée d'Occupation que 130,000,000 par an, et qu'afin de rétablir le niveau entre les dépenses réelles qui pourraient s'élever à 150,000,000 et le taux de 130,000,000 les Puissances diminueront progressivement le nombre de leurs troupes; que dans le cas seulement où cette diminution ne pourrait avoir lieu la France serait obligée de rembourser le déficit qui se trouverait sur les frais d'entretien; mais que ce déficit ne s'élévera pas au delà de 20,000,000 par an.

§ 5.—Enfin le remboursement de ce déficit se fera dans la 4me. et 5me. année, et que même si le gouvernement Français ne croyait pas pouvoir dépasser le payement annuel de 270,000,000,* le dit remboursement serait remis à la 6me. année.

Il résulte incontestablement de ces dispositions que l'intention des Puissances Alliées n'a point été d'imposer à la France une charge indéfinie; que la limite de ses obligations pour l'entretien de l'Armée d'Occupation était clairement posée. La France ne devait dans aucun cas payer pour cet objet plus de 150,000,000 par an; et on lui donnait même l'espoir fondé de ne payer que 130,000,000.

On ne saurait dire que ce Protocole n'était qu'un premier projet, modifié par le traité définitif survenu depuis. La note signée le 20 Novembre (c'est à dire, après la conclusion du traité) par les Plénipotentiaires des Quatre Puissances porte expressément que tout ce qui regarde l'entretien de l'Armée d'Occupation sera réglé conformément aux dispositions du procès-verbal du 13 Octobre, lequel, dit la même note, doit être regardé comme parfaitement obligatoire dans toutes ses clauses.

C'est donc dans ce procès-verbal que se trouve la loi des parties contractantes; lui seul détermine les engagemens réciproques. La France, toujours empressée d'exécuter ceux qu'elle avait consentis, est allé au delà de ce qu'on devait attendre d'elle. Craignant de compromettre le service des troupes Alliées, elle ne s'est pas prévalue des dispositions qu'elle pouvait invoquer pour ne payer que 130,000,000 par année; elle a fait face à toutes les dépenses, sans même s'arrêter au maximum de 150,000,000, si positivement fixé, dans la confiance où elle était, que soit par une réduction progressive dans le nombre des troupes, soit par une compensation, au moment du réglement de compte définitif, le niveau serait rétabli entre les dépenses réelles et la somme qu'elle s'était engagée à fournir.

Cependant, quoique les Puissances Alliées ayent d'après l'esprit du traité retiré une partie de leurs troupes, les dépenses faites pour l'Armée d'Occupation ne s'en élèveront pas moins au 1er. Décembre prochain à 488,332,000 francs. Le gouvernement Français se croit donc fondé à demander formellement qu'une compensation soit établie de manière à ramener cette somme à celle des 450,000,000 qu'elle devait fournir dans les hypothèses

* Savoir, 140,000,000 pour l'indemnité pécuniaire, et 130,000,000 pour les frais de l'Armée d'Occupation.

les plus défavorables : il doit insister de la manière la plus forte sur l'exécution de dispositions aussi précises que celles qui viennent d'être citées, et il attend de la loyauté des Hautes Puissances, que, reconnaissant la scrupuleuse exactitude apportée par la France dans l'accomplissement de ses plus onéreuses obligations, elles voudront, de leur côté, remplir sans restriction toutes leurs promesses.

Indépendamment de la compensation demandée on doit encore faire observer que d'après le paragraphe 5 du même Protocole du 13 Octobre, 1815, le remboursement du déficit annuel de 20,000,000, auquel on admettoit que le gouvernement Français pourrait être tenu, ne devait avoir lieu que dans la quatrième et la cinquième année, et pouvait même être reculé jusqu'à la sixième. La France aurait été fondée à réclamer l'application de cette disposition ; et il s'en suit qu'en payant la solde sur le pied de 30,000,000 par an, ainsi qu'elle y était autorisée, elle aurait eu un délai de trois années pour payer les 60,000,000 qui seraient restés en arrière. Or, ces 60,000,000, dont le payement aurait pu être ainsi retardé jusqu'en 1821, ont été complètement payés dès 1818. Le gouvernement Français se croit donc autorisé à demander que l'escompte de ce payement anticipé soit calculé en sa faveur : en supposant que les payemens eussent eu lieu par tiers, à raison de 20,000,000 par an, l'escompte calculé à 6 pour cent s'éléverait à 5,200,000 francs. Il ne paraît pas qu'il puisse être opposé d'objections fondées à une pareille réclamation, faite dans un moment où la générosité des Puissances Alliées et le désir de consolider la réconciliation des peuples les porteront sans doute à ne refuser aucun des moyens que donne le texte du traité pour alléger le poids des sacrifices de la France.

## Comparative Statement of the Cost of the British Ration according to the different Estimates.

Paris, 15th Oct., 1815.

| Ration. | Prices at present paid by the French Administration. | | Prices quoted in the Report to the Minister of War. | | Prices proposed by M. Ouvrard. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rate. | Amount. | Rate. | Amount. | Rate. | Amount. |
| 1½ lb. Bread | 26 c. per kil. | 19½ c. | 14 c. per lb. | 21 c. | 16 c. per lb. | 24 c. |
| 1 lb. Meat | 95 „ | 47½ | 46 „ | 46 | 55 „ | 55 |
| ⅓ pint Brandy | 1·30 per lit. | 21⅔ | 2 frs. per lit. | 33⅓ | 1·50 per lit. | 25 |
| 10 lbs. Oats | 19 c. per kil. | 95 | No detail given; but the ration proposed by the intendants being valued at 1·70, and that ration being less than the British by 2 lbs. of hay and 3 lbs. of straw, equal to about 15 cent., the latter will be about | 1·85 | 27 frs. 50 c. per setier | 1 fr. 15 c. |
| 12 lbs. Hay | 8 7/10 c. „ | 52⅕ | | | 65 frs. per 1000 lbs. | 78 |
| 6 lbs. Straw | 4⅓ „ | 13⅕ | | | 30 frs. „ | 18 |
| 3 lbs. Wood | 13 fr. per stère | 9⅜ c. | 12 frs. per stère | 9 c. | | 12 c. |

### General Result.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provisions | 0 fr. 87⅜ c. | 1 fr. 00⅛ c. | 1 fr. 04 c. |
| Forage | 1 fr. 60⅓ c. | 1 fr. 85 c. | 2 fr. 11 c. |
| Fuel | 0 fr. 09⅜ c. | 0 fr. 09 c. | 0 fr. 12 c. |

T. Dunmore.

[923.] *To Prince Metternich.*

Paris, ce 16 Oct., 1815.

L'officier qui aura l'honneur de vous donner cette lettre est le Général de Caux, envoyé auprès de moi par Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu en conséquence de ce qui s'est passé entre Son Excellence, Votre Altesse, et les autres Ministres à la Conférence d'hier, pour arranger l'évacuation de la France par les troupes alliées. Je lui ai fait connaître tout ce que je savois sur la marche des troupes Autrichiennes et Prussiennes, et je prie Votre Altesse de le mettre en communication avec ceux que V.A. nommera pour arranger avec lui l'évacuation.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 16 Oct., 1815.

Etant au moment de faire un voyage, je désirerais avoir le plaisir de vous voir avant de partir: en conséquence je vous serai obligé de me faire savoir si je pourrais vous trouver chez vous, ou si vous voudriez passer chez moi, aujourd'hui ou demain, entre 1 heure et 5.

Je vous prie de me croire, My Lord, avec les sentimens de la plus haute considération et sincère attachement,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

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*Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Genoa, 16th Oct., 1815.

Murat sailed from Ajaccio in the night of the 29th September with 150 officers and men, in three vessels, having previously refused to accept the terms of the French Commissioners. He has not been since heard of.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

ROBERT M'FARLANE.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.*

My dear Lord, Paris, 16th Oct., 1815.

In answer to your private letter of the 2nd, enclosing one from Mr. Wilberforce, suggesting the propriety of further instructions being sent to His Majesty's minister at Madrid to urge the Spanish government anew to direct the cessation of the slave-trade on the part of their subjects to the north of the Line, I beg to refer your Lordship to the despatch enclosed, which I addressed to Mr. Vaughan on communicating to him the unqualified abolition of the slave-trade by the French government.

Your Lordship must be aware that any further representations which I might direct to be made at this moment, and under the present circumstances of the Spanish government, would probably not produce any more satisfactory result.

Believe me to be ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

Castlereagh.

[Enclosure.]

*Viscount Castlereagh to C. R. Vaughan, Esq.*

Sir, Paris, 12th Aug., 1815.

You will receive enclosed a note addressed to me by the Prince de Talleyrand, announcing on the part of His Most Christian Majesty the final and entire abolition of the slave-trade throughout the dominions of France.

I have communicated this auspicious determination to the Chevalier de Labrador, now here, for the information of his Court, hoping that this fresh instance of liberality on the part of a great European power, possessing extensive colonies, might have an influence on the councils of His Catholic Majesty in this respect.

You will use your best endeavours to turn this event to profit by urging the Spanish government to adopt at least the measure of abolition north of the Line.

After the unfavourable reception so lately given to Sir Henry Wellesley's remonstrances, it is in vain to press for a more extended concession.

I am, &c.,

Castlereagh.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.*

Dear Bathurst, Walmer Castle, 17th Oct., 1815, 11 P.M.

I send you Castlereagh's despatches of the 16th, which I received this night. The first (No. 79) contains the arrangement respecting the payment of the contribution; and considering the extreme difficulty of the subject, the burden it must bring upon France, and the unavoidable unpopularity of a measure which will really be felt by every one, I do not know how it could be more satisfactorily settled, though it is certainly more complicated than could have been desired.

The second despatch (No. 80) is the cause of his sending a special

messenger: it contains the projet of the Treaty of Alliance between the Four Powers, to be signed at the same time as the Convention with France. You will observe No. 2 is Castlereagh's projet, being a correction of that originally delivered by the Emperor of Russia. I have read it with all the attention in my power, and it appears to me free from any objection. I think you may as well, however, call together such of our colleagues as are in town, and read it over with them; and if the King's Advocate should be in the way, you might as well let him see it. The principle has already been fully approved, and indeed must be approved by all who were friends to the principle of the war. It is only desirable to take care that there are no terms or expressions accidentally used which might be subject to cavil in Parliament. As soon as I hear from you, I will write a private letter to Castlereagh informing him of our approbation of the projet of the Treaty, unless it is thought better that this should be conveyed to him officially by you.

I have no private letter from him; but the question of contribution, the chief difficulty, being settled, the whole negotiation is, I have no doubt, coming to a close.

The Duke of Wellington has written to the Duchess to say he is ready to receive her at Paris.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Walmer Castle, 17th Oct., 1815.

I hope, if it is intended to leave the British force in the neighbourhood of Paris during the winter, as I can easily understand may be necessary, that there will be left at the same time some proportion of Prussian troops, and, if practicable, some proportion likewise of the other Allied corps.

I feel confident that the Duke of Wellington will take every due caution to secure the force in question against any possible accide surprise, and that you will insist on the same principle of pre being extended to his own person. We ought never to lose sigh moment of the consideration, that with whatever humanity and indu the French may have been treated by us, they hate us far more tha other nation; and that they would most willingly embark in any pr for the destruction of the force which has saved them, if they only thoug that it was likely to prove successful.

The arrangement for distributing the contribution to be paid by Fran appears to me to be as good as could have been devised, with the excep only of the sum which it is agreed should be given to Portugal. This sum is indeed inconsiderable in amount; but, however small, I do not conceive Portugal is in any way entitled to it, the Regency of that country being the only government in Europe which actually refused to co-operate, not merely by their unwillingness to comply with the requisition of the Duke of Wellington, but even by declining to lend any part of their force for the other objects which were afterwards proposed to them.

I wish to suggest to you whether the engagement respecting the abolition

of the slave-trade should not be inserted in the general Treaty. If this should meet with difficulties, it ought, at least, to form a part of the convention by which Guadaloupe and the Saints are to be restored to France; but I should think it much more desirable on every account that it should constitute a provision in the Treaty to which all the Powers of Europe will be parties.

LIVERPOOL.

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*Viscount Sidmouth to Earl Bathurst.*

DEAR LORD BATHURST, Richmond Park, 18th Oct., 1815.

I return the papers, which are, upon the whole, satisfactory. The alterations which you have proposed in Lord Castlereagh's projet appear to me not only proper, but necessary.

You will, of course, desire Pole to attend at Carlton House to-morrow.

Sincerely yours,

SIDMOUTH.

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*Major M'Gregor to Lieut.-Gen. M'Farlane.*

SIR, Genoa, 18th Oct., 1815.

With reference to the information I have had the honour of communicating to you this morning, I beg leave to commit it more in detail to paper.

On the 8th instant Mr. Williams, Assistant Surgeon of the Greek Light Infantry, who had been travelling in Calabria, arrived at Messina and communicated to me verbally the following circumstances relative to the surrender of Murat, viz.: That two or three days previous to Mr. Williams's arrival at Messina, Murat with 25 or 26 persons having disembarked at St. Euphemia Bay, they proceeded to the town of Pizzo, where Murat made himself known by a harangue; that after some hesitation several persons proposed to seize him; and after some resistance he was conveyed to the Castle of Pizzo as a prisoner, where he was confined at the period of the officer's departure from thence.

Mr. Williams further related that he passed through the town about an hour after the tumult took place, and that he was charged by the Neapolitan Commandant at Pizzo with a despatch to the Governor of Messina upon this subject.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

DAVID M'GREGOR.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, Walmer Castle, 20th Oct., 1815.

The projet of alliance in substance meets all our ideas. Bathurst suggests two critical alterations, which I should conceive there could be no difficulty in adopting. As the term "legitimate Sovereign" has been ever a subject of cavil in this country since the origin of Whig and Tory, it is very desirable that it never should be used in the sense in which we mean to apply it to France without the term "heirs" being connected with it.

I am not aware of any further observations with which it is necessary that I should trouble you in order to enable you to bring the great work in which you are engaged to a conclusion. I will only therefore further call your attention to what is stated by Bathurst, that it appears to be a reasonable precaution that the occupation of the fortresses should take place previous to the evacuation of the French territory by that part of the Allied force which exceeds the contingent agreed to be left in it.

I will likewise again repeat, that if a foreign force is to remain in Paris or its neighbourhood, it is very desirable that it should be an Allied force (in such proportions as the Duke of Wellington may judge expedient), and not *exclusively* a British force. This part of the arrangement will certainly be the subject of much controversy in Parliament. The justification of it will be much more easy if it is considered as a general measure; and in the event of any difficulties or unpleasant scenes arising out of so novel a circumstance as the presence of a foreign force near the capital of such a country as France, it must be very desirable that most if not all of the Allied Powers should be equally affected by them, and that they should not be confined to the British only.

I have brought this subject again under your consideration from knowing that some of our most rational friends entertain an alarm upon it. I can name Charles Yorke, who highly approves every other part of the intended arrangement.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 20th Oct., 1815.

Your letter of the 6th, calling my attention to the future establishment of the British army under your command, was received yesterday. The subject had already been canvassed here, and I believe a letter from th Horse Guards is in preparation.

I will, however, tell you (what I have, indeed, from day to day inten doing, and should at any rate have taken care to have done before received any letter from the Horse Guards) what I have suggested on subject, that I may have your opinion before anything more in an offi shape shall have been written to you.

I find that the demand for Ireland will be so exorbitant when the mili is disbanded, that after supplying our possessions in the Mediterranean an

the colonies, and after the reduction of all the foreign corps, we shall not have a British disposable force for your Grace as large as I had imagined. I doubt whether we can furnish more than 20,000 or 22,000 British, artillery and cavalry inclusive, particularly if this unlucky Indian war continues.

Of these I should think it advisable that a larger proportion than what is usual with us should consist of cavalry and artillery; say, 5000 cavalry, and 1500 artillery. My reason is that these are the two corps which it would be the most difficult to get up again in case of a renewal of hostilities; and the two which, on account of their expense, our economists at home will insist on being most reduced.

The remaining 8000 or 10,000 men may consist of Hanoverians; and as we shall return the German Legion to Hanover, we might, I imagine, get the Hanoverians at a rate which will be completely covered by what the French are to allow us: so that the only charge on us will be the difference between the French allowance for the 20,000 or 22,000 British and the actual charge; which difference may, I think, be made to appear to be equal to, or at least not much more than, their half-pay would have amounted to, coupled with the low establishment which we shall have in England in consequence of our army in France.

You will observe that all which I am suggesting is with reference to the House of Commons, where our establishments are always canvassed, and where there is a foolish doctrine too prevalent, that we are not to consider ourselves a military country in time of peace. I shall be very glad if, on conversation with Lord Castlereagh, who has to do with these gentlemen, you can obtain a more encouraging prospect.

The British troops at Marseilles and Genoa will be best employed by reinforcing our possessions in the Mediterranean, where we shall be weak, particularly on the reduction of the foreign corps: but this will be left to your opinion.

The sooner I hear from you the better. If you are anxious for more British than what I have suggested, I will go over the several demands more attentively, and see how it can be managed. With respect to the proportions of cavalry and artillery, you will consider the suggestion as one which can be altered without any difficulty.

Let me know if you have any particular wish about the Blues, or any proportion of Guards. I will take care that the letter from the Horse Guards does not go until I hear from you.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 20th Oct., 1815.

I have laid your Grace's representation of General Müffling's services before the Prince Regent, and he has agreed to confer on him the Second Class of the Order of the Bath.

I shall in my letter to General Müffling endeavour to point out his immediate connexion with your Grace as the occasion of this honour, in order to guard us against applications from other quarters.

I am yours very sincerely;

BATHURST.

P.S.—You will, I know, be glad to hear that Lord Hill's Peerage is extended to his elder brother's sons, in case of his dying without issue. Lord Hill was very desirous of obtaining this extension.

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*Richard Penn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.*

War Department, 21st Oct., 1815.

Mr. Vansittart desires me to acquaint your Lordship, with reference to the enclosed letters, that the carriage and everything in it and belonging to it (though contraband), coming *bonâ fide* for the Prince Regent, will be admitted free of duty. Nothing can pass free from examination, in order to ascertain that it is not made the means of introducing smuggled goods for the profit of individuals.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's grateful and obedient servant,

RICHARD PENN.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Earl Bathurst to the Right Hon. N. Vansittart.*

DEAR VANSITTART, Lime Grove, 21st Oct., 1815.

I enclose to you a letter from our Chargé d'Affaires at the Hague, concerning Bonaparte's carriage, which a Prussian officer has offered to present to the Regent, on condition of it not being examined at the Custom House on its arrival. The meaning of this I thought obvious, and I think I spoke to you about it as a thing inadmissible. The Regent offered to purchase the carriage with all its contents at a liberal valuation, and to be at the expense of its transport. The enclosed is an answer to this offer. The 500 florins mentioned in Mr. James's letter was an estimate of the probable value of the carriage only, and one not by any means intended to be abided by, still less to include the horses and the contents of the carriage.

It will be necessary to know what it is which the Prussian officer requires. If he means that there should be nothing in the carriage but what was found in it, and that the whole is to be presented to the Regent, the officer simply requiring that no part of this present should be seized as contraband, or that he should be charged with duties upon them, the matter can, I think, be easily arranged, and I must beg of you to enable me to give to Mr. James the necessary assurances under necessary precautions; but if he means to make a profit

on what the carriage may contain over and above what is to be presented to the Regent, the offer must be rejected.

The first part of the letter I enclose relates to the cuirasses taken at Waterloo for the Regent. If the boxes are found to contain nothing else, they may, I imagine, enter without molestation.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

II.

*J. James, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Hague, 17th Oct., 1815.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 10th instant. As I had already taken means to have the cuirasses forwarded to England, I found myself unable to put that part of your Lordship's directions in execution wherein you desire me to present twenty pair to the Prince of Orange, in the name of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. I trust that this circumstance will prove of less importance, as (in consequence of a former note I had the honour of receiving from your Lordship) I had taken an opportunity of telling Mr. Falck that the Prince Regent was impressed with the conduct of the King of the Netherlands in giving up the cuirasses, and requested His Majesty would reserve a few of them for himself, if he should think proper so to do. No answer being returned to this by which I could conclude that the King intended to avail himself of the offer, and the whole number of the cuirasses being delivered over to me, I lost no time in having them forwarded to England, which I have done, with directions to the General at Ostend to keep your Lordship acquainted with the place of their disembarkation in England, in order that you may take what measures you think proper for their further conveyance to His Royal Highness.

With regard to the carriage of Bonaparte, on which I had occasion to trouble your Lordship, I must beg leave to explain a mistake which exists of its being the one seen by Lord Yarmouth in his way through Bruxelles some time ago. It proved to be that of Jerome Bonaparte, and has disappeared without leaving any traces of its fate. The one in question was the undoubted carriage of Napoleon, and was taken late on the night of the 18th, at Genappe, by the Prussian officer, who had pushed on to that place with two battalions. The carriage was taken with the horses; the doors were found open; and from the confusion which reigned, and the valet de chambre (who was killed on the spot) being still on the seat, there was every reason to suppose that Napoleon had not quitted it many moments. The contents were found on examination to consist of the celebrated brilliants and many diamonds of great value, a very complete canteen of gold plate, a dressing-box of the same materials, reading and writing utensils, firearms, bed equipage, and every contrivance for comfort that can possibly be imagined. The brilliants, as I am assured, were presented to and accepted by the King of Prussia. Everything else remains, together with the horses, in the exact state in which it was found, and in which I have myself had an opportunity of seeing it.

Your Lordship will perceive from these circumstances that this cannot be the carriage mentioned by Lord Yarmouth, and that the sum of 500 dollars would be very inadequate for its purchase, were the officer, as I have reason to believe he is not, disposed to sell it. I have therefore explained to him that a mistake has arisen, and that I should explain the circumstances more fully to your

Lordship. I understood him to offer the effects for the inspection of the Custom House officers, provided he may be exempted from seizure and duties; and, as he still awaits your Lordship's answer, I trust you will honour me with an early communication on the subject.

I have the honour to be, with great truth,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
J. James.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, le 22 Oct., 1815.

Les Ministres des Cabinets Alliés, en même temps qu'au nom de leurs Souverains respectifs ils ont déféré à S.A. Monsieur le Duc de Wellington le commandement en chef de l'Armée d'Occupation, se sont concertés, dans le procès-verbal de la conférence de ce jour, dont copie ci-jointe, sur les mesures à prendre tant au sujet de la dite Armée d'Occupation que relativement à l'évacuation du territoire Français par les troupes Alliées qui ne sont pas destinées à faire partie de cette armée.

Les soussignés s'empressent d'en donner part à Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Wellington en l'invitant à se mettre à cet égard en rapports tant avec le gouvernement Français, qui reçoit aujourd'hui la même communication, qu'avec Messieurs les Généraux commandants en chef les armées Alliées et les Généraux commandants les corps de troupes Alliées qui formeront l'Armée d'Occupation, les uns et les autres devant être incessamment prévenus par leurs Cours de ces mêmes arrangemens.

Les soussignés ont en même temps l'honneur de renouveler à Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Wellington l'assurance de leur haute considération.

Metternich. Castlereagh.
Hardenberg. Capo d'Istrias.

[Enclosure.]

*Procès-Verbal de la Conférence du 22 Octobre*, 1815.

MM. les Ministres des quatre Cours ont pris en considération les mesures qu'il leur reste à prendre pour régler la partie militaire de leurs arrangemens avec le gouvernement Français, et pour donner effet au plan concerté entr'eux pour le maintien de la tranquillité générale.

Ces mesures regardent :—

1. L'organisation définitive de l'armée qui doit rester en France pour la sûreté commune de l'Europe.

2. Les rapports de cette armée et de son chef avec le gouvernement Français.

3. L'évacuation du territoire Français par les troupes qui ne doivent pas faire partie de cette armée.

I. Quant à l'organisation définitive de l'armée Européenne, MM. les Ministres des Cabinets, en vertu des pleins-pouvoirs qu'ils ont reçus à cet effet de leurs Souverains respectifs, ont arrêté :—

1. Que l'armée sera composée de troupes des différentes Puissances dans les proportions suivantes : Les contingens de trente mille hommes à fournir par

l'Autriche, la Russie, la Prusse, et la Grande Bretagne seront composés d'infanterie, de cavalerie, et d'artillerie, dans les proportions que les Puissances respectives jugeront convenables, bien entendu que la cavalerie n'excédera pas le sixième, et ne sera pas au-dessous du dixième, du contingent total; le contingent de la Bavière sera de dix mille hommes; et ceux de Dannemarc, de la Saxe, d'Hanovre, et du Wurtemberg, de cinq mille hommes chacun.

2. Que M. le Maréchal Duc de Wellington est nommé Général en Chef de cette armée.

3. Qu'il est conféré à M. le Duc de Wellington autorité pleine et entière sur cette armée, pour la faire agir comme il le jugera le plus analogue au but général de l'occupation militaire, consultant, autant que possible, les convenances particulières de chaque corps, et pour en diriger les mouvemens selon les circonstances, le tout d'après les instructions qu'il recevra des quatre Cabinets réunis, bien entendu que les troupes de chaque Puissance seront toujours sous le commandement immédiat de leurs Généraux, et qu'elles resteront réunies et placées, autant que possible, sur leurs lignes de communication avec leurs pays. Tout ce qui regarde l'économie et la discipline intérieure de chaque corps est réservé aux Généraux qui les commanderont particulièrement.

4. Qu'en vertu des pouvoirs dont les Souverains ont investi M. le Duc de Wellington pour l'intérêt commun de l'Europe, MM. les Généraux commandants les corps des différentes Puissances seront placées sous le commandement en chef de M. le Duc de Wellington; qu'ils lui adresseront leurs rapports, et obéiront en tout aux dispositions qu'il jugera à propos de faire.

5. Que le gouvernement Français sera prié de se concerter sans retard avec M. le Duc de Wellington sur tout ce qui se rapporte à l'occupation temporaire des places désignées dans le traité principal, à l'entretien de l'armée, et à l'exécution des conventions particulières qui régleront l'un et l'autre de ces objets.

6. Que communication sera faite du présent procès-verbal, 1, à M. le Duc de Wellington; 2, à MM. les Généraux commandants les corps de troupes Alliées qui formeront l'Armée d'Occupation; 3, au gouvernement Français.

II. Quant aux rapports de l'Armée d'Occupation et de son chef avec le gouvernement Français, autant qu'ils ne se trouveront pas réglés par la convention militaire annexée au traité principal, MM. les Ministres se réservent de prendre à cet égard une résolution définitive.

III. Quant à l'évacuation du territoire Français par les troupes Alliées qui ne sont point destinées à faire partie de l'Armée d'Occupation, M. le Duc de Wellington est chargé de s'occuper sans retard de toutes les mesures propres à accélérer cette évacuation, ainsi que des arrangemens dont il faudra convenir à cet égard, tant avec le gouvernement Français qu'avec MM. les Généraux commandants en chef les armées Alliées.

CASTLEREAGH. HARDENBERG.
METTERNICH. CAPO D'ISTRIAS.

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OBSERVATIONS FAITES PAR ORDRE DE MONSEIGNEUR LE DUC DE WELLINGTON SUR LE TARIF PROPOSÉ EN CE QUI REGARDE LE CORPS RUSSE. [ 924. ]

Ce 27 Oct., 1815.

Pour que les troupes de quatre nations différentes soient également bien en suivant pour la subsistance un même tarif, il faudroit que le reste de l'entretien, comme paye, habillement,

&c., soit aussi égal; or cela n'est pas le cas ici, et ne peut l'être.

La paye du soldat et de l'officier Russe est beaucoup moindre que celles des autres armées; mais d'après les règlemens Russes la nourriture est si abondante (comme par ex. 3 livres de pain par jour), et les denrées de première nécessité en Russie à si bas prix, que le soldat non-seulement ne manque de rien, mais la plupart du temps fait une économie sur sa nourriture.

La Commission Française nommée par Son Excellence M. le Duc de Feltre a trouvé naturellement que le tarif proposé pour la subsistance étoit plus considérable que celui qui étoit ordinaire aux troupes Françaises; mais en faisant la réflexion énoncée plus haut, cette Commission verra que non-seulement ce tarif n'est pas trop considérable pour les troupes Russes, mais même il y manque quelques articles nécessaires, et qu'en les accordant encore le corps Russe coûtera toujours beaucoup moins à la France qu'aucun des autres, et que n'auroit coûté un égal nombre de troupes Françaises.

Le soldat Russe ne peut rien mettre de sa paye comme font les autres pour aider à sa nourriture ou entretien; et pour en convaincre le gouvernement Français il suffira de dire ce que c'est que cette paye. Le soldat reçoit ici 38 à 39 francs par an, c'est-à-dire environ 9 centimes ou 1¼ de sou par jour.

Il faudroit par conséquent lui ajouter:—

1. Un peu de farine par jour, comme $\frac{1}{3}$ ou $\frac{1}{4}$ de livre, pour faire du quass-boisson, à laquelle il est accoutumé, qu'il met dans son manger, et qui est utile à sa santé.

2. Doubler la portion de sel, ou au moins y ajouter la moitié, c'est-à-dire, $\frac{1}{10}$ de livre par jour.

3. Fournir $\frac{1}{10}$ de livre de savon par jour. Cet article est indispensable pour la propreté dès que les troupes sont casernées, et le soldat sur ses 9 centimes de paye n'est pas en état de l'acheter. Le défaut de propreté entraîne les maladies, et surtout la gale: et les malades étant au compte du gouvernement Français, il ne gagnerait rien à retrancher cet article nécessaire, et la dépense insignifiante que cela entraînerait seroit compensée par la diminution des malades.

Le même principe énoncé pour ce qui regarde le soldat Russe s'étend jusqu'à l'officier. La paye de l'enseigne Russe ici est de moins de 1000 francs par an, c'est-à-dire, moins de 3 francs par jour. Si sa portion de nourriture est fixée en argent à 1 franc

73 centimes, il n'aura presque pas de quoi vivre, ne pouvant y rien ajouter d'une paye qui suffit à peine pour son habillement et ses autres dépenses les plus indispensables, puisque le tout ensemble ne feroit qu'environ 4½ francs par jour, ou 3*s.* 9*d.* en argent Anglais. Il devra, entr'autres privations, s'interdire le vin, qu'il est accoutumé de boire depuis dix ans de guerre, et se soumettre à cette privation en France, entouré de vignes, et où toutes les classes en font usage. Il seroit donc indispensable d'égaliser un peu la situation des officiers Russes avec celle des autres troupes.

Encore une chose indispensable pour le corps d'armée Russe d'après l'organisation de son économie intérieure est qu'on fasse délivrer au régiment et compagnies d'artillerie des forêts du Roi du bois de charronage et du charbon de bois pour l'entretien de l'artillerie, et des chariots de munition, et autres appartenants aux régiments.

C'est notre système d'équipages qui nous rend indépendants du pays, qui fait que nous prenons infiniment moins de chariots pour nos mouvemens, et par conséquent que nous lui coûtons moins; mais si on ne donne pas les moyens de les entretenir en état, ces chariots se dégraderont, et l'artillerie de même.

Il paroîtroit que les petits changemens proposés pour le corps Russe sont vraiment de nécessité, que les charges du gouvernement Français n'en seroient que bien peu augmentées, que la dépense du corps Russe seroit toujours infiniment au-dessous des autres, et que les deux partis y gagneroient en ce que la troupe ayant ce qu'il lui faut, même pour vivre en caserne, ne sera nullement à charge de l'habitant, et qu'il en sera d'autant plus facile à pourvoir qu'il n'y aye jamais de plaintes d'aucun côté. Au reste, S.E. M. le Duc de Richelieu,* qui connoit mieux que personne l'intérieur de l'armée Russe, ses besoins et ses habitudes, verra bien s'il y a quelque chose de trop dans ce qui est proposé ci-dessus, et si on ne s'est pas tenu au stricte nécessaire.

Il y auroit encore quelque chose à dire sur le charriage, certainement que cette partie pesant directement sur le cultivateur est la plus délicate de toutes; mais d'un autre côté il est indispensable d'avoir un chemin militaire pour communiquer avec nos parcs et dépôts en Bavière, &c., et un chemin militaire sans charriage devient nul, reste à faire les arrangemens nécessaires

* Le Duc de Richelieu had been for a long time Russian governor of Odessa.

pour qu'il n'y aye pas d'abus, et qu'on ne fasse usage de cette ressource que dans la plus stricte nécessité.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Lord Duke, Quiddenham, 27th Oct., 1815.

As it becomes necessary, now that the peace is signed, to decide upon the troops which are to remain in France under your Grace's command, I am anxious to consult your Grace's wishes before anything is definitively fixed both as to the nature of the troops and likewise as to the General officers and particular corps to form the British quota.

I understand that it is the present intention of government to leave 20,000 British in France: I therefore enclose to your Grace the sketch of a corps of that strength, as also of the different regiments intended to be brought home. I have been guided in this selection by the present efficiency of the corps under your Grace's command, and the facility which we now have of completing them from their 2nd battalions: should, however, your Grace have any preference for any particular regiments or battalions, for instance, should you wish to keep the Blues in lieu of any other regiment of heavy cavalry, I beg that you will consult your own feelings and make any alterations that may suit you.

Your Grace will remark that I propose leaving in France a larger proportion of cavalry and artillery than are generally calculated as necessary for a corps of 20,000 men; but when your Grace considers the cry that is made in this country about the expense of these two arms, as likewise the great difficulty of forming them anew if they are reduced, I trust that you will concur with me in the opinion of the policy, and indeed necessity, of keeping up as large a proportion as possible of both of them.

As for the General officers, I should imagine that your Grace would wish that Lord Hill should be second in command, in which case Lord Combermere must come home, and it will be necessary to look out for some good General officer to command your cavalry; but I will wait to learn your Grace's sentiments upon this subject before I take any steps whatsoever.

In regard to the infantry, I propose that Sir Lowry Cole and Sir Henry Clinton should be the two Lieutenant-Generals; but, as I said before, I beg that your Grace will acquaint me with your own wishes.

I am ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

Frederick.

[Enclosures.]

I.

Memorandum.—Army in France.

Horse Guards, 27th Oct., 1815.

*Staff.*

1 Lieutenant-General commanding under the Duke of Wellington.
1 ditto for the cavalry.
2 ditto for the infantry.
8 Major-Generals.

1 Quartermaster-General.
1 Adjutant-General.
2 Assistants Adjutant-General.
2 Assistants Quartermaster-General.
Deputy Assistants Adjutant-General.
Ditto Quartermaster-General.

Assistants Adjutant and Quartermaster-General to be attached to head-quarters and to the commander of the corps.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| One brigade of heavy dragoons, each regiment consisting of three squadrons, of 150 rank and file each .. | 1st Dragoons .. .. .. .. | 450 |
| | 2nd ditto .. .. .. .. | 450 |
| | 3rd ditto .. .. .. .. | 450 |
| One brigade of hussars, each regiment consisting of ditto .. .. .. .. | 7th Hussars .. .. .. .. | 450 |
| | 15th do. .. .. .. .. | 450 |
| | 18th do. .. .. .. .. | 450 |
| One brigade of light dragoons, each regiment consisting of ditto .. .. | 11th Light Dragoons .. .. | 450 |
| | 12th do. .. .. | 450 |
| | 16th do. .. .. | 450 |
| | Officers and non-commissioned officers, about .. .. .. .. | 800 |
| | Total cavalry .. .. | 4850 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| One Brigade of Foot Guards .. .. | Brigade of Foot Guards, consisting of 2 battalions, of 1000 each | 2000 |
| And two divisions of infantry, each consisting of two brigades, each brigade of three regiments, of 1000 rank and file each, viz.: | | |
| 1st division .. 1st brigade .. .. | 1st Foot, 3rd battalion .. .. | 1000 |
| | 3rd do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| | 5th do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| 1st division .. 2nd do. .. .. | 7th do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| | 9th do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| | 27th do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| 2nd division .. 3rd brigade .. .. | 29th Foot .. .. .. .. | 1000 |
| | 39th do., 1st battalion .. .. | 1000 |
| | 81st do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| 2nd division .. Light infantry .. | 43rd do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| | 52nd do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| | 71st do., 1st do. .. .. | 1000 |
| | 95th do., 1st batt., 6 companies | 600 |
| | Artillery .. .. .. .. | 1500 |
| | Officers and non-commissioned officers, about .. .. .. | 1500 |
| | Total infantry .. .. | 17,600 |
| | Cavalry and infantry .. .. | 22,450 |

This is the proportion and proposed selection of British troops to be kept in France, under the arrangement that the British contingent of 30,000 men is to be partly composed of 10,000 Hanoverians.

The selection of regiments has been guided by the present efficiency in point

of numbers or by the facility which the strength of the 2nd battalions may afford towards the immediate completion of each to the number proposed.

Officers and non-commissioned officers are calculated in the total amount of force; and though the numbers amount to upwards of 2000 men beyond that proposed to be kept in France, yet such an overplus will not be found an unfair allowance for the difficulty of keeping the different corps constantly complete, and for the diminution from the effective force which sickness in the most healthy situations may occasion.

The regiments of cavalry that are to come home will transfer the horses (with the exception of the Life Guards and Blues) wanting to complete the regiments that remain to three squadrons of 140 horses each, and the men wanting to complete the latter corps will be sent from this country immediately.

II.

List of Regiments proposed to return from France.

Horse Guards, 27th Oct., 1815.

1st Life Guards.
2nd do.
Royal Horse Guards.
1st Dragoon Guards.
2nd do.
3rd do.
6th Dragoons.
10th Light Dragoons.
13th do.
23rd do.
Waggon Train Troops.
Foot Guards, 2 battalions.
7th Royal Veteran Battalion.
1st Foot, 4th battalion.
4th do. 1st do.
6th do. 1st do.
12th do. 2nd do.
14th do. 3rd do.
16th do.
21st do. 1st do.
23rd do.
25th do. 2nd do.
27th do. 3rd do.
28th do.
30th do. 2nd do.
32nd do.
33rd do.
35th do. 2nd do.
36th do.
37th Foot, 2nd battalion.
38th do.
40th do. 1st do.
41st do.
42nd do.
44th do. 2nd do.
51st do.
54th do.
57th do. 1st do.
58th do. 1st do.
59th do. 2nd do.
62nd do. 2nd do.
64th do.
69th do. 2nd do.
73rd do. 2nd do.
78th do. 2nd do.
79th do. 1st do.
81st do. 2nd do.
82nd do. 1st do.
88th do. 1st do.
90th do. 1st do.
91st do. 1st do.
92nd do.
95th do. 2nd do.
95th do. 3rd do.
Royal Staff Corps,* companies.
2nd Garrison battalion.
3rd Staff Garrison company.

* Blank in manuscript.

*Lieut.-Gen. Count de Girardin to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Monsieur le Duc, Paris, le 27 Oct., 1815.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à Votre Excellence pour l'informer que journellement les officiers et soldats des armées sous ses ordres chassaient sans aucune retenue dans les domaines du Roi. Votre Excellence eut la bonté de faire imprimer un ordre du jour pour défendre de chasser, et de m'en faire donner des copies, que je fis remettre aux Inspecteurs des Chasses. Je n'aurais pas de nouveau importuné Votre Excellence si la destruction du gibier ne s'était pas étendue jusqu'aux cerfs et biches. Les rapports que j'ai depuis un mois font mention qu'il a été tué plus de soixante de ces animaux dans les bois de Versailles, de Marly, et de St. Germain. Sans prétendre faire aucune réclamation, je vous laisse à juger, Monsieur le Duc, s'il ne conviendrait pas de mettre un terme à une destruction qui est d'autant plus pénible qu'elle n'a que des résultats affligeans.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération,

Monsieur le Duc,

Votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

Comte de Girardin,

Lieut.-Général, Capitaine des Chasseurs du Roi.

[Monsieur le Comte,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 27.

Comme vous savez, j'ai déjà donné des ordres très positifs pour empêcher que les officiers de l'armée chassent sans permission des propriétaires; et je mettrai en conseil de guerre tous ceux qui seront trouvés en contravention à cet ordre. Mais si les gardes de chasse du Roi ne veulent pas les arrêter ou les suivre, enfin que je sache qui désobéit à mes ordres, ce n'est pas possible pour moi de faire plus que répéter mes ordres, à moins que Sa Majesté veut que je fasse garder ses chasses.

Wellington.]

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G. O. Paris, 28th Oct., 1815. [925.]

4. Before the troops go into barracks or cantonments, an officer of each troop or company is to visit the barracks or cantonments which the soldiers are to occupy, and to ascertain the state in which they are.

5. The name of the owner of the house in which the troops will be cantoned, and the names of the soldiers cantoned in the house, must be kept.

6. On marching days, the barracks and cantonments of each company are to be visited by an officer, once if possible after the troops will have arrived, and once before they will march;

and upon halting days the barracks and cantonments of the soldiers must be visited twice every day by the officer of the company or troop to which they belong: these visiting officers will observe whether any article has been broken or taken away, if the troops are in cantonments, and will inquire whether the owner of the house has any complaint to make of the men.

7. The non-commissioned officers must be cantoned with the squads to which they belong, and the officers as near as possible to their companies; the Field officers with their regiments; the Generals and Staff as near as possible to their brigades and divisions.

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 28th Oct., 1815.

I should not obtrude a private letter upon your Grace if the Duke of York's absence from town, and the consequent difficulty of my immediate communication with His Royal Highness as well as my objection to the liberty of delaying the transmission of his letter to you, did not render some explanation of the latter necessary, as arising in my knowledge of your recent private correspondence with Lord Bathurst.

The Duke was told that government would only consent to 20,000 British troops being retained in France altogether, and that the remainder of the contingent should be made up by 10,000 foreigners in British pay. It was according to this scale and persuasion that the memorandum was prepared which His Royal Highness has enclosed to you. But I feel it necessary to explain that His Royal Highness is of opinion that you ought to have more British infantry; and as he has already given that opinion to the Secretary of State, you may in your answer reckon upon his seconding the disposition which Lord Bathurst has expressed to your Grace to augment that arm.

In short, I am confident that His Royal Highness will contribute to your having as much British force as possible. I see that the embarrassment with government is lest there may not be troops enough left for the service of Ireland and the colonies without keeping up an establishment difficult to be carried through Parliament; and we have the Ionian Islands and *a war in India* in addition to the points that were for consideration last year.

In the hasty memorandum the Duke sends you, Staff Corps, Waggon-Train, and other detailed branches of service are omitted, which of course would be attended to. Forgive this intrusion, and believe me, my dear Lord Duke,

Ever yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

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J

ORDRE de BATAILLE du CORPS D'ARMÉE I. R. AUTRICHIEN en France.

Paris, ce 29 Oct., 1815.

| Command. Général en Chef. | Command. de Division. | Commandants de Brigade. | Régiment ou Bataillon. | Bataillons. | Escadrons. | Pièces d'Artillerie |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Le Général de Cavalerie Baron de FRIMONT. | Le Lieutenant-Général Marschall. | Le Général Senitzer | Beniowsky | 4 | .. | .. |
| | | | Ignatz Gyulay | 4 | .. | .. |
| | | | 1 Batterie de Brigade | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | Le Général Fölseis | Kerpen | 3 | .. | .. |
| | | | A. D. Rainier | 3 | .. | .. |
| | | | 1 Batterie de Brigade | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | En Réserve | 1 Batterie de Brigade | .. | .. | 6 |
| | Le Lieutenant-Général Lederer. | Le Général Latour | Lindenau | 3 | .. | .. |
| | | | Hohenlohe Bartenstein | 3 | .. | .. |
| | | | 1 Batterie de Brigade | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | Le Général Wrede | Chasseurs-à-pied, No. 10 | 1 | .. | .. |
| | | | Chasseurs-à-pied, No. 8 | 1 | .. | .. |
| | | | Houssards du Prince Royal de Würtemberg | .. | 8 | .. |
| | | | 1 Batterie de Brigade | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | En Réserve | 1 Batterie de Brigade | .. | .. | 6 |
| | Le Lieutenant-Général Meos. | Le Général Desfours | Houssards du Roi de Prusse | .. | 8 | .. |
| | | | 1 Batterie à Cheval | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | Le Général Raigecourt | Dragons du Roi de Bavière | .. | 6 | .. |
| | | | Dragons de Risch | .. | 6 | .. |
| | | | 1 Batterie à Cheval | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | | *Artillerie de Réserve.* | | | |
| | | Directeur de l'Artillerie, Major Zocky | 4 Batteries à 12 li. | .. | .. | 24 |
| | | | 3 Batteries de Brigade | .. | .. | 18 |
| | | | 1 Batterie à Cheval | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | | Summa | 22 | 28 | 96 |
| | | | *Adjudants-Généraux.* | | | |
| | | Le Major Salhausen Adj. Commandant | 1 Adjudant-Général. | | | |
| | | | 2 Aides-de-Camp. | | | |
| | | | 6 Officiers à la Suite. | | | |
| | | | *Etat-Major-Général.* | | | |
| | | | 1 Major. | | | |
| | | | 3 Capitaines. | | | |
| | | | 1 Premier Lieutenant. | | | |
| | | | Corps des Pionniers | $\frac{1}{6}$ | .. | .. |
| | | Le Chef de l'Etat-Major, Major Hauer | Infanterie de l'Escorte de l'Etat Major | $\frac{1}{6}$ | .. | .. |
| | | | Corps pour le Service de la Santé | $\frac{1}{6}$ | .. | .. |
| | | | Dragons de l'Etat Major | .. | $\frac{1}{2}$ | .. |
| | | | Trains des Charrois Militaires. | | | |
| | | | *Direction du Génie.* | | | |
| | | | 1 Major. | | | |
| | | | 2 Capitaines. | | | |
| | | | 1 Lieutenant. | | | |
| | | | Summa | $22\frac{1}{6}$ | $28\frac{1}{2}$ | 96 |

FRIMONT.

*Lieut.-Col. Sir C. Broke to Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill.*

My Lord, Paris, 29th Oct., 1815.

I am desired by his Grace the Duke of Wellington to inform you that the circumstances attending the present situation of the army render it expedient that his Grace should request you will call the attention of the officers under your command to the necessity of the strictest discipline and most exact regularity of the troops in the cantonments which they are about to occupy; and in order to ensure the uniform conduct of the service, his Grace desires that the following points may be attended to:—

Billets are to be made by the mayors, or persons acting for them. They are to be applied for by officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department of Divisions; or if there are no officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department, by Staff officers of divisions or brigades; or if there are no Staff officers, by Quartermasters.

Where there are no mayors or persons having authority to issue billets, the billets are to be arranged and portioned by the officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department of the Divisions; or if there are no officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department, by Staff officers of divisions or brigades; or if there are no Staff officers, by Quartermasters.

All billets when granted are to be made use of.

If the owners of a house refuse a billet, it is to be made good, if necessary by force; but this measure must be sanctioned by the officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department of Divisions; or if there are no officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department, by the Staff officers of divisions or brigades; or if there is no Staff officer, by the Quartermaster authorised to arrange the billets.

If the owner of a house takes away his furniture, or by other means endeavours to deter officers from entering the billet, the commanding officer is to place soldiers in the house.

No inhabitant is to be required to accommodate persons that are not entitled to billets; and it is particularly desired that officers will not give grounds for complaint by taking their wives or families into billets without having the consent of the owners of the house so to do.

Officers are to be warned against shooting over the country without having permission of the proprietors. The General Orders of the army have already given sufficient caution upon this subject.

The situation of the troops will require that military precautions should be attended to.

Alarm posts are to be established, guards and pickets are to be posted, and sufficient measures taken for the security of the communications and for the safety and tranquillity of the cantonments.

The most efficient steps are to be taken for the prompt and certain circulation of orders, so that the whole or any part of the troops may be collected at the shortest notice.

Attention must be paid in the billets of soldiers to the ammunition, and to its security against accident or robbery: for this the frequent company inspection will be a precaution.

The parks of artillery are to be formed where they can be protected:

they are never to be without guards, and troops should be sufficiently near to afford them support.

If any attroupement or riotous assembly of the inhabitants against the military takes place, the troops are to be under arms and the attroupement is to be fired upon.

Any act of violence by the inhabitants against the soldiery is to be immediately noticed, and the offenders are to be secured. The service must be respected. The General officers are to take care that the discipline and good conduct of the troops merit the respect demanded. The mayors are to be informed of the measures that will be taken, and are to be desired to warn the inhabitants against taking part in the disturbances that may subject them to military punishment.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
CHARLES BROKE.

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*Lieut.-Col. Sir C. Broke to Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill.*

MY LORD, Paris, 30th Oct., 1815.

It is the Duke of Wellington's desire that a place of rendezvous should be fixed upon for each division of the army. The routes by which the troops may best move to the place of rendezvous should be reconnoitred, and such instructions given as may render the assembly easy and expeditious.

The places of rendezvous or general alarm posts of the troops under your Lordship's command should be:

For the 2nd Division—Versailles, or about the cantonments of the division that are nearest to Paris.

For the 4th Division—Longjumeau, or about the cantonments of the division that are nearest to Paris.

Baron Estorff's Cavalry—Bièsvres, or about the cantonments of the brigade nearest to Paris.

The Nassau troops—Ecouen or Pierrefitte, or about the cantonments of the troops nearest to Paris.

The ground fixed upon should be clear of the towns or villages, and towards Paris.

The troops when assembled are to be in marching order, with their baggage.

If any other point of assembly is desired, the instructions that may be given will express it.

The brigades and battalions of the divisions are, however, at the same time to have their several alarm posts.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
CHARLES BROKE.

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*The Right Hon. C. Arbuthnot to the Earl of Liverpool.*

DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Paris, Monday, 30th Oct., 1815.

At length I have fixed the time for returning homewards; and as I mean to leave Paris next Saturday, I shall hope to see you at Walmer, if you should be still there, on the Monday or Tuesday following. I cannot flatter myself that my protracted stay here will have been much to others, but it certainly has been very interesting to myself; and although my knowledge of France and of her institutions must be very faint, I think I shall have learnt more than anything short of conversation could have given.

When I was in England we all were attentive to the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, and we were anxious to see what would be their proceedings. What I have been able to collect upon these topics may perhaps be interesting to you, and I will therefore tell you all that I have learned.

I remember it was stated very strongly in England, and was reproached to the King by our Opposition, that by an improper addition to the Electoral Colleges the general sense of the people of France would not be taken, and that, with few exceptions, none could be elected but such as were known to be devoted to the Bourbons. I was very soon convinced that in this we had fallen into error, and that, although some additions to the Electoral Colleges had been made, as well as some alterations in them, they were not of such magnitude and importance as to account for that general spirit of attachment to the Bourbons by which the Deputies seem to be influenced. There has been, as you remember, some addition to the number of the electors; and to have the privilege of electing or of being elected, a larger sum must be paid in taxes (300 francs a year by an elector and 1000 by a deputy) than was the case under Bonaparte; but I am assured, and I believe the fact, that, notwithstanding these changes, the elections might have been adverse to government, if it had been (as I may call it) the fashion of the day so to choose the Deputies. It has been very much my object to ascertain what, therefore, can have been the cause of what may almost be termed an intolerant spirit of Royalty in the new Chamber. As the same explanation has been given to me in different quarters and by the most intelligent men with whom I have conversed, I must suppose that it is the true one. Every one says, "Le François est essentiellement obéissant." It is the humour and temper of the people always to find fault and to criticise; but in spite of the Revolution, and notwithstanding the persecution of all the higher orders in France, there is a feeling among the French which induces them to support for the moment whatever may be the existing government. Thus it is that the Electoral Colleges have made a very different choice of Deputies from what they would have done had Bonaparte remained. The language was, "We must choose Deputies who will be approved of by the government;" and this sentiment prevailed so generally that scarcely any one had a chance of being elected who was suspected of opposition to the Bourbons. No one who has not witnessed it, or who has not been convinced of it by the accounts of others, could form an idea of the rapidity with which the public cry can be changed in France. At 9 in the morning of the day on

which the King last returned to Paris a man was torn to pieces in the Place de Vendôme for wearing the white cockade; at 1 a marshal of France (Moncey or Mortier) riding into Paris with the white cockade was pursued by the populace, and with difficulty saved himself; and at 3 the King entered the capital, accompanied with shouts of acclamation far greater than those which greeted him the year before. All those who in an adverse sense were clamorous in the morning had changed or disappeared; and it has been with the Electoral Colleges as it was with the mob of Paris.

It may be said, then, that the cry being now for the King, this government will continue firm, unless some unforeseen shock should arise. I hope and think that it may continue; but it is not to be inferred from what I have attempted to explain that the Bourbons are generally popular in France. I believe from what I hear that the spirit in the Departments is gradually improving; but, as far as I have been able to judge, I should say that Fouché's report to the King of the interior (so shamefully made public by him) was the truest representation of this country that could be given. What I have meant to state is merely this: the existing government will, for the time being, appear to have general support; but in case of a reverse, the great mass of its supporters will either change or be concealed; and even at the very time that support is given, there exists such an inclination to criticise and abuse as must check the operations of every government.

I hope I shall not have tired you with this very prolix account. The subject is one which had been puzzling to myself, and I have thought it not unlikely that you might wish for the best information which I could give upon it.

Perhaps it may be satisfactory to you if I now proceed to give the best account in my power of the principal proceedings of the Chambers since their meeting. In such an account I cannot hope to be very clear or quite correct, as I shall have to mention things respecting which the very actors themselves have an extraordinary degree of ignorance. They have been occupied in suspending laws, and in creating new ones, without at all knowing the nature or the extent of their Penal Code. One heard of nothing but of the suspension of their Habeas Corpus. I asked, but asked in vain, where this safeguard of individual liberty was to be found. I was referred to the 4th Article of their *Charte Constitutionnelle*, which, being very short, I will copy: "Leur liberté individuelle est également garantie, personne ne pouvant être poursuivi ni arrêté que dans les cas prévus par la loi, et dans les formes qu'elle prescrit."

I had learnt nothing until I had discovered what the law was, and what forms are prescribed by it. This knowledge no one can give me, for it is one which no one possesses. I know that in their first secret meetings the Deputies were stopped short in their proceedings by the universal ignorance which prevailed upon this subject; and I was told from the best authority that nothing could be done until they had consulted some *Procureur Impérial*, who gave them his explanation of what he conceived to be the state of the Penal Laws.

I should think it useless to trouble you with the explanation thus given if it did not seem necessary for the better comprehension of what the

Chambers have since been doing. I must spare you great part of the details to which I listened, but will just observe that, according to the general mode of proceeding, there were under Bonaparte five different modes of arrest. As soon as a man had been arrested, it was necessary, either in the first instance or through the Prefect of the Department, that the magistrate termed *le Juge d'Instruction* should have notice given him of the arrest. It was the duty of this Juge d'Instruction *de s'instruire*, or in other words to make himself acquainted with all the circumstances which led to the arrest; and it was then optional with him, upon his responsibility, to release the arrested person or to give him up to the Court of Justice which was to try the case. If the person was thus given up for trial, he had a right, by the laws made in the beginning of Bonaparte's reign, to require that he should have his case examined within fifteen days after being delivered over to the court by which he was to be tried. Bonaparte soon found that this protection against unjust detention could not accord with his tyranny. He had no scruple, therefore, to set the law aside; but, as a blind to the people, he appointed five Counsellors of State, who were annually to examine all the cases of detention, and upon their report all persons who had been arrested were to be set at liberty, were to be brought to trial, or reasons were to be assigned why their further detention was necessary for the safety of the State. It is a fact, as I am told, that these Counsellors of State never caused the liberation of one single prisoner; and I learnt from a person who was thrown into a dungeon and kept there for years by Bonaparte, that the labour of these Counsellors consisted in exhorting the prisoners to confess to the government in writing that they were guilty of their imputed crimes, assuring them that their release would be the consequence of such acknowledgment, but intending to preserve such a written confession as a justification of the arrest. It will be readily perceived that Bonaparte had destroyed everything which in his first laws had a resemblance to our Habeas Corpus. No new Penal Code was promulgated when the King was restored, but the intention was to give again that individual security which had existed before the appointment of the five Counsellors of State. This might have done, and the French might really have been said to have had their Habeas Corpus, if in the very outset of Bonaparte's legislation he had not taken measures to deprive his subjects of all real security. Although it was originally enacted, as I have observed above, that fifteen days only were to elapse between an arrest and an inquiry into it, yet to this it was added that the trial itself must succeed the inquiry, "après un délai moral." These four words destroyed the whole security, for the "délai moral" had no term assigned to it, and it might be easily alleged that from multiplicity of business in the courts, or from other causes, the trial must be delayed.

Unless I have ill comprehended the information given me, the foregoing is a tolerably accurate, though I am aware a very diffuse, account of the law of arrest and judgment as existing now in France. This is the law referred to in the 4th Article of the Charte Constitutionnelle, and it is this law (termed here generally their Habeas Corpus) which they have now suspended. I will attempt to give an idea of what is substituted in its place, and I will be as succinct as possible.

The protective power against sedition is to be comprised in three enact-

ments: the suspension of their Habeas Corpus, a Sedition Bill, and the establishment of a Cour Prevôtale. I will proceed very briefly to describe them. Any one may, as before, be arrested by the gendarmerie, the Juges de Paix, and, without enumerating them, by all the other authorities which have power of arrest. The arrest being made, the Prefect of the Department will give information of it to les Procureurs du Roi and to the Ministers. It will rest with the Ministers whether the accused person shall be brought immediately to trial, or whether without trial he shall be detained in prison until this new law shall have expired; and unless renewed, it will expire at the end of the next session. Before this suspending law had passed, the arrested person had at least a right to be tried "après le délai moral." There will now be no longer question of such delay, but the being tried or the being detained without trial will depend on the King's Ministers. It is in this that the force of the new law exists.

The Sedition Bill classes and enumerates the crimes against the King and State, and the punishment for those crimes. I need not observe that it is only with regard to such crimes that the above-mentioned suspending law is to have effect. Here it might be necessary to notice generally what this law considers to be sedition, but I will defer doing it until I have to mention what I heard when present at the debates.

The third law (not yet proposed to the Chambers) is the establishment of the Cour Prevôtale. A court of this description was established by Louis XIV. in 1672, and it was for the speedy punishment of the banditti which were committing depredations over the whole of France. The intention, as I understand, is, that without the delays incident to all regular courts of justice, a person arrested for any seditious act shall, *if it be deemed advisable*, be judged instantaneously. If deemed *advisable*, I say, because it will be remembered that it is to rest with the Ministers whether the trial is to take place or not; but if there be no objection to immediate judgment, the Cour Prevôtale will take cognizance of the case. This court will hear the cause, and, without a jury, will decide upon it; differing in this from the regular *Cours d'Assises*, where there is a jury.

From attention to a subject, and from endeavours to become acquainted with it, one begets an interest in it which others may not feel. Perhaps, therefore, I shall tire you out with my details; but, having begun, I cannot help giving you some account of the forms observed in their Chambers, and of the modes of doing business there.

When a project of a new law has been proposed (and I hear that the forms are the same in both Chambers), the whole, after some discussion, is referred to nine bureaux, or, in other words, to nine smaller assemblies, the whole aggregate assembly having been thus divided. The reason assigned to me for thus dividing themselves is the vivacity and impetuosity belonging to the French character, which would incapacitate them, when meeting in such numbers, from giving such calm attention to a subject as the first consideration of it requires. In the bureaux the referred project is discussed: it is either agreed to, rejected, or amendments proposed. All this is decided by vote, and, the resolution upon the project being taken, each bureau, also by vote, selects one of its members to depute to what is called the Central Commission. This Commission, thus consisting of nine members, acts with regard to the project as the bureaux had previously

done; and the resolution upon the project being here again taken, one of its members is by vote selected to make the report to the Chamber. The subject being in this manner brought once more before the Chamber, a debate, which is final, takes place upon the report. In this last debate it is voted whether the measure shall be in exact conformity to the recommendation of the report, or whether it shall be amended, and, finally, whether it shall be sent to the King as one which the Chamber is desirous of passing into a law. Between the two Chambers there are no direct means of communication. The King, in receiving the message, makes no reply, but sends it immediately to the other House. In the House of Peers the same forms exist; and, if sent back to the King, it then rests with him to make it a law or to refuse his consent.

I have been present at debates upon two reports: the one respecting the Suspension, and the other the Sedition Bill.

The day preceding the debate each Deputy wishing to speak writes down his name, and he is called up to the tribune according to the order in which his name is written. It thus must happen that three or four may speak together on the same side of the question, and the means of replying immediately cannot exist as with us. It is optional to read or to speak unprepared. In the debate upon the Suspension Bill most of the Deputies called to the tribune read their prepared speeches; some few spoke them.

Nothing could be more dull or more uninteresting than the prepared speeches, but in those which were spoken there was a considerable degree of talent. I should not say that any one examined and analysed the question as in our Houses, but there were two or three speeches which we should have thought able for young beginners; and, from what I heard, I should imagine that the French have a greater facility of expression and a more general fluency than we have.

In the debates upon the reports all is mixed up and mingled together. In the same speech the general policy is discussed and the amendments are proposed. About five o'clock, or when it is beginning to grow dusk, the *clôture* of the Chamber is loudly called for; and when I was there, although several wanted to speak, the vote was suddenly taken whether the measure should pass or not. It put me in mind of Cardinal de Retz, who said that the Parisians don't like to lose their dinner. When it had been decided that the measure should pass, the President read a list of the amendments offered by each member, but they were each of them, one after the other, negatived at once, without any discussion. The object was evidently to separate, and it never entered into any one's head to care at all about any amendment. I could not have conceived it possible to have proceeded so very summarily.

Such is the prevailing spirit in the Chamber of Deputies that I believe no one would have ventured to argue that the suspension was not necessary. The amendments related more, and indeed chiefly, to the mode of arresting. It was argued by some that the Ministers alone, upon their responsibility, should have the power of ordering arrests; but everything of this kind was overruled. One man, a Monsieur d'Argenson (descended from the Minister of Louis XV.), ventured to say that some inquiry should be made before passing the law as proposed; and, unfortunately for himself, he observed that there might be faults on both sides, it being stated

generally that the Protestants in the South had been assassinated by the Catholics. I thought the whole assembly would have rushed to the tribune, and torn M. d'Argenson to pieces. A great clamour ensued. Fists were held up to him, with a general cry, "Cela est faux! Cela est faux!" He is said to be a man of ability and of firmness. Upon this occasion he showed neither. He prevaricated, recalled his words, and ended his speech miserably.

I had another instance of the spirit of Royalty. The Minister of the Interior, Count de Vaublanc, went to the tribune to defend the law. He made only a few general phrases, eloquently expressed; but, ending a sentence with "La grande majorité veut son Roi!" I thought that the peals of applause would have never ended. One could not help feeling that with this people one is as if on a barrel of gunpowder, for the least spark sets them on fire.

The report upon the Sedition Bill was very ill debated. Almost all the speeches were read, and nothing could be more tiresome. As the length of my letter must have already tired you, I will not enumerate what is to be considered sedition, but will confine myself to one single observation. As it has been felt that ill-disposed persons endeavour to injure the King by circulating that the sold estates are to be restored, the Bill against Sedition declares in one of its clauses that all who spread such reports shall be punishable. There was an attempt to amend this clause. It was observed that, according to the wording of the clause, any unfortunate emigrant who chanced to express a hope and belief that estates were to be restored would be punishable, and this was considered to be a cruelty which an amendment to the law might avoid. Such, however, was the hurry to end the discussion that the clause was passed; and I have since heard it doubted whether, in order to get rid of the clause, the Chamber might not re-tread its steps, and throw out the Bill altogether. The debate was to be resumed this day, and I have not heard what has passed. I dare say the Bill will pass; but I have wished to show how precipitately they act, and how very necessary it will be to adopt other more reflecting modes of proceeding.

I have inquired a great deal about the divisions of parties in the Chambers. I can learn nothing, and I fancy there is next to nothing to be learnt. The number of those who intended to set themselves up as an Opposition to the government is under forty, and this small party is now dissolved. I believe I can tell you what has been the conduct of that party since the meeting of the Chambers. They chose M. d'Argenson (the one above mentioned) to be their leader; and, fancying that my friend the Baron de Vitrolles had been ill-used by the Court when the late Ministers were dismissed, they made an offer to him of making cause with him in all the debates which might arise. This he declined. It seems that the new Minister of Police, M. de Cazes, had some intimation of this; and with a view, I suppose, to get rid of the opposition of that party, he wrote a letter to them, representing himself as the most zealous friend of liberty, and inviting them to meet every day at his house, in order that he and they together should previously discuss the subjects afterwards to be debated in the Chamber. For several days they all did meet at his house, but they soon differed upon the Suspension Bill; and their leader,

M. d'Argenson, having since lost himself in the Chamber, the party has, by common consent, dissolved itself. This is all so very laughable and ridiculous that I would not mention it if I were not assured by the Baron de Vitrolles that every word of what I have stated is strictly true.

If the present state of things should continue to exist, we may hope that, by practice, all their proceedings will be improved. No one can as yet tell who will be the leading characters in the Chambers, but by degrees they will be ascertained, and it is to be expected as well as wished that from among them the Sovereign will be obliged to choose his Ministers. I understand that the King is very anxious to avoid this sort of control; but if ever there is to be a constitutional government and a responsible ministry, this must happen.

There are many other topics upon which I had meant to observe, but time presses, and I have written too much already. I will hasten to a conclusion.

When I first came, we English were up to the skies in popularity. Then we were hated and abused, and there was a wish to trample us under foot. After that came the treaty with the Allies, and the anger which it excited. Now the Chambers occupy the public mind, and so exclusively, I believe, that all the preceding subjects are as much forgotten as if no uneasiness had ever been excited by them. Every one is running to the tribunes to hear the debates, and these alone are talked of.

I wonder whether you will have patience to read this long letter. Had I not been returning to England, I might have told you a good deal which I have heard of Bonaparte, but all this I reserve for our meeting. We shall go to Walmer if we hear at Dover that you are there; and now, with best regards to Lady Liverpool, I am ever most truly yours,

C. ARBUTHNOT.

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[926.] G. O. Paris, 5th Nov., 1815.

1. The Field Marshal is concerned to find that his desire, repeatedly stated in orders, that the officers of the army would not hunt or shoot without the permission of the owners of the property on which they should wish to hunt or shoot, has been unattended to, and that several have destroyed the game in the King's forests and on his estates.

2. He now requests the General officers to take measures to prevent any future disobedience of these orders.

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 7th Nov., 1815.

I have just received your letter of the 3rd, and I hasten to say that it is the wish and intention of the government and of the Commander-in-Chief to make up your effective force as strong as possible in British troops towards the completion of the contingent to 30,000 men; and though His Royal Highness, when he enclosed you the memorandum in his letter of the 27th, thought the British part of the contingent was only to be 20,000 men, he has since been endeavouring to arrange that it should be extended to the full 30,000.

In calculating the strength to which each corps would arrive upon being furnished with the disposable men from the depôts and 2nd battalions, it was not His Royal Highness's intention that such detailed reinforcements should form a part of your contingent until they should join you, or that you should part with any corps destined to return, that might be wanting, in failure of those detachments, to complete the force in the first instance. All this would have been detailed to you in the final instruction after the arrival of the treaty, and the Duke only wished to be put in previous possession of your views and wishes on the subject.

As to the 3rd battalion of the Royals, which you instance as coming within the numbers calculated upon, it was held in view to augment that corps to 1000 rank and file from the 4th battalion stationed in Flanders.

You have misunderstood me regarding the Staff. It was not intended to interfere with your special command of the British troops by any specific or unusual appointment of an officer under you. In alluding to Lord Hill, I only meant that as a Lieutenant-General on the Staff, he would be exclusive of the Lieutenant-Generals of divisions, and have a staff beyond that attached to divisions, as he has now. But I confess I may have expressed myself in a manner to give an impression that a different intention was entertained.

Sir George Murray will be notified as British Quartermaster-General: but your Grace may employ him under the more extensive denomination of Chief of the Staff to the Allied Army under your command; and to give him due weight, he is to have the rank of Lieutenant-General on the Continent. As to all other appointments under him and the Adjutant-General, I am certain you will have *carte blanche* both as to numbers and selection.

I ought to mention that in conformity to the practice of foreign armies, it is proposed to include the officers and non-commissioned officers in reckoning the contingent; but if upon the present occasion it is not the intention of the Allies to include them in their respective contingents, I request your Grace will say so, and every endeavour will be made to effect a corresponding arrangement.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

N.B. It is hoped that the embarkation of the troops to return may take place at Calais and Boulogne. The advanced season of the year renders it desirable to have the shortest water passage.

*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord Duke, Horse Guards, 9th Nov., 1815.

Having received an intimation from His Majesty's government that a contingent British force, consisting of 30,000 troops, shall be maintained in France for a certain period after the definitive treaty of peace, and the period having now arrived for carrying into effect the organization of this force and for removing the remainder of the British army to this country, I have the Prince Regent's commands to acquaint your Grace that the following are the corps selected to remain in France, according to this arrangement, under the command of your Grace, viz. :—

*Cavalry.*

| | Present Strength. | Recruits from England. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Dragoon Guards | 392 | 58 | 450 |
| 2nd „ | 418 | 32 | 450 |
| 3rd Dragoons | 365 | 40 | 405 |
| 7th Hussars | 357 | 93 | 450 |
| 11th Light Dragoons | 387 | 63 | 450 |
| 12th | 341 | 109 | 450 |
| 13th | 343 | 70 | 413 |
| 15th Hussars | 347 | 103 | 450 |
| 18th | 386 | 64 | 450 |
| Waggon Train Troops | 600 | .. | 600 |

*Infantry.*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Foot Guards, 3rd Battalion | .. | .. | 1,200 |
| Coldstream, 2nd Battalion | 996 | 204 | 1,200 |
| 1st Foot, 3rd Battalion | .. | .. | 1,000 |
| 3rd „ 1st „ | 827 | 173 | 1,000 |
| 4th „ 1st „ | 662 | 150 | 712 |
| 5th „ 1st „ | 1,116 | .. | 1,000 |
| 6th „ 1st „ | 781 | 69 | 850 |
| 7th „ 1st „ | 868 | 132 | 1,000 |
| 9th „ 1st „ | 1,051 | .. | 1,000 |
| 21st „ 1st „ | 804 | 196 | 1,000 |
| 23rd | 671 | 29 | 700 |
| 27th „ 1st „ | .. | .. | 1,000 |
| 29th | 808 | 22 | 830 |
| 39th „ 1st „ | 842 | 108 | 950 |
| 40th „ 1st „ | 694 | 106 | 800 |
| 43rd „ 1st „ | 1,044 | .. | 1,000 |
| 52nd „ 1st „ | 987 | 13 | 1,000 |
| 57th „ 1st „ | 601 | 149 | 750 |
| 71st „ 1st „ | 803 | 130 | 933 |
| 79th „ 1st „ | 692 | 80 | 772 |
| 81st „ 1st „ | .. | .. | 1,000 |
| 88th „ 1st „ | 1,130 | .. | 1,000 |
| 91st „ 1st „ | 848 | 100 | 948 |
| 95th „ 1st „ (6 Companies) | 577 | .. | 600 |
| 95th „ 2nd „ „ | 534 | .. | 600 |
| Staff Corps | 302 | .. | 200 |
| Cavalry and Infantry | .. | .. | 27,613 |
| Artillery | .. | .. | 2,000 |
| Officers and non-commissioned Officers | .. | .. | 3,300 |
| Total | .. | .. | 32,913 |

With regard to the cavalry, the detachments of men from the depôts in this country will be forwarded without delay; and your Grace will be pleased to order a transfer of horses from the corps that are to return to England to complete the regiments remaining in France to 420 horses each, leaving five dismounted men in each troop.

Your Grace will order the 3rd battalion of the 1st Guards to be completed to 1200 men from the 2nd battalion. The 2nd battalion of the Coldstream will be completed from the 1st battalion in this country to the same number.

Your Grace will also be pleased to order the transfer of such effectives as may be required from the 4th battalion of the Royals, 3rd battalion of the 27th, and 2nd battalion of the 81st, to complete the 2nd battalion of the former and the 1st battalions of the two latter corps to 1000 rank and file. The remaining transfers from the 2nd battalions and depôts necessary to complete the corps in the manner specified in the foregoing list will be forwarded from this country without delay, and will probably reach their destination before the final departure of the troops returning home; but until their arrival, your Grace will keep such corps from amongst those destined for England as may be necessary to keep the contingent complete in the first instance.

Having made this selection of the corps to remain in France as the British contingent under your command, it remains for me to convey to your Grace the Prince Regent's command that the following corps shall be marched for embarkation to * , under the charge of the Staff that is not destined to remain in France, as soon as your Grace shall have completed your arrangements.

| | R. and F. | | R. and F. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Life Guards | 233 | 36th Foot | 416 |
| 2nd „ | 191 | 37th „ 2nd Battalion | 542 |
| Royal Horse Guards | 302 | 38th | 654 |
| 3rd Dragoon Guards | 310 | 41st | 860 |
| 1st Dragoons | 293 | 42nd | 472 |
| 2nd „ | 298 | 44th „ 2nd „ | 737 |
| 6th „ | 309 | 51st | 558 |
| 10th Hussars | 448 | 54th | 547 |
| 16th Light Dragoons | 390 | 58th „ 1st „ | 630 |
| 23rd | 384 | 59th „ 2nd „ | 458 |
| Waggon Train | 800 | 62nd „ 2nd „ | 538 |
| 1st Foot Guards, 2nd Battalion | 720 | 64th | 508 |
| 3rd „ 2nd „ | 1139 | 69th „ 2nd „ | 454 |
| 1st Foot, 4th Battalion | 500 | 73rd „ 2nd „ | 490 |
| 12th „ 2nd „ | 610 | 78th „ 2nd „ | 327 |
| 14th „ 3rd „ | 593 | 81st „ 2nd „ | 390 |
| 16th | 617 | 82nd „ 1st „ | 825 |
| 25th „ 2nd „ | 426 | 90th „ 1st „ | 820 |
| 27th „ 3rd „ | 585 | 92nd | 526 |
| 28th | 497 | 95th „ 3rd „ | 480 |
| 30th „ 2nd „ | 575 | 2nd Garrison Battalion | 992 |
| 32nd | 555 | 7th Veteran „ | 670 |
| 33rd | 470 | | |
| 35th „ 2nd „ | 575 | Total | 24,714 |

* Blank in manuscript.

I am further to acquaint your Grace that the Prince Regent has been pleased to approve of Lieutenant-General Lord Combermere to command the cavalry, and Lieutenant-General Lord Hill the corps of infantry, under your command; and upon the calculation that the corps of cavalry will consist of three brigades, and that your Grace will find it expedient to form the infantry, exclusive of the Guards, into three divisions and eight brigades, the following are the officers whom it is proposed to attach to these respective corps:—

Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole, G.C.B.
,, Sir Henry Clinton, G.C.B.
,, Sir Charles Colville, G.C.B.
Major-General Sir James Kempt, G.C.B.
,, Sir Thomas Brisbane, K.C.B.
,, Lord Edward Somerset, K.C.B. (Cavalry).
,, Sir Thomas Bradford, K.C.B.
,, Sir John Lambert, K.C.B.
,, Sir Manley Power, K.C.B.
,, Sir C. Grant, K.C.B. (Cavalry).
,, Sir P. Maitland (Guards).
,, Sir John Keane, K.C.B.
,, Sir Frederick Adam, K.C.B.
,, Sir H. Vivian, K.C.B. (Cavalry).

Adjutant-General—Major-General Sir E. Barnes, K.C.B.
Quartermaster-General—Lieutenant-General Sir George Murray, G.C.B.

Your Grace will be pleased to make a selection of the Staff for the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General's Departments, as well as the Medical, Commissariat, and Pay Departments, which you may think adequate to the service; and when your Grace shall have made your selection of the members and the individuals, I request you will send me a list for the Prince Regent's final approval.

I am, my Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Paris, 10th Nov., 1815.

Some weeks ago I had the honour of speaking to you respecting the 50th and 71st Regiments having permission to inscribe on their colours and appointments the word "Almaraz," when your Grace desired me to make a written application to you on the subject. I have now the honour to enclose two letters: one from Colonel Hill, commanding the 50th Regiment; the other from Colonel Reynell, commanding the 71st Light Infantry.

Having in my report of the 20th May, 1812, stated my good opinion of the very distinguished conduct of the 50th and 71st Regiments at Almaraz on the 19th of May, 1812, I shall therefore now merely forward the applications in question, and recommend them strongly to your Grace for favourable consideration.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord Duke,
Your very obedient and faithful servant,

HILL.

*Madame Ney to the Prince Regent.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Paris, le 13 Nov., 1815.

Ma confiance dans la générosité de Votre Altesse Royale est sans bornes, mais je ne me croirais point autorisée à y avoir recours si je n'avais le droit d'invoquer en même tems vôtre justice. —

Qu'il me soit permis, Monseigneur, d'user de ce droit en mettant sous les yeux de Votre Altesse Royale une exemplaire du mémoire par lequel le Maréchal Ney, mon mari, réclame du Duc de Wellington, Général-en-Chef des troupes Anglaises, l'exécution à son égard de l'Article 12 de la Capitulation de Paris, qui mit l'armée et les habitans de cette capitale à l'abri de toute recherche relative à leur conduite antérieure, et qui place ainsi le Maréchal, mon époux, sous la sauve-garde du gouvernement Britannique.

En vous suppliant, Monseigneur, de maintenir par votre puissante protection l'exécution de cette stipulation j'ose espérer que ma juste demande sera favorablement accueilli par le Prince que la Providence a appelé au gouvernement d'une nation qui professe un grand respect pour les lois et la foi des traités; et cet espoir se fortifie de tout ce que la renommée publie des vertus et de la magnanimité qui distinguent Votre Altesse Royale.

Je suis, avec respect, Monseigneur,

De Votre Altesse Royale la très humble et très obéissante servante,

LA MARÉCHALE NEY,
Princesse de la Moskowa.

P.S. Je prends la liberté de joindre à ma lettre une note additionnelle pour répliquer aux objections qui m'ont été faites par le Duc de Wellington.

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 14th Nov., 1815.

The Duke of Wellington, in a private audience granted yesterday to Madame Ney, gave as the grounds for his determination not personally to interfere in the process of the Marshal: *

"That His Majesty the King of France had not ratified the Convention of the 3rd July;"

"That the stipulation written in the 12th Article expressed only the renunciation of the High Powers, on their own account, of all proceeding against any individual in France for his conduct or political opinions;"

"That it was not their duty to interfere in any way with the acts of the King's government."

Madame la Maréchale Ney cannot believe that this first opinion, mani-

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 694: "Memorandum respecting Maréchal Ney," dated Paris, 19th November, 1815, by Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

fested upon the 12th Article of the Convention of the 3rd July, can be definitively maintained in the conference of the Plenipotentiaries.

In effect, in the attacks and invasion purely foreign of a conqueror, the enemy who penetrates into a country has no necessary concern with the troubles which may have broken out in it, and it does not fall within the character of capitulations that those of a certain party shall not be proceeded against. It is, then, because in the present occurrence the war was special, and for the pacification of the interior, that they thought of stipulating it in terms of amnesty.

The King, say they, has not ratified it; but the ratification has been sufficient, for the possession of Paris was its consequence. The condition of the besieged cannot be changed afterwards, unless things be re-established *in statu quo*.

His Highness has not sufficiently considered what ought to be essentially considered: that this 12th Article was the subject of a discussion between the English and Prussian Commissioners and the Commissioners of the French army; and that it was well understood that this stipulation took place on account of the King, and not on account of the Allied armies, who had no positive interest to act against such or such party.

That the Article is consented to in the name and common interest of all the Allied Powers; an interest indivisible, and which the two Treaties of the 13th and 25th of March designated as being principally the interest of His Majesty the King of France.

That it will be no interference in the acts of the King's government to recall to His Majesty engagements made in his name; engagements which his Ministers forget, which individuals proceeded against claim, and of which it becomes the dignity of the High Powers that the effect should not be null.

Finally, in all events, since His Highness allows that at least the High Powers themselves are bound by a renunciation, what must they think of being brought forward as conjuring and requiring the trial of Marshal Ney?

Ought it not to be their first duty in such a conjuncture to disengage, without delay, the balance of criminal justice from this enormous weight?

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*Madame Ney to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY LORD, Paris, 13th Nov., 1815.

I have the honour of laying before your Excellency a copy of the Memorial * which Marshal Ney, my husband, has addressed to the Duke of Wellington, General in Chief of the English army, with a view of claiming the performance, as far as he is concerned, of the 12th Article of the Capitulation of Paris, which protects the army and the inhabitants of this capital from being in any manner made responsible for their former conduct.

Marshal Ney, relying upon that Treaty, remained in France, and can neither be tried nor detained without being the victim of his confidence in

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* See p. 233.

a promise given in the face of Europe, and in the name of the English government.

I flatter myself, my Lord, that you will be pleased to give, as soon as possible, to the Duke of Wellington, and to the English Ambassador at Paris, such instructions as conform with the idea which in France is entertained of British magnanimity; and I look forward with confidence to what, on this occasion, your understanding and your equity will suggest to you.

LA MARÉCHALE NEY,
Princess of the Moskowa.

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*Extract from the Procès Verbal of a Conference between the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, held at Paris the 16th of November, 1815; with Translation, and two Enclosures; viz.* [927.]

His Excellency the Duke of Wellington having received from Marshal Ney a similar letter to that which the Marshal had addressed to the Ministers of the four Cabinets accredited to the Court of France, the Duke communicated at the Conference the answer he proposed to return; and their Excellencies coinciding entirely in opinion with his Grace in respect to this note, it is agreed to insert in the Protocol the letter from Marshal Ney, as well as Lord Wellington's reply.

&c. &c. &c.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Marshal Ney to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

(Translation.)

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY, Paris, 13th Nov., 1815.

In the last extremity, and at the moment when the critical circumstances to which I am reduced leave me but very feeble means to avoid the notoriety and the terrible dangers of a prosecution for high treason, I take the resolution of addressing to you a justifiable application for redress on the following grounds:—

My cause has been removed to the Chamber of Peers, pursuant to an ordinance issued by the King on the 11th of this month, and subsequently to a speech delivered in that Chamber by the President of His Majesty's ministers. This formal denunciation, and the considerations on which it rests, are of a nature to excite in my mind just alarm.

Among other motives for commencing a prosecution against me, I have read with astonishment in the speech, "that *even in the name of Europe* Ministers came to conjure the Chamber and require it to try me."

I beg leave to observe that such a declaration is irreconcilable with the

events witnessed during the late agitation of France. I am at a loss to conceive how the august Allies can be made parties to this impeachment, when their magnanimity has been generously exerted in preserving me from it, and when there exists a formal, sacred, and inviolable Convention on the subject.

Please to call to mind that the High contracting Powers by the Treaty of Paris, of May 30th, 1814, have formed an alliance with His Majesty Louis XVIII. On being informed at Vienna, the 13th of March last, that the cause of legitimacy was threatened by the return of Bonaparte, they concluded the solemn compact of that day, 13th March, with His Most Christian Majesty's ministers to the Congress. In that compact the Allied Sovereigns declared that they were prepared to afford to the King of France and to the French nation all necessary aid for restoring public tranquillity, and for making common cause against those who should be disposed to disturb it.

In the arrangement confirming that of the 25th of the same month of March, the High Powers solemnly engaged to unite all their forces for maintaining in all their integrity *the conditions of the Treaty of Paris* against Bonaparte's designs; *they promised each other to act in common.* They regulated the respective contingent which they *proposed to march against the common enemy.*

Finally, His Most Christian Majesty was *invited to give his consent to the above measures*, in the event of his standing in need of the *auxiliary troops* promised him, &c.

It clearly results from these different stipulations, that all the European armies, without distinction, have been the auxiliaries of the King of France, and that they have fought, in direct furtherance of his interests, for the subjugation of all his subjects.

Victory declared speedily in favour of the English and Prussian arms, united in the plains of Waterloo, and brought them under the walls of Paris.

In that post there was left, to oppose their further progress, a French corps d'armée, which had it in their power to sell their lives dear. A negotiation commenced, and on the 3rd July a Convention was signed by both parties, the 12th Article of which is to the following effect:

"Shall be likewise respected private persons and private property. The inhabitants, and, in general, all the individuals in the capital, shall continue in the enjoyment of their rights and of their liberty; nor shall it be lawful to disturb or call them to account in consequence of any matter having reference to the employment which they either hold or have held, *or to their conduct and public opinions.*"

This Convention has since been ratified by each of the Allied Sovereigns, as being the work of the two first Powers delegated by the course of events. It has thus acquired all the force which the sacred law of nations, the law of nature and of nations, could imprint on it. It is become the unalterable safeguard of all those Frenchmen whom the calamity of disturbed times might perhaps have left exposed to the resentment, however well founded, of their Prince.

His Most Christian Majesty did himself positively accede thereto in entering his capital: he has more than once appealed to the solemn authority of this political contract, as an act from which no portion whatever could be separated.

Can it then be doubtful, Sir, whether, being of the persons that come within the meaning of the above stipulations, I am justified in claiming the benefit of the 12th Article, and of the religious performance of the guarantees there specified?

I therefore presume expressly to demand of your ministerial office, and of the august Power in whose name you discharge it, that you will put a period to every criminal proceeding *against my conduct and my political opinions* on account of the functions exercised by me in the month of March, 1815.

My isolated and forsaken condition is an additional reason to determine your Excellency to afford me relief, and, by your powerful mediation, to place me in the enjoyment of the right which I have acquired.

Had I not implicitly confided in the promise of so many Sovereigns, I should by this time be in some unknown land, and should no more be thought of. It was that august and sacred promise which produced my security. Is it possible that it should be betrayed? I cannot credit it; and I confidently expect from your upright sentiments that you will grant me your speedy intervention.

NEY.

II.

*Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington to Marshal Ney.*

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, Paris, 15th Nov., 1815.

I have had the honour of receiving the note which you addressed to me on the 13th November, relating to the operation of the Capitulation of Paris on your case. The Capitulation of Paris of the 3rd July was made between the Commanders in Chief of the Allied Prussian and British Armies on the one part, and the Prince d'Eckmühl, Commander in Chief of the French Army, on the other, and related exclusively to the military occupation of Paris.

The object of the 12th Article was to prevent the adoption of any measure of severity, under the military authority of those who made it, towards any persons in Paris on account of the offices which they had filled, or their conduct or their political opinions; but it was never intended, and could not be intended, to prevent either the existing French government under whose authority the French Commander in Chief must have acted, or any French government which should succeed to it, from acting in this respect as it might deem fit.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

My Lord, Paris, 16th Nov., 1815.

Madame Ney requested to see me on Monday last, for the purpose of delivering the letter from the Marshal, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, and requesting my interference with the French government to render the 12th Article of the Convention of Paris applicable to the case of that officer.

Without entering into the question, I explained as clearly as the situation of this lady would permit, that it was quite impossible to return any answer to the Marshal's letter unless with the concurrence of my colleagues, the Ministers of the other Powers.

The conversation which took place in an interview with the Duke of Wellington having induced Madame Ney to address me the further remarks I have the honour to enclose, the pretensions of her husband to take advantage of the Capitulation were considered in the conference yesterday morning.

It was determined that the Duke of Wellington, under whose authority that act was negotiated, should state concisely to Marshal Ney the reasons why the 12th Article could not be considered applicable to his case; and that I should intimate to Madame Ney, in the name of the Four Powers, that no other answer would be transmitted to the communication we had received.

His Grace accordingly wrote the answer to Marshal Ney which I have the honour to enclose, and a verbal reference to the letter has led to a further communication from that officer's lady, which I likewise forward.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Charles Stuart.

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*Madame Ney to Sir Charles Stuart.*

Paris, 16th Nov., 1815.

I have the honour to send to your Excellency, for the second time, a reclamation for that protection assured to my husband, Marshal Ney, by the Convention of Paris; and I trust (notwithstanding the answer which you returned to me yesterday through your Secretary) that your Excellency will lose no time in causing a stop to be put, by Articles 12, 14, and 15 of the said Convention, to the proceedings already begun: but if your Excellency should not already be sufficiently convinced of the validity of this reclamation, I ask of you, in the name of your country and of justice, to cause all process to be suspended until the receipt of the answers from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and from Lord Liverpool, to whom I have already addressed the same reclamation which I have now made to your Excellency; but as these letters have been forwarded by private hands, and they might chance to miscarry, I give into your hands copies thereof, for the purpose of being forwarded by the messenger of your government.

I request your Excellency, &c. &c.

La Maréchale Ney,
Princess of the Moskowa.

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*Communication of Madame Ney to Sir Charles Stuart.*

It is neither practicable nor desirable to recapitulate the results and consequences of the Capitulation of Paris, signed by the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher, in the name of the Allies, which Capitulation was immediately made instrumental to the restoration of the King.

The following observations bear upon the faith and validity of capitulations, taking into consideration the 12th, 14th, and 15th Articles of the Capitulation of Paris:—

Capitulations and Conventions made by Commanders-in-Chief are not temporary engagements, but are every where considered binding and permanent.

A government cannot arbitrarily set aside a treaty thus entered into by their representatives, especially when an infraction of it would operate to the prejudice of the safety, of the property, of the liberty, and of the lives of the parties whose interests were guaranteed by the original contract.

It is not even just to dispose of any possession acquired by a capitulation unless all the stipulations specified as the conditions of the acquisition be previously fulfilled. A government ceding any possession cannot get rid of the guarantee of a capitulation; and as the obligation does not cease, the oppressed retain the right of calling upon that government to protect them from subsequent violations of their personal safety.

No persons, civil or military, guilty of any political offence, but protected by a capitulation, can be given up for judgment to a new government, or even to an ancient government restored to its rights.

Time has consecrated these principles among all civilized nations: it is particularly the practice of England. The history of Great Britain offers a series of cases in point.

The Capitulation at Naples is the only exception: there the engagements entered into by Captain Foote were not respected by Lord Nelson, and the persons who had surrendered upon the faith of the British government were delivered up to that of Naples; but Lord Nelson urged that Captain Foote was not authorized to conclude a capitulation. Nevertheless this odious act has thrown a shade upon the character of Lord Nelson, and the sensation created by it in England was so great that it required all the eminent services of Lord Nelson to screen him from Parliamentary impeachment.

In a recent instance, Generals Savary, Lallemand, and several others, were not given up to the French government by that of England, because the Captain of the *Bellerophon* had pledged his word of honour to these individuals; yet there was in this case no *written Convention*: the only engagement consisted in an understanding that the personal safety of all those who should embark under his protection should be guaranteed by the British government.

For these reasons the King of France cannot urge that the Capitulation of Paris is not binding upon him. How can he attempt to violate this single Article (the most solemn of all), when, in respect to the others which are to the prejudice of France, he has been compelled to submit to their most rigorous execution?*

This Capitulation was made in the name of the Allies; and the King of France at the period of its signature was only a member of the Coalition: this is proved by the text of the Declarations and Proclamations issued by the Allied Powers, and particularly by that of the 22nd of June, signed by the Duke of Wellington himself.

The friends of justice put forward these observations the more earnestly, because the whole population of Paris, the lives and property of so numerous a body, have no other protection than this Capitulation.

It is essential to observe that the city of Paris has never been given up to the King; that it is actually under the military dominion of the Allies; and that no person can absent himself from its neighbourhood without a passport signed by the military Commandant of the Allies.

*Articles of the Capitulation applicable to this question.*

Art. XII.—Persons and private property shall be equally respected. The inhabitants, and in general all the individuals who are in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without being in any manner subject to any inquiry or punishment in consequence of any office they may at present hold or may have held, or in consequence of their political conduct or opinions.

Art. XIV.—This present Convention shall be observed, and shall serve as a rule for all mutual relations, until the conclusion of peace.

Art. XV.—If any difficulty should arise in the execution of any of the Articles of this present Convention, they shall be interpreted in favour of the French army and of the city.

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*Thomas Raweroft, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

London, 17th Nov., 1815.

Mr. Roweroft, with most respectful compliments, presumes to think his Grace the Duke of Wellington will feel as much consolation as surprise to learn that at this day, at the end of five months, when the whole of the subscription may be estimated at half a million by March next, all the applications for the "Relief and Benefit" proposed do not amount to more than 575:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Of Killed—Officers .. .. .. .. | 45 | | |
| Non-commissioned .. .. | 85 | | |
| Privates .. .. .. .. | 184 | | |
| | | —— | 314 |
| Of Wounded—Officers .. .. .. .. | 184 | | |
| Non-commissioned .. .. | 20 | | |
| Privates .. .. .. .. | 57 | | |
| | | —— | 261 |
| | | | 575: Total, |

at this day, of casualties, British and Hanoverian, amounting to about 12,500 in the 'London Gazette.'

| | |
|---|---|
| The General Subscription for the British, about .. .. .. | £350,000 |
| „ Church and Parish Collection for the British and the Prussians, about .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 150,000 |
| A little less or more .. .. .. | £500,000 |

The subscription has a noble character of liberality, and does honour to the sense, feeling, admiration, and gratitude of the country for an exertion, merit, and success, beyond equal or parallel in all its circumstances.

The paucity of applications is most consoling, taking it to denote and mark the ease, independence, and content of the officers, and the small engagements in marriage and family of the men.

An unacquaintance with this fund or a disregard of it cannot be supposed.

Wounded officers are liberally considered now on the Army establishment. The wounded men have had able medical assistance, and good hospital quarters and assistance.

1500*l.* have been voted to the widow of Colonel De Lancey; 750*l.* to a sister of General Picton, in Devonshire; 400*l.* (only) to the widow of Major Hodge.

45,000*l.* to the army of Prince Blücher, and the troops of the Netherlands, Brunswick, and Nassau.

All these, or nearly all, should perhaps be reconsidered with a reference to their merit, rank, and claim, and the means of the fund.

The Duke of Wellington's early fields of fame and merit are well vindicated in the recent gallantry and deserved success in Nepaul. The returns to the Circular to the Commanders of all the corps and regiments of the Army of Waterloo, it is hoped, will very nearly ascertain and define what is to be expected of claim from relatives of killed, and those disabled or wounded.

Annuities for life are considered the best and most useful mode of settling the benefits of this subscription.

Reliefs, and not rewards, were all that was proposed in the outset and intent of this proceeding; widows, children, and the disabled of small means, who suffered privation and distress by their losses.

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*Prince Frederic of Hesse to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Rendsbourg, le 19 Nov., 1815.

J'ai l'honneur d'annoncer à Votre Altesse que le Roi mon maître m'a revêtu du commandement du contingent de ses troupes destinées à servir sous vous ordres. Je joins à celle-ci la liste de la force de ce corps, et une itinéraire de notre route jusqu'à Almelo. Si-tôt que celle-ci sera continué à faire jusqu'à Anvers avec le Commissaire des marches Hollandois, je ne manquerois pas de l'envoyer à Votre Altesse.

Agréez, my Lord, les assurances de mes hommages, avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Altesse le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Frédéric, Prince d'Hesse.

[928.] MEMORANDUM IN HAND-WRITING OF DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

20th Nov., 1815.

The French line from the sea should be the river Somme, leaving the districts of the Department of the Somme north of that river from St. Quentin to the sea unoccupied by the troops either of France or of the Allies.

The districts of St. Quentin, Vervins, and Laon, in the Department of the Aisne; of Rheims, St. Menehould, and Vitry, in the Department of the Marne; of St. Dizier and Joinville, in the Department of the Haute Marne; of Toul, Dreuze, and Sarrebrouck, in the Department of the Meurthe; of St. Diey, Bergères, and Remiremont, in the Department of the Vosges; of Lure, in the Department of the Haute Saône, and St. Hyppolite, in the Department of the Doubs; must likewise be unoccupied by the troops either of the Allies or of France.

The Allies are to occupy the Departments of the Pas de Calais, Nord, Ardennes, Meuse, Moselle, and Upper Rhine, and their line is to be along the frontier of those Departments respectively.

They must have a military road through the Departments of the Meurthe and of the Lower Rhine into that of the Upper Rhine.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 20 Nov., 1815.

Les Souverains Alliés, nos augustes maîtres, ayant résolu de confier à Votre Excellence le commandement en chef de leurs armées destinées à rester en France, nous ont ordonné de transmettre à Votre Excellence des copies certifiées des différens traités et conventions signés tant entr'eux-mêmes qu'avec Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne, afin que Votre Excellence ait une idée claire et précise de l'ensemble des arrangemens qui ont été arrêtés à Paris pour la sûreté de l'Europe, et sur la base desquels les rapports futurs des Souverains Alliés avec la France, ainsi que leurs relations réciproques, doivent être réglées.

Pour que la plus parfaite union continue à subsister dans les mesures des Cabinets respectifs, particulièrement dans tout ce qui regarde le système politique à observer vis-à-vis de la France, leurs Majestés Impériales et Royales ont chargé leurs Ministres à la Cour des Tuileries de conduire conjointement la correspondance entre le gouvernement Français et Votre Excellence comme Commandant-en-Chef des troupes Alliées.

Il n'échappera pas à Votre Excellence que nos augustes Souverains, en

plaçant un corps de leurs troupes en France, ont eu principalement en vue deux objets :—

1. D'assurer l'exécution complète et effective des arrangemens Européens tels qu'ils étaient établis par les Traités de Paris et de Vienne de 1814 et 1815, avec les modifications résultant du traité ci-joint.

2. De protéger l'Europe non-seulement contre une attaque directe de la part de la France, mais aussi contre le danger non moins redoutable d'être troublée et forcée de nouveau à recourir aux armes par les convulsions révolutionnaires dont ce pays ne paraît encore que trop menacé.

Quoique les Souverains Alliés considèrent le maintien du repos et des intérêts de leurs propres sujets comme le fondement de leur politique, ils attachent cependant la plus grande importance à la conservation du Souverain légitime, et de l'ordre des choses actuellement établi en France, non-seulement par le respect que leur inspirent les vertus personnelles du Roi, mais encore parcequ'ils regardent cet ordre de choses comme le meilleur moyen d'assurer la tranquillité de l'Europe. Par conséquent, jusqu'à l'époque où les troupes du Roi de France seront suffisamment organisées, Votre Excellence voudra bien, de concert avec le gouvernement Français, distribuer les forces qu'elle commande de manière à assurer à la capitale et à la famille Royale la protection nécessaire, et ne retirer ses troupes dans la ligne de démarcation que lorsque Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne croira ne plus avoir besoin de leur présence.

Nos augustes Souverains, tout en répugnant à l'emploi de leurs troupes pour le maintien de la police et de l'administration intérieure du pays, ont cependant, en considération de l'intérêt majeur qui les porte à affermir le Souverain légitime sur le trône de France, formellement promis au Roi de le soutenir par leurs armes contre toute convulsion révolutionnaire qui tendrait à renverser par la force l'ordre des choses actuellement établi, et de compromettre par là la tranquillité générale.

Les Souverains ne se dissimulent pas que dans cette variété de formes sous lesquelles l'esprit révolutionnaire pourrait se manifester en France, il peut y avoir des doutes sur la nature des cas qui exigeraient l'intervention de la force étrangère. Sentant la difficulté d'une instruction applicable à chaque cas particulier, et pour donner à Votre Excellence une nouvelle preuve de leur confiance, leurs Majestés s'en remettront entièrement à Votre discrétion pour juger quand et comment il sera convenable de faire agir les troupes sous vos ordres, en supposant que vous instruirez toujours sans délai LL.MM. des motifs qui vous auraient fait prendre telle ou telle mesure.

Mais comme, pour guider Votre Excellence dans le choix de ces mesures, il sera essentiellement important qu'elle connaisse avec exactitude non-seulement les événemens qui se passeront en France, mais aussi le point de vue sous lequel ces événemens sont envisagés par les agens diplomatiques des Souverains respectifs à la Cour de France, ces Ministres recevront l'ordre exprès de joindre à chaque réquisition relative à des secours à prêter, que le gouvernement Français adressera à Votre Excellence par leur organe l'exposé complet de leurs opinions, soit pour, soit contre l'objet de la réquisition.

Pour entretenir des communications suivies avec Votre Excellence pendant son absence de Paris, les Ministres des Cours Alliées auront de même

l'ordre de lui adresser, pour le moins une fois par semaine, une dépêche concertée entr'eux; et Votre Excellence pourra compter sur leur exactitude à transmettre toute communication qu'elle jugerait à propos d'adresser au gouvernement Français par leur intervention commune.

Nous prions Votre Excellence d'agréer l'assurance de notre haute considération.

METTERNICH. CASTLEREAGH.
CAPO D'ISTRIAS. HARDENBERG.

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[929.] G. O. Paris, 21st Nov., 1815.

1. All applications for quarters at the head quarters of the army must be made to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, Assistant Quartermaster-General attached to head quarters, whether required for individuals on the Staff, or coming on business to head quarters, or for corps.

2. When application is made for quarters for corps, it must be by the Assistant Quartermaster-General attached to the division, or if for a single regiment by the Quartermaster of the regiment; if for a smaller detachment than a regiment, the application must be made by the commanding officer of the detachment.

3. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly is to apply to the magistrate for the billet for every individual, and he is to keep a register of those granted, and of every change.

4. The Staff officers of divisions or of smaller corps, and the commanding officers of detachments quartered at head quarters, are to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly the billets they have received, of which likewise he is to keep a register.

5. When an officer quits head quarters, he is to report his departure to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly.

6. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly will make known to the Field Marshal any deviation from this order.

7. It is to be understood that all the officers and troops quartered within the barriers of Paris are now at head quarters; and in order to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to regulate this matter as it ought to be, all officers quartered at head quarters are forthwith to report themselves to him, specifying where quartered.

8. The Staff officers of divisions, and of smaller corps, either in barracks or cantonments at Paris, will likewise give Lieu-

tenant-Colonel Kelly the information regarding the billeting of the officers required by paragraph No. 7 of this order.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, le 21 Nov., 1815.

Le traité avec la France ayant été signé hier, ainsi que la Convention Militaire qui en fait partie, les soussignés Ministres des Cabinets réunis sont d'avis qu'il n'y a pas de tems à perdre pour mettre en train l'exécution de l'Article IX. de la dite Convention, d'après lequel les places à occuper par l'armée alliée destinée à rester en France doivent être remises au commandement en chef de cette armée dix jours après la signature.

Les soussignés, ne doutant pas que Son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Wellington ne partage leur opinion à cet égard, ont l'honneur de proposer à Son Excellence de se mettre de suite en communication avec le gouvernement Français, pour obtenir que toutes les mesures soient prises sans retard, afin que les dites places puissent être occupées par les troupes alliées au terme précis stipulé par le Convention Militaire.

Ils ont l'honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence l'assurance de leur haute considération.

CASTLEREAGH. HARDENBERG.
CAPO D'ISTRIAS. METTERNICH.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Madame Ney.*

MADAM, London, 21st Nov., 1815.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant; and it is with sentiments of sincere commiseration for the unfortunate situation in which you are placed that I feel myself called upon to acquaint you that I can return no other answer to the representations contained in your letter than by referring you to the communications which have been already made by the Duke of Wellington and Sir Charles Stuart on the part of the Allied Powers to Marshal Ney and to yourself.

I have, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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*Earl Bathurst to Sir Charles Stuart.*

SIR, Foreign Office, 21st Nov., 1815.

In the absence of Viscount Castlereagh, I have had the honour of laying your Excellency's despatch of the 16th instant, together with its enclosures, before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

His Royal Highness cannot but feel great sentiments of compassion for Madame Ney's unhappy situation; but he can return no other answer than by referring her to the communications which have already been made by your Excellency and the Duke of Wellington on the part of the Allied Powers to her and to Marshal Ney.

I am, &c.,
BATHURST.

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ETAT des TROUPES PRUSSIENNES sous les ordres de Son Altesse le Feld-Maréchal DUC de WELLINGTON, Commandant en Chef des Armées Alliées qui resteront en France.

Paris, 22 Nov., 1815.

Le Lieutenant-Général de ZIETEN, Commandant en Chef du Corps d'Armée Prussien en France.

Chefs de Brigade.

Le Lieutenant-Général de Pirch.
Le Général-Major de Steinmetz.
" de Borcke.
" de Rüssel I.
" de Lossau.

Pour la cavalerie en particulier :—

Chef de Brigade.

Le Général-Major de Türgass.

Commandans de Brigade :

Le Général-Major de Wartenburg. Le Colonel de Golz.

*a.* Infanterie.

Le 2e régiment d'infanterie de la Prusse Orientale.
Le régiment d'infanterie No. 16.
Le régiment d'infanterie de Colberg.
Le régiment d'infanterie No. 14.
Le 2e régiment d'infanterie de Brandebourg.
Le régiment d'infanterie No. 20.
Le 2e régiment d'infanterie de la Prusse Occidentale.
Le 1er régiment d'infanterie de la Silésie.
Le régiment d'infanterie No. 23.
" No. 28.
Le 3e bataillon des Chasseurs.

*b.* Cavalerie.

Le 1er régiment des Dragons de la Prusse Occidentale.
Le régiment des Dragons de la Nouvelle Marche.
" de Brandebourg.
Le 7e régiment des Dragons.
Le régiment des Hulans de la Silésie.
Le 7e régiment des Hulans.
Le 2e régiment des Hussards du Roi.
Le régiment des Hussards de Brandebourg.
Le 2e régiment des Hussards de la Silésie.

*Lord Holland to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY LORD, Woburn Abbey, 23rd Nov., 1815.

I transmit herewith a letter from Madame Ney, directed to your Lordship, and accompanied with another to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, which she desires me to present. I have no acquaintance with this lady, whose afflictions as well as ignorance of this country have probably rendered her very regardless of forms on this melancholy occasion; and I am sure that you will pardon any such irregularity in her, and even in me, in a case where the life of an individual is at stake. I am naturally anxious, since she has entrusted these letters to me, to give, without any reference to my own opinion, full effect to the grounds which she urges in favour of her accused husband, and for that purpose really wish to be informed as soon as possible the manner which would be consistent with every form and respect that is due to His Royal Highness to secure his personal attention to the letter and be most agreeable to him. My object is in no way to express my own feelings or opinions; and therefore, if I were to solicit the honour of an audience, it would be merely because it was the most natural and certain way of delivering the letter: but if there is any mode more expeditious which would at once be agreeable and respectful to His Royal Highness, I would immediately adopt it and feel great pleasure in obeying his commands. If not, may I entreat you to convey through the proper channel my application for an audience, and to let me know by the return of my servant when I can have that honour.

Yours, &c.,

VASSALL HOLLAND.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Lord Holland.*

MY LORD, Fife House, 24th Nov., 1815.

I have this moment received the honour of your Lordship's letter, together with the enclosure from Madame la Maréchale Ney.

If the Prince Regent had been in town, I should have lost no time in taking his pleasure upon it; but His Royal Highness is absent from London, and does not return till to-morrow, at what hour I cannot precisely say.

I can have no doubt, however, that the Prince Regent will be ready to give your Lordship an audience in the course of Sunday, if you will come to town for the purpose.

I would at the same time submit to you whether, considering the absence of His Royal Highness from town and the desire you must naturally have that your communication should reach His Royal Highness with as little delay as possible, your purpose might not be more conveniently answered, under all the circumstances, by your forwarding Madame Ney's letter to the Prince Regent by a special messenger, together with such a representation in writing of your sentiments upon it as you may think proper.

I understand the Prince Regent is likely to sleep at Witham, on the

Essex road, this night; and any letter which you might write upon the subject might be so sent as to reach His Royal Highness there early to-morrow morning, or to meet him upon his arrival in town.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your very faithful humble servant,

LIVERPOOL.

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*Draft Letter from the Earl of Liverpool to Lord Holland.*

24th Nov., 1815.

I can most sincerely assure you that I have received your private letter with every sentiment of kindness.

The differences which have unfortunately arisen between us on political subjects have never, as my best friends well know, impaired the feelings of attachment which I entertained towards you at an early period of both our lives, and I have never doubted of your being actuated by similar feelings towards me.

I cannot disguise from you that my opinion differs widely from yours on the subject which has occasioned your letter.

I will not take up your time by detailing the reasons on which that opinion is founded, but it has not been formed without the most anxious consideration, without the best advice I have been able to obtain; and that it does not rest on any technical question, on which, indeed, I should be ashamed to rest my judgment upon a matter of such a nature.

Whatever may have been the reasons which may have induced Madame Ney to make her applications through you, I can assure you that they are not likely to suffer on that account. Where the life of an individual is at stake, I have invariably considered all channels as equally proper. There can be no doubt of your right as a Peer to an audience of the Prince Regent on this or on any other subject which you may consider as of sufficient public importance to induce you to desire it. I am satisfied likewise that the Prince would feel no personal objection to affording you the opportunity of delivering in person the letter which has been sent to you.

The suggestion, therefore, which I have made in my more official answer arises solely from the consideration which I have stated, that some time might be saved by the mode which I have suggested of making the communication.

If, however, you should prefer a personal audience, you have only to come to town in the course of to-morrow; and upon your notifying your arrival to Colonel M'Mahon at Carlton House, I have no doubt the Prince would fix an early time to see you.

LIVERPOOL.

G. O. Paris, 25th Nov., 1815. [930.]

8. The Field Marshal has learnt that officers of the army going upon leave of absence, and others His Majesty's subjects pretending to be officers of the army, oppose themselves to the execution of the laws of the country regarding passports upon travelling through the country or quitting it.

9. He now gives notice that he has requested the King of France's government to put in execution the laws towards all persons belonging to the army; and they are to understand that they cannot travel in France or embark for England without a passport.

WELLINGTON.

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*Field Marshal Prince Wrede to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Munich, ce 27 Nov., 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence que Sa Majesté le Roi mon maître, par son décret du 25, a, conformément à l'invitation que le Prince de Metternich m'a adressé au nom des Puissances coalisées avec le Roi, daigné m'autoriser de mettre, à dater du 1 Décembre, sous vos ordres, Monsieur le Feld-Maréchal, un corps de 10,000 hommes de troupes Bavaroises. L'état d'après lequel ce corps est organisé se trouve dans le tableau ci-joint, et il me reste à ce sujet à observer que c'est Monsieur le Lieutenant-Général Delamotte que le Roi a désigné pour commander le dit corps. Je lui ordonne, par le courrier porteur de celle-ci, de prendre, à dater du 1 Décembre, les ordres de Votre Excellence.

Le Roi, en vous confiant, Monsieur le Feld-Maréchal, le commandement en chef de ce corps, me charge de vous exprimer officiellement que les conditions sous lesquelles Sa Majesté joint ce dit corps à l'armée Européenne sont les suivantes :—

1. Ce corps ne pourra jamais être divisé ou séparé, et ne pourra recevoir que les ordres directes de Votre Excellence.

2. A dater du 1 Décembre ce corps devra, proportionnellement à sa force, prendre part aux subsistances et au payement dont les Ministres des Puissances Alliées sont déjà préalablement convenus avec le Ministère de France pour l'armée Européenne.

3. Le Roi, qui avec plaisir rend justice aux procédés aimables que Votre Excellence a dans toutes les occasions manifestés pour les intérêts de la Bavière, s'attend qu'elle voudra bien assigner à ce corps un emplacement pour ses dépôts qui sera dans la plus grande proximité des Etats de Sa Majesté, et qui doit être, s'il est possible, une place forte, pour y déposer ses munitions, armes, et bagages. Elle s'attend en outre que Votre Excellence prenne également les mesures les plus agréables pour l'emplacement et le bon traitement des malades de ce corps.

4. Sa Majesté se réserve de rappeler ce corps toutefois qu'elle pourrait en avoir besoin ailleurs ; et

5. Qu'il ne sera employé pour aucun autre but que pour garantir les frontières des Puissances alliées avec Sa Majesté.

Le Roi mon maître ayant trouvé bon de dénommer son aide-de-camp, Monsieur le Lieutenant-Colonel Prince de la Tour et Taxis, pour résider au quartier-général de Votre Excellence, comme organe, pour tout ce qui concerne les intérêts du corps qui passe sous ses ordres, je viens de lui expédier le créditif qu'il aura l'honneur de vous remettre, Monsieur le Feld-Maréchal, et je me plais à croire que vous voudrez bien l'honorer de votre confiance.

Agréez, Monsieur le Duc, l'expression de l'attachement que je vous ai toujours porté, et de ma haute considération.

PRINCE DE WREDE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

ETAT DE SITUATION des Troupes Bavaroises qui resteront en France sous les ordres de M. le Lieutenant-Général DELAMOTTE.

Munich, 27 Nov., 1815.

| | Hommes. | Chevaux. De Selle. Des Officiers. | Chevaux. De Selle. Du Service. | Chevaux. Du Train. | Train d'Artillerie et d'Equipage. Pièces de Canon. | Caissons de Munition. | Fourgons. | Ambulances. | Voitures de Vivres et Habillement. | Forges et Chariots à Charbons. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Etat Major du Corps | 9 | 31 | .. | 8 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. |
| Lieut.-Colonel Prince de La Tour | 1 | 5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Etat Major Général | 6 | 13 | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. |
| Service de Justice | 4 | 3 | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. |
| Commissariat de Guerre | 65 | 23 | .. | 92 | .. | .. | 3 | .. | 20 | .. |
| Service de Santé | 46 | 24 | .. | 24 | .. | .. | 1 | 5 | .. | .. |
| Poste Militaire | 7 | 3 | .. | 8 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. |
| Etat Major de la Brigade de Cavalerie | 9 | 19 | .. | 8 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. |
| Etat Major de la Brigade d'Infanterie | 9 | 19 | .. | 8 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. |
| Batterie de 12 } Artillerie | 215 | 15 | 8 | 144 | 8 | 20 | 1 | .. | .. | 2 |
| " 6 } Artillerie | 179 | 7 | 8 | 108 | 8 | 14 | 1 | .. | .. | 2 |
| Réserve | 159 | 5 | 6 | 188 | .. | 42 | 1 | .. | .. | 2 |
| Cavalerie | 2,048 | 222 | 1646 | 48 | .. | 2 | 4 | 2 | .. | 4 |
| Infanterie | 7,248 | 124 | .. | 96 | .. | 6 | 12 | 6 | .. | .. |
| Total | 10,005 | 513 | 1668 | 740 | 16 | 84 | 33 | 13 | 20 | 10 |

[931.] G. O. Paris, 30th Nov., 1815.

1. The British troops which are to remain in France are to be formed as follows:

2. The 1st dragoon guards,
The 2nd dragoon guards,
The 3rd dragoons,
are to be the 1st brigade of cavalry.

3. The 7th hussars,
The 18th hussars,
The 12th light dragoons,
are to be the 2nd brigade of cavalry.
4. The 11th light dragoons,
The 13th light dragoons,
The 15th hussars,
are to be the 3rd brigade of cavalry.
5. The 3rd battalion 1st guards,
The 2nd battalion Coldstream,
are to be the 1st brigade of infantry.
6. The 3rd battalion Royals,
The 1st battalion 57th,
The 2nd battalion 95th,
are to be the 2nd brigade of infantry.
7. The 1st battalion 3rd,
The 1st battalion 39th,
The 1st battalion 91st,
are to be the 3rd brigade of infantry.
8. The 1st battalion 4th,
The 1st battalion 52nd,
The 1st battalion 79th,
are to be the 4th brigade of infantry.
9. The 1st battalion 5th,
The 1st battalion 9th,
The 1st battalion 21st,
are to be the 5th brigade of infantry.
10. The 1st battalion 6th,
The 29th regiment,
The 1st battalion 71st,
are to be the 6th brigade of infantry.
11. The 1st battalion 7th,
The 23rd regiment,
The 1st battalion 43rd,
are to be the 7th brigade of infantry.
12. The 1st battalion 27th,
The 1st battalion 40th,
The 1st battalion 95th,
are to be the 8th brigade of infantry.
13. The 1st battalion 81st,

The 1st battalion 88th,
are to be the 9th brigade of infantry.

14. Major-General Lord E. Somerset is to command the 1st brigade of cavalry.

15. Major-General Sir H. Vivian the 2nd brigade of cavalry.

16. Major-General Sir C. Grant the 3rd brigade of cavalry.

17. Major-General Sir P. Maitland is to command the 1st brigade of infantry.

18. Major-General Sir M. Power the 2nd brigade of infantry.

19. Major-General the Hon. Sir R. W. O'Callaghan the 3rd brigade of infantry.

20. Major-General Sir D. Pack the 4th brigade of infantry.

21. Major-General Sir T. Brisbane the 5th brigade of infantry.

22. Major-General Sir T. Bradford the 6th brigade of infantry.

23. Major-General Sir J. Kempt the 7th brigade of infantry.

24. Major-General Sir J. Lambert the 8th brigade of infantry.

25. Major-General Sir J. Keane the 9th brigade of infantry.

26. The 1st division of infantry is to be composed of the 1st, 7th, and 8th brigades, and is to be commanded by Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir L. Cole.

27. The 2nd division of infantry is to be composed of the 3rd, 4th, and 6th brigades, and is to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton.

28. The 3rd division of infantry is to be composed of the 2nd, 5th, and 9th brigades, and is to be commanded by Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir C. Colville.

29. Lieutenant-General Lord Combermere will take the command of the cavalry.

30. Lieutenant-General Lord Hill will take the command of the infantry.

31. The British troops to return to England are to be brigaded as follows for their march:

32. The 1st life guards,
The 2nd life guards,
The Royal horse guards blue,
The 3rd dragoon guards,

under the command of Colonel Athorpe, Royal horse guards.

33. The 1st dragoons,
The 2nd dragoons,
The 6th dragoons,
under the command of Colonel Muter.

34. The 10th hussars,
The 16th light dragoons,
The 23rd light dragoons,
under the command of Colonel Quentin.

35. The 2nd battalion 1st guards,
The 2nd battalion 3rd guards,
under the command of Colonel Askew, 1st guards.

36. The 36th regiment,
The 38th regiment,
The 73rd regiment,
The 3rd battalion 95th,
under the command of Colonel the Hon. Sir C. Greville, 38th regiment.

37. The 2nd battalion 12th,
The 2nd battalion 30th,
The 33rd regiment,
under the command of Colonel Stirke, 12th regiment.

38. The 1st battalion 41st,
The 1st battalion 90th,
Detachment Royal waggon train,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Evans, 41st regiment.

39. The 3rd battalion 14th,
The 2nd battalion 35th,
The 51st regiment,
under the command of Colonel Mitchell, 51st regiment.

40. The 54th regiment,
The 2nd battalion 59th,
The 2nd battalion 69th,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Austen, 59th regiment.

41. The 4th battalion Royals,
The 28th regiment,
The 42nd regiment,

The 92nd regiment,
under the command of Colonel Sir C. Belson, 28th regiment.

42. The 3rd battalion 27th,
The 32nd regiment,
Detachment of Staff corps,
under the command of Colonel Sir J. Maclean, 27th regiment.

43. The 16th regiment,
The 2nd battalion 44th,
The 1st battalion 82nd,
under the command of Colonel Tolley, 16th regiment.

44. The 58th regiment,
The 2nd battalion 62nd,
The 64th regiment,
The 2nd battalion 81st,
under the command of Colonel Walker, 58th regiment.

45. Notwithstanding these orders the troops are to continue with their divisions, and commanded as at present, till those ordered to England will march, and the Quartermaster-General will, in concert with the General officers, have assembled those destined by this day's orders to remain in France.

46. When the troops of the German Legion and the Hanoverian troops will march, it will be under the command of the officers commanding the several brigades of infantry and cavalry.

47. Major-General Sir J. Lyon will be so kind as to give orders for the formation of the Hanoverian contingent at a place which will be made known to him by the Chief of the Staff of the Allied army.

48. Upon breaking up the army which the Field Marshal has had the honour of commanding, he begs leave again to return thanks to the General officers, and the officers and troops, for their uniform good conduct.

49. In the late short but memorable campaign they have given proofs to the world that they possess in an eminent degree all the good qualities of soldiers; and the Field Marshal is happy to be able to applaud their regular good conduct in their camps and cantonments not less than when engaged with the enemy in the field.

50. Whatever may be the future destination of those brave

troops of which the Field Marshal now takes his leave, he trusts that every individual will believe that he will ever feel the deepest interest in their honour and welfare, and will always be happy to promote either.

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Paris, 4th Dec., 1815.

In obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 21st ult., I have stated to Madame Ney that the letter she has been pleased to address to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been duly received; but that, notwithstanding the commiseration which His Royal Highness feels for the situation of that unfortunate lady, a reference to the letter which the Duke of Wellington addressed the Marshal upon the same subject is the only answer which the circumstances of the case will admit.

The day after this answer had been returned to Madame Ney I received the accompanying letter through the intervention of a third person; and in the evening the memorial signed by Messrs. Berryer and Dupin, who are charged with the conduct of the Marshal's defence, which I have the honour to enclose, was transmitted to me.

I propose merely to notice this communication in concert with the Ministers of the other Powers by a reference to the answer already given.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Communication from Madame Ney to Sir Charles Stuart.*

2nd Dec., 1815.

A circumstance has been stated to me, Sir, which has given me much pain; and as you have formerly proved to me all the interest which you are pleased to take in my case, under the unfortunate circumstances in which I am placed, I hope that you will deign to afford me a new proof of that interest in taking on yourself the explanation of this painful occurrence.

The subject in question is as follows:—I am assured that Sir Charles Stuart believed I complained of the manner in which he received me at the audience which he granted me. As I know that you are acquainted with his Excellency, I entreat you to be good enough to tell him in my name, that, so far from having complained of the reception he gave me, I could not but be satisfied therewith, and that, even in the few words which he addressed to me, I believed I could perceive the interest with which my unfortunate situation inspired him.

I seize, &c. &c.

LA PRINCESSE DE MOSKOWA.

II.

*Memorial of Messrs. Berryer and Dupin, of Marshal Ney's Counsel, to Sir Charles Stuart.*

Paris, 3rd Dec., 1815.

Your Excellency is informed that Marshal Ney has appealed to the 12th Article of the Capitulation of Paris, to shelter himself from the accusation with which he is charged. You also know the answer of Lord Wellington to Madame la Maréchale Ney. That answer does not clear up the difficulty; there merely results from it, that Lord Wellington *himself* attaches to the 12th Article no other sense than that contained in his answer.

If the Plenipotentiaries who treated with Lord Wellington agreed to give to that Article the same sense, one might be induced to think that Marshal Ney has unseasonably appealed to the Article in question, and that still the right would remain to him of contending that the letter of the Treaty could not be annulled by a simple declaration of intentions.

But, on the contrary, the French Plenipotentiaries maintain and declare that the object of the 12th Article was to prevent all re-action, especially on the part of the King of France.

The result of these two opposite declarations is a state of doubt, which must be cleared up; or, according to the 15th Article of the Convention of Paris, all *doubts* should be determined *in favour of the French army and the city of Paris.*

If Lord Wellington should make a declaration upon a fact which was personal to himself, our respect for his character, the integrity of which is so well known, would not permit us to insist further; but the question is upon a Convention, on a Treaty which is the work of two contracting parties: it cannot then depend upon one alone, to determine the sense of it to the prejudice of the other; in such a case recourse must be had to the rules of interpretation established by law, or to particular clauses of the Treaty.

Besides, we have already said that the 15th Article determined all the doubts in favour of the French army and the city of Paris; and we add (what, moreover, we have proved in a printed Memoir, of which your Excellency shall receive copies) that the 12th Article would have been without an object if it had only contained, on the part of the High Powers, a renunciation, *on their account alone*, of a right of search after persons, which is not authorized by the law of nations; whilst, on the contrary, it is evident that those who stipulated for the French army and the city of Paris only negotiated in contemplation of the return of His Majesty Louis XVIII., in order to place themselves beyond the reach of the prosecutions announced in the Proclamations of Cambrai.

If your Excellency will deign to look back to the 3rd July, and consider the evils which the Convention of that day prevented, it will no longer appear to you that the amnesty contained in the 12th Article could have hindered for a moment the conclusion of that Convention: it must then be understood and executed in the same spirit in which it was made; that is to say, with that wide and liberal spirit by which favourable clauses must ever be interpreted.

It will not escape your Excellency that the Alliance has established

among the High Powers a species of union and concert which obliges them not only to execute themselves, but to ensure the execution of a Convention common to them all. It is particularly upon this point that it is most important, in our view of the subject, that your Excellency should take an interest in the question.

Your Excellency will excuse us if we detain you at such length upon this subject; but the fate of the Marshal is so closely connected with the execution of the Convention of Paris, that our duty as Counsellors imposes upon us the paramount obligation of claiming its benefits, and demanding its fulfilment.

We have the honour to be, &c.

The Counsel for Marshal Ney,

BERRYER, senior.
DUPIN.

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DISTRIBUTION of the ROYAL REGIMENT of ARTILLERY and ARTILLERY KING'S GERMAN LEGION.

Paris, 5th Dec., 1815.

| Troops, Brigades, and Companies. | To what attached and where. | Officers. | Non-com. Officers. | Drummers. | Privates. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lt.-Col. Sir H. D. Ross's Troop . . 9-pr. | 1st Brigade of Cavalry | 6 | 13 | 1 | 189 |
| ,, Bull's Troop . . . . 6 how. | 2nd ,, ,, | 6 | 11 | 1 | 190 |
| ,, Sir John May's Troop . . 9-pr. | 3rd ,, ,, | 5 | 13 | 1 | 184 |
| ,, Sir A. Dickson's Troop . . ,, | 7th ,, ,, | 6 | 10 | 1 | 165 |
| ,, Smith's Troop . . . . 6-pr. | 5th ,, ,, | 6 | 13 | 1 | 170 |
| ,, Sir Rob. Gardiner's Troop ,, | 6th ,, ,, | 5 | 13 | 1 | 174 |
| Major Whinyates' Troop . . . . ,, | 4th ,, ,, | 7 | 13 | 1 | 198 |
| Capt. Mercer's Troop . . . . ,, | Reserve . . . . | 5 | 14 | 1 | 165 |
| ,, Sandham's Brigade . . . 9-pr. | 1st Division . . . . | 6 | 19 | 2 | 181 |
| Major Younghusband's Brigade . ,, | 2nd ,, . . . . | 5 | 20 | 1 | 172 |
| Capt. Rudyerd's Brigade . . . ,, | 3rd ,, . . . . | 5 | 18 | 2 | 156 |
| Major Brome's Brigade . . . . ,, | 4th ,, . . . . | 7 | 18 | 3 | 171 |
| ,, Rogers's Brigade . . . . ,, | 5th ,, . . . . | 6 | 19 | 2 | 173 |
| ,, Unett's Brigade . . . . ,, | 6th ,, . . . . | 7 | 20 | 2 | 158 |
| Capt. Sinclair's Brigade . . . ,, | 6th ,, . . . . | 6 | 17 | 2 | 163 |
| Major Morrison's Brigade . . 18-pr. | Reserve . . . . | 7 | 20 | 2 | 180 |
| Capt. Hutchison's Brigade . . ,, | | 5 | 20 | 2 | 185 |
| ,, Ilbert's Brigade . . . . ,, | | 7 | 22 | 2 | 185 |
| *Companies Unattached.* | | | | | |
| Major Jones's . . . . . | St. Denis . . . . . | 5 | 12 | 2 | 84 |
| Capt. Tyler's . . . . . | Villeron . . . . . | 4 | 9 | 2 | 83 |
| Major Younghusband's . . . . . | Fontenay . . . . . | 4 | 12 | 2 | 79 |
| ,, Dyas's . . . . . | Montmartre . . . . . | 4 | 11 | .. | 81 |
| ,, Holcroft's . . . . . | Tournay . . . . . | 5 | 12 | 2 | 80 |
| ,, Wall's . . . . . | Antwerp . . . . . | 4 | 12 | 1 | 84 |
| ,, Wallace's . . . . . | Bruxelles . . . . . | 3 | 7 | 2 | 71 |
| ,, Durnford's . . . . . | Mons . . . . . | 5 | 12 | 2 | 85 |
| Capt. Hunt's . . . . . | St. Denis . . . . . | 4 | 12 | 1 | 87 |
| Major Sinclair's . . . . . | Bruxelles . . . . . | 4 | 8 | 1 | 78 |
| ,, Carmichael's . . . . . | Bordeaux . . . . . | 5 | 12 | 1 | 75 |
| ,, Michell's . . . . . | Ville-sur-Haine . . . . . | 5 | 9 | 1 | 79 |
| ,, Storey's . . . . . | Ostend . . . . . | 4 | 12 | .. | 76 |
| ,, Clibborne's . . . . . | Peronne . . . . . | 5 | 12 | 2 | 81 |
| ,, Munro's . . . . . | Bruxelles . . . . . | 5 | 14 | 1 | 77 |
| ,, Marshe's . . . . . | Antwerp . . . . . | 4 | 11 | 2 | 79 |
| With the Ball Cartridge Divisions, Grand Reserve, in General Hospitals at different Stations, Staff, &c. &c. . . . . | | 54 | 193 | 8 | 1361 |
| | | 231 | 663 | 58 | 5799 |

General Total of Serjeants, Drummers, and Rank and File, of the British Artillery . 6520

KING'S GERMAN ARTILLERY.

| Troops, Brigades, and Companies. | To what attached and where. | Officers. | Non-com. Officers. | Drummers. | Privates. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lt.-Col. Sympher's Troop . . . . 9-pr. | 2nd Division . . . . . | 6 | 11 | .. | 179 |
| Major Kuhlman's Troop . . . . . ,, | 1st ,, . . . . . | 6 | 16 | 1 | 169 |
| Capt. Cleeves' Brigade . . . . . ,, | 3rd ,, . . . . . | 6 | 19 | 2 | 181 |
| ,, ,, Daniels' Detach. . . . . | Ypres . . . . . | 2 | 12 | 1 | 38 |
| Lieut. Pfannkuche's Detach. . . . . | Nieuport (including staff, &c.) . . . . . | 9 | 18 | 1 | 39 |
| | | 29 | 76 | 6 | 606 |

General Total of Non-commissioned Officers, Drummers, and Privates . . 688

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*The Earl of Harrowby to Earl Bathurst.*

DEAR BATHURST, Fiscall, 7th Dec., 1815.

I have received sundry papers from Hamilton. I am glad you have given Souza a rap on the knuckles: it seems to have been just enough, and no more; and will, I hope, keep him a little in order. I do not, however, believe his assertion that he did not intend to transmit, or has not transmitted, his letter to his own Court, as it could only have been written to prove to his own Court how valiant he is.

The only letters from Castlereagh which have been sent to me are that on the Ionian Islands and the private to Liverpool. I heartily wish he may not be too sanguine in his hopes of a tolerable arrangement by which a sufficient portion of Saxony may be preserved; and, notwithstanding the late and habitual shabbiness of Prussia, I feel all the importance of making her strong on the Rhine, because I do not see what other support Belgium can have; and unless the Prussian acquisitions in that quarter are both sufficient to give her the means of defending them and to interest her deeply in their defence, she will only consider them as temporary possessions and as the ground for future exchanges. Saxony could neither be trusted for the power nor the inclination to protect anything she might gain in that quarter against France. The line taken in Liverpool's letters both as to Saxony and the Ionian Islands appears to me right.

It is comical to see Talleyrand the preacher of moderation in conquest. The line taken by Castlereagh with respect to him seems to be very much in unison with our last recommendation; and the degree of our concurrence may make it more difficult for the war party in France to overcome the King's personal reluctance to a war with us; but it is humiliating to feel that we shall depend for the security of Belgium upon French moderation.

On the slave-trade I know not how to hope much, as the Continental Powers will now be too little inclined to please us to agree upon the only effectual measure in their power, the exclusion of the colonial produce of slave-dealing nations.

Castlereagh does not seem at all aware of the degree in which the continuance of the Congress presses upon our finances. Should not the Prince

of Orange be strongly stimulated to exert himself in placing his army on a stronger footing?

Our million to Sweden (which will be a tough job in Parliament, and which, I hope, is only to be paid by instalments) will materially assist her in defending herself against Alexander's attempts to set aside Bernadotte, which we may soon expect to see.

Yours faithfully,

HARROWBY.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, War Department, 8th Dec., 1815.

It being the intention of His Majesty's government not to retain any longer in the British service the King's German Legion or the Brunswick Hussars, I am commanded by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to signify his pleasure that your Grace should order such of those two corps as are now serving under your Grace's command to march without loss of time to Hanover and Brunswick, in order to their being placed at the disposal of their respective governments.

The details of the arrangement for disbanding or transferring these corps on their arrival in their own country will be communicated to the respective governments, and corresponding orders will be given by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Downing Street, 12th Dec., 1815.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's despatch No. 66, announcing that the army under your Grace's command has been broken up, and enclosing the routes to Calais and Boulogne of those English troops which are not destined to form part of the army for the occupation of a position in France.

I have the honour to acquaint your Grace, that in consequence of the representations which have been made of the unfitness of Boulogne harbour at this season of the year as a port for the embarkation of troops, it has been determined to confine the embarkation to the port of Calais alone. Measures have already been taken to prevent any delay in the execution of this service, and arrangements have been made for receiving the troops on board as soon as they arrive, provided the weather should continue moderate.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

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[ 932. ] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Paris, 18th Dec., 1815.

By reference to the tariff annexed to the Military Convention of the 20th November, your Lordship will see that the soldier's ration is fixed at two pounds of bread, half a pound of meat, vegetables, a ration of spirits, salt.

The ration which the British soldier has been accustomed to receive is one pound and a half of bread, one pound of meat, a ration of spirits; for which a stoppage has been made from his pay of 6*d.* a day.

Upon consulting with the General officers commanding divisions, and after the short experience we have had of the ration fixed by the tariff, I am of opinion that the ration of meat is too small, and that the ration of bread may be diminished.

Upon inquiry I find that there will be no difficulty on the part of the French government in commuting any articles in the ration fixed by tariff for others of the same cost; and I find that the articles of which the whole ration consists, taken separately, cost as follows:—

| | Centimes. |
|---|---|
| Bread 14 centimes the pound .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 28 |
| Vegetables .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 6 |
| Meat 46 centimes the pound .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 23 |
| Spirits .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 20 |
| Salt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 1 |
| | 78 |

| | Cent. | |
|---|---|---|
| The addition of a quarter of a pound of meat would be .. | 11½ | |
| Deduct, therefore, the price of half a pound of bread .. | 7 | |
| | | 4½ |
| | | 82½ |

The British soldier might likewise be deprived of the vegetables and salt, which would more than cover the additional expense of a quarter of a pound of meat in addition to the ration of the tariff, after deducting half a pound of bread. But I would beg your Lordship to observe that his allowance hitherto has been one pound of meat and one and a half of bread, and that if he gets only three quarters of a pound of meat, without vegetables or salt, he will have reason to complain.

That, therefore, which I would propose to your Lordship is,

that I should commute the half pound of bread for a quarter of a pound of meat, and pay the French contractors, on account of the British government, the difference of the expense. This difference will be about one halfpenny for every ration, and the whole expense will be about 25,000*l.* per annum.

When the tariff was fixed, Lord Castlereagh and I were aware that it would not answer exactly for British soldiers; but we were unwilling to increase the difficulties of settling it by bringing forward any demands for an increase, which, however only for our troops, would have been equally demanded by all the other Powers.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM of the COST of a SOLDIER'S RATION according to the Quantities sanctioned to be issued by General Orders.

| | Centimes. |
|---|---|
| 1½ lb. bread .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 21 |
| 1 lb. meat .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 46 |
| 1-6 of a litre of spirits .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 33 |
| | 100 |

MEMORANDUM of the COST of a SOLDIER'S RATION according to the present Tariff.

| | Centimes. | |
|---|---|---|
| 2 lbs. bread .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 28 | |
| 3-16 oz. rice, or ¼ lb. oatmeal .. .. .. .. .. .. | 6 | |
| ½ lb. meat .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 23 | |
| 1-10 litre of spirits .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 20 | |
| 1-30 lb. salt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 1 | |
| | 78 | |
| ¼ lb. of meat .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | Cent. 12 | |
| Deduct ½ lb. of bread .. .. .. .. .. .. | 7 | |
| | — | 5 |
| In the event of a commutation of ¼ lb. of bread for ¼ lb. of meat, the ration would cost .. .. .. .. .. | | 83 |
| Deduct the value of the vegetables, supposing their being struck off altogether from the ration .. .. | | 6 |
| The ration costs .. .. .. .. .. | | 77 |

*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My dear Lord, Foreign Office, 22nd Dec., 1815.

Since I returned I have had a conference with the Dutch Ambassador, in order to clear up any misconception of the principle upon which the two governments are bound to contribute to the defences of the Belgic frontier.

The enclosed is the copy of Monsieur Fagel's despatch to his Court upon this subject. You will observe he does not dispute the equal liability of Holland for all expense beyond the 60,000,000 payable by France. If so, the only questions remaining are those appertaining to the execution of the works: by what engineers to be undertaken? how supply the requisite funds if the money should be expended more rapidly than France is bound to pay?

Upon the first point I think we must insist upon the engineers of both nations being employed, assigning to each distinct fields of labour. Upon the latter I think we must make our share of the necessary advances subject to an account.

I also send you an extract of a letter from Lord Clancarty, written after he had received our last protocol on this subject. If you have anything to suggest to him, you will have the goodness to write direct to Frankfort in order to save time.

When you can find leisure to enter upon this question with the Dutch government, it will be desirable to calculate how much money you will require for the first year beyond the 12,000,000 payable by France.

I have written to Mr. James to direct him to propose your projet No. 1, for the distribution of the 25,000,000, to the government of the King of the Netherlands. The Prince will agree to it on the part of Hanover, and of course Brunswick. Lord Clancarty is mistaken in supposing it for the interest of Holland to adopt the principle of separate grants; for if the Sovereigns divide, it must be in the ratio of their contingents. In that case Great Britain would share in the ratio of three to one; whereas in number the British troops were not, as I apprehend, three times the number of Dutch and Belgians.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

Castlereagh.

[Enclosures.]

I.

*General Fagel to Baron de Nagell.*

Monsieur, Londres, le 12 Déc., 1815.

Dans un assez long entretien que j'eus le 6 de ce mois avec Lord Castlereagh je commençai par m'acquitter de la commission que vous m'avez donnée dernièrement en exprimant à ce ministre combien Sa Majesté est reconnaissante des soins qu'il s'est donnés dans l'affaire de la forteresse de Luxembourg pour conserver l'intégrité de notre royaume. Sa Seigneurie me témoigna de son côté combien elle était charmée d'avoir pu contribuer à atteindre ce but.

J'entamai ensuite la matière des fortifications à rétablir ou à construire sur notre frontière méridionale en communiquant à Lord Castlereagh la corre-

spondance entre S.M. et le Duc de Wellington, telle qu'elle se trouve jointe à la dépêche de V.E., No. 99, du 24 Octobre dernier. Il me fut facile de désabuser Son Excellence sur le mal-entendu qui paraît avoir existé en faisant supposer ici que l'intention du Roi était d'épargner sa quote part des frais que ces ouvrages exigeront. Je représentai, au contraire, que le Roi, très décidé à y contribuer de son côté, ne désirait que de mettre la main à l'ouvrage et de pouvoir compter pour cet effet sur les payemens réguliers à faire par la Grande Bretagne à la suite et en exécution de la convention du 13 Août de l'année dernière. Lord Castlereagh m'expliqua alors de quelle manière il envisageait toute cette affaire. Il m'envoya d'abord au Protocole du 20 Novembre dernier, qui règle la répartition entre les Alliés de la contribution de 700,000,000 que la France doit leur payer, et qui détermine en particulier la distribution du quart de cette contribution destinée aux fortifications à construire.

Il me parla en outre d'un protocole plus récent relatif à ce dernier objet arrêté à la veille de son départ de Paris, et qui est sans doute connu du Roi et de Votre Excellence. Ce protocole laisse à S.M. et au Duc de Wellington l'entière disposition de cette partie de la somme totale destinée aux fortifications Européennes qui doit être employée à celles sur nos frontières; et Lord Castlereagh m'informa que l'intention du Duc était de se rendre incessamment au Pays-Bas pour s'aboucher sur cette matière avec S.M. Voici maintenant la substance de l'explication que Lord Castlereagh m'a donnée :—La somme entière que les Puissances prélèvent, pour ainsi dire, sur la contribution de la France pour l'affecter aux fortifications comme objet Européen, étant de 137½ millions de francs, on est convenu d'en approprier soixante, à peu près 2,400,000*l.* sterling, à celles des Pays-Bas. La contribution de la France devant être payée en cinq années, cela donne pour l'objet-ci pour le service de la première année 12,000,000 de livres de France, qui seront immédiatement à la disposition du Roi. Des payemens égaux suivront chaque année jusqu'à l'entier payement de la somme totale de 60,000,000. Lord Castlereagh, aussi persuadé que le Roi de la nécessité d'exécuter ce grand ouvrage largement, et sans rien épargner, m'assure que si les 60,000,000 ci-dessus ne suffisent pas pour cela, on sera toujours disposé ici, conformément aux stipulations du traité du 13 Août, 1814, à fournir conjointement avec le Roi telles sommes ultérieures qui seront jugées nécessaires jusqu'à la concurrence des 2,000,000 sterling mentionnés dans le traité. Quant aux fonds immédiats à faire pour cet effet, il n'y aura pas de difficulté ici dès que le Parlement sera assemblé à faire à titre d'accompte, et conformément au principe ci-dessus annoncé, telles avances qui seront jugées convenables; S.M. et le Duc s'étant entendus sur la somme ronde qui pourra être dispensée avec fruit pour l'objet en question dans le cours de la présente année.

Pour ce qui est des mesures d'exécution, je crains qu'il y aura de la difficulté ici d'accéder à la proposition de les laisser entièrement à nos officiers. Lord Castlereagh m'a représenté que cela rencontreroit des obstacles dans le Parlement, où l'on entendra que puisqu'on doit contribuer à la dépense, il faut aussi que des ingénieurs Anglais soient employés à l'ouvrage. Suivant lui la meilleure manière de procéder serait qu'on s'entendit d'abord mutuellement sur les ouvrages à construire, que ceux proposés par nos ingénieurs et approuvés par les deux parties fussent exécutés par nos gens, et que ceux proposés par les ingénieurs Anglais et également approuvés par les deux parties fussent exécutés par les officiers Anglais. Je ne manquai pas de lui représenter que les nôtres, connaissant le local, travaillaient plus économiquement. Il me répondit qu'il savait que cet idée était assez généralement reçue; mais que cependant le Duc de Wellington niait le fait; et il me répéta qu'on ne verrait pas de bon œil dans le Parlement que les ouvrages fussent exécutés

sans l'intervention d'officiers Anglais. Au reste, quant à l'arrangement d'exécution ci-dessus proposé, il me dit qu'il s'en remettoit volontiers à cet égard à tel autre qui pourrait être arrêté entre le Roi et le Duc, se persuadant que S.M. elle même sentirait que la défense des frontières méridionales du royaume devant être considérée comme un objet d'un intérêt commun, jusqu'au même degré aux deux pays, plus on pouvait mettre en avant les officiers et employés Britanniques, plus le système serait goûté ici, et plus par conséquent les intérêts de notre Roi lui-même se trouveraient par là consultés et avancés; à quoi il fallait ajouter aussi que l'objet était d'une si grande importance qu'il n'aurait pas trop des talens réunis des ingénieurs des deux nations pour s'exercer dans ce champ.

Ayant lu ce qui précède à Lord Castlereagh (comme j'avais l'honneur de marquer à Votre Excellence dans mon No. précédent du 8 de ce mois que c'était mon intention de le faire), ce ministre m'a fait l'honneur de me dire que j'avais rendu fidèlement sa pensée, et m'a prié de lui faire passer une copie du présent rapport pour qu'il put l'envoyer au Duc de Wellington comme une minute exacte de ce qui s'était passé entre lui et moi, et de ses idées sur cette matière.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

H. FAGEL.

II.

*Extract of a Private Letter from the Earl of Clancarty to Viscount Castlereagh, dated Frankfort, 13th Dec.*, 1815.

The protocol referred to in your private letter of the 6th instant, upon the application of the funds destined for the fortresses, was safely delivered to me, with all the other protocols of the Conferences at Paris, from the 31st October to the 22nd November, both inclusive; and I shall take care in the treaty with the Netherlands, by which the 60,000,000 of francs are to be assured for the purpose of strengthening the frontier of that Power, to have inserted sufficient words to bind His Netherland Majesty that this sum shall be laid out under the particular directions and regulations agreed to in the Conferences at Paris, in such wise that your views may have full effect.

There can be no doubt that with respect to this sum, from the very source from which it flows, and also with respect to that which we have agreed to contribute under the Treaty of August, 1814, we have the fullest right of interference to an equal degree with the King of the Netherlands: nevertheless I suspect His Majesty has so far committed himself with General Krayenhoff, who no doubt already conceives himself a second Vauban, that some delay, and perhaps difficulty, may arise before the matter will be sufficiently understood at the Hague. Having, however, the means in our own hands, His Majesty must ultimately be brought to reason; but perhaps you will think this business ought not to be delayed, as upon its settlement depends the real commencement of the works with vigour. If I am to settle it upon my return, pray send me a pretty tight despatch in answer to that part of mine, No. 2, which treats upon this subject, in order that I may show it to Nagell, and if necessary to the King.

I do not think you will find the King of the Netherlands, although in want of money, averse to the Duke's scheme of dividing his share of the 25,000,000 of francs between the army: though a good economist, he is fully capable of any act of generosity. He may, however, prefer granting his part to his own troops as a mark of his own grace, rather than that it should be attributed to a general resolution, which places the act of favour more in others than in himself.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [933.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 27th Dec., 1815.

I received yesterday your letter of the 22nd. I have already had a meeting with the Dutch engineer, General Krayenhoff, regarding the fortifications in the Netherlands; but as his memoirs were in Dutch, and it was necessary that they should be translated, I could do no more than have a general conversation with him on the subject of each place; and I did not find there was much difference of opinion in principle between him and me. As soon as I shall receive his memoirs I will go into the detail, and give the King an opinion upon the best plan proposed for each place by the English and Dutch engineers respectively.

In my opinion, adverting to the control placed in my hands upon the whole subject by the Allied Powers, we ought to be satisfied with this, viz., that the King should adopt as a principle to employ at each place to be fortified those engineers whose plans for fortifying the places and whose estimates he most approves. If our engineers have not formed as good plans, or are more expensive than the Dutch engineers, it would be very injudicious, and not very fair towards the King, to force him to employ them. On the other hand, if their plans are the best and the least expensive, the King will be as much interested as we can be that they should execute the work.

It is very easy for any man or set of men to write in the newspapers and endeavour to create a sensation in the country upon any point as one of national interest or honour; but it is the business of government to counteract these attempts, and I am convinced that no reasonable man in England can object to the principle above laid down.

In regard to the money, the advances required will depend first upon the whole expense to be incurred in each year; and secondly, upon the adequacy of the funds expected from France, and the regularity of the payments. These are points of detail, however, upon which I will write more fully when I shall have examined the plans and estimates of the engineers of both nations, and made my report, &c.; and shall have seen the King.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Marshal the Duc de Bellune to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 27 Déc., 1815.

Je passais il y a un quart d'heure sur le boulevard vis-à-vis la Rue du Théâtre Italien, seul; je suis fortement heurté par un homme qui courait; je lui demande la raison de cette insulte; il me répond que si je me trouve une autre fois sur son chemin il me jetera à terre. Une sentinelle se trouvant près de nous, je me nomme et lui montre l'insolent en lui disant de l'arrêter. Cet homme, très jeune encore, se dit officier Anglais. Il doit être dans ce moment au corps de garde du poste le plus voisin du Théâtre Italien. Je vous prie, Monsieur le Duc, de le réclamer, et de l'inviter à être désormais plus prudent.

Agréez, Monsieur le Duc, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

LE MARÉCHAL DE BELLUNE.

[Let Colonel Scovell inquire who this person was, and bring him to me.

WELLINGTON.]

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*Marshal the Duc de Bellune to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 28 Déc., 1815.

L'insulte qui m'a été faite hier par un officier de vos troupes n'était pas préméditée, et je la regarde comme accidentelle. Ce jeune homme courant très vite pour éviter, sans doute, d'être atteint par les voituriers qui passaient près de nous dans ce moment, m'a heurté violemment, à la vérité, mais sans dessein de m'offenser. Le seul tort qu'il a eu est de s'être cru l'offensé après ce choc, et de s'être livré à des menaces peu mesurées. Je dois donc, Monsieur le Duc, invoquer votre indulgence en sa faveur, et avec d'autant plus de raison qu'étant vêtu en bourgeois il m'a pris pour tel.

Je prie Votre Excellence, Monsieur le Maréchal, d'agréer l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

LE MARÉCHAL DE BELLUNE.

[Send to the J.A.G.: desire him to tell Mr. ——— that in consequence of this letter I will not bring him to a court-martial; but that in future I hope he will be more cautious, and insult nobody, whether dressed in a military uniform or otherwise.

WELLINGTON.]

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [934.]

My Lord, Paris, 1st Jan., 1816.

I have placed the British contingent of the Army of Occupation in such a situation as to have been able to move the whole from Paris at the period I mentioned to your Lordship in my despatch of the* ; but I have since had a conversation with the Duc de Richelieu, in which he explained to me the consequences which would possibly follow the violence which was manifested in the amendments and discussions of the law called of Amnesty; and he begged me to delay the final movement of the troops from Paris till these discussions should be finished. To this I have consented, and I shall probably not move till the beginning of next week.

From what I have seen and heard likewise of the King's Guard, I don't conceive it is as yet a body in which much confidence could be placed, in case there should be any disturbance in this town.

I have, &c.,

Wellington.

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G. O. Paris, 1st Jan., 1816. [935.]

1. The Field Marshal has learnt that, notwithstanding the orders he has given out, the officers of the army attempt to travel through the country without passports regularly countersigned by the French authorities.

2. Passports for foreigners leaving Paris, although granted and signed by the minister from their own country, must be countersigned by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by the Minister of Police; otherwise the person holding the passport is liable to be stopped, and treated according to the laws regarding passports as a person attempting to travel without a passport.

3. The Field Marshal requests the attention of the officers of the army to this rule, and he begs the General and other officers commanding in stations in the country not to interfere with the postmasters and civil authorities in the execution of the orders they may have received from their own government regarding the law on the subject of passports.

Wellington.

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* Blank in manuscript.

[ 936. ] *To Colonel Barry, Secretary of the Board of Claims.*

SIR, Paris, 2nd Jan., 1816.

Colonel Hervey has given me your letter to him of the 22nd December.

The baggage of the army marched on the 16th June in rear of the several divisions from the cantonments of the troops to Nivelles and Genappe. At about 6 in the morning of the 17th, as soon as the situation of the Prussian army was known, the baggage was ordered to move into the forest of Soignies, in the rear of Waterloo. In the afternoon it was ordered to fall back upon Bruxelles, there to remain.

If the order for the march of the 17th had been immediately and strictly obeyed, none of it could have fallen into the hands of the enemy; as I did not leave the ground at Quatre Bras with the cavalry till near 5 in the evening, that is, ten hours after the order for the march of the baggage from Nivelles had been given. The distance they had to march was about 8 miles; but this order was executed as such orders usually are by persons in charge of baggage, and the enemy certainly took some baggage on the road from Nivelles to Waterloo, late in the evening, after our cavalry had retired through Genappe.

The army which fought the battle of Waterloo was not only very ill equipped in its artillery and other departments, but composed of troops of different nations, and was quite new on service. The defeat of the Prussians on the 16th, the flight of some of the troops of that nation, and of course of the troops of the Netherlands through Bruxelles, on that and the following days, occasioned an alarm and confusion in the rear of the Allied army under my command, for which nothing passing in front in any part of the day of the 18th could have afforded grounds.

As usual, these undisciplined troops plundered the baggage, aided very probably by those in whose charge it was placed. At all events the confusion in the rear of the army was an excuse for the neglect and the panic of the bâtmen and servants, and the occasion of some loss. But I must add that several of the old regiments accustomed to service lost nothing, and that all might and ought to have saved their baggage.

The Board will judge from this statement of the claims of those who bring them forward. I can give no opinion upon the subject.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Palmerston.* [937.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 2nd Jan., 1816.

I send by this occasion answers to several letters from your Lordship on claims made by the army formerly under my command in the Peninsula, *and passed by the Board of Claims.* I beg your Lordship will observe in what an invidious situation you place me by calling upon me for an opinion upon these claims now. First, I must be supposed to possess a most extraordinary memory to be able to recollect all the circumstances, at such a distance of time, which bear upon such claims; secondly, you call upon me to revise the decision of a Board upon the interest of individual officers and soldiers, this decision being supposed to be founded upon previous investigation, and having hitherto been considered final.

If the claims were transmitted to me before the Board should consider them, I should feel no objection to give my opinion upon them, or to state what I know and recollect; but after the Board has decided that a claim is founded, I must say that I don't like to be brought forward as the person to prevent by my opinion an officer or soldier from getting what that decision entitles him to.

I wish, therefore, that your Lordship would consider your letters to me and my answers respecting all these decided claims as *non avenues.*

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duc de Feltre to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 3 Jan., 1816.

Votre Excellence ayant, par sa lettre du 28 du mois dernier, admis en principe l'établissement d'un Commissaire Français dans chacune des places occupées par les troupes Alliées, j'ai l'honneur de lui adresser le projet de

convention destinée à fixer les attributions de ce Commissaire. Je prie Votre Excellence de me faire connoître si elle approuve cette convention, dans laquelle j'ai fait insérer toutes les clauses qui m'ont paru devoir faciliter le plus possible la prompte exécution des mesures que les commandans des places solliciteroient en exécution de l'article 3 de la convention No. 5, du 20 Novembre dernier.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec le plus parfait attachement,

Monsieur le Duc,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE DUC DE FELTRE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROJET de CONVENTION pour l'Exécution de l'Article 3 de la Convention conclue le 20 Novembre, 1815, en conformité de l'Article 5 du Traité Principal du même jour.

ARTICLE 1.

Le gouvernement Français aura dans chacune des places remises en dépôt aux Puissances Alliées un agent, chargé, sous le titre de Commissaire du Roi, de pourvoir à l'entretien des fortifications et bâtimens militaires, ainsi qu'à l'armement et à l'approvisionnement de la place.

ART. 2.

Le Commissaire du Roi dans chaque place aura sous ses ordres les entrepreneurs et agens secondaires, tels que gardes du génie, de l'artillerie, et employés de l'administration militaire, qu'il a été jugé, de concert entre les Commissaires Français et ceux nommés par Son Excellence le Duc de Wellington, nécessaire de laisser dans les places pour leur entretien, leur armement, et les travaux à faire aux établissemens militaires.

ART. 3.

Le Commissaire du Roi correspondra avec le commandant de la place, et réglera, conjointement avec lui, tout ce qui intéressera le bien-être des troupes de la manière stipulée ci-après.

ART. 4.

Il correspondra directement avec le Ministre de la Guerre, tant pour lui rendre compte de ce qui aura été arrêté entre lui et le commandant de la place que pour prendre au besoin ses ordres sur tous les objets qui lui paraîtront exiger des décisions particulières.

ART. 5.

Il se concertera avec le commandant de la place, ou les chefs des différens services délégués à cet effet, pour connoître la nécessité des travaux qui seroient réclamés en exécution de l'Article 3 de la convention du 20 Novembre dernier.

ART. 6.

Il fera exécuter d'urgence par les agens des divers services dont il est parlé dans l'Article 1, et sur les fonds qui seront mis à sa disposition pour les entretiens courans et dépenses imprévues, les travaux réclamés d'après l'Article pré-

cédent, toutes les fois que la dépense nécessaire pour l'exécution de ces travaux n'excédera pas ces fonds. Dans le cas contraire, il fera faire par les mêmes agens l'état estimatif de la dépense qu'occasionneroient les travaux demandés, il le vérifiera et le visera, et l'adressera au Ministre pour être soumis à son approbation.

ART. 7.

Le Ministre de la Guerre adressera au Commissaire du Roi les lettres de fonds nécessaires à l'acquit des ordonnances que Son Excellence aura adressées au Trésor, pour le payement des ouvrages et des dépenses qui auront été approuvés.

ART. 8.

Le Commissaire du Roi concertera, lorsqu'il y aura lieu, avec le commandant de la place l'exécution des lois et règlemens sur l'administration Française, sur la conservation des fortifications, du matériel de l'artillerie, ainsi que celle du mobilier des casernes et hôpitaux, desquels lois et règlemens l'extrait est joint au présent. Il mettra tous ses soins à prévenir toute plainte fondée, et toute inexécution des conventions et des mesures qui doivent en résulter pour le bien-être des troupes Alliées, et le maintien des intérêts de la France.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [938.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 4th Jan., 1816.

We have reports here that government have granted some assistance to the Spanish emigrants of the party of the Cortes; and if that should be the case, I wish to mention to you that Espoz y Mina is here, as I am informed in very great distress, and I should wish to be allowed to relieve him. I believe that only 2000 or 3000 francs would be very useful to him.

I understand his nephew has been relieved in England. He is the man, however, who rendered all the service.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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G. O. Paris, 4th Jan., 1816. [939.]

1. The Field Marshal has made an arrangement with the French government, under which the troops forming the British contingent are to receive as their ration 7-8ths of a French pound of meat, being as nearly as possible equal to an English pound, and 1½ pound of bread, instead of the ration of meat, bread, vegetables, and salt, as settled by the tariff annexed to the treaty.

2. The ration of wine or spirits is to be as fixed by the tariff.

3. The ration as now settled will be issued to the troops as soon as possible.

WELLINGTON.

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[940.] *To the Count d'Angles, Prefect of Police.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, Paris, ce 5 Jan., 1816.

Vous avez écrit le 14me Décembre une lettre sur deux soldats Anglais prévenu d'avoir fait un vol dans la boutique du Sieur Vollée, marchand de nouveautés, Rue Neuve des Petits Champs; et un Conseil de Guerre ayant été en conséquence assemblé pour juger ces soldats, on a appelé le Sieur Vollée d'y paroître et de faire paroître les témoins, nos loix ne permettant pas que qui ce soit soit jugé sans entendre le témoignage de ceux qui ont quelque chose à dire contre lui. Cependant le Sieur Vollée ni ses témoins n'a pas paru.

Je vous demande donc, Monsieur le Comte, d'ordonner qu'ils me fassent connoître si ils veulent ou non paroître, enfin que je mette le Président du Conseil de Guerre en communication avec eux.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[941.] G. O. Paris, 7th Jan., 1816.

1. The Paymasters of regiments are desired to take notice that, independently of the casualties to be specified in the proper place in their monthly estimates, they are required also invariably to state in the column of Remarks whether they have or have not any balance of public money in their hands, from whatever source arising, and, if any, the amount.

3. The attention of officers commanding regiments is called to No. 3 of the General Orders of the 14th December, 1813, and the Field Marshal directs that regiments shall be required to pay for any deficiencies of ammunition arising from a neglect of the above order.

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir D. Pack to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE; Calais, 8th Jan., 1816.

I have been here four days, and came away from Abbeville before I ought, according to the strict sense of the Adjutant-General's letter. I know your Grace will kindly ascribe my motives to have been for the best, and I shall now remain till I get orders after the receipt of this. I found everything wind-bound here; but this morning, I am happy to say, there has been a favourable change, and there is every prospect of our getting the fleet away by the evening's tide. Our government has increased the transport, so that I hope, if the weather is at all favourable, that we shall go on much more expeditiously. There are now in the harbour 46 vessels either full or ready to receive troops; they will take 3736 men and 377 horses, leaving, on a rough calculation, about 5500 men and 2400 horses of the army that is under embarkation orders. The situation of the troops when detained on board is exceedingly disagreeable, but I have the pleasure to report that no disease has appeared amongst those now embarked.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord Duke,

Your faithful and most obedient servant,

D. PACK.

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*To General Jomini.* [942.]

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Paris, ce 9 Jan., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir hier la lettre et le plan de la bataille de Rivoli que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'envoyer, et je lirai la petite brochure que vous m'avez envoyée avec l'intérêt que m'a inspiré vos ouvrages.

Tous mes papiers ayant été perdus dans un naufrage dans le Tage, je n'ai aucun mémoire qui puisse vous être utile en écrivant les opérations de la guerre d'Espagne; et je n'ai rien vu jusqu'à présent qui donne une idée juste, ou de l'ensemble ou des détails, de cette guerre. Je crains donc que le monde n'en possédera jamais une histoire, c'est à dire une relation distincte, qui contiendra toute la vérité, et rien que la vérité, sur les événemens et leurs causes.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir D. Pack to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Calais, 9th Jan., 1816, 10 A.M.

I am sorry to have to report that three hours after I had the honour of writing to your Grace yesterday, the wind flew round to its old quarter, the north-west, and keeps the fleet wind-bound as before; and I much fear, as the tides are low, that if it don't come fair soon, a few of the large transports may not be able to get away for some days.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord Duke,

Most faithfully your Grace's obedient servant,

D. PACK.

P.S.—There is now an agent of transports here (Captain Hill, R.N.), and in future I shall send your Grace direct a state of the harbour, &c., from him, as I think it will be satisfactory.

D. P.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Nineteen vessels sailed January 9, 1816, with 1569 troops and 81 horses.

Thirty-four vessels remain in the harbour, with 2675 troops and 528 horses on board.

Calais, 10th Jan., 1816.

Moderate breezes and cloudy weather, with the wind at W.N.W., and no probability at present of any vessels sailing next tide.

Given under my hand at Calais, the 10th of January, 1816, at 10 A.M.

JOHN HILL, Capt. R.N., V.A.T.

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[943.] *To Madame Victoria Batteras Hauny.*

MADAME, Paris, ce 10 Jan., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 15me Décembre, et je serois bien aise si c'étoit en mon pouvoir d'être utile à votre gendre. J'avois bien recommandé au gouvernement de las Cortes de faire une amnistie générale qui auroit eu peu d'exceptions; et je crois que si cette mesure avoit été adoptée, beaucoup des malheurs des deux côtés auroient été évités: mais le gouvernement de las Cortes et le Roi ayant décidé autrement, ce n'est pas possible pour moi de me mêler dans les affaires d'aucun individu qui se trouve à présent banni

d'Espagne à cause de la part qu'il prit dans les révolutions de ce pays là.

Je ne peux pas plus recommander qui que ce soit au Roi de France.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [944.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 10 Jan., 1816.

Quand les listes de ceux qui sont les sujets de la loi d'amnistie ont été publiés, j'ai parlé au Prince de Talleyrand pour le prier d'intercéder auprès de Sa Majesté pour le Général Comte Lobau; et ce ministre m'a assuré que, comme il n'y avoit eu de la part du Comte de Lobau ni trahison ni voie de fait contre le Roi et sa famille, il se trouveroit une occasion de lui donner sa grâce entière après que les Chambres auraient pris en considération les listes. Je crois en effet que si les listes avoient été un peu plus considérées dans le moment, on n'y auroit pas retenu le nom du Comte de Lobau, qui, quoique serviteur fidèle, et peut être le plus actif et habile, de Bonaparte, n'ayant pas été employé par le Roi, ne l'a pas trahi, et ne s'est pas opposé personnellement au Roi ni aux Princes.

Connoissant la violence des esprits sur ce sujet, j'aurois différé pour quelque tems de demander cette grâce à Sa Majesté, enfin que les esprits puissent se calmer; mais j'apprends de Madame de Lobau, qui est sur ses terres dans les Pays Bas, que le Roi des Pays Bas à donné l'ordre au Général de partir de suite. Je voudrois lui épargner cet inconvénient; et si Sa Majesté daigne me donner l'espérance que par la suite il pardonneroit au Général Comte de Lobau et le permettroit de rentrer en France, je demanderois au Roi des Pays Bas la permission qu'il puisse rester pour encore quelque tems sur les terres de sa femme.

Je vous prie, M. le Duc, de soumettre cette demande à Sa Majesté, et de me croire, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[945.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Paris, 11th Jan., 1816.

I have the honour to inform you that finding that the ration of meat, even as augmented according to the mode proposed in my despatch to your Lordship of the 18th December,* and consented to in that from your Lordship of the † , did not satisfy and was not sufficient for the soldiers of the British contingent, I have proposed to the French government, and have received their consent, to exchange the allowance of vegetables and salt of the ration, as fixed by tariff, for an additional eighth of a pound of meat. The soldiers, therefore, will now receive seven-eighths of a French pound of meat (which is about equal to an English pound), one pound and a-half of bread, and an allowance of spirits *per diem*; and the British government will have to pay for each man 5 centimes, or about one halfpenny sterling.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 12th Jan., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 4th inst.‡ I believe that the first instance of pecuniary assistance given by the British government to the Spanish exiles was in favour of Mina's nephew and two or three of his followers, who all came from France. They represented that they had come from France in order to avoid the conscription enforced by Bonaparte; and under this representation we assisted them. Our assistance has been extended since to other Spanish exiles, but always in the shape of occasional assistance, and coupled with assurances that it would not be continued.

Mina's claims on us will, I think, fully authorise our giving him assistance, and I have sent you an instruction to that effect, taking this ground, which cannot be offensive (justly) to the Spanish government.

I am yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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* See *ante*, p. 253. † Blank in manuscript.

‡ See p. 269.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Downing Street, 12th Jan., 1816.

I am commanded by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to direct your Grace to transmit the sum of five hundred pounds to General Espoz y Mina the elder, His Royal Highness having understood from your Grace that General Mina would be gratified by receiving a pecuniary testimony of the sense which His Royal Highness is graciously pleased to entertain of the valuable services which General Mina rendered by his active co-operation with His Majesty's forces under your Grace's command in the Peninsula.

Your Grace will be pleased to make the above payment a charge in your secret service account.

I have the honour to be
Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

[Draw for this money on account of Secret Service.
WELLINGTON.]

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [946.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 14 Jan., 1816.

Après que j'avois eu l'honneur d'écrire à V. E. hier, et que je vous avois vu dans l'après-midi, j'ai reçu les rapports dont je vous envois les copies, par lesquelles il paroît que le Capitaine Hutchinson, officier des Gardes de Sa Majesté Britannique, et faisant le service avec son corps, est une des personnes arrêtées hier.

Malgré qu'il paroît par le rapport de S. E. le Ministre de la Police que V. E. m'a communiqué qu'il ne savait pas que Monsieur Hutchinson étoit officier de l'armée, et que, jugeant par ce que V. E. m'a fait connaître verbalement des causes de l'arrestation des personnes nommées dans la lettre du Ministre de la Police, je n'ai pas la moindre doute qu'elles sont suffisantes, il est de mon devoir de faire ma protestation contre l'arrestation du Capitaine Hutchinson par le Ministre de la Police.

Cet officier appartient au contingent Britannique, et il faisait dans le moment le service avec son corps; et la manière dont il a été arrêté n'est pas régulière.

Je prie donc V. E. d'avoir la bonté de supplier S. M. de donner ses ordres qu'en cas qu'elle désire qu'un militaire des troupes Alliées faisant le service en France avec son corps soit arrêté, elle ait la bonté de me faire signifier sa volonté; à moins que tel militaire ne soit trouvé en flagrant délit.

J'ai, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

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[947.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Paris, 15th Jan., 1816.

I have the honour to enclose a letter and its enclosure which I received on Saturday from the Duc de Richelieu in regard to the arrest of certain of His Majesty's subjects in Paris, and my answer of the same date.

After I had written that letter, the Duc de Richelieu called upon me, and informed me that the cause of the arrest of these persons was their being concerned in aiding Lavalette to escape from Paris and from France, of which the government possessed undoubted evidence in a letter from Sir Robert Wilson in his own hand-writing to the Earl Grey, which had fallen into the hands of government.

I had no objections to make to the arrest; and the Duke, after detailing some of the circumstances of the escape of Lavalette, and of the conduct of these gentlemen, repeated his assurances that everything should be done which the laws permitted to give them a fair trial.

After the Duke had left me, I received the reports, of which the enclosed are copies, from Lieutenant-General Sir L. Cole, from which it appears that the person by the name of Hutchinson mentioned by the Minister of Police to have been arrested is Captain Hutchinson of the Guards.

I have in consequence written the Duc de Richelieu the letter of which the enclosed is a copy to protest against the irregularity of the arrest of that officer, and to request that such irregularity may not be committed in future.

As, however, I consider the cause of the arrest, and the evidence upon which it was made, to be fully sufficient to warrant

it, I have not thought it proper to claim that Captain Hutchinson should be released.

In the course of the period during which I have commanded His Majesty's armies serving in the dominions of his Allies, frequent instances have occurred of the commission of crimes by those placed under my command, cognizable by the law of the country as well as by court-martial; and in all cases of this description in which the government of the country have expressed a desire to try the accused according to the laws and by the tribunals of the country, I have considered it my duty to consent.

I do not think it proper, therefore, to desire to try Captain Hutchinson by court-martial, notwithstanding that I object to the mode of his arrest.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [948.]

MY LORD, Paris, 15th Jan., 1816.

I enclose two letters from Major-General Sir Manley Power regarding certain comments in the newspapers upon the march of the 2nd battalion 35th regiment into Calais.

Calais was not captured by the Allied troops during the late war, and is one of the towns situated within the departments to be occupied by the Allies which it has been agreed by treaty shall be garrisoned by French troops.

Our troops have, therefore, no right to enter that town; and they have been permitted to pass through it by the French government solely for the convenience of their embarkation, which the French government would have had a right to require should be made in one of the ports of the Netherlands.

The 2nd battalion 35th regiment, however, was destined not only to pass through the town, but to be in barracks and quarters within its walls; and the French commandant had a right to annex the conditions he should think proper to the additional concession he made upon that occasion for our convenience. There was nothing disgraceful in the conditions he did annex; if I

had been in his situation, I would have done as he did; and, in my opinion, the British General officer commanding on the spot would not have done his duty if he had refused to accept the accommodation he wanted for his troops rather than perform these conditions.

It is very easy to talk or write of marching 500 miles; but there are many situations in which even the writers of these fine paragraphs would prefer to submit to any conditions rather than march one.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[Send a copy of this letter to General Power.—W.]

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*Major-Gen. Beatson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, 31, Nottingham Place, London, 16th Jan., 1816.

St. Helena having lately attracted a considerable share of the public attention, I have been induced to prepare a work for the press relative to that island, which will be published in a few days.

It is chiefly composed from materials which originated in circumstances connected with my official duties; and as it is calculated to correct prevalent erroneous notions, and to convey accurate ideas of this extraordinary island, and contains observations on its local and physical circumstances, mineral and vegetable productions, capabilities of improvement, and on its singular strength and security as a military station, I presume that these are subjects that must be interesting to you; and, under this impression, I request you will do me the honour to accept the accompanying proof copy as a small testimony of my highest respect and esteem.

Since your Grace was at St. Helena I made some additions to the fortifications on Ladder Hill by advancing a line of defence about 150 yards in front of Colonel Patton's works, by which Ladder Hill and High Knoll are in a manner connected, and mutually support each other. These new works cut off the north-east angle of Ladder Hill: and as they might contain about 40 pieces of cannon (besides mortars), they give, in my opinion, perfect security against a coup-de-main or an assault upon this most vital part of St. Helena; for whilst this is retained it is wholly impossible to touch the town or the arsenal and stores, or to prevent a communication with ships at the anchorage, even if an enemy superior in numbers to the garrison were in possession of the interior. The concluding part of the introductory chapter enters pretty fully upon the subject of the strength and security of this island.

Permit me to offer to your Grace my most sincere and warmest congratulations upon the great and glorious victory of Waterloo, which has led

to the appropriation of St. Helena as an everlasting monument to future ages of that brilliant achievement.

I have the honour to be,
With sentiments of the highest respect and esteem,
My Lord Duke,
Your most faithful and obedient humble servant,
ALEXANDER BEATSON.

[MY DEAR SIR,

I am very much obliged to you for your work upon St. Helena, which I shall have great satisfaction in reading as soon as I shall have a little leisure.

WELLINGTON.]

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [949.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 17 Jan., 1816.

J'ai reçu hier votre lettre du 15me en réponse à la mienne du 14 sur l'arrestation du Capitaine Hutchinson ; et comme c'est un point qui a attiré beaucoup de l'attention du publique, des Ministres étrangers, et de l'armée, je désire m'entendre clairement avec vous.

J'entends et j'ai voulu expliquer qu'un officier ou soldat appartenant à l'Armée d'Occupation, et faisant le service, qu'on vouloit faire arrêter, ne pouvoit l'être qu'en vertu de et après l'ordre donné par moi ou ses chefs quand le Roi m'en auroit signifié sa volonté ; à moins qu'il soit pris en flagrant délit.

Dans votre lettre vous me dites que si le gouvernement du Roi "se trouvoit de nouveau dans la nécessité d'ordonner l'arrestation d'un militaire des troupes Alliées faisant le service en France avec son corps, il se prêteroit volontiers à faire les dispositions convenables pour qu'elle en fut informée comme elle en témoigne le désir."

Il me paraît que si nous voulons dire la même chose, nous ne la disons pas de la même manière ; et je vous prie de vous expliquer. Entendez vous comme moi que vous devez me demander le militaire que vous désirez faire arrêter ? ou devez vous le faire arrêter en m'en donnant l'information ? Je dirois

que les termes de votre lettre sont, dans le dernier sens, et alors nous ne sommes pas d'accord.

Je vous renvois votre dépêche enfin que vous la fassiez changer si vous le jugez à propos.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, ce 15 Jan., 1816.

J'ai reçu la lettre que V. E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date d'hier, et par laquelle elle m'a fait connoître que le Capitaine Hutchinson, l'un des sujets de S. M. Britannique arrêtés par ordre du Ministre de la Police Générale, est officier des Gardes Anglaises, et faisoit, au moment de son arrestation, le service avec son corps, qui appartient au contingent resté en France. Votre Excellence m'annonce qu'en conséquence il est de son devoir de protester contre cette arrestation.

Vous savez, My Lord, que le gouvernement du Roi ayant à cœur de donner une preuve de sa déférence pour le gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et de son désir d'entretenir avec V. E. les relations de confiance auquel il met tant de prix, s'est empressé de vous faire connoître la mesure qu'il a cru devoir ordonner.

Vous avez pu juger par les détails que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous donner verbalement, et que vous rappelez même dans votre lettre, que le cas étoit extrêmement pressant, et que les circonstances qui ont permis de saisir les fils d'une trame dirigée contre le gouvernement du Roi s'assimiloient, pour ainsi dire, à un cas de flagrant délit.

J'ajouterai que rien n'indiquoit d'ailleurs aux autorités Françaises que le Capitaine Hutchinson fut attaché à un corps de l'Armée d'Occupation.

Je ne doute pas, my Lord, que ces considérations ne vous paraissent de nature à justifier complètement la marche qui a été suivie en cette circonstance.

Au surplus, je suis autorisé à annoncer à Votre Excellence que si malheureusement le gouvernement du Roi se trouvoit de nouveau dans la nécessité d'ordonner l'arrestation d'un militaire des troupes Alliées faisant le service en France avec son corps, il se prêteroit volontiers à faire les dispositions convenables pour qu'elle en fut informée comme elle en témoigne le désir.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

RICHELIEU.

*To F. James, Esq.* [950.]

SIR, Paris, 17th Jan., 1816.

I enclose some papers to which I beg leave to draw your attention.

A person by the name of Jean Poulle Scollette, a native of the Netherlands, was employed in the service of Assistant Commissary-General Wood; and being encamped with him in the Bois de Boulogne, robbed the military chest in charge of Mr. Wood, and escaped.

He was found in the Netherlands, was taken up by the Minister of Police, was delivered over to us, and was coming under escort to the army, when he was stopped and detained at Mons by the Procureur Civil.

The arrest of Scollette in the dominions of the King of the Netherlands was regularly made by the Minister of Police, and it is not explained for what reason the delivery of him to my authority has been countermanded.

I beg you to draw the attention of the King's ministers to the inconvenience which will result from the probable impunity of this person under the present course of proceeding.

When Scollette committed the crime for which he was in confinement he was a follower of the army under my command, at that time in an enemy's country; and I had a full right to try and punish him as such. It is doubtful whether the laws of his country will reach his offence; and, under these circumstances, I would beg leave to suggest to the government of the King of the Netherlands that, adverting to the regularity of his arrest in the Netherlands by the Minister of Police, in the dominions of the King of the Netherlands, they should give him over to me to be dealt with according to the military laws.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lieut.-Gen. Cameron.* [951.]

MY DEAR SIR, Paris, 18th Jan., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 12th, and I had before received that which you formerly wrote to me about your son.

Persons who, like me, have much to attend to ought to have a double portion of time; or those who must be conscious that they can feel nothing towards them but good wishes, and know that they have only the time allotted to other mortals, should excuse them if they omit to perform all the offices, or rather duties, of society and friendship. I omitted to write to you when I received your first letter for the same reason that I omitted to answer many others, because I had not time to write by my own hand, and a letter by the hand of a secretary would neither have been agreeable to you, nor friendly on my part. It has since escaped my memory; but how it came to occur to you that this omission was intended to mark a disapprobation on my part of the conduct of your son is what I can never account for. I had every reason to be satisfied with his conduct, and wish it had been in my power to mark my sense of it in a manner that would have been essentially beneficial to him; but it has not been so, and I regret it much.

I am glad to hear he is well enough to be moved to England; and I will consent to his absence from the army, if he belongs to one of the regiments composing it, upon receiving the official application.

Pray remember me kindly to Mrs. Cameron, and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 19 Jan., 1816.

Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a été à portée de reconnaître que les difficultés que la saison a apportées à l'embarquement successif des troupes de Sa Majesté Britannique retournant en Angleterre avaient nécessairement retardé le moment où elles pouvaient évacuer une partie du territoire, et notamment la capitale et ses environs.

Aujourd'hui que ces difficultés paraissent levées, et que l'encombrement des ports n'existe plus, il y a lieu de croire que rien ne s'oppose à ce que les troupes Anglaises qui se trouvent dans le département de la Seine puissent retourner dans leur patrie ou se diriger sur les cantonnemens qui leur ont été assignés par les traités et conventions du 20 Novembre.

Le Roi m'a donc chargé, My Lord, de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner les ordres nécessaires pour que cette évacuation puisse avoir lieu aussi promptement que possible.

En me faisant part de ses intentions, Sa Majesté m'a spécialement recommandé de saisir cette occasion pour faire connaître à Votre Excellence com-

bien elle a été satisfaite de la conduite des troupes Anglaises dans la capitale, et du soin qui a été mis par les chefs à alléger les charges indispensablement attachées à la présence de ces troupes. Sa Majesté sait à cet égard tout ce qu'elle vous doit, My Lord; et elle a voulu que je vous donnasse de nouveau l'assurance qu'elle ne perdrait jamais le souvenir des témoignages de déférence et d'affection qu'elle a reçus de vous.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, My Lord, avec une très haute considération,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

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DÉCLARATION des Principes de la Majorité de la CHAMBRE des DÉPUTÉS: Session 1815-1816.

Paris, le 20 Jan., 1816.

Nous, membres composants la majorité de la Chambre des Députés, nous sommes unis dans les principes dont nous faisons ici une déclaration formelle:—

1. Nous sommes inviolablement attachés au gouvernement monarchique, et à la succession légitime dans la maison régnante.

2. Nous adoptons entièrement les principes de la Charte constitutionnelle, et la division des pouvoirs qu'elle a établi; nous en maintiendrons l'esprit, et entrerons dans les conséquences de ce système comme le remplacement le plus raisonnable de nos anciennes institutions, libertés, et franchises.

3. Nous ne jetons un regard sur le passé que pour y puiser des leçons pour l'avenir, et nous voulons placer entre l'un et l'autre un mur d'airain; ainsi nous entendons que tous les intérêts créés par la révolution, et qui sont finis, soient irrévocablement assurés; nous maintiendrons l'abolition des priviléges et des ordres privilégiés comme corps politiques; l'égalité d'admission à tous les emplois; la liberté des cultes; l'aliénation des propriétés vendues dans le cours de la révolution, quelle que soit leur origine; mais nous n'admettons plus dans l'avenir l'application des principes qui ont créés ces intérêts, et nous les regardons comme destructeurs de tout gouvernement.

4. Nous pensons que les nouvelles institutions doivent être replacées sur les bases antiques et immuables de la religion et de la morale: c'est ainsi que nous voulons donner au clergé une honorable indépendance, l'administration des biens ou revenus qui peuvent la lui assurer; enfin, une existence civile, et en même tems l'associer aux intérêts les plus chers de l'état en lui faisant prendre part à l'éducation publique, et à l'administration des établissemens consacrés au soulagement et au bien de l'humanité.

5. D'après les mêmes principes nous désirons placer les lois sous une plus grande influence morale, en effacer tout ce qui est contraire à la religion, ce qui est opposé à la morale publique; enfin, tout ce qui ne convient point à l'esprit de la monarchie. C'est sous ces rapports que nous demandons la révision des lois civiles et criminelles; et nous désirons en même temps que la magistrature soit environnée d'une plus grande considération.

6. Nous croyons que la police ne doit être ni une inquisition odieuse ni

un agent du despotisme, mais une garantie pour le trône, et une magistrature qui serve de régulateur à l'opinion; que la presse doit être libre, mais que des lois sévères en répriment les délits.

7. Nous voulons que la France recouvre l'entière indépendance de son territoire, et le premier moyen que nous concevons pour y parvenir est l'exécution pleine et entière des engagemens contractés avec les Puissances Alliées. Nous porterons le même concours à conserver d'honorables alliances; et nous regarderons la prospérité des peuples qui nous environnent comme le premier gage de celle de la France.

8. Dépouillés de tout esprit de conquête, nous voulons une armée nationale dont le cadre resserré en tems de paix puisse en cas de guerre ouvrir ses rangs à de nombreux soldats; et nous ne regardons point comme perdus pour la France les militaires qui, entraînés par des circonstances extraordinaires, ont dû être licenciés, mais qui par leurs talents et leur bravoure contribueront à la sûreté de la patrie comme ils ont contribués à sa gloire.

9. Nous pensons que les intérêts des administrés doivent en plus grande partie être confiés à des administrations locales, soit municipales, départementales, ou provinciales; que la centralisation de toutes les affaires et de toutes les décisions dans les ministères est abusive; qu'elle doit cesser en confiant des pouvoirs plus étendus aux agents supérieurs délégués par les ministres. C'est dans ces principes que nous demandons la révision des lois administratives.

10. Nous plaçons dans la perspective l'espoir de diminuer l'impôt foncier, et d'en régulariser la répartition; d'établir les impôts indirects d'une manière moins uniforme, mais mieux adaptée aux intérêts et aux habitudes des différentes parties du territoire, et de manière à les faire peser davantage sur la consommation du riche que sur celle du pauvre; enfin d'établir un bon système de crédit public.

11. Nous ne négligerons aucune occasion d'embrasser les intérêts du commerce, des arts, et de la civilisation; de développer toutes les industries, tous les genres de productions; de répandre toutes les lumières qui les perfectionnent; et nous désirons que les diverses classes d'arts et métiers forment des associations libres pour assurer leurs intérêts et maintenir parmi leurs membres une discipline utile, sans que ces établissemens puissent gêner l'indépendance de l'industrie.

12. Nous définissons ce que nous entendons par épuration: c'est l'éloignement des emplois publics des hommes qui depuis la restauration se sont établis en état de guerre avec la légitimité du trône et les principes de la morale. Nous admettons encore ici des restrictions. Nous demandons que les emplois de premier ordre, tels que ceux de ministres, gouverneurs, directeurs généraux, conseillers d'état, ne soient occupés que par ceux qui depuis la restauration, et particulièrement pendant les trois mois de l'usurpation, ont donnés au Roi et à la patrie des garanties positives de leur attachement; que les emplois de second ordre, tels que ceux de préfets, de commandans, de premiers magistrats, chefs d'administration, receveurs généraux, ne soient confiés qu'à ceux qui au moins n'ont à se reprocher aucun acte contre l'autorité Royale depuis la restauration: enfin, qu'on éloigne des emplois inférieurs ceux dont la conduite est contraire à la morale et à la probité.

13. En émettant ces principes et ces vœux, la majorité de la Chambre

des Députés ne perd point de vue dans quelles bornes est resserrée la part qu'elle peut prendre à leur accomplissement: elle désire donc que le ministère du Roi uni dans les mêmes principes lui propose, suivant le tems et les circonstances, les moyens de les appliquer; il trouvera dans ce cas dans la majorité de la Chambre un concours franc, entier, et désintéressé, mais aussi une opposition ferme et constante à toute application de principes contraires.

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*General Fagel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON PRINCE, Paris, le 20 Jan., 1816.

Les Commissaires Français ont, ainsi qu'il est à la connaissance de Votre Altesse, faite une retenue arbitraire de 1,500,000 francs sur les sommes qu'ils ont été obligés de payer à Monsieur Dunmore pour l'indemnité d'habillement et équipement de l'armée qui s'est trouvé sous les ordres de Votre Altesse. Ils n'ont allégué ni raisons ni preuves justificatives de cette retenue, qui est censée être faite pour des fournitures que les troupes auraient antérieurement reçues. On a jugé à propos de faire supporter au royaume des Pays-Bas 7-15 de cette retenue, et de lui imposer ainsi une diminution de 700,000 francs sur les 3,600,000 francs qui lui sont dûs. Sur le compte que j'ai rendu de cette difficulté au Roi mon maître Sa Majesté m'a fait transmettre les états de toutes les réquisitions faites par ses troupes.

Il est constant par ces états certifiés qui se trouvent en mes mains que la totalité de la valeur de ces réquisitions dans le département de la Somme et à Cambrai, fournies avant le 1er Septembre dernier, ne s'élève qu'à 208,965 francs 18 cents.; et celles postérieures au 1er Septembre à 42,720 francs 75 cents. L'exagération de la prétention des commissaires Français est donc évidente.

Le Roi mon maître m'enjoint très positivement de m'adresser sans délai à Votre Altesse, et de réclamer ses bons offices, afin de faire cesser ces difficultés mal fondées, suscitées par les Commissaires Français. Je prie Votre Altesse instamment de vouloir bien s'interposer, afin qu'ils soient tenus d'acquitter sur-le-champ les 491,034 francs 82 cents. qui d'après le calcul susmentionné reviennent encore au royaume de Pays-Bas au delà des 2,900,000 francs qui lui ont déjà été remis par l'entremise de Mr. Dunmore.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec une très haute considération, Mon Prince,

De Votre Altesse le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

FAGEL.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [952.]

MY LORD, Paris, 22nd Jan., 1816.

The embarkation of the troops has continued as fast as possible; and I hope that by the time this letter will reach your

Lordship the whole will have arrived in England. According to the last accounts from Major-General Pack, who superintends the embarkation, there remained on the 18th only 300 infantry and 1600 horses for embarkation.

I am sorry to say that many horses have been lost on the passage, of which of course the commanding officers of regiments will have transmitted returns.

The districts allotted to the Army of Occupation being thus evacuated, and the King of France's government being of opinion, as appears by the enclosed copy of a letter from the Duc de Richelieu, that it is desirable that the foreign troops should remove from the capital, the British contingent begin their march to-morrow; and by the end of this week there will be no troops belonging to the Army of Occupation at Paris.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[953.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Zieten.*

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Paris, ce 22 Jan., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 17 Janvier, et je vous assure que je fais tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir pour hâter les arrangemens qui ont pour objet d'améliorer l'état des troupes, et de rendre leur séjour en France moins onéreux aux habitans.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*General Morgan to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 22 Jan., 1816.

Votre Excellence est instruite de mon arrestation et de sa cause. Votre Excellence, mieux que qui que ce soit au monde, est à même de me rendre justice: elle sait quel dévouement je n'ai cessé de montrer pour le Roi. Votre Excellence a vu par elle-même ma correspondance avec le Général Dumouriez, et doit represser avec indignation l'accusation fondée sur une phrase extrêmement légère de Mr. Vansittart. C'est avec la plus intime confiance, My Lord, que j'ai appelé au jugement de Votre Excellence si

elle connaît en France un sujet plus loyalement dévoué au Roi et au système de la légitimité.

D'après cette aperçu, My Lord, j'ose supplier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien déclarer à M. le Duc de Richelieu, principal Ministre du Roi, et au Ministre de la Police, quelle est votre opinion sur ma caractère politique. Je plains sincèrement Sa Majesté si des sujets tels que moi n'ont pour acquise et récompense de leur dévouement que le prison.

Votre Excellence sentira parfaitement que mon honneur, mon existence, celle de ma famille, vont dépendre de l'impression que le gouvernement Français concevra de cette affaire. Il m'importe donc que l'opinion d'un homme tel que vous, My Lord, qui ait tant de droits à la confiance du Roi et de son auguste famille, écarte de moi un soupçon dont l'idée me révolte, et me met hors de moi.

Si jamais, My Lord, j'acquis quelques droits à votre estime et à votre bienveillance, je les dois à une dévouement pour cette noble cause; et c'est à ce titre que je supplie Votre Excellence de vouloir [redacted]me rendre le service de s'expliquer sur mon compte avec M. le Duc de Richelieu et le Ministre de la Police.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'accueillir avec bonté l'hommage de mon dévouement et de mon profond respect.

LE GÉNÉRAL MORGAN.

Votre Excellence excusera ce mauvais papier; mais à présent on n'a pas tous ses aises.

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CONVENTION POUR LA COMMUTATION, EN ARGENT, DES PORTIONS DES OFFICIERS DE L'ARMÉE ALLIÉE. [ 954. ]

Ministère de la Guerre, 23 Jan., 1816.

Les soussignés, MM. le Baron de Müffling, Général Major au service de S. M. le Roi de Prusse; Brosin, Colonel, Aide-de-Camp de S. M. l'Empereur de Russie; Baron de Maréchal, Major au service de S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche; Dunmore, Commissaire-Général de l'Armée Anglaise, agissant au nom de leurs gouvernemens respectifs et sous l'autorité de Son Excellence le Feld Maréchal Duc de Wellington, Commandant en chef de l'Armée des Souverains Alliés, qui, aux termes de la Convention du 20 Novembre dernier, doit occuper une partie du territoire Français, d'une part; et MM. le Baron de Caux, Maréchal de Camp des Armées de S. M. le Roi de France et de Navarre, Chef de la 7me. Division du Ministère de la Guerre; et Barbier, Commissaire Ordonnateur des Guerres et Chef de la 9me. Division du même Ministère, agissant au nom

du gouvernement Français sous l'autorité du Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Guerre, d'autre part; sont convenus de ce qui suit:

ARTICLE I.

A compter du 1 Février prochain les rations de vivres d'officiers qu'aux termes de la Convention du 20 Novembre et du Tarif y annexé la France doit fournir pour l'Armée d'Occupation cesseront d'être fournies en nature, et seront remplacées par une indemnité en argent, laquelle est et demeure fixée en masse pour toute l'armée à la somme d'un million quatre vingt mille francs par mois.

ART. II.

Le gouvernement Français fera payer cette indemnité à Paris, du 1 au 5 de chaque mois, dans les mains d'une Commission que nommera Son Excellence le Feld Maréchal Duc de Wellington dans l'intérêt des différens corps de l'Armée d'Occupation, laquelle Commission en donnera quittance définitive, et sera chargée d'en faire la répartition à qui de droit.

ART. III.

Il est bien entendu que le chauffage n'est point compris dans l'abonnement ci-dessus, et que cet abonnement s'applique exclusivement à la ration d'officier, qui aux termes du Tarif du 20 Novembre se compose de 2 livres de pain blanc, ¼ livre de gruau fin ou surrogats, 2 livres de viande, une portion de liqueur de bonne qualité, et deux chandelles de suif, dont huit à la livre.

ART. IV.

Au moyen de la dite indemnité les officiers de tout grade de l'Armée d'Occupation, et généralement tous les agens, employés, et autres personnes qui leur sont assimilées, seront tenus de se nourrir et s'éclairer à leur frais. Le gouvernement Français n'aura d'autres rations de vivres à fournir à l'armée que celles des soldats; et le nombre de ces rations, qui ne

doivent être fournies que pour les hommes présens, ne pourra pas excéder cent quatre vingt mille.

ART. V.

Les changemens qui pourront avoir lieu dans le nombre actuel des officiers de l'Armée d'Occupation, soit en plus, soit en moins, hors le cas prévu à l'Article ci-après, ne pourront donner lieu à aucune diminution ni augmentation dans l'indemnité déterminée à l'Article I.

ART. VI.

Si l'effectif des troupes qui composent l'Armée d'Occupation d'après l'Article V. du Traité de Paix venait à être diminué, cette réduction entraînerait une réduction proportionnelle dans la quotité de l'indemnité fixée à l'Article I.

ART. VII.

Les hausses et les baisses qui pourraient survenir dans le prix des denrées, soit par l'effet des circonstances, soit à cause d'un changement de position du tout ou de partie de l'armée, ne donneront lieu à aucune augmentation ni diminution dans la quotité de la dite indemnité; mais, si de nouveaux droits venaient à être imposés sur les denrées que les officiers seront obligés d'acheter pour leur subsistance, la dite indemnité sera susceptible d'une augmentation proportionnée à celle qui en résultera dans les prix des denrées dont se compose la ration mentionnée à l'Article III. Cette augmentation sera fixée de gré à gré entre les parties contractantes.

ART. VIII.

L'indemnité déterminée à l'Article I. est fixée pour tout le tems que l'Armée d'Occupation restera en France, et ne pourra éprouver de variation que dans les seuls cas prévus aux Articles VI. et VII.

ART. IX.

La présente Convention sera soumise à l'approbation de Son Excellence le Feld Maréchal Duc de Wellington, Commandant en Chef de l'Armée d'Occupation, et de Son Excellence le

Ministre du Roi de France, Secrétaire d'Etat au Département de la Guerre.

Fait double à Paris, le vingt-trois Janvier, mil huit cent seize, suivant les signatures ci-après.

BARON DE MÜFFLING, Général Major.

BROSIN, Colonel, A.D.C.

BON. DE MARÉCHAL, Major.

T. DUNMORE, Commissaire-Général, &c. &c. &c.

BARBIER.

BARON DE CAUX.

Approuvé,

WELLINGTON.

J'approuve, avec l'autorisation du Roi mon maître, la présente Convention à Paris, le vingt-quatre Janvier, mil huit cent seize.

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Guerre de Sa Majesté très Chrétienne,

DUC DE FELTRE.

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LIST of FRENCH FORTRESSES to be held in DÉPÔT; by what Contingents they are occupied respectively, with the Names of the Commandants d'Armes.

Paris, 23rd Jan., 1816.

| No. | Places. | Troops occupying each Place. | Names of Commandants d'Armes. | Dates of Appointment. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 } 2 } | Charlemont and Givet | Russian .. | Col. Lewenstern .. .. | 20 Dec., 1815, and 20 Jan., 1816. |
| 3 | Thionville | Prussian .. | Col. Schutter .. .. .. | 10 Dec., 1815. |
| 4 | Mézières .. | Do. .. | Col. de Mauvillon .. .. | 20 do. |
| 5 | Sédan .. | Do. .. | Lieut.-Col. de Löwenfeld .. | 20 do. |
| 6 | Longwy .. | Do. .. | Major de Koschitzky .. | 20 do. |
| 7 | Montmédy .. | Do. .. | Capt. vonder Heyde .. | 20 do. |
| 8 | Bitche .. | Bavarian .. | Major Zuanziger .. .. | 10 Jan., 1816. |
| 9 | Bouchain .. | Danish .. | Col. H.H. Prince William de Hesse .. .. .. | 20 do. |
| 10 | Condé .. | Hanoverian | Lieut.-Col. Kleucke .. | 7 Feb., 1816. |
| 11 | Valenciennes | British .. | .. .. | .. .. |
| 12 | Cambrai .. | Do. .. | .. .. | .. .. |
| 13 | Le Quesnoy | Saxon .. | Major Bevilaqua .. .. | 8 Feb., 1816. |
| 14 | Maubeuge | Russian .. | Lieut.-Col. Barozzi .. .. | 7 do. |
| 15 | Landrecies | Do. .. | Lieut.-Col. Petriguine .. | 7 do. |
| 16 | Avesnes .. | Do. .. | Major Woronetz .. .. | 7 do. |
| 17 | Rocroy .. | Do. .. | Major Dorojinski .. .. | 7 do. |

*To the Ambassador of Great Britain, and Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia.* [ 955. ]

MESSIEURS, Paris, ce 24 Jan., 1816.

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre à V.E. copie d'une lettre que j'ai reçu du Duc de Richelieu, dans laquelle il me prévient de l'opinion de S.M. et de son gouvernement que les troupes étrangères peuvent sans inconvénient se retirer de Paris.

Je suis de la même opinion, et j'ai en conséquence mis les troupes en mouvement; et Samedi il n'y sera plus de troupes étrangères à Paris.

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Downing Street, 24th Jan., 1816.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace the enclosed copy of a letter from Lord Castlereagh regarding the distribution of the sum of twenty-five millions of francs to be received from France on account of pecuniary indemnity. Your Grace will consider yourself hereby authorized to direct the distribution of the said money to the troops according to the mode pointed out in Lord Castlereagh's letter.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 19th Jan., 1816.

Referring your Lordship to the communication made to you from my office of the proposals made by the Duke of Wellington for the distribution of the sum of twenty-five millions of francs, part of the sum to be received from France on account of pecuniary indemnity, I am to acquaint your Lordship that the King of the Netherlands has approved of the principle brought forward by the Duke that the said sum of twenty-five millions of francs shall be divided amongst the troops as one mass, and that the other Sovereigns and states concerned have likewise concurred in the same. I have therefore to request your Lordship will have the goodness to give to the Duke of Wellington the necessary authority and instructions to carry this measure into effect.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 24 Jan., 1816.

Nous avons l'honneur d'accuser à Votre Excellence la réception de la lettre par laquelle elle veut bien nous informer que les troupes Alliées sous son commandement évacueront Paris dans la journée de Samedi, 27 du courant, d'après la demande contenue dans la lettre officielle du Duc de Richelieu et les ordres donnés par Votre Excellence à ce sujet.

Nous sommes bien aise de voir que les Ministres du Roi n'aperçoivent aucun inconvénient à cette mesure.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération,

De Votre Excellence les très humbles et très-obéissans serviteurs,

CHARLES STUART. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.
LE BARON DE VINCENT. POZZO DI BORGO.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 24 Jan., 1816.

Votre Excellence vient de nous communiquer que le gouvernement Français, après avoir consenti à l'occupation des forts de Weissembourg et Lauterburg, demandait à son tour la permission de mettre garnison à Abbeville. Elle ajoute que d'après son opinion aucun motif ne s'oppose à cette mesure.

D'après cette explication nous nous réunissons entièrement à son opinion, et aux arrangemens qu'elle prendra pour la mettre en exécution.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération,

De Votre Excellence les très-humbles et très-obéissans serviteurs,

CHARLES STUART. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.
LE BARON DE VINCENT. POZZO DI BORGO.

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[956.] G. O. Paris, 25th Jan., 1816.

1. In consequence of an arrangement made with the French government, the officers of the Allied army are to receive compensation in money, from the 1st February inclusive, in lieu of the ration to which they are entitled under the tariff annexed to the Convention of the 20th November, 1815.

2. The exact amount of this compensation for each ration will be stated in a future order: in the mean time it is expected that it will not be less than 2 francs *per diem* for each ration to which an officer is entitled.

3. In consequence of orders received from the Secretary of State, the Field Marshal announces to the officers of the army that this allowance is to be taken from the 1st March next, in lieu of the soldier's ration heretofore allowed to every officer of the army, and the allowance called bât and forage.

4. In those ranks in which the allowance in lieu of rations will exceed the amount of the bât and forage heretofore received, and of the value of a soldier's ration at 6*d.*, the officers will have the advantage of that excess.

5. In those ranks in which the allowance in lieu of rations will not be equal to the amount of the bât and forage money heretofore received, and the value of a soldier's ration at 6*d.*, an allowance will be paid every six months, to make the allowance equal to what the officers have hitherto received.

6. It is to be understood, however, that the officers of the army are expected to be in the same readiness for the field as they have always been; and that no officer has a claim to receive this allowance except for the period he is present with the army.

WELLINGTON.

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*To General Count Woronzow.* [95.]

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, Paris, le 28 Jan., 1816.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 24 sur la nomination des commandants et des état-majors des places de Maubeuge, Landrecy, Avesnes, et Rocroy. Je crois que vous ferez bien de nommer pour chacune que le commandant seul, et remettez à nommer les états-majors jusqu'à ce que les places soient mises en état. Si nous ne nommons pas les commandants, et ne considérons pas les places comme places fortes, le gouvernement Français ne les envisagera pas non plus sous ce point de vue, et nous nous trouverons en difficulté quand nous les presserons de les ravitailler.

J'espère que l'arrangement pour les portions vous aura donné satisfaction.

Les troupes ont toutes marché, et je partirai dans la semaine prochaine.

WELLINGTON.

*General Count Woronzow to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Maubeuge, le 16 (28) Jan., 1816.

Je viens de recevoir la lettre que Votre Altesse a bien voulu m'adresser et la convention faite avec le gouvernement Français sur l'indemnité pour les portions d'officiers. Elle nous est d'autant plus avantageuse qu'elle mettra fin à toutes les disputes à ce sujet avec les autorités du pays, et rend les officiers absolument indépendants de l'habitant.

Je suis, avec respect, Monseigneur,

De Votre Altesse le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

C. W. WORONZOW.

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[ 958. ] *To Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens.*

MY DEAR TORRENS, Paris, 29th Jan., 1816.

I enclose a list of nine officers entitled to medals whose names were omitted in former returns sent home; and I beg that you will have the goodness to give the necessary directions in order that they may receive the badges to which they are respectively entitled.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

LIST OF OFFICERS entitled to Medals or other Badges of Distinction for former Services.

Paris, 29th Jan., 1816.

Colonel Sir John Elley, Royal Horse Guards, Assistant Adjutant-General—for the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro.

Colonel Ponsonby, 12th Dragoons—battle of the Nive.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, Royal Horse Artillery—for the battles of Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro.

Major Marlay, 14th, Assistant Adjutant-General—for the battle of Orthez.

Lieutenant-Colonel West, Grenadier Guards—for the battle of the Nive.

Major M'Laine, 57th regiment, commanding the light companies of General Byng's brigade during part of the battle of the Nivelle.

Captain Kyle, 94th regiment, commanding the regiment during part of the battle of Vitoria.

Lieutenant Mann, 57th regiment, commanding the battalion during part of the battle of Albuera.

Lieutenant Bace, 61st regiment, commanding during the latter part of the battle of Toulouse.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [959.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 29th Jan., 1816.

I requested Colonel Ross, who went to England yesterday, to make your Lordship acquainted with certain circumstances which had come to my knowledge, which had created a suspicion in the minds of persons in authority here, that the government were not very well disposed towards, and were not acting fairly by, Louis XVIII. Very little caution in receiving and forwarding letters for individuals, and a frank explanation of our conduct, and each of the ministers in England confining his attention in future to his own department, will have the effect of setting us right in the opinion of the French government in a short time. But there are other measures which must be adopted to put an end to the base system of intrigue carrying on between the discontented here and their patrons in England with the sole view of overturning the King of France's government, and of renewing the confusion out of which we have just escaped.

The means by which these intrigues are carried on are by the Ambassador's messengers. The British government have no doubt a right to correspond with their Ambassador and officers by messengers; and this mode of communication was adopted because it was found to be not only the only secure one, but the cheapest, as the French post-office charged as much, or more, for the carriage of our mail-bags as the journey of the messenger costs: but we have no right to allow this mode of communication to be used by every individual residing in either country who chooses to send his letter by it, thus depriving the revenue of both countries of a fair profit, and using that which the privilege of our Ambassador alone gives us for the purpose of overturning the government to which he is accredited.

I am informed that all the correspondence of the Duc d'Orléans with his partisans here is carried on by this channel; and you may conceive the jealousy which is occasioned by this circumstance, added to others which have unfortunately tended to create a suspicion of our intentions.

I earnestly recommend you to order that no letters, excepting to or from official persons, shall be sent by the messengers; and it would be as well if persons in office were to be

cautious for whom they should send letters. It would be right to extend this measure to Spain and Italy as well as France, as, if I am not misinformed, our countrymen are very busy in both these countries, particularly at Rome.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Marshal Oudinot to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, ce 29 Jan., 1816.

J'apprends à l'instant que le départ des troupes Anglaises a laissé l'hôtel de Votre Grâce sans garde ni factionnaire, et je charge en conséquence le commandant du poste de mon état-major de conduire sur-le-champ son détachement à l'Elysée Bourbon.

Je prie Votre Grâce de vouloir bien agréer ce détachement, et de permettre qu'il s'établisse dans son hôtel, en attendant l'exécution des ordres que je viens de donner pour que la Garde Nationale fournisse journellement un piquet d'hommes auprès de Votre Grâce. Je la prie de régler elle-même la composition de ce piquet.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une haute considération, my Lord,

Votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

MARÉCHAL OUDINOT.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON COUSIN, La Haye, le 29 Jan., 1816.

Le jour même de la réception de votre lettre du 23 Janvier le Général Krayenhoff m'a fait parvenir les mémoires, en Français, relatifs aux forteresses sur la ligne méridionale du royaume, savoir, ceux de Nieuport, Ypres, Menin, Ath, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, Ostende, Anvers, et Maastricht, ainsi que les plans de ces mêmes forteresses, à l'exception de celui d'Ypres, qui, ayant été adressé au Général Krayenhoff, à Paris, après son départ, ne lui étoit pas encore revenu. Il a accompagné ce travail d'un mémoire général sur l'organisation en places fortes de la frontière méridionale, en me témoignant le désir qu'il vous fut également soumis. J'envoie toutes les pièces au Général Fagel, qui aura l'honneur de vous les présenter; et j'espère être bientôt mis à même de lui expédier aussi, pour la même fin, le plan d'Ypres. Il m'est bien agréable, mon Cousin, de pouvoir vous mettre à même d'examiner tout l'ouvrage en détail avant votre départ de Paris, afin de régler, d'après vos lumières et avec parfaite connaissance de cause, cet objet important, lorsque j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir.

Je suis, avec une très haute considération, mon Cousin,

Votre affectionné,

GUILLAUME.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [960.]

MY LORD, Paris, 31st Jan., 1816.

I have the honour to inform you that the French government have consented to our making use of Calais as the point of communication for the British contingent with Great Britain with the same spirit of accommodation by which all the intercourse I have had with them has been conducted since the signature of the treaty of peace.

I have appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw Assistant Quarter-master-General to go and conduct the duties there, in concert with the officer who will be appointed by the French government.

I request that before any articles of clothing, equipment, or other necessaries for the troops are sent to Calais, I may be enabled to make application for their admission duty free by having in my hands the invoices, &c., to be produced to the French government, as required by the 7th article of the treaty.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir D. Pack to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Calais, 1st Feb., 1816.

There are infantry detachments (650 men) about to embark at Dover for this place, destined to join the British contingent.

I mentioned the circumstance to Colonel d'Esprémesnil (aide-de-camp to the Duc de Feltre), who immediately remarked that orders had been given by the French government not to receive more troops here from England, and that your Grace had said there were no more to come.

Colonel d'Esprémesnil has given me every possible assistance, and I am sure there will be no objection made to the landing of those troops, and he will to-day communicate with the French government by telegraph on the subject.

In a letter to Sir E. Barnes three days ago, I begged your Grace might be informed that I thought our embarkation would finish by the 5th; but it is going on so prosperously, that I hope to have everything over on the 4th. The last of your Grace's regiment will, I trust, get away this tide. The weather is charming, and most favourable for us.

I also requested General Barnes might ask permission for myself to cross the Channel when this duty is done, and for which I shall feel much obliged,

The Royal Sappers and Miners will bring up the rear. I have worked them a good deal, and they have materially forwarded the embarkation.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord Duke,
Faithfully your Grace's most obedient servant,
D. Pack.

P.S. 12 o'clock.—Captain Hill, R.N., has just sent me word that he hopes to have everything embarked to-morrow.

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[961.] *To the Duke of Cambridge.*

Sir, Paris, 5th Feb., 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 24th January, and I am infinitely obliged to your Royal Highness for having taken into consideration my representation of the unfitness of Colonel ——— to command the Hanoverian contingent. Major-General Lyon has, in obedience to your Royal Highness's commands, taken the command of that corps.

In respect to Colonel ———, I should not have thought it necessary to make any report of him to your Royal Highness if it had not been to induce your Royal Highness to remove him from a situation in which his conduct must have been injurious to the reputation of his country, notwithstanding that while he served under my command I had frequent reason to find fault with him. I hope, however, that your Royal Highness will see that there is a great difference between the employment of an officer in the first situation of trust which the service of his country affords, and to replace such a man as Count Alten; and stopping his promotion when it comes to his turn.

I censured Colonel ——— when I conceived his conduct deserved censure, and I considered the matter as then ended; and I should not have mentioned his misconduct, excepting to induce your Royal Highness to prevent him from filling an important situation for which he was not qualified. If his promotion should be stopped or he should otherwise be punished, he will be punished a second time, which I am sure your Royal Highness will not think it expedient to order.

Wellington.

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*To Lord Viscount Palmerston.* [962.]

My Lord, Paris, 5th Feb., 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 30th January, and I have given the orders to the Paymasters which that letter contains.

Your Lordship may rely upon it, however, that the Paymasters will never fail to find excuses for not settling their accounts; and I earnestly recommend to your Lordship to adopt a rule that from the moment a Paymaster omits to send in his accounts he shall be considered as a public debtor to the full amount of the sum he has received for which he has not accounted, and shall be proceeded against accordingly.

Wellington.

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*To H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.* [963.]

Sir, Paris, 7th Feb., 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's most gracious letter of the 27th Sept., 1815,* and it gives me the greatest satisfaction to find that my conduct in the late war had been thought by your Royal Highness deserving this mark of your approbation.

I assure your Royal Highness that nobody regretted more than I did the absence of your Royal Highness's brave army from the field of battle; and I lamented that the local government of Portugal, which must have been so well acquainted with your Royal Highness's sentiments and intentions, did not take upon themselves to carry into execution the treaties to which your Royal Highness's Ministers had acceded in your Royal Highness's name at Vienna.

The whole world, however, cannot but acknowledge the services which have been rendered to it by your Royal Highness and your brave army; and I trust that your Royal Highness will believe that there is no person more impressed with this sentiment than myself.

I have, &c.,

Wellington.

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* See *ante*, p. 174.

[964.] *To the Duc de Feltre.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 10 Fév., 1816.

J'ai prié le Général Murray de parler au Général de Caux sur la Convention, sur les Subsistences, sur les Commissions Mixtes, et sur ce que V. E. propose pour le ravitaillement des places occupées.

Je propose mettre à l'ordre du jour les stipulations les plus importantes de la première. Il s'y trouve beaucoup qui sont déjà dans le tarif, d'autres qui en sont la conséquence nécessaire, et très peu qui sont nécessaires pour le règlement des troupes. Aucune a exigé la forme de Convention; et je propose de les mettre comme règlement à l'ordre du jour.

La formation des Commissions Mixtes est ordonnée pour ce qui regarde le projet de convention pour le ravitaillement des places: je vous avoue que je doute très fort qu'il réponde à vos vœux.

Je crois que dans le moment nous devrions envoyer dans chaque place un officier de génie nommé par V. E., et un nommé par moi, pour y constater de concert avec l'officier de génie de la nation occupante les travaux nécessaires à faire, leur défense, &c. Après avoir reçu ces rapports, je pourrais convenir avec V. E. sur les moyens d'exécution pour chaque place.

Pour ce qui regarde les dégâts et les travaux journaliers, je crois qu'au lieu d'avoir un commissaire dans chaque place, vous devriez avoir un commissaire avec des officiers de génie au quartier-général, lequel sur le rapport de dégât, ou de travail nécessaire à faire, je pourrais envoyer à la place pour le constater, et qui seroit autorisé par V. E. à faire des travaux de cette nature *to a certain extent.*

Ce système empêcheroit des querelles si difficiles d'éviter s'il se trouve un Commissaire Français dans chaque place.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[965.] *To the Count de Cazes.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, Paris, ce 13 Fév., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V.E. du 12, et je suis prêt à faire remettre le Sieur ———, dit être capitaine au

service de S.M.B., faisant le service avec son corps en France, pour être traité pour le crime dont il est chargé, selon les loix de France. Je vous prie donc de me faire savoir où V.E. désire qu'il se rende.

En égard à Monsieur ———, dit être au service du trésor militaire, qui paroît avoir été pris en flagrant délit, je prie V.E. de le faire juger selon les loix de France.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [966.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 13th Feb., 1816.

I received yesterday evening your letter of the 9th. When I announced my intention of removing the British troops and establishments entirely from Paris, the King and the government, particularly the Duc de Richelieu, expressed an anxious desire that I should keep the head quarters in Paris. To this I would not consent; and they then expressed a desire that I would stay for some time after the troops had gone, and that I would occasionally return to Paris. I have consented to the former, which is attended, I believe, with some benefit. Whether I shall ever return to Paris after I shall quit this city in a few days hence will depend upon circumstances. In the mean time I believe my presence is very useful to the government and to the King in a variety of ways, and gives confidence to that party which brought back the King, although not now in favour.

I am quite certain that I am in no more danger at Paris than I should be at Cambrai or elsewhere.

I am now employed on the Belgian fortifications. As soon as I shall have made my report on that subject, and shall have settled some few points still remaining to be adjusted with the Duc de Feltre, I shall go.

Matters have taken an unfortunate turn here for our reputation, and we are generally suspected of wishing to undo the work upon which we have expended the blood and treasure and labour of twenty-four years. There is not much confidence in anybody either here or in England, excepting myself. But I think a very little caution, and doing no more than what is fair by the French government, will soon show them that we are not

all so bad as, I must say, they have now unfortunately some reason to think us.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[967.] *To Major-Gen. Sir John Lambert.*

SIR, Paris, 14th Feb., 1816.

I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Police has transmitted to me a complaint against an officer in the brigade of infantry under your command, who, from the name, I take to be Captain ——, of the —th Regiment, for making use of seditious and improper expressions respecting the government and person of His Majesty the King of France, at and in the neighbourhood of ——, on the * of January last.

I beg you will inquire and let me know whether Captain —— was at —— on the * , and has or had then in his possession a horse described as follows. If he was at ——, or had a horse of that description in his possession, I beg you will put him in arrest, to wait my further directions, as it is my intention to give him over to the French government to be tried according to the laws of the country.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, War Office, 14th Feb., 1816.

I have the honour to request to be informed whether it is your Grace's intention to form any Board of General officers to investigate claims for losses incurred in the campaign of 1815, or whether it is your wish that all such claims should be preferred to the Board of General officers in this country.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

PALMERSTON.

[Acknowledge this letter. My wish is that all claims for

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losses incurred in the campaign of 1815 should go before the Board of Claims sitting in London.

WELLINGTON.]

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*To General Zieten.* [968.]

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Paris, le 15 Fév., 1816.

J'ai reçu hier la lettre de V. E. du 10me sur la quantité de militaires Français qui se trouvaient dans les limites occupés par les troupes sous votre commandement.

J'avais reçu il y a quelques jours une lettre de la part du Duc de Richelieu sur le même sujet, que j'avais lu au Général Müffling ; et nous avions discuté le sujet, qui ne m'est donc pas étranger ; et j'avais l'intention de vous en écrire.

L'objet de l'occupation militaire se trouve énoncé dans le 5me article du traité principal de 20me Novembre, et il y est convenu que cette occupation ne portera aucune préjudice à la souveraineté de S. M. T. C. Il faut donc que les mesures que nous adoptions, tant de police qu'autres nécessaires pour notre propre conservation, soient calculés de manière à ne pas porter atteinte à cette souveraineté ni aux administrations qu'il est spécialement convenu, par l'article 6 de la Convention Militaire, doivent rester dans les mains de S. M.

Les militaires de l'ancienne armée Française sont un joint objet de soupçon non seulement des chefs de l'Armée Alliée d'Occupation, mais du Roi de France et du gouvernement Français ; et on peut dire que ce sont eux qui ont rendu nécessaires les mesures de précaution que nos gouvernemens ont jugé nécessaire de prendre. V. E. fait bien donc de les faire observer ; et je m'assure que vos mesures pour cet objet auront l'approbation du Roi de France.

Mais je vous prie de prendre soin que parmi ces mesures vous n'en adoptez qui exigent des pouvoirs de souveraineté et même de la législature pour les mettre en exécution.

Par exemple, le Roi de France a ordonné aux militaires non employés de retourner à leurs domiciles ; et ils n'obéissent pas à cet ordre si ceux domiciliés en d'autres départemens vont dans les départemens occupés par les troupes sous le commandement de V. E. ; et vous avez le droit d'exiger que ceux ci obéissent l'ordre de leur Souverain, et de les renvoyer hors des

départemens occupés par les troupes Prussiens, si ils n'y obéissent pas.

Mais exiger que tous les militaires habitans ces départemens tiennent du maire du lieu une carte de résidence qui soit visé par le général de brigade est un pas plus en avant. C'est plus qu'une mesure de police, laquelle je crois limitée à mettre en exécution la loi existante; c'est une mesure de souveraineté, et même de législation; car elle exige des militaires sujets du Roi, résidans chez eux dans ces départemens par ordonnance du Roi, de se pourvoir de papiers pour leur sécurité personnelle, que ni le Roi ni la loi du pays exige de leur part.

Je crois donc que votre ordre devrait se borner à ordonner les militaires étrangers à ces départemens de les quitter, et à vos officiers de mettre votre ordre en exécution si ils en trouvent. En même tems, pour éclaircir ce sujet, vous pouvrez faire demander aux maires, sous-préfets, &c., les listes des militaires domiciliés dans l'arrondissement de chacun, et faire renvoyer tous ceux desquels les noms ne se trouveraient pas sur ces listes; parceque toutes ces mesures seraient en exécution de l'ordonnance du Souverain: mais je ne crois pas que nous serions justifiés à le dépasser.

WELLINGTON.

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*Prince William of Nassau to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Weilbourg, ce 15 Fév., 1816.

Ayant souvent eu le bonheur d'être témoin de la satisfaction que mes troupes ont donné à Votre Altesse dans le courant de la dernière campagne, où elles avoient l'avantage de servir sous ses yeux, elle trouvera bien naturel que je m'adresse maintenant directement à elle pour réclamer de la justice qui la caractérise et de ses bontés qu'elle veuille leur assigner la part qui leur revient de la somme de 25 millions, allouée par les Puissances Alliées à l'armée qui a été sous ses ordres.

Espérant, my Lord, que vous êtes disposé à faire obtenir à mes troupes la récompense qui leur est dûe, je prends la liberté de vous adresser ci-jointe une note, contenant la force totale des troupes de Nassau qui ont eu l'honneur de combattre sous vos ordres dans les champs de Waterloo.

Je saisis avec empressement cette occasion pour vous réiterer les assurances de la plus haute considération, et d'un attachement sans bornes, avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être, my Lord,

De Votre Altesse le très dévoué,

GUILLAUME, PRINCE DE NASSAU.

[ENCLOSURE.]

NOTE sur la FORCE des TROUPES de NASSAU qui ont combattu à la Bataille de Waterloo, sous les Ordres de Son Altesse le Maréchal DUC DE WELLINGTON, PRINCE DE WATERLOO.

Ces troupes se composoient :—

| | Hommes. |
|---|---|
| 1. De deux régimens d'infanterie de Nassau, y compris le régiment à la solde de Sa Majesté le Roi des Pays-Bas | 6080 |
| 2. D'un régiment d'infanterie de Nassau-Orange, qui par suite de la cession du pays d'Orange a passé au service de Leurs Altesses Sérénissimes le Duc et Prince de Nassau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2000 |
| 3. D'une compagnie de Chasseurs Volontaires de Nassau-Orange, commandée par le Capitaine Bergmann, qui par la cession du pays d'Orange est à considérer comme faisant partie des troupes au service Ducal de Nassau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 200 |
| Force totale .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 8280 |

Les troupes de Nassau qui ont le droit d'être comprises dans la distribution de la somme de 25 millions, assignés par les Puissances Alliées, en vertu de la Convention du 6 Novembre, 1815, à l'armée qui a servi sous les ordres de Son Altesse le Maréchal Duc de Wellington, Prince de Waterloo, forment un effectif de huit mille deux cents quatre-vingt hommes.

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*To General Lord Hill.* [969.]

MY DEAR HILL, Paris, 20th Feb., 1816.

I received only yesterday your letter of the 16th, and I am very much concerned for the unfortunate circumstances which have occasioned the necessity for your return to England. I consent to it, as well as to that of Sir Noel. Let him apply through the official channel, but he need not wait for the answer.

In the existing state of public and private credit in England, I am apprehensive that you will find it difficult to procure the money which you will require. I have a large sum of money which is entirely at my command, and I assure you that I could not apply it in a manner more satisfactory to me than in accommodating you, my dear Hill, to whom I am under so many obligations, and your father, for whom I entertain the highest respect, although I am not acquainted with him. I trust, therefore, that if you should experience the difficulty which I expect you will, in finding money to settle the disagreeable concern in

which your family is involved, you will let me know it, and I will immediately put my man of business in London in communication with yours, in order to supply it to you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, St. Petersburg, 22nd Feb., 1816.

I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you from hence on the 30th of December, in which I returned you my thanks for the very kind letter you wrote to me from Paris, and which I got a few days before I set out from the Hague, and at the same time announced to you my entire recovery from the wound, and arrival at Petersburg. I now address you upon another occasion. Feeling satisfied that you continue to take some interest about me, I consider it my duty to communicate to you, my dear Duke, the celebration of my marriage, which took place yesterday. I have every reason to hope that I will find as much happiness in this union as can be hoped for, the character of the Grand Duchess being a very delightful one, her mind very accomplished, and her person very pleasing. Pray remember me, my dear Duke, to all those that are about you; and do not alter towards him who shall ever remain with the warmest feelings of gratitude

Your sincerely affectionate,

WILLIAM PRINCE OF ORANGE.

Would you be so good, my dear Duke, to forward the enclosed letter to Lord FitzRoy. I send it to you, not knowing where to address it to, and having reason to believe that some of my letters to him have been lost.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 24th Feb., 1816.

It is quite impossible for me to express in terms sufficiently strong my feelings of gratitude to your Grace for your letter of the 20th instant.* Your kindness and consideration on the present occasion have made such an impression on my mind that I am sure I never, never can forget them. All I shall say is, that no event ever occurred in my life that gave me so much real satisfaction and comfort as the receipt of your kind letter of the 20th. With respect to the leave, I of course shall avail myself of it, and mean to set out this day for Shropshire. In regard to your generous offer to lend assistance to my family in the present embarrassment, I beg to state, that although the sum required to pay this cruel debt will be very

* See p. 305.

considerable, yet I trust, and really think, we shall be able to settle it without calling upon any of our friends for assistance in that way; and it is a source of satisfaction to us to find that Mr. Kynaston's finances turn out more effective than we were led to suppose, and there is reason to hope he will be able to pay his share of the debt.

I am sure your Grace will be glad to hear that Lord Liverpool has given the appointment of Receiver-General for the county of Salop to my brother Sir Francis. The late possessor of that situation was considered a truly upright man: his infamous conduct has amazed the whole county.

Pardon me, my dear Duke, for trespassing so much on your time; and

Believe me to be your ever obliged and faithful servant,

HILL.

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*To General Slade.* [970.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Paris, 25th Feb., 1816.

I have perused with attention the paper which you left with me yesterday; and although it is impossible for me to enter upon the subject of the rewards of the Crown, or of the causes of your removal from the staff of the army in the Peninsula, I can have no hesitation in assuring you that I had every reason to be satisfied with your conduct while you were under my command as a General officer commanding a brigade of cavalry.

I have not by me the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry into your conduct, in consequence of an unfortunate affair in which you had been engaged in Estremadura; but if they can be found among my papers in England, a copy shall be sent to you. It cannot be expected that I should recollect what passed on that occasion; but, as well as I do recollect, the cause of the misfortune was that the officer commanding the reserve charged through the defile, as well as the advanced guard and the main body of the brigade, as it appeared contrary to your orders, and the whole being in confusion were driven back together by the French reserve, and much loss was sustained. No blame was imputable to you upon that occasion, as well as I can recollect, excepting that you yourself galloped forward with the advanced guard in the pursuit of the enemy through the defile, and did not at the same time attend sufficiently to the movements of the main body and of the reserve to keep them in order.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[971.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 25th Feb., 1816.

Murray has communicated to me the letter from your Lordship, with the Duke of York's wishes respecting ———; and if I had known them a day or two sooner, I would not have removed him from the Staff, as I did some days ago, from having no occasion for his services. I confess, however, that that was not my only motive for removing him. I selected him for removal because he has very indiscreetly been excessively busy, and made himself very remarkable, in all the political transactions and discussions here against the King's government, and his name is on the list of those whom the Procureur-Général was about to charge as being conspirators with Sir Robert Wilson against the tranquillity of France and the repose of the world.

I certainly would not have consented to employ ——— with one of the foreign corps under my command, although I might, if I had known the Duke of York's wishes, have kept him on the Staff of the British army, because he was one of the most noisy persons in the clamour respecting Marshal Ney, and I should not have thought it expedient to employ an officer confidentially with a foreign corps who accused me of allowing Marshal Ney to be murdered because I could not beat him in the field. My own opinion is that it is best that ——— should not be on the Staff of this army.

You see in Kinnaird's letter and elsewhere the notions entertained of the opinions of the officers of the army respecting the King's government. I am certain that these notions are erroneous as far as they regard the opinions of the officers in general, and that they are to be attributed to the language of these foolish talkers, who have in reality no fixed opinion upon any subject. ——— is one of these, and it is as well that his opportunities of doing us this mischief should be curtailed.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[972.] G. O. Paris, 27th Feb., 1816.

1. The Field Marshal directs that applications for leave of absence for Captains may not be forwarded unless one half of

the establishment (not including the recruiting companies of infantry regiments) will remain actually present with and fit for the duties of the regiment, in case the leave applied for should be granted; and that in like manner applications may not be forwarded for subalterns of infantry unless fifteen will remain for the duties of the regiment; and in the cavalry regiments twelve for the 1st Dragoon Guards, and nine for the other regiments.

2. Applications for Field officers are not to be made unless one will remain with the regiment.

3. Officers commanding regiments will take care that the indulgence of leave of absence is so regulated that all the officers may participate in their turn in the benefit thereof in the course of the year.

4. The above orders do not in any manner comprehend the regimental staff, nor do they affect the general staff of the army.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King of France.* [973.]

SIRE, Paris, ce 29 Fév., 1816.

Il y a quelque temps que Votre Majesté m'a fait l'honneur de m'ordonner de lui écrire si je croyois que les affaires publiques exigeoient son attention dans un point de vue particulier; et je crois de mon devoir de le faire dans le moment actuel.

Votre Majesté connoit les principes sur lesquels les Puissances Alliées ont basés le système de l'occupation temporaire d'une partie de ses domaines, et les instructions qu'elles m'ont donné en quittant Paris, et la responsabilité qu'elles m'ont imposé. Quoique j'envisage cette occupation comme mesure de paix, je ne peux pas m'empêcher de voir que d'un jour à l'autre il est possible que je me trouve dans le cas de mettre toute l'Europe une autre fois sous les armes; et même si Votre Majesté ne me l'avoit pas ordonné, il seroit de mon devoir non seulement envers les Puissances Alliées, mais aussi envers Votre Majesté, de l'avertir quand je vois que les circonstances tendent vers un tel crise.

Sire, les scènes qui se passent dans la Chambre des Députés

sont connus de tout le monde. Votre Ministère, quoique possédant et méritant la confiance de Votre Majesté et celle de toute l'Europe, n'y a point d'influence, et il se trouve sur le point d'abandonner le budget dans lequel toute l'Europe est essentiellement intéressée, et de revenir sur des transactions de l'année passée confirmées en loix par le nom sacré de Votre Majesté, ou de quitter leurs emplois.

Je le dois à la vérité, et à mon attachement à Votre Majesté et à la tranquillité de l'Europe, d'avertir Votre Majesté qu'il est notoire que la famille de Votre Majesté, que les personnes de sa Cour, et de celles des Princes, exercent dans la Chambre des Députés une influence en opposition à celle de vos Ministres, et à leurs vues pour la marche des affaires de Votre Majesté. J'ai déjà pris occasion de faire savoir verbalement à Votre Majesté combien l'exercice de cette influence était nuisible à ses affaires, et même à sa réputation de bonne foi et de loyauté, et combien il lui étoit facile non seulement de la détruire, mais de la tourner au profit du Ministère par les moyens duquel Votre Majesté trouveroit à propos de gouverner la France. Le moment est venu où c'est absolument nécessaire pour Votre Majesté de se déclarer avec fermeté, et de soutenir son Ministère par toute l'influence de la Cour, qui leur est à présent la plus nuisible.

Par ces moyens, qui sont non seulement parfaitement légitimes, mais nécessaires pour le maintien de l'autorité de Votre Majesté et son influence dans ses propres affaires, Votre Majesté mettra fin à l'état des choses qui a existé pendant les derniers trois mois, qui s'en pire tous les jours, et duquel la crise s'approche.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Sire, de Votre Majesté

Le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 29th Feb., 1816.

I received your letter of the 19th regarding Lord Arthur Hill's desire of getting into the Blues, and I am desired by the Duke to acquaint you that His Royal Highness will be happy to facilitate your wishes on the subject whenever an opportunity shall offer. Unfortunately none can occur in the case of Major Clayton as his vacant troop must be filled up by pur-

chase in the regiment, he having been allowed to purchase a Majority of infantry upon the express condition of retiring from the service by its early resignation.

The Duke was prevailed upon to adopt this arrangement at the pressing instance of his family; and a knowledge of your well-grounded objection to inquiries into personal conduct was a further inducement to His Royal Highness to let the thing pass quietly. I must observe, by the by, that, notwithstanding Major Clayton's engagement, I have not yet been able to get his resignation!

I also received your letter of the 12th, in which you enclosed one from Lieutenant-Colonel Norcott of the 95th. I need say nothing of his request to be made a Commander of the Bath, as in his present rank it is contrary to regulation: but you may be assured that I shall pay every attention in my power to the high opinion you have expressed of him, and to your desire that his claims should be attended to as opportunities might offer; with which view His Royal Highness has desired me to take a minute of his case, and your application in his favour.

You may easily imagine that we are much occupied here with all the *pros* and *cons* regarding the peace establishment. There is something extremely provoking in the attempted analogy, on the part of the Opposition, between the present and former periods of peace. If it were possible for the army at present to be established at similar numbers, the expense would be treble, owing to the increase of pay and allowances sanctioned by Parliament. If the general attempt made by these gentlemen to lower the military profession is not firmly resisted by government, the country will have to deplore one day or other the want of means to uphold the station in the world which the great successes of her arms have attained. In fact, they wish that England should be a great nation without paying for it, and that she should have great foreign possessions without the expense of protecting them.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

Major Heise has got the promotion of Lieutenant-Colonel, with the date of 4th December.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 29 Fév., 1816.

D'après l'explication que vous avez bien voulu me donner, il me paraît comme à vous qu'il vaut mieux que j'écrive à M. le Comte de Goltz relativement aux introductions frauduleuses faites à Givet le 1er Décembre dernier.

Quant au fait qui a eu lieu à Weissembourg, et sur lequel vous désirez, avant d'agir, avoir les procès-verbaux, il ne m'en a pas été envoyé, et j'ai lieu de croire qu'il n'y en a pas eu de dressé. Je viens d'apprendre que le Préfet du Bas-Rhin a adressé directement des représentations au Général Wurtembourgeois de Worllwarth; mais ces sortes de représentations faites

par les autorités locales sont à peu près sans effet, à moins que votre intervention ne force à y avoir égard. C'est ce qui me porte à vous renouveler la prière de donner quelques ordres à ce sujet.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, My Lord,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

[Let me see the complaint on this subject.

WELLINGTON.]

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*Lieut.-Gen. Zieten to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUC, Sédan, ce 29 Fév., 1816.

Le 17 Décembre dernier trois chasseurs Prussiens retournant de Launoy à leurs cantonnemens à deux lieues de là s'égarèrent à deux heures de la nuit, et se présentèrent à la ferme, dite des Epiceries, pour demander un guide qui pût les remettre sur le chemin. Thomas Boucher, propriétaire de cette ferme, se leva à leur demande, et ils lui exposèrent ce qu'ils désiraient. Il répondit qu'il allait sortir; mais au lieu de le faire il monta au premier étage avec sa femme, qui s'était également levé, et qui d'une croisée appela le domestique couché dans l'écurie. Ce dernier sortit, les trois chasseurs lui renouvelèrent leur demande, et il était sur le point de les remettre sur leur chemin lorsque la femme Boucher le rappela pour lui parler. Au même instant Thomas Boucher tira sur les chasseurs un coup de fusil: ils entendirent siffler la balle, qui n'atteignit personne, et s'en allèrent aussitôt sans répondre d'aucune manière à cette attaque.

Le coupable prit aussitôt la fuite: on ne parvint à s'en saisir que sur la fin du mois de Janvier dernier. Dans l'interrogatoire qu'il subit, il ne disconvint point d'avoir lâché le coup: il allégua seulement pour excuse que les trois chasseurs avaient demandé à boire et à manger, et qu'il n'avait tiré qu'en l'air pour les faire partir. Le domestique a démenti la première de ces allégations, en affirmant que les chasseurs ne demandaient qu'à être remis sur leur chemin: la seconde se détruit d'elle même, puisqu'au moment où le coup est parti les chasseurs étaient sur le point de quitter la cour, et qu'ils ont tous trois affirmé par serment avoir entendu siffler la balle tout près d'eux. La seule possession d'une arme à feu d'ailleurs, étant contraire aux ordonnances, met Boucher dans un état de culpabilité.

La cause instruite, les pièces furent transmises au Procureur du Roi de France près le tribunal civil de Sédan; mais ce même tribunal mit aussitôt le coupable en liberté, en déclarant qu'il n'y avait pas lieu à suivre sur les inculpations dirigées contre lui, et en motivant ce singulier arrêt sur ce que d'après les lois Françaises il n'y avait ni crime, ni délit, ni contravention punissable à écarter par un coup de fusil qui ne blesse personne des militaires qui se présentent nuitamment à des maisons isolées.

Le service militaire exige des communications continuelles, sans égard aux heures ni aux lieux: il se trouverait tout à fait interrompu si le soldat, égaré souvent sur des routes qui lui sont tout à fait inconnues, n'avait

le droit de demander un guide partout où il en a besoin, sans craindre qu'on lui lâche des coups de fusil. Cette permission ne pourrait d'ailleurs servir que trop souvent de prétexte à la malveillance.

Les lois de toutes les nations maintiennent la sûreté des habitations sans permettre aux habitans de se servir d'une arme quelconque contre des militaires qui ne commettent aucune violence. Cet arrêt du tribunal de Sédan est donc rendu en dépit du bon sens; les principes qu'il établit sont incompatibles avec l'existence d'une armée étrangère sur le territoire Français, et entraîneraient la nécessité des vengeances individuelles et arbitraires.

J'ai rendu constamment justice aux réclamations des habitans Français: même en temps de guerre leur vie et leurs propriétés ont été à l'abri de tout attentât de la part de mes soldats. Je n'en suis donc que plus en droit de demander une garantie suffisante pour la vie de mes soldats: je ne la trouve point dans l'arrêt inique rendu évidemment par la prévention en faveur de Thomas Boucher.

Je prie My Lord Duc de vouloir bien porter cette affaire à la connaissance du gouvernement Français, et lui demander que le coupable Thomas Boucher soit remis sans délai en état d'arrestation, qu'il soit de nouveau procédé contre lui sur la base des instructions qui ont eu lieu; et ensuite qu'il soit demandé compte de sa conduite dans cette affaire au Procureur du Roi près le tribunal civil de Sédan; qu'il soit puni rigoureusement de la manière inique dont il a suivi cette cause; enfin, qu'il soit adopté pour tous les délits commis par les habitans du pays envers les militaires Prussiens un mode de procédure qui garantisse aux deux partis la justice qui leur est dûe.

Votre Altesse ne méconnaîtra pas que sans cela je suis hors d'état de maintenir la bonne intelligence qui doit exister, et que si la haine et la prévention font la base des décisions d'un tribunal, je ne pourrai réprimer les passions que de pareilles iniquités doivent nécessairement faire naître.

Agréez, My Lord Duc, l'hommage des sentimens respectueux avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Altesse le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

ZIETEN.

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*To Baron Vitrolles.* [974.]

Paris, Mars, 1816.

OBSERVATIONS SUR UN PAPIER INTITULÉ "DÉCLARATION DES PRINCIPES DE LA MAJORITÉ DE LA CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS, SESSION 1815-16."*

Il n'y a point d'observation à faire sur les premiers et seconds articles.

Sur le troisième je n'entends pas ce qu'on veut dire par "placer un mur d'airain entre le passé et l'avenir." Après 25

* See p. 283.

ans de malheur, le Roi est rentré pour gouverner son pays. Ce pays est la France; et ce n'est pas possible pour le gouvernement de placer un mur d'airain entre le passé et l'avenir de la France. Cela n'est pas possible dans aucune des relations du gouvernement, soit intérieure soit étrangère. La chose est également impossible dans les relations des individus les uns envers les autres; et il faut expliquer ce qu'on veut dire par ce "mur d'airain," et par les mots qui suivent, c'est-à-dire, "ainsi nous entendons que tous les intérêts créés par la Révolution, et *qui sont finis*, soient irrévocablement assurés."

Quels sont les intérêts qui sont finis? Qu'est ce qu'on veut dire par ces mots, "nous n'admettons plus dans l'avenir l'application des principes qui ont créés ces intérêts, et nous les regardons comme destructeur de tout gouvernement"?

Si on veut dire qu'on ne veut plus de confiscation ni de spoliation, on n'a qu'à se tenir à la Charte: elles sont abolies par cet instrument. Si on veut dire qu'on ne veut plus entendre parler des principes qui ont créés ces intérêts en discutant des questions qui regardent ces intérêts, et doivent nécessairement les régler et leur application, je réponds qu'on viole les promesses du Roi.

Le Roi est rentré en France en 1814, rappelé par son peuple, et il a commencé par sa Déclaration de St. Ouen à faire des promesses qu'il a après confirmés par sa Charte. Ce n'est pas nécessaire de discuter à présent si le Sénat, qui lui avoit proposé des conditions, avoit ou non le droit de les imposer à S.M. Le fait est que le Roi a promis à son peuple à St. Ouen à peu près ce que le Sénat lui avoit proposé, et il a confirmé et ratifié, de la manière la plus formelle par sa Charte, ce qu'il avoit déjà promis à son peuple par sa Déclaration de St. Ouen.

Les événemens, et la rentrée du Roi, de 1815, accompagnés comme ils ont été des déclarations et ordonnances de S.M. des mois de Juin et de Juillet, n'ont fait aucun changement aux dispositions de ces instruments.

Le Traité de Paris de 1814, et les Traités et conventions de Nov. 1815, les déclarations et contre-déclarations des Puissances Alliées d'un côté et de S.M. de l'autre, les instructions que les premiers ont donné à leur Général en France, et les communications qu'ils en ont fait à Sa Majesté, montrent de quelle manière les intérêts créés par la Révolution sont considérés par les Puissances de l'Europe, et combien les promesses de S.M. envers

ces intérêts sont la base de toutes les mesures que les Alliés ont pris ou prendront jamais en égard à la France; soit en plaçant S.M. sur son trône deux fois, soit en l'y maintenant.

Veut-on ou non marcher dans la ligne droite de l'accomplissement franc et loyal des promesses de S.M.; ou veut-on accomplir aussi peu qu'on pourra; ou, pour mieux m'expliquer, veut-on violer chaque jour autant qu'on osera?

Je suis sûr qu'un ministère du Roi qui promettroit d'agir dans le sens du 3e article de la "Déclaration des Principes" pourroit se trouver en ligne opposée aux promesses de S.M. et aux principes des traités de S.M. avec les Puissances de l'Europe; et que si par malheur des troubles en France seroient le résultat de ses mesures, S.M. pourroit se trouver sans l'appui que les Puissances Alliées avoient l'intention de lui donner, si, malgré les promesses de S.M. et son administration douce et paternelle, il devenoit encore le but des trames et des efforts des suppôts de la Révolution.

Je n'entends pas ce qu'on veut dire par donner au clergé l'administration des biens ou revenus qui peuvent lui assurer une honorable indépendance. Veut-on rétablir le clergé comme corps de l'état, et que comme corps il redevient propriétaire, et administrer des biens?

Que veut-on dire par existence civile? Veut-on revenir sur les loix qui ont ôté au clergé l'administration du droit civil en France?

Dans quelques uns des mesures proposées dans cet article on violeroit les engagemens du Roi, dans d'autres on agiroit d'une manière anti-politique. Par exemple, je ne veux pas défendre ce qui avoit été fait pendant la Révolution en égard au droit civil, ni à l'education publique; mais il n'y a pas de doute qu'il y a grande différence entre l'opposition qu'on donneroit à un changement proposé après l'expérience de siècles, et celle au désir de revenir aux anciennes modes après qu'un changement a été fait pendant 25 ans, et qu'après avoir repenti tous les inconvéniens du changement, on commence à en repentir les bienfaits.

Une autre question à discuter est si le clergé Français du jour est capable de prendre part à l'éducation publique?

Un ministère du Roi ne pourra pas, en mon opinion, s'engager sur les points énoncés dans l'article 4.

Avant de connoître les détails de ce qu'on veut changer par l'article 5, je ne peux pas y répondre.

Je ne vois aucune objection à l'article 6, ni aux articles 7 et 8.

L'article 9 renferme des questions sur lesquelles je ne peux pas donner une opinion sans connoissance de ce qu'on veut changer. En général j'ai à remarquer que la constitution du gouvernement civil Français est la plus forte qui ait jamais été inventée; et qu'un Ministère du Roi, de qui le devoir doit être de préserver inviolable l'autorité de S.M., doit y regarder plusieurs fois avant qu'il consente à changer les loix administratives. Il peut sier aux factions du jour que le gouvernement ait un peu plus ou un peu moins d'autorité dans les départemens; mais il ne peut jamais sier au Roi de diminuer son autorité.

Les objets des 10e et 11e articles sont tous à désirer.

Pour ce qui regarde le 12e article, le ministère du Roi ne peut pas promettre de se départir de la ligne des promesses de S.M. par ses déclarations, sa Charte, ses proclamations, ses ordonnances, et enfin sa loi d'amnistie.

Si le Roi a permis qu'un homme sera pardonné pour un tel acte, il veut dire qu'il en est absous de toutes les conséquences pénales quelconques. Son ministère, c'est-à-dire, s'il veut remplir les promesses du Roi franchement et loyalement, ne peut pas aller promettre à une autre classe d'hommes que tels et tels gens ne seront pas choisis pour remplir tels et tels emplois. S'ils le font, ils manquent à la promesse du Roi, car ils leur imposent une peine. Encore, le ministère du Roi, s'il veut faire son devoir envers S.M., doit nécessairement se refuser à s'engager avec qui que ce soit en égard de choix pour les emplois. Leur devoir au Roi exige que les ministres choisissent ceux qu'ils jugeront les plus capables à servir S.M. dans l'emploi à donner, et s'ils s'engagent autrement ils trahissent leur devoir.

Observez que je ne veux pas dire que la trahison de quelques individus à une occasion quelconque leur donne un droit ou une réclamation à être employé, ni qu'un ministre ne doit pas considérer dans le choix qu'il a à faire le caractère et la réputation des hommes parmi lesquels il a à choisir; mais il ne peut pas d'avance s'engager comme il est proposé.

WELLINGTON.

*To the King of the Netherlands.* [975.]

SIRE, Paris, ce * Mars, 1816.

J'ai à présent l'honneur de soumettre à Votre Majesté les rapports de Messieurs les officiers du Génie des Pays-Bas et de Messieurs les officiers du Génie d'Angleterre qui ont examiné les systèmes pour la défense de la frontière méridionale du royaume de Votre Majesté, et différents points à être fortifiés, selon le mémoire que j'avois eu l'honneur d'envoyer à V.M. dans l'année 1814.

Un abstrait de ce que propose chaque comité d'officiers de Génie, et ce que coûteront les ouvrages proposés, et mon opinion sur leurs propositions respectives, accompagnent aussi ce rapport.

L'expérience acquise dans la campagne de l'année dernière démontre l'avantage du système proposé à V.M. dans l'année 1814. Il n'y a pas de doute que l'ennemi auroit eu un grand avantage à attaquer la frontière de Votre Majesté entre la Sambre et l'Escaut, au lieu de par la Sambre et la Meuse; et comme il avoit dans le mois de Mai détruit les routes dans ce dernier pays qui mènent à la frontière, il y a raison de croire qu'il avoit l'intention de diriger son attaque entre la Sambre et l'Escaut. Il est évident donc que le peu qui a été fait aux forteresses de Mons, Ath, et Tournay, l'a forcé de se tourner sur Charleroi et Namur; et puisque l'ennemi avoit très peu de temps à donner à l'attaque de la frontière de V.M., il est probable que si nous avions pu remettre les ouvrages de ces places comme nous l'avions fait des autres, cette attaque n'auroit pas eu lieu. Je ne considère pas cette attaque un malheur dans le moment actuel; mais il auroit pu en devenir un bien grand. En tout cas c'est le devoir de ceux chargés de la défense d'un pays d'en empêcher l'entrée de l'ennemi si c'est possible; et il n'y a guères à douter que les mêmes résultats heureux auroient été produits, quoique d'une autre manière peut-être, si l'ennemi n'avoit jamais entré sur le territoire de Votre Majesté.

Ainsi donc je m'assure que le système que j'avois proposé à Votre Majesté est le meilleur sous toutes les circonstances.

Les grands principes que nous devons tenir en vue sont—1, de rendre l'extrême frontière si respectable qu'elle ne peut pas être

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attaquée par coup de main, et que le temps soit donné à rassembler les troupes pour la défense du pays; 2, de s'assurer les communications avec—1, les anciennes provinces de la Hollande; 2, l'Angleterre; 3, l'Allemagne; parceque c'est enfin avec de fortes armées qu'il faudroit décider la lutte pour la possession de ce beau pays.

Je crois que ce qu'on se propose de faire depuis Nieuport jusqu'à Namur, et depuis Namur jusqu'à Liège et Maestricht, remplira le premier objet. Le second sera rempli en grande partie en s'assurant d'Ostende et Anvers. Mais pour rendre le système parfait dans la vue de la communication avec la Hollande et l'Angleterre, et pour ôter toute espérance de la réussite d'une attaque du côté de la Flandre, je recommande à Votre Majesté de renforcer la ligne de l'Escaut en fortifiant Oudenarde, la citadelle de Gand, et la ville de Dermonde.

Le point le plus important des Pays-Bas méridionaux est sans doute Bruxelles. C'est la capitale, le siége du gouvernement, la résidence des gens riches et nobles du pays, une ville de commerce bien étendu, et le centre de toutes les communications du pays, tant par eau que par les grands chemins.

Un ennemi en possession de Bruxelles non-seulement empêcheroit la communication de V.M. avec tout le midi de son royaume, mais aussi rendroit celle avec le grand duché du Bas-Rhin bien difficile. Bruxelles est le vrai pivot de la défense des Pays-Bas.

Malgré son importance ce ne'st pas possible de fortifier Bruxelles, ou de faire plus à ses ouvrages que de les rendre capable à être tenu contre un coup de main. Mais pour assurer la possession de cette ville et de ses communications, je recommanderois à Votre Majesté de faire construire une forteresse sur le champ de bataille de Waterloo qui commanderoit les approches du forêt de Soignies par les routes de Charleroi et de Nivelles, et une autre sur la position occupée par le corps du Prince Frédéric pendant la bataille de Waterloo. Ces forteresses serviroient de seconde ligne à celles sur la Meuse et entre la Meuse et l'Escaut; et Votre Majesté pouvoit compter sur la possession de Bruxelles.

Votre Majesté observera par l'abstrait des rapports que je ne propose de rien faire au pays de Luxembourg. La raison en est que, si je ne suis pas mal informé, ce pays est presque impraticable pour une grande armée; que les ressources lui man-

queroient tellement qu'elle ne pourroit y vivre; et qu'en fortifiant la citadelle de Liège, Huy, et Namur, qui en seroient les débouchés naturels pour une grande attaque sur les territoires de V.M., en traversant le pays de Luxembourg l'ennemi se trouveroit comme dans un cul de sac, d'où il seroit trop heureux de se retirer. Toute extension aussi des armées de V.M. dans le pays de Luxembourg, qui deviendroit nécessairement la conséquence d'un système de fortification sur la frontière de ce pays-là, seroit l'occasion d'une foiblesse dans d'autres points essentiels aux intérêts et à la sécurité de V.M.

Je ne connois pas assez le local pour pouvoir donner à V.M. un jugement définitif sur la proposition des officiers du Génie des Pays-Bas sur la seconde ligne qu'ils proposent établir sur Malines et Diest, et le long du Demer et de la Dyle. En général je suis très opposé aux lignes, surtout quand elles sont étendues; et je crois que si l'armée destinée à défendre les Etats de V.M. ne peut pas se maintenir en avant de Bruxelles, elle doit opérer sa retraite ou sur Anvers ou sur Maestricht, selon les vues et espérances politiques du jour, et ne pas se fier à une ligne d'inondation de telle étendue que celle proposée.

Il y a deux points encore à considérer en ce que j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à V.M., dont l'un est la force de troupes qu'exigeroient les garnisons des forteresses qu'on propose construire, l'autre la dépense de leur construction, armement, &c. Sur le premier point je n'ai pas la moindre doute que les forces de V.M. et de vos alliés seroient plus que suffisantes. Ce n'est pas nécessaire de tenir en tout temps dans une place la garnison qu'il lui faudroit pour sa défense contre une attaque de vive force; et la force de la garnison de chaque place en temps de guerre doit nécessairement devenir un des points de la responsabilité du Général chargé de la défense des Etats de V.M.

Pour ce qui regarde la dépense, V.M. verra ce que les officiers du Génie de chaque nation estiment que les ouvrages qu'ils proposent soient exécutées coûteront. Les officiers du Génie des Pays-Bas ne m'ont pas envoyés les détails de leurs présupposés, et je n'ai pas eu les moyens de les comparer avec les détails des officiers de Génie Britanniques, pour pouvoir juger ce que coûteroit une forteresse à laquelle, comme à Nieuport, je désire appliquer en partie le plan des deux. De l'autre côté, les officiers de Génie Anglais n'ont pas fait de présupposé pour la dépense des bâtimens nécessaires; mais en général je crois que

V.M. peut compter qu'en ajoutant la dépense des forteresses proposées en avant de Waterloo et de Halle, et ce qui est nécessaire pour la construction des bâtimens, et pour l'armement des places, que les fonds sont plus que suffisans.

WELLINGTON.

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[976.] *To the Duc de Feltre.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 1 Mars, 1816.

Je vous envois un rapport que je viens de recevoir du Général Kempt sur la conduite de ceux chargés de pourvoir aux troupes Britanniques dans les environs de Bapaume. Si les fournisseurs ne font pas leur devoir, V.E. peut s'assurer que toutes les mesures que je prendrai pour assurer la discipline ne produiront aucun effet.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[977.] *To General Dumouriez.*

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Paris, ce 1 Mars, 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir hier votre lettre du 13 Février, et j'ai déjà fait tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir de faire pour le Général Morgan.

Je n'ai aucune connaissance de la cause de son arrestation excepté ce m'a dit sa nièce ; et ce n'est pas à moi à discuter la convenance de ce que Monsieur Vansittart fasse de Monsieur Rosenhagen le canal de sa correspondance avec le Général Morgan, ni de ce que la police de la poste a été mise en exécution sur ces lettres.

Je ne crois nullement à l'existence d'une partie Orléaniste, ni je n'ai jamais entendu que le gouvernement du Roi avoit dénoncé un tel parti. Je suis bien sûr que le Duc d'Orléans n'encourage pas un tel parti.

Je n'ai qu'à ajouter à cette lettre que ce n'est pas vrai que le Général en Chef de l'armée Alliée " est obligé de prolonger son séjour à Paris après le départ de ses troupes pour en assurer la tranquillité," et de vous assurer que

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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ARTICLES RÉGLEMENTAIRES soumis à Son Excellence Monsieur le DUC DE WELLINGTON pour l'exécution des Traité et Conventions du 20 Novembre, 1815, en ce qui concerne les Douanes Françaises.

Paris, Mars, 1816.

ARTICLE I.

A dater du 15 Avril prochain, l'Article 7 de la convention fesant suite au traité du 20 Novembre recevra sa pleine et entière exécution. Ainsi, aux termes du dit article: "Aucune partie ou quantité quelconque d'effets d'habillement et équipement, et autres articles nécessaires destinés aux troupes Alliées, ne pourront être introduits que munis d'un certificat d'envoi, et *à la suite d'une communication à faire par les officiers commandant les différens corps au Général en Chef de l'armée Alliée*: lequel à son tour en fera donner avis au gouvernement Français, qui donnera des ordres en conséquence aux employés de l'administration des Douanes."

Les préposés des Douanes sur la frontière sont autorisés à refuser l'entrée à tout convoi d'effets déclarés militaires, qui après l'époque fixée ci-dessus, du 15 Avril, ne leur aurait pas été annoncé d'avance dans la forme voulue, quels que soient d'ailleurs les certificats ou permis qui accompagneraient le dit convoi.

ART. II.

Afin de parer aux retards et autres inconvéniens qui résulteraient de la visite faite par les Douanes Françaises des effets militaires et autres destinés aux troupes Alliées, et de donner cependant au gouvernement Français la garantie que les conducteurs des dits effets n'abusent point de leurs transports pour introduire, à la faveur des convois, des marchandises de contrebande, le Général en Chef, après s'être concerté avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté le Roi de France, est convenu de ce qui suit.

1.—Les certificats d'envoi qui doivent lui être communiqués à l'avance par les officiers commandant les différens corps contiendront la désignation du nombre des boucauts, tonneaux, caisses, balles ou ballotins contenant les effets qui leur sont envoyés, l'indication de l'espèce des objets contenus dans chaque colis, ainsi que les numéros de série et de reconnaissance des dits colis, lesquels seront revêtus d'un plomb ou sceau ou tout autre signe distinctif du gouvernement qui aura fait l'expédition.

2.—Dans la communication à faire au Général en Chef par les officiers commandant les corps, ceux-ci lui feront connaître à l'avance la route que tiendront les convois d'effets militaires qui leur seront envoyés, les points précis par lesquels ils entreront sur le territoire Français, et les lieux d'établissement des principaux magasins pour lesquels ils seront destinés.

ART. III.

Les conducteurs des convois et transports d'effets militaires annoncés comme il est dit aux articles précédens, en entrant sur le territoire Français, présenteront les duplicata des certificats communiqués au Général en Chef, aux préposés des Douanes, qui s'abstiendront de visiter les voitures sur lesquelles seront chargés les dits effets, mais seront tenus seulement de les escorter jusqu'à leur arrivée dans les magasins indiqués.

ART. IV.

Nul conducteur ou agent de transports militaires ne pourra décharger ou extraire quoique ce soit des voitures, caissons, ou fourgons ainsi placés sous l'escorte des Douaniers, depuis l'entrée des dit voitures sur le territoire Français jusqu'à leur arrivée au magasin, sauf le cas d'accident imprévu, lequel serait constaté par procès-verbaux signés des Douaniers d'escorte.

ART. V.

A l'entrée dans les magasins, les employés des Douanes Françaises devront, concurremment avec les garde-magasins ou Commissaires des troupes Alliées, constater l'identité des effets militaires introduits avec les certificats d'envoi, en reconnaissant simplement le nombre, les numéros, et les signes distinctifs des colis de chaque espèce; ils pourront en tenir registre; et en cas de différence dans le nombre ou l'espèce de colis, en rédiger procès verbal qui serait transmis par le gouvernement Français au Général en Chef.

Mais les employés des Douanes Françaises s'abstiendront de vérifier le contenu des colis, à moins qu'ils ne soient volontairement ouverts en leur présence par les Commissaires ou garde-magasins des troupes Alliées.

ART. VI.

Si néanmoins les employés des Douanes Françaises étaient fondés à soupçonner que des objets de fraude ou de contrebande ont été frauduleusement introduits et cachés dans quelques uns des colis présentés comme contenant des effets militaires, ils pourraient en spécifiant ces colis s'adresser aux officiers commandant les corps pour en requérir l'ouverture et la visite, laquelle se ferait dans le magasin militaire en présence des commissaires ou garde-magasins; et si les dits colis contenaient en effet de la fraude, elle serait saisie par les Douaniers, et les objets de fraude remis immédiatement à leur disposition. Ils seraient tenus au contraire de rétablir à leurs frais en bon état les colis ouverts sur leur demande, s'il était reconnu par la vérification qu'ils ne contenaient que les objets énoncés dans les certificats.

Pour copie conforme,

F. B. HERVEY, Col., Acting Mil. Sec.

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[978.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 2 Mars, 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V.E. du 27, et je consens volontiers à admettre au quartier-général un officier-général Français, qui auroit le commandement de toute la gendarmerie Française des départemens occupés; et je vous prie de le faire nommer.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à V.E. copie de la lettre que j'avois écrit au Général Zieten sur la police militaire à être exercée

par les commandans en chefs des corps dans les départemens occupés, et que j'avois lu à V.E. avant que de l'envoyer. Cette lettre avoit été écrite en conséquence de celle de V.E. du 27 Janvier, et d'une que j'avois reçu sur le même sujet du Général Zieten.

Je viens de demander des renseignemens au Général Zieten sur le Colonel Cottard et les autres officiers Français renvoyés de leurs domiciles par les commandans des places occupées par les troupes Prussiennes.

Je suis très loin d'approuver les mesures de rigueur que je vois adoptés souvent comme mesures de police, mais il n'est pas très facile de les empêcher. L'existence d'une police militaire une fois admise, l'examen par les commandans militaires des passeports de ceux qui passent par le pays occupé en est une conséquence qui ne peut pas être évitée. Il faudroit voir si en mettant en exécution ces mesures de police il se trouve des abus.

Pour ce qui regarde la demande au maire de Stenay de la liste des militaires qui s'y trouvent ou aux environs, V.E. verra que j'avois suggéré cette mesure dans ma lettre du* au Général Zieten. Elle devient onéreuse à cause du nombre de militaires qui se trouvent dans ces environs; mais aussi il faut observer que la nécessité de tenir les militaires en observation est urgente en proportion de leurs nombres, et le Général Zieten m'apprend dans une lettre du 20 qu'il n'y a pas moins que 20,000 dans les districts occupés par l'armée Prussienne.

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 2nd March, 1816.

I have this morning received your letter of the 25th ultimo regarding ———. I am sorry he has taken a wrong view of the question. I was sure he would talk enough, whichever side he took; but I was (until lately) in hopes he had judged things better, as he wrote a private letter to my son Seymour in great delight on the arrest of Sir Robert Wilson; but I observed there was a good deal in his letter to the Duke of York which indicated a different disposition. I am very glad you have put him off the Staff; and I trust it will be known that had he been more prudent, he would have been more fortunate.

I am sure that the best chance we have of checking this spirit in the army before it has gained strength, and has become unmanageable, will be that government should discountenance it by their acts; and though I trust there is no doubt of the English officers now on trial at Paris being

* Blank in manuscript.

dismissed the army should they be found guilty, yet I should like to be fortified with your opinion on the subject whenever the trial is over.

I am yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*T. S. Gillett, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Paris, 2nd March, 1816.

I have the honour to inform your Grace that I am proprietor of the Abbey of Auziers, situated at the distance of a mile and a half from Mont St. Jean, near Waterloo, the scene of your Grace's late glorious exploits. No mansion or habitation of any kind having been annexed to the donation of woods made to your Grace by the States of Holland, I conceive that it might perhaps be agreeable to your Grace to make the acquisition of this Abbey, to serve as a temporary residence whenever you might think proper to visit the domains attached to the principality of Waterloo.

If this proposal should accord with your Grace's intentions, I would consent to sell it at a very moderate valuation, and offer to lay before your Grace for your inspection a plan of the premises. The extent of ground within the walls exceeds 30 acres, and is laid out in gardens and pleasure-grounds, with a river passing through the property.

I beg permission on this occasion to offer to your Grace my services for the administration of the woods ceded to your Grace by the States of Holland, all of which lie contiguous to the Abbey of Auziers. As I reside half the year at the Abbey, I could, without inconvenience to myself, superintend the improvements of which the property is susceptible, and attend to your Grace's interests that no depredations should be committed on it.

Messrs. Danoot and Co., bankers in Bruxelles, with whom I have lived on terms of the most intimate friendship for fifteen years that I have resided in Bruxelles, will, I presume, be a sufficient reference to ascertain that I possess the requisite qualifications for the administration of your Grace's possessions in that neighbourhood; but if your Grace should condescend to think me a proper person for this appointment, and that your Grace should think fit to have further information respecting my person and family, I beg leave to mention that I was born at Chard, in Somersetshire, where my father possessed estates; that my cousin, William Dickinson, Esq., is member for the county of Somerset; and that my person and family are well known to the Earl Poulett.

Your Grace will, I hope, condescend to receive with indulgence a few lines I have written in honour of your Grace's glorious victory at Waterloo as the expression of my admiration for this great event.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, my Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most devoted humble servant,

THOMAS SANDERS GILLETT.

[Compliments, and is much obliged to him for his poem, and the offer of the sale of his house.

The Duke has not yet had leisure to pay any attention to his estate in the Netherlands; but he is convinced that it will not suit his circumstances to purchase a house near it.

WELLINGTON.]

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## MEMORANDUM FOR EARL BATHURST ON THE IONIAN ISLANDS.

In the present situation of the government of the Ionian Islands, it appears to be an object of the very first importance that when the plan of the new Constitution is once submitted to the consideration of that Assembly (whatever it may be) which is ultimately to settle it, the Lord High Commissioner should be in such perfect possession of the views and opinions of His Majesty's government here, as to be enabled, if possible, to carry it through without any further reference to this country.

At present they are totally ignorant of the precise species of Constitution which will be submitted to their consideration; and it is of extreme importance that when so submitted, they should have no time to refer it to any foreign country, but particularly to Russia, for opinion or advice; and be forced to confine themselves to their own narrow circle of political knowledge, and to their own narrow and limited ideas.

In regard to the mode of assembling the body that is to settle the Constitution, I shall waive all consideration of the members of such body being elected by the voice of their countrymen; because I am most deeply convinced that any Assembly that could be elected by the people at large would never answer either the views of the Ionian people themselves, or the wishes of His Majesty's government here.

There are then but two modes in which, in my opinion, this Assembly can be constituted with safety and security: the one, by a nomination on the part of the Lord High Commissioner of a portion of this Assembly, leaving the rest to be elected, under very strict guards, by the two classes of nobility; the other, by the whole being nominated by the Lord High Commissioner himself. But whichever course is pursued, I apprehend the line to be adopted in regard to it is nearly as follows:—

First, That the said Assembly should be limited in the strictest manner to the formation of the new Constitution; but should have no executive power of any kind, and that the executive power should rest, as it is at present, in the provisional governments till the new Constitution is ratified by the Crown and subsequently carried into effect.

Secondly, That antecedent to calling together the Assembly to settle the Constitution, at least ten of the persons best affected towards our interests, and best fitted for such end, should be called together by the nomination of the Lord High Commissioner to settle, under him, the exact propositions that are to be made to the ultimate Assembly; and that those, under any circumstances, should be integral members of the Assembly itself.

If we adopt the first mode I have proposed of organizing the Assembly, we will have, as far as they can be relied on (which is, indeed, but very little),

this committee of ten completely on our side; and as I never would think under any circumstances of allowing the Assembly to consist of more than forty persons, we would have one-quarter with us, and the other three-quarters uncertain, which, under all the circumstances, would, I apprehend, rather put us in a precarious situation.

The number of the committee, indeed, might be extended to one-half of the Assembly; and this would give us a proportional additional security: but it is ever to be recollected, in looking at this subject, that any security is precarious from the vice and character of the inhabitants, and that no pledge, which would in any other country be deemed sacred, can be relied on in those possessions.

I therefore have ever considered that the safest and best mode of forming this Assembly would be by the Lord High Commissioner nominating the whole.

If this line be adopted, however, two considerations must be maturely weighed.

First, How far such a mode comes within the true spirit and letter of the Treaty; and Secondly, What effect it will have on the people themselves.

In regard to the Treaty, unless it was explained otherwise at the time, it appears clear to me that this mode of convoking them is within its spirit, if not within its letter. The cavil indeed will clearly be, that, though the Lord High Commissioner is to "regulate the forms of convocation," regulating the forms does not give him a right to name the persons. But it will not escape observation that in this Article of the Treaty the object of calling the Assembly is specifically stated; viz., "to ground the political reorganization upon that organization which is actually in force;" and I should apprehend, whatever alterations we may make in the Constitution, that if we adhere fairly to this principle, the Lord High Commissioner is warranted in nominating the members.

It is true that there was, in former instances, a different mode pursued; and that there was the farce of, in some degree, a popular election: but it is equally true that such election was merely a farce, and that, in fact, the members were elected by the fiat of the Russian Envoy.

This certainly appears to me to be the eligible mode; and as to the effect it will have upon the people, it is always to be recollected that the mass of the people have ever been considered as having no concern in the business, and as having no elective franchise of any kind.

Those who have hitherto been deemed as connected with any such election consist, first, of the old Venetian nobles; secondly, of the new class of nobility established by Mocinigo antecedent to the Constitution of 1803, embracing all proprietors possessed of property to a certain extent, and men of eminence in various professions; a most loose and vague tenure, but which answered his purpose for the moment, of lowering the old Venetian nobles, and setting up this new and conflicting class of nobility, which, as might naturally be expected, is an object of jealousy to the higher class of nobility; and this class is now the only one wedded to all their ancient prejudices and old Venetian habits.

On the supposition that the Lord High Commissioner nominates the whole, were he to restrict himself closely to the lower class of the nobility,

or to the nomination of those who are publicly known to be attached to the British interests, he would certainly expose himself to the imputation of having acted with a decided hostility to the ancient nobility, and a perfect determination that only persons on our side of the question should be admitted.

It therefore appears to me that the selection ought to be so managed as to do away the effect of such feelings: that is to say, that it must be made in a way to admit a certain portion of members, though we know them to be disinclined to our views, only taking care that they are the most moderate and fittest of their class.

Should, however, His Majesty's government be of opinion that the nomination *in toto* by the Lord High Commissioner would be any stretch either of the spirit or the letter of the Treaty, I am rather inclined to think, if the original committee be extended to one-half, and the Lord High Commissioner retains the power of negativing the election of any of the others, that, at the same time that this would be a more moderate measure, it might afford us a reasonable degree of security that we would be able to carry through such Constitution as we might submit to the consideration of the Assembly; and if any weight is given to the construction that may be put upon the Treaty, that the Lord High Commissioner has not the direct right of nominating the whole of the members, he would certainly get rid of it by his calling together in the first committee all connected with our views, and then delegating to them the power of naming the whole.

Having stated thus shortly my opinion on the subject of the mode of convoking the Assembly to settle the Constitution, I shall proceed to notice the principal points in the Constitution itself.

The Ionian Islands were, by the Treaty of March, 1800, placed under the joint protection of Russia and the Porte; and the mode in which this protection was uniformly exercised by Russia was by the direct interference of her Plenipotentiary, whose powers were perfectly undefined, and who in fact was neither more nor less than sovereign of the country.

The powers delegated to the Lord High Commissioner in the Treaty are by no means specified or defined.

It states, indeed, the general objects of his appointment; but the mode, or the extent to which these objects are to be carried into effect, is left perfectly loose, and resting with His Majesty's government.

To me it ever appeared that the most desirable mode, both for the Ionian people and the government here, would be to get the nature and character of these powers fixed in the Constitution itself, and conceded on the part of the Ionian people; and if this mode be desirable for us, it will certainly be equally so for the people themselves; for it will not be contended that any concession they may make, and which we may deem necessary, is not more to their advantage than leaving them to be controlled by an indefinite power in the hands of the Lord High Commissioner.

The nature of the power that must be conceded may be stated as follows:

From the nature and situation of these islands, it is presumed that the government must be something of the following kind: that there must not only be a general government for the whole, but a particular government

for each island; and that it therefore should follow that, whatever powers the Lord High Commissioner is vested with, as relating to the supreme government, the person appointed by him as his delegate or representative in the separate islands should there possess, in regard to the local governments, in his absence, the same power he holds over the supreme government.

The executive branch of the general government might consist of a President and four members, to be changed every two years; and the first great point to settle is, whether the nomination of the members of this government ought not to rest in His Majesty's Lord High Commissioner, limiting him in his election to natives of the islands, and never allowing but one member of the general government to come from any one island.

I can have no doubt that it is of the very first importance that the election of this government should rest in the Lord High Commissioner's hands, and I am not without hopes that it may be effected.

Taking this as the foundation, it would become of minor consequence whether we insisted on the nomination of the different local governments; and my own opinion is, that in enacting that the local governments, consisting, say generally, of a President and two members, be named by the supreme government, but with the approbation of the Commissioner, who should have a negative on it, looking at the tie he must have over those appointments from his nominating the supreme government, this would be sufficient.

I rather think, however adverse I may feel to it, that it will be necessary to concede to them a Legislative Assembly, but to meet once only in two years; and then, at the outside, for three months; and that under particular guards we might admit of such Assembly being elected by the nobles.

The guards are: first, that all measures should generally be submitted to its consideration by the general government; and that the Assembly should have no power of commencing any measure except in the form of address to the supreme government, who should be bound to take it into consideration, and if judged fitting to be adopted by a majority of votes should be submitted to the Lord High Commissioner for his consideration; and his assent being granted, it should then be sent to the Assembly to be proceeded on; but that the Lord High Commissioner should possess the power, even after it was voted by the Assembly, either to withhold the assent of the Crown, or to grant such assent till referred to His Majesty.

Secondly, That the Lord High Commissioner should have the power of withholding the assent to all expenditure of public money.

Thirdly, That he should have the power of calling, proroguing, and dissolving the Legislative Assembly; of naming the President; and of presiding in it himself when he judged fitting.

I have many doubts whether, in the local governments, any such Assembly ought to be admitted; and am rather of opinion that all local regulations peculiar to the different islands should be enacted by the local executive, amenable solely to the confirmation of the general government and His Majesty's Commissioner.

Fourthly, That the Assembly, as the Legislative Assembly of the Ionian States, should possess no power of addressing the Crown direct without the previous sanction of His Majesty's Lord High Commissioner.

Fifthly, During the prorogation of the Assembly, all legislative acts promulgated by the supreme government or the local governments, and sanctioned by the Lord High Commissioner, should be submitted to its consideration on its assembling; and if two-thirds of the members vote for their repeal, such acts shall be accordingly repealed: but that, on the other hand, if there be not a majority of at least two-thirds, they should be established as law.

I rather apprehend we shall be obliged to concede that the general government should possess the authority of naming to all places of importance in the general government and the local governments, and that the local governments should have the power of nominating to the different inferior local situations; His Majesty's High Commissioner still possessing a negative over all, and reserving the power of nomination in some.

There are departments, too, that must be left solely at the disposition of His Majesty's Lord High Commissioner. First, the Police of the country, as connected with the military; secondly, the Health Office, because as much connected with us as with the islands themselves; and thirdly (if possible), the Customs.

The most material point of all, however, for the people will be the arrangement of their Courts of Justice on a new footing, and a perfect revision and correction, if not of their laws, at least of the process under the law. But this it will be impossible to effect by the Assembly to settle the Constitution. It will, therefore, be necessary that a power be reserved on this head; that the Lord High Commissioner shall possess the power of naming a committee with this view, whose report, when submitted to the Legislative Assembly, shall be recorded as part of the Constitution itself; and that, in the interim, the laws shall be administered as they are at present.

It would be unnecessary now to enter into the powers that, under this committee, the Lord High Commissioner should hold: possibly not the direct nomination of all the Judges, but certainly the original negative on their appointments, and subsequently the power of suspending them from office till the pleasure of His Majesty be known; and on this head it may be well to mention that the general feeling I have on the subject is, that the whole process should be curtailed and simplified; that the laws should be revised and explained, so as to exclude as much as may be the great evil that exists in all those countries, viz., "the arbitrium judicis;" that they should be bound to decide according to law; and above all that a supreme Tribunal of Justice should be instituted, to which appeals from all courts, whether in law or equity, should lay; and that this court should be named by the Lord High Commissioner.

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*General Zieten to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord Duc, Sédan, ce 3 Mars, 1816.

Conformément aux ordres de Votre Altesse qui m'ont été notifiés par M. le Lieutenant-Général Murray, j'ai l'honneur de lui annoncer que la route militaire qui établit la communication entre le corps d'armée sous mes

ordres et les états Prussiens traverse les étapes de Luxembourg et Gravenmathen, dans le royaume des Pays-Bas; Pfielzel près Trèves, Wittlief, Lützerath, Poleh, et Coblentz, dans le grand duché du Bas-Rhin.

Votre Altesse m'ayant permis d'indiquer les changemens de route qui pourraient présenter quelque avantage, je crois devoir lui exposer que le transport des effets militaires qui se trouvent à Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, et Düsseldorf se ferait beaucoup plus facilement en partant d'Aix-la-Chapelle par Herve, Liège, Huy, Namur, et Dinant, dans le royaume des Pays-Bas; Givet, Fumay, et Rocroy, en France; et que ce changement serait de la plus haute importance relativement à ces transports; ce chemin étant le plus court et le plus propre aux grands transports, et évitant en même tems le grand détour que les effets militaires sont obligés de faire par des chemins presqu'impraticables, étant dirigés d'Aix-la-Chapelle sur Coblentz et Luxembourg.

Le Général Comte de Gneisenau et moi avons été en communication pendant longtemps avec le gouvernement des Pays-Bas pour l'usage de cette route; j'ai encore tout-récemment envoyé le Major de Rüts vers S.M. le Roi des Pays-Bas, sans pouvoir cependant obtenir une décision favorable à cet égard.

Votre Altesse acquierroit de nouveaux droits à la reconnaissance du corps d'armée sous mes ordres, et à la mienne personnelle, si elle daignait s'intéresser, près du Cabinet de la Haye, pour obtenir la permission de faire arriver par la route indiquée ci-dessus, comme par celle de Coblentz et Luxembourg, les effets qui sont dirigés sur ces frontières.

Agréez, My Lord Duc, &c.,

DE ZIETEN.

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*General Zieten to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUC, Sédan, ce 3 Mars, 1816.

Votre Altesse ne peut ignorer combien la portion accordée aux soldats de l'Armée d'Occupation par la convention du 20 Novembre dernier est insuffisante pour leur entretien. Les militaires sont obligés, sans exception, d'employer leur paye pour y suppléer, et trop souvent on leur vend à un prix exorbitant les denrées de première nécessité. Cet état des choses m'a paru tellement contraire aux principes de l'existence en France du corps d'armée sous mes ordres, que j'ai adressé aux préfets des départemens occupés par ces troupes la demande que les prix des denrées de première nécessité soient fixés tous les mois dans chaque ville ou commune par les maires et leurs adjoints, et qu'un officier Prussien soit partout présent à cette taxation, afin que les soldats soient informés exactement du prix auquel les débitans sont obligés de leur vendre ces denrées. En même tems je donnai les ordres aux chefs des brigades pour veiller à ce que cette taxe d'usage se fit avec régularité dans tous les cantonnemens. Cette taxation existe dans toutes les villes de l'Europe; elle est même ordonnée par les lois Françaises, que les autorités de ces départemens n'ont point observé; elle est enfin dans l'intérêt des deux partis: aussi les préfets se sont-il empressés

de me rendre grâce d'une proposition qui n'a pour but que l'ordre et la justice ; ils ont adhéré sans difficulté à ma demande en alléguant seulement qu'ils n'avaient pas le droit d'assujettir à une taxe la bière et les eaux-de-vie. Quoiqu'il soit à désirer que ces derniers objets fussent également soumis à une taxe, je me suis cependant borné à leur exprimer mes désirs à cet égard, voulant procéder à l'introduction de cette taxe pour la viande et le pain, articles convenus avec les préfets ; le maire de cette ville vient de me communiquer copie de la lettre ci-jointe du Ministre Secrétaire d'État de l'Intérieur, Comte de Vaublanc. Votre Altesse verra dans cette lettre qu'il y est encore question d'infractions aux droits du gouvernement Français. L'exposé précédent démontre clairement que de mon côté toutes les formes ont été observées, qu'il n'a été question que de mesures salutaires pour les deux partis, et aucunement arbitraires. Je prie donc Votre Altesse d'éclaircir cette affaire au gouvernement Français, mais aussi de faire sentir à M. le Comte de Vaublanc qu'il a tort de supposer qu'aucune mesure émanée de ma propre autorité puisse jamais se trouver en contradiction avec l'autorité Royale. Dans les discussions qui vont avoir lieu sur la matière des taxations des denrées de première nécessité, je supplie Votre Altesse de vouloir considérer l'existence précaire du soldat dans un pays où une cherté exorbitante se joint à l'esprit de rapacité dont les habitans sont imbus.

Agreez, My Lord Duc, l'hommage des sentimens respectueux avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Altesse le très humble et obéissant serviteur,

DE ZIETEN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

COPIE de la Lettre de S.E. le MINISTRE de l'INTÉRIEUR, en date du 24 Février, 1816, à M. le MAIRE de la VILLE de SÉDAN.

J'ai reçu, Monsieur le Maire, avec votre lettre du 9 de ce mois, une copie de celle que vous a écrite le Directeur en Chef de la Police Militaire de l'armée Prussienne, pour vous annoncer le projet d'une taxation sur les denrées de première nécessité, vu l'insuffisance des rations arrêtées dans le traité.

J'ai instruit aussitôt S.E. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de cette circonstance : je ne doute pas que des négotiations très promptes ne s'entament à ce sujet, et ne lèvent toutes difficultés.

J'approuve toutefois le sens dans lequel vous avez répondu à M. le Comte de Loncey : peut-être les représentations que vous avez faites auront-elles seules dissuadé les autorités étrangères de leur entreprise : au surplus, elles n'ont point le droit de fixer le prix des denrées ; ce serait s'ingérer dans l'administration civile, et cela leur est formellement interdit par l'Article 6 de la convention conclue d'après l'Article 5 du traité principal. Nous pouvez donc, Monsieur le Maire, vous renfermer dans le cercle de raisons que vous avez déjà données jusqu'à ce que des ordres supérieurs vous ayent été transmis.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur, de vous offrir l'assurance de ma considération.

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur,

VAUBLANC.

[979.] *To Major-Gen. Sir J. Lyon.*

SIR, Paris, 5th March, 1816.

I enclose you the extract of a letter which I have received from the Minister of Finance, containing complaints against the officers and soldiers of the Hanoverian contingent stationed at Condé, and particularly of the Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel ———, on account of the encouragement they give to smuggling, contrary to good order and discipline, to the treaty made by their Sovereign, and to the positive orders issued by myself.

I beg that upon the receipt of this letter you will remove Lieutenant-Colonel ——— from the station of Commandant of Condé, and that you will take the command of the place yourself till an officer can be appointed to the command, whom I beg you will recommend without loss of time.

There is no point upon which the Allied Sovereigns have expressed a stronger interest, not only in their treaties but in their acts, than that smuggling by the officers and troops should be prevented; and it must be obvious to anybody who reads the treaties, and knows how much depends upon the payment of the contributions by the French government, how important it is that the troops should aid in preventing it, rather than encourage it and assist in carrying it on.

I am therefore determined that it shall be prevented: and if I find that any body of troops persist in carrying it on notwithstanding my remonstrances and orders, I must remove them from the frontier, stating publicly the reason; and if that will not prevent it, I must make my report to the Allied Sovereigns, and request that the troops who persist in so disgraceful and injurious a practice may be withdrawn entirely from the army under my command.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[980.] *To the Duc de Feltre.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 6me Mars, 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V. E. du 27me, et je consens au projet de règlemens que V. E. m'a proposé pour l'exécution de l'Art. 3 de la Convention Militaire.

L'objection que j'avais au projet de la nomination d'un Commissaire du Roi dans chaque place venait de ce, qu'il me paraissait qu'elle donnerait occasion à des difficultés nouvelles; en même tems que les moyens que j'avais proposé pour faire la même chose me paraissaient assurer également les intérêts du Roi. Mais si les Commandans en Chef des corps d'armée composant l'Armée d'Occupation désirent qu'un Commissaire du Roi soit nommé pour résider à chaque place, je n'ai pas la moindre objection.

Je crois que les commissaires nommés en vertu du règlement auquel je donne mon consentement par cette lettre devront avoir le pouvoir de régler tout ce qui regarde le ravitaillement des places auxquelles ils seront envoyés; c'est à dire les ouvrages à reparer, celles à confectioner, et les présupposés de la dépense à faire à chaque place.

J'instruirai les officiers que j'enverrai de ma part selon cette entendement.

L'objet des commissaires envoyés ci-devant était de constater l'état des places au moment qu'elles seraient rendu à la garde des Puissances Alliées, et cet état ne pouvait pas été constaté si la puissance qui avait possession de la place et le gouvernement Français n'étaient pas d'accord à laquelle puissance appartenaient le canon et les munitions qui s'y trouvaient. Les commissaires de ma part ne pouvaient pas entrer dans cette question, qui ne pouvait se décider que par une explication diplomatique entre les deux gouvernemens.

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Grenville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Camelford House, 8th March, 1816.

My friend Mr. Craufurd Bruce has just been with me in much agitation and distress.* He is naturally alarmed at the new turn which has now been given to the business in which his son is unhappily involved. The letters which I have seen, received by him from his son both before and since his imprisonment, have impressed him with the fullest conviction, in which I entirely participate, that there is not the smallest foundation in truth for the attempt which is now made to connect the steps taken to assist Lavalette in escaping out of France with any conspiracy or design against the French government; but the very circumstance itself of the temper and disposition which such an attempt indicates must give to the

* See reply in p. 338.

friends of the persons involved, and particularly to a father so deeply interested in the honour and safety of his son, the most serious apprehensions as to the issue of proceedings conducted in such a spirit.

I am well aware that you have no longer any official concern with the conduct which the French government may adopt towards any English gentlemen resident for a time in that country, and that it is to Sir C. Stuart that application should be made for that protection which his official station enables him, and which his own feelings will, I am sure, induce him, to extend to the utmost of his power to any of the King's subjects involved in so painful a situation.

But it is impossible for me not to feel that there is no other individual in Europe whose personal wishes have, and ought to have, so great and decisive an influence with the present King of France as yours; and that if the same temper which seems to govern this prosecution should (as is but too probable) extend itself to the tribunal which is to judge it, the only recourse which these persons, however innocent of this new charge, can then have, even against its extremest consequences, must be in the weight of personal application.

One is unwilling to anticipate an event which cannot be supposed without attributing the grossest injustice both to the government of France and to its courts of law; but in such circumstances it is natural that the friends of the persons involved should omit no precaution which may eventually be necessary. None could in such a case possibly be so effectual as the expression of your personal wishes. It would be a small return indeed for the torrents of English blood that were shed last year (to speak of last year only), and for the thousands of English lives that were sacrificed in that glorious and decisive victory which replaced the King upon his throne, that he should concede to the Commander of that army, to the author of that victory, to the restorer of that throne, the pardon of three individuals, even if it were true that their indiscretion had led them beyond the bounds of prudence and law, much more of three individuals undoubtedly innocent of the crime with which they are now charged.

I know too well what must be your feelings on such a subject to think that it can be necessary for me to apologise to you for the liberty which I now take in making myself the channel of this request. An intrusion much less warrantable than this I could not have refused to the anxiety of a father whom I have long reckoned among my friends. In such a case his own application would, I am sure, have induced you to do all that with propriety you possibly could do; but when he thought that the smallest additional weight could be derived to it from my undertaking to lay it before you, not only as his earnest entreaty, but as my own also, that supposition was in itself too honourable and too gratifying to me to admit of my hesitating, even for a moment, on the fitness of my troubling you with this letter.

I am always most happy in this or any other opportunity of expressing to you the sincere regard and high respect and admiration with which

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your most faithful and most obedient humble servant,

GRENVILLE.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 9th March, 1816.

I think it desirable that you should know what passed yesterday at Lord Liverpool's, as it may, to a certain extent, have given occasion for the despatch which Sir Charles Stuart will receive by the messenger; although I believe, at any rate, some communication would have taken place, in consequence of the aggravated character of the charges now brought against Sir Robert Wilson, &c.

Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, having desired to see Lord Liverpool, called together on him yesterday. They agreed in representing the extreme hardship to which these gentlemen will be exposed, if, after having answered interrogatories on the assurance that the charges against them were not capital, the charges should now become so. Lord Grey said that he thought the French government intended to push matters to extremities. Lord Grenville said he did not think so, but was apprehensive that the government might not be able to resist the clamour of the ultra-Royalists and others, who would insist on an Englishman being executed for treason, after a French Marshal had suffered for a similar crime. Both joined in representing the serious consequences which an execution, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, would produce in this country, where the injustice of the proceeding would be generally felt, and a proportionable degree of compassion excited in favour of the individuals concerned. They therefore trusted that the British government would interfere, so as to prevail on the French government to drop the heavier and resume the milder indictment. Lord Liverpool said that he thought it was impossible to make such an application to the French government, and expressed his persuasion that the French government did not intend to go to extremities; and he communicated what had already passed on Sir Charles Stuart's representation. They both pressed the possibility of this disposition to lenity not being acted upon, and left him with observing that, whatever government might do, it must be done immediately.

*We* do not doubt of the intention of the French government to remit the penalty of death, should the accused be condemned; and *many* of us are not apprehensive of the French government being clamoured into a departure from that intention. Our chief fear is, lest there should be in the interval a change in the administration in France which might adopt more violent counsels.

You will, of course, see the instruction with which Sir Charles Stuart is furnished. We are convinced that nothing would be so prejudicial to the cause of the Bourbons in this country as the execution of these men on a case of constructive treason, after the assurances given to them that the charge would not be capital; but if Sir Robert Wilson were aware that the British government interfered decidedly to save their lives, he will so presume upon it as to conduct his defence in a way to set the French government at defiance, and thereby degrade it in public estimation. We are so aware of Sir Charles Stuart's very strong leaning towards Sir Robert and Co. that there is some danger in putting him in full possession of the decided sentiment entertained by the government here that these gentle-

men should not on any account be executed, as he may like to communicate this immediately to Sir Robert. The instruction, therefore, may not be as positive as we wish it to be, but there will be another note addressed to the French Ambassador here, more fully explaining our sentiments. He has recently conveyed an offer to this government to leave the extent of the punishment entirely to us, and even to send them home to be punished as we thought proper. It has been explained to him that we could do nothing to two of them, except taking their commissions away from them, and that Mr. Bruce would escape unpunished. This latter offer was therefore very objectionable, and the former too delicate to accept; but this communication will enable Lord Castlereagh to speak more confidentially with the Duke d'Osmond.

The more immediately the French government remit the heavier penalty after condemnation the better, so that it should appear to be their own act, not the effect of our interference; the colour which I suspect Sir Charles will be inclined to give it. The extent of the imprisonment, for half a year, one year, or two, must depend on the gravity of the case and the conduct which the accused may observe in their defence.

I have troubled you with this long detail, as the French government will most likely consult you, and you will therefore wish to be fully apprised of what has passed.

I am yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

P.S. Lord Grey seems a little apprehensive of the letters which have been addressed to him, and this may be an additional reason for his wishing that the first charge, which would not have occasioned the disclosures, should be resumed. He is, in private, crying up the military merits of Sir Robert Wilson, who, he says, was the real person who gained the battle of Leipzig.

I need not tell you how very essential it will be that the French government should not be induced to suppress any documents they may have explanatory of the system alleged to have existed of subverting the present order of things in France, and indeed in Europe, as, after what the government has advanced, they stand pledged to disclose them.

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[981.] *To the Duchess of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUCHESS, Paris, 10th March, 1816.

Some time has elapsed since I have written to you, and I had intended to write by this occasion when I received your kind letter of the 4th.

I knew, because I had ordered, that some soldiers who were not sufficiently recovered to be removed from Bruxelles should be kept in an hospital there, when our establishments were broken up; and the very circumstance of their being in an

hospital ought to have shown the *busy* people who have interested themselves for them that care had been taken of them, and that whatever the soldiers might themselves think of the necessity for wine, &c., for their cases, there were persons in charge of them who might be reputed better judges.

It is very possible that the soldiers are not taken care of or are ill fed in this hospital, although under charge of Staff-Surgeon Sergel; but as you say the Commandant, Major Evatt, was certainly at Bruxelles when you wrote, he is possibly there at this day; and why did not these humane persons apply to him, who would certainly have remedied the evil, if any could have existed, as long as he and the Staff-Surgeon remained in the town? But they thought it best to apply to an unnamed officer of my staff, who said the matter should be inquired into; but nothing has been done. Who is this officer, and when was the application made to him?

The fact of the case is this:—There are at Bruxelles many Englishmen who have nothing to do, and but little to think of; and there, as well as elsewhere, they seek employment by meddling in the concerns of others for the purpose of mischief. If anything goes wrong, and a person means well, the line to be adopted is simple, viz., to apprise those immediately whose duty it is to see that a remedy is applied: but in general everything else is done excepting what is so plain and easy; because the object is not to do good, but to find employment and do mischief. I am sorry that you subscribed, as I am certain there was no occasion: however, I'll send to inquire.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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G. O. Paris, 10th March, 1816. [ 982. ]

The frequency of prisoners making their escape from confinement has particularly struck the attention of the Field Marshal, and induces him to believe that these prisoners have effected their escape, not merely by the gross neglect of duty on the part of the guard, but by their actual connivance: he is therefore determined, on any future occurrence of this kind, to bring the non-commissioned officers and the whole of the guard to trial before a General Court Martial.

WELLINGTON.

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*Prince Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Mon cher Duc, Trieste, ce 11 Mars, 1816.

Il m'a bien tardé de répondre à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser, mais il y a long tems que je n'ai disposé d'une occasion directe: ce fait a l'air de prouver un grand état de santé politique en Europe, qui cependant n'existe que bien conditionnellement. Le Ciel a créé une classe d'hommes incorrigibles; les émigrés de tous les pays et de tous les âges ont ce malheur: la mort civile, pourvu qu'elle se prolonge un peu, produit sous plusieurs rapports les mêmes effets que la mort physique: toute machine qui s'arrête se rouille, et se décompose, et elle se cadre plus avec le monde, qui ne s'arrête jamais, et qui peut devenir *antique* sans devenir *vieux*. Les hommes n'ont pas ce privilége; et les vieux hommes dans un nouveau monde auront toujours de la peine à bien faire. Nous éprouvons journellement cette triste vérité; et il s'agit que les hommes qui veuillent le bien se servent autour du principe, et empêchent le plus que faire se peut les vieux et les insensés de se précipiter dans leur propre ruine. Personne n'est plus fait que vous, mon cher Duc, pour être chargé du rôle le plus difficile que fut jamais: vous avez si bien rempli votre tâche jusqu'à présent que si elle peut être bien rempli jusqu'au bout, ce n'est certainement que vous qui puissiez opérer cette espèce de miracle. Vous pouvez dans tous les cas compter sur nous, et être sûr que nous ne dévierons pas d'un pouce de la ligne convenue: nous formons une masse bien imposante; et si nous ne pouvons pas empêcher tout le mal, nous en empêcherons du moins beaucoup par notre constance et par notre union avec votre gouvernement.

Je réponds de l'Italie. On n'y court aucun véritable risque: à quelques cris près tout y est tranquil; et ces cris ont en grande partie été provoqué par nos amis Wilson et Compagnie. Ces moyens commencent à y être bien usés; et le procès de ces Messieurs à Paris n'est pas fait pour leur établir du nouveau crédit autre part.

L'affaire de Ragany va être fini toute à l'heure; et quelque mauvais sujet qu'il soit, il sera certainement conservé à sa pauvre femme. Veuillez la rassurer, et je le fais de mon côté.

Si vous voyez Lady Kinnaird, faites lui bien mes complimens. Je l'aime beaucoup, car elle est toute bonne et aimable. Une thèse que j'ai souvent soutenu vis-à-vis d'elle, c'est celle qu'elle n'est pas née pour l'opposition. Elle prétend le contraire; et elle n'a pas tort, car il faut toujours être du parti d'un mari quand on est bonne femme; mais cela ne prouve pas que j'ai tort pas non plus. Qu'elle vienne nous voir à Vienne: la France ne vaut plus rien pour l'activité de Milord; et chez nous on se reçoive si peu que ceux qui en ont l'habitude la perdent bientôt.

Adieu, mon cher Duc: conservez moi souvenirs et bontés, et croyez que vous n'avez personne qui vous soit plus véritablement et sincèrement dévoué que moi.

Metternich.

*To R. Barry, Esq.* [983.]

SIR, Paris, 13th March, 1816.

In reference to the claims forwarded herewith for the decision of the Board, I have to remark that I never yet could see any reason why a man, not so severely wounded as to be left on the field of battle, and consequently subject to be pillaged by the enemy, should lose his arms, accoutrements, and necessaries; and adverting to the considerable expense (amounting to nearly 10*l.* per man) which would be incurred by a general admission of such claims, I am of opinion that they should be minutely investigated.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lord Grenville.* [984.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 14th March, 1816.

When I first heard of the new charges against the three English gentlemen in confinement in this town, I took an opportunity of speaking to the Duc de Richelieu upon the subject; and his answer was that, although the government thought it proper to frame charges against them in such a manner as to enable its officers to bring before the public regularly the proofs which the government possessed of the designs and objects of Sir R. Wilson and of some of his correspondents, those proofs were not considered sufficient to establish the guilt of Sir Robert, much less of the two other gentlemen; and that even if they should be convicted of the charges, the King intended to pardon them. I do not think I can well do more in the business at present. In my opinion it is desirable that the French government should bring before the world the proofs it possesses of Sir Robert's designs, and those of some of the persons with whom he was in correspondence; and I apprehend could not effect this object without making a charge. But even if the proofs could be produced without putting the prisoners on their trial for the charge, I do not think it would be proper for me to interfere to prevent the government from bringing forward the

charge, if the law officers of the Crown advise that it should be brought forward.

I entertain no doubt that the King will pardon these gentlemen, even if they should be convicted of the new charges. It is scarcely necessary that I should apprise your Lordship that the imputations cast upon him in the English newspapers of cruelty and bloodthirstiness are totally without foundation. After having been the victim of treachery unexampled in the annals of the world, he has since his return in July allowed the law to be put in execution upon two persons regularly tried and convicted of that treachery, which deprived him of his crown, and brought all the armies of Europe into France. I know that the harsh part of the Law of Amnesty, as it is called here, was forced upon him by the Chamber of Deputies.

Your Lordship may depend upon it, however, that I will watch the progress of the trial; and if I should find that the gentlemen are convicted of the new charges, I will do every thing in my power to prevail upon the King to adhere to his resolution to pardon them.

I am very anxious that it should not be known to them that I have interfered already, and that the King intends to pardon them. I entertain no doubt that if either of these circumstances were known to Sir R. Wilson, he would conduct himself upon his defence in such a manner as to excite feelings here which might induce the King to alter his intention, and it might be very difficult to prevail upon him to pardon them.

Although Mr. Bruce has given more of his attention, and interfered in the affairs of this country more than is usual for a foreigner residing in any country for the objects of business or pleasure, I should do him great injustice if I were to leave upon your Lordship's mind a notion that he entertained the same designs as Sir R. Wilson and some of his correspondents. Excepting a perpetual intrigue, Sir Robert has apparently been guilty of no act of treason; and the correspondence in the possession of the French government, as far as I have seen of it, tends only to show his wishes, and the objects and designs of those intrigues of himself and some of those who wrote to him, which certainly go to the subversion of this government and to the revival of a general war and confusion in Europe. But I don't believe that Mr. Bruce even saw one of their letters.

WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.* [ 985. ]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 16th March, 1816.

I have received your letter of the 9th, marked "confidential."* I had before received one of the same date from Lord Grenville on the same subject, principally in reference to Mr. Craufurd Bruce. I answered him that I had already spoken to the Duc de Richelieu on the subject of the new charges against the prisoners; that the Duc had told me he did not consider the evidence sufficient to convict them of these charges, and that even if convicted the King intended to pardon them; and that I should observe the progress of the trial, and apply to the King when it should be necessary. I requested Lord Grenville not to make these circumstances known to the prisoners or their friends, lest the knowledge of them should influence their conduct on their trial.

I will take the earliest opportunity of speaking to the Duc de Richelieu again regarding these charges; and, if necessary, I will speak to the King on the subject, but I don't believe it is necessary. Any change of administration which may take place will not occasion any alteration of intention on this subject. The principle of thepower of pardoning appears to be perfectly understood in the Chambers, and there are no persons who could be chosen Ministers who would like to commence their administration by putting the King in a state of quarrel with the British government.

Sir Charles Stuart showed me the instruction he received on this subject, and one which he had received before upon Lord Kinnaird's case; but I have seen no others to him, and none written by him.

He brought me a book of his despatches one day in consequence of my having communicated to him a complaint made to me by Vitrolles that Sir Robert Wilson had mentioned in a letter to Lord Grey that Sir Charles Stuart had reported to England that Vitrolles disapproved of the measures of government, in order to show that he had never written such a report. Of course I had not time to read the book, and he took it away. I mention this because you appear to think that, as a matter of course, I see all his instructions. I know nothing

* See page 335.

of what is going on anywhere excepting what I learn by my own means.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

Since writing the above I have learnt that the Cour Royale has this day refused to find the Bill against the three prisoners on the new charges; so that you need feel no apprehension on this subject. There will be no harm in their being punished for their concern in Lavalette's escape.

Sunday, March 17th.

Sir Charles Stuart has just been with me, and has informed me that De Cazes has apprised him on Thursday, and he had informed Lord Castlereagh by that night's messenger, of the intention to withdraw the new charges against the prisoners. This is probably the reason why the Cour Royale has not found the Bill.

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[ 986. ] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Paris, 16th March, 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch of the 12th regarding the Waggon Corps.

No person can be more impressed than I am with the absolute necessity of a corps of the description of the Royal Waggon Train, and I am perfectly sensible of the exertions made and of the expense incurred to complete the corps at the commencement of the late war. But the total failure of all those exertions and expense to produce anything that was not a disgrace to the service shows that some measure should be adopted in time of peace in order to have for service a corps so necessary in time of war. This is the point to which I wished to draw your Lordship's attention in my despatch of the 1st February.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 18th March, 1816.

The Prince Regent having been graciously pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to command that a medal should be struck for the officers and men who fought at the battle of Waterloo, I forward to your Grace herewith a box containing medals for the General and Staff officers, &c., who were present upon that glorious occasion now serving under your command; and I request that your Grace will give orders for their being distributed to the several individuals to whom they are addressed a list of whose names is herewith transmitted.

I am, my Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

[ENCLOSURE.]

LIST of the GENERAL and STAFF OFFICERS present at the Battle of Waterloo, now serving with the British Contingent in France.

Lieutenant-Generals Sir H. Clinton, G.C.B.; Sir Charles Colville. (This medal has been sent to Sir C. Colville.)

Major-Generals Sir James Kempt; Sir Edward Barnes; Lord E. Somerset Sir John Lambert; Sir James Lyon; Sir P. Maitland.

Colonel Sir G. Wood, Knt.

Lieutenant-Colonels John Fremantle, Coldstream Guards (some alteration is required to this medal); Hon. H. Percy, 14th Light Dragoons; Lieutenant Hon. G. Cathcart, 6th Dragoon Guards, Aides-de-camp to the Duke of Wellington.

Lieutenant-Colonels Richard Egerton, 34th Foot; C. H. Churchill, 1st Guards; Captain Digby Mackworth, 7th Foot, Aides-de-camp to Lord Hill.

Captain Francis Dawkins, 1st Guards, Aide-de-camp to Sir H. Clinton.

Brevet-Major James Jackson, 37th; Lieutenant Frederick W. Frankland, Queen's Foot; Captain Lord James Hay, 1st Guards (extra), Aides-de-camp to Sir C. Colville.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Childers, 11th Dragoons, Brigade-Major to Sir J. O. Vandeleur.

Captain Hon. Charles Gore, 85th Foot, Aide-de-camp to Sir James Kempt.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Hamilton, 4th West India Regiment, Aide-de-camp to Sir E. Barnes.

Lieutenant Brathwaite Christie, 5th Dragoon Guards, Aide-de-camp to Sir D. Pack.

Captain Henry Somerset, 3rd Garrison Battalion, Aide-de-camp to Lord E. Somerset.

Lieutenant Thomas Baynes, 39th Foot, Aide-de-camp to Sir J. Lambert.

Captain James M'Glashan, 1st Ceylon. Aide-de-camp to Sir James Lyon.

Captain George Richter, 2nd Light Battalion King's German Legion, Brigade-Major to Sir James Lyon.

Brevet-Major James Gunthorpe, 1st Guards, Brigade-Major to Sir P. Maitland.

Captain Henry Baynes, Royal Artillery, Brigade-Major Royal Artillery.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel William Campbell, 23rd Foot, Brigade-Major to Lord E. Somerset.

Colonel Sir John Elley, K.C.B., Blues, Deputy Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonels John Waters (Unattached); Sir Thomas N. Hill, 1st Foot Guards; Sir John May, Royal Artillery; Alexander Wylly, 7th Foot; Major William L. Darling (half-pay), Assistants Deputy Adjutant-General.

Majors Hon. E. F. Erskine, 60th Foot; Lord Charles FitzRoy, 60th Foot; Charles A. F. Bentinck, Coldstream Guards, Assistants Adjutant-General.

Captain H. S. Blanckley, 23rd Foot; Lieutenants James Hamilton, 46th Foot; John Harford, 7th Royal Veteran Battalion, Deputy Assistants Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Goodman (Half-pay), Deputy Judge-Advocate.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Broke, K.C.B., Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Colonels Hon. Alex. Abercromby, Coldstream Guards; F. B. Hervey, 14th Light Dragoons; Lieutenant-Colonels Robert Torrens, 1st West India Regiment; Lord Greenock; John George Woodford, 1st Guards; Colquhoun Grant, 11th Foot; Sir H. H. Bradford, 1st Guards; Sir George Scovell, Cavalry Staff Corps; Dawson Kelly, 73rd Foot; De Lacy Evans, 5th West India Regiment, Assistants Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Captains William G. Moore, 1st Guards; George Hilliar, 74th Foot; Lieutenant Peter Barailler, 33rd Foot, Deputy Assistants Quartermaster-General.

Colonel Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., Commandant of Head Quarters.

Serjeants Williamson, 1st Foot Guards; Simpson, 2nd Light Battalion King's German Legion; Garman, Coldstream Guards; Phition, 1st Foot Guards; Williams, 4th Foot, Assistants Provost Marshal.

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*Lord Grenville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Camelford House, 23rd March, 1816.

I beg you to accept my best thanks for the kindness of your letters, which I received last night.

I am perfectly sensible of the force of the reasons which you mention for wishing that the circumstance of your friendly interposition in behalf of these gentlemen may not be known, and you may rely on my carefully observing your injunction.

I never had in my own mind the smallest apprehension of any sanguinary purpose on the part of the King, whose character, on the contrary, is, as I well know, directly of the opposite description; but I thought that, if this course of accusation had been persisted in, both he and his Ministers might, by the progress of the business or the possible turn of public feeling upon it, have been involved in such embarrassments as might have made it difficult for them to pursue their own purpose.

Excuse this short explanation, and believe me ever, my dear Lord, with sincere respect and regard, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

GRENVILLE.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 28th March, 1816.

The arrangements that are making for the performance of the cavalry duty in this country and in Ireland, connected as they are with the intended dismount to the extent of 20 men per troop, suggest the expediency of sending out the fourth squadron to six of the regiments under your command, and bringing home the three remaining corps.

I wish to consult your Grace, therefore, and to receive your early answer, as to the three regiments you would wish to send to this country, in order that the fourth squadrons of the other six may be prepared for embarkation without delay. It does not appear to me that this arrangement need alter the present formation of your cavalry into three brigades, as with the fourth squadrons they will be nearly as strong while consisting of two regiments as they now are with three regiments of three squadrons each.

The distance is so short, and the means of communication so easy, as to render it unnecessary, under present circumstances, to have any depôt squadron or troop for the regiments of cavalry under your command. The ninth troop has therefore been reduced, and any depôt and recruiting duties can be performed by your Grace permitting a captain and two subalterns from each corps to remain in England.

I remain, my dear Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

P.S. In order to guide your Grace's judgment in the selection of the corps to return to this country, I enclose an abstract of the number of men and horses at the depôts fit to join their regiments.

[ENCLOSURE.]

ABSTRACT of the Number of MEN and HORSES at the Depôts fit to join their Regiments.

| | Men. | Horses. |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Dragoon Guards .. .. .. | 30 | 103 |
| 2nd ditto .. .. .. | 15 | 22 |
| 3rd Dragoons .. .. .. .. .. | 55 | 34 |
| 7th Hussars .. .. .. .. .. | 160 | 96 |
| 11th Light Dragoons .. .. .. | 40 | 60 |
| 12th ditto .. .. .. | 100 | 105 |
| 13th ditto .. .. .. | 60 | 102 |
| 15th Hussars .. .. .. .. .. | 40 | 40 |
| 18th ditto .. .. .. .. .. | 150 | 150 |

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*M. Fabricius to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON PRINCE, Paris, le 28 Mars, 1816.

Le Ministre de Sa Majesté le Roi des Pays-Bas, Monsieur le Lieutenant-Général Baron Fagel, s'étant, comme Votre Altesse sait, rendu pour quel-

ques jours à Bruxelles auprès du Roi, je me suis en son absence présenté chez Monsieur le Baron de Barbier, Président de la Commission des quatre Cours Alliées, pour le prier d'ordonner que la somme de quatre millions de francs, formant le 2e quadrimestre de la somme destinée sur les contributions au royaume des Pays-Bas pour la construction des forteresses, fut comptée, ainsi que le 1er quadrimestre l'a été, à Monsieur Thuret, Consul-Général de Sa Majesté à Paris.

Monsieur le Baron de Barbier, en témoignant ses dispositions favorables à cet égard, m'a cependant fait observer que les stipulations du protocole du 21 Novembre de l'année dernière l'empêchaient de déférer aussitôt à ma demande, et que l'intervention de la Grande Bretagne exigée pour les Pays-Bas, comme celle d'Autriche pour la Sardaigne, &c., le mettait dans le cas de m'inviter à me munir d'abord d'une attestation qui prouvât le consentement du gouvernement Anglais à ce second payement, basé sur l'emploi qui aurait été fait du premier. Comme personne ne saurait être juge plus compétent dans cette matière que Votre Altesse, qui connait tout ce qui se fait relativement à cet objet, j'ai cru devoir prendre la liberté de m'adresser à elle de préférence et directement, à d'autant plus forte raison que ses sentimens de justice et d'impartialité bien connus, et l'intérêt qu'elle porte au royaume des Pays-Bas, la rendront sans doute disposée à faire ce qui dépend d'elle pour écarter tout obstacle à la prompte rentrée de fonds, à laquelle le Roi s'attend avec raison, et dont le retard serait sans doute fort désagréable à Sa Majesté. J'ose en conséquence prier Votre Altesse de vouloir bien faire parvenir soit à moi soit par la voie qu'elle jugera convenable, à la commission même, la déclaration qu'elle demande, et au moyen de laquelle les quatre millions puissent être reçus comme les premiers l'ont été. Le Roi, au Ministère du quel je rends compte de la démarche que je fais auprès de Votre Altesse, sera, j'ose l'assurer, sensible aux démarches qu'elle aura bien voulu faire à cet effet.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une considération très respectueuse,

Mon Prince, de Votre Altesse

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

FABRICIUS,

Conseiller de Légation de S.M. le Roi des Pays-Bas.

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[ 987. ] *To the Editor of the Gazette.*

Paris, le 1er Avril, 1816.

Nous avons lus avec surprise un article du 'Courier' du * qui rapporte non seulement le sens mais même les prétendues expressions d'une lettre supposée écrite par M. le Duc de Wellington à Sa Majesté, et d'une conversation supposée entre le Duc et M. le Comte Jules de Polignac.

Malgré qu'il soit bien connu que les gazetiers Anglais, et

* Blank in manuscript.

surtout celui du 'Courier,' employent des personnes à Paris pour leur faire parvenir des nouvelles de France, et que ce genre de correspondance s'est trouvé jusqu'à présent toléré, on devrait avoir la discrétion de ne pas publier des choses de cette nature, et dont la vérité n'est pas démontrée; car personne ne peut savoir ce qui s'est passé dans pareilles communications.

Nous sommes autorisés à dire que M. le Duc de Wellington s'est expliqué à des personnes qui lui en ont parlé de manière à nous assurer que dans aucune des lettres qu'il ait jamais écrit à S.M. il existe ni le sens ni aucune expression de celles qui ont été publiés dans le 'Courier' et autres gazettes Anglaises; et qu'il n'avait jamais eu une conversation sur affaire avec M. le Comte Jules de Polignac.*

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*To General Count Woronzow.* [988.]

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, Paris, ce 1er Avril, 1816.

Je vous envois copie de la lettre que je reçois du Roi en réponse à celle que je lui avais écrit sur votre désir de faire passer vos magasins par Maestricht. Vous voyez que vous pourrez faire vos arraugemens quand vous le jugerez à propos.

WELLINGTON.

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*Brigadier-General Bryce to Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, London, April, 1816.

In reply to your Lordship's queries of yesterday respecting the result that might be expected from the employment of British Engineers in directing the execution of a portion of those fortresses in the Netherlands where the projects of the British Committee have been approved of, I do myself the honour to state that, besides the zeal and intelligence naturally evinced by officers in the execution of their own designs, much time would probably be gained in the completion of the system of defence; for it would be unreasonable to expect that the Corps of Engineers of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, in its present infant state, should be able to furnish a sufficient number of experienced officers to direct the works of the whole of the fortresses in contemplation, which are not less than twenty in number, forming the most extensive system ever simultaneously undertaken in any country; and it is hardly necessary to observe of how much

* In the handwriting of the Duke of Wellington.

importance it is that these fortresses should be all finished, or at least in a very respectable state of defence, within the period of five years. Should the assistance of British Engineers be for the above reason afforded to direct the execution of a portion of these fortresses, I would suggest for the satisfaction of all parties concerned, and more particularly to give to His Majesty the King of the Netherlands the necessary control over the British officers so employed, that the works should be contracted for by open competition, which would be the more easily effected as there are persons of large capital in the country in the habit of executing public works. The King of the Netherlands might, in this case, nominate the Préfet of the district, or some other confidential person, to preside at the formation of the contracts, which should be framed with great care, and even rigour, respecting the time of execution and other conditions usually stipulated. His Majesty should also appoint the paymasters at each place, who would make the payments on the usual certificates and measurements of the Directing Engineer and other officers that all the terms of the contract had been duly fulfilled.

As there would necessarily be a Superior British Engineer appointed, to direct the whole of the British officers in one uniform system, he might also be ordered to make such periodical reports of progress and expenditure as the King of the Netherlands might require; and this officer might also be employed by the British government to examine and report periodically on the progress and expense of the works executing by the Dutch Engineers, with such observations on all the circumstances as would furnish the necessary information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army for the satisfaction of all concerned in this important measure; and indeed it would appear necessary, in any case, that a commissioner of this nature should be appointed.

I shall only further have the honour to observe to your Lordship that, as the projects already approved of by the Duke of Wellington, forming the whole system of defence for the Netherlands, will require the whole of the funds applicable to this purpose, any considerable extension of the works, particularly as contemplated by the Dutch Engineers at Charleroi, would, besides a most important loss of time, necessarily occasion a reduction in some other quarter, which it would be unadvisable to make; and this remark, as far as loss of time is concerned, is equally applicable to Mons and Nieuport.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Your Lordship's very obedient humble servant,

ALEXANDER BRYCE.

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*Count Jules de Polignac to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Aux Tuileries, ce 3 Avril, 1816.

Je ne pouvais guères supposer que la visite que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous faire il y a environ trois semaines donnerait lieu aux bruits absurdes qui circulent maintenant dans la capitale, et que les papiers Anglais ont recueilli en y ajoutant des détails aussi dénués de fondement que ces mêmes bruits qui y ont donné naissance.

En effet, le 'Courier' et le 'Morning Chronicle' rapportent une prétendue conversation que j'aurais eu avec vous, Monsieur le Duc, dont le but eut été de vous entretenir d'un changement de ministère en France, et dans laquelle j'aurais déployé, dit-on, un caractère officiel que vous n'auriez pas cru devoir reconnaître.

Vous savez, Monsieur le Duc, combien le contenu des articles de ces papiers est faux en tout ce qui est relatif à la prétendue conversation qu'ils rélatent. Le bruit de votre prochain départ ayant circulé à Paris il y a environ trois semaines, je me présentai à l'Elysée-Bourbon pour avoir l'honneur de vous voir, et je me félicitai d'autant plus de vous y trouver que dans mes précédentes visites je n'avais pas encore eu cet avantage: respectant vos nombreuses occupations, je crus ne devoir rester que peu de momens, pendant lequel tems vous eutes la bonté de m'entretenir, d'abord, des souvenirs que vous conserviez aux habitans de la ville de Toulouse, qui sous vos yeux au mois d'Avril, 1814, donnèrent des preuves d'amour pour leur Roi, si noblement alors appréciées par vous; et enfin, de la satisfaction que vous éprouviez en voyant l'exactitude avec laquelle les payemens stipulés dans le dernier traité étaient effectués par le gouvernement Français; à quoi je répondis en premier lieu que la France presque toute entière partageait les sentimens dont étaient animés les Toulousains; et en second lieu, que la nation Française avait à cœur de montrer à l'Europe que des engagemens pris par son Roi devenaient sacrés pour elle; j'ajoutai même, que la Chambre des Députés, si digne d'être l'organe de la France, offrirait bientôt un exemple touchant de cette vérité.

Tels furent, Monsieur le Duc, les seuls points sur lesquels roula la conversation qui remplit le tems de ma courte visite, et dans laquelle aucune affaire politique ne fut traitée, ni aucune mission annoncée de ma part.

Je ne doute donc point, Monsieur le Duc, que vous ne contribuiez de votre côté comme je le ferai du mien à détruire les faux bruits auxquels la visite que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous faire a pu donner lieu, et dont je n'aurais jamais songé à vous entretenir si l'on ne m'avait assuré que de graves personnages (involontairement, sans doute) ne les eussent accrédités; et si, d'après la manière dont ces bruits ont été rapportés dans les papiers Anglais, cette erreur de leur part ne devenait injurieuse pour le Prince auquel j'ai l'honneur d'être attaché, et dont vous connaissez, Monsieur le Duc, la noblesse de caractère et l'amour pour tous ses devoirs.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE COMTE JULES DE POLIGNAC.

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*To Count Jules de Polignac.* [989.]

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, Paris, ce 3 Avril, 1816.

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre de ce matin; et je vous assure que l'article du 'Courier' du * ne vous a pas occasionné plus d'étonnement qu'à moi.

* Blank in manuscript.

Je me ressouviens que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me rendre visite il y a environ trois semaines, et que vous avez resté avec moi environ un quart d'heure; mais la conversation que nous avions n'avait aucune relation avec les affaires, et regardait seulement nos anciens amis de Toulouse.

WELLINGTON.

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## STATE, &c., OF THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE.

Paris, 3rd April, 1816.

| Regiments. | Present Strength. | | Strength after deducting the Staff Corps and adding the Remounts. | | Strength without deducting the Staff Corps, but adding the Remounts. | | Horses proposed to be retained from the Regiments going home. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | At the Dépôt. | To be Cast. |
| 1st Dragoon Guards | 407 | 410 | 416 | 484 | 437 | 513 | ... | .. |
| 2nd do. do. | 431 | 420 | 423 | 412 | 446 | 442 | 22 | 8 |
| 3rd Dragoons .. .. | 394 | 416 | 429 | 424 | 449 | 440 | 84 | 12 |
| 7th Hussars .. .. | 451 | 416 | 588 | 492 | 611 | 522 | 96 | 16 |
| 15th do. .. .. | 437 | 416 | 454 | 429 | 477 | 456 | .. | .. |
| 18th do. .. .. | 441 | 412 | 568 | 535 | 591 | 567 | 150 | 26 |
| 11th Light Dragoons | 442 | 417 | 459 | 448 | 482 | 477 | 60 | 18 |
| 12th do. .. .. | 441 | 405 | 518 | 481 | 541 | 510 | 105 | 6 |
| 13th do. .. .. | 403 | 409 | 442 | 485 | 463 | 511 | .. | .. |
| | 3847 | 3721 | 4297 | 4192 | 4497 | 4438 | 467 | 96 |
| Deduct the present strength .. .. .. .. | | | | | 3847 | 3721 | 563 | |
| Difference more .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | | 650 | 717 | | |
| Amount of the 3 regiments proposed to be sent home* .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | | 1377 | 1480 | | |
| Difference less .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | | 727 | 763 | | |
| Staff Corps .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | | 200 | 251 | | |
| | | | | | 927 | 1014 | | |
| Proportion of Staff Corps to be given by the 3 regiments going home .. .. .. .. .. | | | | | 65 | 82 | | |
| Eventual diminution of force .. .. .. .. | | | | | 862 | 932 | | |

* 1st Dragoon Guards .. .. Men. 437, Horses. 513
15th Hussars .. .. .. .. 477, 456
13th Light Dragoons .. .. 463, 511
Being the weakest of their respective classes.

RETURN of HORSES belonging to the ARMY in FRANCE, under the command of Field Marshal his Grace the DUKE of WELLINGTON, K.G. and G.C.B., which have been found unfit for service at a General Inspection directed by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief's letter of the 30th Jan., 1816.

Head-quarters, Paris, 31st March, 1816.

| Regiments. | Number. |
|---|---|
| 1st Dragoon Guards | 17 |
| 2nd do. | 8 |
| 3rd Dragoons | 12 |
| 7th Hussars | 16 |
| 11th Light Dragoons | 18 |
| 12th do. | 6 |
| 13th do. | 52 |
| 15th Hussars | 64 |
| 18th do. | 26 |
| Total | 219 |

E. BARNES.

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*The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, St. Petersburg, 3rd April, 1816.

Trusting in your usual kindness towards me, I apply to you for your assistance and advice in a matter which seems to me of high importance. The spirit of the Belgians becoming daily worse and more dissatisfied on account of the entire influence of the Dutch, who have all the business in hand, and consider Belgium daily more as an annexed province which is to be submissive to the mother country, it seems to me of great importance to check this bad spirit as much as possible.

The King is exclusively surrounded by Dutch, who, although his intentions are the fairest and the best, lead him to be decidedly partial in favour of the Dutch; and this being the case, he is made to be quite averse to my being at my return from hence settled for the greatest part of each year at Bruxelles, which is the general wish of the Belgians, and might be very useful, for you know how easily that nation is gained and amused by a Court, and when amused they forget to a great degree their grievances, which at present is the only thing to try, since I can apply no radical cure, my reflections and remarks being never attended to, or, when attended to, they are ill interpreted by the Dutch that influence the King.

The circumstances being thus, I would request you, my dear Duke, if you approve of this measure, to propose it as a measure of policy to the King, who, by giving me the command of the troops on the French frontier, might by that means render my stay at Bruxelles likewise very palatable to the Dutch; and if you could also get your government to propose it, I think the King would agree to it. I hope you will not take it amiss that I applied to you on this occasion, but the uniform kindness with which you have treated me has encouraged me to take this step. Pray, whatsoever may be your decision upon the subject, I wish you would be so good to let me have a line by the courier Count Woronzow will send back in answer to the one who is the bearer of the present letter.

I hope you have received a former letter in which I announced to you, my dear Duke, my marriage. I cannot leave this before the middle of June, and shall not be in the Netherlands before the end of July.

Many remembrances to all those that are about you, and believe me for ever, my dear Duke,

Yours sincerely affectionate,

WILLIAM OF ORANGE.

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[ 990. ] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 8th April, 1816.

The Duc de Richelieu has just been here, and has informed me that Monsieur d'Osmond * has not yet been received by the Prince Regent as French ambassador, and that this circumstance occasions a good deal of conversation here; and encourages the outrageous Royalists, who wish that La Châtre should continue the ambassador.

Indeed, the Duc suspects that La Châtre entertains the same intentions; and he has gone so far as to tell the Duc lately that he considers himself ambassador still, and to claim the salary; and this notwithstanding his letter of recall has been presented to the Prince, and only because his successor has not yet been formally received.

The Duc de Richelieu is very anxious that an end should be put to this state of things, at least before the Princess's marriage. I told him I was certain that the cause of the delay in receiving Monsieur d'Osmond was the Prince's continued indisposition; and equally so that the knowledge of his wish that he should be received immediately would be attended to.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 991. ] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 8 Avril, 1816.

Je compte partir Mercredi ou Jeudi, dont je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez donner connaissance à Sa Majesté.

Je vous ai déjà entretenu sur le tort de la Comtesse de

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* Le Marquis d'Osmond succeeded the Duc de la Châtre as Ambassador from France to the Court of St. James's in April, 1816.

Lobau, de la famille d'Alberg; et par votre entremise Sa Majesté a eu la bonté de promettre sa grâce au Comte. Il paraît par la lettre incluse que j'ai reçu il y a quelque tems de Madame la Comtesse qu'on a mis le séquestre sur une terre qui lui appartient. Je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez avoir la bonté de mettre cette lettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté quand vous en trouverez l'occasion, et de la prier de faire faire des perquisitions sur la réclamation de Madame la Comtesse au moment où S.M. le jugera convenable.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 9th April, 1816.

In reference to my private letter of the 28th ultimo and to your reply of the 8th instant, I have to acquaint your Grace that the Prince Regent has been pleased to approve of the return to this country of the King's Dragoon Guards, the 13th Dragoons, and the 15th Hussars, sending in their room all the serviceable detachments at the depôts belonging to the remaining regiments under your command towards their completion to eight troops of 75 rank and file and 70 horses each.

I have to acquaint you that, for reasons which will be explained to your Grace, His Majesty's government have come to a recent decision that a further reduction shall take place in your cavalry force by withdrawing a fourth regiment; and I have the Prince Regent's commands to desire accordingly that the 11th Light Dragoons may be sent home in addition to the three above-named regiments.

Should any other of the light regiments appear to your Grace better calculated for recall than the 11th Dragoons, I beg you will give orders accordingly, acquainting me with the change, in order that the necessary depôt arrangements may be made.

This diminution of your cavalry force will render it impossible to have more than two brigades, and it will be therefore necessary that the junior Major-General of cavalry should be struck off the staff of your army. Your cavalry force will consist of one heavy brigade of two regiments and a light brigade of three regiments.

According to the suggestion of your Grace in your private letter, I request you will give orders that a transfer of horses may be made from the regiments returning to this country to those that remain in France in proportion to the number of men belonging to the latter that are now at the depôts, as stated in the margin;* and that you will also replace the horses declared unfit for service on the late inspection, selling the latter to

* 2nd Dragoon Guards, 16; 3rd Dragoons, 60; 7th Hussars, 160; 12th Light Dragoons, 100; 18th Hussars, 150.

the credit of the public for what they will bring on the spot, to save the expense of transportation.

I am, my Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 9th April, 1816.

It has become a great object with the Opposition to prove that the maintenance of the British army in France will be a charge upon this country, and they hope by that means to make the whole system unpopular.

I think there is no doubt that the receipts will cover the expenditure, unless there should arise any unforeseen demands; but it is very desirable to keep down the expense in order to meet any such charge. One way is obviously to keep as nearly as possible to the number of troops which we have stipulated to maintain, not only on account of the additional expense direct with regard to, but also because we must account with the French government for all excess of rations. As far as I have been able hitherto to make out the annual charge, estimating the amount of the force as low as 31,500, including officers and artillery, commissariat, and other extraordinary charges, it will be 1,150,000*l*. Our receipts, on the supposition of the whole to which we are entitled being received and equally divided during the five years, will be at the rate of 1,270,000*l*. This would give us an annual surplus, on which, however, we must not too much depend, as all calculations on extraordinaries of the army exceed the estimate; and there is some reason to believe that we shall be obliged to give way to a demand made by Hanover on Brunswick for part of the contribution, for the whole of which we have taken credit.

The commissariat charge is stated to be 70,000*l*. annually. Do you think that this can be any how reduced, as it appears a large sum? Among the extraordinaries is usually reckoned the secret service money. If this should happen to amount to much, do you not think it had better be taken out of the account, and placed under the secret service money of the Foreign Office, where it will not attract notice, and it will relieve the amount of the extraordinaries?

If there is any other change which your Grace can suggest calculated to lower the charge, it will be very desirable to become acquainted with it.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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## General Distribution of the Army under the Command of Field Marshal His Grace the Duke of Wellington, K.G., &c. &c.

Head Quarters, Cambrai, 10th April, 1816.

| Brigades. | Regiments. | Cantonments. | Number of Officers. | Number of Men. | Number of Horses. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | CAVALRY. | | | |
| 1st Brigade.—Head-Quarters, Cassel | 1st Dragoon Guards. | Frevent and adjacents | 30 | 458 | 438 |
| | 2nd " | Avesnes and adjacents | 22 | 437 | 420 |
| | 3rd Dragoons | Bailleul | 26 | 431 | 579 |
| 2nd Brigade.—Head-Quarters, Samer | 7th Hussars | Etaples | 13 | 114 | 112 |
| | | Frenecq | 1 | 38 | 38 |
| | | Longvilliers | 3 | 38 | 40 |
| | | Tubersent | .. | 30 | 30 |
| | | Widehent | 1 | 18 | 18 |
| | | Le Faux | .. | 17 | 17 |
| | | Esnocq | .. | 8 | 8 |
| | | Brixent | .. | 12 | 12 |
| | | Cormont | 2 | 33 | 31 |
| | | Bennilles | 1 | 27 | 28 |
| | | Recques | 1 | 6 | 6 |
| | | Montarville | 2 | 20 | 22 |
| | | Bensent and Inquexen | .. | 18 | 18 |
| | | Neutersent and Etreil | 1 | 32 | 27 |
| | | Boutin and Atir | .. | 20 | 20 |
| | | | 25 | 459 | 430 |
| | 12th Light Dragoons | Fruges | 10 | 167 | 116 |
| | | Ridingham | 2 | 19 | 21 |
| | | Luzy | 2 | 28 | 32 |
| | | Ruisseauville | 2 | 26 | 24 |
| | | Crigny | 2 | 46 | 37 |
| | | Verchin | 2 | 49 | 40 |
| | | Caulas | 2 | 23 | 23 |
| | | Fressin | 6 | 79 | 67 |
| | | Sains | 1 | 27 | 30 |
| | | Wambercourt | 1 | 44 | 43 |
| | | | 30 | 499 | 433 |
| | 18th Hussars | Deserves | 10 | 152 | 134 |
| | | St. Requiere | 1 | 18 | 18 |
| | | Long Fosse | 1 | 20 | 20 |
| | | Huquilieres | 2 | 49 | 44 |
| | | Preures | 1 | 18 | 18 |
| | | Cremarit | 1 | 22 | 21 |
| | | Weirving | 1 | 29 | 28 |
| | | Bentain | 1 | 20 | 15 |
| | | Bourthes | 3 | 80 | 65 |
| | | Menneville | 3 | 64 | 63 |
| | | | 24 | 468 | 426 |
| | Royal Horse Artillery | Samer (Head-Quarters) | 4 | 137 | 139 |
| | | Tangar | .. | 15 | 22 |
| | | Weirbois | .. | 6 | 9 |
| | | Longrick | .. | 6 | 9 |
| | | Carley | .. | 6 | 10 |
| | | | 4 | 170 | 189 |
| 3rd Brigade.—Head-Quarters, Cassel | 11th Light Dragoons | Wormhout | 13 | 195 | 159 |
| | | Eklesbeke | 7 | 140 | 131 |
| | | Steenverde | 4 | 61 | 60 |
| | | Soix | 3 | 42 | 31 |
| | | Quaetipie | 1 | 24 | 24 |
| | | | 28 | 462 | 405 |
| | 15th Hussars | Bourbourg and Vicinity | 24 | 496 | 437 |

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY—*continued.*

| Brigades. | Regiments. | Cantonments. | Number of Officers. | Number of Men. | Number of Horses. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | CAVALRY—*continued.* | | | |
| 3rd Brigade—*continued* | 13th Light Dragoons | Hazebrouck | 13 | 161 | 124 |
| | | Barmchove | 3 | 46 | 51 |
| | | Meville | 3 | 56 | 57 |
| | | Castre | 2 | 52 | 48 |
| | | Eake | .. | 8 | 11 |
| | | Morbeck | 3 | 51 | 51 |
| | | Steinbeck | 1 | 34 | 35 |
| | | Bosingham | 2 | 20 | 21 |
| | | | 27 | 394 | 398 |
| | Royal Horse Artillery | Cassell | 4 | 164 | 171 |
| | | INFANTRY.—1ST DIVISION, Head-Quarters, Cambrai. | | | |
| 1st Brigade | Grenadier Guards | Cambrai | 27 | 1259 | 75 |
| | Coldstream Guards | Cambrai | 11 | 253 | 29 |
| | | Marcoing | 5 | 231 | 9 |
| | | Gouzeaucourt | 4 | 226 | 9 |
| | | Gonnelieu | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| | | Villers Glishain | 3 | 116 | 5 |
| | | Honnecourt | 2 | 117 | 5 |
| | | Villers Ploich and Beaugnart | 3 | 116 | 10 |
| | | Banteau and Bantouzelle | 2 | 113 | 3 |
| | | | 31 | 1179 | 73 |
| 7th Brigade.—Head-Quarters, St. Leger | 43rd Regiment | Bapaume | 17 | 355 | 35 |
| | | Martinpuche | 4 | 105 | 4 |
| | | Ligny | 3 | 80 | 4 |
| | | Thilloy | 1 | 27 | 2 |
| | | Transloy | 3 | 125 | 4 |
| | | Beaulaincourt | 2 | 68 | 3 |
| | | Villers-aux-flots | 5 | 104 | 7 |
| | | Fremiecourt | 3 | 68 | 4 |
| | | Bancourt | 2 | 45 | 2 |
| | | Warlencourt | 2 | 40 | 3 |
| | | Le Sec | 1 | 62 | 1 |
| | | | 43 | 1079 | 69 |
| | 7th Regiment. | Amblainsville (Head-Quarters) | 4 | 47 | 12 |
| | | Bucquoy | 8 | 230 | 12 |
| | | Achiet le Petit | 3 | 90 | 3 |
| | | Puisieux au Mont | 4 | 76 | 5 |
| | | Grevillers | 3 | 89 | 4 |
| | | Bievillers | 1 | 33 | 1 |
| | | Bisancourt | 2 | 35 | 3 |
| | | Achiet le Grand | 2 | 43 | 2 |
| | | Behagnies | 1 | 37 | 1 |
| | | Gomiecourt | 1 | 29 | 1 |
| | | Ervillers | 2 | 73 | 3 |
| | | Courcelles | 3 | 78 | 4 |
| | | Ayette | 1 | 36 | 1 |
| | | Douchy | 2 | 37 | 2 |
| | | | 37 | 933 | 54 |
| | 23rd Regiment | Hamelincourt (Head-Quarters) | 6 | 53 | 12 |
| | | Boyelle | 2 | 40 | 4 |
| | | Moyenneville | 3 | 64 | 4 |
| | | Boiry St. Bictrude | 4 | 34 | 7 |
| | | Boiry St. Martin | .. | 26 | .. |
| | | Bois lieux au Mont | 3 | 39 | 2 |
| | | Bois lieux St. Mard | 1 | 24 | 1 |
| | | Henin | 2 | 40 | 2 |
| | | Boiry Bequerel | 2 | 31 | 2 |
| | | St. Leger | 1 | 51 | 2 |
| | | Croisilles | 6 | 141 | 5 |
| | | Bullecourt | 3 | 45 | 2 |
| | | Escout St. Mein | 4 | 77 | 5 |
| | | Mory | 3 | 57 | 3 |
| | | | 39 | 722 | 52 |

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY—*continued*.

| Brigades. | Regiments. | Cantonments. | Number of Officers. | Number of Men. | Number of Horses. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | INFANTRY—*continued*. | | | |
| 7th Brigade—*continued* | Commissariat | Sapignies | 1 | 43 | 61 |
| | | Farreuil | 1 | 43 | 61 |
| | | Bapaume | 1 | 4 | 4 |
| | | | 3 | 90 | 126 |
| 8th Brigade.—Head-Quarters, Beaumez | 27th Regiment | Queant | 6 | 139 | 7 |
| | | Riencourt | 2 | 42 | 2 |
| | | Lignycourt | 4 | 95 | 7 |
| | | Wraucourt | 4 | 38 | 3 |
| | | Vaulx | 4 | 155 | 8 |
| | | Bugniatre | 2 | 28 | 2 |
| | | Beaumez | 5 | 96 | 7 |
| | | Morenil | 2 | 40 | 2 |
| | | Morchies | 1 | 47 | 2 |
| | | Bertincourt | 6 | 129 | 8 |
| | | Velu | 1 | 19 | 3 |
| | | Bucquieres | 1 | 31 | 1 |
| | | Barastre | 2 | 49 | 4 |
| | | Rocquigny | 1 | 39 | 1 |
| | | Bugny (Head-Quarters) | 3 | 50 | 10 |
| | | | 44 | 968 | 67 |
| | 40th Regiment | Havincourt (Head-Quarters) | 6 | 150 | 14 |
| | | Granicourt | 2 | 56 | 4 |
| | | Hermis | 4 | 150 | 6 |
| | | Ruyancourt | 1 | 39 | 2 |
| | | Bus | 1 | 39 | 2 |
| | | L'Echelle | 1 | 14 | 2 |
| | | Neuville | 2 | 47 | 4 |
| | | Metz en Conture | 8 | 133 | 12 |
| | | Trescault | 1 | 25 | 2 |
| | | | 26 | 653 | 48 |
| | 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade | Bourlon (Head-Quarters) | 13 | 142 | 36 |
| | | Inchy en Artois | 8 | 168 | 10 |
| | | Pronville | 4 | 82 | 5 |
| | | Baralles | 1 | 30 | 1 |
| | | Buissy les Baralles | 3 | 52 | 4 |
| | | Sains le Marquion | 1 | 29 | 1 |
| | | | 30 | 503 | 57 |
| | Commissariat | Bugny | 1 | 30 | 46 |
| | Royal Artillery | Bapaume | 6 | 155 | 18 |
| | Reserve Ammunition | ,, | 2 | 61 | 72 |
| | Commissariat | ,, | 1 | 10 | 17 |
| | | 2ND DIVISION.—Head-Quarters, St. Pol. | | | |
| 3rd Brigade.—Head-Quarters, St. Pol | 3rd Regiment | Croix (Head-Quarters) | 3 | 40 | 10 |
| | | Humieres | 5 | 91 | 8 |
| | | Beauvais | 1 | 42 | 1 |
| | | Eclimeux | 1 | 60 | 1 |
| | | Croisette | 2 | 86 | 3 |
| | | Herricourt | | | |
| | | Oeuf | 4 | 101 | 4 |
| | | Lanzeu | 3 | 99 | 3 |
| | | Incourt | 1 | 40 | 1 |
| | | Blingel | 1 | 23 | 2 |
| | | Blangy | 3 | 132 | 3 |
| | | Humereuil | 2 | 32 | 4 |
| | | Bermincourt | 3 | 69 | 3 |
| | | Pierremont | 1 | 69 | 2 |
| | | Fleury | 1 | 32 | 1 |
| | | Wilmans | 4 | 97 | 4 |
| | | | 35 | 1013 | 50 |

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY—*continued.*

| Brigades. | Regiments. | Cantonments. | Number of Officers. | Number of Men. | Number of Horses. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | INFANTRY—*continued.* | | | |
| 3rd Brigade—*continued.* | 39th Regiment | Bethincourt | 2 | 32 | 6 |
| | | Tanques | 5 | 43 | 8 |
| | | Tanquette | 1 | 9 | 2 |
| | | Villersbrulin | 1 | 56 | 2 |
| | | Bethensar | 2 | 38 | 2 |
| | | Berles | 1 | 27 | 1 |
| | | Berlette | 1 | 23 | 1 |
| | | Chelers | 3 | 75 | 4 |
| | | Averdving | 3 | 53 | 3 |
| | | Ligny | 1 | 50 | 1 |
| | | Bailliel aux Cornailles | 3 | 95 | 5 |
| | | Monchy le Breton | 4 | 59 | 7 |
| | | La Tienloy | 2 | 38 | 2 |
| | | Magnycourt en Comte | 2 | 59 | 2 |
| | | Bovelin | .. | 34 | .. |
| | | La Comte | 2 | 71 | 2 |
| | | Bajeu | 1 | 18 | 1 |
| | | Dieval | 5 | 94 | 7 |
| | | Bours | 4 | 94 | 6 |
| | | | 43 | 968 | 62 |
| | 91st Regiment | Gauchin | 2 | 50 | 2 |
| | | Troisveaux | 2 | 45 | 4 |
| | | Anvin | 1 | 49 | 2 |
| | | Tencur | 1 | 26 | 2 |
| | | Joune | 1 | 14 | 1 |
| | | St. Michel | 3 | 63 | 6 |
| | | Touflin | 2 | 36 | 2 |
| | | Hernicourt | 2 | 40 | 5 |
| | | Wavrans | 1 | 47 | 1 |
| | | Ostreville | 1 | 49 | 2 |
| | | Marquay | 2 | 40 | 2 |
| | | Roillicourt | 1 | 52 | 1 |
| | | Epenchen | 1 | 22 | .. |
| | | Rocourt | 1 | 21 | 1 |
| | | Hestries | 2 | 67 | 2 |
| | | Eps | 1 | 30 | 1 |
| | | Conteville | 1 | 20 | 1 |
| | | Monchy Cayeux | 2 | 70 | 2 |
| | | St. Pol (Head-Quarters) | 16 | 251 | 24 |
| | | | 43 | 992 | 61 |
| | Commissariat Train | Vallum | 1 | 42 | 60 |
| | | Baillieul | .. | 21 | 31 |
| | | Maisnil | 1 | 27 | 49 |
| | | | 2 | 90 | 140 |
| 4th Brigade | 4th Regiment | Fauquemberg (Head-Quarters) | 8 | 109 | 17 |
| | | St. Martin | ... | 46 | .. |
| | | St. Lerian | .. | 34 | .. |
| | | Theimbroime | 3 | 68 | 5 |
| | | Renty | 4 | 49 | 12 |
| | | Assonval | 1 | 23 | 1 |
| | | Audinethum | 2 | 68 | 3 |
| | | Dennebrock | 1 | 42 | 2 |
| | | Ricklingham | 1 | 35 | 1 |
| | | Verchocq | 2 | 65 | 3 |
| | | Herly | 2 | 44 | 2 |
| | | Aresnes | .. | 23 | .. |
| | | Rumilly | 2 | 74 | 2 |
| | | Wadonne | 1 | 54 | 1 |
| | | Menca | .. | 12 | .. |
| | | Campagne | 2 | 68 | 3 |
| | | | 29 | 814 | 52 |

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY—*continued.*

| Brigades. | Regiments. | Cantonments. | Number of Officers. | Number of Men. | Number of Horses. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | INFANTRY—*continued.* | | | |
| 4th Brigade—*continued.* | 52nd Regiment | Upen de Aval (Head-Quarters) | 3 | 18 | 8 |
| | | Upen de Amont | .. | 21 | .. |
| | | Herbelle | 2 | 59 | 4 |
| | | Blessy | 3 | 60 | 5 |
| | | Marthes | .. | 34 | .. |
| | | Roquitoire | 4 | 100 | 5 |
| | | Rebecque | 2 | 34 | 2 |
| | | Crecque | 1 | 34 | 2 |
| | | Mannets | .. | 34 | .. |
| | | Ecques | 3 | 68 | 4 |
| | | Inghen | 1 | 19 | 1 |
| | | Clarques | 1 | 51 | 4 |
| | | Therouanne | 2 | 39 | 3 |
| | | Couchy de Ecques | .. | 30 | .. |
| | | Corjeeques | 2 | 39 | 3 |
| | | Delette | 2 | 55 | 2 |
| | | Neille les Therouannes | 1 | 20 | 4 |
| | | Bomey | 2 | 63 | 5 |
| | | Erny St. Julien | 1 | 31 | 1 |
| | | Estre Blanche | 2 | 38 | 4 |
| | | Enquinegatte | 2 | 60 | 2 |
| | | Serny | 2 | 25 | 3 |
| | | Flechinel | .. | 26 | .. |
| | | Enquin | 1 | 45 | 4 |
| | | Bilques | 2 | .. | 4 |
| | | | 39 | 1003 | 70 |
| | 79th Regiment | Wizernes (Head-Quarters) | 3 | 106 | 7 |
| | | Bayinghem | 2 | 40 | 4 |
| | | Affringues | 1 | 21 | .. |
| | | Eine | 2 | 27 | 2 |
| | | Wavrans | 1 | 36 | .. |
| | | Lumbres | 3 | 62 | 5 |
| | | Werquin | 1 | 15 | 1 |
| | | Rumilly | 1 | 25 | 1 |
| | | Ouve | 1 | 15 | .. |
| | | Quimes | 2 | 21 | 1 |
| | | Arquin | 2 | 33 | 1 |
| | | Tatinghem | 3 | 56 | 2 |
| | | Helfeent | 3 | 60 | 3 |
| | | Campagne | 1 | 22 | .. |
| | | Wardinecque | 2 | 30 | .. |
| | | Blandecque | 7 | 98 | 11 |
| | | Haline | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| | | | 37 | 671 | 42 |
| | Commissariat Train | Clety | 1 | 20 | 35 |
| | | Dohem | 1 | 32 | 45 |
| | | | 2 | 52 | 80 |
| 6th Brigade.—Head-Quarters, Lillers | 6th Regiment | Busnes | 7 | 159 | 6 |
| | | Burbuse and Lozinghem | 3 | 73 | 3 |
| | | Ham | 3 | 84 | 3 |
| | | Allouagnes | 2 | 72 | 2 |
| | | Auchel and Couchy à la Tour | 4 | 75 | 4 |
| | | Equedecqu Lepesse | 2 | 78 | 1 |
| | | Lillers (Head-Quarters) | 14 | 302 | 19 |
| | | | 35 | 843 | 38 |
| | 29th Regiment | Chocques (Head-Quarters) | 7 | 136 | 20 |
| | | Gonnelrem | 8 | 235 | 12 |
| | | Hinge | 5 | 154 | 11 |
| | | Mont Bernenchen | 4 | 141 | 4 |
| | | La Boeuvières | 4 | 110 | 9 |
| | | La Pugny | 3 | 85 | 3 |
| | | | 31 | 861 | 59 |

## GENERAL DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY—*continued.*

| Brigades. | Regiments. | Cantonments. | Number of Officers. | Number of Men. | Number of Horses. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **INFANTRY—*continued.*** | | | |
| 6th Brigade—*continued.* | 71st Regiment | Norrein Ponte (Head-Quarters) | 6 | 158 | 12 |
| | | St. Hilain | 1 | 59 | 2 |
| | | Leers | 1 | 20 | 1 |
| | | Ame | 1 | 42 | 2 |
| | | Amette | 3 | 39 | 3 |
| | | Auchy | 1 | 46 | 2 |
| | | Vestrakin | 1 | 39 | 1 |
| | | Rely | 2 | 38 | 3 |
| | | Lingham | 1 | 37 | 1 |
| | | Ligny | 3 | 77 | 4 |
| | | Isberque | 3 | 79 | 5 |
| | | Molingham | 3 | 80 | 6 |
| | | Berquette | 2 | 78 | 2 |
| | | Muzlingham | 1 | 44 | 5 |
| | | Rombly | 2 | 13 | 4 |
| | | Ferfay | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | | Vitteniess | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | | Lietre | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | | Norrein | 1 | .. | 2 |
| | | | 35 | 864 | 62 |
| | Commissariat Train | Boureq | 1 | 36 | 64 |
| | | St. Hilaire | .. | 4 | 10 |
| | | | 1 | 40 | 74 |
| | Royal Sappers and Miners | Weil | 2 | 3 | 7 |
| | | Pernes | 6 | 79 | 18 |
| | | Floringham | .. | 19 | 38 |
| | | | 8 | 101 | 63 |
| Major Rogers's Brigade Royal Artillery | | Lillers | 7 | 157 | 114 |
| Captain Sandham's Brigade Royal Artillery | | St. Pol | 5 | 144 | 110 |
| Reserve Ammunition | | Lillers Barbent | 3 | 57 | 61 |
| Royal Waggon Train | | Aubigny | 3 | 58 | 69 |
| 1 Troop | | Agmires | 1 | 18 | 35 |
| | | | 4 | 76 | 104 |
| Division Commissariat | | Le Parcq | 2 | 34 | 49 |

### 3RD DIVISION.—Head-Quarters, Valenciennes.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2nd Brigade | 3rd Batt. Royals | Valenciennes | 36 | 1132 | 49 |
| | 57th Regiment | Valenciennes | 42 | 705 | 38 |
| | 2nd Batt. Rifle Brigade | Le Celles | 14 | 212 | 20 |
| | | Rumigies | 6 | 168 | 11 |
| | | Rosuth | 7 | 173 | 9 |
| 5th Brigade | 5th Regiment | Valenciennes | 37 | 1152 | 49 |
| | 9th ,, | St. Amand | 40 | 1032 | 36 |
| | 21st ,, | Valenciennes | 42 | 1004 | 43 |
| 9th Brigade | 81st ,, | Valenciennes | 37 | 1076 | 40 |
| | 98th ,, | Valenciennes | 34 | 1113 | 56 |
| Major Brown's Brigade of Artillery | | Valenciennes | 9 | 215 | 192 |
| Captain Hutchinson's Brigade of Artillery | | St. Amand | 4 | 161 | 110 |
| Troop Royal Waggon Train | | Herrin | 5 | 76 | 76 |
| Royal Staff Corps | | Proville (Head-Quarters) | 4 | 69 | .. |
| | | Noyelle) | 7 | 99 | .. |
| | | | 11 | 168 | .. |
| Royal Waggon Train | | Raillencourt (Head-Quarters) | 3 | 18 | 29 |
| | | Sailly | 7 | 56 | 114 |
| | | St. Olle | .. | 16 | 36 |
| | | | 10 | 90 | 179 |

General Distribution of the Army—*continued.*

| Brigades. | Regiments. | Cantonments. | Number of Officers. | Number of Men. | Number of Horses. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | INFANTRY—*continued.* | | | |
| Commissariat Waggon Train | | Sancourt | 6 | 10 | 15 |
| | | Blecourt | 2 | 49 | 64 |
| | | Abancourt | 2 | 46 | 40 |
| | | Hem Le Glet | 1 | 44 | 62 |
| | | Fressies | 1 | 44 | 62 |
| | | Abancheul | 1 | 44 | 62 |
| | | Oissy | 4 | 137 | 186 |
| | | Pellue | 1 | 42 | 62 |
| | | Salgy L'Elrec | 1 | 42 | 62 |
| | | Epigney | 1 | 42 | 62 |
| | | Haynecourt | 3 | 33 | 20 |
| | | Fontaine Notre Dame | 2 | 88 | 124 |
| | | Valenciennes | 9 | 317 | 434 |
| | | Bourcy | 5 | 179 | 245 |
| | | St. Pol | 10 | 269 | 372 |
| | | | 48 | 1343 | 1816 |

R. Torrens, Lieut.-Col., A.Q.M.G.

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*To C. Long, Esq.* [992.]

My dear Long, Cambrai, 13th April, 1816.

I have considered your Army Prize Bill; but before I can give you a final opinion upon it, I should wish to read the existing law, of which I have no copy. I have no reason to complain of the evil which it is the object of your law to remedy. The agents who made the payment of the Peninsular prize-money commenced it as soon as the lists of those entitled could be prepared, and I could with propriety give the order for the payment. Exchequer-bills had been bought with the money as soon as it was received, and the interest on the bills up to the day of payment was carried to the account of the fund. Nothing could be fairer or more advantageous to those entitled to share than this mode of proceeding; and they would not gain at all in this respect by the enactments of the proposed bill: indeed they would lose under the operation of the 9th clause, supposing that the lists should not be ready at the moment the money should be paid to Chelsea by the Treasury. The retired soldiers of the army would derive great advantage from the 13th, 16th, and 19th clauses. I am very much embarrassed upon the whole of this subject by the mode in which it has been necessarily determined by the Sovereigns whose troops composed

the army under my command in the late campaign, to make the division of the contribution. The foreign troops cannot receive their money at Chelsea, and cannot be made to obey the provisions of an English Act of Parliament. I am inclined to wish, therefore, that you would delay this measure till after the payment of the French contribution, or that payment should be excepted from the operation of your bill; but I shall be able to give a more decided opinion upon this subject when I shall see the existing law.

WELLINGTON.

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[993.] *To Colonel* ————————.

SIR, Cambrai, 13th April, 1816.

I feel the greatest difficulty in recurring back to transactions and events of such long standing as those which followed the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro. I was not on the spot when General Brenier passed the Agueda after escaping from Almeida, and I of course depended upon the reports I received in forming my judgment of the transaction, and of the credit due to the officers and troops. As well as I can recollect at this distance of time I did not entirely approve of your conduct upon that occasion, and I could not report that I did so; neither can I now make an explanatory report, in order to convey an approbation which I did not at the time feel.

I am much concerned that it is not in my power to comply with your wishes.

WELLINGTON.

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[994.] *To Lord Niddry.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 13th April, 1816.

I have received your letter of the 2nd regarding the desire of the 92nd Regiment to wear the word "Arriverete" in their colours, &c., to which I have no objection; and I will apply for this distinction, if, after this explanation, they should still desire it.

Arriverete is a village on the Gave de Mauléon, at which

there is a wooden bridge. We had passed the river at other points; but our communication across it was difficult, and the enemy was in such force at Sauveterre, in the neighbourhood, that we could not venture to move along it; and I wished to get possession of the bridge before the enemy could destroy it. The 92nd forded the river, and attacked and took the village against very superior numbers of the enemy in the most gallant style, in the manner in which they have always performed every service on which they have been employed; but without much loss. There the affair ended. We were not prepared at that time to do more; and we held the village as a tête de pont till our means were in readiness for our farther operations.

There is no doubt that the troops behaved as gallantly in this affair as they could in any of greater importance; but the result was not of that consequence to the ulterior operations of the army to have rendered it notorious to the army at large: and, although I reported it as I ought, I know that there are many belonging to the army, some even who were present, who have no recollection of the name of the place which was the scene of the action, and some not even of the action itself.

It appears to me to be beneath the reputation of the 92nd to have to explain for what cause the name of a particular place has been inscribed in their colours; and notwithstanding that on no occasion could they or any other troops behave better than they did upon that, I acknowledge that I am anxious they should not press this request. But if, after this explanation, they continue to wish it, I will take care that it shall be granted.

I hope your health is quite re-established.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King of the Netherlands.* [995.]

SIRE, Cambrai, ce 14 Avril, 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de Votre Majesté du 9me; et comme je compte me mettre en route Vendredi pour avoir l'honneur de lui faire ma cour, je remets jusqu'à ce moment de soumettre à Votre Majesté mes idées sur ce qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de me communiquer.

WELLINGTON.

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[996.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 14th April, 1816.

I send you copies of papers which I received yesterday from the King of the Netherlands, from which your Lordship will perceive that His Majesty has ordered the commencement of some of the proposed works, and has referred others to the consideration of his engineers. It appears that he does not propose to employ the British engineers on this service at all.

As I never saw his decree of November, 1815, regarding Charleroi, I do not know whether he proposes to adopt the plan which I recommended to him in my report; and I see that he has delayed the execution of the works at Mons, the completion of which will take five years' time. The expense, likewise, is a very serious consideration on this subject.

General Bryce, who is in England, will explain to your Lordship the difference of expense in the employment of the British or Netherland engineers in every part and in the whole of this plan.

I write to the King to inform him that I shall go on Friday to pay my respects to him, but I am afraid he is gone to the Hague. I will endeavour to get him on upon Mons, and set him right upon Charleroi. But the employment of the British engineers must be a matter of diplomatic negotiation.

WELLINGTON.

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[997.] *To Baron de Nagell.*

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 14th April, 1816.

I received yesterday from the Intendant-General de l'Administration de la Guerre at the Hague a warrant for 9800 florins for my pay to the 31st of March, which is the cause of my troubling you on this occasion. I was highly flattered by His Majesty's appointment of me to be a Field Marshal in his service, and to command his troops during the war, and I willingly accepted the pay of that situation whilst I performed the duty of it. But His Majesty has rewarded the services I may have rendered him far beyond my deserving, and I do not think that I ought to be a burthen upon the finances of the

kingdom after the period at which I ceased to exercise the command of his troops, or to perform any duty with them. I hope, therefore, that at the same time that I feel honoured by being permitted still to consider myself as belonging to His Majesty's service, and that I shall always be happy to render His Majesty any service in my power, His Majesty will approve of my declining to receive the pay of a Field Marshal in his service as long as His Majesty will not find it necessary to employ me as such. I trouble you to explain these sentiments to His Majesty, and to believe me

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON, PRINCE OF WATERLOO.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [998.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 15th April, 1816.

I return the proxy signed and sealed. Cole goes on Thursday, and I will request him to take care to be in London by Thursday week, as he proposes to pass by Lisle, Cassel, &c. I will send Lord Edward likewise.

In answer to your letter of the 9th, you may depend upon it that I will do everything in my power to keep down the expense of the British contingent. I have already brought down the horses from 13,500 to 10,000, and I will send home every body not absolutely necessary to keep the corps in a reasonably efficient state. It is understood by the French government that we can draw 40,000 rations for men; so that if you do not wish to reduce the numbers we have now, with a view to diminish the expense incurred here on account of their pay, there is no occasion to reduce them on account of their food. If you should wish to reduce the numbers here on account of the expense incurred here of their pay, and you do not want the troops for service elsewhere, I would beg you to allow me to make the reduction among some of the departments which I may think can be reduced. It is very distressing to see how much the expense of all the civil departments of the service has increased in late years; but I think the evil can be traced to the desire of government to provide a more efficient control over the expenditure, and to force the holders of public

money to account for it, as well as to the necessity of raising the salaries of clerks, &c.

I know that since the Peace of Paris we have three new civil departments in this army. We had a Commissary-General and a Commissary of Accounts. We have now, besides these two officers and their departments, an Accountant-General, a Comptroller of Army Accounts, and a Storekeeper-General, each of them with large departments. We have not less than 150 clerks in this town; and all this appears necessary when we live at the expense of the French government.

The duties of the Accountant-General appear to be of a very extraordinary description: they are to make up the accounts of other people, who one might imagine might as well make up their own, and would make them up if the simple principle were adopted of considering and acting towards a man as a debtor who should have public money in his hands unaccounted for, in the same manner as every individual's servant or steward would be considered in private transactions.

I refer you to the despatches I wrote to you in the late war upon the subject of the accounts of the Commissariat. We have now here an intelligent and active Comptroller of Army Accounts. Let us keep the Commissary-General and him, and their necessary departments, and send all the rest away; and let us try the system which I proposed to you in those letters.

Let each individual officer in the Commissariat be accountable at stated periods for what he receives, and be turned out as a servant or steward would be if he neglects to account at the period and in the form required, and let the Comptroller of Army Accounts be the auditor; and I will engage not only to get rid of a large expense, and an inconvenience which upon service would be quite intolerable, but to produce the accounts better and more regularly settled than they have been to this moment.

I think also that the Purveyor-General's department is entirely useless and very extravagant, and might be abolished.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

If the 11th Dragoons is withdrawn only to diminish the number of horses with the army, I beg to inform you that I

have brought the number down to 10,000 including that regiment: I can keep it therefore without inconvenience, and I will order that it shall not embark till I shall hear again.

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*To Sir Charles Stuart.* [999.]

My dear Stuart, Cambrai, 15th April, 1816.

We must come to some fixed arrangement about the communication with England which your office will really and strictly carry into execution.

If you send and receive your letters by this place, I will take care that the messenger shall not be detained longer than is necessary for him to change horses. Persons shall be ready at the post house to receive what he has to give, and to give him what he is to carry on.

It may perhaps be as well that he should be despatched from Paris at six in the evening instead of twelve at night.

If you do not send him this way, it is best that I should arrange my own communication with England.

It appears to me an useless expense to have an English messenger travelling backwards and forwards twice a week between Paris and Cambrai, and carrying nothing. But whatever we may arrange, let it be really executed. I heard you order that a messenger might be sent off with my letters on Friday night, as soon as they should arrive from England, but they are not yet come. If you had not so settled the matter, one of my aides de camp would willingly have stayed to bring them.

Ever your most faithfully,

Wellington.

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*To General Zieten.* [1000.]

Mon cher Général, Cambrai, ce 17 Avril, 1816.

Avant de quitter Paris j'ai eu plusieurs conversations avec le Général Müffling sur le nombre de chevaux que vous aviez dans votre corps d'armée, sur lequel sujet le Duc de Richelieu et le Duc de Feltre m'avaient écrit, et parlé plus d'une fois.

Vous savez que les Alliés en général sont limités à 50,000 chevaux, ce qui vient à 10,000 pour chacune des Grandes Puissances, et un nombre proportionné pour celles du second ordre. Il est vrai que les corps Allemands n'ont pas tous les chevaux qu'ils pouvaient avoir, mais le corps Russe en a plus que son nombre; et il a été convenu aux conférences à Paris que s'il se trouvait un défaut de la part d'aucun des corps, il seroit porté à compte du corps Russe, puisque S.M. l'Empereur n'avait pas les mêmes facilités que les autres Puissances d'augmenter et diminuer son contingent. Je me trouve dans la nécessité de vous prier de faire diminuer le nombre des chevaux avec l'armée sous votre commandement jusqu'à la concurrence de 10,000. Je sais que le Général Müffling vous a déjà écrit sur ce sujet; mais comme il n'est pas ici, et que je suis obligé d'en écrire au Duc de Richelieu, j'adopte cette méthode de vous en prévenir encore.

Aussi bien que vous, j'ai eu plus de chevaux dans le contingent Britannique que 10,000, et je me suis trouvé dans la nécessité d'en réduire le nombre dans toutes les branches du service.

J'ai toujours laissé le Colonel Hardinge à votre quartier-général, avec l'espérance qu'il pouvait vous être utile dans nos communications; et j'espère qu'il se conduit de manière à vous être agréable.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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PROCLAMATION.*

Au Château de Schoenbrunn, le 5 Février, 1816.

MARIE LOUISE, Archiduchesse d'Autriche, etc., aux François.

FRANÇOIS!

En acceptant la main de votre Empereur j'avois sacrifié mes goûts, mes affections, à l'intérêt de mon pays et au repos de l'Europe. Je n'espérois d'autre dédommagement de ce grand sacrifice que dans la confiance d'avoir accompli mes devoirs, lorsque votre estime et votre amour vinrent m'apporter des consolations inattendues. Elles sont encore et seront éternellement présentes à mon cœur, ces nombreuses et touchantes témoignages d'affection dont vous daignâtes payer les efforts que je faisois pour pratiquer quelques foibles vertus, dont je ne crus pas que le rang suprême pût me dispenser.

* Sent by Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh on the 18th of April.

Si jamais dès lors d* tout pour votre bonheur. Ainsi lorsque les désastres de 1814, en précipitant mon époux du trône, me forcèrent à en descendre moi-même, le Ciel m'est témoin si j'hésitois un seul instant d'immoler toutes mes prétentions au repos de ma seconde et chère patrie. J'espérois que des Princes que le hasard des événements réplaçoit sur un trône d'où les repoussoit le vœu national tant de fois si solennellement déclaré— j'espérai dès que ces Princes, retrempés par le malheur, essayèrent par une administration paternelle de faire oublier au peuple François que depuis 25 années ils conspiroient sous les bannières étrangères contre son bonheur et sa liberté.†

Mon attente fut douloureusement trompée! Les cris des nombreux victimes de vos tyrans ont retentis jusqu'à moi. Vos inquiétudes, les angoisses, et les tourments auxquels vous êtes en proie pèsent sur mon cœur. Non, François, je ne vous laisserai point périr. J'accours, accompagné de l'élite des braves, voués à la cause nationale, et suivie de deux armées. Un général qui dans ses fonctions directes a su conquérir l'estime des François, le Prince Charles, mon oncle, est à la tête de la première. La seconde est commandée par un chef dont le nom rappelle l'incomparable fidélité à la France, le Prince Eugène. Je ne viens point pour vous apporter de nouvelles vengeances, vous livrer aux fléaux de nouvelles réactions. L'arbitraire, l'hésitation, la cruauté appartient à la foiblesse. L'indulgence mêlée à la fermeté, la constance sont les caractères de la force. Rappelé par le vœu unanime des François, que doit craindre mon fils d'une poignée de misérables?

Je viens consolider, avec l'appui d'une représentation vraiement nationale, tout ce que la révolution au milieu de ces désastres a conservé de bon, de juste, de véritablement libéral: je viens calmer *toutes* les inquiétudes, et assurer toutes les existences.

Non, braves et intéressants habitants des campagnes, vous ne craindrez plus désormais la retenue de ces droits odieux dont une noblesse superbe et un clergé avide écrasèrent vos ancêtres.

Acquéreurs de domaines nationaux, cessez de craindre pour vous et vos familles. La fortune de neuf millions de François ne sera point bouleversée. La garantie nationale sera respectée. Soldats qui ont combattus sur tant de champs de bataille, vos services ne seront plus des titres de proscription. Je ne viens point, il est vrai, vous ouvrir la carrière des combats, mais le prix de tant de sang versé pour la patrie vous sera compté. François qui gémissent par le verrou de la tyrannie, les portes de vos cachots vont tomber à ma voix. La loi désormais décidera de la liberté des citoyens.

On ne verra plus sacrifié par l'intérêt d'une famille des mesures que l'intérêt de la nation pourroit à peine légitimer. François, réunissez à l'espérance. L'aurore du bonheur luise pour vous. Recevez pour gage l'assurance que mon auguste père vient de me donner que les Puissances Alliées, en abandonnant les Bourbons, renoncent aux impositions énormes qu'une politique peu généreuse vous avoit imposée. Mais c'est peu d'adoucir vos malheurs présentes, de vous procurer tout le bonheur que les circonstances peuvent comporter. Il faut maîtriser l'avenir par des institutions fortes et libérales. Le soin regardera l'Assemblée Nationale que vous allez nommer. Je prends l'engagement solennelle de la seconder de toutes mes forces dans tout ce qu'elle décrétera dans sa sagesse pour la prospérité et la liberté du peuple Français.

Persuadé que les vertus d'un citoyen sont nécessaires au chef d'un peuple libre, c'est à elle que je m'en remettrois du choix des hommes capables de

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* "Can't read the original."—*Note by copyist.*

† "This reads imperfectly in the original."—*Note by copyist.*

façonner mon fils au joug des lois; que vos suffrages ont appelé à l'honneur périlleux de vous gouverner un jour.

François de toutes les classes, levez-vous, donc, qu'une révolution dans l'intérêt de la nation soit faite par la nation elle-même.

C'est le moyen d'écarter l'intrigue ambitieuse, et de faire que tous les résultats soient véritablement populaires.

Certified copy,

JOHN FREMANTLE.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Paris, 18th April, 1816.

Monsieur and the Princes continue to manifest warm interest in the success of the proposition lately submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for the regulation of the elections, and have omitted no endeavour to induce the King to send up the amendment to the Peers. The inclination of Monsieur to declare his sentiments upon this subject in the Chamber of Deputies on the last day of the discussion was merely restrained by the assurance on the part of the Duc de Richelieu that he feared such a proceeding would compel the King's Ministers to answer His Royal Highness from the tribune in terms which might appear disrespectful to the Royal family.

The support His Royal Highness has endeavoured on this occasion to grant to the ultra-Royalist party has, however, been unavailing; for the King has finally determined to regulate the elections by an ordonnance conformable to the article of the Charter which divides the re-elections into proportions of one-fifth.

The financial arrangements for this year having been finally passed through the Chamber of Deputies, will be submitted to the Peers on Saturday.

A proposition for the creation of six millions of Rentes, to face the claims of different foreign Powers under the treaty of the 20th November, was at the same time voted, under an engagement on the part of the Ministers to account for the application at the commencement of the next session.

The difference of opinion which has prevailed among the Ministers during these debates does not offer a prospect of that union in the government which the present state of the kingdom urgently requires: it is, therefore, very probable that during the first weeks after the conclusion of the present session a partial recomposition of the Cabinet will be attempted, and the King must come to a resolution upon this occasion either decisively to support the Duc de Richelieu and the administration of his choice, or to give way to the counsels of the party which has been supported by the Royal family.

The spirit of insubordination manifested by the teachers and scholars of the Polytechnic School has determined the government to suppress that institution, and a commission is appointed to superintend the reorganization of the establishment upon principles analogous to the present situation of the country.

I am, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 19th April, 1816.

We have no returns later than the 24th of February. I cannot therefore answer the question of the Treasury how many of the enclosed list are off, or going off the Staff: just mark them, and return the paper.

I have this moment received your Grace's private letter of the 15th, and have not time to answer it.

The proposed reduction of the 11th Dragoons was under the supposition that cavalry would be the least exceptional reduction, and the most efficient in point of expense; but I will write more on the subject next mail. I certainly wish to leave entirely at your disposition the mode of reduction, whatever it may be, and shall state more fully on Tuesday the object the government have in making any.

Many thanks for returning the proxy.

Yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [1001.]

MY DEAR LORD, The Hague, 23rd April, 1816.

In answer to your official letter of the 19th, regarding La Fère, I have to inform you that I sent to the Duc de Richelieu before I left Paris to beg that he would not desire to occupy that place at present, and I have reason to believe he acquiesces in the justice of my reasoning on that subject.

It had been attacked by the Prussians, contrary to the wishes of the other Allies, up to the moment of the signature of the Treaty of Peace, not, I believe, with any view to the security of their frontier, as they alleged, but with a view to get hold of the artillery and stores which the place contained. It would put me in an awkward situation with the Prussian government if I were to take upon myself to allow it to be occupied now; and it would equally place the Prussian government in an awkward situation with the Prussian army if they were to consent upon the question being referred to them.

I think, therefore, and I recommended, that the question should not now be agitated, to which I understand the Duc de Richelieu consented; and I believe that Sir C. Stuart has not any fresh application from him, but has only reported what passed in the conference at which I was present on the day before I left Paris. After the conference I requested the Duc de Richelieu to consider the application as not made, and not to renew it for some time.

On mere military grounds I should certainly object to the

occupation of La Fère by the French government; but I don't think the question would rest upon mere military grounds at any time, and that the King of France ought to be accommodated, if it can be done without inconvenience to the Allies.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 23rd April, 1816.

It will be very desirable that the army in France should be reduced to 31,500 men, officers and non-commissioned officers included: but it is left entirely to your Grace to decide as to the mode in which this reduction shall be made; and you will consider the order for the return of a fourth regiment of cavalry as not having been received.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I will answer that part of your letter respecting the Commissariat on Friday, but I have not yet seen Mr. Vansittart.

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*Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 23rd April, 1816.

I received your private letter of the 15th on Friday last, and I should have answered it by the mail of that evening had the Duke not been absent for the day in the country.

From what you say, His Royal Highness has arranged with the government that the original intention of bringing home three regiments only should be resumed, and that the order respecting the 11th Dragoons should be cancelled.

It is His Royal Highness's wish that your three brigades of cavalry should be kept up; and when the fourth squadrons of the remaining six regiments are completed, he thinks they will be sufficiently strong for this purpose.

The government, however, do not wish that your total effective numbers should exceed 31,500 men; and it is left to you to reduce to this number in any manner you think proper, even including a fourth regiment of cavalry, should you think that preferable to a corresponding number of infantry.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

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*To the Emperor of Russia.* [1002.]

SIRE, La Haye, ce 24 Avril, 1816.

Etant venu ici pour faire ma cour à Sa Majesté le Roi des Pays-Bas, et pour parler à Sa Majesté sur quelques points en égard des forteresses sur les frontières, j'y ai trouvé le Général Ojarowski sur le point de retourner auprès de Votre Majesté, et je prends cette occasion de lui écrire pour lui connaître l'état des affaires en France. Les troupes occupent à peu près les frontières que j'ai indiqué à Votre Majesté dans la dernière lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser; et je suis bien heureux de pouvoir faire rapport à V.M. que le système de l'occupation militaire d'une partie de la France remplit les attentes de ceux qui l'ont adopté plus que l'on pouvait l'espérer. Les officiers et les troupes de toutes les nations se comportent envers les habitans du pays de manière à les concilier; et je suis bien heureux de pouvoir assurer V.M. que les siennes en donnent le meilleur exemple.

D'après le désir du Général Comte Woronzow le dépôt d'artillerie de son armée est en mouvement sur le Rhin, pour entrer la Meuse et venir à Charlemont.

Le Ministre de V.M. à Paris est si capable de lui donner des renseignemens sur l'état des affaires, et les vues de tous ceux chargés à y veiller de la part des différentes Puissances sont si conformes, que je ne peux lui apprendre rien de nouveau. Le mal est toujours le même en nature; et comme elle est dans les personnes mêmes des Princes et de la Cour, elle paraît presque sans remède. Le système d'occupation marchant si bien, nous avons tout lieu d'espérer de maintenir la tranquillité tant qu'il durera. Je voudrais pouvoir dire que mes espérances de sa durée après ce terme ne diminuaient pas de jour en jour.

J'ai l'honneur d'être de Votre Majesté, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir Charles Stuart.* [1003.]

MY DEAR STUART, The Hague, 24th April, 1816.

I arrived here on Saturday night; and finding that the King had gone to Loo with the Queen, and was not to return till the following night, I went on Sunday to Amsterdam and returned on that night. I waited upon His Majesty on Monday, and had a conversation with him which lasted two hours, principally

on the French in Belgium. Before my arrival the King had already adopted measures to remedy some of the inconveniences and evils complained of. His Majesty had ordered that measures should be taken to prosecute the printer of one of the most libellous of the publications, and it is to be apprehended that the law of the country (the Code Napoléon) is not strong enough to punish him. The King has ordered that a new law may be prepared, to be submitted to the consideration of the legislature, should it be necessary. These measures, the King says, would have been adopted at an earlier period if the complaints of these publications had been brought officially under the consideration of his government. The King has besides ordered that all the persons whose names are in the lists of the Ordonnance of July, 1815, should quit his dominions at different periods, the latest on the 15th of May; and although the King makes a distinction between these persons and the regicides banished under the law of the Amnesty and not included in the Ordonnance of July, 1815, I understood from His Majesty that he would not permit the latter to reside in the southern provinces. I must do the King the justice to say I found him perfectly disposed to do all in his power to satisfy the wishes of the French government and of the Allies upon the whole of this subject. I could not prevail upon him to order away from Bruxelles the French Generals and others now residing there who have come there under the authority of passports from the French government, specially naming Bruxelles as the place to which they were to go; but His Majesty assured me, first, that he would not allow any French subject to remain in the southern provinces who should come without a passport, or who should come with a passport for any other place in His Majesty's dominions, or in Germany or in any other country; secondly, that if the French government would recall to France any of the French Generals or other Frenchmen now residing at Bruxelles under the authority of French passports, and notice should be given to General Fagel that such persons were recalled to France, the King would consider them in the same light as persons without passports, and would not allow them to remain in the southern provinces of his dominions; and thirdly, the King expressed himself disposed to cooperate with the French government in preventing evil-disposed persons from plotting in his dominions, and that if the French government would apprise General Fagel when any persons of that description should enter

his dominions, whether with or without passports, measures should be taken to prevent them from remaining. All this appears perfectly fair, and I entertain no doubt that the King will do as he says.

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Paris, 25th April, 1816.

I enclose a copy of the proceedings* upon the trial of Sir R. Wilson, Mr. Bruce, and Captain Hutchinson.

The accompanying letter, requesting my intervention to prevent the interruption of their defence, was received on the second day of the trial.

The communication of this paper to the Duc de Richelieu induced his Excellency to send me the note which I likewise forward.

The result of the proceeding is a sentence of imprisonment for three months, which sentence will very probably be commuted to an order to leave the kingdom before the expiration of that term.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

Your Lordship's very obedient servant,

CHARLES STUART.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 25th April, 1816.

The departure of a courier for Naples having enabled me some weeks since to write to Mr. A'Court, I availed myself of the opportunity to transmit, through that gentleman, a complimentary message to Count de Blacas, expressing the regret of his friends that the King should have been deprived of his support during the trying moments which have followed the re-establishment of the government. The return of the courier has brought an answer from Mr. A'Court, which details the substance of his communications with Count de Blacas upon this occasion, in terms which merit your Lordship's attention.

As the language used by M. de Blacas respecting General Pozzo di Borgo appears to be strictly confidential, your Lordship will, I am sure, be fully aware that it is very necessary this communication should not be divulged.

I am, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*W. A'Court, Esq., to Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR STUART, 8th April, 1816.

My brother delivered to me your letter of the 22nd March, with its interesting enclosures.

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* Not sent.

I saw the Count de Blacas the following day, and communicated to him *verbatim* the message you charged me to deliver. This communication led to a very long discussion upon French affairs, by which I perceived that the Count wished to delay his return for two reasons: 1, because if he returned supporting the present Administration, he would become identified with those of whose conduct he did not approve, and whose long existence as an Administration he did not think possible; 2, if he returned, overthrowing the present Administration, the responsibility would fall entirely upon him, and he would again be held up to public execration as the man whose baleful influence was exerted only to mislead his master.

At the same time, powerful as these objections are, I see very well that all his hopes and wishes are directed towards a return: indeed, he has authorized me to tell you, with many thanks and expressions of gratitude for your friendship and good opinion, that an order from the King to return to his post will be obeyed with the utmost alacrity. Such an order, however, will be indispensably necessary, that it may not be said that his return was owing to any low intrigue or underhand solicitation on his part.

If you can procure such an order to be sent, independent of the service you wish to render to the world at large, depend upon it you will secure an influence which will not easily be undermined.

With respect to M. Pozzo di Borgo, of whom so much mention is made in the enclosures contained in your letter, M. de Blacas is firmly convinced that he is endeavouring to mystify everybody, his sole object being to obtain the post of Prime Minister of France for himself. He tells me the King himself is fully aware of this.

I have no particular news to send you from hence. The future Duchess of Berri is arrived from Sicily, and I presume will undergo the marriage ceremony very shortly.

The fleet will sail for France towards the end of the month.

I may perhaps (if things are quiet at home and abroad) run home for a few weeks towards the beginning of May.

Our plague at Noya continues, but it is less virulent.

I am, &c.,

W. A'COURT.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Paris, 25th April, 1816.

The Minister of the Interior brought forward a proposition in the Chamber of Deputies, three days since, for restoring to the port of Dunkirk the privileges formerly enjoyed as a free port of commerce.

This proposition forms a part of a general arrangement for reestablishing the same system in the ports of France which was in force before the Revolution, when Dunkirk, Marseilles, and Bayonne enjoyed the advantage of free trade.

A regulation has already established, under certain restrictions, the freedom of the port of Marseilles; and I understand the enfranchisement of the port of Bayonne will be proposed whenever the law respecting Dunkirk has been voted.

I have the honour to be with great truth and respect

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

CHARLES STUART,

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

My Lord, Paris, 25th April, 1816.

At the conference which took place yesterday General Baron de Vincent communicated to the Allied ministers the substance of a despatch he had received from his Court.

With reference to the letter which the Duke of Wellington, upon the suggestion of the Allied Ministers, lately addressed to the King respecting the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies, Prince Metternich, in this paper, unequivocally approves the line of conduct we had adopted upon this occasion, and instructs Baron de Vincent, in conformity with the principles which have hitherto guided our proceedings, to avail himself of every opportunity to render the King perfectly aware of his situation, authorising him to concur, on the part of his government, in every measure of prudence which his colleagues may think expedient to ensure support to the present government, and confirm the public opinion in their favour.

The substance of this letter has been inserted in the protocol of our proceedings, and will be the rule of our conduct as far as it shall be compatible with the future instructions from our respective Courts.

It appears nevertheless that a possibility of a difference of opinion is contemplated by the Austrian government; for the Baron de Vincent on the same day read to me a despatch from Prince Metternich directing his invariable adherence to my opinions and to those of the Duke of Wellington if, in the course of future discussions, either of our colleagues should manifest an inclination to diverge from the line of conduct which the general instructions of the Allied ministers have marked out for our guidance.

I have the honour to be with great truth and respect

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

Charles Stuart.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Mon Cousin, La Haye, le 28 Avril, 1816.

Je vous envoie ci-joint, d'après le désir que vous m'en avez témoigné, un tableau de l'organisation et de la force de l'armée des Pays-Bas. Je me flatte qu'il vous fournira tous les renseignemens que vous souhaitez. Je crois cependant nécessaire, pour donner une idée précise de la composition des 17 afdeelingen d'infanterie, d'ajouter aux observations qui sont consignées au tableau, que chaque afdeeling est formé d'un bataillon de ligne fort de 32 officiers et 912 sous-officiers et soldats, et de trois bataillons de milice nationale, qui chacun ont 29 officiers et 912 sous-officiers et soldats, formant ainsi un total de 119 officiers et 3648 sous-officiers et soldats. Ces quatre bataillons ont chacun sept compagnies, mais dont une, forte de 153 sous-officiers et soldats, est placée au bataillon de dépôt, de sorte que le bataillon de dépôt, qui forme le cinquième, se trouve composé des quatre compagnies prises dans les bataillons respectifs de l'afdeeling, et forme un total de 19 officiers et 612 sous-officiers et soldats.

Je ne saurois laisser passer cette occasion sans vous renouveler, mon Cousin, l'expression du plaisir que m'a fait éprouver votre visite à la Haye. Je regrette seulement que vous n'ayez pu y prolonger votre séjour.

Je suis, avec une haute considération, mon Cousin, votre affectionné,

Guillaume.

TABLEAU de l'Organisation et de la Force de

| Désignation des Corps. | Désignation et Division Générale des Corps. | Désignation et Indication des Sous Divisions. | FORCE Des Sous Divisions. Officiers. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | De chaque Division Générale. Officiers. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | L'Etat Major de l'Armée . | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Etat Major Général de l'Armée . | Département du Quartier Maître Général . . | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | Etat Major des Places . . | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Infanterie . | 16 Afdeelingen d'Infanterie, composée chacun de 5 Bataillons . . . . . | Chaque Afdeeling :— | | | | | | |
| | | Un Bataillon de Ligne . . . | 25 | 759 | .. | | | |
| | | Idem Milice . . | Idem. | Idem. | .. | | | |
| | | Idem Idem . . | Idem. | Idem. | .. | 119 | 3648 | .. |
| | | Idem Idem . . | Idem. | Idem. | .. | | | |
| | | Idem Dépôt . . | 19 | 612 | .. | | | |
| | | No. 29 un Régiment de 2 Bats. . | 75 | 1930 | .. | | | |
| | 4 Régimens Suisses . . . | No. 30 Idem 2 Idem | Idem. | Idem. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | | No. 31 Idem 2 Idem | Idem. | Idem. | .. | | | |
| | | No. 32 Idem 4 Idem | 112 | 2895 | .. | | | |
| | 1 Régiment Infanterie Légère de Nassau . . . | 3 Bataillons . . . . . | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | Dépôt Colonial . . . | 1 Bataillon . . . . . | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | Bataillon de Garnison . . | 10 Compagnies . . . . . | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Cavalerie . | 4 Afdeelingen de Carabiniers . . . . . | Chaque Afdeeling :— | | | | | | |
| | | 2 Escadrons de Ligne . . . | 16 | 390 | 416 | | | |
| | | 2 Idem Milice . . | 16 | 390 | 416 | 41 | 861 | 925 |
| | | 1 Compagnie de Dépôt . . | 9 | 81 | 93 | | | |
| | 2 Régimens de Dragons . . | Chacun de 4 Escadrons . . | .. | .. | .. | 41 | 861 | 925 |
| | 2 Régimens de Hussards . | Idem Idem . . | .. | .. | .. | 41 | 861 | 925 |
| Artillerie . | 10 Bataillons d'Artillerie à pied, dont 4 de Ligne et 6 de la Milice . . . | Les Bataillons sont d'une force égale, chacun à . . . . . | 32 | 728 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | Corps d'Artillerie à Cheval Pour le Service du Matériel | 8 Compagnies . . . . . | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Train de l'Armée . | 3 Bataillons de Milice . . | La force de chaque Bat. est . . | 22 | 1254 | 877 | | | |
| | | Il y a auprès de l'Etat Major des 3 Bataillons . . . . . | 2 | .. | 5 | .. | .. | .. |
| Génie . . . | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Pontonniers, Mineurs, et Sapeurs . | Un Bataillon . . . . . | Une Compagnie de Pontonniers, deux idem de Sapeurs, deux idem de Mineurs . . . . . | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |

## l'Armée de Sa Majesté le Roi des Pays-Bas.

TOTALE.

| De toutes les Divisions. | | | Des Corps. | | | De l'Armée. | | | OBSERVATIONS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officiers. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Officiers. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Officiers. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | |
| | | | | | | | | | L'Etat Major de l'armée est composé d'un Feld Maréchal, 2 Généraux (dont un Inspecteur Général de toutes Armes), 22 Lieutenants Généraux, (dont un Grand Maître de l'Artillerie, un Inspecteur Général de cet arme, un Idem du Génie, un premier Inspecteur Général de l'Infanterie, et un Inspecteur Général de la Cavalerie), 45 Généraux Majors (dont un Quartiermaître Général et un Inspecteur Général de l'Infanterie), 52 Adjudans des Généraux, 7 Colonels, 5 Lieutenant-Colonels, 7 Majors, 5 Capitaines et 3 Lieutenants en premier. |
| 149 | .. | .. | | | | | | | |
| | | | 351 | .. | .. | | | | |
| 54 | .. | .. | | | | | | | |
| 148 | .. | .. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | Le département du Quartiermaître Général est composé de 12 Officiers Supérieurs, 24 Capitaines, et 18 Adjoints. |
| | | | | | | | | | Il y a 58 Commandans de Places, et 90 Majors de Places, savoir: Quarante de la 1e, Trente de la 2e, et Vingt de la 3e Classe. |
| | | | | | | | | | Il y a dans chacune des 17 Afdeeling un Colonel ou Colonel en second, 4 Lieutenant-Colonels, et 2 Majors. |
| | | | | | | | | | Elles sont composées de cinq Bataillons, dont un de dépôt. |
| | | | | | | | | | Le Bataillon de dépôt est composé de 4 Compagnies, tandis que les autres le sont de six. |
| | | | | | | | | | A la tête de chacun des quatre premiers Bataillons est un Officier Supérieur, mais à celle du Bataillon de dépôt sont le plus ancien Lieutenant-Colonel et le plus jeune Major de celle même Afdeeling. Ces deux Officiers Supérieurs sont chargés de l'administration. |
| 2023 | 62,016 | .. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | A la tête de chacun de ces régimens est un Colonel, et à celle de chaque bataillon un Lieutenant-Colonel assisté d'un Major. Chaque Bataillon est composé de dix Compagnies. |
| 337 | 8,685 | .. | 2522 | 75,831 | .. | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | Le Régiment de Nassau est commandé par un Colonel assisté d'un Lieutenant-Colonel. Chaque Bataillon est composé de six Compagnies et commandé par un Major. |
| 92 | 2,958 | .. | | | | | | | |
| 30 | 912 | .. | | | | | | | |
| 40 | 1,260 | .. | | | | | | | Ce bataillon est commandé par un Lieutenant-Colonel, assisté d'un Major. |
| | | | | | | 3829 | 95,191 | 9776 | Les compagnies de ce bataillon sont indépendantes les unes des autres, et dont le Capitaine a rang d'Officier Supérieur. Elles sont reparties dans diverses garnisons, et ont chacune leur administration particulière. |
| | | | | | | | | | A la tête de chaque Afdeeling ou régiment de Cavalerie est placé un Colonel ou Colonel en Second, qui est assisté dans le Commandement du dépôt par un Lieutenant-Colonel, et dans celui des Escadrons par deux Majors. |
| 164 | 3,444 | 3700 | 328 | 6,888 | 7400 | | | | |
| 82 | 1,722 | 1850 | | | | | | | |
| 82 | 1,722 | 1850 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | Chaque bataillon d'Artillerie à pied est composé de six Compagnies, et commandé par un Lieutenant-Colonel assisté d'un Major. — Il y a pour cette arme un grand maître et un Inspecteur-Général: le dernier est assisté de deux Généraux Majors pour le personnel, et de dix Directeurs et 10 officiers supérieurs ou subalternes pour le matériel. |
| 320 | 7,380 | .. | 420 | 8,152 | 640 | | | | Le corps d'Artillerie à Cheval est commandé par un Colonel en second assisté d'un Lieutenant-Colonel et deux Majors. |
| 35 | 729 | 640 | | | | | | | |
| 65 | 43 | .. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | Sur le pied de Paix il n'y a dans chaque Bataillon que deux Compagnies de montées; et comme chacune d'elles a la force requise pour l'attelage d'une batterie, ce qui fait qu'on peut toujours considérer six batteries mobiles, dont le matériel se trouve réuni, et sert journellement à l'instruction. |
| .. | .. | .. | 68 | 3,762 | 1736 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | A la tête du corps du Génie est un Inspecteur-Général avec le grade de Lieutenant-Général. Il est du reste composé de Sept Directeurs, six Lieutenant-Colonels, six Majors, trente-deux Capitaines, trente-deux premiers Lieutenants, et d'un nombre égal de sous Lieutenants. |
| .. | .. | .. | 116 | .. | .. | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | Ces diverses Armes sont réunis sous le Commandement d'un Colonel, et appartiennent à l'inspection de l'Inspecteur-Général du Génie. |
| .. | .. | .. | 24 | 556 | .. | | | | |

RÉCAPITULATION.

| Désignation des Corps. | Divisions des Corps. | Force Totale. Officiers. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Etat Major Général de l'Armée .. .. | .. .. | 351 | .. | .. |
| Infanterie .. .. | 81 Bataillons .. .. .. 17 Idem de Dépôt 1 Bat. Dépôt Colonial 1 Idem de Garnison .. (100) | 2522 | 75,831 | .. |
| Cavalerie .. .. | 16 Escadrons Carabiniers .. 16 Idem Cavalerie Légère 8 Compagnies de Dépôt .. | 328 | 6,888 | 7400 |
| Artillerie .. .. | 10 Bataillons à Pied .. .. Un Corps à Cheval .. .. Pour le Service du Matériel | 420 | 8,152 | 640 |
| Train de l'Armée .. | 3 Bataillons .. .. .. .. | 68 | 3,762 | 1736 |
| Génie .. .. .. | .. .. | 116 | .. | .. |
| Pontonniers, Mineurs et Sapeurs | 1 Bataillon .. .. .. .. | 24 | 558 | .. |
| | Total .. .. .. | 3829 | 95,191 | 9776 |
| | | 99,020 | | |

NOTE.—Les troupes destinées pour les Colonies ne sont pas comprises dans la force portée sur ce Tableau.

*Divisions Territoriales du Royaume.*

Le territoire du royaume est divisé militairement en six commandements-généraux, à la tête de chacun des quels est placé un Lieutenant-Général.

Le 1er de ces commandements-généraux comprend les provinces d'Hollande et d'Utrecht. Le quartier-général en est à Amsterdam.

Le 2d celles de Frise, de Groningue, de Drenthe, d'Overyssel, et de Gueldre; quartier-général à Deventer.

Le 3e celles de Zélande et des deux Flandres; quartier-général à Gand.

Le 4e celles des deux Brabants et d'Anvers; quartier-général à Anvers.

Le 5e celles de Liège et de Limbourg; quartier-général à Maestricht.

Le 6e celles de Namur et du Haynaut, ainsi que du Grand Duché de Luxembourg; quartier-général à Namur.

Il existe dix-huit commandements provinciaux. La province de Hollande en comprend deux: savoir, celui de la Hollande septentrionale et celui de la Hollande méridionale. Chacune des autres provinces en forme un, à l'exception néanmoins de celle de Drenthe, qui pour cet effet est réunie à celle de Groningue.

Le nombre des commandements de place est de cinquante-huit.

Les Majors de place sont au nombre de quatre vingt-dix.

*Directions de l'Artillerie et du Génie.*

Le territoire du royaume, y compris le Grand Duché de Luxembourg, est divisé en égard à l'Artillerie et au Génie en six directions, à la tête de chacune des quelles il y a pour chacune des deux armes un directeur.

Ces directions sont composées comme suit:

La 1re renferme les provinces d'Hollande, d'Utrecht, et une partie de celle de Gueldre.

La 2me celles de Frise, d'Overyssel, de Groningue, de Drenthe, et de l'autre partie de celle de Gueldre.

La 3me celles de Zélande, des deux Flandres, ainsi que de l'arrondissement de Tournay.

La 4me celles du Brabant septentrional et d'Anvers.

La 5me celles du Brabant méridional, de Limbourg, et de Liège.

La 6me celles de Haynaut (à l'exception de l'arrondissement de Tournay), de Namur, et du Grand Duché de Luxembourg.

Les deux ateliers de construction à Delft et à Anvers ne ressortissent pas des directions d'artillerie dans lesquelles ces deux villes sont comprises, mais ils sont sous les ordres d'un directeur particulier.

Il en est de même à l'égard de la fonderie de canons de bronze existant dans la résidence, et de celle de canons de fer établie à Liège. Ces deux établissemens ont aussi leurs directeurs particuliers.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1004.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 29th April, 1816.

When at the Hague I had a good deal of conversation with the King regarding the fortifications and his military establishments in general. Upon the former he has departed in many instances from the plans I recommended to him, and he has put the whole matter in the hands of General Krayenhoff, the chief engineer of the Netherlands, upon whose plans I had already decided; and he has desired me to discuss the matter with him. I do not believe that this is what either the British government or the Allies intended when they placed the matter in my hands: however, I don't think it advisable that I should insist upon discussing the matter with the King instead of with his engineer, and I have appointed the latter to meet me on the frontier. After seeing him I will make an official report to your Lordship. In respect to the King's army, he proposed to send me an official report of the mode in which he proposed to form and keep it up. As far as I could understand his system from his verbal explanation of it, he is to have eight regiments of cavalry of 900 men each, of which half are to be militia; and he has divided his country into seventeen military divisions. Each division is to furnish one battalion of the line, by what we call the ordinary recruiting, three battalions of marching militia, and one of burghers; the marching militia to be taken by ballot from the young men, who are to serve for five years. These may enlist into the battalion of the line: after this service they

are liable to serve in the burghers. The whole militia to be embodied one month in the year. The King can always keep out one quarter of them without assembling the States-General. The officers of the line and militia are the same. The King has besides in his service about 4000 troops of Nassau, and from 6000 to 8000 Swiss; but you will observe that the total for service, for which he provides the means of recruiting, is 68 battalions, of which 51 are of militia and only 17 are of the line. This will give him about 50,000 men, of which about 12,000 or 13,000 will be of the line, besides about 10,000 foreign troops. Allowing that he makes the most of his burghers and militia for his garrisons, and reckoning his cavalry and artillery, he will never produce 40,000 men in the field. This is not enough for the advanced post of Europe. From what he and his ministers told me, I judge that he has great difficulties with his legislature, particularly with his Belgians.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1005.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 29th April, 1816.

Sir Charles Stuart has sent me his private letter to your Lordship of the *, in which he mentions the arrest of certain Spaniards at Paris. Some time ago Monsieur de Cazes informed me that he had seen a letter from Lord Holland to Lord William Russell on the subject of the subscription in England for the Spanish patriots, in which he hinted that he had objects in view beyond the mere pecuniary relief of the persons for whom it was made. He appeared to doubt that it was practicable to keep this object a secret from the Spanish or the British government. It is extraordinary enough that I should not now be able to recollect whether I saw the copy of the letter or not, but I think I did, and that the expressions regarding secrecy were the suspicious part of the letter. It appeared to me that the French government would make use of the letter at Madrid to aid in their scheme of alienating the Spanish government from the British nation, for which it was likely to afford them great facilities.

* Blank in manuscript.

I mention this now, as I imagine that De Cazes never mentioned the subject to Sir Charles Stuart, as he has not adverted to it in his letter to your Lordship of the *

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Commissary-General to Colonel Hervey.*

SIR, Cambrai, 29th April, 1816.

I have the honour to submit to the consideration of his Grace the Duke of Wellington a report from the Commissariat officer at Bruxelles, covering a claim from the civil authorities of that city for remuneration for damages sustained by certain public buildings occupied as magazines by the British Commissariat.

It may not be improper at the same time to transmit for his Grace's information copy of a communication which I have already addressed to the Comptroller of Army Accounts on the subject, and of his reply.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

T. DUNMORE.

[It appears to me that as the Commissariat took possession of these buildings to be used in different ways, without making any inspection of them previous to occupying them or making any report or memorandum on their state, contrary to the orders of the army and to the common practice of business, they must pay any damage which the owners may state they did the buildings, as they have placed the public entirely at their mercy. Mr. Alder's assertions are so much waste paper: he should have proceeded regularly and officially, and in a business-like manner, to have ascertained the state of the buildings before he used them, and then he might have disputed these claims with advantage.

WELLINGTON.]

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*To General Frimont.* [1006.]

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Cambrai, ce 30 Avril, 1816.

Quand j'étais à la Haye j'ai reçu les dépêches de V.E. du 7 et 14 Avril sur la violation du territoire Français par les

* Blank in manuscript.

troupes de S.A.R. le Grand Duc de Bade; et je remercie V.E. des mesures que vous avez pris pour le conserver intacte. J'ai écris au gouvernement Français pour qu'il donne ses ordres à ses agens avec le Grand Duc de s'en expliquer avec son gouvernement.

WELLINGTON.

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[1007.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 30 Avril, 1816.

Je vous envois deux lettres que je reçois de M. le Duc d'Otrante. Je ne sais pas exactement pourquoi il m'écrit, ni ce qu'il veut m'expliquer par tout cela; mais il est bon que vous le voyez. C'est bien vrai, et je l'ai toujours dit, que le Roi lui était redevable de son retour tranquil à son trône, ce que je crois personne ne niera qui a connu les affaires du mois de Juillet passé.

Votre très fidèle serviteur,

WELLINGTON.

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[1008.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 30th April, 1816.

I have received your letter regarding the keeping our force down to 31,500. We have now 29,261 rank and file, and 3543 officers, non-commissioned officers, and drummers, making altogether 32,804. We are sending away 1400 cavalry, including officers; 1700 men entitled to their discharge; 800 to be discharged as unfit; and 400 of the Guards; making altogether in round numbers 3300: and we shall receive about 800 recruits. So that you see we shall have fewer men than you intended.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir Charles Stuart.* [1009.]

MY DEAR STUART, Cambrai, 30th April, 1816.

I have received yours of the 29th. When I was at the Hague I had not with me the protocol, and I was not sufficiently informed to be able to discuss with the King the question of the regicides, and he certainly does not appear to think those persons in the situation with those under the Ordonnance of July, 1815. He talked of them as very old and infirm, some very rich and others very poor, and all desirous of being allowed to pass their days in obscurity. Many of them are quitting his dominions and going either to Germany or America, and very few will remain; and taking the question as a practical one, and not upon the principle, I confess that I thought it of little importance whether two or three regicides did or did not remain in his dominions, provided they were not immediately upon the French frontier.

If you are quite clear upon the protocol, I entertain no doubt that I shall be able to prevail upon the King to send away the regicides entirely, if the Allied ministers think it an object; but I must have a little time to work upon him. I think he is more anxious and angry about David than he is about the others.

You may communicate this letter to your colleagues.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 30th April, 1816.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will have the goodness to transmit to me your plan for the Commissariat department in France, and I can assure you that the Treasury are quite prepared to accept your suggestions and act upon them. There cannot be a better time to try the efficiency of your system than at the present moment; and it may be of essential advantage, in case of any future war, to have digested a plan by which the heavy charges and complicated accounts of the present system may be avoided.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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[1010.] *To Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens.*

MY DEAR TORRENS, Cambrai, 2nd May, 1816.

We have by this morning's state 29,073 rank and file, and 3529 officers and non-commissioned officers, making a total of 32,602, including the three regiments of dragoons not yet embarked; and we are receiving about 800 recruits, which will make us 33,400. We are sending away 400 Guards, 800 invalids, 1700 entitled to be discharged, three regiments of dragoons (1400): total in round numbers, 4300. So we shall remain with fewer men than we have been allowed to keep. The Staff officers are not included in this account, but they make but little difference. I wrote to Lord Bathurst two days ago on this subject a letter, which he will have got by last post. There is a difference between the account sent to him and this; because that sent to him was made out from the weekly state of the 24th April, and this from the daily state of this day, which I enclose.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[1011.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Cambrai, 3rd May, 1816.

I beg to inform your Lordship that it will be necessary to appoint a Commandant at Cambrai and one at Valenciennes, both places being occupied by the British troops.

The Lieutenant-Generals commanding the divisions, the troops belonging to which have hitherto occupied these places, have till now commanded in them; but this is a very inconvenient arrangement, and the duty in the places cannot be done as it ought without the employment of a special Commandant. I hope, therefore, that your Lordship will have no objection to my appointing a Commandant at each place.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.* [1012.]

MY LORD, Cambrai, 3rd May, 1816.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter of the 18th April, received yesterday by the Comptroller of Army Accounts from the Secretary of the Treasury, referring to a letter of the 18th of March from General Bunbury to Mr. Lushington, enclosing a list of the Staff of this army from the 25th of December, which Major-General Bunbury states not to be accurate; but yet Mr. Rosenhagen is instructed not to issue warrants for the pay of any Staff officers not included in that list.

I beg to inform your Lordship that Colonel Sir James Dickson, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain Fitzgerald, and Captain Frazer, Deputy-Assistants-Quartermaster-General, who were struck off on the 24th of December, were detained on duty in this country superintending the details of the embarkation of the army till long after that period. As some expense attends the performance of duties on the Staff, and as every person in the public service deserves his pay for the service he performs, I thought it proper to direct that Colonel Sir J. Dickson and Captain Frazer should continue to receive their pay till the 24th of February, and Captain Fitzgerald to the 24th of January, which I hope will be approved by your Lordship.

Colonel Elley, the Deputy Adjutant-General, is the senior Colonel of the army; and Colonel Sir George Wood, Commanding officer of the Artillery, is very high on the list of Colonels. Juniors to both in rank were Colonels on the Staff in command of brigades; and it has always been usual to give officers of the rank of Colonel in the situation of Deputy Adjutant-General and Commanding officer of the Artillery the Staff pay of their rank, particularly if they should be the seniors, as these are. If the government think proper, this Staff pay can now be discontinued; but I hope that the government will allow it to be issued till the end of the muster, in which notice will be given to these officers of its discontinuance; that is, to the 24th of June, in order that they may choose whether they will or not continue in their situations on the reduced allowances.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir U. Burgh, Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle, and Lieutenant-Colonel Percy, are the Assistants to

my Military Secretary; and I am quite certain that there are no clerks in any office who do so much. The business also which passes through their hands is of so confidential a nature that it is not unusual to pay those who transact it at least four times as much as these gentlemen have received. I hope, therefore, that your Lordship will approve of their continuing to receive their allowance.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir C. Broke is by his commission permanent Assistant in the Quartermaster-General's Department, and he must receive his pay either here or in England. He has hitherto, as others have, received it here, to which I hope there will be no objection.

Major Shaw is an Assistant Quartermaster-General appointed to do the duty at Calais. It is impossible to carry on the service without this officer, and I trust there will be no objection to his receiving his pay.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory is the Commandant at the Hospital at St. Denis. When the army was at Paris an hospital was necessarily formed at St. Denis, and a Military Commandant was appointed to it. That hospital still exists, and till it is broken up the Commandant must be continued, or great disorders will be committed, and many duties required cannot be performed. I trust there will be no objection to the Commandant at St. Denis receiving his pay as long as the hospital continues.

The Majors de Place and Aide Majors de Place at Cambrai and Valenciennes are situations to which I appointed officers, as the Commander in Chief of the Army of Occupation, in order to be responsible for the duties of those places respectively, and to take charge of the stores, &c., belonging to them, for the delivery of which in the order in which they were received your Lordship will observe that the British government are engaged by treaty. In a former despatch, No. * , I explained to your Lordship that it was settled by the Allied Ministers that each of the Powers should defray the expense of the places which their troops occupied; and I hope there will be no objection to paying these officers.

There are twelve Chaplains with the army, ten Assistant Provost-Marshals, and five Assistant Baggage-Masters, and a

* Blank in manuscript.

Medical Staff, which I hope your Lordship will think it expedient should be paid.

None of the officers above mentioned are included in the list transmitted by Major-General Bunbury to Mr. Lushington, which he called an inaccurate one, but upon which the Treasury have issued their orders to Mr. Rosenhagen to stop the pay of the officers. At the same time accurate returns and reports of the Staff of the army are regularly transmitted to England.

I would beg your Lordship to observe generally upon these orders that the Treasury ought to have sent them to me, as Mr. Rosenhagen issues the warrants for this Staff pay under a warrant and authority from me, as the Commander of the Forces, and not under the Treasury; and next, that the order dated the 18th of April was received here the 2nd of May, after the warrants of the 24th of April had been actually issued, and is dated six weeks after the receipt from your Lordship's office of the list on which it was founded.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [1013.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 5th May, 1816.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the Prince of Orange upon a scheme which he has for establishing himself in a kind of Court at Bruxelles.

I have written to him to endeavour to dissuade him from this scheme, which is so disagreeable to the King that he will never consent to it. I have told him that I was certain the British government would not interfere in this question, which was either purely domestic or relating to interior policy, and that the King would be offended at our interference; but that I would send you his letter.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[1014.] *To the Prince of Orange.*

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 5th May, 1816.

I received your letter marked "Most secret"* some days ago upon my return here from the Hague; and having learnt from Count Woronzow that he will have an opportunity in a few days of sending a letter to St. Petersburg, I avail myself of that opportunity to answer it.

If I had received it before I went to the Hague, I might have taken an opportunity of speaking to the King about your wishes, as in the last days I was there His Majesty more than once spoke to me respecting your Royal Highness, and expressed an anxious desire that you should give your whole attention to the army. His wish appears to be that you should have your usual residence at Court, which it appears to be his present intention to have for six months of the summer at the Hague, and six months of the winter at Bruxelles; and His Majesty is making arrangements for a residence for your Royal Highness at the former. In regard to the latter His Majesty said he should do nothing till you yourself should fix upon the situation you would have. Under these circumstances I don't think I could, with advantage to the wishes of your Royal Highness, enter upon the subject again with the King, unless I should have another opportunity of seeing him before your Royal Highness will arrive. This is what occurs to me at present on the subject; but if I should have any opportunity of writing to the King upon it, I will do so.

Your Royal Highness may depend upon it that the British government will feel a great disinclination to interfere in any manner on this subject. It is either of a nature purely domestic, or relating to interior policy; and the King would naturally be offended with his ally if the government were to pretend to give him any advice upon it. However, I'll write to Lord Bathurst upon it, with whom I believe your Royal Highness has always been in the habit of communicating confidentially.

I'll now give your Royal Highness my opinion upon your object itself. I think your Royal Highness is misinformed and mistaken regarding the existence of dissatisfaction amongst the Belgians. I know it is reported; but everything that is reported must not be believed to be true, particularly when, as in this

* See page 350.

case, there are so many individuals, and even whole nations, who are interested in breaking the union which has fortunately taken place between the northern and southern provinces of the kingdom. I should rather say that there existed strong symptoms of the satisfaction of the latter with the union; but of this I am quite clear, that, if not satisfied now, they will be so before long, as there never was a country placed so suddenly in so advantageous a situation. I don't advert to those people who become courtiers, though these likewise will benefit by the union of their country with the northern provinces, as they are never satisfied out of the region of a Court.

From what I have above stated to your Royal Highness you will see that the King intends to reside six months of the year at Bruxelles, at least in time of peace, and to hold the States in that town next October. This will put out of the question the execution of your Royal Highness's plan for more than the remaining six months. Upon this point I would beg to observe to you, that if you should fix your residence entirely at Bruxelles now, you will be under the necessity of doing so likewise when the period arrives at which the government of the country will devolve upon you. I imagine that in time of war this arrangement would be attended by the most inconvenient and dangerous consequences. Bruxelles is too near the frontier on all sides to be safely occupied as the capital of the kingdom; and this being the case, it is not expedient that the nobility and persons of fortune in the southern provinces should be accustomed to reside in it as such, and to look forward to the period at which it will actually become so. It is desirable, on the contrary, that they should be induced as soon as possible to consider the Hague as the capital of their country, and should provide accordingly. This they will not do if your Royal Highness should fix your residence permanently in Bruxelles. This I confess that I feel very strongly: that your Royal Highness should conform on this subject with the King's wishes, which appear so decidedly in favour of your fixing your residence at his Court, that I don't think it will be possible to move him from them. Nothing would be more unfortunate for your Royal Highness's family than any known difference between the King and you; and you may depend upon it you will never be upon the terms on which you ought to be, and on which all those attached to your family would wish you to be, if you should

fix your residence at Bruxelles without the King's entire consent.

I have taken the liberty of giving your Royal Highness my opinion freely upon this subject, which you must attribute to the sincerity of my regard and attachment. From what I have above stated you will see that, although I will speak, and even write, to the King regarding your wishes, if I should have an opportunity, I do not concur with your Royal Highness in thinking that the gratification of them will be advantageous to your permanent interests; and whatever success I may have with the King, which I do not think at all probable, I wish you to be prepared on your arrival to do what will be most agreeable to His Majesty.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1015.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Cambrai, 6th May, 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch, No. 101, of the 3rd May, in which you have enclosed the correspondence with the Treasury, upon which I had addressed you on the same day.

As soon as the treaties with the French government were signed, and the army under my command could be broken up, and those troops not destined for the British contingent of the Army of Occupation could march, I issued the orders on the 2nd and 3rd December for dismissing the Staff, and appointed the earliest day at which I thought it possible that they could have concluded their service for the discontinuance of their allowances, viz., the 24th of December. Owing to delays in the embarkation of the troops, the service of three of those officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, Captain Fitzgerald, and Captain Frazer, was not concluded till after the 24th of December; and upon the representation of the Quartermaster-General I ordered that they should receive their allowances, the first and last to the 24th of February, and the second to the 24th of January.

I now enclose your Lordship a list of the Staff of British contingent and Army of Occupation, to which no addition has

been made excepting of Major Shaw, in consequence of the necessity of employing an officer at Calais; and of Major Campbell, required for the 3rd brigade of cavalry, the officer who filled that situation having gone home with his regiment since the period at which it was formed by the orders of the 2nd and 3rd December. Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable James Stanhope was struck off, as was Colonel Hervey in consequence of his being appointed Military Secretary; and Colonel Sir Henry Hardinge has been appointed Assistant Quartermaster-General from the 24th February, in order to be employed at the Prussian head quarters, and the officers mentioned in mine of the 3rd instant for the garrison Staff of the places occupied by the British contingent. This list has been sent home every month, and no objection has ever been made to it.

It was reduced in December to as small a number of officers as I thought could perform the duty; and I have in the instances of Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, Captain Fitzgerald, and Captain Frazer, above referred to, and in the payment of the officers in the enclosed list, hitherto exercised a discretion which, from the silence and confidence of government, I have imagined belonged to the office which I have had the honour to fill, viz., that of ordering the payment of their Staff pay to those officers on the list of the Staff to whose appointments no objection should have been made by any authority at home.

Notwithstanding that the armies which I have commanded have cost such large sums of money, I don't believe that any expense was ever incurred under my direction which it was possible to avoid, and I am certain that there is no instance in which any expense authorised by me has been disapproved of. Nothing can be more reasonable than that I should not be permitted to increase the Staff of an army situated as this is without permission of my superiors; but I hope it will not be denied that those officers who were on the Staff previous to the 24th of December, and those whose names are on the lists which have from time to time been sent home since, and have not been disapproved of, will be permitted to receive their Staff allowances, at least till your Lordship will notify to me that you disapprove of them.

I beg to have your orders upon this point and upon the enclosed list as soon as it may be convenient.

WELLINGTON.

[1016.] *To the Duke of Buccleugh.*

MY LORD DUKE, Cambrai, 6th May, 1816.

I had the honour of receiving yesterday your Grace's letter of the 28th December last, in which you enclosed me the Resolutions of a general meeting of the Highland Society electing me an honorary member of the same; and I beg that your Grace will do me the favour to present my acknowledgments to the Society for the honour which they have conferred upon me.

I have long and frequently had occasion to applaud the distinguished valour and other good qualities as soldiers of their countrymen, and I am much flattered at being admitted a member of their Society.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1017.] *To Baron Nagell.*

MONSIEUR LE BARON, Cambrai, ce 6 Mai, 1816.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à V.E. la lettre que je reçois de Monsieur le Général Gablenz, commandant le contingent Saxon, en réponse à celle que je lui avois faite écrire par le chef de l'état-major général sur les rixes qui avoient eu lieu entre des soldats Saxons et les habitans d'un village sur la frontière, sur lesquels V.E. m'avoit écrit.

WELLINGTON.

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[1018.] *To M. J. F. Audoor.*

MONSIEUR, Cambrai, ce 6 Mai, 1816.

Je vous envois la procuration comme administrateur de mes biens dans les Pays-Bas, et la copie d'une lettre de Monsieur de Nagell; la copie d'une lettre de Monsieur le Chevalier Van der Fosse du 8 Jan.; la copie de la traduction du décret de S.M.; la copie du projet de liquidation à moi envoyé par Monsieur Van der Fosse; copie de l'état approximatif de mes bois, envoyé par le même; et l'état des bois à moi cédés, par le même.

Vous verrez par le projet de liquidation qu'il se trouve déjà

une somme d'argent à moi dûe, que je vous prie de recevoir. Je vous prie aussi de prendre possession de mes bois sans perte de temps, et de me faire un détail de l'état dans laquelle vous les trouvez.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Préfet du Nord.* [1019.]

MONSIEUR LE PRÉFET, Cambrai, ce 6 Mai, 1816.

Je vous envois la description d'un officier du 4e régiment, au service de S.M.B., qui s'est absenté sans permission sous des circonstances graves, et lequel je crois se trouve dans St. Omer ou Dunkerque, ou dans leurs voisinages. Je vous prie d'en faire faire des perquisitions, et de le faire arrêter, et de l'envoyer au quartier-général.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 8 Mai, 1816.

Une dépêche télégraphique avait annoncé avant-hier que des soldats licenciés, unis à des paysans, et guidés par des officiers à demi-solde, avaient fait une tentative pour s'emparer de la ville de Grenoble. Un courrier arrivé cette nuit a porté les détails de cet événement. Le 4, au soir, on aperçut de Grenoble des feux sur les hauteurs voisines, ce qui fit supposer qu'il se formait un rassemblement. Le matin le Général Donnadieu, qui commandait dans la ville, fit sortir la légion de l'Isère, quatre compagnies de la Garde Nationale, quelques dragons, et deux pièces de canon.

La légion du Herault fut mise sous les armes pour garder la ville.

Les troupes qui en étaient sorties s'aperçurent que les révoltés s'étaient emparés d'un petit fort ruiné, appelé la Bastide. Elles y marchèrent, et après quelque résistance le poste fut emporté, et les insurgés mis en fuite. Plusieurs ont été tués, et d'autres fait prisonniers. On avait résolu de faire quelques exemples de sévérité. Le Général Donnadieu se loue beaucoup du zèle des troupes, de celui de la Garde Nationale, et en général de toutes les autorités. Les chefs des rébelles étaient un officier de gendarmerie, qui a été tué, et un capitaine d'infanterie licencié. Ils criaient tous, *Vive l'Empereur!*

Le Ministère paraît ne pas appréhender aucune conséquence sérieuse de cette tentative. Le Général Thiare, qui est censé être complice dans cette affaire, vient d'être arrêté ici.

Par le 'Moniteur' d'aujourd'hui Votre Excellence aura vu le changement qui s'est opéré dans le Ministère.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec une haute considération,

Monsieur le Duc, de Votre Excellence

Les très humbles et très obéissans serviteurs,

LE BARON DE VINCENT. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.
CHARLES STUART. POZZO DI BORGO.

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[1020.] *To Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR STUART, Cambrai, 9th May, 1816.

I confess that I differ in opinion with the Allied Ministers regarding the operation of the Protocols of the 14th, 22nd, and 27th August.

Those of the 14th and 22nd August contain nothing more than the opinion and proposition of the Austrian Cabinet, to which the Russian, Prussian, and British Cabinets consented by the Protocol of the 27th.

The persons upon whom the proposition of the Austrian Cabinet and the decision of the Four Cabinets operated were those proscribed by the King's Ordonnance of July, 1815. Some of these persons had at the time quitted France, and were in Switzerland. These as well as others still in France were asking for passports and seeking asylums in the territories of the Allies from each of the Cabinets; and it was expected that the result of the reference to the Chambers in regard to the list No. 2, which was held out by the King's Ordonnance, would be that several of the persons whose names were contained in it would be banished from France.

It is obvious that the Four Cabinets could have had in view only these persons, because by the King's Ordonnance and previous Proclamations all others were pardoned. This is rendered still more clear by the title of the paper No. 93, in the Protocol of the 27th August, which is as follows:—"Principes d'après lesquels les Cours, &c. conviennent vouloir régler leur conduite relativement aux individus compris dans les deux classes *désignés par le Décret du Roi du 24me Juillet.*"

I don't mean to contend that the same principles don't apply to the regicides banished from France under the law of the Amnesty; but I say that nothing has been *decided* even by the

Four Courts regarding these persons, and that the King of the Netherlands, even supposing he had declared his consent to the contents of the Protocol of the 27th of August, which I believe he has not, would still have a right to act as he should think proper regarding the regicides, because they could not have been in the contemplation of the Four Cabinets at the time the rule was made.

Observe that I am now reasoning the question as one of right, and I believe it will be admitted that there is no right to call upon the King of the Netherlands to send the regicides out of his country.

As to the expediency of doing so, I beg that it may be understood that I think I shall have no difficulty in persuading him to send them away if the Ministers of the Allied Courts should advise it. But I beg them to consider the following points:— First: The regicides, almost without exception, are the most harmless at the present moment of all the Frenchmen concerned in the Revolution. They are in general old and infirm, and either very rich or very poor, and in either case desirous of being allowed to live in tranquillity and obscurity. Secondly: Very few of them, and those the most harmless, are in the dominions of the King of the Netherlands, and these are to be obliged to live in the provinces north of the rivers. Thirdly: We must not forget the sentiments and opinions we entertained ourselves, in common with the King of France's Ministers, upon the clause of the law of the Amnesty regarding the regicides. I believe there are none of us who did not feel that the Chamber of Deputies not only adopted a measure upon that occasion which every view of the internal policy of France ought to have induced them to refrain from, but that by adopting it they dragged the King and his Ministers through the dirt. The King of the Netherlands is of the same opinion, and is moreover very unwilling to submit himself to the dictates of the folly of the French Chamber of Deputies. He has besides upon all these questions some difficulties with his own States-General.

These are the facts upon which I wish the Allied Ministers would consider this question. I feel as strongly as others how desirable it is that all the Powers and all the people of Europe should show an abhorrence of all those concerned in the French Revolution, and particularly in the late rebellion; but considering the manner in which these regicides were banished, how

few of them there are remaining in Holland, and what miserable wretches they are, and that to press the matter further will be disagreeable to the King, I cannot think it desirable to do so. If there is the slightest trace of any one of them being engaged in cabals against the French government, I entertain no doubt the King will send them all away; but till we can prove that, it appears to me not worth while to notice them.

In regard to the regulations in the Protocols respecting Frenchmen leaving France with passports, they are referable only to "*les individus de cette classe*" (that is, *seconde classe*) "*qui demanderoient à quitter ce royaume, et qui se trouveroient munis de passeports en règle du gouvernement Français,*" &c.

Those persons residing at Bruxelles and elsewhere whom the King cannot send away till the French government will recall them, have come into the Netherlands *munis de passeports en règle du gouvernement Français,* in which they are permitted to reside at Bruxelles; and these persons are not only not included in the *seconde classe,* but, however guilty and however much more dangerous than any or all the regicides, they are not accused of any crime whatever. The regulations of the Protocol of the 27th August, therefore, have nothing to say to them.

WELLINGTON.

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[1021.] *To Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR STUART, Cambrai, 9th May, 1816.

I enclose some papers upon which I wish you to take the opinion of the Allied Ministers before I give any answer to General de la Motte.

I have forwarded to England two complaints of the violence of the King's messengers to the officers on duty at the gates of the fortified towns through which they pass. They are intolerably slow on their journeys. The messenger who is despatched by you at six in the evening does not arrive here till after three the next day, instead of at eleven or twelve. On Tuesday I went to Lisle at about one, and left Cathcart to follow me with the letters and to order the messenger on to Bethune, where he should receive them again. I read the despatches at Lisle, and my courier arrived with them at Bethune an hour before the

English messenger arrived direct from Cambrai. It will be necessary to take some steps in order to hasten them a little.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Secretary at War.* [1022.]

MY LORD, Cambrai, 9th May, 1816.

I enclose an application from Assistant-Surgeon Shubard, of the 7th line battalion King's German Legion, for his travelling expenses from Paris to Genoa to join his regiment, by order of the Legion Office, which it appears by your Lordship's order of the 30th January, 1816, 3952, has been referred to me for payment.

I beg to inform your Lordship that we have no knowledge in this army of travelling expenses excepting for the immediate service of the army; and we don't know in what manner either to prevent the incurring of these expenses, which certainly in this instance appear to have been very useless, or to check their amount; and I don't recollect an instance in which I have granted a warrant for a charge of this description.

I beg leave to suggest, therefore, that as the charge has been incurred under orders from the Legion Office, it may be paid by warrant from the War Office.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [1023.]

MY LORD, Cambrai, 9th May, 1816.

I enclose a list of stores arrived at Calais on board the *Lord Townshend* and *Montrose*, G. S. transports.

These vessels are necessarily detained until I shall get from the office by which the stores are sent the necessary documents to enable me to apply that the stores may be introduced duty free.

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 13th May, 1816.

I have received your letter of the 5th instant,* enclosing a copy of one marked "secret and confidential," addressed to your Grace from the Prince of Orange, in which His Royal Highness states the advantage to be derived from his fixing his residence at Bruxelles; his apprehensions that it is not acceptable to his father; and his desire that your Grace will use your influence and that of the British government to persuade his father to consent to it.

I certainly agree with His Royal Highness in thinking that as His Majesty's habits and system of government will most probably make him reside chiefly in Holland, the Prince's residence at Bruxelles would have the best effect in reconciling His Majesty's new subjects. A young Royal couple, *his* early military career, and *her* accomplishments, which I understand to be very considerable, would give a brilliancy to the Court which could not fail of gratifying the national pride of the Belgians, and repress the spirit of dissatisfaction, to the progress of which the inconsiderate encouragement given to Jacobin emigrants has probably contributed. But I am afraid that if the proposition did not come from the father, or at least that he was not ready to meet it halfway, it would never do; and I am very sure that our interference in so very delicate a part of His Majesty's system of government would have a very bad effect.

The pretext which His Royal Highness suggests, that of your applying for him to have the military command of the Dutch garrisons on the frontier, would be ill interpreted. His Majesty would guess the immediate object; he would be taught to suspect ulterior ones; and there is such a habit of jealousy in the different Courts of Europe, that many of them would immediately apprehend a secret understanding, and be possibly misled into separate engagements to counteract an imaginary one.

I am almost sure that if the Prince will but keep his own counsels, and act quietly and systematically, what he wishes will happen of itself. His father's visits to Bruxelles will each time become more irksome; and he will soon be willing to encourage his son to prolong his residence there, as the best means of saving himself the trouble of an early return. His Royal Highness will, with a little management, soon find that without any formal arrangement his residence will be chiefly fixed at Bruxelles; but he should be very careful not to allow his father's government to be censured before him. He may depend upon it that they cannot be friends to the family who endeavour to set the son against the father, and that whatever passes on these subjects at his table will be repeated, and uncharitably repeated too, to His Majesty. If his father have the infirmity of jealousy, the only way of overcoming it is by abstaining from exciting it.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

* See page 390.

*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, St. James's Square, 13th May, 1816.

I have to thank you for two or three letters, of which your visit to the Hague and the incessant fatigue of attendance in the House of Commons have led me from day to day to delay the answer.

You will see from the enclosed Lord Bathurst's view of the question of British Engineers, as applied to the expenditure in the Netherlands. Neither of us feel it a point of sufficient importance to press unpleasantly upon the King, and we shall be both prepared to support in Parliament whatever you recommend, wishing only that there may be arranged, if the British Engineers are excluded, some regulation by which the progress and amount of expenditure may be satisfactorily ascertained. This is essential if we are ever to come to Parliament to provide funds in aid of the French contributions for this service. As you are to have a meeting with the Dutch Engineer, you will probably be enabled to take a final determination upon the whole of the case after this interview.

I have heard nothing further of the Spanish business, except the departure of Mina from this country, as it is supposed for South America. The question has slept in a great measure in Parliament since Mr. Brougham's motion; but I expect to hear a good deal upon this and other Continental topics of inflammation as the session draws towards a close, and when the tirailleurs of Opposition can emancipate themselves from the rules the party laid down for keeping their troops together during the campaign. You will see Sir S. Romilly is going to revive the Protestant question, which I thought was at rest.

We have had one of the most disagreeable sessions I ever remember: a sour, discontented temper among our friends, considerable distress throughout the country, and endless debates upon economy, whilst everything that has been done by the Prince and his government is either forgotten or thrown into the shade. The rise of the markets has somewhat improved the tone in Parliament; but we have a great deal to travel through before we can settle the mind of the country upon its peace system.

I conclude the reports of your paying us a visit are premature, and that you cannot yet let go the reins. I have rejoiced to observe the good humour with which you have kept the Allied machine together. This is the great point to watch, and I continue to persuade myself that Russia means and wishes to preserve it. The Emperor has recently made a very cordial overture to the Regent in this sense.

I hope the check given to the insurgents near Grenoble may be of use. Why these obsolete prosecutions? They appear calculated only to expose government to successive defeats, and for no adequate object.

I am ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Earl Bathurst to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 26th April, 1816.

I return your Lordship the Duke of Wellington's letter, and have had conversation with Major-General Bryce.

There is certainly nothing whatever in the treaty which can authorise us t require the employment of British Engineers in the formation of a barrier f the Netherlands; neither have we any object in pressing for their employme but, on the contrary, every disposition to decline it, if their employment co give any just cause of umbrage to the corps of Dutch Engineers.

It is, however, impossible, I think, to read the enclosed letter from Maj General Bryce without being convinced that the employment of Briti Engineers is necessary if the work in hand is to be completed within the term o five years; that it is reasonable to expect them to execute their own plans more zealously than others; and that the system proposed by them is not one calculated to place the expenditure out of the control of the King of the Netherlands, or deprive his subjects of the advantage to be derived from it.

I think there is no misunderstanding with respect to the plan carried on for the fortifications of Charleroi. If that proposed by the Dutch Engineers be adopted in contradiction to the opinion given by the Duke of Wellington, the difference between the expense attending the plan proposed by the Dutch Engineers and that suggested by the Duke, as it will not have been approved by the Allies, must be borne exclusively by the Dutch government.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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[1024.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 14 Mai, 1816.

Je reçois aujourd'hui seulement votre lettre du 10, sur les pamphlets, &c., qui s'introduisent en France, venant des Pays-Bas, par les moyens des bureaux des postes de l'Armée d'Occupation et par les vaguemestres des corps.

Avant de donner des ordres à ce sujet, je désire vous faire savoir qu'il n'y a pas de bureaux de poste à aucun corps de l'Armée d'Occupation qui ne reçoive ses lettres de Bruxelles par la poste Française. Le corps Prussien a une correspondance par estafette Prussien avec l'étranger, mais c'est avec Coblentz, et non avec Bruxelles, que cette communication se fait.

Tous les chefs de douane avec lesquels j'ai parlé, et j'ai encore parlé aujourd'hui avec celui de Valenciennes, m'assurent qu'ils sont parfaitement satisfaits de la conduite des troupes depuis que l'Armée d'Occupation a été établie. Les vaguemestres n'ont aucune communication qui n'est soumise à l'inspection des employés à la douane; et même il y en a très peu d'aucune espèce. Je ne disois pas, cependant, que par les moyens de Cosaques ou d'officiers qui visitent Mons ou autre ville de la frontière journellement il ne puisse pas s'introduire des exemplaires du n Jaune ou autre libelle, mais je ne peux pas croire que ce

soit plus que suffisant pour la curiosité de ceux qui les envoient, ou que pareils gens puissent apporter des exemplaires en nombre suffisant pour donner ombrage au gouvernement.

V.E. aura vu par la lettre que j'avois écrite au Chevalier Stuart jusqu'où j'avois pu mener le Roi des Pays-Bas sur la question de ces libelles et des François qui se trouvent à Bruxelles. Vous n'avez qu'à dénoncer officiellement une libelle quelconque, et le procès en sera fait à l'imprimeur, &c.; et qu'à rappeler en France tous les François qui se trouvent dans les Pays-Bays munis de passeports François, et le Roi les fera sortir tous de Bruxelles et des provinces du Midi de son royaume. Il n'y restera plus demain aucune personne frappée par les ordonnances du Roi de France.

Je vous prie de me faire savoir si après ces explications vous désirez que je fasse encore quelque chose sur l'introduction des libelles; et si vous décidez que quelque mesure est nécessaire, je vous prie de me faire en confidence par quel corps, et plus particulièrement par quels moyens et routes, cette introduction se fait.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [1025.]

MY LORD, Cambrai, 15th May, 1816.

When I formed the establishments of the Commissariat and Medical Department upon breaking up the army in November last, I continued both on a larger scale than appears now to be necessary, as I was not quite certain how the system of the Army of Occupation would answer. I find, however, that both can now be reduced very considerably without inconvenience to the service, and I enclose the orders which I have issued to discontinue certain officers of both from the Staff of this army from the 24th of May.

The Medical Department will be still further reduced as soon as the hospital at St. Denis will be broken up, and the sick and wounded can be removed from the civil hospitals in Bruxelles and Antwerp, as I have detained a British medical officer at each station to look after them.

WELLINGTON.

[1026.] *To G. Harrison, Esq.*

SIR, Cambrai, 17th May, 1816.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and enclose a list of officers of the Commissariat discontinued from the Staff of this army from the 24th of May, among whose names you will find those mentioned in your letter, as I had understood from Mr. Dunmore that he had received intimation from the Commissary-General that their presence was required in England.

If the presence of Mr. Dunmore in England is absolutely necessary for the settlement of his accounts, he must go likewise; but I beg leave to suggest to their Lordships that his past accounts might be settled here, and therefore it will be excessively inconvenient to the service to part with Mr. Dunmore.

He has been concerned in all the money transactions with the French government, and in arranging the other matters connected with the present situation not only of the British but of the contingents of the other Powers, and it will not be an easy task for any other gentleman to fill his place.

If, however, it should be absolutely necessary to withdraw Mr. Dunmore, I know no person more capable than Mr. Bisset of filling his situation.

I beg to observe that the Commissariat officers whom we have removed by order of the Treasury from the army, with the exception of Mr. White, are those who have served longest with the army and have rendered the greatest services; and if a positive order had not been received to send them home, I should certainly have not deprived myself of their assistance, or the army of their services.

WELLINGTON.

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[1027.] *To the Prince of Orange.*

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 17th May, 1816.

I send your Royal Highness in confidence the copy of the answer which I have received from Lord Bathurst* regarding your Royal Highness's wish that you should reside at Bruxelles. I did not inform Lord Bathurst of my opinion, in which your Royal Highness will observe he does not concur, although he

* See page 400.

does in thinking that it is best that neither the British government nor I should say anything on the subject.

The two last paragraphs of the letter contain the best advice your Royal Highness can have upon the subject. If it is wise that your Royal Highness should fix your residence at Bruxelles, it can only be so in concurrence with the King's opinion, and for the ease of his government. It is best, therefore, that you should not now bring the matter forward, but keep your object in view, and not talk of it, nor allow it to be talked of; and sooner or later, if it is advisable, you will attain it.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1028.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 20 Mai, 1816.

Je reçois votre lettre du 18, et vous pouvez être sûr que le nombre des libelles qui s'introduisent par le moyen des contingens Alliés est si petit qu'il ne vaudroit pas la peine d'en empêcher l'introduction, même si ce résultat étoit en notre pouvoir. Cependant je parlerai à Woronzow, et je verrai ce qui se pourra faire. J'ai vu aussi bien que vous que le procès intenté au Surveillant n'a jusqu'à présent pas fait grand effet en empêchant les libelles, et il faut voir quel en sera le résultat après qu'il sera fini, et que l'imprimeur aura subi sa punition. Si tout ce que la loi actuelle peut faire n'est pas suffisant pour empêcher les libelles, le Roi n'a aucune objection à la proposition d'une nouvelle loi dont la force sera suffisante pour accomplir son objet.

Si vous connoissez ceux qui écrivent les libelles, et ils sont François, vous n'avez qu'à les rappeler, s'ils se trouvent dans les Pays-Bas avec passeport, et le Roi ne les permettra pas de rester auprès de votre frontière. S'ils n'ont pas passeport François, vous n'avez qu'à les dénoncer au Roi, et il les fera partir également. Vous n'avez aussi qu'à dénoncer officiellement une libelle quelconque, et le Roi fera faire son procès à celui qui l'aura publiée. Tous ceux qui se trouvent dans les listes de l'Ordonnance de Juillet, 1815, doivent avoir déjà quitté les Pays-Bas, avec exception du Comte Lobau, qui a la permission du Roi de France d'y rester; et en tout je suis persuadé que le Roi des Pays-Bas est disposé de marcher dans la ligne qui vous

conviendra le mieux sur ce sujet, et d'accord avec vous. Vous n'avez qu'à indiquer ce que vous désirez sur les principes ci-dessus énoncés, et vous pouvez vous assurer que le Roi le fera; mais il ne peut pas arrêter les libelles d'une manière violente, pas plus que nous le pouvions en Angleterre.

L'affaire de Grenoble s'est très bien terminée, et je vous en félicite; mais il faut de la sagesse de la part de la famille Royale, et il faut qu'ils considèrent un peu de quelle manière ils ont rentrées en France, et combien peu cette manière peut être considérée comme le triomphe du parti Royaliste sur les autres partis du royaume, et donc qu'ils ne devroient pas agir comme si elle en étoit une. S'ils ne prennent pas garde, ils auront beaucoup d'affaires comme celle de Grenoble; et s'il se trouve par hasard un commandant lâche, ou ignorant, ou déloyal, à s'y opposer, et qu'une réussit, nous aurons tous beaucoup à faire, et c'est impossible de prédire quel en sera le résultat.

Je compte partir pour Paris dans huit ou dix jours. J'ai encore un voyage à faire dans les Pays-Bas.

WELLINGTON.

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[1029.] *To General Vicomte Donnadieu.*

M. LE GÉNÉRAL, Cambrai, ce 20 Mai, 1816.

Malgré le désir que j'ai de ne pas vous interrompre dans vos occupations importantes, et dont le résultat a jusqu'à présent été si heureux, je ne peux pas m'empêcher de vous écrire deux mots pour me rappeler à votre souvenir, pour vous féliciter comme je le fais très sincèrement à vos succès; et pour vous assurer que non-seulement pour la cause publique, mais pour vous même, il n'y a personne qui y a pris un intérêt plus vif que celui qui a l'honneur de se souscrire

Votre très fidèle
WELLINGTON.

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[1030.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Cambrai, 24th May, 1816.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Mr. Rosenhagen regarding the claims for losses for the Hanoverian contingent, upon which

I beg to have your Lordship's orders. The case is so clearly explained in Mr. Rosenhagen's letter, that it is useless for me to add to it, excepting to enclose your Lordship the copy of a letter I lately addressed to the Secretary of the Board of Claims in London, to explain my opinion of the nature of the claim of the British officers and troops for baggage lost in the battle of Waterloo.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1031.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, 25 Mai, 1816.

J'envois à V.E. la copie d'une dépêche, &c., que je reçois du Général Frimont, sur l'organisation d'une compagnie de Gardes Nationales à cheval à Bistweiler.

Je crois que dans les circonstances actuelles il seroit bon de ne pas faire organiser des Gardes Nationales dans les départemens occupés par les troupes Alliées.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai.* [1032.]

M. LE PRÉFET, Cambrai, ce 26 Mai, 1816.

Le Quartiermaître-Général me fait savoir qu'un de ses officiers de la première division ayant ordonné à un chirurgien de s'établir au village de Fontaine Notre Dame, et que l'officier qui y commande les troupes ayant demandé au maire de ce village un billet de logement pour cet officier, il s'y est refusé, en disant qu'il s'en réfèreroit à M. le Sous-Préfet de Cambrai, qui en communication avec M. le Colonel Torrens sur ce sujet a paru croire que le maire avoit raison.

Pour le bien-être général je l'ai cru à propos de consulter les principaux officiers civils des départements sur la dislocation des troupes, et elles se trouvent placées à présent à peu près de la manière qu'ils ont conseillé. Mais il y a des cas où je me trouverai obligé de ne pas les consulter sur le mouvement et la dislocation des troupes, et d'autres de trop peu d'importance pour qu'ils deviennent un sujet de communication entre eux et moi,

et l'emplacement du chirurgien à Fontaine Notre Dame est un de ceux-ci.

Je ne peux pas permettre aux maires des villages de se refuser de donner des logemens aux militaires qui y vont par mon autorité, seulement parcequ'ils n'en reçoivent pas des ordres de leurs supérieurs civils; et je vous prie de le leur faire savoir, afin que je ne prenne pas la mesure d'autoriser aux officiers de prendre des logemens eux-mêmes, sans l'intervention des maires.

WELLINGTON.

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CONTINGENT ANGLAIS.—RÉCAPITULATION.

ETAT GÉNÉRAL d'Effectif du 1 Juin, 1816.

Cambrai, 1st June, 1816.

| | Officiers. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Domestiques. | Femmes. | Enfans. | Chevaux |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Head-Quarters Staff, Garrison Staff, Cambrai, &c. .. .. | 224 | 784 | 388 | 65 | 59 | 976 |
| Cavalry and Horse Artillery .. | 256 | 3,996 | 155 | 236 | 291 | 4469 |
| Infantry 1st Division .. .. | 353 | 8,080 | 121 | 461 | 328 | 946 |
| Infantry 2nd ,, .. .. | 393 | 8,735 | 93 | 527 | 467 | 1021 |
| Infantry 3rd ,, .. .. | 444 | 9,345 | 213 | 561 | 616 | 1483 |
| Total .. .. .. | 1670 | 30,940 | 970 | 1850 | 1761 | 8895 |

T. DUMARESQ, D.C.G.

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[1033.] *To Count Lieven.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, Cambrai, ce 2 Juin, 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V.E. du 10me Mai, et le paquet, à mon adresse, contenant une boîte à portrait de S.M.I., que S.M. m'a destiné à l'occasion du Traité d'Alliance conclu à Paris le 20me Novembre dernier. Je reçois cette boîte comme une nouvelle marque de la bienveillance de S.M.; et je prie V.E. de lui en faire agréer ma reconnaissance.

Acceptez, Monsieur le Comte, l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.* [1034.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 4th June, 1816.

I enclose an estimate of the probable expense of the British contingent from May 24th; and I will in future send you one every month, founded upon the preceding month's expense, in which you will find stated any excess or diminution upon this estimate, and any new head of expense and the cause. We shall thus have constantly under review our current expenses, and we shall be able to check any immediately that ought not to be incurred.

I have reduced all the establishments. The medical establishment will be still farther reduced as soon as the hospital at St. Denis will be broken up. There will likewise be a farther reduction of the expense of the Commissariat Waggon Train.

I have adopted measures to reduce, and if possible to prevent altogether, the contingent expenses of transport, &c.; and I hope the expense of the British contingent will not exceed the estimate I now enclose. I will do everything in my power to produce this desirable result, but I cannot be quite certain.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*General Zieten to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Sédan, le 7 Juin, 1816.

L'administration générale des jeux publics en France m'ayant fait connaître qu'elle avoit l'intention d'établir, avec l'autorisation du Ministre de la Police Générale, des jeux dans les places de Sédan et de Mézières, j'ai écrit aujourd'hui à ce Ministre que les lois militaires Prussiennes prohibant entièrement ces sortes d'établissemens, je les avois sévèrement défendu non-seulement dans les deux places sus-mentionnées, mais aussi dans tous les cantonnemens occupés par les troupes sous mes ordres.

Agréez, my Lord Duc, l'hommage de la respectueuse considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Altesse le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

ZIETEN.

[MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

Je reçois aujourd'hui la lettre de V.E. du 7 Juin, et je suis entièrement de votre opinion sur l'établissement des maisons de jeux dans les garnisons occupés par les troupes Alliées. J'en ai communiqué mon opinion à S.E. le Ministre de la Police, qui m'a promis de retirer tous les agens.

WELLINGTON.]

## ETAT du CORPS D'ARMÉE AUTRICHIEN, sous les Ordres du Général BARON FRIMONT.

Quartier-Général à Colmar, 10 Juin, 1816.

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. Généraux. | Officiers Majors. | Officiers. | Bas Officiers. | Music. et Sapeurs. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | Non-Combattans. | Chevaux. | Commandans des Brigades. | Commandans des Divisions. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bataillon de Chasseurs à pied, No. 8 | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 23 | 72 | 25 | 708 | 829 | 38 | .. | Général Major Baron Wrede. | Lieut.-Général Baron Lederer. | Delle. |
| Régiment d'Hussards du P. R. de Wurtemberg | .. | 8 | .. | | 4 | 47 | 105 | 15 | 1,031 | 1,202 | 181 | 1204 | | | Altkirch. |
| Régiment d'Infanterie Lindenau, No. 29 | 3 | .. | .. | 1 | 4 | 73 | 236 | 72 | 2,509 | 2,894 | 150 | .. | Idem | | Thann. |
| Idem Hohenlohe Bartenstein, No. 41 | 3 | .. | .. | | 4 | 79 | 226 | 73 | 2,713 | 3,091 | 107 | .. | Latour. | | Mühlhausen. |
| Total | 7 | 8 | .. | 2 | 13 | 218 | 639 | 185 | 6,961 | 8,016 | 476 | 1204 | | | |
| Régiment d'Infanterie Benyovsky, No. 31 | 4 | .. | .. | 1 | 5 | 103 | 332 | 97 | 3,982 | 4,519 | 211 | .. | Idem | Lieut.-Général Baron Marchall. | Hagenau. |
| Idem Ignatz Gyulay, No. 60 | 4 | .. | .. | | 4 | 91 | 291 | 95 | 4,080 | 4,561 | 116 | .. | Senitzer. | | Molsheim. |
| Idem Kerpen, No. 49 | 3 | .. | .. | | 4 | 81 | 227 | 69 | 2,203 | 2,584 | 104 | .. | Idem | | Rihauviller. |
| Idem E. H. Rainer, No. 11 | 3 | .. | .. | 1 | 3 | 76 | 229 | 68 | 3,102 | 3,478 | 107 | .. | Baron Fölseis. | | Obernai. |
| Total | 14 | .. | .. | 2 | 16 | 351 | 1079 | 329 | 13,367 | 15,142 | 538 | .. | | | |
| Régiment de Dragons du Roi de Bavière, No. 2 | .. | 6 | .. | 1 | 3 | 42 | 78 | 9 | 728 | 860 | 98 | 883 | Idem | Lieut.-Général Baron Mohr. | Erstein. |
| Idem de Riesch, No. 6 | .. | 6 | .. | | 3 | 39 | 84 | 10 | 653 | 789 | 135 | 802 | Raigecourt. | | Bischweiler. |
| Bataillon de Chasseurs à pied, No. 10 | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 23 | 75 | 25 | 662 | 786 | 39 | .. | Idem | | Dammemarie. |
| Régiment d'Hussards du Roi de Prusse, No. 10 | .. | 8 | .. | | 4 | 52 | 108 | 10 | 896 | 1,070 | 127 | 1054 | Desfours. | | Egnisheim. |
| Total | 1 | 20 | .. | 2 | 11 | 156 | 345 | 54 | 2,939 | 3,505 | 394 | 2739 | | | |
| Extra Corps: | | Cos. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Artillerie | .. | 8 | 96 | .. | 2 | 36 | 130 | 3 | 2,130 | 2,301 | 125 | 1580 | . . | .. | Du Parc, à Haguenau; mobile, Fribourg en Bade. |
| Pionniers | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 12 | 19 | 144 | 179 | 4 | .. | . . | .. | Markolsheim. |
| Corps de Santé | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 176 | .. | . . | .. | Turkheim. |
| Dét. de Dragons d'Ordonnance | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 38 | 39 | 4 | 39 | . . | .. | |
| Corps du Train | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 958 | 194 | . . | .. | Egnisheim. |
| Total | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 2 | 40 | 143 | 22 | 2,312 | 2,519 | 1267 | 1813 | | | |
| Total Général | 22 | 28 | 96 | 6 | 42 | 765 | 2206 | 590 | 25,579 | 29,182 | 2675 | 5756 | | | |

ETAT du CORPS D'ARMÉE RUSSE, sous les Ordres du Lieut.-Général COMTE WORONZOW. Quartier-Général, à Maubeuge, 1 Juin, 1816.

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. Généraux. | Officiers Majors. | Officiers. | Bas Officiers. | Musics. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | Chevaux. | Surnuméraires et dans la Cavalerie, à pied. Bas Officiers. | Soldats. | Non Combattans. | Commandans des Brigades. | Commandans des Divisions. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *3e Division de Dragons.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1e Brigade — Régiment de Smolensk | .. | 6 | .. | .. | 3 | 28 | 96 | 18 | 897 | 1,042 | 1,196 | 5 | 101 | 100 | Gén. Major Balabin. | Lieut.-Général Alexéeff. | Château Portiers. |
| 1e Brigade — Idem Twer | .. | 6 | .. | .. | 1 | 31 | 96 | 19 | 930 | 1,077 | 1,238 | 5 | 12 | 110 | | | Rethel. |
| 2e Brigade — Idem Kinbourn | .. | 6 | .. | .. | 3 | 31 | 85 | 19 | 948 | 1,086 | 1,231 | 14 | 78 | 114 | Général Major Kobloukoff. | | Buzaney. |
| 2e Brigade — Idem Courlande | .. | 6 | .. | .. | 3 | 34 | 96 | 19 | 877 | 1,029 | 1,226 | 5 | 96 | 145 | | | Vouziers. |
| Compagnie d'Artillerie à Cheval No. 25 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | .. | 8 | 22 | 2 | 242 | 274 | 403 | .. | .. | 62 | | | Attigny. |
| Etat Major de la Division et des Brigades | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 1 | 4 | .. | .. | .. | 10 | 85 | .. | .. | 53 | | | |
| Total | .. | 24 | 12 | 5 | 11 | 136 | 395 | 77 | 3,894 | 4,518 | 5,379 | 29 | 287 | 584 | | | |
| Cosaques du Don — Régimens de Jagodin | .. | 5 | .. | .. | .. | 15 | 18 | .. | 547 | 578 | 544 | .. | .. | 15 | Capitaine Kiseleff. | Lieut.-Général Alexéeff. | Iway. |
| Cosaques du Don — Idem de Grevzoff | .. | 5 | .. | .. | 1 | 13 | 14 | .. | 524 | 552 | 630 | .. | .. | 20 | Major Grevzoff. | | St. Sauve. |
| Total des Cosaques | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 1 | 26 | 32 | .. | 1,071 | 1,130 | 1,174 | .. | .. | 35 | | | |
| *9e Division d'Infanterie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1e Brigade — Régiment de Nachenbourg | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 30 | 120 | 49 | 1,644 | 1,845 | 136 | 32 | 112 | 126 | Général Major Achiestuheff. | Général-Major Oudom. | Soire le Château. |
| 1e Brigade — Idem Abcherousk | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 38 | 120 | 50 | 1,640 | 1,851 | 139 | 34 | 67 | 143 | | | Avesnes. |
| 2e Brigade — Idem Riask | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 28 | 120 | 46 | 1,674 | 1,872 | 142 | 29 | 79 | 138 | Général Major Poltoratsky. | | Nouvion. |
| 2e Brigade — Idem Jakoutsk | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 35 | 120 | 47 | 1,666 | 1,871 | 131 | 32 | 107 | 139 | | | Hirson. |
| 3e Brigade — 10e de Chasseurs | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 36 | 120 | 46 | 1,673 | 1,877 | 122 | 28 | 88 | 132 | Général Major Ivanoff. | | Fumai. |
| 3e Brigade — 38e Idem | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 33 | 120 | 47 | 1,655 | 1,856 | 133 | 30 | 98 | 138 | | | Givet. |
| 9e Brigade d'Artillerie — Compagnie de Position No. 9 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | 1 | 8 | 21 | 11 | 234 | 295 | 275 | .. | .. | 55 | Col. Czéremissnoff. | | Etraungt. |
| 9e Brigade d'Artillerie — Idem Légère No. 17 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | 1 | 5 | 22 | 2 | 169 | 199 | 172 | .. | .. | 42 | | | Rocroi. |
| 9e Brigade d'Artillerie — Idem Idem No. 18 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | 1 | 4 | 19 | 1 | 176 | 201 | 160 | .. | .. | 36 | | | Givet. |
| Etat Major de la Division et des Brigades | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 69 | .. | .. | 48 | | | |
| Total | 12 | .. | 36 | 4 | 19 | 218 | 782 | 299 | 10,551 | 11,873 | 1,479 | 192 | 551 | 997 | | | |
| *12e Division d'Infanterie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1e Brigade — Régiment de Smolensk | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 32 | 120 | 48 | 1,667 | 1,871 | 144 | 26 | 116 | 148 | Général Major Bogdamousky. | Général-Major Lesanevitch. | Maubeuge. |
| 1e Brigade — Idem Narwa | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 34 | 120 | 47 | 1,676 | 1,880 | 152 | 29 | 115 | 156 | | | Maubeuge. |
| 2e Brigade — Idem Alexopol | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 36 | 120 | 49 | 1,656 | 1,866 | 163 | 33 | 69 | 160 | Général Major Gourieff. | | Landrecies. |
| 2e Brigade — Idem Nouvelle Ingrie | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 34 | 120 | 47 | 1,661 | 1,867 | 155 | 31 | 73 | 147 | | | Solesmes. |
| 3e Brigade — 6e de Chasseurs | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 30 | 120 | 49 | 1,678 | 1,880 | 129 | 32 | 121 | 133 | Général Major Pautzerbites. | | Le Cateau. |
| 3e Brigade — 41e Idem | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 33 | 120 | 48 | 1,655 | 1,861 | 137 | 23 | 103 | 141 | | | Le Cateau. |
| 12e Brigade d'Artillerie — Compagnie de Position No. 12 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | .. | 5 | 19 | 14 | 253 | 291 | 283 | .. | .. | 64 | Lieut.-Col. Zeiutch. | | Dourlers. |
| 12e Brigade d'Artillerie — Idem Légère No. 23 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | 1 | 7 | 16 | 2 | 176 | 202 | 173 | .. | .. | 35 | | | Engle-fontaine. |
| 12e Brigade d'Artillerie — Idem Idem No. 24 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | 1 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 160 | 183 | 170 | .. | .. | 38 | | | Castillon. |
| Etat Major de la Division et des Brigades | .. | .. | .. | 4 | .. | 3 | .. | .. | .. | 7 | 110 | .. | .. | 57 | | | |
| Total | 12 | .. | 36 | 4 | 25 | 221 | 770 | 306 | 10,582 | 11,908 | 1,616 | 174 | 597 | 1082 | | | |
| Compagnie de Pionniers de Capit. Roslinkoff | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7 | 10 | 2 | 155 | 174 | 18 | .. | .. | 14 | Capitaine Roslinkoff. | | Villers. |
| Parc d'Artillerie No. 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 6 | .. | 47 | 57 | 546 | .. | .. | 216 | Lieut.-Capt. Voiniakony. | | Givet. |
| Idem No. 4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 7 | .. | 84 | 96 | 546 | .. | .. | 227 | Capitaine Lasberg. | | Givet. |
| Parc de l'Intendance | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 2 | .. | 16 | 21 | 254 | .. | .. | 145 | Lieut.-Capt. Mortez. | | Maubeuge. |
| Etat Major du Corps | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 32 | 80 | 11 | .. | 46 | 172 | 534 | .. | .. | 289 | | | |
| Total Général | 24 | 34 | 84 | 16 | 88 | 700 | 2015 | 684 | 26,446 | 29,949 | 11,546 | 395 | 1435 | 3589 | | | |

ETAT du CORPS

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. Généraux. | Officiers Majors | Officiers. | Bas Officiers. | Music. et Sapeurs. | Soldats. | Total sous Armes. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Cavalerie.* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1e Brigade | 2e Dragons de la Garde (ou de la Reine) | .. | 4 | .. | 1 | 4 | 29 | 28 | 8 | 409 | 482 |
| | 3e Dragons (ou du Roi) | .. | 4 | .. | | 4 | 34 | 41 | 9 | 399 | 487 |
| 3e Brigade | 7e Hussards (ou de la Reine) | .. | 4 | .. | 1 | 2 | 28 | 45 | 10 | 569 | 654 |
| | 11e de Dragons Légères | .. | 4 | .. | | 5 | 30 | 38 | 7 | 488 | 568 |
| 2e Brigade | 12 Idem (ou du Prince de Galles) | .. | 4 | .. | 1 | 1 | 31 | 30 | 9 | 503 | 580 |
| | 18e d'Hussards | .. | 4 | .. | | 5 | 27 | 46 | 9 | 578 | 660 |
| Total de la Cavalerie | | .. | 24 | .. | 4 | 21 | 179 | 244 | 62 | 2,944 | 3,437 |
| *Infanterie.* | | Bat. | | | | | | | | | |
| 1e Brigade | 1e Régiment (ou Grenadiers) de la Garde | 3e | 1 | .. | 2 | 9 | 30 | 54 | 21 | 1,004 | 1,118 |
| | 2e de la Garde (ou Coldstream) | 2e | 1 | .. | 1 | 8 | 33 | 51 | 22 | 1,005 | 1,119 |
| 7e Brigade | 7e Régt. (ou Fusiliers Britanniques) | 1e | 1 | .. | 1 | 2 | 36 | 51 | 23 | 873 | 985 |
| | 23e (ou Fusiliers Gallois) | 1e | 1 | .. | | 2 | 40 | 40 | 18 | 652 | 752 |
| | 43e Légère | 1e | 1 | .. | | 2 | 36 | 55 | 22 | 863 | 978 |
| 8e Brigade | 27e de la Ligne (ou Enniskillen) | 1e | 1 | .. | 1 | 3 | 38 | 52 | 19 | 960 | 1,072 |
| | 40e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 2 | 3 | 47 | 20 | 757 | 862 |
| | Brigade de Carabiniers | 1e | 1 | .. | | 4 | 29 | 37 | 9 | 559 | 638 |
| Total de la 1e Division | | | 8 | .. | .. | 5 | 32 | 278 | 387 | 154 | 6,673 | 7,524 |
| 3e Brigade | 3e Régt. (ou Jaunes) | 1e | 1 | .. | 1 | 3 | 38 | 52 | 22 | 1,036 | 1,151 |
| | 39e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 7 | 37 | 59 | 22 | 881 | 1,006 |
| | 91e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 3 | 39 | 53 | 21 | 921 | 1,037 |
| 4e Brigade | 4e (ou du Roi) | 1e | 1 | .. | 1 | 6 | 35 | 50 | 15 | 805 | 911 |
| | 52e Légère | 1e | 1 | .. | | 3 | 35 | 67 | 22 | 885 | 1,013 |
| | 79e (Montagnards Ecossais) | 1e | 1 | .. | | 3 | 38 | 54 | 18 | 603 | 716 |
| 6e Brigade | 6e | 1e | 1 | .. | 1 | 4 | 37 | 42 | 18 | 775 | 876 |
| | 29e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 3 | 38 | 45 | 16 | 766 | 868 |
| | 71e Légère | 1e | 1 | .. | | 6 | 40 | 62 | 22 | 821 | 950 |
| Total de la 2e Division | | | 9 | .. | .. | 4 | 37 | 338 | 484 | 176 | 7,493 | 8,528 |
| 2e Brigade | 1e (ou Ecossais Royals) | 3e | 1 | .. | 1 | 3 | 32 | 58 | 25 | 1,011 | 1,139 |
| | 57e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 3 | 34 | 31 | 24 | 615 | 707 |
| | Brigade de Carabiniers | 2e | 1 | .. | | 4 | 27 | 33 | 13 | 489 | 566 |
| 5e Brigade | 5e Régt. de Ligne | 1e | 1 | .. | 1 | 7 | 35 | 48 | 17 | 957 | 1,064 |
| | 8e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 6 | 36 | 47 | 25 | 917 | 1,031 |
| 9e Brigade | 21e (ou Fusiliers Ecossais) | 1e | 1 | .. | 1 | 3 | 39 | 50 | 23 | 1,002 | 1,117 |
| | 81e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 2 | 35 | 59 | 27 | 991 | 1,114 |
| | 89e | 1e | 1 | .. | | 6 | 35 | 62 | 24 | 999 | 1,115 |
| Total de la 3e Division | | | 8 | .. | .. | 4 | 33 | 283 | 388 | 178 | 6,981 | 7,863 |
| Total de l'Infanterie | | | 25 | .. | .. | 13 | 102 | 899 | 1259 | 508 | 21,147 | 23,915 |
| Artillerie | | | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 19 | 87 | 68 | 17 | 1,949 | 2,140 |
| Corps du Génie, et de Sapeurs et Mineurs | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 46 | 34 | 16 | 671 | 772 |
| Total de l'Artillerie et du Génie | | | .. | 10 | 60 | .. | 24 | 133 | 102 | 33 | 2,620 | 2,912 |
| *Extra Corps.* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff Corps—Cavalerie | | | .. | 2 | .. | .. | 1 | 15 | 23 | 4 | 204 | 247 |
| Idem | Infanterie | | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 13 | 10 | 3 | 173 | 202 |
| Corps du Train, Royal | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 28 | 28 | 4 | 433 | 494 |
| Idem | Commissariat | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 20 | 2 | 90 | 115 |
| Total | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 59 | 81 | 13 | 900 | 1,058 |
| Total Général | | | 25 | 26 | 60 | 17 | 152 | 1270 | 1686 | 606 | 27,608 | 31,322 |

D'ARMÉE BRITANNIQUE. Quartier Général, 15 Juillet, 1816.

| Chevaux. | Complet. Officiers. | Bas Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Commandans des Brigades. | Commandans des Divisions. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 426 | 36 | 517 | 433 | Le Général Major le Lord Ed. Somerset. | Le Lieut.-Gén. le Lord Combermere. | Hazebrouck. |
| 440 | 43 | 515 | 446 | | | Steenvorde. |
| 511 | 43 | 661 | 520 | Le Général Major le Chevalier Grant. | | Bourbourg. |
| 480 | 42 | 668 | 581 | | | Wormhout. |
| 481 | 44 | 652 | 520 | Le Général Major le Chevalier Vivian. | | Desvres. |
| 565 | 43 | 678 | 581 | | | Samer. |
| 2908 | 251 | 3,691 | 3081 | | | |
| .. | 46 | 1,076 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Maitland. | Le Lieut.-Gén. le Lord Hill, Comm. l'Infanterie. | Cambrai. |
| .. | 46 | 1,075 | .. | | | Idem. |
| .. | 53 | 1,092 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Kempt. | | Amblain-ville. |
| .. | 53 | 882 | .. | | | Hamlincourt. |
| .. | 50 | 1,092 | .. | | | Bapaume. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Lambert. | Le Lieut.-Gén. le Chev. Cole, Commt. le le Division. | Bapaume. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | | | Bugny. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | | | Havrincourt. |
| .. | 32 | 535 | .. | | | Bapaume. |
| .. | 386 | 7,945 | .. | | | |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | Le Général Major le Chev. O'Callaghan. | Le Lieut.-Gén. le Chev. H. Clinton. | Croix. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | | | Tanques. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | | | St. Pol. |
| .. | 53 | 1,113 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Pack. | | Tauquemberg. |
| .. | 53 | 883 | .. | | | Thierouenne. |
| .. | 50 | 1,077 | .. | | | Wizernes. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Bradford. | | Lillers. |
| .. | 53 | 1,113 | .. | | | Choques. |
| .. | | | | | | Norrein. |
| .. | 474 | 9,651 | .. | | | |
| .. | 49 | 1,077 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Power. | Le Lieut.-Gén. le Chev. Colville. | Valenciennes. |
| .. | 53 | 875 | .. | | | Le Celle. |
| .. | 32 | 535 | .. | | | Idem. |
| .. | 53 | 1,076 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Brisbane. | | Valenciennes. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | | | St. Amand. |
| .. | 53 | 1,098 | .. | | | Valenciennes. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | Le Général Major le Chevalier Keane. | | Idem. |
| .. | 53 | 1,093 | .. | | | Idem. |
| .. | 399 | 7,935 | .. | | | |
| .. | 1259 | 25,531 | .. | | | |
| 1342 | 106 | 2,146 | 1342 | Le Col. le Chev. Wood. | | Quartier-Général, Cambrai. |
| 429 | 51 | 766 | 429 | Le Col. Smyth. | | Idem. |
| 771 | 157 | 2,912 | 1771 | | | |
| 240 | 17 | 252 | 250 | Le Lieut.-Col. le Chev. Seovoll. | | Quartier-Général, Cambrai. |
| .. | 16 | 192 | .. | Le Col. Nicolay. | | Proville, près de Cambrai. |
| 554 | 29 | 500 | 600 | Le D. A. C. Wickars. | | Valenciennes. |
| 133 | 3 | 112 | 133 | | | |
| 927 | 65 | 1,056 | 983 | | | |
| 5610 | 1732 | 33,190 | 5835 | | | |

## ETAT du CORPS D'ARMÉE PRUSSIEN, sous les Ordres du Général de ZIETEN.

Quartier-Général à Sédan, 1 Juin, 1816.

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. Généraux. | Officiers. | Bas Officiers. | Music. et Sapeurs. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | Chevaux. | COMPLET. Officiers. | Bas Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Commandans des Brigades. | Commandans des Divisions. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Cavalerie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Régiment d'Hussards de Brandebourg | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 35 | 57 | 8 | 455 | 555 | 533 | 28 | 605 | 601 | Attaché à la Brigade Pirch. | Le Général Major de Wahlen Hiergass. | St. Mihiel. |
| 7me Régiment de Dragons | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 26 | 51 | 12 | 405 | 494 | 596 | 28 | 605 | 601 | Idem Borke. | | Sédan et Donchery. |
| Régiment de Dragons de Brandebourg | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 28 | 57 | 12 | 456 | 553 | 575 | 28 | 605 | 601 | Idem Ryssel. | | Stenay. |
| Régiment d'Hulans de Silésie | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 27 | 58 | 9 | 437 | 531 | 573 | 28 | 605 | 601 | Idem Lossau. | | Briey. |
| 1e Dragons de la Nouvelle Marche | .. | 4 | .. | 1 | 37 | 56 | 12 | 412 | 517 | 542 | 28 | 605 | 601 | Com. par le Col. de Borstell. | | Commercy. |
| 2e Régiment des Hussards du Corps | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 37 | 61 | 14 | 485 | 597 | 550 | 28 | 605 | 601 | Idem Col. | | Souilly. |
| 1e Régiment de Dragons de Prusse Occidentale | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 23 | 59 | 12 | 419 | 513 | 584 | 28 | 605 | 601 | Comte Lehndorff | | Thionville. |
| 7e Régiment d'Hulans | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 23 | 58 | 9 | 379 | 469 | 554 | 28 | 605 | 601 | | | Clarleville. |
| Total de la Cavalerie | .. | 32 | .. | 1 | 236 | 457 | 88 | 3,448 | 4,229 | 4507 | 224 | 4,840 | 4808 | | | |
| *Infanterie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2e Régiment de la Prusse Occidentale | 3 | .. | .. | | 79 | 174 | 47 | 2,165 | 2,465 | .. | 82 | 2,413 | .. | Le Lieut.-Gén. de Pirch. | .. | Bar-le-Duc, &c. |
| 1e Régiment de Silésie | 3 | .. | .. | 1 | 80 | 181 | 48 | 2,100 | 2,409 | .. | 82 | 2,413 | .. | | | Vaucouleurs, &c. |
| 2e Bataillon de Chasseurs | 1 | .. | .. | | 20 | 45 | 10 | 385 | 460 | .. | 27 | 801 | .. | | | Ligny en Barrois. |
| 2e Régiment de Brandebourg | 3 | .. | .. | 1 | 71 | 170 | 48 | 2,129 | 2,418 | .. | 82 | 2,413 | .. | Le Gén. Major de Borke. | .. | Sédan. |
| 14e Régiment d'Infanterie | 3 | .. | .. | | 75 | 175 | 49 | 2,030 | 2,329 | .. | 82 | 2,413 | .. | | | Mézières, &c. |
| Régiment de Colberg | 3 | .. | .. | 1 | 68 | 179 | 47 | 1,965 | 2,259 | .. | 82 | 2,413 | .. | Idem Ryssel. | .. | Clermont, &c. |
| 16me Régiment d'Infanterie | 3 | .. | .. | | 72 | 178 | 66 | 1,864 | 2,180 | .. | 82 | 2,443 | .. | | | Montmédy. |
| 2me Régiment de la Prusse Orientale | 3 | .. | .. | 1 | 72 | 183 | 48 | 2,125 | 2,428 | .. | 82 | 2,413 | .. | Idem de Lossau. | .. | Longwy. |
| 28me Régiment d'Infanterie | 3 | .. | .. | | 70 | 172 | 47 | 2,006 | 2,295 | .. | 82 | 2,413 | .. | | | Thionville. |
| Total de l'Infanterie | 25 | .. | .. | 4 | 607 | 1457 | 410 | 16,769 | 19,243 | .. | 683 | 20,105 | .. | | | |
| *Artillerie.* | | Cos. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Batteries de 12 livres | .. | 5 | 24 | .. | 22 | 51 | 10 | 876 | 959 | 748 | 20 | 995 | 780 | | | |
| Idem 6 livres | .. | 10 | 32 | .. | 41 | 100 | 18 | 1,150 | 1,309 | 986 | 40 | 1,410 | 1040 | | | |
| A Cheval | .. | 5 | 24 | .. | 19 | 51 | 7 | 666 | 743 | 1018 | 20 | 745 | 1070 | | Le Colonel Röhr. | |
| Trains | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 31 | 38 | 6 | 511 | 586 | 1821 | 30 | 600 | 1890 | | | |
| Dépôt de Chevaux | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 34 | .. | 1 | 50 | | | |
| Total des Combattans | .. | 30 | 80 | .. | 113 | 241 | 41 | 3,203 | 3,598 | 4607 | 110 | 3,751 | 4830 | | | |
| Colonnes Laboratoires | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12 | 22 | .. | 237 | 291 | 77 | 9 | 363 | 81 | | .. | |
| Colonnes d'Ouvriers | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 3 | .. | 48 | 57 | 132 | 6 | 48 | 138 | | .. | |
| Total de l'Artillerie | .. | 30 | 80 | .. | 131 | 266 | 41 | 3,508 | 3,946 | 4816 | 125 | 4,162 | 5049 | | | |
| Pionniers | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 15 | 60 | 12 | 722 | 809 | 46 | 16 | 800 | 56 | | Le Lt.-Col. Markoff. | |
| Total Général | 25 | 32 | 80 | 5 | 989 | 2240 | 551 | 24,447 | 28,227 | 9369 | 1048 | 29,907 | 9608 | | | |

## ETAT du CONTINGENT BAVAROIS, sous les Ordres du Lieut.-Général DE LAMOTTE.

Quartier-Général, à Sarreguemines, 2e Juillet, 1816.

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. | | | | Non-combattans. | Chevaux. | Commandans des Brigades. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Généraux. | Officiers. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | | | | |
| Etat Major-Général du Corps .. .. | 1 | 15 | 38 | 54 | 60 | 111 | .. .. | Sarreguemines. |
| *Cavalerie.* | | | | | | | | |
| Etat Major de la Brigade .. .. .. | 1 | 5 | 15 | 21 | 2 | 27 | Le Général Major Comte Seidewitz. | Idem. |
| 1er Régiment de Chev. légères .. .. | .. | 37 | 924 | 961 | 20 | 916 | | Idem. |
| 3e Idem .. .. | .. | 37 | 909 | 946 | 20 | 911 | | St. Avold. |
| Total de la Cavalerie .. .. | 1 | 79 | 1848 | 1928 | 42 | 1854 | | |
| *Infanterie.* | | | | | | | | |
| Etat-Major de la Brigade .. .. .. | 1 | 4 | 10 | 15 | 2 | 24 | Le Général Major de Bernclau. | Forbach. |
| 6e Régiment de Ligne .. .. .. .. | .. | 67 | 2205 | 2272 | 45 | 40 | | Bitche. |
| 12e Idem .. .. .. .. | .. | 66 | 2234 | 2300 | 42 | 40 | | Bouzonville. |
| 15e Idem .. .. .. .. | .. | 66 | 2223 | 2289 | 43 | 40 | | Sarreguemines. |
| | 1 | 203 | 6672 | 6876 | 132 | 144 | | |
| *Artillerie.* | | | | | | | | |
| Etat-Major .. .. .. .. .. .. | .. | 9 | 6 | 15 | 4 | 16 | Le Major de Hofstetten. | Sarreguemines. |
| 9e Batterie de 6 livres .. .. .. .. | .. | 4 | 106 | 110 | 6 | .. | | Grosredrechingen. |
| 8e „ 12 „ .. .. .. .. | .. | 4 | 118 | 122 | 6 | .. | | Rohrbach. |
| Réserve .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | .. | 2 | 101 | 103 | 4 | .. | | Bitche. |
| Train de la 9e Batterie .. .. .. .. | .. | 1 | 64 | 65 | 4 | 125 | | Grosredrechingen. |
| Train de la 8e „ .. .. .. .. | .. | 1 | 91 | 92 | 4 | 167 | | Rohrbach. |
| Train de la Réserve .. .. .. .. | .. | 1 | 135 | 134 | 4 | 200 | | Rahling. |
| | .. | 22 | 619 | 641 | 32 | 508 | | |
| Train des Equipages .. .. .. .. | .. | 1 | 169 | 170 | 4 | 357 | .. .. | Blüsbrucken. |
| Total Général .. .. .. .. | 3 | 320 | 9346 | 9669 | 270 | 2974 | | |

## ETAT du CONTINGENT DANOIS, sous les Ordres de S.A.S. le PRINCE FRÉDÉRIC de HESSE.

Quartier-Général à Lewarde, près de Bouchain, 15 Juillet, 1816.

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. Généraux. | Officiers Supérieurs. | Officiers. | Bas Officiers. | Music. et Sapeurs. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | Non-combattans. | Chevaux. | Commandans des Brigades. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Etat Major du Corps | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 41 | 18 | 7 | 98 | 165 | 102 | 234 | .. | Lewarde, près de Bouchain. |
| Etat Major de la 1e Brigade | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 3 | 1 | .. | .. | 5 | 12 | 27 | Le Colonel de Waldeck. | Lens. |
| Régiment de Dragons de S.A.R. le P. Fd. de Dannemarc | .. | 4 | .. | .. | .. | 25 | 36 | 8 | 470 | 539 | 63 | 667 | | Carvin et environs. |
| Régiment de Chasseurs de Slesvic | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 25 | 45 | 6 | 280 | 356 | 45 | 50 | | Houdain. |
| Idem de Holstein | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20 | 32 | 5 | 206 | 263 | 40 | 45 | | Lens. |
| Batterie de 8 pièces de 6, et 2 obusiers | .. | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 8 | 9 | 2 | 134 | 153 | 130 | 256 | | Henin Leitard. |
| Total de la 1e Brigade | 2 | 4 | 10 | .. | 1 | 81 | 123 | 21 | 1080 | 1316 | 290 | 1045 | | |
| Etat Major de la 2e Brigade | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 5 | 1 | .. | 2 | 9 | 15 | 51 | S.A.S. le Prince Guil. de Hesse. | Bouchain. |
| Régiment d'Infanterie de S.M. la Reine | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 29 | 52 | 22 | 642 | 745 | 67 | 56 | | Arleux, et l'Ecluse. |
| Idem de Fionie | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 27 | 51 | 19 | 681 | 778 | 58 | 59 | | Nitry, Brébières, &c. |
| Idem de Jutlande | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 26 | 51 | 25 | 671 | 773 | 66 | 55 | | Bouchain. |
| Batterie (démontée) de 8 pièces de 6, et 2 obusiers | .. | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 7 | 12 | 2 | 132 | 153 | 141 | 21 | | Idem. |
| Total de la 2e Brigade | 3 | .. | 10 | .. | 1 | 94 | 167 | 68 | 2128 | 2458 | 347 | 242 | | |
| Le Parc | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 3 | 1 | 46 | 55 | 70 | 126 | .. | Aubergicourt, Agincourt, &c. |
| L'Ambulance | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 17 | 7 | .. | 54 | 78 | 32 | 31 | | |
| Total Général | 5 | 4 | 20 | 1 | 2 | 238 | 318 | 97 | 3416 | 4072 | 841 | 1678 | | |

## ETAT du CONTINGENT SAXON, sous les Ordres du Major-Général de GABLENZ.

Quartier-Général à Turcoing, 15 Juillet, 1816.

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. Généraux. | Officiers. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | Chevaux. | COMPLET. Officiers. | Bas Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Commandans des Brigades. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Etat Major-Général du Corps .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 20 | 16 | 37 | 85 | 21 | .. | .. | .. | Turcoing. |
| *Cavalerie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ordonnances de l'Etat Major .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 21 | 21 | 19 | .. | 21 | 21 | .. | Idem. |
| Régiment d'Hussards .. .. .. | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 37 | 701 | 738 | 745 | 38 | 712 | 712 | Le Lt.-Col. Stünzner. | Seclin, &c. |
| Total .. .. .. | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 37 | 722 | 759 | 764 | 38 | 733 | 733 | | |
| *Infanterie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2e Régiment de Ligne .. .. .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 41 | 1410 | 1451 | 46 | 41 | 1459 | .. | Le Colonel de Seydewitz. | Turcoing, Lincelle, &c. |
| Bataillon de Chasseurs à pied .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 21 | 434 | 455 | 22 | 21 | 470 | .. | | Labassée, Illers, &c. |
| 1e Bataillon d'Infanterie légère .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 22 | 692 | 714 | 26 | 21 | 730 | .. | | Boubaix, &c. |
| 2e Bataillon d'Infanterie légère .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 22 | 678 | 700 | 26 | 21 | 730 | .. | | Du Quesnoy. |
| Total .. .. .. .. | 5 | .. | .. | .. | 106 | 3214 | 3320 | 120 | 104 | 3389 | .. | | |
| *Artillerie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Etat Major .. .. .. .. .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 3 | .. | .. | Le Major Rourroy. | Lannoy, Lys, &c. |
| Batterie de 8 pièces de 6 livres .. .. .. Artillerie | .. | .. | 8 | .. | 3 | 110 | 113 | 4 | 3 | 121 | .. | | |
| Train | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 79 | 80 | 152 | 1 | 79 | 155 | | |
| Parc d'Artillerie .. Artillerie | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 92 | 98 | 7 | 6 | 95 | .. | | Labassée, Salomé, &c. |
| Train | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 128 | 130 | 217 | 2 | 133 | 219 | | |
| Total .. .. .. | .. | .. | 8 | .. | 15 | 414 | 429 | 389 | 15 | 428 | 374 | | |
| Ambulance et Administrations .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 42 | 224 | 266 | 348 | 43 | 229 | 360 | | |
| Total Général .. .. | 5 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 220 | 4590 | 4811 | 1706 | 221 | 4779 | 1467 | | |

## ETAT du CONTINGENT WURTEMBERGEOIS, sous les Ordres du Lieutenant-Général BARON de WŒLLWARTH.

Quartier-Général, à Weissembourg, 2 Juillet, 1816.

| SPÉCIFICATION DES CORPS. | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. | COMBATTANS: PRÉSENS SOUS LES ARMES. Généraux. | Officiers Majors. | Officiers. | Bas Officiers. | Music. et Sapeurs. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | Non-Combattans. | Chevaux. | COMPLET. Officiers. | Bas Officiers et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Commandans des Brigades. | Commandans des Divisions. | Cantonnemens. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Etat Major-Général du Corps | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 7 | 3 | .. | .. | 11 | 14 | 8 | 26 | | 8 | | | Weissembourg. |
| Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval, No. 4 | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 2 | 28 | 8 | 9 | 493 | 540 | 40 | 519 | 580 | | 519 | Le Colonel de Reinhard. | .. | Lauterbourg, &c. |
| *Infanterie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Régiment de Ligne, No. 2 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 36 | 16 | 36 | 1288 | 1380 | 50 | 16 | 1430 | | 16 | Le Général Major de Misani. | .. | Neiderbronn, &c. |
| Idem No. 3 | 2 | .. | .. | 1 | 4 | 37 | 16 | 36 | 1288 | 1381 | 50 | 16 | 1430 | | 16 | | | Weissembourg, &c. |
| Idem No. 8 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 37 | 16 | 36 | 1288 | 1381 | 50 | 16 | 1430 | | 16 | | | Sulz, &c. |
| Total de la Brigade | 6 | .. | .. | 1 | 12 | 109 | 48 | 108 | 3864 | 4142 | 150 | 48 | 4290 | | 48 | | | |
| Artillerie: 1 Batterie légère à pied de 6 pièces de 6 livres | .. | .. | 6 | .. | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 97 | 105 | 42 | 64 | 146 | | 64 | Le Major de Diedel. | .. | Weissembourg. |
| Total Général | 6 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 15 | 147 | 61 | 119 | 4454 | 4798 | 246 | 639 | 5042 | | 639 | | | |

## ETAT du CONTINGENT HANOVRIEN, sous les Ordres du Lieutenant-Général COMTE ALTEN.

Quartier-Général à Condé, 15 Juillet, 1816.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Etat Major-Général du Corps | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 2 | 27 | 8 | .. | .. | 39 | 19 | 112 | 30 | 8 | 112 | | .. | Condé. |
| Régiment d'Hussards du Prince Régent | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 4 | 23 | 30 | 16 | 552 | 625 | 53 | 740 | 31 | 646 | 771 | Le Colonel Kielmansegge. | .. | Templeuve, &c. |
| *Infanterie.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Etat Major de la Brigade | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 4 | 1 | .. | 1 | 7 | 9 | 23 | 5 | 2 | 23 | | Le Général Major le Chevalier Lyon, Commandant-en-Chef *ad interim*. | Condé. |
| Bataillon d'Infanterie légère de Luneberg | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 29 | 17 | 8 | 489 | 545 | 24 | 51 | 28 | 650 | 51 | Le Colonel Halkett. | | Idem. |
| Idem de Hoya | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 29 | 19 | 8 | 525 | 584 | 9 | 52 | 28 | 650 | 52 | | | Idem. |
| Idem d'Osnabruck | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 30 | 20 | 8 | 526 | 587 | 28 | 49 | 28 | 650 | 49 | | | Idem, Fresnes, &c. |
| Total de la 1e Brigade | 3 | .. | .. | .. | 9 | 92 | 57 | 24 | 1541 | 1723 | 70 | 175 | 89 | 1952 | 175 | | | |
| Etat Major de la Brigade | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 4 | 1 | .. | 1 | 7 | 2 | 23 | 5 | 2 | 23 | | | Marchiennes. |
| Bataillon de Grenadiers de Bremen | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 28 | 18 | 7 | 497 | 552 | 4 | 50 | 28 | 650 | 50 | Le Colonel de Berger. | | Idem, &c. |
| Idem de Verden | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 30 | 23 | 7 | 587 | 650 | 13 | 54 | 28 | 651 | 54 | | | Pont à Marque, &c. |
| Idem d'Ostfrieslande | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 30 | 22 | 8 | 541 | 603 | 12 | 53 | 28 | 650 | 53 | | | Orchies, &c. |
| Total de la 2e Brigade | 3 | .. | .. | .. | 8 | 92 | 64 | 22 | 1626 | 1812 | 31 | 180 | 89 | 1953 | 180 | | | |
| Total de l'Infanterie | 6 | .. | .. | .. | 17 | 184 | 121 | 46 | 3167 | 3535 | 101 | 355 | 178 | 3905 | 355 | | | |
| Artillerie: Batterie de 9 livres, No. 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7 | 4 | 1 | 222 | 234 | 1 | 216 | 8 | 252 | 228 | Le Major Rettberg. | .. | Condé. |
| Total Général | 6 | 4 | .. | 2 | 23 | 241 | 163 | 63 | 3941 | 4433 | 174 | 1423 | 247 | 4811 | 1491 | | | |

## RÉCAPITULATION.

| No. | Contingens. | Combattans: présens sous les Armes. | | | | | | | Non-Combattans. | Chevaux. | No. de Bataillons. | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Canons. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Généraux. | Officiers Majors. | Officiers. | Bas Officiers. | Music. et Sapeurs. | Soldats. | Total sous les Armes. | | | | | |
| 1 | Autrichien .. .. .. | 6 | 42 | 765 | 2206 | 590 | 25,579 | 29,182 | 2675 | 5,756 | 22 | 28 | 96 |
| 2 | Russe .. .. .. .. | 16 | 88 | 700 | 2410 | 684 | 27,881 | 31,779 | 3589 | 11,546 | 24 | 34 | 84 |
| 3 | Britannique .. .. | 17 | 152 | 1270 | 1686 | 606 | 27,608 | 31,322 | .. | 5,600 | 25 | 26 | 60 |
| 4 | Prussien .. .. .. | 5 | .. | 989 | 2240 | 551 | 24,447 | 28,227 | .. | 9,369 | 25 | 32 | 80 |
| 5 | Bavarois .. .. .. | 3 | .. | 320 | .. | .. | 9,346 | 9,699 | 270 | 2,974 | .. | .. | .. |
| 6 | Danois .. .. .. | 1 | 2 | 238 | 318 | 97 | 3,416 | 4,072 | 841 | 1,678 | 5 | 4 | 20 |
| 7 | Saxon .. .. .. .. | 1 | .. | 220 | .. | .. | 4,590 | 4,811 | .. | 1,706 | 5 | 4 | 8 |
| 8 | Wurtembergeois .. | 2 | 15 | 147 | 61 | 119 | 4,454 | 4,798 | 246 | 639 | 6 | 4 | 6 |
| 9 | Hanovrien .. .. .. | 2 | 23 | 241 | 163 | 63 | 3,941 | 4,433 | 174 | 1,423 | 6 | 4 | .. |
| | Total .. .. | 53 | 322 | 4890 | 9084 | 2710 | 131,261 | 148,293 | .. | 40,691 | .. | .. | .. |

*M. Dargannut to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, ce 12 Juin, 1816.

Le Secrétaire du Roi à la conduite des Ambassadeurs a l'honneur de prévenir Son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Wellington que le corps diplomatique se réunira Lundi prochain 17, à dix heures précises, à l'hôtel de M. l'Ambassadeur de Sardaigne, pour se rendre de là ensemble à la tribune qui lui est réservée à Notre Dame pour la cérémonie du mariage de Mgr. le Duc de Berri.

Le même jour, à six heures et demie précises, le corps diplomatique, dans le même nombre où il se sera trouvé à la tribune de Notre Dame, se réunira au salon des Ambassadeurs pour se rendre aux appartemens au jeu et au festin Royal.

Son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Wellington est invité à se rendre aux heures indiquées chez M. l'Ambassadeur de Sardaigne, et le soir au salon des Ambassadeurs, pour se réunir au corps diplomatique.

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[1035.] *To Major-Gen. Sir P. Maitland.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Paris, 16th June, 1816.

I enclose some papers given to me by the Commissary-General, to which I beg you will call the attention of the Sous-Préfet, and tell him that I am surprised that after the many examples he has had of our desire to do justice to those who have to complain of any of our people, the police at Cambrai should have suffered such a riot to take place without noticing it. You have my orders to turn out the troops and fire whenever the people attempt any riot again. I repeat them now, and I beg you will inform the Sous-Préfet that I have reminded you of them; and particularly that the troops are not to be turned out to quell a riot without firing in earnest.

I beg you also to tell the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai that I can no longer allow the Garde Nationale of Cambrai to remain armed. They must be paraded in an hour after you will make this communication, and must lodge their arms in the great square, and go to their homes. You will take possession of their arms, for which you will give a receipt. They are to be lodged in store. Inform the Sous-Préfet that I consider him and the Maire responsible to me that no arms are kept by the individuals of the Garde Nationale.

I understand that people from the gambling-houses have been sent down to all the garrisons; and I beg you will tell the Sous-Préfet that I will not allow them to remain; and they had better therefore remove without obliging me to use force.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1036.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 18 Juin, 1816.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer les copies de deux lettres que je reçois de M. le Général Comte de Woronzow se plaignant de la conduite des douaniers dans le Département du Nord. Il y a déjà quelque tems qu'un Cosaque avait été tué par un coup de fusil tiré par un douanier, et les plaintes sur leur conduite sont générales et multipliées.

S.E. Monsieur le Comte de Cornetto a déjà convenu avec moi sur le principe que les douaniers n'auraient rien à dire aux militaires étrangers excepté aux bureaux de douanes; et je suis d'opinion qu'il serait à propos d'ordonner l'exécution immédiate de ce principe.

Les lettres du Comte de Woronzow ne regardent pas seulement la conduite des douaniers, mais aussi la justice qu'on rend aux plaintes qui se sont fait de la conduite des douaniers et autres envers les militaires étrangers. Il n'y a que trop de raison de se plaindre sur ce sujet; et malgré toutes les peines que le gouvernement et les chefs des corps prennent pour cultiver l'harmonie entre les militaires étrangers et les habitans, il y a lieu de craindre que l'impunité sous laquelle les magistrats souffrent les délits des derniers contre les premiers à être commis se mènera à des rixes sérieuses qui ne peuvent qu'avoir des malheureuses conséquences.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1037.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 22 Juin, 1816.

Il y a quelques jours que je reçus un rapport que des personnes se trouvant à une vente publique de chevaux à Cambrai, qui se faisait par mes ordres, avaient en conséquence d'une dispute qui s'est élevée obligé les Commissaires chargés de la vente de se retirer, en les chassant de la place où la vente se faisait à coup de pierre. La police de Cambrai ne prit aucune notice à cette affaire, qui avait passée sans attention.

Elle m'a paru cependant très grave; et j'ai de suite envoyé un ordre à l'officier général qui commande à Cambrai d'y attirer l'attention du Sous-Préfet, et de lui intimer en même tems

que comme la Garde Nationale à Cambrai avait continué armé, et que cette circonstance était contraire aux traités, je le priai de la faire désarmer de suite, et de faire loger les armes en endroit sûr, d'où ils seraient rendus aux officiers du Roi.

J'ai le rapport du Général Maitland que cette opération s'est effectué le 20 du mois, le Général en ayant parlé au Sous-Préfet que ce jour là; mais le Général m'a en même tems fait savoir que dans l'après-midi du 19me sept officiers à demie-solde, demeurant à Cambrai, avaient tombé sur quatre soldats qui se promenaient tranquillement sur la route auprès de la ville, et après sur deux officiers qui se trouvaient sur leur passage dans l'entrée de la ville; lesquels, si loin de leur donner la moindre cause, avaient quitté la route pour leur faire place. Ces deux officiers Anglais ayant après eu le secours de deux autres ont fait prisonniers trois des officiers Français qui les avaient attaqué, et les ont remis aux autorités Françaises de la ville de Cambrai.

Les noms de ces trois officiers sont nécessairement connus; et je sais que les noms des quatre autres le sont à la police de Cambrai, aussi bien qu'à S.E. le Ministre de la Police.

Monsieur le Duc, je ne peux pas vous cacher que la cause de ces rixes se trouve dans l'impunité de toute espèce d'excès qui se commet dans le pays contre les troupes Alliées.

Les officiers généraux qui commandent les différens corps d'armée ont donné l'exemple de la discipline la plus sévère parmi les troupes; et je défie aux autorités du pays de montrer un exemple où un délit ait été constaté, où celui qui l'ait commis n'a pas été puni avec sévérité. Tout dernièrement j'ai remis au Procureur du Roi à Cambrai, pour être traité selon les lois, deux Anglais attachés au Commissariat, contre lesquelles il y avait des plaintes; et tous les décrets des conseils de guerre, soit contre officier ou soldat, même ceux de mort, sont mis en exécution de suite. Je regrette d'être obligé de dire que la même justice ne nous est pas rendu par les autorités du pays; et la conséquence en est les rixes dont il est question dans cette lettre, qui auront des suites encore plus graves si les autorités Françaises ne font pas leur devoir.

V.E. doit sentir que je ne peux pas souffrir une répétition d'événemens pareils à ceux qui font le sujet de cette lettre. Je crois qu'il n'y a jamais eu d'exemple que la populace d'une ville ait été permis avec impunité de chasser de la place publique

les Commissaires de la garnison occupés à faire leur devoir; ni que des habitans (car les officiers à demie-solde ne sont que des habitans) ayent été permis d'attaquer sous les murs de la place des soldats et officiers qui en faisaient la garnison. Même si le gouvernement était disposé à permettre de tels outrages, ou que moi-même j'eusse cette disposition, les officiers et troupes eux-mêmes ne les souffriraient pas.

Je prie donc V.E. de réitérer ses ordres pour que leur procès soit fait aux sept officiers qui sont connus à la police de Cambrai; et même je crois qu'il serait à désirer qu'il ne leur soit plus permis de rester à Cambrai, quelconque en soit le résultat.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1038.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 24th June, 1816.

Mr. Marshall, whom you know, and who had not been near me for some months, called on me yesterday and gave me the enclosed paper, which I told him I should send to you. He said amongst other things that he was in constant communication with the King, and that it was the King who desired him to give me the intelligence which the paper contains.

You know best what credit you ought to give to the intelligence itself. I have not yet been able to discover whether Marshall does or not see the King three times a week, as he says: Sir C. Stuart does not know.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

21st June, 1816.

The Americans have formed the strictest alliance with Russia, and have agreed that she shall occupy four ports upon the coast of the Pacific Ocean at her choice, as soon as America has possession of Mexico and California. America has no doubt that she will succeed in this project, and has assured Russia that three parts of the inhabitants are in her interest, and will second the first efforts she makes to procure their independence.

Russia has been using great endeavours to augment her establishments in that quarter, in order to avail herself of the promise America has made; and has assured America, in the event of its being fulfilled, that it will support her as to any consequences that may occur in Europe.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 25th June, 1816.

So many civilians have considered themselves aggrieved by not being permitted to accept Foreign Orders, that it is very necessary to guard against anything which may be considered as a deviation from that rule. I very much doubt, therefore, whether we can consider Sir Robert Kennedy's and Mr. James Pipon's services so much of a military nature as to enable me to recommend the application. I wish you to consider this before I give a public answer to your despatch No. 40.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON COUSIN, La Haye, le 25 Juin, 1816.

J'ai reçu par votre lettre du 8 de ce mois une nouvelle preuve de votre amitié et de votre sollicitude pour les intérêts des Pays-Bas. Je regrette d'y avoir trouvé la confirmation des rapports du Général Fagel au sujet de l'irritation du gouvernement Français, occasionné par les feuilles publiques qui s'impriment dans les provinces méridionales. L'issue du procès entamé à Liége contre le 'Mercure Surveillant' semble avoir bien injustement augmenté encore celle-ci, l'appel que les deux partis ont interjecté ne permettant pas d'établir une opinion, et étant requis préalablement d'attendre le jugement de la cour supérieure qui devra confirmer ou modifier celui du tribunal de première instance. Je me trouve également dans l'obligation d'attendre le fin des procédures de Liége avant de pouvoir proposer une loi aux Etats Généraux, l'expérience devant prouver l'insuffisance de la législation actuelle avant d'y substituer une nouvelle, surtout à l'égard d'une matière aussi délicate que la liberté de la presse, que bien des personnes considèrent comme le garant de la liberté politique, et à l'égard de laquelle je n'oserais pas répondre de l'opinion de la pluralité des Etats Généraux. Quelque disposé que je sois de faire les démarches que l'expérience prouvera être requise, je ne saurais cependant pas vous cacher toute ma sensibilité aux plaintes continuelles qui me parviennent sur une objet que toute l'Europe sait être la conséquence des principes libéraux de la constitution des Provinces Unies, que nous avons puisé dans celle qui fait le bonheur et la gloire de la Grande Bretagne. On semble vouloir exiger de moi que j'abandonne des dispositions que j'ai juré solennellement, et à la face de la nation et de l'Europe, de maintenir, et me placer entre mes devoirs et la complaisance pour des gouvernemens étrangers. Ainsi que ceux-ci, mon gouvernement, et moi personnellement, je suis en but aux attaques d'écrivains folliculaires; mais quand leurs réflexions sont non fondées, je les méprise ainsi qu'elles le méritent, tout comme en plusieurs occasions j'avoue volontiers avoir été à même d'y trouver d'utiles avertissemens. Le mépris est en général le sentiment que doivent inspirer ces productions du moment; et j'oserais affirmer qu'elles ne prennent de l'importance que par celle qui leur est attaché. A cet égard encore j'ose citer l'Angleterre.

Néanmoins je serai toujours prêt à avoir les plus grands égards pour toutes les plaintes officielles qui me parviennent au sujet des articles contenues dans des gazettes, et les procureurs seront toujours chargés de poursuivre les éditeurs d'après les lois; mais je ne saurais donner des ordres généraux à cet égard, devant me borner aux cas spéciaux qui font le sujet de plaintes de gouvernemens étrangers, tout comme la constitution me défend toute démarche arbitraire, et qui pourrait être considéré comme un déni de justice. Je ne saurais du reste que vous répéter, mon Cousin, ce que j'ai eu le plaisir de vous dire au sujet des Français, et particulièrement des généraux et militaires Français qui se trouvent avec des passeports de leur gouvernement dans mes états, étant toujours disposé à les faire inviter de retourner dans leur patrie du moment qu'ils y seront rappelés, ou bien, en cas de refus de se soumettre aux ordres de leur Roi, de les considérer comme étant en état de désobéissance, et l'effet de leur passeport pour Bruxelles venant à cesser, ainsi que de la protection que celui-ci leur assure par égard pour le gouvernement qui le leur a donné. A l'égard d'individus, surtout de ceux qui ont cessé d'être Français, la chose deviendra plus difficile dans l'exécution, le gouvernement n'ayant pas les moyens de les rappeler, et ses rélations étant suspendues par la manière dont ils sont considérés en France. Ma position et mon caractère m'obligent à une conduite franche et loyale, et à m'expliquer sans détours quand je crois nécessaire de donner ma façon de penser à connaître. L'acquit de ma conscience ne me permet pas de suivre une autre marche que celle que je crois être celle de la ligne du devoir. Si par là je ne suis pas toujours à même de faire ce qui est pour le moment agréable, j'ose cependant me flatter qu'à la longue il sera rendu justice à mes sentimens, et que la conviction s'établira que si j'erre, c'est de bonne foi, et par un principe louable. C'est particulièrement de votre opinion que je suis jaloux; et je désire, mon Cousin, que vous appréciez ma position et mes sentimens. Ceux que je vous porte m'y font attacher grand prix.

Recevez en l'assurance ainsi que de la considération très distinguée avec laquelle je suis, mon Cousin,

Votre affectionné

GUILLAUME.

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*To Generals Frimont, Zieten, &c.* [1

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, Paris, ce 28 Juin, 1816.

Je me trouve dans la nécessité de faire un voyage en Angleterre pour trois semaines ou un mois, ce qui remettra pour quelque tems la visite que j'avais l'intention de vous faire. Il y aura cette avantage de ce délai, que la récolte sera faite, et que je pourrai, sans inconvénient, voir les troupes en même tems.

J'ai fait des arrangemens pour qu'il n'y ait aucun délai dans

les demandes que vous pourriez être dans le cas de me faire pour être passées au gouvernement Français.

Le quartier-général restera à Paris, où je vous prie de m'adresser toutes vos lettres.

WELLINGTON.

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[1040.] G. O. Paris, 28th June, 1816.

1. The Field Marshal desires that as soon as the regiments will be encamped, or whenever they can be assembled for exercise, they should be rendered perfect in the following movements:

1st. Marching in column on an alignment at full, half, and quarter distance, officers keeping accurately the exact distance ordered.

2nd. Deployments of close columns into line.

3rd. Wheeling a close column, or one at quarter distance, into a new direction.

4th. Formation into line from open column, by the *échelon* march of divisions.

5th. Formation of the square from columns at half and quarter distance, and at close order.

6th. March in line.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 29 Juin, 1816.

Votre Excellence se rappelle que par l'Article 1er du 20 Novembre il a été stipulé, § VI., que des commissaires seraient nommés par les gouvernemens respectifs pour régler tout ce qui a rapport à la délimitation des pays de part et d'autre.

Le Roi, pour l'exécution de cette section, a nommé deux commissaires, M. le Lieutenant-Général Baron de Maureillan et M. le Lieutenant-Général Comte Guilleminot, qui ont reçu des instructions pour procéder à la démarcation des limites de concert avec des commissaires des pays voisins; le premier depuis l'océan jusqu'à l'embouchure de la Lauter dans le Rhin, le second depuis ce point jusqu'à la Méditerranée.

M. le Baron de Maureillan s'est à cet effet rendu à Mons, et est déjà entré en communication avec le Commissaire du royaume des Pays-Bas. M. le Comte Guilleminot s'est rendu a Basle, où il attend le Commissaire Badois. Tous deux sont accompagnés d'ingénieurs géographes et d'officiers

d'états-major, qui doivent, sous leurs ordres, prendre part aux travaux de la démarcation.

En vous informant, My Lord, de la mission de ces deux commissaires, j'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien, dans le cas où cette précaution lui paraîtrait nécessaire, donner des ordres aux troupes de l'Armée d'Occupation pour qu'il ne soit apporté de leur part aucun obstacle aux travaux des Commissaires.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute consideration, My Lord,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cray Farm, Sunday,* July, 1816.

Not having had the pleasure of seeing you on Friday at the ball, I enclose the letter I had prepared in reference to the Duc de R.'s overture to you. Under the impression that your remaining force will be sufficient, in your judgment, to maintain our position and influence in France, the Duc de R. will not find this government disinclined to meet his wishes; but as our Allies might justly complain of anything like a pledge, or even a separate discussion of such a point, I hope you approve of the letter being so worded as to guard us against any imputation of views in separation from our Allies.

I am, my dear Lord, ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*To the Honourable the Chairman and Court of Directors of the East India Company.* [1041.]

HONOURABLE SIR, London, 5th July, 1816.

I beg leave to enclose a memorandum which has been sent to me by Mrs.* in favour of her son, Mr. James Stevenson, by the late Colonel, her deceased husband. I beg leave to recall to the recollection of the Honourable Court the services and merits of the late Colonel; and I take the liberty of recommending his son, Mr. James Stevenson, to their protection and favour at the period at which by the regulations of the service of the East India Company he can be admitted into it.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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* Blank in manuscript.

*Extract of a Letter from Rear-Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm to his Brother, Mr. Gilbert Malcolm.*

St. Helena, 6th July, 1816.

. . . Yesterday I had an interview of two hours and a half with Bonaparte, in which we discussed various events in a free and candid manner: he was in great good humour, and frequently laughed, which is a rare occurrence. We cut some good jokes on his admirals. I do not think that there is anything very particular in his appearance. His countenance is such as can change with his mind: to me it has always appeared pleased, but I can easily believe that when he is angry it is most ferocious. He speaks thick, and not very good French: but I understood every word, and he appeared to comprehend me; and, as I frequently differed from him, I had often to speak. I noticed that when I made a remark which he was not prepared to answer, he changed the subject directly. He is now writing his history: he has promised to let me read some of the chapters. I am particularly well situated to remain on good terms with him, and at the same time to perform my duty most rigidly.

Sir Hudson Lowe has a much more irksome task, and a much more ungracious one, for in him originate all orders of restriction; but, although he performs his duty with as much regard as possible to the feelings of Bonaparte, yet it is impossible for him to give satisfaction. The set around him are bad: they hate each other, and the truth is not in one of them. I believe the lies they tell do much mischief, and prevent him being at peace in his own mind. But now for his remarks, which I will give you just as they were said upon the various subjects. We began on naval events:—

*Battle of Trafalgar.*—He had heard Lord Nelson's arrangements criticised. I replied *not* by good judges, for it was impossible to lay down rules for conducting naval actions, particularly when near the shore and in variable winds. That had Lord Nelson met a French fleet equal to his own at a distance from land, his arrangements would have been quite different; but that in my opinion, considering the then situation of the combined fleet, nothing could be better than his mode of attack. I said that I considered Lord Nelson the greatest sea officer that had ever appeared. He agreed. He said that the French had never done anything very brilliant at sea; that they had *tactic*, so had the Prussians, on land; but with these Potsdam manœuvres it was impossible to believe how easily he won the battle of Jena.

*Basque Roads.*—He thought that his Admiral had not made good arrangements to resist our attack by fire-ships: I agreed with him. He also remarked that we might have done more. You know my opinion on that subject.

*St. Domingo.*—His Admiral was a fool, or he never would have remained at so exposed an anchorage, but would have refitted at the Havannah. This is entirely true.

*Toulon Fleet.*—He had given orders that they should weigh daily, and stand towards our fleet, but not to risk a battle. At first, by their awkwardness, it cost him much money for repairs; but the last year they were so expert that very seldom they had an accident. He had appointed

Admiral Lallemand to command, because he was a rough fellow, who obliged them all to do their duty, and to remain on board their ships: very seldom for three years had they had leave to come on shore. This I know to be true.

*Invasion.*—His plan was that his fleet should put to sea; steer towards the West Indies, where ours would follow; to turn on the passage, come up Channel, which for a short time would give him the superiority at sea; and then, under the protection of his fleet, to land his army. His gun-boats were only for deception. He allowed the risk was great, but the object was worth it.

*Battle of Waterloo.*—Wellington ought to have retreated, and not fought the battle of Waterloo. Had he lost it, Bonaparte would have established himself in France; but if he had been obliged to follow the English and Prussians, in the end he must have been beaten by the junction of all the Allied army. Wellington risked too much; for by the rules of war, he, Bonaparte, should have gained the battle. He calculated that his General Grouchy would have kept the Prussians in check till he beat the English; and he ought to have done it. I replied that he knew it was always dangerous to retreat when opinion was the great point; that Lord Wellington must have apprehended that if he permitted the French army to cross the frontier, the Belgians would have joined them; that of course he relied on being assisted by the Prussians; and that the result proved his judgment to have been correct. Bonaparte said that two causes lost him the battle: that of Grouchy, and his great charge of cavalry being made half an hour too soon. I asked him why he did not attempt to enter Belgium by attacking the right of the English, and cutting them off from the sea? He replied that in forming his plan he took into consideration the characters of the two Generals: one he considered as a perfect hussar; the other as an officer of method, who would not move his army without reflection, and without bringing with him his supplies. That if he attacked the English, the Prussians would be on him full gallop; and, as everything depended on the first onset, he thought it best to attack the Prussians, thinking that the English army would be somewhat slower, particularly as its cavalry was at a distance from the point he began. He said that all his troops fought well: some few officers were traitors to him, but not a single soldier. I replied that we had done full justice to their valour, particularly to the Cuirassiers.

*Bourbons.*—Bourbons would never tranquillise France. I asked him what line they ought to have pursued in order to have established their power? On their first return they ought to have said to the French people, "You have had a great revolution, during which, although great atrocities have been committed, yet the nation has done great things. You appointed a man your Emperor; he did great things for France. Circumstances have occasioned you to offer me the Crown of France. I accept it on the terms you propose; and as such great changes have taken place as to render it neither desirable nor possible that things should return to their original state when my family reigned over you, and as you thought proper to erect a fourth dynasty in the Crown of France, I shall now consider myself as the beginner of the fifth." Had they done this, I must have ended my days at Elba, or wherever else they thought proper. *Opinion* is everything in

France. They are now considered as head of the old feudal system; and for ages those who have lost their lands will hate the families of those who possess them. Better were it for France, as they chose to consider themselves as Kings on the old plan, that they did actually give back all the estates at once; for, as it is, they sit on a smothered volcano, and no person is content. "I have written," said he, "on this subject, and will one of these days show it to you. Henri IV., who was undoubtedly the greatest monarch that ever sat on the throne of France, when he conquered the armies of the Ligue, and had it at his feet, yet he could not reign till he obtained the opinion of the people by changing his religion; and even then he lost his life by a wretch not believing he was in earnest." I said that it was a new idea changing the dynasty, and I did think it might have had the effect, but now it was too late. He said almost all France was for him when he returned from Elba. I allowed that the military were to a man, but not the others; for they considered the return of the Bourbons as the return of peace, and it was considered that he was fond of war. He smiled, and talked of something else. The English should not have made war on him on his return. He offered every concession: all depended on England. I asked him why he did not consent to the terms offered at Châtillon; his reply was singular: "There are certain opinions founded on circumstances that men who act such a part as mine keep to; that was the reason why I would not give up Belgium, which I would have done before." I cannot say I made out what he meant. He added, "My father-in-law and I corresponded on the subject." He said that the contributions on France were bad; that we had better have taken territory; that Europe was in a very unsettled state.

I think I have given you the substance of this very interesting conversation. I shall reduce it into a better form by way of journal, but in the mean time I know that this undigested story will be most acceptable to you. It is wonderful that I should be in so close contact with the man who has kept all the world in hot water, and that I should be on such terms as to converse and argue freely with him. Remember this injunction: that if you copy this letter before you send it to ——, you only read it to your friends. It must not on any account get into print.

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[1042.] *To General Sir G. Beckwith.*

SIR, Cheltenham, 8th July, 1816.

I have the honour to transmit you a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from certain gentlemen belonging to the settlement of Madras, in which they have sent me a bill for 4000*l.* sterling, for the benefit of the families of those who have fallen at Waterloo.

I have transmitted the bill to Messrs. Coutts, and have requested to receive the amount.

It seems to be the wish of the gentlemen composing the Committee at Madras that I should myself dispose of this money, otherwise I should immediately have placed it at the disposal of the Committee of which you are the Chairman; and I am the more induced to take upon myself the trouble of disposing of it, as, upon communication with His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, His Royal Highness appeared to be of opinion with me, that there were cases to which it was most desirable to afford relief, but which were of a nature that a public body could not with propriety afford it. In the performance of this duty, however, I propose to act in every case in communication with the Committee of which you are the Chairman, and to adopt the same rules respecting the amount to be given for each rank as they have.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*E. Bisset, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Paris, 8th July, 1816.

Having since your Grace's departure been endeavouring to make myself master as much as possible of everything connected with the Army of Occupation, and the ample means now in the military chest having drawn my attention to the source from which they were procured, I have obtained from Mr. Drummond a statement showing the funds that may be reckoned on for the future, and these I have contrasted in the enclosed paper with our estimated expenditure, and have taken the liberty to send it to your Grace as a rough memorandum for reference, either for your own amusement or to assist your memory in case of official inquiry.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, my Lord Duke,

Your Grace's very faithful servant,

E. BISSET.

P.S. The reasoning in England, I know, is, that were the army not here, the whole would go to the Ways and Means of the English Treasury: without the army, however, there is a chance of the payments becoming rather irregular, if made at all.

E. B.

[ENCLOSURE.]

ROUGH CALCULATION of the probable EXPENDITURE of the ARMY of OCCUPATION for the next Two Years, say, from the 1st August, 1816, to 1st August, 1818.

Paris, 8th July, 1816.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The estimate for June is as follows (those of July have not yet reached me), viz.: | | | | |
| Ordinaries .. .. .. .. .. .. | £53,000 | 0 | 0 | |
| But there appears to have been an error of .. .. .. .. .. .. | 11,000 | 0 | 0 | |
| Say .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | £42,000 0 0 |
| Commissariat extraordinaries, £13,787 4s. 7d.; but I take it on that made out for July .. .. .. .. | | | | 9,000 0 0* |
| Ordnance Department .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | 9,000 0 0 |
| Storekeeper-General .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | 400 0 0 |
| Comptroller of Army Accounts .. .. .. .. .. | | | | 300 0 0 |
| Accountant-General (will finish 24th August) .. .. | | | | .. .. |
| Then I would take the proportion for one month of bât and forage .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | 1,000 0 0 |
| Say, in round numbers, the estimate for August, 1816 .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | | 61,700 0 0 |
| Which, as the different establishments are nearly brought to what they will remain at, I shall take for the year at twelve months, | | | | |
| Making per annum in sterling .. .. | | | | £740,400 0 0 |
| Or in French currency .. .. .. .. | | | | Fr.17,769,600 0 |

| | Francs. | Cents. |
|---|---|---|
| Take then the money necessary to meet the expenditure of the Army of Occupation from 1st August, 1816, to 1st August, 1817, at .. .. .. .. .. | 17,769,600 | 0 |
| I will suppose that the 432,000 frs. given me monthly to pay the indemnity in lieu of officers' rations is adequate to the purpose exactly (I am now ascertaining this, and taking measures to get the estimates of the other departments sooner): I therefore take no notice of the disbursements on the one hand or the receipts on the other. | | |
| From the statement given me by Mr. Drummond it appears that, for the 1st year, from 1st August, 1816, to 1st August, 1817, he has to receive as follows:— | | |
| Carried forward .. | 17,769,600 | 0 |

* This is estimated to the full, as being where variation is most likely to occur.

| | Francs. | Cents. | Francs. | Cents. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brought forward .. | | | 17,769,600 | 0 |
| In the 1st four months .. .. .. | 8,133,333 | 33 | | |
| „ 2nd four months .. .. | 9,166,666 | 66 | | |
| „ 3rd four months .. .. | 9,166,666 | 66 | | |
| On account of the 700,000,000 of indemnities .. .. .. .. .. | 26,466,666 | 65 | | |
| And besides, the monthly sum of 535,714 fr. 28⅓ cents., which for 12 months makes .. .. .. | 6,428,571 | 40 | | |
| In all, for the year from 1st August, 1816, to ditto, 1817 .. .. .. .. .. | | | 32,895,238 | 5 |
| Making a surplus .. .. .. .. | | | 15,125,638 | 5 |

The increase in the monthly sum to be received by Mr. Drummond arises from the arrangements made in the first six months for letting the Prussians and Austrians get their quota in advance.

Again: take the year from 1st August, 1817, to 1st August, 1818, at the advanced payments every four months, at which they are to continue :—

| | Frs. | Cents. | Francs. | Cents. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Say .. .. .. .. .. .. | 9,166,616 | 66⅔ | | |
| For three quarters is .. .. | 27,499,850 | 0 | | |
| Add the monthly sum of 535,714 f. 28⅓ c. besides, is per annum .. .. .. | 6,428,571 | 40 | | |
| Making the receipt for 1818 .. .. | | | 33,928,421 | 40 |
| Take the average of 1817 as the probable expenditure for 1818 .. .. .. .. .. | | | 17,769,600 | 0 |
| Leaving a surplus .. .. .. .. | | | 16,158,821 | 40 |

*Recapitulation.*

| | Francs. | Cents. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Surplus for 1817 .. .. .. | 15,125,638 | 5 | |
| „ for 1818 .. .. .. | 16,158,821 | 40 | |
| „ for both .. .. .. | 31,284,459 | 45 | French currency. |
| Or .. .. .. .. | £1,303,519 | 2 10½ | Sterling. |
| „ for one year .. .. | £651,759 | 1 5½ | Sterling. |

To set off against off reckonings, &c., &c., &c., paid for in England, or disbursements not accurately estimated for or foreseen, and also in diminution of the extra expenditure incurred in the first year, before the army was reduced to its fair establishments.

E. Bisset.

* Should, in fact, be 6.

[ 1043. ] *To the Earl of Lauderdale.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cheltenham, 11th July, 1813.

I received your letter of the 9th; and although I go to town to-morrow, I am afraid I cannot attend poor Sheridan's funeral, as I leave town early on Saturday morning.

Instruct me as soon as possible respecting the state of Sheridan's affairs, in order that I may apply without loss of time for his family; and I only beg that nothing may be done from any other quarter till I shall have tried what I can do.

Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

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*E. Cooke, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, 1, North Row, Park Lane, 11th July, 1816.

When Bonaparte was made First Consul, in order to establish himself he restored the Popedom and made the Concordat. In this instrument the Pope consented to reduce the French bishoprics from, I think, 160 to 80, and retained 10 archbishoprics, making the Archbishop of Paris Primate instead of the Archbishop of Rheims, who used to crown the kings, and the archbishopric was suppressed. The Pope invited the suppressed bishops to resign: 18 of them were in England, who refused and protested.

The Abbé Gacchet was employed here to support the cause of the ex-bishops upon the principles of the Gallican Church, by which no bishop could be deposed or his bishopric altered or suppressed but upon a formal and regular canonical process, as the Gallican Church did not acknowledge the power of the Pope to act against the canons *ex plenitudine potestatis apostolicæ pro necessitatibus ecclesiæ*. The Abbé Gacchet made a most furious attack, stigmatised the Pope for heretical conduct, and considered him to have forfeited the Popedom. The British vicars apostolic and the Irish titulars replied to the Abbé, supported the Pope's *plenitudo apostolica*, and silenced the Abbé as far as they could. The controversy was droll, and not unentertaining.

The Archbishop of Rheims of course considers the Pope's acts against him as uncanonical; he considers himself still the real Primate of France, and entitled to crown the King; and I suppose the King's object is to get the Pope to subtract or modify the Concordat as to ex-bishops, that the Archbishop of Rheims may crown him.

But it happens that, whatever the Pope may have otherwise lost by the Concordat, he has obtained by it a kind of recognition of his *plenitudo apostolica* to act without or against the canons *pro necessitate ecclesiæ*, and he must be unwilling to give up this point, which he would seem to do were he to restore the ex-bishops: for, I believe, the ex-bishops would

not accept a restoration but on the principle that they had been uncanonically ejected.

There is, however, one point in the Concordat that troubles both the King and the Pope, which is, that by it the Lutheran and Calvinistical churches are put upon a level with the Catholic, and equally established and supported. The Angoulême party, and probably the King's, are anxious to do away this equality and restore Catholic domination: but this the Pope will leave the King to do, if he dare; for the equality of the three religions is not established by that part of the Concordat to which the Pope's legates are a signing party, but merely by the organic articles which follow it, and are undersigned by Mant only; against which the Pope protested, though long after their publication. As part of the Concordat the Pope crowned Bonaparte as Emperor.

I know not any other points in which the liberties of the Gallican Church are diminished by the Concordat.

Your Grace not feeling yourself quite clear as to the objects of M. Blacas's mission to Rome, I have opened my ideas of them.

I trust the waters agree with you, and that we shall soon see you returned quite re-established.

Ever most truly and faithfully your Grace's servant,

E. Cooke.

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## ARRANGEMENT FOR CAMPING THE TROOPS.

### BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR GEORGE MURRAY.

Paris, 11th July, 1816.

*1st Division.*

To be camped immediately.—One battalion Guards; 27th regiment: Cambrai, upon the glacis.

One battalion Guards will remain in garrison at Cambrai.

As soon as communications have been made by the French government respecting the indemnities to be made for the use of the ground.—1st battalion Rifle Brigade: Boudon, a common in the cantonment. 40th regiment: Ribecourt, a common in the cantonment.

No uncultivated ground has been reported for camping Sir James Kempt's brigade.

*2nd Division.*

As soon as communications have been made by the French government respecting the indemnities to be made for the use of the ground.—The whole division, with its artillery, to camp upon the heath between Racquinghem and Helfaut (between Aire and St. Omer). The camps to be placed so as to leave open as great an extent as possible for exercising ground.

*3rd Division.*

To be camped immediately.—Sir J. Keane's brigade, and one battalion Sir M. Power's brigade: Valenciennes, glacis, and ground belonging to the works.

One battalion Sir M. Power's brigade will remain in garrison at Valenciennes.

As soon as communications have been made by the French government respecting the indemnities to be made for the use of the ground.—2nd battalion Rifle Brigade: St. Amand, a common in the cantonment. Sir T. Brisbane's brigade: Helesmes and Erre, grass and common lands.

*Cavalry*

Will move into these cantonments as soon as the 2nd division goes into camp.

The 1st and 3rd brigades of cavalry to be brought into cantonments near the exercising ground between Racquinghem and Helfaut.

The 2nd brigade to remain in its present cantonments, where it has an opportunity of exercising three times a week.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Count Woronzow.*

My dear General, Paris, 11th July, 1816.

General de Caux was with me this morning, and I had a good deal of conversation with him upon a subject which I have been made more fully master of since by your letter containing copies of those you had written to the Duke of Wellington and to General Pozzo di Borgo.

This affair of the douaniers, to which I allude, seems to demand the most serious attention; and from the nature of the communications which had already passed between the Duke of Wellington and the French government previously to his Grace leaving this, you may depend upon the Duke viewing it in that light. In the mean time I shall see General de Caux again upon the subject; and from what he already mentioned to me this morning, both as to his own sentiments and in regard to a conversation he had had with the Duc de Richelieu, I am inclined to think that your right to complain strongly of what has passed is fully felt.

I am sure you will believe that I feel sincere concern at these events, more particularly so on account of the very disagreeable manner in which you cannot fail to be yourself affected by them.

Believe me, &c.,

G. Murray.

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*Major-Gen. Sir J. W. Gordon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 13th July, 1816.

The Royal Waggon Train is composed as follows, viz. :—6 troops, of which 4 are in France under your Grace's command, and each troop consisting of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 cornets, 1 troop serjeant-major, 6 serjeants, 6 corporals, 1 trumpeter, 1 wheelwright, 1 collar-maker, 1 blacksmith, 3 farriers, 97 privates, 138 horses. The remaining two are in depôt in England, and employed in various parts of the kingdom.

I propose to send to Calais, to commence their march from Croydon on Thursday next, the 18th instant, one of these home troops, complete to the above numbers, when your Grace will have 5 troops in France.

If your Grace chooses to have more, I can send one more troop equally complete in about a month from this time.

I understand that your Grace has Commissariat waggons enough, but I am informed that their construction is faulty, as too cumbersome and heavy for four horses. I could wish, therefore, to have your authority to provide others of a better and lighter make. If, however, your Grace is contented with those you have, I can say nothing further upon that point.

The troop, or troops, which now go from hence, can be at this moment easily replaced, and at no expense, as we have not yet been able to discharge all our supernumeraries, or sell all our horses; and I have suspended all further operations of this sort until I shall be honoured with your Grace's commands upon this letter.

It is difficult for me to convey to your Grace an idea of the obstacles which we have to encounter in the keeping up any part of this corps. The civil authorities do not understand the utility of it, and they look upon its establishment as an expensive excrescence which they wish to lop off; while if any considerable part of it is to remain on service in France, it is manifest there must be a certain establishment in depôt at home to provide for the ordinary wear and tear abroad.

It would, therefore, be very gratifying to me if your Grace thought fit to give me the weight of your authority in enabling me to say that the services of this corps were useful and necessary to the army under your Grace's command, and that you were satisfied with them.

Ever, with the highest respect,
Your Grace's most faithful friend and servant,
J. W. GORDON.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON COUSIN, La Haye, le 14 Juillet, 1816.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 29 Juin dernier, et je me réserve de vous faire part du résultat des recherches et des mesures que j'ai ordonnées en conséquence aussitôt que le rapport que j'en attends d'un jour à l'autre me sera parvenu.

D'après vos conseils j'ai chargé dans le tems mon Ambassadeur auprès du gouvernement Britannique de faire les démarches nécessaires pour obtenir que le mode et les termes du payement de la somme pour laquelle il s'est engagé de concourir à l'établissement du nouveau système de défense fut fixé pour cette année. Ces démarches ont eu lieu pendant la réunion des Chambres, mais ce n'est qu'après leur prorogation que mon Ambassadeur a reçu en réponse une note de Lord Castlereagh, par laquelle il se propose de donner à Lord Clancarty, immédiatement à son arrivée à la Haye, des instructions pour se concerter avec le gouvernement des Pays-Bas—

1. Sur un système d'inspection et de vérification combinée des frais à faire pour le compte des deux états.

2. Sur la somme totale qu'il faudra probablement pour l'exécution de tous les travaux; et

3. Sur la dépense présumée pour l'année suivante, dont dépendra le montant des fonds à suppléer par les deux états aux fournissemens de la France; et que, ces préliminaires étant fixés, le gouvernement Britannique sera prêt à s'arranger avec moi pour régler les avances à faire en vertu du traité du 13 Août, 1814.

L'incertitude dans laquelle cette réponse me laisse, tant sur l'époque où un arrangement définitif sur cet objet pourra avoir lieu qu'à l'égard de celle où les fonds nécessaires pourront se trouver à ma disposition pour les frais qu'ils sont destinés à couvrir, me fait éprouver un grand embarras, et me mettra dans l'impossibilité de faire suivre jusques là les travaux arrêtés d'après votre opinion avec l'activité dont nous étions convenus. J'ai cru devoir, mon Cousin, vous informer de cet état de choses, et de l'obstacle qu'il met à l'exécution des projets approuvés.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien contribuer par les éclaircissemens que la connoissance parfaite de ces projets vous met à même de donner à rapprocher autant que possible le moment où je pourrai compter sur le secours qui m'est assuré par le traité du 13 Août, 1814. Je vous aurais une nouvelle et bien grande obligation si vous vouliez expliquer à Lord Castlereagh l'importance de cet objet, et je me tiens assuré que les bonnes intentions de ce Ministre à mon égard accéléreront la conclusion de cette affaire.

Je suis, avec une haute considération, mon Cousin,

Votre affectionné,

GUILLAUME.

RETURN of SICK belonging to the Army in France under the command of Field Marshal his Grace the DUKE of WELLINGTON, K.G. and G.C.B.

Head Quarters, Paris, 15th July, 1816.

| CORPS. | Strength of each Corps. | Number of Sick. |
|---|---|---|
| Artillery | 2,960 | 119 |
| Engineers | 428 | .. |
| Staff Corps, Infantry | 193 | 1 |
| Waggon Train | 490 | 10 |
| 2nd Dragoon Guards | 477 | 16 |
| 3rd Dragoons | 476 | 20 |
| 7th Hussars | 631 | 10 |
| 11th Light Dragoons | 556 | 29 |
| 12th ,, ,, | 571 | 13 |
| 18th Hussars | 639 | 10 |
| Cavalry Staff Corps | 272 | 12 |
| Grenadier Guards, 3rd Battalion | 1,120 | 44 |
| Coldstream Guards, 2nd Battalion | 1,104 | 43 |
| 1st Foot, 3rd Battalion | 1,158 | 45 |
| 3rd ,, ,, | 1,133 | 20 |
| 4th ,, ,, | 895 | 22 |
| 5th ,, ,, | 1,064 | 38 |
| 6th ,, ,, | 863 | 29 |
| 7th ,, ,, | 966 | 18 |
| 9th ,, ,, | 1,029 | 35 |
| 21st ,, ,, | 1,078 | 47 |
| 23rd ,, ,, | 727 | 11 |
| 27th ,, ,, | 1,045 | 16 |
| 29th ,, ,, | 847 | 21 |
| 39th ,, ,, | 986 | 25 |
| 40th ,, ,, | 814 | 15 |
| 43rd ,, ,, | 960 | 12 |
| 52nd ,, ,, | 974 | 15 |
| 57th ,, ,, | 721 | 54 |
| 71st ,, ,, | 914 | 9 |
| 79th ,, ,, | 707 | 18 |
| 81st* ,, ,, | 1,156 | 84 |
| 88th* ,, ,, | 1,260 | 170 |
| 91st ,, ,, | 1,005 | 11 |
| 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade | 623 | 11 |
| 2nd ,, ,, | 541 | 6 |
| Total | 31,383 | 1060 |

* The proportion of sick in the 9th Brigade (81st and 88th) exceeds that of any other very considerably. In the 88th Regiment there are 57 cases of ophthalmia.

Shall Dr. Grant be directed to inquire into and report upon this excess of sick?

E. BARNES.

[Certainly, inquire.

WELLINGTON.]

[1044.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Count Woronzow.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Cheltenham, 18th July, 1816.

I have received your letter of the 8th instant, and I find that Sir George Murray had already had a satisfactory communication with the French government on the subject to which it relates. I entirely participate in your feelings on this occasion.

I had already repeatedly complained to the French government and to the Allied Ministers at Paris on this subject, and had given orders that my troops should turn out and fire whenever there was a riot in which the French magistrates did not do their duty. I am certain that the magistrates of whom you have complained will be dismissed. We must see if it will be done in a proper manner.

I leave this on the 31st, and England on the 6th of August, so that I shall soon have the pleasure of seeing you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1045.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cheltenham, ce 18 Juillet, 1816.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à V.E. les copies d'une dépêche que je reçois du Général Comte de Woronzow, commandant en chef du corps d'armée Russe, se plaignant de la conduite des Procureurs du Roi à Avesnes et Douai dans les recherches que ces officiers auraient dû faire sur le meurtre d'un Cosaque par des douaniers, au mois de Mars dernier.

J'ai eu déjà l'honneur de m'expliquer avec V.E. verbalement et par écrit sur le même sujet, et de vous prier d'y attirer l'attention de S.M., comme étant d'une importance majeure pour les intérêts et la tranquillité de la France.

V.E. tient à présent dans ses mains les preuves de la mauvaise volonté et de la mauvaise conduite comme magistrats des Procureurs du Roi d'Avesnes et Maubeuge; et c'est à S.M. à décider si par une punition exemplaire et méritée il veut montrer sa justice envers ses Alliés, et que la justice se fasse sans partialité dans tous les cas, ou que le temps de l'occupation se fasse dans une petite guerre de vengeance particulière, pour les maux

que peuvent infliger les troupes Alliées d'un côté et les employés et les sujets du Roi de l'autre.

Pour moi, je vous l'ai déjà annoncée je suis intimement persuadé que les magistrats du pays n'ont pas l'inclination, et ne veulent pas nous rendre justice ; et ils ne le feront pas tant qu'ils verront qu'ils peuvent continuer leur marche avec impunité ; c'est à dire, que le déplaisir du Roi ne leur sera pas démontré d'une manière qui leur sera sensible. J'avoue que je ne peux pas blamer la sensibilité du Comte Woronzow ; et ayant moi-même pris la résolution et donné des ordres pour que toute émeute populaire soit résisté par la force, à cause de la manière dont les magistrats se sont conduits à Cambrai, je ne puis pas empêcher les commandans en chef des corps d'armée de faire la même chose.

En réponse à la lettre que j'aie eu l'honneur de recevoir dernièrement de V.E., je vous prie d'observer premièrement que l'ordre du Directeur-Général des Douanes, dont vous m'avez envoyé copie, ne fait mention que du corps d'armée Russe ; secondement, qu'il n'y ait pas ordonné que les équipages des officiers ne soient pas fouillés excepté aux bureaux des douanes.

Dans le moment où j'écris cette lettre je reçois la lettre incluse du Général Zieten, par laquelle V.E. verra qu'il y a eu une autre meurtre près de Sédan. Vous y verrez aussi, M. le Duc, une preuve du désir du Général de Zieten de punir ceux des soldats qui peuvent commettre des délits.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1046.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cheltenham, ce 18 Juillet, 1816.

Je vous envoie la copie d'une lettre que je reçois de Lord Castlereagh après sa consultation avec ses collègues sur le désir de S.M. que la force des Alliés en France soit diminuée à la fin de l'année. Vous y verrez qu'on croit en ce pays-ci ne pas pouvoir même discuter la question sans la participation des autres Puissances ; mais je crois que vous trouverez le gouvernement Britannique très disposé à accéder à vos vœux, s'il n'y a de la répugnance de la part des autres Puissances. Je vous ai déjà conseillé de n'en pas faire l'ouverture jusqu'à vers la fin de

l'année : je crois que vous vous trouverez alors en meilleur état sous tous les points de vue.

Mais c'est absolument nécessaire de mettre fin à cette espèce d'irritation qui existe partout à cause de l'injustice des magistrats Français.

Pour moi, je vous assure que malgré le désir que j'ai de faire ce qui peut convenir au Roi, et à vous personnellement, je m'opposerai à la réduction de la force si nous nous trouvons dans le cas de nous faire justice à nous-mêmes. C'est clair que notre position en France devient essentiellement différente dès que les loix ne nous donnent aucune protection personnelle.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Je n'ai pas le tems aujourd'hui d'écrire au Général Pozzo di Borgo; et je vous prie de lui communiquer ce que je vous annonce dans cette lettre, pour qu'il en écrive à S.M. l'Empereur.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, St. James's Square, 10th July, 1816.

I have not failed to communicate to the Cabinet the substance of the confidential conversation which the Duc de Richelieu held with your Grace immediately previous to your departure from Paris, on the subject of a possible reduction in the amount of the Allied forces stationed in France.

It must be distinctly understood that the Prince Regent's Ministers can form no opinion upon this or any other question affecting the general interest except upon deliberation with the Allied Cabinets; but subject to this understanding, your Grace may assure the Duc de Richelieu that their disposition would prompt them upon this, as upon all occasions, in the spirit of the Protocol signed at Paris in November last, to accommodate their arrangements to the financial convenience of the French government, so far as the same can be reconciled with the general security of Europe, with which the interest of His Most Christian Majesty must be considered as inseparably identified.

The Cabinet entirely concur with your Grace in opinion that the close of the ensuing meeting of the Chambers is the earliest period at which any reduction whatever can be prudently contemplated in the Allied forces, and that it must wholly depend upon the state in which affairs shall be left in France at the close of their deliberations how far any measure of this description can be then adopted consistently with a due attention to weightier considerations.

Should the Duc de Richelieu think fit to open this question to the Allied Ministers at Paris, the British government will be disposed to entertain it, in conjunction with their Allies, subject to the qualifications above stated.

Ever, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir J. W. Gordon.* [1047.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Cheltenham, 18th July, 1816.

I have received your letter of the 13th.* The corps of the Royal Waggon Train has improved very much, and particularly lately; and whatever may be the extent of the military establishment to be kept up by Great Britain in time of peace, I conceive a part of it, and that not a small one, ought to be of the Royal Waggon Train. It is much more easy, and there are more means and facilities, to form cavalry and infantry soldiers in a hurry than to form military drivers. If they are not regularly trained and formed, no reliance can be placed on them; and yet the most important operations of war depend frequently on the due performance of their duty by this description of corps.

I have kept up in France the *cadre* of a corps of Commissariat drivers, having about 25 waggons. They are very bad indeed, enormously expensive, and I believe can never come to good. I had thoughts of discharging them entirely before I came to England; and upon talking with His Royal Highness and you, I determined to do so forthwith, as I was to have some more of the Waggon Train.

The more you send me the better. I have room for all, both men and horses; and the discharge of the Commissariat train will do more than cover the expense. You may safely state this to His Royal Highness and to the Secretary of State; and that I recommend that they should send me as many as they can, in order to keep up the strength of this corps, which is becoming excellent, and is absolutely necessary in war.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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* See page 437.

## Scale of proposed Distribution of the Waterloo Subscription, subject to the Discretion of the Committee on the Contingencies of Cases.

18th July, 1816.

| Rank. | To the Relatives of Killed. | | | | | | | | | | To the Wounded. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Widows and Children. | | | | | Orphans. | | Parents. | | Sisters. | Slightly. | Severely. | | Disabled. |
| | Widows for Life. | Children, each. | | | | Until 21 Years of Age. | At 21. | If 1. | If 2. | Each. | | Not Discharged. | Discharged in consequence of Wounds. | |
| | | Until 7 Years of Age. | Until 14 Years of Age. | At 14. | At 21. | | | | | | | | | |
| | Annuities. | | | Donations. | | Annual. | Donations. | | | | Donations. | | | Annual. |
| | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. | £. |
| Privates | 10 | 4 | 15 | 10 | 30 | 15 | 30 | 15 | 20 | 10 | 5 | 15 | 20 | 6 |
| Corporals | 12 | 4 | 15 | 10 | 35 | 15 | 35 | 20 | 30 | 10 | 7 | 17 | 22 | 7 |
| Serjeants | 14 | 4 | 15 | 10 | 40 | 20 | 40 | 30 | 45 | 20 | 10 | 25 | 30 | 8 |
| Do. Major, "Regl." | 20 | 4 Until of age or married. | 15 | 10 | 50 | .. | .. | 35 | 50 | 25 | 12 | 30 | 35 | 10 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Slightly. | Severely. | Disabled. | |
| Ensigns | 30 | 15 | .. | .. | 150 | 30 | 150 | 65 | 90 | 35 | 15 | 80 | 150 | |
| Lieutenants | 40 | 20 | .. | .. | 200 | 40 | 200 | 75 | 100 | 45 | 20 | 100 | 200 | |
| Captains | 50 | 25 | .. | .. | 300 | 50 | 300 | 100 | 150 | 60 | 30 | 150 | 300 | |
| Majors | 80 | 40 | .. | .. | 450 | 60 | 450 | 120 | 180 | 100 | 40 | 220 | 450 | |
| Lieutenant-Colonels | 100 | 50 | .. | .. | 600 | .. | 600 | 150 | 200 | 120 | 50 | 300 | 600 | |
| Colonels | 120 | 60 | .. | .. | 700 | .. | 700 | .. | .. | .. | 80 | 350 | 700 | |
| Major-Generals | 150 | 70 | .. | .. | 800 | .. | 800 | .. | .. | .. | 100 | 400 | 800 | |
| Lieutenant-Generals | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 450 | 900 | |
| Generals | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 500 | 1000 | |

Female children, on marriage before twenty-one, will receive the last donation; but in cases of those of non-commissioned and privates, certificates of correct conduct will be required. The orphans to be on the same footing.—G. Beckwith.

The two natural children of Colonel Ellis, by different mothers, have received 250*l.* each in trust; and such cases are considered, but not placed on a similar footing with legitimate children. Parents and sisters only when nearest of kin.—G. Beckwith.

*To M. Congouilhe.* [1048.]

MONSIEUR, Cheltenham, ce 19 Juillet, 1816.

Le Colonel Hervey m'a montré vos lettres jusqu'au 16me.

Je prendrai votre maison pour un an, à commencer le 1er Août, à raison de 2400 francs par mois. Si je ne vous avertir par le 1er Février de mon intention de quitter au bout de l'an, elle me restera pour encore six mois, et ainsi de six mois en six mois si je ne vous avertir par le 1er Août ou le 1er Février de mon intention de quitter. Le loyer vous sera payé de trois mois en trois mois à Cambrai.

Pour ce loyer je dois avoir la maison meublée comme elle était le 20 Mai dernier; tous les bâtimens de toutes espèces y appartenans, les jardins, parc, &c., qui se trouvent environnés par le mur et l'Escaut, et le droit de chasse dans vos bois et vos propriétés environnantes.

Je nommerai quelqu'un pour voir de ma part tout ce que je dois tenir, et quelqu'un pour recevoir l'ameublement, et pour en signer une liste; et je dois vous le rendre en même état, sauf les dégâts par l'usage ordinaire.

Je vous prie de faire dresser un contrat selon ce qui est écrit dans cette lettre, à moins que vous ne voulez la considérer comme contrat, auquel je consens.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir J. Lambert.* [1049.]

SIR, Cheltenham, 20th July, 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 2nd inst., and the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of Privates Carr, M'Nulty, and M'Ginnis, of the —— regiment, with the recommendation of the Court of the prisoners.

I am always anxious to attend to the recommendation of a Court Martial, but it appears to me that this is a case which does require an example.

The soldiers of the British army are unfortunately but too ready to strike even their own officers; and it will not do to

allow them with impunity to strike those of a foreign nation. The assault also appears to me to have been quite unprovoked on the part of the French officers; to have been occasioned by jealousy on the part of Carr; and to have been so far of an aggravated nature as that it appears that there was a conspiracy between the three soldiers for the purpose.

Whether the assault was of a nature to justify the measures which the French officers adopted for their defence is not a question for the consideration of the General Court Martial; but as the Court have considered it, I must say that I don't entertain the smallest doubt that if any officers whatever in a similar situation had been attacked in a similar manner by soldiers, they would have made use of all the means in their power; including their side-arms, to defend and extricate themselves from their hands.

I would likewise beg the Court to observe that the impunity in which the Court wish to allow this affair to pass will ever be the best excuse for the conduct of the French officers, and will be the strongest inducement to others situated in a similar manner to follow their example.

I am anxious, therefore, that the Court should reconsider their recommendation.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1050.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Murray.*

MY DEAR MURRAY, Cheltenham, 20th July, 1816.

By some accident I have not received anything respecting Ensign Sedley's affair at Calais, and know nothing about it. I see in the newspapers that there has been a riot by our officers at Boulogne, but I suppose this is a different affair.

Tell Mr. Bisset that I beg him not to adopt his transport arrangement till I shall return. I have got a reinforcement of Royal Waggon Train, and propose to discharge all our *blackguard Blues*. The reinforcement of the Royal Waggon Train consists of about 120 men and 138 horses, respecting whom I beg you to send orders to Calais. They had better be kept together and go to the neighbourhood of Cambrai.

I approve of the proposed situation for the camps. Let the

troops be encamped without loss of time. The Commission Mixte must take good care about the fuel.

The troops need not encamp in the cultivated fields till the harvest will be reaped.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE FORTRESSES IN THE LOW COUNTRIES. [1051.]

22nd July, 1816.

1. The British government have agreed for a valuable consideration to give two millions sterling to be laid out with a similar sum to be given by the King of the Netherlands on the fortresses in the Low Countries; and the Allied Powers have since granted 60 millions of francs from the French contributions for the same purpose.

2. The Duke of Wellington was appointed by the ministers of the Allied Powers at Paris to control the expenditure of the 60 millions of francs granted by the Allies. (See the Protocols upon this point.) He had been appointed by the British government in the year 1814 to inspect the frontier of the Netherlands, and to report upon the best means of fortifying it. Upon this Report separate committees of English and of Dutch engineers were appointed to form detailed plans and estimates of the several works to be executed, the whole of which, with the exception of the Dutch estimates, have been submitted to the Duke; and he has settled with the Dutch engineers the works to be carried into execution according to the detailed plans either of the English or of the Dutch committee or of a mixture of both, as far as the works to be executed at each place have been determined upon.

3. It appears, therefore, that, as far as the business has advanced to this moment, the Allied Powers and the British government have had a control over it through the Duke of Wellington, nominated by them; and this control will be continued in the same form till the decision will be made on every work to be executed.

4. It will be necessary, however, now to provide by arrangements with the King of the Netherlands for a more active and effectual control by the Duke of Wellington on the part of

Great Britain and of the Allies, over the following points: the detail, the execution and the progress of the work at each station, the estimates of the expenditure at each station, and the accounts of the expenditure at each.

5. It is obvious that the Allies, or the person who acts for them, have a right to have a knowledge and control upon these points; otherwise the money which they have granted might either be expended upon any other objects, or laid out upon fortifications in such a manner as that it would produce no advantage either to the King of the Netherlands or them. It appears that the British government must have the information and control which it is the object of the 4th paragraph to obtain, or the Parliament will not be satisfied; and the proposition appears so reasonable in itself, and the King of the Netherlands appears so well satisfied with the communications he has already had with the Duke of Wellington upon this subject, that there is every reason to hope that he will not make any great objection to the measures which may be proposed to him to render the control of the Duke more efficient on the points above mentioned. Indeed the truth is that the King is more interested than any other Power in rendering the control as efficient as possible.

6. It is quite impossible for the Duke to exercise any farther control over these measures (beyond what remains yet to be determined regarding the plans at certain places) in the manner in which he has done hitherto. It will be impossible for him to attend in person at each place at which work is being carried on, either constantly or so frequently as he ought in order to be able to judge of its execution and progress; and still less has he time to acquire the knowledge which is necessary to enable him to control the expenditure of the money. For these objects he must have some assistance; and it must be settled with the King of the Netherlands: first, that the estimates of the expenditure on the plans now being carried into execution shall be submitted to the Duke; secondly, that he shall have the power of sending an officer or officers when he thinks proper to any place at which work is in the progress of execution under these plans, who must be permitted to examine the state and progress of the works, and to whom all the information required by the Duke must be given by the officer in charge, whether regarding the works or the number of persons employed on them, the estimate or the expenditure; thirdly, that the chief Dutch engineer shall

give every information to the Duke regarding his expenditure either made or to be made, and that it shall be settled that the funds shall be supplied as follows: the sum paid monthly by the French government shall be applied in the first instance, and the remainder shall be furnished, one half by the British and one half by the government of the Netherlands. The British government will furnish the sum agreed by them to be paid to the extent of two millions sterling from time to time, upon the report of the Duke of Wellington that it is necessary.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.* [1052.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cheltenham, 22nd July, 1816.

It has been suggested to me to urge government to make some provision for Sheridan's family; and I beg you to take the case of his family into your consideration, and to bring it before Lord Liverpool.

I believe there is no doubt that upon several occasions Sheridan took a line in Parliament different from that of his party, and rendered essential service to government. If this conduct was not the principal cause of his being out of Parliament in the latter years of his life, it had at least tended to separate him from the party, and was in some degree the reason of his being abandoned by some of his old friends belonging to it, and probably the cause of the poverty and distress in which he has left his family. However, at all events his talents in the public service will not be denied, any more than his successful exercise of them in support of good government upon several important occasions, nor that he has died leaving his family in the greatest distress.

I have informed myself upon this last point; and I find that the money which had been settled on Mrs. Sheridan was laid out in the purchase of the estate at * , which may give about 600*l.* a year, which is all that Mrs. Sheridan has for herself and son.

I do think she is a fair object for the bounty of government, and that the public would be satisfied if any thing were granted to her.

Ever, &c.;

WELLINGTON.

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* Blank in manuscript.

## MORNING STATE of the FORCES serving in FRANCE, under the Command of FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Head-Quarters, Paris, 23rd July, 1816.

| Date of last State received. | Divisions. | Officers. | | | | | | Troop Quartermasters. | Serjeants. | | | | | Trumpeters or Drummers. | | | | Rank and File. | | | | | | Horses. | | | | Alterations. | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | Sick. | | | | | Sick | | | | Sick. | | | | | | | | | Men. | | | | Hor. |
| | | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Staff. | | Present. | Present. | Absent. | Command. | Total. | Present. | Present. | Command. | Total. | Present. | Present. | Absent. | Command. | Prisoners of War and Missing. | Total. | Present. | Sick. | Command. | Total. | Joined. | Deserted. | Promoted. | Reduced. | Dead. |
| July | *Cavalry.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17th | 1st Brigade | .. | 2 | 3 | 11 | 30 | 15 | .. | 74 | 1 | .. | 4 | 79 | 16 | .. | 1 | 17 | 747 | 37 | 1 | 66 | .. | 851 | 799 | 21 | 59 | 879 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ,, | 2nd ,, | 1 | .. | 2 | 10 | 27 | 14 | 1 | 80 | 1 | .. | 2 | 83 | 18 | .. | .. | 18 | 1,049 | 33 | .. | 22 | .. | 1,104 | 952 | 19 | 23 | 994 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ,, | 3rd ,, | .. | 1 | 2 | 9 | 26 | 13 | 1 | 81 | .. | .. | 3 | 84 | 18 | .. | .. | 18 | 1,014 | 35 | 1 | 38 | .. | 1,088 | 933 | 15 | 31 | 999 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | Total | 1 | 3 | 7 | 30 | 83 | 42 | 2 | 235 | 2 | .. | 9 | 246 | 52 | .. | 1 | 53 | 2,810 | 105 | 2 | 126 | .. | 3,043 | 2704 | 55 | 113 | 2872 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 |
| July | *Infantry.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20th | 1st Division | 2 | 4 | 2 | 48 | 164 | 45 | .. | 397 | 3 | 1 | 15 | 416 | 155 | 4 | .. | 159 | 6,655 | 135 | 19 | 61 | 1 | 6,871 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 2 | .. |
| 18th | 2nd ,, | 2 | 5 | 8 | 39 | 208 | 48 | .. | 483 | 4 | .. | 9 | 496 | 176 | 2 | .. | 178 | 7,622 | 129 | 18 | 23 | .. | 7,792 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 2 | .. | .. |
| 19th | 3rd ,, | 3 | 3 | 10 | 33 | 182 | 43 | .. | 378 | 16 | 1 | 3 | 398 | 177 | 6 | .. | 183 | 6,894 | 511 | 5 | 10 | .. | 7,420 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | Total | 7 | 12 | 20 | 160 | 554 | 136 | .. | 1258 | 23 | 2 | 27 | 1310 | 508 | 12 | .. | 520 | 21,171 | 775 | 42 | 94 | 1 | 22,083 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | .. |
| July | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20th | Cavalry Staff Corps | .. | 1 | .. | 3 | 4 | 6 | .. | 22 | 1 | .. | 1 | 24 | 4 | .. | .. | 4 | 186 | 21 | .. | 17 | .. | 224 | 220 | 13 | 17 | 250 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ,, | Royal Artillery | .. | 3 | 1 | 19 | 42 | 22 | .. | 64 | 4 | .. | .. | 68 | 16 | .. | .. | 16 | 1,985 | 95 | .. | .. | .. | 2,080 | 1331 | 9 | .. | 1340 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ,, | Engineers, Sappers and Miners | 1 | 1 | .. | 12 | 26 | 2 | .. | 34 | .. | .. | .. | 34 | 17 | .. | .. | 17 | 672 | 42 | .. | .. | .. | 714 | 421 | 5 | .. | 426 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ,, | Royal Staff Corps | 1 | .. | .. | 4 | 9 | 2 | .. | 10 | .. | .. | .. | 10 | 3 | .. | .. | 3 | 173 | 5 | 1 | .. | .. | 179 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ,, | Royal Waggon Train | .. | 1 | .. | 4 | 19 | 5 | .. | 26 | .. | .. | 2 | 28 | 4 | .. | .. | 4 | 404 | 4 | .. | 34 | .. | 442 | 493 | 4 | 57 | 554 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | General Total | 10 | 21 | 28 | 232 | 737 | 215 | 2 | 1649 | 30 | 2 | 39 | 1720 | 604 | 12 | 1 | 617 | 27,401 | 1047 | 45 | 271 | 1 | 28,765 | 5169 | 86 | 187 | 5442 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |

E. BARNES, Adjutant-General.

RECAPITULATION of RANK and FILE.

| | Fit for Duty. | Sick. | | Command. | Prisoners of War and Missing. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Present. | Absent. | | | |
| *Cavalry.* | | | | | | |
| State of 22nd July .. | 2,812 | 103 | 2 | 126 | .. | 3,043 |
| State of 23rd ,, .. | 2,810 | 105 | 2 | 126 | .. | 3,043 |
| Difference .. .. .. | 2 Decrease. | 2 Increase. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| *Infantry.* | | | | | | |
| State of 22nd July .. | 21,159 | 787 | 42 | 94 | 1 | 22,083 |
| State of 23rd ,, .. | 21,171 | 775 | 42 | 94 | 1 | 22,083 |
| Difference .. .. .. | 12 Increase. | 12 Decrease. | .. | .. | .. | .. |

RETURN of DESERTERS.

| Regiment. | Name. | Date of Desertion. | Country. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Foot .. .. .. | Joseph Corton* .. | 15th July .. | Ireland. |
| Rifle Brigade, 1st .. | John Cleary .. | 17th ,, .. | Ireland. |

* Supposed to be a German, and speaks French.

RETURN of DESERTERS who have been APPREHENDED or REJOINED.

| Regiment. | Name. | Date of | | Where Apprehended. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Desertion. | Apprehension. | |
| 21st Foot .. | William M'Naugher | 19th June | 16th July | Valenciennes. |
| 81st ,, .. | Thomas Elvait .. | 13th July | 17th July | Valenciennes. |

*To the Masters of the several Lodges of Freemasons at Bath.* [1053.]

24th July, 1816.

The Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to the [&c. &c.], and is much flattered by their desire to enrol his name on their list; but he is concerned to inform them that he is not a Freemason.

*Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Murray to Colonel Sir A. Barnard.*

SIR, Paris, 26th July, 1816.

The enclosed extract of a letter from the Duc de Richelieu to his Grace the Duke of Wellington refers to the disarming of the National Guard at Cambrai, by which arrangement certain duties performed by that guard have necessarily ceased.

When you were lately at Paris I mentioned this circumstance to you, and requested you would provide against any inconvenience resulting from it by causing such of those duties as might appear to be necessary to be done by the troops in garrison at Cambrai; and I have therefore reason to suppose that the wishes of the Duc de Richelieu conveyed in the enclosed extract have been already fulfilled.

I have, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 24 Juillet, 1816.

Votre Excellence dans la lettre qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 22 Juin m'a entretenu de deux événemens qui s'étaient passés à Cambrai quelques jours auparavant. Sans doute, depuis cette époque il aura été fait à Votre Excellence sur ces deux événemens des rapports qui les lui auront présentés avec plus de précision que les premiers, et elle aura appris que les autorités de Cambrai ne s'étaient pas rendu coupables de l'insouciance qui leur avait été reprochée.

En effet le jour même où pendant une vente de chevaux ordonnée par Votre Excellence il survint une rixe qui la troubla, l'adjoint du maire faisant fonctions de commissaire de police informa sur cette rixe, et en dressa procès-verbal; et s'il ne fut point donné de suite à l'affaire, c'est qu'il parut qu'aux yeux mêmes du Commissaire Anglais chargé de la vente, aucun Français n'avait eu de torts, au moins de torts graves, et que ni ce commissaire ni aucun autre officier Anglais n'avait porté de plainte aux autorités Françaises. Du reste, la vente n'avait été interrompue que fort peu de temps, et il n'avait pas été jeté une seule pierre.

Quant aux militaires Français en retraite qui avaient attaqué des officiers Anglais près de la porte de Cambrai, le Procureur du Roi à Cambrai a fait mettre en prison ceux d'entr'eux qui avaient été arrêtés, et les y a retenus jusqu'à ce que le jugement soit prononcé, quoiqu'aux termes de la loi ils eussent pu obtenir leur liberté provisoire en fournissant caution. Les autres ayant pris la fuite, leurs signalemens ont été imprimés et adressés aux autorités compétentes, avec ordre de les arrêter partout où ils seront rencontrés. Cette affaire, loin d'être négligée, se poursuit avec tout le soin et toute la célérité possibles.

Depuis que ces événemens ont eu lieu la Garde Nationale de Cambrai, qui fournissait des postes pour la garde des prisons, pour celle des caisses, &c., ayant été désarmée par ordre de Votre Excellence, ces établissemens publics n'ont plus été gardés, à l'exception de la prison civile, à laquelle il y a eu, mais pendant vingt-quatre heures seulement, une sentinelle Anglaise. Les autorités de la ville ne pouvant suppléer la Garde Nationale par aucun moyen,

puisqu'elles n'ont en tout à leur disposition pour la police et le maintien de l'ordre que quatre gendarmes et un maréchal des logis, je me flatte que Votre Excellence voudra bien donner l'ordre de faire garder par des soldats de la garnison les différens établissemens publics de Cambrai, qu'elle sentira parfaitement ne pouvoir rester dépourvus de garde sans inconvénients, et j'ai l'honneur de lui en adresser la demande.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, My Lord, avec une très haute considération,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cray Farm, Saturday, * Aug., 1816.

I return your memorandum, with the correspondence that has recently passed on this subject.

You will find in Fagel's note the King's valuation of the sum required for this year's works, by which he calculates upon receiving from us 219,000*l.* in aid of the sum receivable from France.

Although from your sketch we cannot expect any surplus over the Contribution Account to be applied to purposes of fortifications, I do not conceive that the Treasury will refuse an aid to this extent if you think it requisite to push on the works; but we must recollect that to this demand must be added what will be wanted for 1817, the provision for which will fall on the supplies of next session in addition to the 219,000*l.*

I conceive therefore the object will be for you to consider when on the spot what sum can be advantageously expended in this and the ensuing year on these works, deducting from this the fortification money receivable from France: the difference is to be equally furnished by Great Britain and Holland. When we know what the sum is which we may thus be expected to find, it will be then for the Treasury to judge whether they can undertake to supply so large a sum within the time, or whether they must negotiate with the Dutch government a postponement of the British payments, which may be effected either by working on a smaller scale, or by the Dutch making the advances themselves, to be repaid by Great Britain.†

Many thanks for your Army Returns, which I will return in a day or two.

I am, my dear Lord, ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Combermere.* [1054.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, 4th Aug., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 28th July. I don't propose to encamp the cavalry at all. I may get them all together in

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* Blank in manuscript.

† This deficiency will probably be covered by the unexpected funds already received on account of clothing, and the British share (viz., 10,000,000) of the 50,000,000 paid by France in lieu of the revenues of the departments occupied by the Allied troops.

closer cantonments in the neighbourhood of the camp of the infantry, when I shall assemble the latter.

I wish very much that you would turn your mind to the order of the formation of the cavalry. My opinion is that the order of the files of the cavalry is too loose. We must adhere to the regulation, which I believe allows of a more loose formation than the cavalry of other armies; but we must adhere to it strictly, and not allow our order to become more extended than it is. Then all our movements are too quick for those of large bodies of cavalry; and the consequence of this system and of the looseness of our files is, that in all great movements of our cavalry they get into confusion, the horses are jaded before the moment of exertion arrives, and it becomes impossible for any man to produce the great effect with the cavalry of which it is capable.

Our horse, although I believe him the best in the world, becomes unmanageable in proportion as his rate of going is increased, and this is another reason for shortening the pace in all movements excepting the last and decisive charge. I wish you would turn your mind to these subjects:

1st. To keep as close order as the regulation will permit.

2nd. To draw the attention of the General and Commanding officers to the regularity, the closeness, and the exactness of all the movements, and the preservation of strict order in all their parts, rather than to their celerity.

3rd. To prevent the repetition of commands by those not authorized by the regulation to give them when in line or squadron.

4th. To keep the charge as well as all other movements at the pace with which at least the middling goers, if not the slowest, can keep up.

5th. To notice particularly all officers or soldiers whose horses break the ranks or general line without order, whether in a charge or any other movement.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—I gave Ponsonby leave to come to London, but omitted to write to Barnes upon it. The fact is, that I had much to do at the moment, and was going to Cheltenham and forgot it. The fault is mine.

*To W. Sheldon, Esq.* [1055.]

My dear Sir, London, 4th Aug., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 1st, in which you desire that I should be a Vice-President of the Veterinary College, with which honour I should be much flattered if I were to stay in England, or had any time to devote to the Institution. I hope, therefore, that the Society will excuse me.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

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*To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Combermere.* [1056.]

My Lord, London, 5th Aug., 1816.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 31st July, enclosing one of the same date from Sir Hussey Vivian relating to an affray at the theatre of Boulogne, in which certain officers of his brigade were concerned, accounts of which had appeared in the English newspapers, and had drawn the attention of government and of the public, and upon which the Adjutant-General had received my directions to call upon the Major-General for a report.

It does appear extraordinary that the Major-General should not have thought it necessary to make a report, though uncalled for, upon a riot in the theatre of a French garrison town, in which officers of his brigade were concerned, and to quell which it now appears that the Commandant of the town interfered with the guard at the theatre; and I beg that your Lordship will point out this omission of duty to the Major-General, and order him to report in future without delay on any disturbance or quarrel in which the officers or soldiers under his command may be concerned with the inhabitants of the country.

It gives me great concern likewise to observe upon the Major-General's conduct in regard to the officers concerned in this riot. Lieutenant —— is an officer with whose conduct, as the Major-General knows, I had a heavy reason to be much dissatisfied; and then, after he had wantonly given cause for this disgraceful transaction, and had been beaten on the stage of a public theatre in a French garrison town by an actor, the Major-

General has thought proper to release him from his arrest, and to pass over his conduct without farther notice, not on condition of his retiring from the service, or even from the regiment, but because Lieutenant —— stated his intention to retire on half-pay for his own private convenience.

As for my part, I think Lieutenant ——'s conduct, and his having been beaten by an actor on the stage of a public theatre in a French garrison town, render him a disgrace to the army; and I must have that question decided upon by a General Court Martial if I am to command Lieutenant —— any longer, or to wear the same uniform with him; and I therefore beg your Lordship to put him in arrest, and to order Major-General Sir C. Grant, Colonel the Honourable F. Ponsonby, and *
to assemble to inquire into the transaction at the play-house at Boulogne on the night of the * , and to report their opinion whether there is or not ground to bring Lieutenant —— to trial before a General Court Martial.

The Major-General has not named the other two officers of the 18th Hussars who he reports interfered in this affair "solely to prevent mischief and to put an end to the affray, and for this purpose only." I wish he had reported what grounds he had for this belief; and that, even believing it, he had stated what right or authority British officers in a French garrison town had to interfere in a riot at the theatre, even to prevent mischief and to put an end to the affray. I know they have no right or authority to do so in England, and if they did so they would be punished; and I have never heard of any authority they had to do so in any French garrison town.

I beg, therefore, that your Lordship will inquire the names of these officers; that you will put them in arrest; and that you will submit their conduct to the same Court of Inquiry, and order the Court to report upon it in the same manner.

I return the papers which your Lordship sent to me.

Till the report of this Court of Inquiry will be received, I beg that your Lordship will give orders that none of the officers of the 18th Hussars are to go into any French garrison town without leave from your Lordship or from head-quarters.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

* Blank in manuscript.

*William Mudford, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

No. 13, Union Street, Somers Town,
6th Aug., 1816.

My Lord,

Though I scarcely know how to frame the language of this letter in such a way as adequately to express the apprehension I feel of incurring your Grace's displeasure, yet I presume to send it, because your Grace has had the condescension to pardon a similar presumption. To reiterate apologies would be useless; for I can only plead again, what I have pleaded before, my strong and increasing anxiety to produce an authentic account of the battle of Waterloo.

My gratitude to your Grace for the spontaneous advice which you deigned to give me in your first letter I can never forget. But for that advice and that caution, I should have confided in what appeared to be correct official documents, and should have had afterwards to lament the existence of errors by which the value of the work would have been deteriorated.

In your Grace's second letter you refer me to General Alava's report as "the nearest to the truth" after your Grace's own despatch; "but even that report," your Grace adds, "contains some statements not exactly correct." May I presume to solicit the honour of being informed by your Grace what those statements are? I should otherwise be liable to incorporate with my narrative those very points, perhaps, which are not correct.

There are other particulars of infinite importance upon which a diversity of opinion prevails, and which your Grace's authority alone can determine. These, however, I dare not obtrude upon your attention, unless permitted to do so by your Grace's express sanction. In doing what I have done, I have always been deeply impressed with a sense of my temerity, which not even your Grace's condescension has been able entirely to remove. My only support is, that the world will benefit by my boldness, while I reflect with mingled satisfaction and regret how much it is to be lamented that the campaigns of your Grace's predecessor, the Duke of Marlborough, were bequeathed to a posterity which has never had the disposition or the means to do them justice. May it be the proud distinction of the present age that at least the battle of Waterloo has not been left untold till a period when it became impossible to obtain authentic details.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Grace's most grateful and most obedient humble servant,

William Mudford.

[Compliments.—The Duke has already informed Mr. Mudford that he had no intention of publishing any thing upon the Battle of Waterloo, or of giving authority for any publication. He has warned Mr. Mudford that mistaken and incorrect statements have been published; but there is a wide difference between giving him that warning and correcting these statements, and thus giving authority to others which Mr. Mudford should publish.

Wellington.]

[1057.] *To Major-General ———.*

My dear General, London, 10th Aug., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 9th inst. I have never done more in respect to any officer whatever than to recommend his services to the favourable attention of government, and I did only that in respect to you at the period you mention. It rests with government to mark their sense of them in the manner which they think proper.

I do not think I should do you justice if I were to do more at present: in fact it would be no satisfaction to you to receive a mark of distinction which should not be conferred upon you in the same manner as upon your brother officers.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

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[1058.] *To Colonel Sir John Malcolm.*

My dear Malcolm, London, 11th Aug., 1816.

Mr. Canning called upon me the other day, and I spoke to him respecting you. I recommended him to employ you, not less on account of the interest I felt for you than for the public service. He was aware of what your object was, viz., to obtain the government of Bombay; and I am quite certain from what passed, not only that there is no disinclination to you, but, on the contrary, every disposition to appoint you if circumstances should permit. Of course Mr. Canning did not make me any promise, or even hint such a thing; but he spoke highly of you, and of the assistance he had already received from you, and did not appear to doubt your fitness for that or any other high situation.

I now recommend you to let the matter drop, and to turn your attention to the public service only. You may be quite certain that great situations are not obtained in this country by personal exertions and interest. Let a man show that he has talents, integrity, and enlarged views, and he may depend upon it that if employment abroad is his object, he is more likely to obtain it without solicitation than by making the most active exertions.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

I go on Tuesday morning.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.* [1059.]

MY DEAR SIR, London, 11th Aug., 1816.

Upon passing over in my mind the conversation I had with you the other day, it occurs to me that I may have stated my opinion against further alliances in India too strongly. I object to the extension of the subsidiary system further than to the great Powers, that is to say, the Peshwah and the Nizam. I think it very possible, however, that in order to form an efficient system against Meer Khan and his Pindarries, it may be necessary to form alliances with others, either temporary or permanent, or applicable to that object, or for general objects, according to circumstances, to which you could not have an objection. But it is very desirable that we should not take upon ourselves the defence of any more Powers in India, and that we should endeavour to prevail upon the governments of the Peshwah and of the Nizam to maintain at all times such a body of horse as they are respectively bound to maintain by their treaties with us.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Colonel Allen.* [1060.]

MY DEAR ALLEN, London, 11th Aug., 1816.

You wrote me word you would call upon me, but you never came. I go out of town on Tuesday morning, and I am afraid I shall not see you unless you come to-morrow. I want to talk to you about some godsons of mine, all of whose fathers and mothers expect that I should provide for them.

I wish likewise to speak to you respecting Malcolm. In my opinion the Company could not do better than employ him in a great situation, such as the government of Bombay, if it should be vacant. He has talents and enlarged views to qualify him for any situation; his integrity and zeal for his employers are undoubted; and it might be desirable to show the military profession in the East Indies that when they produce such a man as Malcolm, the road is open to them to every situation in the service.

Ever yours, my dear Allen,

WELLINGTON.

[1061.] *To Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens.*

MY DEAR TORRENS, London, 11th Aug., 1816.

I have received a melancholy tale from a Mrs. St. Aurin, the mother of the late Captain St. Aurin, of the 20th, who was killed in the battle of Orthez. She has written me a most dismal letter respecting herself, her widowed daughter-in-law, and two orphan female children. Could you do anything for this family? Could the widow get a commission for sale? Could the children be put on the Compassionate List?

Ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

I enclose the letter, which I beg you will return me.

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[1062.] *To the Duc de Feltre.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 24 Août, 1816.

Le Général Murray m'a mis sous les yeux toutes les pièces de la correspondance qui a eu lieu sur la conduite du Colonel Comte de Bains, Gouverneur de Calais; et je suis parfaitement convaincu que V.E. est également avec moi persuadé, 1, que M. le Colonel Comte de Bains a pris sur lui une autorité qu'il n'avoit pas, quand comme gouverneur militaire de Calais il a donné l'ordre de faire arrêter l'officier Anglais Sedley, employé dans la ligne de l'armée alliée par mon ordre. 2. Que M. le Colonel Comte de Bains en donnant cet ordre a manqué aux convenances de politesse et d'autorité qui ont réglé toutes les communications entre les nations et leurs officiers respectifs depuis la paix, même s'il en avait eu l'autorité. Si M. le Comte de Bains, ou autre autorité Française, eut cru que le service sur lequel étoit employé l'officier Sedley étoit contraire aux traités ou injurieuse aux intérêts de S.M., il auroit dû ou s'en plaindre à ses supérieurs et attendre leurs ordres, ou en faire des représentations à moi-même; mais M. le Colonel Comte de Bains ni autre autorité Française n'a le droit d'arrêter qui que ce soit voyageant ou employé dans la ligne de l'armée par des ordres supérieurs. 3. Qu'il paroît que non-seulement il y a eu assomption d'autorité et défaut de convenances dans la conduite de M. le Colonel Comte de Bains, mais que les officiers agissant sous ses ordres ont pris sur eux d'adopter des mesures contraires

à l'esprit et aux stipulations des traités en refusant à l'officier Sedley ses rations de provision et de fourrage.

Il peut convenir à l'intérêt général que les magasins soient placés dans une ville occupée par les troupes Françaises; mais si les magasins y sont, je ne peux pas souffrir que le Commandant de cette ville ni l'officier chargé de la surintendance de ces magasins puisse refuser à un officier ou à des troupes marchant par mes ordres les vivres et fourrages auxquels ils ont le droit. Je m'assure que V.E. sentira comme moi que si ces Messieurs sont permis de prendre sur eux une telle autorité, je me trouve dans le cas d'exiger que les magasins soient placés dans des emplacemens où ils ne pourront pas exercer cette autorité.

En priant V.E. d'avoir la bonté de faire sentir à M. le Colonel Comte de Bains l'erreur où lui et les officiers agissant sous ses ordres se sont trouvés, je serois fâché qu'il en résultat à M. le Colonel ou à d'autres aucun inconvénient. J'ai eu tout lieu d'être content des communications que j'ai eu jusqu'à présent avec M. le Colonel et toutes les autorités de la ville de Calais. Je suis persuadé qu'il est un brave et digne serviteur de S.M., et que sa conduite doit s'attribuer à son zèle pour le service de son Roi; et je serois vraiment peiné si il en sentit le déplaisir de S.M.

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM. [1063.]

Paris, 25th Aug., 1816.

Lord Castlereagh having desired me to speak to Monsieur Labrador on the subject of the situation of the Spanish government in relation to the Allies, and on the state of the claims of Spain on the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, I had an interview with him in the presence of General Alava yesterday.

After informing Monsieur Labrador that Lord Castlereagh had desired me to communicate with him upon those subjects, I observed that I could not explain the state of the several questions better than by referring to Lord Castlereagh's exposition of them in a despatch recently written to Sir C. Stuart, the contents of which I knew that he had seen; and I observed that he must be aware that it would be quite impossible for the King of Spain either to obtain his objects in Italy, or to place himself on the same footing with the Allies in relation to France, till he

should have signed and ratified the Treaty of Vienna, and should have acceded to the Treaty of Paris of November, 1815. Monsieur Labrador explained the situation in which he found himself under his instructions. He is instructed to sign the Treaty of Vienna without limitation, but on condition that the reversion of the Italian Duchies should be given to the son and daughter of the Infanta Maria Louisa and of the late King of Etruria; and that the Allies would support the claims of Spain upon France under the treaties of Basle, &c.

I pointed out to him that the objects of Spain might be the subject of negotiation, particularly the first with France and the Allies, after the King of Spain should have signed and ratified the Treaty of Vienna; but that till that was done it appeared impossible to attain them.

M. Labrador stated the objections which were felt to bind the King of Spain to the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna without having some security for the attainment of his objects; and the conversation then turned upon the mode to be adopted, first, of attaining them; and next, of attaining them in a form which should secure them to the King of Spain at the moment he should sign and ratify the Treaty of Vienna.

In regard to the first point, it was obvious that it could be effected as far as regarded the objects in Italy only by the mediation of Great Britain with the other Allies, and by the application of the Four Allied Courts in concert with Spain to France. Supposing these negotiations to be successful, three instruments might be prepared, bearing different dates, to be signed at the same period: one of ratification of the Treaty of Vienna; the second of accession to the Treaty of Paris; and the third between the Four Powers and France and Spain, to regulate the succession to the Italian Duchies as well as to Lucca, and other matters connected with those points.

In regard to the second point, I told Monsieur Labrador that it appeared to me that as soon as Spain should have placed herself on the same footing with the other Powers of Europe, the questions regarding her claims upon France would come under decision in the same manner as those of other Powers. Monsieur de Labrador was of opinion, and quoted the words of the Article of the Treaty of Paris of 1815 to prove, that whether he signed the Treaty of Paris or not, Spain as one of the Powers of Europe having claims upon France was entitled

to send a Commissioner to the Commission for the settlement of claims upon France.

Among other points to be settled under the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, Monsieur Labrador stated an augmentation of the revenues from the Bohemian Fiefs to be necessary, in order to render the situation of the Infanta more nearly equal to what it would have been if she had got possession of the Duchies of Parma, &c.; and some arrangement respecting their collection to render her independent of the Imperial treasury.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1064.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 26th Aug., 1816.

I have had a conversation with Labrador, according to your desire, respecting the Spanish concerns, and I enclose a memorandum of what passed. I think the King of Spain will not sign the Treaty of Vienna unless he gets the reversion of the Italian Duchies. I think he will sign if he gets an assurance from us that he is to have them; that is, he will believe what we say, but not anybody else: if you should not approve of the form in which I propose in the enclosed paper to throw the business.

From a casual conversation at the Conference the other day upon Spanish concerns, originating in an inquiry of mine respecting the fortification money, in which Pozzo caught at the idea of giving the reversion of the Duchies to Spain, I should think you would find no opposition from the Emperor, unless, indeed, it was Pozzo's Bourbon feeling, rather than his Russian, which occasioned the eagerness with which he took up the subject. From a conversation I have since had with Vincent, I should think you would find none at Vienna. A great object with Labrador is to obtain the interference of the Allies in favour of the Spanish claims upon France. The truth is that he made a bad bargain for Spain by the Treaty of 1814; and he wishes to force the construction of that treaty as far as possible, in order to get Spain and himself out of the awkward situation of having a balance to pay, instead of one to receive from France.

WELLINGTON.

## [1065.] MEMORANDUM TO MINISTERS ON THE LIBELS PUBLISHED IN THE LOW COUNTRIES.

Paris, 29th Aug., 1816.

The subject which at the present moment gives the greatest uneasiness to the friends of good order and government is the libels published in the Low Countries. It is true that, owing to the difficulty of circulating them in consequence of the measures of police adopted in France, it may be hoped that they do not do all the mischief in France which they are intended to do; but they are doubtless an insult to the King of France, his family, his government, and his adherents, as well as to the authority of allied Europe, inasmuch as they are written and published by the remnant of a party which, having succeeded in overturning nearly all the governments of the world, has itself been twice got the better of by force of arms, and the individuals composing it owe their lives to the mercy of the Sovereigns whom they thus insult. They have chosen as their residence and the place from whence to issue these libels the dominions of one of these Allied Sovereigns; and at the same time that they claim the protection of his liberal disposition and of the laws of his country, they do everything in their power to shake the loyalty of his new subjects. They insult his servants and Ministers whenever they dare; even his own person and the measures of his own government are not exempt from their injurious libels; and it is well known that in case they should succeed in their objects in France, their first operations would be, as they have always hitherto been, to overturn the authority and conquer the kingdom of the King of the Netherlands.

As, however, the measures to be adopted to get the better of this system of libel may affect the internal policy of one of the countries forming the Great Alliance of Europe, it is necessary to proceed with deliberation and caution, and to examine maturely the measures which have been hitherto adopted upon this subject and their success.

These measures relate either to the persons above referred to, or to the libels in question.

In regard to the persons, they may be classed under the following heads:

First, those included in the Ordonnance of the 24th July, 1815.

Secondly, the regicides banished from France by the law of the Amnesty.

Thirdly, persons either banished from France by measures different from either of the other two abovementioned, or residing out of France by order of the King's government, or having passports from the King's government.

In regard to the first, the Allied Sovereigns and their Cabinet Ministers settled in conference in August, 1815, in what manner they should be disposed of; and the King of the Netherlands is understood to have declared his adherence to the act by which this disposition is made. His Majesty declared to me, and authorised me to declare, his intention not to allow any of these persons to remain in his dominions, excepting one, the Comte de Lobau, in whose favour I applied to him by consent of the King of France. His Majesty has since shown his inclination to carry this declaration into execution; as upon my stating to him that three of these persons were living concealed at and in the neighbourhood of Bruxelles, he ordered that they might be forthwith sent away, and this order was carried into execution. I have now received information that there are fifteen of these people residing in His Majesty's dominions, of which I will inform his Ministers; and I will urge them to recommend to His Majesty to order them forth by proclamation, stating, as his reason for this measure, the disposition made of their persons by the agreement of the Allies, to which His Majesty had adhered.

In respect to the persons mentioned in the second instance, it now appears to be agreed that my notions, as stated in my letter of the 9th May, respecting them were correct;* and that the dispositions of the protocols of August, 1815, did not apply to them.

It will be necessary, then, for the Allied Sovereigns to adopt some measures respecting them; such as, for instance, those dispositions which have been made for the list No. 2 in the Ordonnance of July, 1815. Time would be saved if these measures were in the first instance considered in the conference at Paris, and were proposed by the several Ministers to their respective Sovereigns. If adopted by them, they might be recommended by the Sovereigns to the King of the Nether-

* See letter to Sir Charles Stuart of the 9th May (p. 396).

lands, and his accession asked by their several Ministers residing at his Court, and acting simultaneously and in concert.

It is probable that the King of the Netherlands will wish to except some individuals from the operation of these rules; and as the regicides are certainly the most harmless of all the persons above referred to, the Allied Sovereigns will probably have no objection to receive his accession to this arrangement, with such exceptions as His Majesty may think proper to make.

In respect to the persons mentioned in the third instance, some of them, such as Madame Hamelin, have been banished to the Netherlands by the King of France's government, and all of them are residing there under passports or other permission from the King of France's Ministers. When I spoke to the King of the Netherlands on this subject, he appeared very unwilling to violate the rights of hospitality in their persons. They were not judicially accused of any crime. They came there by the order, or by the permission, and with the passports of their own Sovereign, and the King did not conceive that he had any ground upon which he could found an order for sending them away. His Majesty, however, declared and authorised me to state that he was willing to act upon the whole of this subject in perfect concert with the French government; and that if the French government would signify to General Fagel that they had recalled or had withdrawn the passports of any French subjects residing in the Netherlands, His Majesty would order them to withdraw from the southern provinces of his dominions.* The question is, whether the French government has adopted the measure of recalling them or of withdrawing their passports.

I don't think it would be reasonable to expect from the King of the Netherlands that he should give any order respecting these persons till the King of France will have recalled the orders or withdrawn the passports under which they had permission to reside in the Netherlands. If the French government has withdrawn its passports, it will then rest with me to urge the King of the Netherlands to carry into execution the measures which he authorised me to state that he would adopt in case the passports should be withdrawn.

* See my letter to Sir Charles Stuart of the 24th April (p. 373).

But it is quite clear that all these measures may be of little avail in stopping the evil which is the object of our solicitude. We may remove from the Low Countries the Frenchmen who invent and write these libels, but we cannot remove the natives of the country who assist them, and whose names are as well known as are those of the persons above referred to. Some measures have been adopted even to check this libellous spirit, although obviously without success; and it is desirable to consider what they are before we go farther.

In consequence of the complaint of the King of France, measures were adopted to prosecute the editor of one paper; but it was decided by the tribunal that there were no grounds for the prosecution. The same editor was prosecuted for a libel on the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. There was a verdict and judgment against him, but he appealed, and it appears that the proceedings on the appeals from the last-mentioned trial are not concluded.

The King of the Netherlands declared to me, and authorised me to declare, his intention to prosecute any editor for any paragraph of which official complaint should be made to his government. The French government had intended to complain of certain paragraphs, but I don't know that they have carried that intention into execution, nor how that matter stands either here or in the Netherlands. But it is obvious from the judgment already passed on the editor of the paper in which the libel on the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia appeared, and against which the editor has appealed, that the law in the Netherlands is not strong enough to prevent this evil; and the King declared to me, and authorised me to declare, that if this should be found to be the case, His Majesty would propose a new law to the legislature.

The licentiousness of the press in any country upon the Sovereigns and the measures of the governments of its neighbours is a legitimate subject of complaint to all governments. The people of any country may have a right to say and publish what they please, and nobody can with justice remonstrate against the exercise of that right, or on the nature of the legal consequences of its exercise, as long as it is confined to domestic matters, or as long as the persons, the authority, and the measures of foreign governments are treated with the respect which is

due to them. But Europe is now in such an advanced state of civilization, the communications between all parts of it are so easy and frequent, and afford such facilities to the circulation of libels, that the publications in any country, or the nature of the legal consequences attending the abuses of the press, as far as the publications may relate to foreign affairs, cannot be considered a matter of indifference to its neighbours.

It appears, by the late trials in the Netherlands, that the editor of the 'Mercure Surveillant' accused the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia of a conspiracy against the liberties of mankind, of which the Treaty called the Sacred Treaty was supposed to be the compact. No imputation can be imagined more capable of exciting against those august Sovereigns the detestation of their own subjects and of the world; and yet after trial, conviction, and appeal, the sentence of the Court upon the publisher of this libel is two months' imprisonment and a fine of six hundred francs. Nobody can believe that this punishment is of a nature to deter others from the commission of a similar crime, which could have been the only object of those august Sovereigns in permitting the prosecution of the editor of the 'Mercure.' Indeed, this fact is sufficiently proved by the increased number of libels published in the Netherlands against all governments and people since this trial. There can be no doubt, then, that some farther measures are necessary to render the punishment of this offence more adequate to prevent it from being committed.

This will appear to be more necessary in the Netherlands than elsewhere, when it is considered that these libels are generally, if not in every instance, published by Frenchmen, who, banished from their own country on account of their recent treachery and rebellion against their Sovereign and their hostility against the order of succession and system of government which all Europe and France have thought best for that country, have fixed themselves in the Netherlands as the country from which they could with most facility and convenience to themselves again disturb the peace of the world.

The French government have endeavoured with some, but not complete, success to prevent the circulation of these libels in France by impeding the communication between the two countries; and as all the governments in Europe are interested

in maintaining the existing order of things in France, and must therefore be desirous that it should have the respect of their subjects, it cannot be very agreeable to them to see the libels against the French government which are published in the Netherlands circulated throughout Europe. Each of them would be justified in throwing impediments in the way of the communication with the Netherlands, by which alone the circulation of these libels is effected; and, as an alternative for this measure, each of them would have a right to call upon the Sovereign of the Netherlands to alter the law of the country, so as to afford some security, by adequate punishment, that the publication of these libels will not take place.

I have every reason to believe that the King of the Netherlands is disposed to endeavour to have the law of the country amended so as to give every reasonable satisfaction to the Sovereigns of Europe that this abuse will be checked; but it appears to me that it would strengthen His Majesty in relation to his legislature if the Sovereigns were to apply to him upon the subject; and in my opinion their application would be fully justified by the circumstances of the case. This measure might be adopted by their Ministers at the Hague in concert and simultaneously.

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 29th Aug., 1816.

Your brother Pole is probably not so much engrossed with his Mint concerns as not to have given you constant accounts of the Regent's health. His Royal Highness was certainly for three days in a very critical state, but he is now recovering in a very favourable way. At one time the physicians were afraid that the copious bleedings which were requisite might so impoverish his blood as to lay the foundation of serious complaint; but his blood continued to the end rich, and the early return of his appetite seems to have removed all apprehensions.

The Duke of York wrote a very strong remonstrance against the proposed reduction of cavalry at home. Although the question is not properly within my department, I answered it on the part of the government, and the measure is considered as decided, except that the order for stopping the recruiting of those regiments whose numbers are above the proposed establishment has not yet been signed by the Regent. As we have founded part of our argument on the maintenance of the 3000 cavalry in France, I

hope you will not make a reduction in that instance, if we are to reduce next year our force in France, according to the suggestion you brought over, for it will not appear quite fair to have argued upon the existence of a force which we intended to reduce.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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[1066.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 30th Aug., 1816.

You will be glad to know in what state the question of the reduction of the force here stands. It appears that the Austrian government have consented to a reduction of 6000 men of their contingent, provided I should think it safe. I believe the Russian government have given a similar consent. The Prussian government has not yet been consulted. Monsieur de Richelieu will probably find it more difficult to persuade them to leave the question to my decision. The King has spoken to me in a very urgent manner upon the subject on the two occasions on which I have seen him, and so has the Duc de Richelieu. I told them both that if I were now called upon to give my consent to the reduction, I should refuse it: I therefore requested them not to stir the question for a decision till the moment at which it would be desirable for the French government that it should be carried into execution, that is, towards the end of the year.

The Duc de Richelieu, in adverting to the calculations upon this subject yesterday, said that France was certainly in a much better state in every respect than any of us would have expected last year when we made the calculations founded upon a supposed reduction of the army. This is undeniable. But I told him that when we should decide upon this measure, we must not look to what we expected last year, but to the state of the country at the moment and its probable state in future, and to the effect of this reduction upon the discontented in France and the factious elsewhere.

The King told me yesterday as a great secret that he had determined to dissolve the Assembly, at the same time recalling his Ordonnance of last year, by which it had been augmented from 260 to 400, and that by which members were admitted under the age of forty. It appears that this measure was recom-

mended to him by his ministers some days ago, and he desired to have a week to consider of it, and he decided upon it the night before last. It is a bold measure, but I believe the King is right. He told me that he saw parties formed and people pledged to each other to adhere to their opinions and measures of last year; that the dissolution of it, should it have no other effect, would demonstrate to the world that the conduct of the Assembly had not been satisfactory to him; and that even supposing persons of the same principles, or even many of the same, should be elected again, it is probable they would be more manageable, and that his ministers would have a better chance with them. If they will watch the elections, I believe they may return whom they please, and a little attention to the deputies on their arrival at Paris will keep them steady to the government.

I shall be obliged to you if you will not mention the dissolution, as it is not yet known to the foreign ministers. It may be so probably by Monday's post.

I go to-morrow.

You will see that we have had a good deal of discussion here upon the libels in the Netherlands, occasioned partly by a strong paper upon the subject sent here by Metternich, and partly by a sortie of the Duc de Richelieu's upon Fagel, upon some recent libels at a great dinner at Pozzo's. I found all parties so warm, that I thought it best to give in a memorandum * to the Conference of Ministers, in which I have reviewed all that has passed upon it, and recommended one or two practical measures. The King and the Duc de Richelieu are a good deal softened, and so are the foreign ministers, who wanted to erect themselves into a Power.

But we must really do something to prevail upon the King of the Netherlands to put a curb upon the neck of rebels and traitors who have collected in his country.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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* See Memorandum of 29th August, p. 464.

[1067.] *To Major-Gen. Bryce.*

MY DEAR SIR, Paris, 31st Aug., 1816.

It is but justice to you and the Committee of British Engineers who acted with you and under your superintendence in the Netherlands, to inform you that I have lately been on the ground at Mons, and it is clear that the Engineers of the Netherlands misunderstood you when they supposed that you wished to bring all the inundations to one level. I finally settled the plan for the outworks at least of Mons when I was there, which is in principle the same as that proposed by the British Committee, modified at my suggestion in Paris. There may be some difference in the details, of which I think you would approve.

It is not possible to do much this year on the interior of the line; and considering how strong the place will be by its inundations, and the expense and time required for the proposed interior line in masonry, I am inclined to prefer earthwork, or at most a demi revetment. I also think that a great deal of expense and time would be saved, and the place would be nearly equally strong, if we were to leave the existing ditch as it is, and consider it the ditch of the place, and construct the works of a regular form from the earth of the existing rampart within it. I believe the purchase of the buildings and ground in the town would cost less than the filling up of the existing ditch and the excavation of a new one. Let me know what you think of these notions.

Ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

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[1063.] *To Madame de St. Aurin.*

MADAM, Paris, 31st Aug., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst., and return the enclosures.

I find that Captain St. Aurin's prize money has been received.

If you will send me a memorial from his widow, stating the number and names of her children, I have reason to believe that I can get some addition to her means for herself and children.

WELLINGTON.

*Intelligence from Algiers, forwarded by Sir Charles Stuart.*

Alger, 31 Août, 1816.

Depuis l'arrivée de la gabare la Ciotat l'alarme se répandait tous les jours davantage dans l'esprit des habitans. L'opinion de M. le Consul d'Espagne s'était déjà manifestée de se retirer dans les montagnes dans la crainte du bombardement des Anglais, et d'une sédition de la milice ; celle des Consuls d'Amérique et de Dannemark paraissait positive de rester dans leur maison de ville, dans la crainte d'un soulèvement général des Arabes. Le danger me paraissant plus positif et double à Alger, je consultai quelques Maures puissans et de considération à Alger. Je leur demandai s'il y aurait sûreté pour moi dans la montagne de la Bouzarye, dans le cas d'un soulèvement des Arabes. Ils me protestèrent que je ne devais pas avoir la moindre crainte ; que certainement les Français seraient respectés par les Arabes et les Maures.

Le 27 Août, au matin, on eut avis ici de l'arrivée prochaine de l'escadre Anglaise, qui paraissait au loin dans l'ouest. Le Dey avait déjà fait proclamer l'ordre d'être chacun à son poste. Les Turcs et les Maures se portaient en foule aux batteries de la marine. Vers une heure après midi l'escadre entra dans la rade avec un vent faible. Elle était composée de 32 voiles, dont 2 vaisseaux à 3 ponts, 3 vaisseaux de 74, 1 grosse frégate de 60, 5 frégates de 40 à 44, 1 corvette, 5 bombardes, et 4 cutters Anglais ; plus 5 frégates Hollandaises, et 1 corvette Hollandaise, et 5 avisos ou petits armements.

Une frégate en fut détachée arborant pavillon parlementaire ; elle expédia à terre un canot avec le même pavillon. Ce canot fut arrêté en avant du port, et il ne fut pas permis à l'officier de débarquer. Il était porteur d'une dépêche écrite en Anglais et en Turc, qu'il remit au Capitaine du port. Cette lettre portait qu'à la vérité la Cour de Londres, par l'entremise de Lord Exmouth, avait consenti, le 15 Mai, à attendre six mois pour la détermination à prendre par la Régence d'Alger sur l'abolition de l'esclavage ; mais que le Dey avait assuré l'Amiral Anglais, lors de cette transaction, que pendant le peu de tems que les négociations avaient été rompues, toutes les personnes et les propriétés Anglaises avaient été respectées dans tout le royaume d'Alger, et celles qui auraient été séquestrées auraient été religieusement restituées. Cependant la Cour de Londres ne tarda pas à apprendre que les Anglais et les personnes jouissant de la protection Anglaise à Bone avaient été massacrés, et leurs propriétés pillées ; que deux navires Anglais avaient été également arrêtés et pillés, et que depuis il n'avait été donné aucune satisfaction aux intéressés.

En conséquence la Cour de Londres avait déterminé de ne plus attendre l'écoulement de six mois pour l'abolition de l'esclavage des Européens à Alger ; qu'elle devait être accordée et stipulée immédiatement par la Régence, et en reconnaissance de ce principe remettre à bord de son escadre tous les esclaves Européens existant entre ses mains, et en réparation des torts et des pertes occasionnées à Bone et à Oran aux sujets Anglais la Régence devra restituer les 370,000 piastres fortes payées par la Cour de Naples.

Le Dey renvoya avec mépris la lettre de Lord Exmouth, et fit entendre à l'officier qu'il n'y avait aucune réponse.

Dès lors l'Amiral Anglais fit à l'escadre le signal du combat en arrivant sur la ville. Les bombardes furent les premières à mouiller assez près des batteries; les Algériens eussent pu facilement les désemparer. C'était le sentiment de tous les officiers de la marine Algérienne, qui demandait à grands cris qu'on fit feu; mais le Vikillhaidgi s'y opposa, et envoya demander les ordres du Dey, qui annonça son arrivée à bord de la mer. Pendant ce tems les deux vaisseaux à trois ponts et deux de 74, ainsi que la grosse frégate de 60 canons, eurent le tems de prendre poste vers les 2½ heures après midi à 60 brasses de terre ou à demi-portée.

Alors seulement les forts commencèrent à tirer, mais trop tard. Les vaisseaux déjà embossés firent un feu si vif que toutes les batteries supérieures des fortifications de la marine furent en un moment démontées. Les inférieures tinrent bon pendant dix heures consécutives, et firent beaucoup de mal aux Anglais. Mais un capitaine d'artillerie et un lieutenant de marine ayant demandé à l'Amiral la permission d'aller dans une embarcation attacher une chemise de soufre à bord de la première frégate Algérienne qui était à la bouche du port, et d'y mettre le feu, cette détermination, qui eut un plein succès, déconcerta totalement les Algériens. Ils ne savaient plus de quoi ils devaient s'occuper de chercher à sauver leur escadre, ou à nourrir le feu des batteries. Un vent d'ouest assez frais mit bientôt le feu à toute l'escadre. 5 frégates, 4 corvettes, et 30 chaloupes canonnières furent la proie des flammes, et formaient un foyer ardent pendant plus de quatre heures consécutives.

Vers minuit deux frégates en feu, poussées par le vent hors du port, furent jetées sur l'escadre Anglaise, qui ne put se dégager qu'en coupant ses cables pour se mettre hors du portée.

Jusqu'alors un feu très vif de l'escadre Anglaise, qui dura pendant près de dix heures consécutives, les bombes qui tombaient dans la ville, les fusées à la Congrève, et un boulet qui fut jeté près du mole, abattirent enfin le courage des Algériens. Ils se jetaient tous dans les batteries, et le Dey était partout et toujours dans le poste le plus périlleux, encourageant tout le monde, et répandant de l'argent avec profusion. Le Vikillhaidgi fut grièvement blessé, l'ancien Amiral, six capitaines de vaisseaux, et environ 8 à 9 cent hommes furent tués sur les batteries de la marine; 300 autres eurent le même sort dans la ville et les autres forts.

Le 28 l'escadre Anglaise était mouillée en grande rade et hors de portée. Alger était consterné. Le Consul de Suède fut invité à se rendre auprès du Dey.

Arrivé au Ministère de la Marine, qui est sur le bord de la mer, il y trouva le Dey et tous les membres de la Régence rassemblés, qui lui firent part de leur détermination à concéder aux Anglais toutes leurs demandes. Dans ces entrefaites arriva un canot parlementaire de l'Amiral Anglais, avec une lettre de sa part au Dey, par laquelle il lui mandait que quoique le sort des armes et les avantages de sa position le misent en mesure de faire des conditions très dures à la Régence, néanmoins il assurait au Dey qu'il lui accorderait les mêmes conditions de la veille à l'exception de celles-ci: que les Hollandais qui ont pris part à la bataille jouiraient des mêmes priviléges que les Anglais à Alger, et que les présens consulaires à l'arrivée des Consuls Anglais et Hollandais seraient annullés.

Le Dey et la Régence chargèrent le Consul de Suède et le Capitaine du

Port, Aly Rays, de porter des paroles de paix à l'Amiral, et le 29 il fut conclu un armistice sur les bases d'un arrangement conclu avec l'Amiral, et par lequel il est dit—1, que la Régence consent à reconnaître l'abolition de l'esclavage des Européens à Alger, et par suite de ce principe de remettre immédiatement en liberté tous les esclaves Européens, qui sont au nombre de 640 Napolitains, 160 Romains, 180 Espagnols, 28 Hollandais, et 30 autres Italiens, soit Toscans, et autre Suisses, total 1038; 2, que la Régence payera et donnera à l'Angleterre les 370,000 piastres fortes portées par les Napolitains à Alger, en réparation des torts faits à Bone et à Oran; 3, que les présens consulaires sont aboli, mais comme ils sont d'usage en Orient, ils pourront être admis comme présens personnels du Consul arrivant; ce qu'il donnera en présent en son propre nom ne pourra jamais surpasser cinq cent livres sterling; 4, que le royaume des Pays-Bas pourra jouir des mêmes priviléges et attributions de l'Angleterre; 5, qu'il y aura enfin un nouveau traité formel entre Angleterre et la Régence d'Alger, auquel la Hollande participera.

Du reste, il a été stipulé que la Régence est maîtresse absolue de faire la paix ou la guerre avec ou contre toute Puissance de l'Europe, et de lui imposer telle condition onéreuse, à l'exception de l'esclavage des Européens, lesquels pris par les Algériens seront réputés et traités comme prisonniers de guerre.

Les esclaves ont passé hier et aujourd'hui à bord l'escadre Anglaise; incessamment les autres clauses du traité seront remplies.

Si les Algériens ont perdu 1200 hommes, les Anglais en ont perdu 883, d'après le rapport fait à Lord Exmouth. La frégate de 60 pièces de canon a été fort endommagée, et mise presque hors de combat. Le vaisseau contr'Amiral à 3 ponts, et un vaisseau de 74, ont également beaucoup souffert, et le feu a été si vif de la part des Anglais pendant dix heures que la poudre commençait à manquer dans les vaisseaux du 1er rang. Ils étaient obligés d'envoyer prendre des munitions à bord des corvettes. En seconde ligne venaient les frégates Anglaises et Hollandaises; deux entr'elles ont eu beaucoup de dommage, et ont perdu beaucoup de monde. On s'est battu avec acharnement des deux côtés. Voici ce qui a décidé la question. Jamais les Algériens ne s'imaginaient que les Anglais viendraient prendre position à demi-portée de canon, et surtout que l'Amiral se serait placé devant la bouche du port, presqu'à toucher les maisons, et à prendre à revers toutes les batteries des forts de la marine, de manière à foudroyer l'intérieur du port, et par conséquent à exterminer tous les canonniers qui sont restés à découvert. Vint ensuite la résolution d'attacher une chemise de soufre à la première frégate Algérienne, qui fut en feu en un instant, et fit les plus grands ravages dans le port.

La ville n'a pu être incendiée dans aucun point, ni par les bombes ni par les fusées à la Congrève. La construction des maisons en pierres et en briques, toutes terrassées, ne donnait aucune prise aux matières incendiaires; mais les bombes ont fait des dégâts immenses, et même les boulets de 56, qui, lancés de très près, perçaient deux murs, et ont fait écrouler des pans de murailles considérables.

Toute la campagne est restée tranquille, attendant avec anxiété l'événement. Toutes les femmes de la ville étaient disséminées dans les montagnes. Cependant il y eut un mouvement d'insurrection dans un camp

Arabe éloigné de 6 lieues d'Alger, qui voyait avec impatience qu'on ne le fesait pas marcher ni avancer, mais il fut aussitôt appaisé.

Les maisons des Consuls de France, de Suède et Dannemark, et d'Amérique ont été fort mal traités.

Le Vikillhaidgi, Ministre de la Marine, à qui on attribue la faute de n'avoir pas fait tirer sur-le-champ sur les bombardes et sur les vaisseaux aussitôt qu'ils étaient à portée, et de les avoir laissé tranquillement s'ancrer et s'embosser, est accablé de toute l'animadversion publique. Il est disgracié, et a été remplacé par Gsaba Hussein, Vikillhaidgi du Palais. Celui-ci paraît jouir de l'estime publique, et de beaucoup de considération auprès de la milice.

Lord Exmouth a expédié cette nuit la grande frégate de 60 canons, qui a besoin de grandes réparations, et une frégate bonne volière, à Londres. Il expédie demain une frégate Hollandaise à Marseilles, qui porte des dépêches pour la Cour de Londres, voie de Paris. Elle doit amener ici M. Fraissinet, Consul de Hollande à Alger, qui se trouve à Marseilles.

P.S.—Les Algériens ont sauvé 1 brick de guerre, 1 geolette, 1 demi-galère, avec 4 chaloupes canonnières, et 4 autres sur le chantier.

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*Baron de Binder to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, ce 31 Août, 1816.

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à Votre Excellence la copie du protocole qui sera joint à son mémoire sur les libelles publiés aux Pays-Bas, et je profite de cette occasion pour prier Votre Excellence d'agréer l'hommage de la très haute et respectueuse considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, my Lord,

De Votre Excellence le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

LE BARON DE BINDER.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROTOCOLE de la CONFÉRENCE du 29 Août, 1816.

*Présens:*

Le Ministre d'Autriche.
L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.
Le Ministre de Prusse.
Le Ministre de Russie.

Les soussignés Ministres réunis, S.E. M. le Duc de Wellington s'est rendu à la conférence, d'après l'invitation qui lui avoit été faite, afin de prendre en considération la note communiquée par le Ministre d'Autriche, en vertu des ordres de sa Cour, concernant les inconvéniens qui résultent de la présence des réfugiés Français dans les Pays-Bas, et les abus provenants de la licence de la presse dans ce royaume.

S.E. le Duc de Wellington a fait lecture à ce sujet d'une pièce intitulée "Mémoire sur les libelles publiés aux Pays-Bas," laquelle a été annexée au

présent protocole, et que S.E. se propose de porter également à la connoissance de S.M. le Roi des Pays-Bas.

Après avoir conféré sur le contenu des documens sus-énoncés, ainsi que sur les renseignements venus à la connoissance des Ministres, et les explications qui ont eu lieu à cet égard avec M. le Duc de Richelieu, les soussignés ont jugé de leur devoir et conforme à la grande importance de l'objet de soumettre à leurs augustes Cours les opinions qu'ils professent sur les différents points qui forment l'objet de la présente délibération.

Chargés par leurs instructions de rendre compte de tout ce qui peut influer sur la tranquillité de la France, les Ministres sont convaincus, d'après l'expérience la plus évidente, ainsi qu'ils l'ont précédemment témoigné, que l'asile donné par S.M. le Roi des Pays-Bas aux réfugiés Français en général est regardé par leurs fauteurs dans l'intérieur comme une protection accordée dans des vues nuisibles à la conservation et aux intérêts de Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne.

Que ces individus, non-contents de vivre paisibles dans l'asile qu'ils rencontrent, cherchent par des correspondances criminelles à exciter des révoltes, et à pervertir l'esprit et l'opinion publique par tous les moyens qui sont en leur pouvoir.

Que leurs productions politiques ou littéraires, ainsi que celles de plusieurs autres journalistes qui circulent sous le nom de sujets de S.M. le Roi des Pays-Bas, ont pour but évident de calomnier et d'avilir le Roi de France et les Princes de sa famille, et le rendre odieux à ses propres sujets, de provoquer à la rébellion contre son gouvernement, et de bouleverser l'ordre actuellement établi dans ce pays.

Que les principes et les doctrines généralement et ouvertement professés par ces écrivains tendent à attaquer tous les états; et quoiqu'ils soient d'un danger plus immédiat en France, ils le deviennent également pour les autres, surtout ceux qui par leur voisinage sont exposés à en être plus aisement infectés.

Que le gouvernement Français paroît décidé à ne plus vouloir souffrir un pareil avilissement, et qu'il est prêt à interrompre envers le Roi des Pays-Bas les rapports diplomatiques existans, et probablement toute communication quelconque entre les deux pays.

Que si cet événement avoit lieu, les soussignés sont d'avis qu'il en résulteroit un état de choses fâcheux pour les deux royaumes, scandaleux pour le reste de l'Europe, et capable d'amener les plus grands inconvéniens.

Après avoir ainsi constaté les faits, les Ministres sont d'opinion qu'il conviendroit aux quatre principales Puissances de prendre les mesures suivantes:—

1. Faire des démarches directes et efficaces par leurs Ministres à sa Cour pour demander du Roi des Pays-Bas le renvoi de ses états de tous les individus contenus dans la première et seconde liste annexées à l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet, 1815, en conformité des précautions arrêtées dans les protocoles qui ont eu lieu à cet effet.

2. Comme les dispositions contenues dans les dites protocoles paroissent affecter également les régicides exclus de la loi d'amnistie (comme bannis par acte de l'autorité législative), et la Cour de France les considérant compris dans cette catégorie, déclarer que les quatre Puissances Alliées les considèrent comme compris dans les dispositions des protocoles des Ministres du mois d'Août, 1815, et par conséquent assimilés à la catégorie des individus nommés dans la liste No. 2 de l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet.

3. Déclarer à S.M. le Roi des Pays-Bas que les abus et la licence effrénée de la presse dans ses états sont incompatibles non-seulement avec la bonne amitié qu'il est de l'intérêt de l'Europe de lui voir conserver envers le Roi de France

mais encore avec tout autre gouvernement régulier, en conséquence l'inviter à prendre des mesures efficaces pour mettre un terme absolu à ce désordre public, et pour punir ceux qui voudroient y persister.

Quant aux individus Français non compris dans aucune des différentes catégories, mais qui sont sortis de France, et se sont réfugiés en Belgique avec passeports du gouvernement Français, comme il est évident qu'ils sont associés aux individus des deux autres classes dans l'intention d'exciter des troubles en France, et qu'ils participent à toutes les entreprises de ce genre, les Ministres croient qu'il conviendroit également de représenter au Roi des Pays-Bas la convenance et la nécessité de les éloigner de ses états.

Le présent protocole a été communiqué à Son Excellence M. le Duc de Wellington.

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[1069.] *To the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai.*

MONSIEUR LE PRÉFET, Cambrai, ce 2 Sept., 1816.

Ayant reçu un rapport de M. le Colonel Barnard que la paix du théâtre de Cambrai a encore été troublé hier au soir avec des circonstances qui démontrent que cet événement a été causé par les malveillans qui se trouvent dans cette ville, il me paraît, comme je vous l'ai déjà annoncé dans l'entrevue que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous ce matin, que le service du Roi exige que nous prenions des mesures de concert pour empêcher une répétition de ces événemens; et je vous prie de faire fermer le théâtre jusqu'à ce que un corps de garde puisse y être construit, au fin d'avoir les moyens de faire observer le bon ordre par ceux qui désirent le troubler.

WELLINGTON.

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[1070.] G. O. Cambrai, 3rd Sept., 1816.

1. The Field Marshal begs that the officers of the British army, including those of the departments attached to it, will wear their side arms, and the hats or caps ordered for them respectively by the regulations of the service, or by the orders of their regiments, whenever they appear out of their quarters or tents.

WELLINGTON.

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*M. Hachin to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Cambrai, le 3 Sept., 1816.

La mesure que vous proposez de faire fermer la salle de spectacle jusqu'à ce qu'un corps de garde y soit établi me paraît la seule qui puisse empêcher de nouveaux troubles. Déjà je sais que M. le Commissaire Général de Police de cette ville a fait exécuter cette mesure par suite de l'entretien que vous avez eu avec lui hier matin, et de mon côté j'invite M. le Maire de Cambrai à tenir la main à cette exécution.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec respect, Monseigneur,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Pour le Sous-Préfet en congé, le Conseiller d'Arrondissement,

A. HACHIN.

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G. O. Cambrai, 4th Sept., 1816. [1071.]

1. It frequently happens that articles arriving from England, for officers and other individuals of the Allied army, are detained in the custom-house at Calais, owing to a non-compliance with the formalities of admission agreed upon with the French government, under the 5th article of the tariff annexed to the Military Convention of the 20th November, 1815.

2. Information may be obtained at the Quartermaster-General's office at head-quarters, or from the Assistant Quartermaster-General attached to divisions, of the formalities requisite for the admission of such effects as can be allowed to enter France free of duty, under the article of the tariff above referred to; but if these formalities are not complied with, the effects will be detained in the French custom-house until the individuals they belong to shall have either paid the duties due upon them, or shall have obtained permission of the French custom-house to send them back to England.

WELLINGTON.

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*Colonel Sir J. C. Smyth to Colonel Hervey.*

SIR, Cambrai, 4th Sept., 1816.

I have to request of you to take an opportunity of reporting to his Grace that the advanced work on the Western Sand Hills at Ostend (called Fort Wellington), authorised by Lord Bathurst's letter of the 16th June, 1815, and which I received his Grace's orders, by your letter of the 23rd of the same month, to cause to be constructed, is now complete and ready to be given over to the government of the Low Countries.

I have directed Captain Gipps, who superintended the work, to remain in charge of it until he is regularly relieved by an engineer officer in the service of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, and afterwards to join the army at Cambrai, where he will be at hand to afford any explanation that may be required by the Comptroller of Army Accounts respecting the different particulars of the contractors' bills, and which arrangement will, I hope, meet with the approbation of his Grace.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
J. CARMICHAEL SMYTH.

[Desire Sir C. Smyth to order that the fort may be given over to the officer whom the King of the Netherlands may appoint to receive it, and the officer to proceed to head-quarters.

WELLINGTON.]

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[1072.] *To Mr. Picton.*

SIR, Cambrai, 6th Sept., 1816.

I have received this day your letter of the 31st August, which I conclude you had sent to Paris.

Notwithstanding what is stated in the English newspapers, I assure you that I have nothing to do with the French government. You should therefore complain to the British Ambassador at Paris, if you should think it proper to make any complaint on the subject on which you have written to me. I believe, however, you will find that, according to the law of all countries in which letters are carried by a public establishment, particularly according to the law of the Post-office in France, as well as in England, no individual is permitted to carry letters; and the master of the packet respecting whom you have written to me was probably guilty of a breach of the law, which it is equally probable that the custom-house officer was employed to prevent or detect.

I would likewise recommend you to complain to the British Ambassador regarding the mode in which individuals are searched at Boulogne, if you should think the subject of a nature to be complained of. It must be observed, however, that the laws for collecting the duties of the customs are very severe in all countries, and are carried into execution everywhere with great severity and little respect for persons; and I

can state from recent experience that the custom-house officers in England perform this duty with as much strictness as can be used elsewhere. I conceive, therefore, that but little advantage can be derived from your complaint. I have troubled you with these observations out of respect for your relation, and with the desire of saving you the trouble of making complaints on subjects on which you cannot obtain the redress you expect.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 6th Sept., 1816.

I am very much obliged to you for your memorandum on Spanish affairs. I send you a copy of my letter to Vienna on this subject. You will see I have gone as far as I well could to carry the point of the reversion for Spain. If Austria declines or hesitates, I am clear Spain ought to accede notwithstanding to both treaties, by which she secures much, and, in fact, loses nothing, as the reversion remains equally open to future negotiation. Her holding off, so far from operating in favour of her object, may create an expectation that Lucca, &c., may by her obstinacy also become disposable, and thus both possessions pass into other hands. I have told Fernan Nuñez how the case *now* stands, and that *we* have done our best to settle the point in their favour. I have also given him my opinion as to the line his Court should pursue in either alternative; but whilst we have thus endeavoured to serve Spain, we must not be understood to be committed beyond the present time with respect to the reversion of the Duchies; not that we have any present intention of giving another destination to it, and certainly see serious objections to its going to the little Bonaparte. But in all such cases it is right to preserve our free agency, and there is certainly no motive for pledging ourselves blindly to such a government as that of Spain on any question, without reference to combinations and circumstances to which the future may give birth, if the Allies cannot at the present moment be brought to agree in closing the question as we have proposed.

I have only to-day received your confidential letter from Paris of the 31st. I am not aware of the cause of this delay: possibly the late gales have obstructed the passage.

I send you a copy of my letter to Sir Charles Stuart in reply to his on the reduction of the Allied force in France, in which I have placed the question as we agreed. I rather incline to think that to give to the French government the full advantage of this measure in point of influence, the Duc de Richelieu ought to address himself officially to the Allied Ministers without delay, and that they, giving as much hope as their instructions will permit as to the future, should upon conference with you adjourn over the final decision of the question till after

the Chambers shall have taken their measures for the service of the ensuing year. This will keep you free, and put the French government in a situation to make the new Assembly feel that the prospect of relief depends upon themselves.

I am not able to judge of the probable success of the intended measure of parliamentary reform. It certainly is a bold measure, but it is not necessarily wrong on that account. It seems necessary for the King and his Ministers to do something decisive to acquire the means of going on, and I don't know that any more feasible course presented itself.

I shall neglect no means to awaken the government of the Netherlands to the danger, I should rather say to the ruin, they will sooner or later bring upon themselves, if they do not cease in time to make their press and their territory the instruments of general mischief. We may offend by our constitutional licence, because we have the sea for our frontier; but such a state as the Netherlands will never be tolerated in doing so. I quite agree with you, however, that Prince Metternich's despatch on this question is very ill considered, and that the Allied Ministers must be very cautious of obeying his summons.

I am, my dear Lord, in haste, ever yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Viscount Castlereagh to Lord Stewart.*

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 6th Sept., 1816.

I have delayed writing to your Excellency relative to the communication I some time since apprised you had been received by Sir Charles Stuart from the Chevalier de Labrador, as to the terms on which his Court would be willing to become a party to the Treaty of Vienna and to the succeeding transactions at Paris.

I was desirous, before I did so, of ascertaining with more precision the views of Spain, and of representing the impracticability of some of those conditions which had been put forward by the Spanish Minister. As I understood the substance of his first conversation with Sir Charles Stuart, he claimed,

1st. The reversion of the Duchies for the Infant and her issue after the death of the Archduchess.

2nd. That she should continue to retain possession of Lucques, together with the pension of 500,000 francs attached thereto, even after the reversion of the Duchies had accrued.

3rd. That the pensions regulated at 500,000 by the Act of Vienna should be increased to a million of francs.

Upon the first point there was nothing to remark as inconsistent with the Treaty of Vienna, or as interfering with *any vested interest now subsisting*; the Duchies not being given with remainder to Maria Louisa's heirs, but the reversion having been expressly reserved, by Article 99 of that treaty, to be regulated hereafter by the Powers therein named.

Upon the second point, it was observed that M. de Labrador's proposition appeared utterly repugnant to the Treaty of Vienna; the reversion of Lucques, in the event of another succession accruing to the Queen of Etruria, being actually vested in the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

Upon the third point, it was only necessary to remark that the Allied Sovereigns had no means now to make fresh conditions with the Emperor of Austria and the Grand Duke of Tuscany with a view of increasing the income which Her Majesty was to enjoy as Sovereign of Lucques.

In order to bring the proposition of Spain more distinctly to a point, I requested the Duke of Wellington to see M. de Labrador on his return to Paris, and to use his influence to make the Spanish Minister feel that his Court should find the means, as early as possible, of becoming a party to the late European arrangements; and that until this had been effected by their accession both to the Treaties of Vienna and Paris, in the judgment of the British government they were not entitled to any of the beneficial stipulations of either treaty.

I requested the Duke further to impress the inconvenience of Lucques remaining so long in a provisional state, and that Spain must expect, if her accession was much longer withheld, to be pressed by the Allied Sovereigns for a categorical decision, which might lead, however reluctantly, to the complete alienation from the Spanish family of the provision settled by the Act of Congress upon the Queen of Etruria and her children.

I now enclose you a confidential memorandum I received from the Duke of Wellington, in which is reported his conversation with M. de Labrador, from which it is clear that Spain adheres to her first proposition; that she does not mean to press her second; but that she desires to negotiate with Austria upon the third.

Your Excellency will communicate this despatch, with the memorandum accompanying it, to Prince Metternich; and you will suggest for his consideration whether, as the Court the most interested, Austria might not invite the three other Allied Powers to authorise their Ministers at Paris, *in concert with France*, to open a negotiation with Spain for her immediate accession to the late treaties upon the basis which the Treaty of Vienna itself leaves open, namely, the disposal of the reversion of the Duchies in favour of the Queen of Etruria after the death of the Archduchess Maria Louisa.

What it may be deemed by the Austrian Minister expedient to do upon improving, whilst at Lucques, the Queen's income, it is not for the British government to judge. The main point is to ascertain whether the Austrian Cabinet will concur in now assigning the reversion of the Duchies to the Spanish family, the Court of Madrid having descended from the high ground on which its plenipotentiary stood at Vienna, namely, the accepting nothing less than the immediate possession of the Duchies. In this case I should conceive an arrangement might be brought about, and the whole executed at Paris, as the Duke of Wellington suggests, by three instruments.

As to the motives which may actuate the Austrian government, I can conceive the Archduchess may complain of her son being left without an ostensible establishment; but still, if I remember right, the Emperor never intended to encourage his pretensions to this inheritance, and rather looked, upon grounds of general policy, to find some other provision than a sovereignty for the son of Napoleon.

Upon any other view of this subject, I should conceive the Austrian government would not hesitate upon the policy of closing the question without delay. They cannot expect a concurrence from the Powers named in Article 99 to any destination of the Duchies to the prejudice of the Spanish family, more especially from France. To leave open a succession in Italy to be scrambled for upon the death of Maria Louisa, is surely unwise; and I think they ought not altogether to dismiss from their consideration, even putting a contest with France out of the question, the possibility of a maritime quarrel hereafter with Spain

on such a point which might place their commercial interests in the Adriatic in a predicament of great embarrassment.

You will observe, by the enclosed protocol, that Sir Charles Stuart has made a communication upon this subject to the Allied Ministers at Paris. I think he has rather put more strongly than the truth that Spain must first give her accession to the treaties *before* she can negotiate upon the point of the reversion.

This is not quite accurate. She must have given her accession to the treaties before she can entitle herself to beneficial stipulations arising out of these treaties, either in contribution, fortification money, or even in seeking, through the provisions of these acts, indemnity as against France; but there is nothing which precludes her from negotiating with the Allies previous to such an accession upon any point which was left undecided by those treaties, and in which she may take a special interest.

The Allies might certainly decline such a negotiation; and, upon such refusal, Spain would be to make her option between refusing, in such case, her accession, or giving her accession keeping alive her claims to the reversion; but if it is desirable to close all litigated points, and to have all our European arrangements ratified by all the great Powers, there seems no motive for dividing the questions, if we can agree upon the mode in which they are to be finally regulated.

Not having heard anything from Paris of the result of the Russian Minister's endeavour, in pursuance of orders from his Court, to induce the King of France to interpose his good offices with Spain in order to procure its accession, I presume he has not found His Most Christian Majesty prepared to undertake this task.

I am satisfied that this *démarche* will be productive of no result, and that the only one that can succeed is a joint negotiation with Spain and Paris by the Ministers of the Five Powers, to whom the discussion on this question is referred by the Treaty of Vienna.

The Austrian Minister's intercourse at Vienna with the Duke of St. Carlos may correct erroneous impressions at Madrid; but the Spanish government is not likely to consent to remove the actual negotiation from Paris to Vienna upon a point in which the concurrence of all the Powers enumerated in the 99th Article of the Treaty of Vienna is required. Nor would it be, as I conceive, the interest or wish of Austria to give to this discussion the complexion of a negotiation between Power and Power, instead of between Spain and all the Powers that signed the Treaty of Vienna.

It seems, then, that at Paris alone the question can speedily be brought to a point; and if Prince Metternich concurs in this, your Excellency will submit to him the expediency of his Court taking measures for inviting without loss of time the other Powers to authorise their Ministers in France to deliberate upon the means of bringing this business to a final settlement, which I think may be done if they are agreed upon giving the reversion of the Duchies to the Queen of Etruria and her issue after the Archduchess's death, under the reservation contained in the treaty as to Lucques passing, in that event, to the family of Tuscany.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

P.S.—I enclose an extract from the Congress protocol of the 27th May, 1815, in which you will find that Prince Metternich himself actually brought forward the proposition of giving this reversion of the Duchies to the Infant. If the Austrian Cabinet will adhere to this offer, I have no doubt the whole may be speedily settled.

C.

II.

*Viscount Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.*

SIR, Foreign Office, 6th Sept., 1816.

In reply to your Excellency's despatch desiring to know what language you are to hold in the event of any proposition being brought forward by the French government for reducing the Allied forces now stationed in France, your Excellency may state that you can enter into no *engagement* upon such a question except after full deliberation and upon a joint decision with the other Allied Ministers.

With respect to the military expediency of such a reduction, your Excellency will avail yourself of the Duke of Wellington's judgment, and be guided wholly by his Grace's opinion.

With respect to the political expediency of this measure, it is decidedly the opinion of your government that such a question can only in prudence be judged of when the Chambers shall have taken their measures for providing for the services of the ensuing year. If, by giving an efficient support to the King's government, and by a liberal supply to meet the Allied engagements, they shall dissipate all reasonable apprehension as to the fulfilment of the late treaty, the British government will have the greatest satisfaction in concurring with the other Allied Powers in giving effect to the reduction of force contemplated as possible in the Protocol of November last. They shall even rejoice in having it in their power to afford this proof to the King and the French nation of the solicitude which the Prince Regent feels to alleviate the burthens to which His Most Christian Majesty's government has necessarily been subjected. But although such a hope may very properly be held out by the Allies as contingent upon a satisfactory close to the approaching labours of the Chambers (a hope which must obviously constitute a powerful motive with them adequately to provide for the public exigencies), your Excellency will claim that the discretion shall rest with the Allies finally to decide this question, after they shall have had experience of the result of their deliberations.

From what you have learnt of the sentiments of the Austrian government upon this point, I agree with you that there is every reason to presume that the Emperor of Russia is not unfavourably disposed to give effect to the principle recognised in the Protocol above alluded to. I persuade myself there will be found but one sentiment amongst the Allies upon this point, if France will only be true to her own interests, and give them an opportunity of evincing to Europe, without improvidence, the friendly spirit in which the late peace was framed, and will uniformly be acted upon by them towards Louis XVIII. and his subjects.

In carrying the above instructions into effect, you will report the result of your deliberations with the other Ministers for the Prince Regent's sanction before the decision is finally notified to the French government.

Your Excellency will understand that although the proposed reduction of force is a measure that His Royal Highness desires should be taken with all due caution, it is one, nevertheless, which in principle he is rather desirous of encouraging than of impeding; because it would, in his judgment, essentially tend to inspire confidence both in the stability of the peace, in the consolidation of the King's authority in France, and in the liberal and disinterested principles of the alliance.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ 1073. ] *To the King of the Netherlands.*

SIRE, Cambrai, ce 7 Sept., 1816.

J'ai l'honneur de faire rapport à Votre Majesté que l'ouvrage appelé par les officiers de Génie Anglais le Fort Wellington, à Ostende, est fini; et j'ai donné les ordres nécessaires pour que les officiers le mettent à la disposition de ceux que Votre Majesté jugera à propos de nommer pour en prendre possession.

J'ai aussi l'honneur de faire connaître à Votre Majesté qu'il se trouve à Ostende des pièces de canon et autres objets d'artillerie qui avaient été envoyés d'Angleterre pour le service des places dans les provinces méridionales dans l'année 1815, sur la réquisition de Son Altesse Royale le Prince d'Orange; et j'ai donné des ordres pour que ceux dont la liste est incluse soient tenus à la disposition des officiers que Votre Majesté jugera à propos de nommer pour les recevoir.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Sire, de Votre Majesté le très obéissant et fidèle serviteur,

WELLINGTON, PRINCE DE WATERLOO.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 7 Sept., 1816.

Le 'Moniteur' d'aujourd'hui apprendra à Votre Excellence l'exécution de la mesure que le Roi lui avait confiée, et dont j'avais eu l'honneur de l'entretenir. Après y avoir bien et mûrement réfléchi, nous avons cru qu'il était indispensable de rentrer dans les limites de la Charte, seule base sur laquelle repose aujourd'hui la législation de la France. L'assentiment que vous avez bien voulu donner à ce plan, Monsieur le Duc, augmente ma confiance; et j'espère voir par la consolider l'ouvrage que vous avez si glorieusement accompli. Il dépendra de Votre Excellence de mettre de notre côté dans la balance un poids bien considérable, en voulant bien déterminer une diminution quelconque dans l'Armée d'Occupation. J'ai écrit à Berlin pour obtenir le consentement de la Cour de Prusse: si vous aviez la bonté d'appuyer d'un mot auprès du Prince de Hardenberg, je ne douterais plus du succès. Il est bien à désirer que vous soyez investi de tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour décider ici cette question: il me semble qu'il ne manque plus que l'assentiment de la Prusse; et je ne doute pas qu'elle ne cède aux vœux des autres Cours, et à celui que vous voudriez bien exprimer. Si le Roi dans son discours d'ouverture pouvait annoncer l'espoir fondé de voir diminuer une partie des charges qui pèsent sur la France, je ne fais aucun doute que l'influence du Ministère sur cette Chambre, quelle qu'elle fut, n'en fut augmentée de manière à lui assurer un

succès complet. L'union qui existerait alors entre tous les pouvoirs affermirait la tranquillité en France, et en faisant renaître le crédit assurerait les moyens de remplir tous les engagemens contractés par les traités. J'abandonne cette idée à la sagesse de Votre Excellence, qui est plus à portée que personne d'en apprécier la valeur.

Quelque ennuyeux qu'il soit de reparler sans cesse des folliculaires de la Belgique, je ne puis m'empêcher de vous prier, Monsieur le Duc, de vouloir bien jeter un coup d'œil sur le 'Mercure Surveillant' du 30 Août dernier. Vous y verrez un article, au tout simplement et sans figure: on dit en toutes lettres qu'il n'y a que l'élévation du Prince d'Orange sur le trône de France qui puisse terminer la révolution, et assurer le repos de l'Europe. Je laisse à penser quelle impression doit faire sur l'esprit des hommes crédules la tolérance de pareilles provocations, et la publicité de ces vœux en faveur du beau-frère de l'Empereur de Russie. Espérons que le Roi des Pays-Bas n'attendra pas pour les réprimer l'intervention des quatre Cours.

Veuillez agréer avec bonté les nouvelles assurances de la très haute considération et du respectueux attachement avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Monsieur le Duc,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 9 Sept., 1816.

Nous avons l'honneur de communiquer ci-jointe à Votre Excellence une copie du Protocole de notre séance d'hier, relatif à l'ordonnance Royale du 5 de ce mois, portant dissolution de la Chambre des Députés, afin qu'elle veuille prendre connaissance de notre manière d'envisager cette mesure, que nous supposons être conforme à la sienne.

La feuille également ci-jointe du 'Moniteur,' qui contient l'ordonnance Royale, vous fera connaître, Monsieur le Duc, l'ensemble des dispositions prises à cet égard; et nous nous bornons à observer que leur publication a eu pour suite immédiate une hausse dans les fonds publics.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération, My Lord,

De Votre Excellence les très humbles et très obéissans serviteurs,

CHARLES STUART. POZZO DI BORGO.
LE COMTE DE GOLTZ. LE BARON DE BINDER.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROTOCOLE de la CONFÉRENCE du 8 Septembre, 1816.

*Présens.*

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.
Le Ministre de Prusse.
Le Ministre de Russie.
Le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche.

Dans la séance d'aujourd'hui l'attention des Ministres s'est dirigée sur l'ordonnance du Roi, en date du 5 de ce mois, portant dissolution de la Chambre

des Députés, et convocation des Colléges Electoraux, à l'effet de procéder à l'élection d'une nouvelle Chambre, en la réduisant au nombre déterminé par la Charte, et en n'y appelant que des hommes de l'âge de quarante ans.

Les Ministres ayant pris cet objet en considération, vu le peu de probabilité qui existait de rencontrer dans la Chambre des Députés actuellement dissoute cet esprit de conciliation et de modération si nécessaire à la marche et à la stabilité du gouvernement présent :

Vu que la mesure de renouvellement était impérieusement commandée, tant sous le rapport de la conciliation des Français entre eux que comme moyen de rétablir le crédit et les finances de ce pays, menacés par les débats qui ont eu lieu durant la dernière session de la Chambre des Députés, et par les actes qui sont émanés de cette assemblée :

Vu, enfin, que cette mesure est également légale et constitutionnelle :

Sont d'avis que d'après un premier aperçu elle peut être envisagée comme un moyen propre à rapprocher les différens partis, à relever le crédit public, et à renforcer le gouvernement ; par conséquent propre à remplir un but également utile et nécessaire, et conforme aux véritables intérêts de la France et de tous les autres gouvernemens.

Il a été convenu de communiquer une copie du présent Protocole à S.E. M. le Duc de Wellington moyennant la lettre ci-annexée.

[*Suivent les Signatures.*]

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[1074.] *To the Duc de Feltre.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Haguenau, ce 15 Sept., 1816.

Avant de quitter le Département du Nord j'avois passé auprès de St. Omer pour faire la revue des troupes de S. M. B. qui se trouvent campés dans le voisinage, et j'ai à communiquer à V. E. quelques avis sur ce qui se passe de ce côté là. Entre nous le gouverneur de St. Omer est beaucoup alarmé pour la sûreté de sa garnison, qu'il croit être extrêmement compromise par le voisinage de ce camp. Excepté à une occasion où un jeune homme a voulu marcher son régiment de cavalerie à travers la ville, non seulement rien n'est arrivé pour lui causer de l'inquiétude, mais au contraire les généraux ont fait tout en leur pouvoir pour lui prouver qu'ils étoient là seulement parceque c'étoit le seul emplacement où ils pouvoient faire exercer leurs troupes sans nuire au pays. L'officier qui a voulu passer la ville avec ses troupes a déjà été traité comme il le mérite, et je l'ai en mains à présent, et je vous assure qu'on ne commettra pas cette faute une seconde fois. Il seroit très àpropos si V. E. voulut prendre des mesures pour calmer les inquiétudes du gouverneur de St. Omer sans toutefois le prévenir que j'en suis instruit.

Je crois que lui comme d'autres a étendu ses limites beaucoup plus que n'étoit convenu, mais je ne m'en plains pas. Il nous conviendroit cependant si les troupes étoient permises de s'exercer un peu plus près de la forteresse, c'est-à-dire dans les limites comme elles sont marquées à présent, en avertissant la forteresse ou sous quelque autre règlement que vous jugerez àpropos de prescrire.

J'ai l'honneur d'être,

WELLINGTON.

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*Baron Nagell to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Hague, 16th Sept., 1816.

Permit me to add a few words to the official despatch I have the honour to address to-day to your Highness, and to present your Highness my personal respects. We have, indeed, gained a main point if the States-General agree to the proposed law against the licence of the press, of which I do not entertain any doubt. We shall be able to prevent the odious publications; and the set of disturbers must go to other countries to distil their heinous poison. I hope this will prove the sincere desire of my Royal Master to do what is in his power to promote the tranquillity of France. At the same time I beg to express that the behaviour towards General Fagel has not been such as we should wish; and I would not restrain to make the proper remark to the Count de la Tour du Pin. I am sure your Highness will not approve of it; and a hint from your side would probably prevent any similar occurrence. I do not apologise for the long time my answer has been detained, because I flatter myself your Highness will feel that we were in need of serious deliberations.

It is with the utmost respect that I subscribe myself, my Lord Duke,

Your Highness's most obedient humble servant,

A. W. C. DE NAGELL.

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*Baron Nagell to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON PRINCE, La Haye, ce 16 Sept., 1816.

Je n'ai rien eu de plus empressé que de mettre sous les yeux du Roi la lettre dont Votre Altesse a bien voulu m'honorer le 29 Août dernier.

Sa Majesté ayant pris en sérieuse considération la proposition que cette lettre contient, m'a chargé de répondre à Votre Altesse que la mesure de faire intimer par voie de proclamation aux personnes comprises dans le second état de l'ordonnance de Sa Majesté très Chrétienne, du 24 Juillet, 1815, de quitter le territoire de ce royaume, a paru moins nécessaire puisque d'après les rapports de la police, de tous les Français dont les noms sont

consignés dans ce liste, il n'y a que les Sieurs Merlin et Pommereuil qui se trouvent actuellement dans les provinces méridionales ; que le premier de ces deux individus quittera le territoire du royaume encore avant l'expiration du mois de Septembre, tandis que l'état fâcheux de santé du Sieur Pommereuil n'a pas permis son éloignement, à moins qu'on aurait voulu mettre de côté tous préceptes d'humanité ; que cependant il sera renvoyé aussitôt que cette mesure pourra s'effectuer sans cruauté.

Il ne sera pas échappé à l'attention de Votre Altesse que les observations qui ont rapport à quelques unes des personnes mentionnées dans sa lettre indiquent elles-mêmes qu'il est plus que probable qu'ils se trouvent ailleurs que sur le territoire des Pays-Bas. Si à l'exception des deux individus déjà nommés ci-dessus il y en avait encore d'autres qui auraient réussi à se cacher jusqu'ici, il est à craindre que l'émanation d'un acte tel que Votre Altesse le propose ne remplirait aucunement le but désiré, mais servirait au contraire à redoubler les mesures prises par eux pour se dérober aux poursuites et à la vigilance de la police, en se tenant plus que jamais sur leur garde dans les retraites qu'ils auraient pu se choisir.

Le Roi aime donc à se persuader que Votre Altesse se contentera de l'assurance que Sa Majesté est sincèrement disposée à tenir les engagemens qu'elle a pris relativement à l'éloignement des Français réfugiés, et que les ordres les plus sérieux ont été renouvelés de renvoyer tous ceux qu'on parviendrait à découvrir par la suite.

Je prie Votre Altesse d'agréer l'assurance renouvelée de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Mon Prince,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

A. W. C. DE NAGELL.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Baron Krayenhoff to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Bruxelles, le 22 Sept., 1816.

J'ai l'honneur de présenter à la signature de Votre Altesse le procès-verbal de notre dernière inspection, et de nos conférences au sujet de la défense de la frontière méridionale du royaume des Pays-Bas, pour être soumis ensuite à la ratification du Roi.

J'en ai différé l'envoi jusqu'au moment que j'aurai reçu la carte des provinces méridionales du royaume exécutée par l'Institut Géographique de Weimar, comme aussi de mon précis historique des opérations géodésiques et astronomiques faites en Hollande. Je supplie Votre Altesse de vouloir accepter ces deux objets comme témoignage de mon plus profond respect.

Dans quelques jours je suis d'intention de partir pour Amsterdam, ma résidence ordinaire, où je prie Votre Altesse de m'envoyer le procès-verbal susdit, après l'avoir signé et apostillé.

Agréez, Monseigneur, le renouvellement bien sincère de mon dévouement très parfait, et du plus profond respect avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Monseigneur,

De Votre Altesse le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le Lieutenant-Général, Inspecteur-Général du Génie,

KRAYENHOFF.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROCÈS-VERBAL de l'INSPECTION faite dans le courant du mois d'Août de cette année, 1816, et des CONFÉRENCES qui ont eu lieu entre S.A. le Maréchal PRINCE de WATERLOO et S.E. le Lieut.-Général BARON KRAYENHOFF, Inspecteur-Général des Fortifications, pour aplanir quelques points, relatifs à la défense de la Frontière Méridionale des Pays-Bas, sur lesquels ils n'étaient point d'accord et n'avaient rien arrêté dans leur dernière Conférence tenue à Cambrai le 15 Mai précédent.

Mons, le 19 Août, 1816.

Sur l'invitation de Son Altesse le Maréchal Prince de Waterloo, l'Inspecteur-Général des Fortifications s'est rendu le 15 Août dernier chez S.A. à Bruxelles, afin de prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour l'inspection qu'ils voulaient faire de concert.

L'on s'est mis en route dans la nuit du 15 au 16, et l'on a successivement visité les places fortes et les positions encore à fortifier qui se trouvent marquées dans cette relation.

*Charleroi.*—1. Le projet du Capitaine Ingénieur Oortwyn ayant été examiné sur le terrein avec le plus grand soin n'a donné lieu à aucune observation importante: l'on eut seulement souhaité que le système des lunettes détachées à établir au delà du ravin de l'ouest eut pu être porté plus avant sur la hauteur; mais le Capitaine Ingénieur Oortwyn ayant présenté quelques considérations et démontré qu'alors ces lunettes seraient privées d'une grande partie du feu protecteur de la place, et indispensables pour elle, après quelques discussions l'on est convenu de ne rien changer aux dispositions déjà prises à l'égard de cette place, et de partir de suite pour

*Namur.*—2. Le Lieutenant-Colonel Evers a présenté sur le terrein à Son Altesse et à l'Inspecteur-Général des Fortifications son nouveau projet pour la hauteur de Terre Neuve, suivant lequel cette hauteur serait couverte par une fortification continue, liée des deux côtés aux ouvrages à corne, le long de la Meuse et de la Sambre. Ce projet examiné sur les lieux a été discuté, approuvé, et adopté par l'un et l'autre, sans la moindre observation. Ayant ensuite visité en détail les vieilles ruines du Fort Orange, l'on a dû se convaincre que la restauration de ce fort seroit, si non tout à fait impraticable, du moins d'une dépense excessive: d'après cela on a jugé plus convenable d'aplanir le vieux fort autant que possible, afin d'en avoir un plateau uni, et bien découvert des ouvrages qu'il laisse derrière lui; qu'on l'occuperait ensuite par une forte lunette détachée, et une pour défensive, placées en bonne liaison avec les deux autres lunettes détachées, projetées par le Lieutenant-Colonel Evers, pour les hauteurs de la deuxième ligne: le projet de cette forte lunette sera soumis à S.A. La construction de la troisième ligne plus en avant encore, qui consisterait, suivant le projet, en une grande lunette et deux tours défensives, ne recevra pas encore son exécution.

[Avant de décider cette question il faudra voir le terrein aplani.—W.]

*Huy.*—3. Le jour suivant (17 Août) l'on s'est rendu à Huy, où l'on a inspecté les deux hauteurs présentées par l'Inspecteur-Général pour être fortifiées, savoir: le rocher du vieux château et la hauteur de St. Joseph, occupées jadis l'une et l'autre par quelques ouvrages de fortification.

Le Prince de Waterloo n'a différé d'opinion avec l'Inspecteur-Général qu'en cela seulement, que, selon lui, il serait très vraisemblablement suffisant de fortifier

le rocher du château; et l'on a par suite arrêté que le projet en serait fait le plutôt possible pour qu'on peut mieux juger alors s'il n'est pas indispensable d'occuper la hauteur de St. Joseph. L'on a pris aussitôt la route de

*Liége.*—4. L'on a visité ici que la hauteur de la vieille Citadelle: le projet présenté par le Major Ingénieur Camerlingh a été approuvé de suite et sans la moindre observation à l'inspection du terrein. A l'égard du plateau de la Chartreuse, il a été décidé qu'on en fera préalablement les projets pour les examiner de suite sur les lieux mêmes. Quant aux hauteurs près le village St. Giles, on a reconnue que sans les couvrir d'ouvrages de fortification permanente elles étaient propres à constituer une position militaire, qui soutiendrait les ouvrages du château et de la Chartreuse. Dans la nuit du 17 et 18 l'on est retourné de Bruxelles, qu'on a quitté vers midi, pour se rendre à

*Hal.*—5. S.A. a indiqué à l'Inspecteur-Général des Fortifications, entre les deux routes conduisant l'une à Enghien et l'autre à Braine-le-Comte, la position qu'il trouve propre à devenir une place de deuxième ligne, pour couvrir la ville de Bruxelles.

L'Inspecteur-Général s'est chargé de faire exécuter de suite la levée et le nivellement du terrein, afin de pouvoir ensuite prendre une décision définitive à cet égard.

De Hal l'on s'est dirigé sur Mons, où l'on est arrivé dans la soirée.

*Mons.*—6. Après avoir tenu dans la matinée du 19 avec le Capitaine Ingénieur Van de Polder, auteur du deuxième nouveau projet de cette forteresse, une longue conférence, tant au sujet de la division des bassins d'inondation qui devront couvrir le corps de place que de quelques autres points importants relatifs au corps de place, l'on s'est rendu sur le terrein à l'effet d'examiner les projets pour couvrir les têtes des principales retenues d'eau, tant du côté à Nimy que vers les hauteurs de Bartadmont. Le Capitaine Ingénieur Van de Polder ayant expliqué et motivé de la manière la plus claire les détails de ses projets, il a été immédiatement arrêté qu'ils seraient mis en exécution, sauf à attendre une nouvelle décision pour l'exécution du fort à construire en avant de la ville sur la Chaussée du Ghlin, entre les branches de la vieille Haim.

*Menin.*—7. L'Inspecteur-Général des Fortifications a soumis à S.A. les nouveaux projets des divers points de la place de Menin, sur lesquels on n'était pas tombé d'accord. Ces projets rectifiés conformément aux remarques faites à ce sujet par les ingénieurs Anglais ont été approuvés par S.A., pour être mis en exécution.

Pendant cette entrevue les positions de Dinant et quelques autres n'ont point été visitées, S.A. ayant témoigné qu'elle préféroit que l'on commençât par en faire les projets, ce qui a été accueilli par l'Inspecteur-Général, comme aussi de se charger de la rédaction de cette relation sommaire, afin de pouvoir le présenter à la ratification de Sa Majesté.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1075. ] *To Major-General Sir Charles Colville.*

SIR, Cambrai, 23rd Sept., 1816.

I returned here last night, and have received the letter which you wrote to Colonel Sir Colin Campbell on Monday, the 9th instant, in consequence of the assault upon my servant on the road between Cambrai and Valenciennes.

I beg that you will do me the favour to observe to the magistrates of Valenciennes that I complained to them not because an outrage was committed upon the servant of the Commander in Chief, but I asked for redress as an individual for a breach of the law. If such outrages are to be committed, it is best that I should be the object of them than another, as I hope I have discretion enough to act in a manner which shall not occasion a farther breach of good order.

In consequence, however, of what has passed upon this subject, and as it appears from the answers given by the person complained of to the questions put to him that he had no intention to strike my servant, I request that the matter may go no farther, and that if he is in confinement he may be released.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Feltre.* [1076.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 24 Sept., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre particulière de V.E. du 21me, et je regrette extrêmement comme vous les méfiances dont il paraît que nous autres, surtout sur la droite, sommes les objets, lesquelles nous placent dans une position bien désagréable, et causent beaucoup de mal au service du Roi. Si on me croit assez fripon pour vouloir m'emparer d'une place occupée par un garnison du Roi, on devrait au moins me faire la justice de croire que je ne suis pas assez bête pour le faire. Croit-on que les Puissances Alliées me confieroient le commandement de leurs troupes après que je me serais rendu coupable d'une telle lâcheté? ou croit-on que les Puissances de l'Europe, ayant fait un traité avec le Roi, sont unanimes dans leur résolution d'y manquer, et que le premier signal de cette résolution doit être de saisir une bicoque dans le Département du Nord et du Pas de Calais; et que le Roi et ses ministres ignorent absolument de cette résolution de la part des Puissances de l'Europe? Vraiment l'idée est trop ridicule; et si ce n'était pas pour les inconvénients et le mal auxquels cet état de choses donnait lieu, et les conséquences encore plus graves qui pourraient en résulter, je ne ferais que m'en moquer.

Le principe de l'occupation d'une partie de la France par les Puissances Alliées est assez clairement énoncé dans les traités et dans les déclarations et contre-déclarations des parties contractantes aux traités, qui tous sont sous les yeux du public; et il s'ensuit que l'occupation est une mesure de paix; que son objet est, en affermissant le trône du Roi, et en donnant au Roi le tems de s'affermir lui-même dans son gouvernement, de maintenir la paix parmi les nations, et d'assurer autant que possible la tranquillité du monde. Les troupes des Puissances étrangères qui se trouvent en France sont donc les alliées du Roi; et quel que soit l'opinion à présent sur le bien ou le mal qu'elles font à S.M., on ne peut pas nier que l'année passée on croyait que leur présence était absolument nécessaire pour assurer les objets que tout homme bien pensant avait en vue.

Mais quand des troupes amies ou alliées se trouvent dans un pays, est-ce l'usage que même un ordinaire ne sera pas envoyé à la porte d'une ville fortifiée sans consigner ses armes, c'est à dire, son sabre ou sa baïonnette, à la porte? que pas même un officier n'est pas permis d'entrer dans une ville fortifiée avec ses armes? et que si on veut faire passer un détachement de troupes par une ville fortifiée (et observez que si on veut marcher en hiver ou en été cette armée-ci, il faut passer par les places fortes), il faut désarmer les officiers et soldats à la porte, placer les armes sur les chariots, et passer ainsi comme prisonniers! Vraiment je rougis en écrivant sur cette matière, dont je n'ai appris les détails que dernièrement; et je m'assure que V.E. verra comme moi la nécessité de mettre fin à des telles absurdités. Je sais bien qu'elles sont contraires aux ordres du Roi. A Calais, où nous passons par une convention avec V.E., nous ne sommes pas sujèts à pareilles inconvenances; et ce qui me paraît le plus extraordinaire dans tout ceci c'est que dans toutes les autres parties de la ligne d'occupation on passe, on va, et on vient comme on veut, sans aucune de ces absurdités, qui feraient croire qu'au lieu d'être en paix nous nous trouvons dans un état de trève pendant quelques heures.

Mais ces Messieurs devraient apprendre que les choses ne peuvent pas exister comme elles sont. Nos lettres doivent passer par les postes Français; et on n'a pas le droit de demander une humiliation de notre part pour les recevoir. Il faut que les ordinaires qui vont les recevoir paraissent comme des militaires doivent paraître dans tous les cas possibles; ou que si on

ne veut pas les recevoir dans la ville avec leurs armes, les lettres leur soient donné à la barrière.

Le gouverneur d'une ville forte a le droit d'empêcher l'entrée à ceux qu'il veut, et à mettre les conditions qu'il voudra à l'entrée; mais si on continue la prohibition d'entrer aux officiers et soldats avec leurs petites armes, je serai dans la nécessité de leur défendre de mettre le pied dans aucune ville de ce pays-ci. Que dira-t-on en France et en Europe si je donnais un pareil ordre? Que diraient Messieurs les Gouverneurs des villes de ce pays-ci si je mettrais des sentinelles à leurs limites, et j'insistais que tous ceux qui y passeraient y consigneraient leurs armes?

Le principe et les usages militaires exigent qu'il y ait des précautions en admettant aucune troupe, même de la même nation, dans une place forte; mais est-ce nécessaire, est-ce l'usage de les désarmer? est-ce possible que je puisse m'y soumettre? N'y a-t-il pas des précautions d'une autre nature qui seraient réelles, et qui sont d'usage, et qui pourraient concilier tous les objets de la sécurité de la ville à passer avec ce qui est dû au caractère et au respect dû à l'armée d'une autre nation? Par exemple, ne pourrait-on pas avertir du passage, et convenir du nombre qui pourrait passer par la porte au même moment?

Ces Messieurs ne voyent pas les inconvéniens auxquels ils peuvent exposer le gouvernement ou leurs compatriotes par cette conduite. Je ne peux pas, ni ne veux pas, me soumettre au désarmement de mes soldats en passant par une ville quelconque. Il restera donc au gouvernement de nous faire des routes qui ne passeront pas par les villes fortes; et en attendant il faudra que nous occupions des cantonnemens plus resserrés, ou dans les villes où nous avons des garnisons, ou sur les routes où nous pouvons commander le passage. L'habitant en suffrira; mais ce sera la faute de ceux qui par leurs absurdités me forceront à adopter ces mesures.

WELLINGTON.

*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cray Farm, 24th Sept., 1816.

The answer from Madrid refers the question of accession on the part of Spain to both treaties to your intervention. As soon as I hear from Vienna, you shall know, whether the point of the reversion will drive now, or whether it must be reserved. When you return to Paris, I think you will find no great difficulty in closing this point.

I cannot yet see through the Portuguese business: it is so very base as the question now stands, that one cannot but suppose there will yet appear some solution to it. *We* stand quite clear by Chamberlain's protest against the expedition.

I am happy to observe that the King of the Netherlands has taken a step to control his libellers, and that the Duc de Richelieu is satisfied with it.

I have closed the discussion with Sir Charles Stuart. I wish he had made a better figure in it.

Would Mr. Scott, for whom you wished a consulship, go to the Brazils, I could open that of Bahia for him, which I understand is a good one.

I am, my dear Lord, ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 25 Sept., 1816.

Nous avons eu l'honneur d'informer en son tems Votre Excellence de l'ordonnance Royale du 5 de ce mois, touchant la dissolution de la Chambre des Députés, et la convocation des colléges électoraux. Les nouvelles reçues depuis de tous les départemens prouvent qu'elle s'exécute partout avec beaucoup d'activité, et que nul part elle a donné lieu au moindre trouble.

La destitution de M. le Comte de Chateaubriand, comme Ministre d'Etat, pour cause de publication d'un ouvrage intitulé "De la Monarchie sous la Charte," vous sera connue, Monsieur le Duc, par les feuilles publiques. Tous les exemplaires de cet ouvrage qui n'étaient déjà vendus ont été saisis, et la vente ultérieure en est arrêtée. On dit que l'affaire sera poursuivie judiciairement.

La loi présentée par le Roi des Pays-Bas aux Etats-Généraux, en date du 12 de ce mois, contre la licence de la presse, à l'égard des Souverains et Princes étrangers, alliés ou amis de S.M., aura sans doute trouvé l'approbation de Votre Excellence. Cette mesure paraît suffisante au gouvernement d'ici pour maintenir la bonne harmonie entre les deux pays, et pour mettre fin au scandale des écrits, journaux, et pamphlets qui a existé jusqu'ici.

Le Roi en a exprimé sa satisfaction au Général Fagel dans des termes très gracieux à l'occasion du cercle diplomatique d'hier.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération,

My Lord, de Votre Excellence

Les très-humbles et très-obéissants serviteurs,

CHARLES STUART. POZZO DI BORGO.

LE COMTE DE GOLTZ. LE BARON DE BINDER.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1077.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 27th Sept., 1816.

I had intended to write to you this day, in order to send you the enclosed copies of letters which have passed between Labrador and me on the Spanish question. I told Alava, who brought me Labrador's letter, that you were doing everything in your power to obtain the reversion of the Duchies for Spain; and I think it probable they will delay to take any steps in the negotiation with the Allied Ministers at Paris till they will hear the result of what you have done. I have no immediate intention of going to Paris; but when I shall hear from you what Metternich has determined upon, I will go up and endeavour to smooth matters. My own opinion is that the Emperor of Russia will not give up these reversions to Spain without obtaining something in return.

The state of the case between Spain and Portugal will require attention. You will hear probably that the first intention upon hearing of the Portuguese expedition was to go to war and to send back the Princesses. Abisbal's corps, which was under orders for America, was ordered to march upon Badajoz, and the intention was to seize upon Alentejo and Algarve. The King and his brother, however, being very desirous of concluding the marriages, determined upon *las bodas y la paz*. But from all I hear, I should not be at all surprised if, after the consummation of the marriages, the scheme for attacking Portugal were resumed and carried into execution. I hope that Beresford has returned. It will not answer to allow Spain to get hold of Alentejo: if we do, we shall have to incur the expense of an armament to get them out again.

I consider ——— to be the most violent and worst disposed towards us of all the Hibernian Spaniards, who certainly are worse disposed towards us than the natives; and he will drive

matters to extremities if he can. Beresford is much more than a match for him as a General, but I doubt the Portuguese being able to get 20,000 men into the field.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1078. ] *To the Chairman and Members of the Madras Committee.*

GENTLEMEN, Cambrai, 27th Sept., 1816.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters (without date) in duplicate, in which you enclose a bill upon the Court of Directors for 8000*l.* sterling, in further aid of the families of those who fell in the late campaign under my command; and an additional list of subscribers; and I beg leave to return you my most grateful acknowledgments for this fresh proof of the liberality and kindness of the inhabitants of Madras towards their fellow-subjects.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1079. ] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Cambrai, 29th Sept., 1816.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of Conventions which I have recently made with the Duc de Feltre respecting soldiers' rations, and men in regimental hospital, by which your Lordship will observe an additional saving will accrue to the British government.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Convention regarding Soldiers' Rations in Hospital.*

Son Excellence le Feld-Maréchal Duc de Wellington, commandant en chef les troupes des armées Alliées qui doivent rester en France, stipulant pour le gouvernement Britannique, et Son Excellence le Maréchal Duc de Feltre, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Guerre du Royaume de France, agissant pour le gouvernement Français: Jugeant convenable de réviser

les conventions conclues entr'eux les 24 Décembre, 1815, et 4 Janvier, 1816, relativement aux modifications apportées en ce qui concerne les sous-officiers et soldats des troupes composant le contingent Anglais, dans le tarif des rations annexé aux conventions du 20 Nov., 1815 :

Considérant que les prix qui ont servi de base pour la fixation de la plus value stipulée par les dites conventions des 24 Décembre, 1815, et 4 Janvier, 1816, n'étaient que des prix provisoires, et que ces prix ont éprouvé des réductions depuis ces époques, ont arrêté les Articles suivans, après s'être fait rendre compte de l'importance de ces réductions.

ARTICLE 1.

La plus value de cinq centimes qui, aux termes des conventions des 24 Décembre, 1815, et 4 Janvier, 1816, devait être payée par l'Administration Anglaise pour raison des substitutions apportées dans la ration de vivres des sous-officiers et soldats des troupes Anglaises est réduite à deux centimes deux dixièmes de centime par chaque ration de viande de sept huitièmes de livre distribuée à ces sous-officiers et soldats.

ART. 2.

Cette réduction aura son effet à partir du 15 Février, 1816, inclusivement, et continuera de s'effectuer jusqu'à ce que les circonstances rendent nécessaire une modification ultérieure.

ART. 3.

Les conventions des 24 Décembre, 1815, et 4 Janvier, 1816, sont maintenues en tout ce qui n'est pas contraire à la présente.

Fait double à le Septembre, 1816.

LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE FELTRE.
WELLINGTON.

II.

*Convention Additionnelle à celle du 25 Février, 1816, relative aux Hôpitaux Régimentaires des Troupes Anglaises.*

Son Excellence le Feld Maréchal Duc de Wellington, commandant en chef l'Armée d'Occupation, et Son Excellence le Maréchal Duc de Feltre, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Guerre du Royaume de France ; considérant, 1, que le prix de soixante-onze centimes stipulé dans la Convention du 25 Février, 1816, relative à l'abonnement fait entre les troupes Anglaises et le gouvernement Français, pour les hôpitaux régimentaires de ces mêmes troupes, n'a été qu'un prix provisoire ; 2, qu'il importe de le régler définitivement et de manière à concilier les intérêts des deux parties contractantes ; 3, qu'il résulte des nouveaux calculs établis à cet égard sur les prix mêmes qui sont accordés aux entrepreneurs généraux, que la ration moyenne en vivres, liquides, et chauffage doit être évaluée, déduction faite de toutes retenues, comme ci-après, savoir :—

| | C. | M. |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Pour le pain, le gruau, le sel, et la viande, à .. .. | 58 | 19 |
| les liquides, à .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 14 | 84 50/100 |
| le chauffage, à .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 5 | 65 46/100 |
| Total .. .. .. .. .. | 78 | 68 96/100 |

Sont convenus de ce qui suit:—

ARTICLE 1.

La somme à allouer à l'Administration Anglaise, par jour, pour chaque homme traité dans les hôpitaux régimentaires, est et demeure fixée définitivement à soixante-dix-neuf centimes.

ART. 2.

Cette nouvelle fixation aura son effet à compter de l'époque même où le prix de l'abonnement a dû être payé, par le Département de la Guerre du Royaume de France, en exécution de la Convention du 25 Février, 1816.

ART. 3.

Il sera formé, en conséquence, en ce qui concerne les payements déjà effectués, des états de rappel pour la différence qui existe entre le prix provisoire réglé par la dite Convention et le prix définitif fixé à l'Article 1 ci-dessus; et le montant de ces états, après avoir été vérifié et arrêté par l'Ordonnateur Français attaché à la Commission mixte, sera ordonnancé par ce fonctionnaire au profit de l'Administration Anglaise.

ART. 4.

La présente Convention additionnelle sera annexée à celle du 25 Février, 1816, qui continuera à recevoir son plein et entier effet, à l'exception de l'Article 3, dont celle-ci annulle définitivement les dispositions en ce qui concerne le prix de l'abonnement.

Fait double à le Sept., 1816.

LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE FELTRE.

WELLINGTON.

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[1080.] *To Count Fernan Nuñez.*

MI QUERIDO PRIMO, Cambrai, ce 29 Sept., 1816.

Je vous envois les listes des tableaux Espagnols* que vous m'aviez donné quand j'étois à Londres; et Alava, à qui je les ai communiqué, y a fait des remarques dont la connoissance pourra vous être utile.

J'ai beaucoup de tableaux appartenans au Roi, que j'ai pris à l'ennemi à la bataille de Vitoria, quand j'ai commandé les armées des Alliés, y incluse celle de S.M. J'envoyai dans le

* These pictures were afterwards given to the Duke by the King of Spain, and are now at Apsley House.

temps la liste de ces tableaux à la Régence aussitôt que j'ai su ce qu'ils étoient ; et je les ai prié de commissionner quelqu'un à Londres pour les voir, enfin que je puisse renvoyer ceux de la collection qui appartenoient à Sa Majesté. Mon frère en a depuis parlé plusieurs fois aux Ministres de S.M., mais ni la Régence ni les Ministres de S.M. n'en ont encore donné aucun ordre.

Je vous prie quand vous écrivez en Espagne sur ce sujet d'attirer l'attention de M. de Cevallos à ce que je vous ai dit ci-dessus.

WELLINGTON, DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

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G. O. Cambrai, 29th Sept., 1816. [1081.]

1. As His Majesty's regulations do not contain orders respecting the order of review for the infantry in column, the following orders are to be obeyed in this army.

2. When the troops are ordered to be formed in columns, the original formation is to be in columns of battalions, if possible at quarter distances, in one or more lines, as may be ordered.

3. The columns of the several battalions are to be at the distance from each other which is ordered to be between two battalions when formed in line.

4. When the reviewing General arrives on the ground, the officers and colours are to form in one line two paces in front of the column, the colours being in the centre, the mounted officers two paces in front of the line of officers, and the Commanding officer in front of the whole ; the surgeons and quartermaster to be in the rear of the battalion, and the Staff serjeants in their rear.

5. The band and drums to be formed in several ranks in line with the front rank of the battalion and on its right.

6. The pioneers in one rank in rear of the drums.

7. The General officers commanding divisions and brigades to be stationed in respect to the troops under their command as they would be if the troops were in line.

8. The General officer is to be saluted according to His Majesty's regulations without opening ranks, and then the troops are to stand shouldered in the order above directed while the General will go down the line.

9. In passing in review at quarter distances, the interval between the battalions is to be that prescribed by His Majesty's regulations between two battalions in column at ordinary distances.

10. In this interval are to march the band and drums, and pioneers, and those mounted officers who, according to His Majesty's regulations, precede a battalion on its march in column.

11. In passing in review in column at quarter distances in quick time, the mounted officers are alone to salute; the others and the colours march in their places as fixed by His Majesty's regulations.

12. There is to be no additional interval left for the colours.

13. When the artillery is in line with the infantry formed in columns, the officer commanding the artillery must take care to occupy the space with his guns which he will occupy in marching in column, so that no time may be lost in getting off the ground.

14. In passing in review, and in all movements with the troops in close columns, the artillery will move with six carriages in front if possible; if not, with three.

WELLINGTON.

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[1082.] *To Major-Gen. Sir H. Vivian.*

SIR, Cambrai, 2nd Oct., 1816.

I have perused the proceedings and sentence of the General Court-Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of Lieutenant ——, which I beg that the Court will revise.

I have always considered a General Court-Martial to be the means by which an officer placed in command of an army was to maintain its necessary discipline; and in the course of the long experience which I have had in that situation I have differed from them in opinion in but few instances; and I have generally found that a very little explanation of the view which in my opinion ought to be taken of the question in discussion has produced the effect of attaining that unanimity of opinion which it is my wish always to preserve with a General Court-Martial. I have, therefore, the less scruple in calling upon the Court to revise their proceedings and sentence; a duty,

however, which is absolutely incumbent upon me, as I differ in opinion with them, not only on the degree of the guilt of the prisoner, but on the necessity of punishment in this instance.

The Court have found Lieutenant —— guilty of the fact, and of the unofficerlike and disorderly conduct, charged in the first part of the first charge; but they have acquitted him of being the cause of the consequences of this conduct, and of the fact charged, viz., the disturbance and affray which followed. In the evidence upon this part of the subject there is a good deal of extraneous matter relating to the conduct of the French guard and inhabitants, as if the General Court-Martial were trying those persons instead of Lieutenant ——. Those persons behaved on this occasion, as such persons always do, with a good deal of unnecessary violence; but that does not at all alter the truth of the second part of the charge, viz., that Lieutenant ——, by his unofficerlike and disorderly conduct in the theatre, in insulting —— ——, &c., of which the Court have found him guilty, did thereby cause a disturbance and an affray therein, to the interruption of the performance, and to the terror of the audience.

It appears by the sentence of the Court on the second charge, that the Court are of opinion that Lieutenant —— used violence and fought with —— ——, notwithstanding that they acquit him of disorderly conduct in so doing, as he had been struck by —— ——, upon which I will trouble them with a few words presently; but I would now beg the Court to observe, that if there were violence and fighting on the stage in which Lieutenant —— was concerned, it was in consequence of the unofficerlike and disorderly conduct, and insult to —— ——, charged in the first charge, of which the Court have found Lieutenant —— guilty. It was this conduct, then, which was the first cause of the disturbance and affray, and of the other consequences; unless it is contended—which I am convinced the General Court-Martial cannot contend—that the police of the town of Boulogne ought to stand by and see fair play when a British officer and an actor are fighting upon the stage, instead of interfering to put a stop to the affray, which the Court appear to be of opinion existed. I confess that I am anxious, for the reputation of the Court themselves, that they should alter this part of their sentence, as it bears an awkward appearance in the manner in which it stands at present.

I feel the same anxiety respecting the finding on the second charge, and for the same reasons.

An officer is found guilty of unofficerlike and disorderly conduct in wantonly insulting an actor at the theatre. The actor strikes him, and violence and fighting on the stage are the consequence; but this officer, although he gives the first insult, is acquitted of the violence and fighting because the actor struck Lieutenant ——, and Lieutenant —— is supposed to have been acting in self-defence. I beg the Court to observe they are not trying the actor, but Lieutenant ——. He was the person who gave the first insult, and he was the cause of all that followed, and would have been responsible for all the mischief, whatever might have been its extent. But I would beg to ask the Court whether it is proper for a General Court-Martial to sanction in so many terms by its sentence the principle that a British officer when struck, no matter on the part of whom is the provocation, nor where the scene occurs, shall return the blow, and fight a battle with his fists. Is there no authority to whom complaint should be made, and is there nothing to be done, according to the common received notions of officers and gentlemen, excepting to "use violence and fighting" in a public theatre?

I now come to consider the sentence passed upon Lieutenant ——, which, in whatever way I view the crime of which Lieutenant —— has been found guilty, I do not think at all commensurate to his offence. It is impossible for any officer commanding an army to pretend to keep it in order if a General Court-Martial, when a crime of this kind is brought before them, do not make an example of him whom they find guilty of unofficerlike and disorderly conduct. The insult of Lieutenant —— towards the actor was unprovoked and wanton; his conduct has drawn a good deal of the attention of the public; and we shall well deserve the imputation of injustice if his punishment, instead of being of a nature to mark the sense of the Court-Martial of his crime, and to be an example, shall be the smallest which it is in the power of the Court to inflict.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Cambrai, 6th Oct., 1816. [ 1083. ]

1. The Field Marshal begs that the Staff officers of the army and the aides de camp of General officers, particularly his own, will appear dressed and equipped according to His Majesty's orders and regulations, upon all occasions on which they appear in uniform.

2. All ornaments not ordered by His Majesty are to be discontinued, and the Staff officers and aides de camp must appear in blue or white pantaloons, and black boots.

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Mount Stewart, 9th Oct., 1816.

I am much obliged to you for your two letters, and rejoice to find that your frontier questions all stand so well. The state of the army, the harmony in which they live with the people of France, and the decisive measures at last adopted by the government of the Netherlands to repress the agitators, are all circumstances highly satisfactory. I earnestly hope that out of the new elections we may have equal reason to congratulate ourselves upon having gained some ground against the spirit of exaggeration and turbulence which prevails in the interior.

Sir Charles Stuart wrote to me a private letter, probably at the same time he wrote to you, concerning Blacas, stating his adherence to moderate views in the event of his being employed, &c. Seeing the question exactly in the same light you do, namely, that it is *very improbable* that the Duc de R. and B. could long draw together; having no reason, but the reverse, to desire a change; and being quite clear that nothing could be more prejudicial than the notion that the British government was secretly caballing to effect such a change, I have thought it right (notwithstanding Sir Charles Stuart's letter was by no means expressed in such a manner as to indicate such a purpose) to give him a strong injunction against exposing *himself* or *us* to the possibility of suspicion on such a point. My sincere belief is, that the Duc de R. is the best minister France could now furnish, *all things considered*; and, as such, I heartily wish him success. I propose remaining here for about a month, and shall then return to the neighbourhood of London. In the mean time, anything you send to the office will reach me without delay.

Ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours in haste,

CASTLEREAGH.

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[1084.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 10 Oct., 1816.

J'ai reçu il y a deux ou trois jours votre lettre du 7 Sept., qui m'avoit été envoyé en Alsace, et m'a suivie depuis, et j'ai écrit au Prince Hardenberg pour lui faire connoître dans quelle manière la question de la réduction des forces de l'Armée d'Occupation se trouvoit à peu près placé en relation de la Russie, de l'Autriche, et de l'Angleterre.

Je ne crois pas que le Prince de Hardenberg sera disposé de suite à se fier à mon jugement sur cette question, et je crains que vous trouverez la plus de difficulté que vous ne vous imaginez.

Permettez-moi aussi de vous observer, Monsieur le Duc, qu'il me paroît que dans aucun cas vous pourriez annoncer l'espoir de la réduction de force dans le discours à l'ouverture des Chambres, parceque ceux qui sont les plus disposés à adopter la mesure désirent la faire dépendre de la conduite des Chambres, de laquelle, malgré le bon résultat à ce qui me paroît des élections, on ne pourra juger que par l'expérience.

Je me rejouis de savoir que vous êtes satisfait des mesures adoptées par la Législature des Pays-Bas sur les libelles. Il paroît que les Chambres étoient si bien disposés qu'ils ont outrepassé la proposition du gouvernement.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 10th Oct., 1816.

At Colonel Ottway's request I send the copy of my letter adverting to the conspiracy which occupied the French government last week.

I also transmit a report I have received from one of the agents in my employment, which enters more into the particulars of that affair than any communication which I have yet seen.

Faithfully yours,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Paris, 3rd Oct., 1816.

I enclose the reports from the provinces, laid before the King by the Minister of Police during the last three days.

The efforts of the different parties which divide the public opinion to influence the elections continue to be unceasing. I do not hear, however, that many candidates of the exaggerated Royalist party have been named in the electoral colleges of the arrondissements.

An attempt to influence the elections at Bordeaux by circulating a report, through the agency of an English gentleman named Bruin, that Bonaparte had escaped from St. Helena, has been frustrated by the arrest and imprisonment of the parties concerned.

In the North the violent Royalists have been more successful, and candidates favourable to their opinions have been named at Amiens, Abbeville, and the neighbouring arrondissements.

Several obscure persons were arrested yesterday at Paris, who are concerned in a plot, of which the details resemble those of the conspiracy of the Patriots of 1816.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

II.

*Report of an Agent to Sir Charles Stuart.*

Paris, ce 2 Oct., 1816.

J'ai prévenu V.E. que j'aurais à lui communiquer un événement important qui devait avoir lieu la nuit de Mardi à Mercredi. Il s'agissait d'un complot formé contre la personne du Roi et de la famille Royale.

Le Prévôt, qui en a été averti, l'a fait avorter. Il s'est transporté hier à 9 heures du soir à la tête d'un détachement de gendarmerie dans un lieu de réunion près la rue Vaugirard. Là il a saisi 6 ou 7 personnes faisant partie d'un plus grand nombre. Il a trouvé environ 300 fusils et une aigle. Il n'a pu trouver le drapeau tricolor, ni aucune pièce. Il les a fait conduire à son hôtel, a employé la nuit et cette matinée pour les interroger. De leurs interrogatoires il résulte qu'ils n'avaient eu jusqu'à présent que la pensée de détruire la famille Royale; mais comme ils n'ont pas pu nier les propos séditieux dont plusieurs individus ont déposé, ils se sont bornés à dire "qu'ils ne pouvaient pas être punis de mort, et qu'ils n'étaient susceptibles tout au plus que de la peine de la déportation." On les a mis à la Force, où ils sont tenus au secret. Voici les noms de quelques-uns des détenus:—

Martin, Capitaine des Vétérans.

Vatrengues, Restaurateur, rue de Sèvres.

Leroi, officier retiré.

Les autres personnes sont de la même classe.

Il paraît que le Prévôt par sa précipitation a plutôt voulu prévenir le mal que de le laisser faire.

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*To Sir Charles Stuart.* [1085.]

MY DEAR STUART, Cambrai, 13th Oct., 1816.

I have received letters from the Duc de Richelieu, urging in the strongest terms a reduction of the force of the Allies in France, a measure which he states has been left to my decision; and he expresses an anxiety to be allowed to announce

to the Legislature at its opening that there will be a reduction of expense.

I am not aware that the question has been left to my decision by any of the Allied Sovereigns. I believe they are all disposed to consult my opinion upon the question, and to go so far as this, viz., that they will not consent to a reduction if I should not think it advisable. But I don't know that they would all consent to a reduction if I should think it advisable; and I am certain they are, none of them, prepared to consent to a reduction till they will see what is the conduct of the Legislature in the approaching session. To this I must add, that, although I should have thought 120,000, or even 100,000, men a sufficient number to leave in France originally for all our purposes, there is a good deal of difference between commencing with 150,000 and reducing to 120,000, and commencing with 120,000; and that at this moment I do not think it would be expedient to make any reduction. Whether it will be so or not after the session of the Legislature, in a military view, is a point upon which I would wish to decline to give an opinion till the time arrives.

I would wish you to show this letter to your colleagues, and to confer with them confidentially upon its contents, and to get them to open themselves to me confidentially upon the subject, either individually or collectively. I think that if they are of opinion that it is expedient that the government should be able in the course of the session to announce a diminution of expense, I could propose a mode of doing it which would not be objectionable; would keep the question of reduction in the hands of the Allies; and would lead to it only by degrees.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Let me know when Vincent returns.

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[1086.] *To the Duc de Feltre.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 13 Oct., 1816.

Je regrette beaucoup de vous faire connoître que vos entrepreneurs vont de mal en pire, et je suis assuré que si vous ne les changez pas, un grand malheur arrivera. Je vous envois des

rapports que j'ai reçu hier à St. Omer; et en conversation avec Lord Combermere j'ai appris qu'il avoit offert au Sous-Préfet de prendre tout ce qu'on lui donneroit pour les chevaux; mais que le Sous-Préfet lui avoit répondu que ni lui ni la Commission Mixte avoit ou ordres ou argent; qu'il feroit volontiers des réquisitions, mais que personne ne les obéiroit, à moins que le commissariat Britannique n'en garantissoit le payement. Ainsi donc, Monsieur le Duc, je me trouve dans la situation la plus ridicule du monde, celle de manquer de vivres dans le pays le plus riche de l'univers, et au moment où la plus belle récolte se trouve sur le terrain même.

Je ne demande pas beaucoup. Nous devions avoir pour quinze jours d'avance; je n'en ai demandé que deux pour faire la revue des troupes. Il paroît que nous n'en avons pas pour donner aux troupes de jour en jour.

Soyez sûr, Monsieur le Duc, que votre système est mauvais; que vos entrepreneurs ne sont pas assez riche pour accomplir leur affaire; que malgré que vous leur donnez un prix plus que suffisant, ils nous donnent des mauvais approvisionnemens ou rien; qu'ils ont fait partout des sous-entreprises; que le service va manquer tout à fait; et que nous allons dans la triste nécessité de vivre sur le pays comme nous le pourrons comme en temps de guerre.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1087.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 13 Oct., 1816.

Malgré que je vous ai écrit le 10 sur l'objet de la réduction de la force en France, je ne veux pas manquer de répondre à la lettre de Votre Excellence du 10, que j'ai reçu hier au soir.

Il me paroît que vous ne connoissez pas exactement où nous en sommes sur la réduction de la force. Quelques-uns des Puissances, c'est-à-dire la Russie, l'Autriche, et l'Angleterre, ont adopté l'idée jusqu'à ce point-ci, qu'ils veulent l'entretenir après avoir connoissance de la conduite des Chambres dans la session qui va avoir lieu.

Je crois aussi que quelques-unes de ces Puissances, nommément l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, et même la Russie, se sont déclaré disposés à déférer à mon opinion sur cette question en ce

qui regardoit la partie militaire; mais la Prusse ne s'est déclaré jusqu'à présent sur aucun des points de la question, à ma connaissance au moins.

Par tout ceci Votre Excellence verra que vous ne pourrez rien annoncer à l'ouverture des Chambres; et je vous l'avoue que si la décision de la question de la réduction dans le moment restoit avec moi, comme elle ne reste pas, comme vous aurez vu, je déciderois que dans le moment il ne faudroit pas réduire, malgré que je vois l'avantage que le Roi et son gouvernement auront de la réduction quand elle pourra se faire. J'espère que vous croirez qu'il n'y a personne qui plus que moi désire que le Roi et son gouvernement jouissent de tous les avantages possibles; mais dans cette question je suis sûr que les intérêts du Roi et ceux des Puissances sont les mêmes, et qu'en demandant que la question ne soit pas discutée dans le moment, je sers le Roi et sa cause pas moins que je sers les Puissances dont je commande les troupes.

WELLINGTON.

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[1088.] *To General Count Woronzow.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, Cambrai, 13 Oct., 1816.

Je dois vous prévenir que je me trouve dans la nécessité de remettre la revue jusqu'à Lundi le 21, à cause des difficultés pour la subsistance des troupes sur la marche.

Je serai bien aise de vous voir, cependant, quand vous voudrez venir.

WELLINGTON.

[The same to Gen. Zieten.]

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[1089.] *To the Marquis de Vaudreuil.*

MONSIEUR, Cambrai, ce 13 Oct., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir vos deux lettres sur le sujet de la chasse du Chevalier Noel Hill. Je suis assuré que cet officier, ayant permission de chasser dans le département du Nord, n'avoit aucune intention de dépasser ces limites, et il l'a fait par ignorance. Je lui rends la permission, et je lui ai fait dire de vous faire parvenir le papier que vous lui aviez donné par méprise.

Pour ce qui regarde la chasse dans le département de la Somme, j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que j'ai la permission de S.M. d'y chasser, laquelle j'aurai l'honneur de vous montrer la première fois que je vous rencontrerai.

En attendant, je peux vous assurer que je n'ai pas fait jusques ici la valeur de cinq sous de dommage à qui que ce soit.

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 14th Oct., 1816.

I have just received your letter of the 13th, and shall lose no time in attending to your Grace's suggestion by communicating the substance of its contents to my colleagues. I think it necessary, however, that you should be aware that the instructions which have been transmitted to me on the subject by Lord Castlereagh,* by which government (although they consider your Grace to be the sole judge how far the reduction of the Army of Occupation is expedient in a military point of view) appear to doubt of the political prudence of such a measure before the Chambers shall have made their financial arrangements for the next year, and I have reason to believe the communication of the same opinion through M. d'Osmond, have induced the Duc de Richelieu to abstain from pressing the subject hitherto in conversation with me.

I am assured that M. de Labrador has long since received powers from his government to accede to the different treaties, provided that an Act settling the ultimate destination of the Italian Duchies is signed at the same time under a different date. As the instructions which he received with these powers compel him to terminate this question by a direct negotiation with you, I am anxious to learn if he has addressed your Grace any communication, since he has not hitherto said a word to me upon the subject.

Believe me, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

CHARLES STUART.

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*To Marshal Lord Beresford.* [1090.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Cambrai, 15th Oct., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 22nd September, and I sincerely congratulate you upon your return to Portugal, and upon the satisfaction you have derived from your voyage to the Brazils. I have read with attention the papers you have enclosed, to which, in a personal communication with you, I might

* See *ante*, p. 485.

state some objections; but the subject is too long for a discussion in a letter, particularly at the present moment; and I think it most probable the objections I feel had occurred to you, and that you had very sufficient reasons for adopting your plan as it stands, notwithstanding them. Besides, I doubt very much whether you have it in your power now to make any alteration. I was in England in July, but had no communication with any of the ministers regarding affairs in Portugal excepting one casual and very short conversation with Lord Castlereagh, in which it appeared to me that after having put all the British officers serving with the Portuguese army on half-pay, the government were waiting till you should return to Europe to decide whether they would allow them to remain in Portugal at all or not.

The refusal of the Portuguese government to come forward in the cause of Europe in 1815 was certainly the origin of this measure of putting all the officers on half-pay; but the state in which you will have found the public mind in England upon everything like a military expense that is not indispensable, and the low state of the government, would have rendered this measure absolutely necessary, even though the Portuguese government had so conducted themselves in 181[illegible] as to justify the British government in the eyes of the country for continuing this expense, and in the eyes of Europe for maintaining such an influence in the councils of Portugal as the payment of this body of officers would necessarily give us. I think, therefore, that even if they should determine upon allowing you and the officers on half-pay to continue to serve in Portugal, which will depend, I think, very much upon yourself, as far as I can judge upon a subject on which I have really no information, they will not consent to incur any expense whatever.

You will be the best judge whether it is worth your while in this case to remain in Portugal. I confess that it is my opinion that you are throwing yourself away, and that there are situations in which you might be employed, in which you would render more service to the public, and, of course, to yourself.

Your account of the King is very interesting; but there are two points which are the subject of discussion in all societies in Europe upon which you say nothing. One is his return to Portugal; the other is the expedition sent to Monte Video, either previous to or at the moment of your departure from the

Rio, and against which it appears that our minister protested. Is it possible that he could have concealed this measure from you?

Upon your arrival in Portugal you will have heard of the effect the expedition to Monte Video produced at Madrid. The Privy Council recommended that the Princesses should be sent back, and that Abisbal's army should be marched upon Badajoz. The King answered, "Las Bodas y la Paz;" but Abisbal's army is not embarked, and remains in Andalusia for further orders.

The desire to * the Princesses occasioned this determination; but who can answer for its continuance, more particularly as the attack upon Monte Video is considered throughout Spain as a national disgrace, and the desire to revenge it is universal? I wrote to Lord Castlereagh some time ago upon this subject, and warned him of the danger, and of the necessity for our early interference, if we intended to maintain the peace. He is gone to Ireland, and I have had no answer from him; but Mr. Canning passed a day with me on his way to Bordeaux about a week ago; and I understand from him, between ourselves, that government intended to make this dispute the means of accomplishing their slave-trade objects with one or both of the states of the Peninsula. There *we* are, you see! We risk a war, in which all Europe may be involved, for nonsense and folly. It will certainly occur if we do not interfere: it will as certainly not occur if we do.

I have thought it right to tell you this between ourselves, as it will be a guide to you in your military measures and preparations.

You will recollect what I wrote to you, either from Vienna or shortly after my arrival at Bruxelles, in 1815, respecting the probability that the Spaniards would attack Portugal if Portugal should be too considerably weakened. You will have seen how near its accomplishment this event was, even though Portugal was not weakened, excepting by your absence, and by the folly of the local government respecting the army. You may depend upon it that if we do not, by persuasion or force, induce the King of Portugal to give satisfaction for his attack upon Monte Video, Portugal will be attacked by the Spaniards.

* Blank in manuscript.

I shall be either here or at Paris all the winter, and, of course, shall be delighted to see you when you will come.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 16 Oct., 1816.

M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre nous a communiqué confidentiellement la lettre que Votre Excellence vient de lui écrire, et qui a été motivée par la demande réitérée de M. le Duc de Richelieu de mettre le Ministère à même de pouvoir annoncer à l'ouverture prochaine des Chambres une réduction de l'Armée d'Occupation. Nous y avons vu, My Lord, que quoique vous regardez une telle réduction pour le moment actuel comme inadmissible, vous croyez cependant, dans le cas où les Ministres seraient d'avis qu'il était convenable de fournir au gouvernement Français les moyens d'annoncer durant la session prochaine une diminution de dépenses, pouvoir proposer un moyen qui ne serait sujet à aucune objection, et qui laisserait la question de la réduction de l'armée entre les mains des Alliés, ou bien amenerait cette réduction d'une manière graduelle.

Disposés comme nous le sommes de faire tout ce qui peut véritablement soulager la France sans préjudice aux intérêts de nos Cours, et à entrer dans les vues de Votre Excellence, nous prendrons l'objet de sa lettre en considération, comme elle le désire; mais nous croyons avant tout devoir vous prier, My Lord, de nous faire connaître d'une manière plus distincte qu'il serait le moyen ou les moyens que vous jugeriez propres pour amener le résultat que nous désirons tous d'obtenir, savoir, de soulager la France sans compromettre nos propres intérêts, tant politiques que financiers.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération,

My Lord,

De Votre Excellence les très humbles et très obéissant serviteurs,

LE BARON DE VINCENT. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.

*CHARLES STUART. POZZO DI BORGO.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 17 Oct., 1816.

Veuillez bien excuser si, malgré la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 13 de ce mois, je persiste encore à lui parler de la réduction de l'Armée d'Occupation. Je regarde cet objet comme si essentiel pour l'affermissement du gouvernement du Roi, que quelque chagrin que j'aie de ne pas me trouver de votre opinion, Monsieur le Duc, je crois de mon devoir de vous développer les motifs de mon insistance.

Le peuple Français souffre ; et sans vouloir contester la justice des représailles auxquelles il est aujourd'hui soumis, il souffre, et dans son amour propre, et par les charges énormes qui lui sont imposées. Il obéit, paye, et attend avec patience de la médiation de son gouvernement, et de l'intérêt bien entendu des gouvernemens étrangers, quelque adoucissement à ses maux. J'en appelle à Votre Excellence elle-même : eussiez-vous cru il y a un an, Monsieur le Duc, qu'une parfaite tranquillité eut régné en France ; que les contributions eussent été payées avec cette exactitude ; que les liquidations eussent marché aussi promptement ? Les sacrifices considérables que plusieurs Puissances désiraient faire pour réaliser immédiatement leur part des contributions prouvent assez qu'elles comptaient peu sur nos moyens de les acquitter régulièrement. Cependant nous avons fait des efforts incroyables pour remplir nos engagemens ; nous sommes disposés à les continuer ; et ils seront encore plus pénibles à cause des fléaux sans nombre qui ont affligé plusieurs parties de la France. Mais pour empêcher le peuple de perdre absolument courage, pour lui faire prendre confiance dans son gouvernement, le rattacher à ses Princes légitimes, en prouvant que les gouvernemens étrangers ont confiance en eux, et comptent sur leur bonne foi, nous avons désiré pouvoir annoncer que l'Armée d'Occupation seraient diminuée de 30,000 hommes, ce qui soulagerait la France de 30,000,000 à 35,000,000 au moment où elle en a le plus impérieux besoin. Les Cours d'Autriche et de Russie y ont consenti. J'ai lieu d'espérer que celle de Prusse suivra bientôt cet exemple. Il ne resterait donc plus qu'à obtenir l'assentiment de votre gouvernement, et le vôtre, plus important à mon avis que tout le reste. Votre Excellence désire attendre pour voir la marche que suivra la nouvelle Chambre : mais le moyen le plus puissant d'influence n'est il pas ôté au Roi s'il ne peut rien promettre, rien annoncer de favorable ; s'il ne peut pas dire aux députés des départemens, "Le calme que vous avez montré au milieu des plus grandes sacrifices a inspiré aux Souverains mes Alliés la plus grande confiance, et je puis vous annoncer que les charges que vous supportez sont dès à présent diminuées" ? Ne croyez-vous pas, Monsieur le Duc, que si le Roi pouvait tenir ce langage, il acquérerait la plus grande influence, et que le refus qu'il éprouve produira un effet tout contraire ? Votre Excellence croit qu'il est de l'intérêt du Roi, comme de celui des Souverains Alliés, que cette réduction n'ait pas lieu ; mais elle est donc persuadée qu'il existe en France un parti assez puissant, des chefs assez audacieux, assez considérés pour pouvoir renverser un gouvernement, dont je vous ai entendu plusieurs fois vanter la force et l'organisation. Si telle est notre position, peut-être en effet la diminution demandée serait elle imprudente et dangereuse. Cependant 120,000 hommes, et sous vos ordres, Monsieur le Duc, paraîtraient encore plus que suffisans pour conserver ce que vous avez su rétablir avec moins de force : peut-être même d'ailleurs l'effectif actuel n'était pas si éloigné de celui que je proposerais ; et pour nous c'est moins le nombre de troupes effectives qu'il nous importe de diminuer que celui des millions que nous avons à payer. Mais d'après les renseignemens que nous avons ici, nous ne pouvons pas regarder notre état intérieur comme si effrayant. Si nous pouvons montrer au peuple une perspective plus heureuse dans un avenir pas éloigné, nous tarirons la source d'une partie des murmures et des mécontentemens. Quelque foible que soit la force publique dont nous pouvons disposer, elle existe

cependant, et elle a donné des preuves de son bon esprit et de sa fidélité. La Garde Royale présente un noyau autour duquel tous les hommes bien intentionnés viendraient se rallier s'il en était besoin. Mais encore une fois aucun symptôme m'annonce que nous soyons menacés de dangers aussi imminens; et si, en attendant pour nous soulager, que la confiance soit établie, on nous ôte les moyens de la faire naître, nous nous trouvons dans un cercle vicieux dont il nous sera à jamais impossible de sortir.

Veuillez bien, Monsieur le Duc, peser dans votre sagesse les raisons que je prends la liberté de vous exposer: je l'ai fait avec franchise, et sans réserve, me reposant sur votre loyauté et sur la bienveillance que vous m'avez toujours marqué.

Veuillez agréer l'hommage de la plus haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 17th Oct., 1816.

Having submitted your letter of the 13th October to the consideration of my colleagues, the discussion took place of which you will find the heads reported in my letter to Lord Castlereagh of this date.

The alternative you have proposed for diminishing the expense of the army to the French government, without reducing their numbers, being perfectly in unison with the tenor of the instructions from Lord Castlereagh which I have communicated, I have concurred in the propriety of addressing you the enclosed letter.

I thought it expedient to resist the desire of General Pozzo di Borgo to place your letter in the protocol of our proceedings, alleging that as that paper can merely be considered a confidential communication, it cannot with propriety be transmitted officially to our respective Courts.

M. de Vincent arrived the day before we took this subject into consideration.

Believe me, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

CHARLES STUART.

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[1091.] *To H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge.*

SIR, Cambrai, 18th Oct., 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 19th instant regarding the 2nd Hussars.

According to the decision of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief and of the War Office, the 2nd Hussars, equally with every regiment under my command at the period

of the battle of Waterloo, have all the benefits of service and pension granted to the army on account of that battle.

I conceive the Waterloo medal to have been granted to those officers and soldiers only who were in the battle of Waterloo, and it is not my fault if it has been sent to General Sir C. Colville's detachment and to other troops who were certainly not in the battle; and entertaining the opinion that it was the intention of the Prince Regent that the medal should be sent only to those corps and individuals who were engaged in the battle, it is impossible for me to recommend that the 2nd Hussars should receive it, however meritorious and useful their conduct may have been in the situation in which they were placed.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1092.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 18th Oct., 1816.

I enclose a copy of the arrangement in regard to the fortifications in the Netherlands, which I settled some time ago with General Fagel, according to the system proposed in the memorandum which I had submitted to you when I was in England. He wished to allow the King to see it before he signed it, and I now enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from him, with the King's observations upon the proposed arrangements.

There is no objection, in my opinion, to the alteration proposed regarding the fortifications. The question is, whether you mean that any of your money should be expended on the artillery for these places. It appears to me very reasonable that it should; and if it is to be so, it is very proper that I should know how that expense is going on, and the regulations proposed in the enclosed paper, or something like them, are necessary. I cannot, however, consent to them without your approbation.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[Enclosure.]

MEMORANDUM.

In order to enable His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland to have a knowledge of the expenditure in the Netherlands on the fortresses and of the progress of the several works, it is agreed between General Fagel and the Duke of Wellington, Prince of Waterloo:

1. That the detailed estimates of the expense of the works agreed upon and ordered to be carried into execution at each station shall be laid before his Highness.

2. That an account shall be laid before the Duke of Wellington of the expense incurred at each station from the commencement of the works up to the end of the month of October, 1816, and a report made of the work performed.

3. That a report shall be made to the Duke of Wellington, Prince of Waterloo, on the 10th of every month, from the month of November, 1816, inclusive, of the work intended to be executed at each station in the course of the succeeding month, commencing on the 1st and ending on the 30th, specifying the expense to be incurred at each station.

4. That in the month of November of every year the Inspector-General of Fortifications in the Netherlands shall lay before his Highness an estimate of the expense to be incurred, whether for the purchase of materials or the construction of works, and a prospectus of the work to be performed at each station in the course of the succeeding year, commencing on the 1st of January.

5. As the Duke of Wellington cannot have leisure to visit in person the stations at which works are carrying on as frequently as would be necessary in order to be able to report in a satisfactory manner upon their progress, efficiency, &c., it is agreed that his Highness shall be permitted to send an officer to such of them as he may think proper, who shall have permission to examine the works carrying on, and to whom the officer in charge of them shall be directed to give every information that shall be required regarding them, the number of persons employed upon them, and the expenditure.

6. It is agreed that the money required shall be given from the funds and in the proportions as follows:

First. The money paid monthly by the French government, that is to say, twelve millions of francs per annum.

Secondly. The remainder in equal proportions by the British government and the government of the Netherlands, to the extent of two millions sterling from each.

The sum required for the expenditure of the year being ascertained, the British government shall, immediately upon the report of the Duke of Wellington, Prince of Waterloo, pay to the government of the Netherlands the sum required for its proportion for three months; and at the end of those three months, if the expenditure shall have been equal to the estimate, an advance will be made of the amount required for the succeeding three months; and so on from quarter to quarter, till the expiration of the year.

If the sum expended in any year shall have exceeded the estimate, the British government will, upon the report of the Duke of Wellington, Prince of Waterloo, pay at the expiration of the quarter the due proportion of actual expense which it is above agreed shall be paid by Great Britain, provided that the total sum to be paid by Great Britain on account of these works shall not exceed at any time two millions sterling.

WELLINGTON.

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G. O. Cambral, 18th Oct., 1816. [ 1093. ]

2. The troops are to receive a certain quantity of blank musket cartridges for the review, and for this same occasion they must be deprived of the ball cartridges in their pouches.

3. These must be delivered into regimental stores in the several camps of the infantry; and the officers commanding companies, and the quartermasters of regiments, will see that the ball musket cartridges are delivered in and packed in such a manner as that they may after the review be issued again and be useful.

4. Sir G. Wood will take measures for receiving the ammunition from the quartermasters, and preserving it in the camps till the review will be finished, when it is again to be issued to the several regiments.

5. Blank cartridges will be issued to only six men per troop of

the cavalry, who must likewise be deprived of their ball ammunition, and this the Captains commanding troops will receive and take care of during the review.

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 18th Oct., 1816.

Lord Castlereagh having confided to me a number of papers relating to the communications which took place with the Court of Russia shortly after the termination of the last session of Parliament, the instructions to which they have given rise, and which have been forwarded here at the same time that they are sent to Lord Cathcart, throw so much light upon the views of government respecting the different matters which are at present under consideration here, that I have not hesitated to forward them to you, through Lord FitzRoy Somerset, in the hope that you will send me the observations you think proper upon the subjects to which they relate.

Nothing further has passed since my last respecting the proposition brought forward by the Duc de Richelieu for hastening the reduction of the Army of Occupation, though that minister, and indeed the King himself, at an audience yesterday, adverted to the subject in a tone which showed their anxiety to carry their point.

Ever sincerely yours,

CHARLES STUART.

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[1094.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 19 Oct., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V.E. du 17me, et je vous prie de croire que je serai toujours bien heureux de recevoir de vos lettres, et je regrette seulement de ne pas être de la même opinion que vous dans le moment. Il me semble que vous êtes mal informé sur les dispositions des Puissances de diminuer leurs forces en France. Je sais qu'en Angleterre on a adopté la mesure comme principe politique ; c'est à dire, qu'il est à désirer de pouvoir diminuer la force. Mais avant de venir à une décision, on désire connaître quelle sera la conduite des Chambres dans la session prochaine ; et si je ne me trompe pas, les opinions de ceux dans ce pays-ci qui savaient qu'il s'agissait

de cette réduction étaient assez d'accord sur ce point avant mon départ de Paris. Pour moi, je n'ai rien vu jusqu'à présent qui doit donner une assurance que la conduite des Chambres sera telle que tout le monde le désire; et je ne crois pas que le gouvernement Britannique ait pu, ou plutôt ait dû, changer la décision qu'il avait pris, il est vrai avant la dissolution des Chambres.

La décision du gouvernement Autrichien s'était à peu près analogue avec celle du gouvernement Britannique. Je crois que celle de S.M. l'Empereur de Russie était la même; et je me ressouviens parfaitement que son ministre à Paris était d'opinion qu'il ne fallait rien décider jusqu'à ce qu'on voyait quelle serait la conduite des Chambres. Je ne connais rien des décisions de la Prusse. Pour moi, je regarde l'occupation comme mesure de sûreté pour le Roi et en même temps pour l'Europe. Il y a des personnes qui y joignent l'idée qu'elle est une sécurité pour l'Europe des payemens des contributions; ce que n'est pas sûrement pas à nier: mais je suis d'opinion que si elle n'était pas nécessaire pour la sûreté du Roi et pour la tranquillité de l'Europe, elle n'auroit pas été à désirer comme mesure de sécurité pour les payemens. Il est vrai que les circonstances ont changé, mais pas tant qu'on croit, depuis que cette mesure a été adopté; mais j'avoue que je vois du danger dans la réduction dans le moment actuel. Il ne faut pas croire que je le croye possible qu'un malheur puisse arriver; mais je vois les risques des tentatives de différentes espèces dans une réduction qui n'existe pas tant que la force sera maintenue sur le pied où elle se trouve aujourd'hui.

L'esprit de mécontentement qui règne dans le pays est un des symptômes de ces risques. Il existe, je le sais, non seulement parmi le peuple, peut-être même moins parmi le peuple que parmi les gens aisés, et surtout parmi les employés du gouvernement. Même les Royalistes, surtout les Purs, ont oublié que l'an passé ils criaient "Vous n'allez pas laisser le Roi et sa famille entre les mains de ces assassins;" et ils veulent à présent que nous partions. Le désir est naturel: je le partage moi-même, si la chose est possible; mais, connaissant le caractère Français, j'avoue que je verrai avec peine une diminution prononcée de la force jusqu'à ce que les choses soient un peu mieux établis qu'elles ne sont pas dans le moment actuel.

Une chose est claire, c'est que tant que nous gardons la force

que nous avons les affaires doivent nécessairement marcher, et nous avons une certitude morale que la tranquillité publique ne sera pas sérieusement interrompue. Nous n'avons pas, au moins je n'ai pas, la même certitude si nous annonçons la diminution de la force trop tôt; et observez que toute interruption de la tranquillité publique ayant relation à l'occupation vous rejettera nécessairement plus loin du but que tout honnête homme doit avoir en vue, celui de la voir cesser entièrement.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM of the MANŒUVRES proposed to take place in the neighbourhood of DENAIN on the 22nd October, 1816.*

Cambrai, 20th Oct., 1816.

The corps to assemble to consist of the Danish, Saxon, British, and Hanoverian contingents.

*Original Formation of the Troops.*

The Danish contingent will be upon the right;
The Saxon contingent will be next to the Danes;
The British next to the Saxons; and
The Hanoverian contingent upon the left.

The infantry of the Danish, Saxon, and Hanoverian contingents will be formed in close columns of battalions in two lines of columns. The alignement for the head of the columns in front of the line will be †

The artillery is to be on the right of the columns of infantry to which it belongs.

The cavalry of the Danish contingent will be in line upon the right of its artillery.

The cavalry of the Hanoverian contingent will be in a line upon the left of their infantry.

The Saxon cavalry will be in line in rear of its own infantry, the left of the cavalry covering the left of its infantry, the right extending behind the Danish troops.

The British infantry will be formed in columns of battalions of a company in front at quarter distances, the right in front.

Each division forming three lines of columns.

The light infantry battalion of each brigade is to be in column upon the left of its brigade.

The artillery of each division will be upon the right of the infantry, one

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* In the handwriting of the Quartermaster-General, Sir George Murray; under the instructions of the Duke of Wellington.

† Blank in manuscript.

brigade on the alignement of the first line of columns, the other brigade on the alignement of the second line of columns.

The British cavalry will be formed in three lines in the rear of the British infantry, having a troop of horse artillery on the right of each line.

The brigade of reserve artillery, ammunition carriages of the artillery, musket ball carts, and other carriages of the artillery will be in rear of the cavalry towards the right.

The pontoon train will be on the left of the artillery carriages, and in the same line with them.

The Royal Waggon Train, including all the waggons belonging to it, which are attached to the troops, will be on the left of the pontoon train.

*Situation of the supposed Enemy.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Scovell will place the Staff Corps of Cavalry of the British contingent upon the heights extending from near Abscon towards Denain, to represent the enemy, having the village of Escandain behind the centre.

Detachments of the Royal Staff Corps (infantry) will be distributed in the villages of Escandain, Denain, L'Ourche, and Rœult, and be under Sir George Scovell's direction.*

Two troops of horse artillery, and the reserve brigade of British artillery, will be also placed under Sir George Scovell's direction, and will be sent to him as soon as they have been seen in the original formation of the army.†

*General Manœuvres.—First Movement.*

The Danish corps will move in the order in which it has been formed, directing its march towards the village of Abscon, and will act against the left of the enemy's position.

The Danish cavalry will move on the right of the corps, and will send out skirmishers to cover the advance. Some light infantry should support the skirmishers of the cavalry.

The Saxon corps will move in a similar manner against that part of the enemy's position which is on the heights to the enemy's left of Escandain. When the Saxon troops arrive upon those heights, they will halt, and will cannonade the village of Escandain.

The Hanoverian corps will move forward in its original formation towards Denain, directing its principal attack against the high ground between Escandain and Denain. The cavalry will be on the left of the infantry.

The artillery upon the enemy's position will open as the several columns approach, and will be answered by that of the attacking troops.

The British contingent will receive orders to advance to support the attacks of the other corps already mentioned.

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* These detachments will be assembled at Escandain at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 22nd.

† The pontoon bridges that are to be laid below Denain, and those ultimately destined for the river Selle, will move off towards the Scheldt below Denain as soon as the first movement begins.

When the British troops have advanced a short distance, the cavalry will be directed to pass through the intervals of the columns of infantry, and to form in front of them. The cavalry will then charge in three lines towards the village of Escandain, in the plain between the attacks made by the Saxon and the Hanoverian corps.

The above movements will be supposed to decide the enemy's retreat, which will be made upon the village of Neuville.*

Sir George Scovell will, however, still keep out his infantry detachments in Rœult and in L'Ourche, and will establish a line of vedettes between these two places. He will withdraw his infantry from Denain, and place it in Douchy; he will also place infantry in Neuville, and have a few men on the right bank of the Scheldt, between Neuville and the bridge at L'Ourche.

*Second Movement.*

When the enemy retires upon Neuville, the Danish corps will wheel gradually upon its left, leaving the village of Abscon to its right; and it will direct its march towards Rœult.

The Saxon corps will continue to move forward, leaving the village of Escandain close upon its left, and will direct its march upon the village of L'Ourche.

The cavalry of these two corps will make a combined attack upon the enemy's line between Rœult and L'Ourche; the light infantry of the Danes making an attack at the same time upon the village of Rœult, and the light infantry of the Saxons an attack on the village of L'Ourche.

The Danish and Saxon artillery will act in support of these attacks, and Sir George Scovell will employ a part of his artillery to support the two villages and his line of vedettes whilst the rest of his line is retreating across the bridge of Neuville.

When the attack upon the villages has continued some time, Sir George Scovell will evacuate them, and will withdraw his troops entirely to the right bank of the Scheldt, occupying Neuville with infantry, and placing his artillery upon the heights behind the village.

The supposed position of the enemy will then have its right on the Selle at Douchy, its centre on the heights behind Neuville, † and its left at Lieu St. Amand.

Upon Sir George Scovell's evacuating L'Ourche, the Saxon corps will occupy that village, and will pass a few light infantry over the Scheldt by the foot bridge of L'Ourche, who will extend themselves along the right bank of the river, without, however, advancing against the enemy's new position.

The Danish corps will occupy Rœult, and will send forward some light infantry, who will attack and carry the bridge of Neuville, but will not advance against the village of Neuville itself.

The attack of this light infantry upon the bridge should be supported by

* The British infantry will be ordered to halt when the cavalry have passed through and formed, preparatory to making its charge.

† Sir George Scovell will have a vedette or two at the corner of the wood on the height above Douchy, going from Douchy towards Denain.

a battalion a little in rear of the light infantry, and also by half the artillery placed upon the high ground about 500 yards from the bridge.

Sir George Scovell will also open a few guns from the heights above Neuville against this attack.

The Hanoverian corps (as soon as the enemy will have retreated from his first position near Escandain) will make a gradual wheel upon its right; and after having advanced a little way, it will deploy into two lines on an alignement a little more forward than the line between Escandain and Denain.*

The Hanoverian troops will there be in reserve to the Danish and Saxon corps.

The British infantry (as soon as the enemy will have retreated from his first position near Escandain) will halt. The columns will be formed into columns left in front, by the counter-march of companies; and each division will move off in a separate column, at quarter-distances, from its own left.

The first division will move towards Denain, making a circuit so as to conceal its march as much as the nature of the ground admits of, and to keep clear also of the rear of the Hanoverian corps; it will cross the Scheldt by the bridge of Denain, and having moved up the opposite heights, will form in three lines of columns behind the wood above Douchy, leaving the light infantry battalions out of the line, and throwing part of them into the wood.

The 2nd and 3rd divisions will direct their march towards the village of Wavrechin, leaving Denain to their right. They will move from the neighbourhood of Wavrechin to the pontoon bridges which will be laid for them upon the Scheldt, which bridges will begin to be laid as soon as the advanced guards of these two columns reach the river.†

The British cavalry (immediately that the Hanoverian corps begin to form in line to the left of Escandain) will march off in columns from the left, and leaving Denain, Wavrechin, and the British infantry on their right, will proceed to Rouvigny, and there pass the Scheldt by the bridge on the high road to Valenciennes.

When the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the British infantry have effected the passage of the Scheldt by the pontoon bridges, the 1st division will move to its left up to the top of the ridge, and form in three lines; its right to the wood of Douchy, its centre in rear of a house on the high road, its left extending towards a small mound or barrow which is in the continuation of the ridge.

The 2nd and 3rd divisions will move up also to the top of the ridge which overlooks the Selle, and will place themselves to the left of the 1st division, so as to deploy in three lines upon the same alignement‡ with that division.

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* The exact alignement will be given at the time.

† Lord Hill will be so good as to push the advanced guards pretty well forward before the columns.

‡ The marks for this alignement will be a single farm house upon the chaussée where the top of the ridge overlooks Douchy, and a small mound or barrow upon the continuation of the same ridge.

The British cavalry, soon after having passed the bridge of Rouvigny, will move to its left in the direction of Haspres, and will place itself in columns on the left of the infantry, so as to be prepared to deploy also in three lines.

The Hanoverian corps (as soon as it perceives that the 1st division of British infantry has crossed the bridge of Denain, and is preparing to form its line) will march by its left through Denain and cross the Scheldt by the bridge of that place (the infantry first, the cavalry following the infantry), and it will take up the position of the 1st British division; the infantry in two lines, the cavalry in reserve behind the infantry.

Upon the arrival of the Hanoverian troops the whole of the British corps will take ground to its left, continuing to move in that direction until the right of the 1st division has crossed the chaussée.

In making this movement the whole will move in open column along the alignement.

The enemy (on discovering the menaced attack on the side of the river Selle) must be supposed to alter his position a little, drawing in his left from Lieu St. Amand and extending his right along the heights overlooking the Selle, having a considerable portion of his artillery upon these heights, and placing infantry in Noyelles as well as in Douchy, and upon the bank of the river between these villages.

*Third Movement.*

The British and Hanoverian troops will move forward to pass the Selle, and attack the enemy's position on the left bank of that river.

The Hanoverian corps will direct its attack upon Douchy.

The 1st British division will attack between Douchy and Noyelles, and will lay a bridge by which to pass the river in that quarter.

The 2nd British division will attack by the village of Noyelles.

The 3rd British division will lay a bridge a little above Noyelles, and will pass in that quarter.*

In the advance of all the British divisions, the first line will move in line in so far as the ground will admit of its doing so; supporting the light infantry which will have been pushed on in front, and by its fire and by that of the light infantry, aided by the batteries, it will cover the laying of the pontoon bridges.

The second line of infantry will follow the movement of the first line, leaving an interval of about 400 paces between the two lines; and when the bridges have been laid, the second line will move out in columns from the centre of battalions, and passing through the first line will cross the river in that order; part of the light infantry preceding the columns.

The third line of the British divisions, after having moved forward to the original alignement of the first line, will halt there in reserve, until the second line begins to form in columns to pass the river, when it will move forward also in columns from the centre of battalions and follow the second line across the Selle. The second line, as soon as it is clear of the houses and enclosures or other obstacles, will deploy into line and attack the

* The attacks by Douchy and by Noyelles must not be pressed too much, in order to give time for the laying of the bridges by the other two columns.

enemy. It will be supported by the third line, which will also deploy when sufficiently advanced to do so.

The first line will pass the river (in columns from the centre of battalions in rear of the third line) and will continue in column, in reserve, after having passed.

During these movements of the infantry, the British cavalry will have passed the Selle by a bridge at a farm house above Noyelles, and it will make an attack upon the supposed right of the enemy's position, at the same time that the infantry is attacking, after having crossed the river.

The Hanoverian cavalry will pass through Douchy, in rear of the first line of its infantry, and will deploy as soon as the ground opens sufficiently, to its left of the chaussée. It will make an attack afterwards in the direction of Lieu St. Amand, when the whole of the Hanoverian infantry has got through Douchy.

Whilst the British and Hanoverian troops are attacking the enemy's position upon the Selle, the Danish corps will attack, and at length gain possession of the village of Neuville. The Saxon corps having thrown a considerable body of light infantry across by the foot bridge at L'Ourche, will throw a pontoon bridge across the Scheldt between L'Ourche and Neuville; and when that bridge is laid, the Saxon corps will pass the Scheldt by it, the Danish crossing the river at the same time, by the bridge of Neuville.

Part of the Saxon light infantry will be detached towards Douchy, to establish a communication with the Hanoverian column; skirmishing against the enemy in doing so.

When the Hanoverian and British troops are making their attack, after having crossed the Selle, the Danish and Saxon cavalry will make a joint attack in the direction of Lieu St. Amand, and the infantry of those corps will make a short movement in the same direction, in support of their cavalry. A few guns will be fired from the works of Bouchain, as if to check the pursuit of the Danish and Saxon cavalry, and protect the retreat of the enemy.

*Conclusion.*

The several corps will march past from the right in quick time, according to their accustomed forms.

G. MURRAY,
Quartermaster-General.

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MEMORANDUM OF THE MANŒUVRES PROPOSED TO TAKE PLACE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF DENAIN ON THE 22ND OF OCTOBER, 1816. [1095.]

*General Supposition.*

Bouchain is supposed to belong to the enemy; but the place being unprovided against a siege, he is desirous of keeping his army in its neighbourhood for its protection.

In this view the enemy is supposed to have taken up a

position on the heights in front of Escandain, having his right at Denain, and his left at the village of Abscon.

The attacking army, which is supposed to have approached from the side of St. Amand, is assembled between the villages of Helesmes and Avelay.

The result of the first attack is, that the enemy is obliged to retire across the Scheldt, which he does, partly through Bouchain, and partly by the bridges which he has near the villages of St. Ourche and of Neuville; and he takes up a new position, having his right behind the Selle at Douchy, his left on Lieu St. Amand, and protected by Bouchain, and the Scheldt covering his centre.

Whilst the enemy is held in check, and threatened in this new position on the line of his front, a movement is made by a part of the attacking army to turn his right. This is effected by the bridges of Denain and Rouvigny, and by intermediate bridges thrown across the river for the purpose.

The enemy, finding his right turned, reinforces himself in that quarter, and he extends himself along the heights on the left bank of the Selle, occupying in force the villages of Douchy and Noyelles. Being attacked at the same time, however, both on the line of the Scheldt and on the Selle, he is forced in both quarters, and obliged precipitately to retreat in the direction of Cambrai.

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

ÉTAT d'une partie de l'Armée Alliée d'Occupation, rassemblée près de DENAIN, le 22 Octobre, 1816.

| Contingens. | PRÉSENS, SOUS LES ARMES. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. d'Escadrons. | No. de Bataillons. | No. de Pièces d'Artillerie. | Cavalerie. | | Infanterie. | Artillerie, Génie, et Sapeurs. | | Train et Pontoniers. | | | Total. | |
| | | | | Officiers, Sous-Officiers, et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Officiers, Sous-Officiers, et Soldats. | Officiers, Sous-Officiers, et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Officiers, Sous-Officiers, et Soldats. | Chevaux. | Pontons. | Hommes. | Chevaux. |
| Britannique . . | 26 | 25 | 60 | 2757 | 2768 | 20,761 | 1794 | 1212 | 550 | 807 | 40 | 25,862 | 4787 |
| Danois . . . . | 4 | 5 | 10 | 530 | 530 | 2,874 | 154 | 146 | 87 | 29 | .. | 3,645 | 705 |
| Saxon . . . . | 4 | 5 | 8 | 570 | 541 | 2,560 | 107 | 13 | 81 | 141 | .. | 3,318 | 695 |
| Hanovrien . . . | 4 | 6 | 6 | 491 | 469 | 2,938 | 129 | 111 | .. | .. | .. | 3,558 | 580 |
| Total . . | 38 | 41 | 84 | 4348 | 4308 | 29,133 | 2184 | 1482 | 718 | 977 | 40 | 36,383 | 6767 |

II.

## ETAT du CONTINGENT DANOIS en France rassemblé près de Denain, le 22 Oct., 1816.

Au Quartier-Général à Lewarde, le 22 Oct., 1816.

| Subdivisions du Contingent Danois. | ETAT DE L'EFFECTIF. | | | | | | | | | | | MALADES. | | | TOTAL. | | ANNOTATIONS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Présents sous les Armes. | | | | Employés ayant le rang d'Officiers. | Etat Major ou Employés inférieurs. | Domestiques. | Cochers ou Soldats du Train. | Chevaux de Selle. | Chevaux du Train. | Voitures. | | | | | | |
| | Officiers. | Sous-Officiers. | Musiciens. | Soldats. | | | | | | | | Officiers. | Soldats. | Chevaux. | Hommes. | Chevaux. | |
| Le Quartier-Général | 16 | 12 | .. | .. | 18 | 2 | 62 | 39 | 159 | 67 | 20 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 151 | 227 | |
| L'Etat Major de la 1ère Brigade | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 8 | 21 | 8 | 3 | .. | .. | .. | 18 | 29 | |
| Le Batterie d'Artillerie de Gerstenberg | 6 | 9 | 2 | 133 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 126 | 19 | 228 | 41 | .. | 3 | 6 | 293 | 253 | De ce nombre 241 hommes et 175 chevaux paroîtront sur la place. |
| Le Régiment de Dragons du Prince Ferdinand | 19 | 33 | 8 | 506 | 7 | 8 | 40 | 15 | 620 | 39 | 10 | .. | 14 | 5 | 650 | 664 | De ce nombre 530 hommes et autant de chevaux paroîtront sur la place. |
| Un Bataillon de Chasseurs de Slesvic | 24 | 52 | 14 | 338 | 4 | 2 | 29 | 16 | 17 | 33 | 10 | 2 | 7 | .. | 488 | 50 | De ce corps ce qui est combattant paroîtra sur la place. |
| Un Bataillon de Chasseurs de Holstein | 16 | 31 | 6 | 204 | 4 | 2 | 23 | 15 | 42 | 34 | 10 | .. | 4 | .. | 305 | 46 | Idem. |
| L'Etat Major de la 2ème Brigade | 4 | 1 | .. | 2 | .. | .. | 11 | 3 | 25 | 6 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 21 | 31 | |
| La Batterie démontée à Bouchain | 6 | 12 | 1 | 111 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 89 | 15 | 6 | 41 | .. | 20 | .. | 254 | 21 | Fera service de garnison à Bouchain. |
| Le 1er Bataillon du Régiment de la Reine | 24 | 53 | 21 | 662 | 4 | 11 | 36 | 20 | 9 | 46 | 15 | .. | 22 | 1 | 853 | 57 | De ce corps ce qui est combattant paroîtra sur la place. |
| Le 1er Bataillon du Régiment de Fionie | 20 | 47 | 19 | 674 | 4 | 10 | 30 | 19 | 13 | 46 | 14 | 2 | 31 | 1 | 856 | 60 | Idem. |
| Le 1er Bataillon du Régiment de 2de Jutlande | 25 | 51 | 25 | 647 | 4 | 12 | 34 | 21 | 11 | 46 | 14 | .. | 43 | 1 | 862 | 58 | Idem. |
| Le Pare de Réserve | 3 | 4 | 1 | 48 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 74 | 4 | 132 | 22 | .. | 1 | 2 | 141 | 138 | Ne paroîtra pas sur la place. |
| L'Ambulance | 3 | 7 | .. | 48 | 14 | 1 | 15 | 15 | 4 | 29 | 27 | .. | 2 | .. | 105 | 33 | Idem. |
| En Tout | 168 | 312 | 97 | 3373 | 65 | 59 | 305 | 458 | 922 | 720 | 229 | 5 | 153 | 17 | 4995 | 1667 | |

### RÉCAPITULATION de ce qui paroîtra sur la Place.

| | Hommes. | Chevaux. |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Cavalerie | 530 | 530 |
| 2. Infanterie | 2874 | .. |
| 3. Artillerie | 154 | 146 |
| 4. Train d'Artillerie | 87 | 29 |
| | 3647 | 707 |

FRÉDÉRIC DE HESSE.

NOTE pour Son Altesse Monseigneur le DUC de WELLINGTON, sur l'Approvisionnement du Corps d'Armée Russe en France.

Maubeuge, le 15 (27) Oct., 1816.

Depuis longtems les fournitures du pain et des fourrages pour le corps d'armée Russe se font avec une inexactitude qui de jour en jour devient plus intolérable pour les troupes et en même tems pour les habitans.

Bien loin de voir nos magasins, outre la distribution, avoir une réserve de quinze jours, ainsi qu'il est stipulé par les Conventions, nous ne recevons les vivres que de jour à la journée, et quelquefois ils manquent tout-à-fait, ou sont d'une si mauvaise qualité qu'il est impossible de les recevoir.

Ce mal s'augmente de tous côtés dans les cantonnements, et fait craindre pour l'hiver, quand les difficultés seront augmentées par l'état des chemins, un manque total de provisions, et l'obligation de recourir à des mesures très onéreuses pour le pays et fort désagréables pour les troupes, celles des réquisitions forcées.

Hormis le mal qu'un pareil état de choses fait tant aux habitans qu'aux militaires, il produit encore un autre désavantage important, en diminuant la bonne harmonie et l'accord entr'eux, et en rejettant dans l'esprit des paysans sur les troupes toute la faute qui ne provient absolument que de la négligence ou du manque des moyens des fournisseurs.

Il est bon de remarquer à ce sujet que quoique ces fournisseurs ont fait à de très bon prix un contrat avec le gouvernement pour délivrer à leurs frais les vivres dans les endroits qui seront indiqués, et où les troupes cantonnent, cependant ils se sont arrogés le droit, et, ce qui paraît encore plus singulier, le gouvernement et l'administration locale ont souffert que tous leurs transports soient faits par réquisition de voitures de paysans, comme en tems de guerre, à un prix fixé et très bas, et ce prix même, tout insuffisant qu'il est, n'a presque jamais été payé aux paysans jusqu'ici.

On nous dira peut-être que ces mesures locales ne nous regardent pas, et que c'est l'affaire du gouvernement. Cela est vrai, quant à l'exécution de ces mesures que nous ne devons ni empêcher ni entraver, quelques pernicieuses qu'elles nous paraissent, mais nous pouvons et nous devons même remarquer ces abus, et les présenter tels qu'ils sont, car ils nous font beaucoup de mal ; grâce à l'indulgence exercée aux dépens des pays envers les fournisseurs qui même avec cela ne remplissent pas leurs engagemens, si le service se fait, et que les troupes reçoivent ce qui leur est dû, c'est sur les voitures et les chevaux des paysans distraits par là aux travaux des champs pour un prix arbitraire, et qui n'est pas même toujours payé. Si par contre le service ne se fait pas, ces mêmes troupes, par la loi invincible de la nécessité, sont nourries par réquisition ou logées militairement chez ces mêmes paysans, de manière que, quelque chose qui arrive, le mal que nous causons involontairement au pays nous procure de sa part une haine que nous ne méritons nullement par notre conduite, et que l'article de vivres ne devrait jamais nous attirer ; puisque, si l'on se tenait strictement aux Conventions et aux engagemens, les habitans seraient entièrement neutres pour tout ce qui regarde les vivres entre nous et les fournisseurs, et surtout dans le corps Russe, dont la plus grande partie, même dans les villages, n'est pas logée chez les habitans, mais occupent des casernes particulières.

Les témoignages des Préfets et autres autorités constatent la bonne conduite en général des troupes, et je peux en même tems prouver que sur le nombre des petites rixes et plaintes entre les habitans et nous, les trois-quarts au moins ont pour cause immédiate ou première l'obligation dans laquelle le paysan se trouve contre son attente de transporter les vivres pour les fournisseurs.

Il est juste de dire ici qu'il y a peu de plaintes contre les Commissaires nommés par le gouvernement pour surveiller le service des fournitures. Le Commissaire-Ordonnateur Lajard montre toujours du zèle et de l'activité, et la plupart des employés sous ses ordres font ce qu'ils peuvent aussi pour assurer le service. Le mal est dans les entreprises elles-mêmes, soit que les entrepreneurs aient pris une tâche au-dessus de leurs moyens, soit qu'il y ait trop de gradations de sous-traitans, sous-employés, &c. Ce mal ne peut être remédié que par quelque mesure générale prise à Paris; sans quoi nous sommes menacés, surtout dans la partie pauvre de nos cantonnemens, comme dans les Ardennes, d'avoir une disette totale.

Encore un point auquel il est urgent d'appeler l'attention du gouvernement Français: c'est l'état des chemins dans les Ardennes. Il est tel que si même les entrepreneurs étaient plus capables et plus zélés qu'ils ne sont, toujours serait-il presqu'impossible de faire dans ce pays aucun transport.

Le Maréchal Duc de Feltre, instruit de cela, y a envoyé dernièrement une commission. Les résultats de cette mesure ne sont pas connus, mais non-seulement aucun changement pour le bien n'en est encore survenu, mais il est peut-être impossible qu'il y en ait, tellement ces chemins sont dégradés; cependant, comme c'est dans ce pays que nous avons 5000 chevaux de dragons, &c., les transports y sont plus fréquents et inévitables qu'autre part, à cause de la grande quantité de fourrages nécessaire pour ces chevaux; et il est à craindre que le pays sera épuisé et tourmenté, et qu'en même tems notre cavalerie pourra souvent manquer même des nécessaires.

Le Lieutenant-Général Comte Woronzow.

[Enclosure.]

*The Sous-Préfet of Rethel to Lieut.-Gen. Count Woronzow.*

Mon Général, Rethel, le 8 Oct., 1816.

J'ai eu l'honneur de faire connaître verbalement à Votre Excellence les causes de l'interruption du service des fourrages dans mon arrondissement, ainsi que des obstacles qui en ont continuellement entravé la marche depuis que l'entreprise générale en est chargée. Je vais vous les retracer par écrit.

Ces causes ont été produites dès le principe par un grand vice dans l'exécution du service. L'administration générale de l'entreprise, au lieu de le faire faire pour son compte et par des agens à elle, en a confié le soin à des sous-traitans, qui n'avaient ni les moyens pécuniaires ni les lumières nécessaires pour parvenir à un résultat satisfaisant. En effet, ces sous-traitans ont eux-mêmes sous-traité avec des particuliers du pays, qui ont assuré le service tant qu'ils ont été payés des denrées qu'ils fournissaient, mais qui l'ont abandonné dès que l'on a cessé de remplir les engagemens que l'on avait contractés avec eux. Il est même de ces sous-traitans en second ordre, à qui il est encore dû des sommes

assez considérables. Il ne faut donc point s'étonner que le service ait toujours été chancelant. Ce mode a d'ailleurs produit le fâcheux résultat de consommer toutes les denrées du pays, et de les maintenir constamment à un prix excessif. On est parvenu d'autant plus facilement à les épuiser toutes, qu'il restait peu de fourrages de l'année dernière, et que la récolte de cette année a été presque nulle, à cause des pluies continuelles qui ont eu lieu, notamment durant la récolte des foins, et qui ont pu avoir une très mauvaise influence sur celle des avoines.

Il en est encore résulté que les approvisionnemens que devait avoir l'entreprise aux termes de son traité n'ont jamais pu être faits, et que le service ayant manqué au même instant sur tous les points dès le 11 du mois dernier, on s'est trouvé absolument sans ressources pour y pourvoir.

Pour remédier au manque de service il a fallu recourir à des marchés d'urgence et à la voie des réquisitions, moyen désastreux en toute circonstance, mais qui l'est devenu bien plus encore dans un moment où la récolte des avoines n'était pas faite, et où l'on était par conséquent dans la nécessité de la donner en gerbe.

Mais une semblable mesure pouvait avoir des effets beaucoup plus funestes : des différens pouvaient s'élever entre les habitans et les soldats, et produire des rixes fâcheuses. Si l'on doit à cet égard se louer de la conduite prudente des habitans en livrant des denrées qui leur sont si précieuses pour la nourriture de leurs bestiaux, on ne doit pas moins d'éloges à l'ordre que MM. les chefs militaires ont fait observer par leurs troupes.

Néanmoins il est urgent que des mesures promptes et vigoureuses soient prises contre les entrepreneurs pour les obliger à faire un service régulier, et pour cela il ne s'agit que de leur faire exécuter les clauses de leur traité, c'est-à-dire de les forcer à avoir des approvisionnemens; autrement le service manquera à chaque instant, et nous verrons se perpétuer un état d'angoisse qui met le désespoir dans le cœur des habitans ; ceux-ci ont déjà beaucoup à souffrir de la charge des transports dans les cantonnemens, charge à laquelle les entrepreneurs sont également obligés, mais dont ils se trouvent dispensés au moyen d'une indemnité qu'ils payent aux cultivateurs, trop faible pour compenser le sacrifice résultant d'une pareille obligation.

Ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de vous dire, mon Général, touchant le service des fourrages, me conduit tout naturellement à vous parler d'un autre abus, dont vous avez eu déjà connaissance. Pendant longtems le pain a été de très mauvaise qualité. C'était un surcroît de charge pour les habitans, qui, pour la plupart, se trouvaient par là dans la nécessité de donner leur propre pain en place de celui qu'ils recevaient des magasins; ce qui était une charge accablante pour eux dans un moment où le prix du grain est si élevé. C'est un fait si notoire qu'il existe des procès-verbaux qui constatent que M. le Commissaire des Guerres a fait sortir du magasin de très-grandes quantités de pain qu'il avait reconnu mauvais. Je sais que des mesures ont été prises pour réprimer cet abus, mais il n'est pas moins important de faire cesser celui qui existe par rapport au service du fourrage. Si mes administrés y ont le plus grand intérêt, il en est de même à l'égard de vos troupes pour maintenir la bonne harmonie entr'elles et les habitans.

C'est au moment surtout où ces troupes sont sur le point d'entrer dans les casernes qui leur ont été préparés qu'il est intéressant de faire assurer convenablement tous les services et de ne plus user de tolérance envers les entrepreneurs. J'ai fait un rapport dans ce sens à Son Excellence le Ministre de la Guerre. Si Votre Excellence juge à propos de faire valoir auprès de lui dans l'intérêt des troupes Russes les motifs qui nécessitent de promptes mesures contre les entre-

preneurs, c'est une nouvelle obligation que vous aura l'arrondissement de Rethel et la ville en particulier, qui n'a point oublié la générosité dont V.E. a usé envers elle en 1814.

Je suis, avec respect, mon Général,

De Votre Excellence le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

DE FOURMENT, Sous-Préfet de Rethel.

P.S.—Je joins à la présente des exemplaires des différentes circulaires par lesquelles j'ai chargé les maires de mon arrondissement de pourvoir soit aux transports soit à la fourniture des denrées nécessaires au service.

Pour copie conforme,

LE COMTE WORONZOW.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1096.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 28th Oct., 1816.

My brother is gone by, and I learn from him that nothing has yet been decided on the question between Spain and Portugal: indeed, I understood from Mr. Canning when I saw him last that this question was to resolve itself into *slave trade.*

In my letter of the 27th I informed you how matters were situated between Spain and Portugal, and all I have heard since has tended to convince me that the King of Spain will be forced to attack Portugal, and that Portugal is not a match for Spain: that is to say, that we cannot venture, as was Mr. Canning's notion, to allow the two countries to fight out their dispute, and interfere at last only as the price of abolition of the slave trade by the one in favour of which we should interfere.

*Coûte qu'il coûte,* we must interfere, I should think, to prevent Spain from getting possession of Portugal, or even of Alentejo; but if we allow the contest to commence, and the two countries to fight it out for some time, Spain will be in such a situation as that we can interfere only by an armament, and you know the expense of an armament as applied to the Peninsula. Then observe that if the contest should go on for a year or two before we interfere, France will again be on the stage. We may depend upon it that our interference will not be unattended with hers in one shape or another; and it will depend upon circumstances, and probably on France, whether we shall not again be involved in a general war on this question.

In my opinion, then, we ought to interfere immediately; but

that interference ought to be against Portugal. We ought to insist not only upon their desisting from all their operations upon the Rio de la Plata, but upon their giving satisfaction to the King of Spain.

This can be done now without any great effort. It is an act of justice, and we may rely on its success in preventing the contest in the Peninsula, to which the King of Spain feels no inclination, and into which if he enters, it will be only by the clamour of his subjects.

I have been so long accustomed to communicate with your Lordship freely upon subjects of this kind, that I trust you will forgive the freedom with which I discuss this one.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Rev. George S. Griffin-Stonestreet to Colonel Sir U. Burgh.*

Head-quarters, Brigade of Guards, Cambrai,
SIR, 28th Oct., 1816.

In reference to the inquiries which you have made by direction of his Grace the Duke of Wellington as to the authority upon which marriages have proceeded abroad, I have the honour to transmit to you the following statement for the information of the Field Marshal.

It does not appear that there is any specific legal authority for the solemnization of marriage in foreign countries by Chaplains of the Forces. The Act of Parliament relating to marriages refers only to such as are contracted at home; and the civilians contend that marriage is to be solemnized according to the laws of the country in which the parties propose that it shall take place.

But as this rule is inapplicable to military bodies on foreign service, where they are neither subjects nor in any way domiciliated, a general usage has prevailed in the British army of marrying persons abroad in any way attached to it according to the forms of the Church of England; and this usage is recognized in a recent General Order (dated Horse Guards, July 1), in which it is required of Chaplains of the Forces not to marry soldiers without the consent of the commanding officer.

It has always appeared to me desirable to assimilate the proceedings in such marriages as closely as possible to those required to be observed in England; and it is on this account that in *addition* to the written consent of the commanding officer, I have published the banns of all marriages when the situation of the troops has made it probable that divine service would be successively performed in the interval. For the usage of publication, as a legal qualification of marriage, is general throughout all parts of Europe; nor is marriage ever contracted at home without this proceeding, or the form which is intended to represent it. What is called a licence is

but a dispensation from the publication of banns, wherein one of the parties takes on himself to declare upon oath that none of those impediments exist which it is the object of a publication to ascertain or examine; and a special licence is but a joint dispensation from publication and from certain provisions of the Marriage Act.

I have always considered the consent of a commanding officer as necessary, indeed as analogous to the consent of a parent to the marriage of a minor; but as the consent of a parent alone in such case does not make the publication of banns less essential to the legality of marriage in England, I have judged it as a safe rule to proceed afterwards to a publication. In the case of *followers* of the army it seems even more necessary, as some security against fraudulent marriage.

In consequence of the frequent applications for marriage by persons of rank and consideration while I was attached to the head-quarters of the British army at Bruxelles, I took the opinion of a civilian of eminence, and I applied to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, then commanding, for his authority; and I have proceeded in consequence, where the parties are both British subjects, without any variation from the forms adopted at home.

The statute of Peter Pence, passed at the Reformation, reserves to the Archbishop of Canterbury all the powers of granting dispensation from publication in all places which had been enjoyed by the Pope; and it has appeared that if his Grace were to nominate some proportion of the Chaplains of the Forces as surrogates, with the same powers as are exercised by the diocesan officers so termed of administering the oaths and executing licences of marriage, it would be the most simple and the shortest way of placing it on a safe and permanent foundation.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

GEO. S. GRIFFIN-STONESTREET.

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G. O. Cambrai, 30th Oct., 1816. [1097.]

1. 4*s.* 6*d.* per month for each horse is to be allowed to defray the expense of shoeing the following public horses, and to commence from the 24th of last month, provided the horses are really kept by the officers concerned:—the camp kettle horse of each troop of cavalry; adjutant's horse for carrying regimental books and paper; paymaster's horse for carrying regimental books and paper; public horse, in charge of the quartermaster, to carry intrenching tools; surgeon's horse for the regimental medicine chest; veterinary surgeon's horse for the regimental medicine chest; serjeant saddler's horse to carry his tools, &c.

2. The Field Marshal has lately referred to the consideration of a Court of Inquiry a report made by Colonel Sir G. Wood, of the Royal Artillery, of an attempt made by a tradesman at

Dover to smuggle goods into France with a detachment of the Royal Artillery, having marked them as "regimental stores;" and at the same time that he expresses his approbation of the conduct of Lieutenant —— —— of the Royal Horse Artillery upon this occasion, he desires that Serjeant Major —— of the Royal Artillery may be brought to trial before a General Court Martial for his conduct in this transaction.

3. The Assistant Quartermaster-General stationed at Calais is hereby directed to make over the cases above referred to, containing these goods, to the chief of the customs at Calais; to inform him that they do not belong to the army; and to desire him to deal with them according to the laws for the government of the French customs.

4. In future the Assistant Quartermaster-General stationed at Calais is desired to require, from the officer commanding any regiment or detachment which may land, a return signed by himself of the baggage accompanying it, specifying the number and description of the packages, and the general nature of their contents.

5. The Assistant Quartermaster-General stationed at Calais will besides adopt the measures which he may think necessary to prevent the practice of smuggling through the means of the facilities afforded by the treaty to the importation of the baggage and stores of the officers and troops.

6. The Field Marshal desires that printed copies of this order may be sent to Calais, to be communicated by the Assistant Quartermaster-General to all officers who may arrive there in command of troops.

7. He is convinced that there are none who would knowingly permit the abuse, for private gain, of a privilege granted to the military in France; but he trusts that this order will serve to draw their attention to the subject, and will induce them to co-operate with the Assistant Quartermaster-General in preventing abuses which are not only injurious to the reputation of the army, but must eventually tend to their inconvenience and disadvantage.

8. The chaplains of the army are forbidden to marry any persons without the permission in writing of the Field Marshal.

10. In the circular letter from the Quartermaster-General of the 29th October, 1815, the Field Marshal expressed his desire that "no inhabitant should be required to accommodate persons

that are not entitled to billets;" and he begs that the officers of the army will understand the last part of the paragraph in which that desire is expressed as containing an order that no person is to be admitted to lodge in a billet excepting those for whom the billet is granted, without having the consent of the owner of the house.

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 31st Oct., 1816.

Though Lord FitzRoy Somerset has delivered me your message upon the subject of the proposed reduction of the expenses incurred by the French government for the maintenance of the Army of Occupation, I cannot but wish you would send a few lines in answer to the letter the Allied Ministers lately wrote respecting that question. They are anxious to receive an instruction from their respective Courts; and as they appear to think that instruction must necessarily be grounded on this correspondence, they have repeatedly pressed me to remind you of the importance they attach to the subject.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever truly yours,

CHARLES STUART.

[Sir George Murray has six papers belonging to this.

WELLINGTON.]

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*The Ministers of the Four Courts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, 30 Oct., 1816.

Les Commissaires spéciaux de nos Cours ayant dans une de leurs dernières séances agité la question de payemens à faire par la France (à dater du 1er Décembre prochain) pour la solde, l'équipement, et l'habillement de l'Armée d'Occupation, nous avons cru devoir soumettre leur opinion à la décision de nos Cours, en consignant leur procès-verbal au protocole de notre dernière conférence. En ayant l'honneur d'en transmettre également une copie à Votre Excellence nous avons en même tems celui d'y joindre, outre les deux pièces qui sont citées dans le dit procès-verbal, encore une troisième, qui n'était point connue aux Commissaires spéciaux lors de la remise de leur dernière note, et laquelle, servant d'explication à différens articles du Traité et de la Convention Militaire du 20 Novembre dernier, jette encore plus de jour sur l'ensemble de la question, et contribuera à la résoudre plus facilement.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération,

Monsieur le Duc,

De Votre Excellence les très humbles et très obéissans serviteurs,

LE BARON DE VINCENT. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.
CHARLES STUART. POZZO DI BORGO.

II.

PROCÈS-VERBAL de la Séance du 26 Octobre, 1816.

La Commission s'est assemblée aujourd'hui, sur l'invitation du Président, pour délibérer et prendre une résolution éventuelle sur les questions suivantes, savoir :—

Si la France doit payer à dater du 1 Décembre prochain pour la solde, l'équipement, l'habillement, et autres objets accessaires pour l'Armée d'Occupation, la somme de 50,000,000 francs par an, ou 4,166,666⅔ francs par mois ; et si elle doit en outre faire pendant cette même année un premier remboursement de 5,000,000 également en rentes mensuelles, sur les 20,000,000 de francs qu'elle a payés de moins au même titre pour la première année, qui va échoir à la fin de Novembre prochain ? ou bien,

Si la France a le droit de continuer à payer la solde, l'habillement, et l'équipement sur le pied de 30,000,000 de francs par année, et d'acquitter seulement plus tard ce qu'elle aura payé de moins que les 50,000,000 annuels qui ont été stipulés pour couvrir ces dépenses ?

On a observé que l'Article II. de la Convention patente du 20 Novembre dernier relative à l'occupation d'un ligne militaire en France par une armée Alliée renfermait à cet égard des dispositions claires et précises que d'après cet article la France devait payer pour la solde, l'équipement, l'habillement, à dater du 1 Décembre, 1815, la somme de 50,000,000 de francs par an, et que cette somme était payable en numéraire de mois en mois ; que d'après ce même article les Puissances Alliées avaient seulement consenties à ce qu'il ne soit pas payé dans la première année que 30,000,000 de francs sur la solde, sauf à être remboursés dans les années subséquentes de l'occupation.

On a observé de plus que les instructions qui ont été données aux Commissaires soussignés ne contenaient rien qui soit contraire à ces dispositions, et que par conséquent la Commission serait obligée de demander au trésor Royal de France le 31 Décembre prochain, pour le premier mois de la deuxième année :

1. La somme de 4,166,666⅔ francs à titre de solde et d'équipement de l'Armée d'Occupation, sur le pied de 50,000,000 par année ; et

2. Celle de 4,166,666⅔ francs à titre du premier remboursement sur le 20,000,000 que la France a payé de moins pendant la première année ; le tout conformément au calcul éventuel qui a été fait par la Commission et joint à son protocole du 4 Décembre, 1815, 9me séance.

Le Président, qui partage cette opinion sans aucune réserve, a crû néanmoins devoir appeler l'attention de MM. ses collègues sur le contenu de deux pièces dont il leur a donné communication. La première est une copie du procès-verbal de la Conférence des Ministres qui ont négocié le Traité et les Conventions du 20 Novembre dernier, conférence qui a eu lieu le 13 Octobre précédent ; et la seconde est la copie d'une note adressée par le Duc de Richelieu le 20 Novembre aux ministres susdits après la signature du Traité.

Il résulte de ces deux pièces ;

Que dans aucun cas la France ne serait tenue à payer par an un somme plus forte que celle de 270,000,000, savoir : 140,000,000 à titre d'indemnité de la guerre ; 100,000,000, à quoi sont évalués le logement, le chauffage, l'éclairage, les vivres, et les fourrages de l'Armée d'Occupation ; et 30,000,000 pour la solde, l'équipement, et l'habillement de cette armée.

Qu'enfin d'après la teneur de la note susmentionnée du Duc de Richelieu, qui se réfère au Protocole du 13 Octobre, dont il considère toutes les dispositions comme expressément maintenues, la France ne serait obligée à rembourser successivement les susdits 20,000,000 qu'elle paye de moins chaque année, qu'au

moyen des épargnes qu'elle pourra faire sur les 100,000,000 qui sont destinés au logement, à l'éclairage, chauffage, et aux vivres de l'Armée d'Occupation.

La Commission, ayant délibérée ce qui précède, a décidé qu'elle n'était point autorisée à s'écarter de ce qui était clairement et expressément stipulé dans la Convention du 20 Novembre, d'autant moins que le procès-verbal susmentionné portait la date du 13 Octobre; que cette pièce ne lui a point été communiquée officiellement avec l'ordre de s'y conformer; et que la note précitée du Duc de Richelieu pouvait encore moins l'autoriser à dévier de ce qui lui a été prescrit; qu'en conséquence elle demanderait le 31 Décembre prochain le payement de la solde, de l'équipement, et de l'habillement, sur le pied de 50,000,000, ainsi que le premier remboursement mensuel de 20,000,000 payés de moins la première année, si dans le courant des mois de Novembre et de Décembre prochain elle ne reçoit pas de nouveaux ordres à ce sujet de la part des quatre Cours signataires du Traité.

La Commission a résolu de plus de remettre à LL. EE. MM. les Ministres de ces Cours une copie du présent procès-verbal.

[*Suivent les Signatures.*]

III.

*Pièce explicative du Protocole du 13 Octobre, 1815.*

TABLEAU des SOMMES que la France aurait à payer dans chacune des cinq années.

| | Contribution. | Entretien. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1re année .. .. .. | 140,000,000 | 130,000,000 | 270,000,000 |
| 2de année .. .. .. | idem | idem | idem |
| 3me année .. .. .. | idem | idem | idem |
| 4me année.—Minimum dans le cas que la réduction ait eu lieu pendant les trois premières années, et que l'occupation finira au bout de la troisième .. .. | 140,000,000 | .. .. .. .. .. | 140,000,000 |
| Médium dans le cas que l'occupation ait continuée pendant les trois premières années sur le pied de 150,000 hommes, mais qu'elle finira au bout de la troisième .. .. .. | 140,000,000 | Remboursement pour le déficit des trois premières années, 60,000,000 .. .. | 200,000,000 |
| Maximum dans le cas que l'occupation ait continuée sur le pied de 150,000 hommes, et qu'elle soit étendue à cinq ans sur le même pied .. .. .. | Entretien. 140,000,000 | Déficit. 130,000,000 | 60,000,000 330 mil. |
| 5me année.—Minimum .. | 140,000,000 | .. .. .. .. .. .. | 140 mil. |
| Maximum .. | 140,000,000 | 130,000,000 | 40,000,000 310 mil. |

IV.

*Observations explicatives du Tableau.*

Il résulte de ce travail :

1. Que les demandes des Alliés sont conformes aux conditions acceptées par la France, savoir : de payer une contribution de 700,000,000, et de maintenir à sa charge le corps d'occupation temporaire.

2. Que les Alliés cherchent à faciliter le payément à la France dans les termes qu'elle même a jugé devoir proposer.

3. Que les Alliés entrent dans tous les arrangemens qui peuvent alléguer les charges de la France, et que ces charges ne peuvent être augmentées que par la propre faute de la France.

Les Alliés sont prêts à diminuer graduellement leur Armée d'Occupation dans les trois premières années, et de la retirer en entier au bout de ce terme, dans la supposition que l'intérieur du royaume fut pacifié, et que des sûretés suffisantes ayent été fournies pour la rentrée du reste de la contribution et des réclamations des particuliers.

Or, si l'une ou l'autre de ces chances devait ne se pas réaliser, la faute n'en serait pas aux Alliés, mais bien à la France elle-même ; et il ne serait que juste qu'elle en partat la charge.

V.

NOTE confidentielle, servant à l'explication de différens Articles du Traité principal et de la Convention Militaire, le 20 Novembre, 1815.

Les soussignés, en adressant à S.E. M. le Duc de Richelieu le projet du Traité principal, ainsi que ceux des Conventions particulières qui l'accompagneront, ont l'honneur d'ajouter à ces communications les observations suivantes :

Il n'échappera pas à M. de Richelieu que les soussignés ont eu constamment en vue dans la rédaction de ces différens actes d'éviter tout ce qui aurait pu blesser le gouvernement Français, ou faire une impression défavorable sur le public de France.

Cependant comme, d'un autre côté, les devoirs que les soussignés ont à remplir envers leurs Souvérains leur prescrivent de ne point négliger les précautions propres à prévenir des doutes et des incertitudes que le texte de quelques-uns des articles, tel qu'il est à présent, pourrait faire naître, ils ont cru devoir préciser le sens qu'ils attachent aux dits articles, en réunissant dans une note confidentielle les explications qui leur ont paru nécessaires pour obvier au dit inconvénient.

La première de ces explications se rapporte au dernier paragraphe de l'Article V. du Traité principal. La durée de l'occupation militaire n'est limitée dans ce section que par les considérations politiques qui ont motivé cette mesure. Mais comme il est expressément dit dans le § 6 de l'Annexe ci-jointe du procès-verbal du 13 Octobre, que si au bout de trois ans la situation des choses est telle que les Puissances ne se trouvent point dans le cas de prolonger l'occupation militaire par les motifs politiques, cette occupation sera réduite à une échelle proportionnée aux sommes qui resteront encore à acquitter sur l'indemnité pécuniaire ; et comme le dit procès-verbal, signé par le Duc de Richelieu, est considéré par les soussignés comme parfaitement obligatoire dans toutes ses clauses, ils déclarent que quoique la disposition qu'ils viennent de rappeler ne soit pas enoncée dans l'Article V. du Traité principal, elle n'en sera pas moins regardée comme partie intégrante de cet article.

Les explications à ajouter à la Convention Militaire se rapportent aux articles suivants :

1. A l'Article II. : Les soussignés attendent que tout ce qui regarde l'entretien de l'Armée d'Occupation sera réglé conformément aux dispositions du procès-verbal du 13 Octobre, et que s'il est au pouvoir des Alliés de diminuer la force de cette armée, et d'opérer par cette mesure une réduction de dépense dans la partie de l'entretien que la France doit fournir en nature, la somme à payer par le gouvernement Français à titre de solde sera augmentée dans la même proportion, afin de rembourser aux Puissances dans des termes plus rapprochés le surplus de dépense que la partie de la solde leur aura causée pendant la première année ; bien entendu toutefois que la France ne payera pas au delà de 130,000,000 par an pour la solde et les subsistances réunies de l'Armée d'Occupation.

2. A l'Article III., § final : On s'est borné à dire dans cet article que le gouvernement Français se concertera avec le Général-en-Chef de l'armée Alliée sur les moyens d'assurer les différens services annoncés dans les Articles II. et III. de la Convention.

Cependant les soussignés entendent que si contre toute attente les autorités Françaises se refusaient à faire droit aux réclamations que le Général en Chef de l'Armée d'Occupation leur aurait adressé à cet égard, ce Général serait autorisé à recourir à des mesures militaires pour assurer dans les départemens occupés par les troupes sous ses ordres l'exécution des dites stipulations.

3. A l'Article III., § 2 : Par rapport aux places énumérées dans ce paragraphe, dans lesquelles le gouvernement Français tiendra garnison, il doit être entendu que les troupes et les transports militaires de l'armée Alliée auront le droit de passer librement auprès de ces places.

4. A l'Article IV., § avant dernier, commençant par les mots "S'il parvenait à la connaissance du Général-en-Chef de l'armée," il doit être entendu que le Général-en-Chef de l'armée Alliée aura le droit d'envoyer de tems en tems des officiers dans les dites places, afin de vérifier et de constater que les stipulations qui les regardent sont exactement remplies.

Les soussignés prient le Duc de Richelieu de leur donner acte des explications et déclarations contenues dans cette note.

## VI.

### Procès-Verbal de la Conférence du 13 Octobre, 1815.

*Bases des Arrangemens pécuniaires.*

1. Les arrangemens pécuniaires entre la France et les Puissances Alliées se feront d'après le principe que dans les trois premières années, à dater du 1er Octobre, 1815, la France ne payera pas au delà de 270,000,000 par an.

2. Sur ces 270,000,000 la somme annuelle de 140,000,000 sera employée au payement successif de l'indemnité pécuniaire, dont par ce moyen la totalité se trouvera acquittée en cinq ans ; et celle de 130,000,000 à l'entretien de l'Armée d'Occupation, avec les conditions et réserves spécifiés dans les articles suivans :

3. Quoique la France ait pris l'engagement général de se charger de tout ce qui compose l'entretien complet de l'Armée d'Occupation, les Puissances, pour la soulager autant que possible, ont l'intention d'opérer, si les circonstances le permettent, une réduction progressive d'année en année dans le nombre des troupes destinées à l'occupation militaire, et de rétablir par cette mesure le niveau entre les 130,000,000 à fournir par la France, et les frais réels de l'entretien de leur armée, lesquels, d'après des calculs admis de toutes parts, monteront à 150,000,000.

4. Si la situation ultérieure de la France ne permettrait pas aux Puissances de réaliser cette réduction, la France serait obligée de leur rembourser le déficit entre les 130,000,000 à fournir par elle et les frais réels de l'entretien des troupes. Ce déficit ne s'élévera pas au delà de 20,000,000 par an.

Comme on est d'accord que la somme totale à payer par la France dans les trois premières années ne doit pas excéder 270,000,000, le remboursement du déficit, lequel, dans les suppositions les plus défavorables, ne s'élévera pas au dessus de 100,000,000, se fera dans la quatrième et cinquième année; ou si le gouvernement Français ne se croyait pas en état de dépasser pour cet objet le payement annuel de 270,000,000, le dit remboursement serait remis à la sixième année, sauf à régler les garanties nécessaires pour assurer ce remboursement.

6. Si au bout de trois ans la situation des choses est telle que les Puissances ne se trouvent pas dans le cas de prolonger l'occupation militaire par des motifs politiques, cette occupation sera réduite à une échelle proportionnée aux sommes qui resteront encore à acquitter sur l'indemnité pécuniaire; et la France pourra la faire cesser entièrement en acquittant le restant de l'indemnité, soit en valeurs réelles, soit par des arrangemens qui seraient jugés par les Alliés l'équivalent du payement effectif.

7. Les Cours Alliées remettront au gouvernement Français les chefs des réclamations rentrant dans les articles non exécutés du Traité de 1814, et le gouvernement Français fera ses propositions sur les moyens de parvenir le plus tôt possible à la liquidation définitive et au remboursement effectif des sommes réclamées.

*Ajouté du 15 Octobre.*

En vertu de la signature du Protocole du 13, nous, les Ministres, d'accord avec M. le Duc de Richelieu, sont convenus d'accélérer, le plus que faire se pourra, l'évacuation du territoire Français. Pour cet effet il sera nommé sur-le-champ des Commissaires de part et d'autre, afin de régler les marches d'après le principe ci-dessus énoncé, et de leur demander immédiatement un rapport sur les termes à fixer pour l'évacuation finale du royaume, sauf le corps d'occupation temporaire.

| | |
|---|---|
| METTERNICH. | RASOUMOFSKY. |
| CASTLEREAGH. | WESSEMBERG. |
| HARDENBERG. | CAPO D'ISTRIAS. |
| HUMBOLDT. | RICHELIEU. |

VII.

*Réponse du Duc de Richelieu à la Note confidentielle et additionnelle du 20 Novembre, 1815.**

Paris, le 20 Nov., 1815.

Le soussigné, Ministre et Secrétaire d'Etat, &c., en réponse à la note de LL. EE. MM. les Ministres des quatre Cours Alliées en date de ce jour, et ayant pour objet de prévenir toute incertitude sur le sens de plusieurs des stipulations du Traité principal signé aujourd'hui, et de la Convention Militaire y annexée, a l'honneur de déclarer:

Que, relativement au dernier paragraphe de l'Article V. du Traité principal, il est entendu que si à l'expiration de trois ans les causes politiques de l'occupation militaire ont cessé, cette occupation pourra néanmoins continuer les deux années suivantes, et non au delà, mais que pour chacune des dits deux

* Il a été adressé à chacun des quatre Ministres un exemplaire.

années l'Armée d'Occupation, le nombre des places, et l'étendue des territoires occupés, seront réduits proportionnellement à la partie de l'indemnité pécuniaire qui aura été acquittée par la France, et que la France pourra même la faire cesser entièrement en acquittant le restant de l'indemnité, soit en valeurs réelles soit par des arrangemens qui seraient jugés par les Alliés l'équivalent du payement effectif.

Que relativement à l'Article II. de la Convention Militaire il est entendu que tout ce qui regardera l'entretien de l'Armée d'Occupation sera réglé conformément aux dispositions du procès-verbal du 13 Octobre, et que s'il est en pouvoir des Alliés de diminuer la force de cette armée, et d'opérer par cette mesure une réduction de dépense dans la partie de l'entretien que la France doit fournir en nature, la somme à payer par le gouvernement Français à titre de solde sera augmentée proportionnellement à cette réduction, afin que les Puissances soient plus promptement remboursées de la partie de la solde de la première année, que la France ne doit payer que dans les années suivantes, la France toutefois ne pouvant dans aucun cas être tenue de payer au delà de 130,000,000 par an pour la solde et les subsistances réunies de l'Armée d'Occupation.

Que relativement au dernier paragraphe de l'Article III. de la même Convention, il est entendu que si les demandes adressées par le Général-en-Chef de l'Armée d'Occupation aux autorités Françaises pour assurer les différens services énoncés dans les Articles II. et III. de la Convention Militaire restaient sans effet, ce Général serait autorisé à recourir à des mesures militaires pour faire exécuter dans les départemens occupés par les troupes sous ses ordres les stipulations des articles sus-dits.

Que relativement au second paragraphe de l'Article IV. de la même Convention il est entendu que les troupes et les transports militaires appartenant à l'armée Alliée auront le droit de passer librement auprès des places dénommées dans ce paragraphe, dans lesquelles la France tiendra garnison.

Enfin, que relativement à l'avant dernier paragraphe du même Article IV., il est entendu que le Général-en-Chef de l'armée Alliée aura le droit d'envoyer de tems en tems des officiers dans les places ci-dessus designées, afin de vérifier et de constater que les stipulations qui les concernent sont exactement remplies.

Le soussigné, en adressant la présente déclaration à LL. EE. MM. les Ministres des quatre Cours Alliées, a l'honneur, &c.

RICHELIEU.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens.* [ 1098 ]

MY DEAR TORRENS, Cambrai, 5th Nov., 1816.

Another application has been made to me lately in favour of Sir C. Halkett, and I acknowledge that I should be very glad if something could be done for him. He is a very gallant and deserving officer, and I believe has only his pay as a General officer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Paris, 7th Nov., 1816.

There can be no doubt, I think, but that the result of the elections has been favourable to the ministry; and the King's speech appears to be well calculated to strengthen them, and to soften or divide their opponents. What is said in it of the clergy meets one imputation against the government, viz., that they were disposed to leave that body in a state of neglect and destitution; while on the other hand it is so guarded as not to alarm the fears of the possessors of confiscated Church property. What is said of the Royal Family is (I take for granted) directed against the charge, currently reported and believed, of an intention somewhere to change the line of succession upon the demise of the King. That such an intention does exist among some of those who side with the Ministers against the Royalists, I certainly should be inclined to believe; but that the party entertaining such a project have any considerable strength or consistency, I cannot think. The Royalists contend that the disavowal of it by the King, in a speech known to be literally his own, proves only that he is not privy to such a project, which nobody supposed him to be; but I think it must be admitted that the public allusion to such a suspected project goes a good way towards defeating it. The Royalists take much to heart the last words of the speech; but upon the whole I have not heard that they complain of the general tenor of it. You will learn from Stuart's despatches the defeat of the Royalists in the House of Peers on the choice of Secretaries, and the success of the Ministry in the House of Deputies in the composition of the Bureaux. I confess that these things have been carried with a higher hand than I expected; I believe than the Ministers up to a very late period expected themselves. Nobody has been sanguine all along, except Pozzo. The very intention of proroguing the Chamber for a while, which certainly was not abandoned till a few days before the meeting, must have grown out of a distrust of their own strength, which the meeting appears to have dissipated.

I am most anxious to be present at a debate in the Chamber of Deputies. The first that is likely to occur is, I understand, on the Budget, on the 15th. In the course of the week after I shall turn my steps towards home.

The Duke of Wellington, I hope, has some notion of being able to afford relief in the charge, though not in the numbers, of the army. The most serious matter here is, after all, perhaps, the failure of the harvest and the vintage.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

Madame de Staël is arrived. She is violent against the Ultras, but not very warmly in favour of the Ministry. The chief object of her hostility, however, is the Alliance, which has placed 150,000 men on the frontiers of France.

Talleyrand is here since the day before the opening of the session. He is said to hold himself aloof from all parties. The Ultras, I suspect, thought it not unlikely that he might join them.

G. C.

*To Earl Bathurst.* [1099.]

My Lord, Cambrai, 8th Nov., 1816.

A practice had prevailed here lately among the army chaplains of marrying any persons who applied to them, whether His Majesty's subjects or otherwise, who should state themselves desirous of being married according to the rites of the Church of England. As soon as I discovered it, I issued a General Order to forbid all marriages by the chaplains unless the consent of the commander of the army should be obtained; and several applications having since been made to me for permission to be married, not only by soldiers or persons belonging to the army, I beg to receive your Lordship's directions upon the subject whether I am to authorise the military chaplains to perform these marriage ceremonies, and under what regulations and restrictions.

I have, &c.,

Wellington.

[Enclosures.]

I.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Downing Street, 15th Nov., 1816.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's despatch of the 8th of November, acquainting me that you had by a General Order prohibited the chaplains of the army under your Grace's command from solemnising marriages without the consent of the commander of the army, and requesting to receive directions as to the propriety of permitting the chaplains to solemnise marriages other than of soldiers or of persons belonging to the army.

At the same time that I entirely approve the General Order which your Grace has issued upon this subject, I must beg to defer conveying to you any instructions with respect to the propriety of permitting the army chaplains to solemnise marriages between any other than military persons until I shall have had an opportunity of receiving from His Majesty's law servants an opinion as to the legality of marriages so solemnised.

Bathurst.

II.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, London, 29th Nov., 1816.

With reference to your Grace's despatch of the 8th November relative to marriages solemnised by chaplains of the army, I do myself the honour to

transmit to you the copy of a Report from His Majesty's Advocate-General, to whose consideration the subject was referred; and I have to signify to your Grace the commands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent that you should in no case consent to the celebration of marriages by chaplains of the army between persons not military, unless it shall have been previously certified to your Grace that the persons desirous of being married by the military chaplain have already contracted marriage agreeably to the laws of France.

BATHURST.

III.

*The Advocate-General to Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Doctors' Commons, 23rd Nov., 1816.

I am honoured with your Lordship's commands of the 15th instant, transmitting a despatch addressed to your Lordship by his Grace the Duke of Wellington; and your Lordship is pleased to request that I would take the same into consideration, and report to your Lordship for the information of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent whether marriages solemnised abroad by a clergyman of the Church of England in a Roman Catholic country between British subjects are valid in point of law, and whether such marriages are rendered legal and valid by the circumstance of the clergyman celebrating the marriage being a chaplain of a British army stationed in the country, and solemnising it with the consent of the officer commanding such British army, the persons to be married not being military persons.

In obedience to your Lordship's directions I have considered the same, and am of opinion that the marriage of persons belonging to the British army in France by the chaplains of the army alone would be valid, as the army is to be considered as holding its position independent of the government of France.

With respect to the other individuals, the general rule applied by the law of England as the test of the validity of foreign marriages, is, whether they are celebrated according to the law of the country; and therefore it would be necessary that these marriages should be contracted agreeably to that law, and that the celebration *in ecclesia* by the chaplain of the army should not be had till after the contract is so regularly completed.

CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON.

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[1100.] CIRCULAR.

*To Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir G. Lowry Cole.*

SIR, Cambrai, 12th Nov., 1816.

The regimental hospitals of the army having lately cost a much larger sum under the system adopted under the General Orders of the * than they had when managed by

* Blank in manuscript.

the regimental surgeons, I have had an inquiry made into the subject, and I enclose the copy of a report upon it from the Commissary-General, to which I beg to draw your attention.

There are several reasons which render it desirable to continue the system of management established by the General Orders; and I beg that you will inform the commanding-officers of regiments under your command that it is necessary that they should give their attention to the demands of the regimental surgeon equally as they did to his accounts under the system of the regulations; to prevent, on the one hand, the want of anything which may be requisite for the comfort of the soldier, and on the other any unnecessary expenditure of money.

The economy of the regimental hospitals under the system of the regulations was highly creditable to the regimental surgeons, and I hope that they will not by unnecessarily extravagant demands upon the Commissariat prevent the accomplishment of those views which I have for the public service.

Necessity occasioned a departure from the old system; and I intend, if I can, to continue the regimental hospitals upon the existing system, with views to other arrangements for the benefit of the military hospitals: but I cannot effect this object unless the regimental hospitals should be conducted with more economy than they have been for the last four months.

I beg you to communicate this letter and its enclosures to the commanding officers of the regiments in your division.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[This letter and enclosures to be printed, and copies enough to be sent to each of the Lieutenant-Generals * to be circulated to the commanding-officers of the several regiments under their command.—W.]

* Lieutenant-Generals Sir H. Clinton, the Hon. Sir C. Colville, Lord Hill, Lord Combermere.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*The Commissary-General to Colonel Hervey.*

SIR, Cambrai, 22nd Oct., 1816.

Having received the commands of his Grace the Duke of Wellington to inquire minutely into the causes why the expenditure of the regimental

hospitals exceeded so much the sums appropriated to their maintenance, I have, of course, not failed to give my best attention to the investigation; and although not even now prepared to give so decided an opinion as his Grace may expect on the expediency of continuing the execution of this service as it is, or of allowing it to revert to its former channel, I may nevertheless give such information on the subject as may enable his Grace to decide the point himself from his thorough knowledge of both branches; whereas whatever information I possess is chiefly confined to my own.

| The hospital expenditure | £. | s. | d. | The indemnity for | £. | s. | d. | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In June, was | 982 | 4 | $7\frac{13}{40}$ | Rations, at 71 centimes* | 789 | 16 | $10\frac{9}{10}$ | | | |
| | | | | Stoppages* | 234 | 17 | 3 | 1024 | 14 | $1\frac{9}{10}$ |
| | | | | The indemnity for | | | | | | |
| In July | 1700 | 4 | $2\frac{6}{10}$ | Rations, at 71 centimes | 808 | 16 | $9\frac{1}{10}$ | | | |
| | | | | Stoppages | 303 | 9 | 7 | 1112 | 6 | $4\frac{1}{10}$ |
| | | | | The indemnity for | | | | | | |
| In August | 1695 | 18 | $9\frac{24}{40}$ | Rations, at 71 centimes | 842 | 15 | $11\frac{9}{10}$ | | | |
| | | | | Stoppages | 283 | 2 | 2 | 1125 | 18 | $1\frac{9}{10}$ |
| | — | | | Leaving a balance, in 3 months, against the hospitals, of | | | | 1115 | 8 | $11\frac{35}{40}$ |
| | 4378 | 7 | $7\frac{31}{40}$ | | | | | 4378 | 7 | $7\frac{31}{40}$ |

* [This sum is 8*d.*; with 3*d.* stoppage from each soldier in hospital, makes 11*d.* The usual stoppage from the soldier in regimental hospitals is 9*d.*!! Observe, likewise, that in the credit for *stoppages* are included those from men in general hospitals. Yet with all these advantages the regimental hospitals are now a burthen upon the public, instead of, as before, producing a saving!!—W.]

This balance, however, as we are to receive under the Convention lately signed 79 centimes for each man, instead of 71, as calculated above, will, in fact, be reduced to 840*l.* 7*s.* $0\frac{31}{40}$*d.* on the three months.

From the above it will be seen that, whilst the sums received in lieu of rations and the stoppages for the three months are nearly the same, the expenses have augmented considerably; nor does this appear to arise so much from the increase of prices as from the extra quantities required. And on a perusal of the different accounts the following heads of service have occurred to me as being where it is not improbable that some alteration might be effected without any material injury.

1st. The surgeons have, almost invariably, exacted the first quality of tea, which costs 10 francs per pound; whereas I learn that tea at 7 francs was formerly deemed sufficiently good.

2ndly. The same may, in some instances, be said with regard to sugar, which certain surgeons have required to be refined, and, in one instance, double-refined was applied for, but refused.

3rdly. The very best bread is demanded in general; whereas good household bread, by the War Office regulations, seems to be defined as sufficient, excepting, indeed, in very bad cases.

4thly. Coals, instead of being required of a fair mixture of large and

small, are frequently exacted in large lumps only. The small coal costs 9 f. 50 c. per 1000 lbs.; the large 16 f. 25 c. per 1000 lbs.: but of the expediency of this I cannot form an opinion.

5thly. The amount paid for wages of hospital servants, and washing, &c., appears very considerable, the expenditure under these heads having amounted, between the 25th June and 24th August, a period of only two months, for wages, 300*l.* 13*s.* 11*d.*; and for washing, &c., 291*l.* 3*s.*

6thly. The article of wine forms also a heavy part of the expenditure, and a considerable proportion of port, at 6 francs per bottle, has been furnished; but on the expediency of this in a country where wines of a very good quality can be had cheaper, I am equally incompetent to judge.

Independently of the above, the Commissariat officers under me to whom I have had recourse for information have brought the following observations on the subject to my notice, and they seem to require that I should notice them here:

1st. The 9th Regiment and the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade have drawn nothing but mutton for the month of August, at 57½ centimes per pound; whereas good contract beef could be furnished at 45 centimes, with the deduction of 2 per cent.

2ndly. The same regiments drew for a time loaf sugar, at 40 sols per pound.

3rdly. The 5th Regiment drew, in the month of August, 55½ pounds of tea, of the first quality, at 10 francs per pound.

4thly. Assistant Commissary-General Dobree paid, in August last, for repairing the hospitals of the 3rd battalion Royals, for the

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Slater's bill | .. .. .. .. .. .. | 142 francs |
| Carpenter's | .. .. .. .. .. .. | 27 „ |
| Joiner's | .. .. .. .. .. .. | 30 „ |
| Mason's | .. .. .. .. .. .. | 291 „ |
| Locksmith's | .. .. .. .. .. .. | 19 „ |
| | In all .. .. .. | 509 |

5thly. The surgeon of the 23rd Regiment, among other articles, had incurred an expense of nearly 100 francs for bed curtains, and, on the account being refused payment, it was stated to have been inserted by mistake. The copy of it, however, which is enclosed, shows the whole to have been duly supported by the necessary certificates. Indeed, the regular way would have been, not for the surgeon to have incurred the expenses, but to have demanded what was requisite, in order to have been then furnished and paid for by this department.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

E. Bisset.

II.

MÉMOIRE des MARCHANDISES et Objets fournis par le Soussigné à l'Hôpital du 23me Régiment d'Infanterie de l'Armée Anglaise pendant le mois de Juin, 1816.

Bapaume, ce 1 Août, 1816.

| | F. | C. |
|---|---|---|
| Quatre balais de crin, à 2 f. 50 c. | 10 | 0 |
| Quatre torchons de toile grise, à 1 f. 80 c. | 7 | 20 |
| Quatre brosses, à 45 sols | 9 | 0 |
| Une pelle en fer avec manche | 2 | 50 |
| 6 balais de bois, à 10 cents. | 0 | 60 |
| Six assiettes, à 25 cents. | 1 | 50 |
| Deux secrétaires, à 2 francs | 4 | 0 |
| 2 rouge d'Angleterre, à 50 cents. | 1 | 0 |
| 12 petites boettes en fer blanc, à 20 cents. | 2 | 40 |
| 2 bassins en fer blanc, à 5 francs | 10 | 0 |
| 20 cadres en fer blanc pour numéroter les lits, à 25 cents. | 5 | 0 |
| 6 écuelles en fer blanc, à 1 f. 50 c. | 9 | 0 |
| Deux gamelles en fer blanc, à 7 f. 50 c. | 15 | 0 |
| Deux seaux en fer blanc, à 6 francs | 12 | 0 |
| 44 aunes de toile blanche, à 34 sols | 74 | 80 |
| Pour façon de huit rideaux, à 1 franc | 8 | 0 |
| Pour cordonnet et moulette pour les rideaux | 7 | 50 |
| Pour 18 bâtons ronds pour les dits rideaux, à 50 cents. | 9 | 0 |
| 20 planches pour les têtes de lit, à 40 cents. | 8 | 0 |
| 3 boettes pour mettre le charbon, à 3 f. 50 c. | 10 | 50 |
| Une paire de béquilles | 1 | 25 |
| Pour avoir fait ferrer neuf bâtons pour les rideaux, virolles, &c. | 9 | 0 |
| Ferré huit poulies pour fenêtres, à 60 cents. | 4 | 80 |
| Ferré vingt tablettes, mis des charnières à chaque | | |
| Vingt crochets, quatre vingt pitons | 30 | 0 |
| Total | 252 | 5 |

Certifié véritable le présent Mémoire, montant à la somme de deux cents cinquante deux francs cinq centimes.

(Signé) Femme CATETOING.
(Signé) JOHN DUNN,
Surgeon, 23rd Regiment.

Vu par le Maire de la Ville de Bapaume,
le 1 Août, 1816. (Signé) BONIFACE.

(Stamp of the Municipality of Bapaume.)

I certify that the above articles, amounting to two hundred and fifty-two francs five centimes, have been obtained for the use of the hospital of the 23rd Regiment, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

(Signed) JOHN DUNN,
Surgeon, 23rd Regiment.

*To the Rev. W. Elliott.* [1101.]

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 12th Nov., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 5th. I have been obliged, for many good reasons, to refuse to give leave of absence to every officer upon the General or Regimental Staff of the army, and I have not yet departed from this rule in any instance. I am aware that this practice is not very agreeable to those who are the objects of it, and that neither they nor their friends are disposed to admit its justice. But still I confess that, seeing how many officers we now have qualified to fill Staff situations, I cannot see any reason why the public should pay those who absent themselves from their duty with the army, either for their pleasure or for their private business. I am also of opinion that there is but little of the latter which requires an officer's personal attendance at home; and I am certain that till the officers of the army, particularly those on the Staff, make up their minds to consider their profession the sole business of their life, our army, good as it is, will not be in the state of perfection in which it ought to be.

I have stated thus much to you, in order to account for my refusal of the leave of absence which your son had before requested, which, however, I have now granted at your request for one month. I beg you will observe that he is the only instance of a departure from this rule, and it is probable that this departure will occasion a renewal of all the applications to which up to this moment I have refused to attend.

I sincerely congratulate you upon the marriage of your daughter. I hope that your own health is good.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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G. O. Cambrai, 13th Nov., 1816. [1102.]

1. The Field Marshal having received intimation of the distress which the wives of soldiers experience, arising from the imprudence of their husbands in writing to them to come out to this country, desires that officers commanding regiments will in the most pointed manner caution the non-commissioned officers and soldiers against inducing their wives to come out to the

regiments without the permission of the commanding officers thereof, as they will in all probability be subject to prevention of embarkation at Dover, or, should they by clandestine means get across the water, to apprehension at Calais by the French police and be sent back to Dover; and even should they ultimately succeed in getting to the regiment, they cannot obtain rations, quarters, or any of the benefits accorded to a soldier's wife who is permitted to be with the regiment.

2. The officers commanding regiments, in their communications with the officers in charge of their respective depôts, should take care to acquaint them whether any, and what number of men who are expected to be sent out to join the regiment, may be permitted to bring their wives with them.

3. All officers who come out from England in charge of detachments are required to make an immediate report, on their arrival at Calais, to the Assistant Quartermaster-General, of any women who may have got on board the vessel clandestinely, in order that steps may be taken for sending them back, and the officer will be held responsible that no such women are permitted to disembark at Calais.

4. The number of women allowed to remain with each regiment will be six per troop or company.

WELLINGTON.

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[1103.] *To the Prince of Hesse.*

MON PRINCE, Cambrai, ce 15 Nov., 1816.

J'envois à V.A. les copies de lettres que je reçois de Paris sur un événement qui est arrivé auprès de Lewarde. Je prie V.A. de lire les traités, et elle y verra que tous les droits et prérogatives de Souverain restent dans les mains du Roi de France dans les pays occupés; et il n'y a pas de doute que le droit de rendre justice aux habitans est un des plus précieux de sa couronne, qu'il ne doit pas et qu'il ne peut pas abdiquer.

L'événement est très malheureux, et je prie V.A. de m'en faire connoître les circonstances, et son opinion sur les mesures qu'elle pourra adopter tant pour donner satisfaction à l'habitant qu'au gouvernement Français.

WELLINGTON.

*To the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai.* [1104.]

M. LE PRÉFET, Cambrai, ce 16 Nov., 1816.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que j'ai fait faire le procès et je viens de donner les ordres pour la punition d'un officier qui a eu la bassesse d'être, de concert avec une maison Anglaise à Cambrai, sous le firme de Mitchel et Reddall, à faire entrer des marchandises de contrebande en France. Les marchandises ont été donné aux officiers des douanes de Cambrai.

Ayant fait punir l'officier, c'est à vous, Monsieur le Préfet, de juger ce qu'il faudroit avec les soi-disants marchands.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1105.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 19th Nov., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 8th. It is quite impossible to form a satisfactory judgment upon any political question without having before me the state of the case, and I don't know the nature of the demand which the Spaniards have made upon you. I take the urgency of our interference high from seeing the danger of Portugal, which country, sooner or later, we must defend, in order to prevent its falling into the hands of Spain entirely, or from being materially crippled.

The change of ministry in Spain, and the effect that change will have at Paris, are important points in the case. You may depend upon it that the object of the French Court is in some manner or other to reunite the Family Courts, *coûte qu'il coûte.* Have you received an answer to your overture respecting the reversion of the Italian Duchies?

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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G. O. Cambrai, 19th Nov., 1816. [1106.]

* * * * *

3. Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by the Field Marshal.

4. The Field Marshal requests the particular attention of

the officers of the army to the charge of which Captain —— of the —— —— —— has been found guilty; and for which it is his duty to reprimand that officer.

5. Certain tradesmen at Cambrai contrived, under different false pretences, to introduce goods into France without payment of duties, which were transmitted in the usual course to the stores at Cambrai, from whence, according to order, they could not be removed without the signature to a receipt of the Commanding officer of the regiment to which the goods were addressed. But Captain —— took upon him to sign this receipt, knowing that the goods in question did not belong to the —— —— ——, but to the tradesmen above referred to, who accordingly received them from the stores.

6. It is not proved, or even charged, that Captain —— derived any profit from the transaction, but he made himself a party to all the false pretences and frauds by which it was conducted; and he was the principal actor in its completion. Although the receipt of profit is neither charged nor proved, yet it will scarcely be believed that motives of private friendship for tradesmen, a mere desire to enable them to increase their profits at the expense of the French government, could have induced an officer to become a principal party in a transaction in which so many frauds have been committed, and which is so very disgraceful to the character of the army.

7. Captain —— is hereby reprimanded.

WELLINGTON.

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[1107.] *To the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai.*

M. LE PRÉFET, Cambrai, ce 22 Nov., 1816.

J'ai demandé d'avoir l'honneur de vous voir enfin de vous parler encore sur la police des routes. Ce matin la route étoit encore en plusieurs endroits intransitables. Les voitures ne veulent pas se donner place les uns aux autres; ils arrêtent, et la route devient tellement barrée qu'on peut à peine passer à cheval.

Je n'en ai pas vu un seul qui avoit le nom ou le numéro du propriétaire.

Je voulois aussi vous parler sur une discussion qui a eu lieu entre le maire et le Colonel Barnard sur l'état des rues de la

ville de Cambrai. Il n'y a pas de doute, Monsieur le Préfet, que quand l'état d'une ville devient tellement empiré que les militaires peuvent en ressentir les mauvais effets, c'est le devoir du Commandant de la place d'en faire une représentation au maire, et je crois que ceux qui voudroient concilier les choses diront que c'est le devoir du maire d'y donner attention. Voilà ma manière de voir cette discussion; ce que je voulois vous expliquer en personne aujourd'hui si j'eusse pu avoir le plaisir de vous trouver chez vous.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Palmerston.* [1108.]

MY LORD, Cambrai, 22nd Nov., 1816.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 16th.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the only capacity which I fill in this country under the British government is that of Commander of the British contingent, and I have nothing to say to any accounts in the Low Countries.

I have, however, directed the Commissary-General to transmit your Lordship's letter and the papers enclosed to the British Commissary remaining at Bruxelles for the settlement of unsettled accounts.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir Charles Stuart.* [1109.]

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 23rd Nov., 1816.

I have received your letters of the 21st, with that from M. Fabricius to the Ministers of the Allied Courts, regarding the payment of the money for four months to the King of the Netherlands on account of the Fortification Fund. The fortifications in the Netherlands are in progress, and I conceive that the money received from the French government ought to be paid to M. Fabricius as required.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1110.] *To Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 23rd Nov., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 21st regarding the directions recently received by Baron Vincent from Prince Metternich regarding the question of the reduction of the Allied forces in France, respecting which I can form no judgment without seeing them. In my opinion the time is approaching when that question ought to be discussed by the Ministers of the Allied Courts residing at Paris. The course which it ought regularly to take is as follows:—It should be discussed by the Ministers in conference, and I will either attend them or send my opinion in writing. They should then inform their Courts of the result of this discussion, and each obtain orders for their guidance. If the result of the discussion should be an early diminution of the force, each Court will, of course, give its own orders to its own General, apprising me of the same.

As this measure has long been in contemplation, it is very possible that the Ministers of each of the four Courts have instructions for their guidance, as I know you have, and as it appears Baron Vincent has. But as these instructions can be only conditional, and depending upon the state of affairs and opinions in France, and upon the result of the discussion amongst yourselves and with me, which must take place upon this question, I don't conceive that any benefit can be derived from placing on the protocol prematurely the instructions to any Minister, or the opinion of any Court; on the contrary, it will serve only to cramp and fetter discussion on a question on which it ought to be most free. This, however, is a matter of private opinion, which, of course, must be subordinate to the instructions which Baron Vincent will have received. The next point to be considered is the period at which the Allied Ministers will take this question into consideration. Do they consider the measures and intentions of the legislature to be sufficiently clearly manifested to enable them now to reason upon them as certain in this discussion? Would it not be advisable to allow more time, and before the question is discussed to see what will be the nature of the discussions in the Chambers, and what their conduct and decisions in the several questions brought before them by the government?

I throw out these points for consideration, and I shall be glad to hear from the Ministers of the Allied Courts upon them.

Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Messrs. Caldwell.* [1111.]

GENTLEMEN, Cambrai, 26th Nov., 1816.

I have before taken an opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of 4000*l.* and of 8000*l.*, being the amount of the subscriptions of the gentlemen of the Madras establishment for the benefit of the widows and orphans of those who fell in the battle of Waterloo.

Conceiving from the tenor of the communications you made to me that it was your wish that I should myself dispose of these sums, I made every inquiry respecting the best mode of effecting your object; but I found upon examination and after mature deliberation that the Committee for the management of the Waterloo Fund had already provided for every case, and that if I had taken upon myself to distribute your money I must have been guilty of partiality and injustice. I therefore considered that I should act as you would have done yourselves if you had been on the spot, by handing over your money to the Committee to be disposed of by them, and to be distributed particularly in making an addition to the provision already made for the widows and orphans of those who had fallen.

I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote on this occasion to General Sir George Beckwith, the chairman of the Committee; and as I am anxious to retain the confidence which the gentlemen of Madras were pleased to repose in me, it will give me the greatest satisfaction to know that they approve of the measure which I have adopted upon this occasion.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[Look at their letter and take the address from it, or copy the address on the last letter.]

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[1112.] *To General Lord Lynedoch.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 27th Nov., 1816.

I return Mr. Dunmore's letter. I should have been very happy if it had been possible for Mr. Dunmore to remain with the army, and I think an injustice was done to him in removing him; but having been removed, and another gentleman having been appointed to the situation, it is impossible for me, without doing an equal injustice to that gentleman, to take any step which can have a tendency to remove him to make room for Mr. Dunmore.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1113.] *To General Sir Robert Brownrigg, Bart.*

SIR, Cambrai, 29th Nov., 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 25th of June last, and an address from the inhabitants of the Island of Ceylon; and Mr. Huskisson has informed me that he has at my disposal the sum of 1500*l.*, being the amount hitherto paid of the subscription of the respectable inhabitants of Ceylon for the relief of the widows and orphans of the brave soldiers of the army under my command who fell in the battle of Waterloo.

Having already had occasion to make inquiry regarding the mode of distributing the amount of similar subscriptions for the benefit of those concerned, and to carry into execution the beneficent views of the subscribers, I have considered it best to place them all at the disposal of the Committee for the management of the Waterloo Fund; and I write accordingly by this occasion to Mr. Huskisson to request that he will pay the amount of the subscription of the inhabitants of Ceylon to the same Committee; and I transmit the list of subscribers to be published.

I beg leave to take this opportunity of returning my thanks to your Excellency and to the respectable inhabitants of Ceylon for their humane and kind attention to the relatives of the brave officers and soldiers who served under my command, and

for the confidence they have been pleased to repose in me in employing me to carry into execution their humane intentions.

I have likewise to express my best acknowledgments for the Address to myself with which they have accompanied this act of beneficence. Nothing can be more gratifying to me than to receive these marks of the confidence and approbation of gentlemen who have shown that no difference of pursuit, no distance, no duration of absence can weaken their feelings for the interests of their country and of mankind, nor their humane affections for those who have fallen in the contest.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Major Gabriel.* [1114.]

SIR, Cambrai, 29th Nov., 1816.

I return you the proceedings of the Court Martial, of which you are President, for revision, because the charge does not import an offence punishable by sentence of transportation, and that the forfeiture of pay and allowance during the confinement of the prisoner would have taken effect under the 19th section of the Mutiny Act without any adjudication at all on that point.

It will be fit also for the Court to consider, on a revisal, whether it is their intention to convict the prisoner of the capital offence of burglary, and to declare so in their finding, in which case the Court must pass sentence of death on the prisoner; or if it is their intention to convict the prisoner of the military offence of being out of his quarters after watch-setting, aggravated by the circumstance of his having forced his way into the house, and being discovered in the cellar attempting to steal the liquor of the person on whom he is quartered, it is open to the Court so to modify their finding, and to pass sentence under the 24th section of the Mutiny Act.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1115.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Campbell.*

MY DEAR CAMPBELL, Cambrai, 2nd Dec., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 28th November, and am rejoiced to find that you are returned in good health, with Lady Campbell and your daughter.

I received your letter respecting the money for the Waterloo Fund, to which I have lately written an answer, of which I enclose the duplicate.

As you think of coming over here, you will be glad to know what my probable movements may be. I propose shortly to go to Bruxelles; from thence I shall return here after an absence of two or three days; and I shall remain here till about Christmas, when I shall go to Paris. I need not add how happy I shall be to see you.

Ever, my dear Campbell, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1116.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 2nd Dec., 1816.

I heard only yesterday that Sir Alexander Campbell had not got the Second Class of the Order of the Bath. If I had known or observed the omission of his name before, I would certainly have taken the liberty of drawing your attention to his services and claims at an earlier period; but as there are still some vacancies, and his return from his late command in the Isle of France affords a fair opportunity of doing him justice, I now take the liberty of doing so. Sir Alexander Campbell was always respected and distinguished as an officer in the East Indies. I can recollect perfectly his distinguishing himself at the siege of Seringapatam upon more than one occasion. He commanded a division of infantry at the battle of Talavera, which, you will see by the reports, took 20 pieces of the enemy's cannon. He was there severely wounded. He returned to the army early in 1810, and was with us during what I think the most arduous and disagreeable part of the service in the Peninsula, the years 1810 and 1811; and in the battles of Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro; and in the operations in Estremadura and Castille which followed the first attempts to retake Badajoz

and Ciudad Rodrigo. He commanded the 6th division from the time it was formed in 1810 till he quitted the army in the end of 1811.

If you look over the list of the officers who were in the battle of Talavera and in the same situation with Sir Alexander Campbell, viz. Sir John Sherbrooke, Lord Hill, General Mackenzie who was killed, Sir William Payne who quitted the army early in 1810, and Lord Combermere, you will see that Sir Alexander, who was certainly by accident the most successful on that day, has not been the most favoured, and he has besides from other causes every claim to this mark of distinction.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens.* [1117.]

MY DEAR TORRENS, —Cambrai, 3rd Dec., 1816.

I have received your letter of November 29, and I entirely concur in your establishment of 800 rank and file for the infantry. I am afraid, however, that you will have to reduce it lower, as we are about to discuss at Paris a reduction of our force to the amount of 30,000 men, which will reduce us 5000. I intend to object to the reduction, but I am not certain that I shall be able to keep the force at its existing strength.

I concur with you. The Ministers must take a lead in the country; they must regain the ground they lost last session in Parliament, or they are gone.

As for our distress, I believe it consists principally in the reduction of our war establishments, in the rage for travelling of all our gentry, which have deprived some of our people of employment, and lastly and principally in the idleness, dissipation, and improvidence of all the middling and lower classes in England, produced by a long course of prosperity and of flattery of their vices by the higher orders and the government.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1118.] *To Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 3rd Dec., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 1st. That which I have always imagined turns out now to be the case, viz. that the anxiety to place the Austrian note on the protocol is founded upon the apprehension that the Russians should first stir the question of reduction, and upon a wish to get a little favour at the Court of France. This policy is beneath M. de Metternich.

I have never changed my opinion. We must know better than we do now how the Chambers will conduct themselves before we can ever discuss the question with advantage; and I won't take any step which can lead to a premature discussion, particularly if I should be at Paris when it is produced. Therefore I will not go there till the day shall be fixed for the discussion, and I will either attend or send my opinion in writing.

I am going to Bruxelles, but shall be back on Sunday.

Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

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[1119.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Bruxelles, 6th Dec., 1816.

Sir Charles Stuart informed you in one of his last despatches that M. Ouvrard was coming to speak to me on the subject of a scheme which the French government had in contemplation to raise a loan in England to complete the supplies of the year. He arrived here yesterday, and I have talked with him yesterday and this day.

It appears that the sum which is wanting is 300,000,000: that is to say, 140,000,000 for the war contribution to the Allies, and 160,000,000 for the pay and subsistence of their armies. On account of the high price of all articles of provision in consequence of the failure of the harvest, it is impossible to raise this sum by loan at all, and it is equally impossible for French agents to raise it in France by the use of Inscriptions of Rentes. M. Ouvrard went to England some time ago to converse upon

the state of the French finance with Mr. Baring and Mr. Hope, and to see whether any assistance could be derived from them; and both appeared to be of opinion that it was practicable to give the French government the aid required, and that the capital would probably be found in France and in other parts of the continent of Europe if their names should appear in the transaction; but they refused to be concerned without the consent of the British government. A discussion then ensued upon the different degrees of consent and encouragement which these gentlemen would require, of which I will give you the outline. One idea was that the Allies should be generally responsible together with the French government for the whole sum advanced, which I told M. Ouvrard was quite out of the question, and I was convinced the British government would not listen to the proposition for a moment. Another idea was that that part of the transaction which went to provide for the pay and subsistence of the troops should be exclusively French, and that for the other part, viz. 140,000,000, the Allies should each be responsible for the sum it should receive. I told M. Ouvrard that this proposition was equally inadmissible, and that, in point of fact, the British government derived so little advantage from the war contribution that even if circumstances and the state of public opinion in England were such as to favour the measure, it would not be worth while to violate a principle for such a consideration; and I told him that I was of opinion that all idea of security on the part of Great Britain must be laid aside, as I was convinced the government would not listen to the proposition for a moment. In regard to consent or permission, I told M. Ouvrard that I was not aware of the existence of any law to prevent a British subject from lending his money or assisting in loans to a foreign power in time of peace, although it was certain that no respectable person would in these times enter into such a transaction if it should be discountenanced by the government. I then pointed out to M. Ouvrard the opinions which might possibly prevail in England on this question. Some might think it so important that the settlement of last November should be maintained, as that an inconvenience ought to be suffered in England in order to maintain it; others might, on the other hand, think that all the resources which Great Britain possessed or could draw from other countries were necessary to support the public and private credit of the country, and that the govern-

ment ought, not only to give no encouragement or permission to this transaction, but ought to oppose it, and adopt every measure to prevent its execution; and that it appeared to me that the government would permit or would discourage the transaction according to the prevalence of the one or the other of these opinions.

M. Ouvrard then opened himself still further. He said that he thought that Baring and Hope would enter into the transaction on these terms: they would take 16,000,000 of Rentes from the French government, and would engage to supply the means of paying and finding subsistence for the Allied army, provided the Allies would employ them as their agents to dispose of the Rentes and other securities which might be placed in their hands in payment of the contribution of the year 1817, under the Convention to carry into execution the 4th article of the Treaty. I told him that upon the whole of this question I understood that he and I were talking merely as friends, and that he was come to me to know what I thought the government would do. The choice of the persons to be entrusted with the disposal of these securities certainly rested with the Allies; and it was not probable the British government would oppose itself to the employment of any persons in this business to whom the other Allies should think proper to entrust it, more particularly if in the selection of those persons the Allies were guided by views of convenience for the French government. I begged M. Ouvrard to observe, however, that the consent to employ these persons would be a species of encouragement to British subjects to aid the French government with the capital and resources of Great Britain, and that the British government might find itself under the necessity of objecting in the first instance to give even this limited encouragement to the transaction.

M. Ouvrard expressed an anxiety that Mr. Vansittart should see Mr. Baring on this subject.

I believe the extent of the capital which they expect to get in England is about 2,000,000*l.* sterling. The greatest part of the remainder they expect to get in France by the credit of the foreign names, and some in Holland, and a little in Germany.

It is my opinion that unless some arrangement of the description proposed is adopted, France will be aground this year, and our settlement of last year will be entirely destroyed. The

harvest in wine has failed entirely; the old revenue will probably not be realised; and no new taxes can be laid on with any prospect of anything but ruin to the old revenue. If they can get through the difficulty of this year, it is probable that they will get through those of the following years by additional taxes, or by the adoption of a similar measure to that now proposed, which the improvement of public credit will facilitate, or by a mixture of both.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I return to Cambrai on Sunday.

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*To Her Royal Highness the Princess Charlotte.* [1120.]

Cambrai, 9th Dec., 1816.

I had the honour of receiving last night your Royal Highness's letter of the 20th of November; and as I hope soon to have it in my power to recommend officers to the Spanish government for the Order of St. Ferdinand, your Royal Highness may depend upon it that I will not forget Sir R. Gardiner's claims to that mark of distinction nor your Royal Highness's wishes in his favour.

In respect to the Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword, a great length of time has elapsed since I have ceased to recommend any officer for it, and I could not with propriety again write to the King of Portugal with a view to make fresh recommendations. It also happens that Sir R. Gardiner's services were confined to Spain, at least during that period of the war in which the operations of the British army were most important to the Portuguese government. I should think, therefore, that it would be best not to recommend him for that Order.

I was highly flattered by your Royal Highness's gracious notice of me, and that of Prince Leopold, when I was in England; and your Royal Highness may rely upon my taking the earliest opportunity which circumstances may afford of paying my duty to you again.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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## DECLARATION OF THE KING OF THE TWO SICILIES.

FERDINAND I., by the Grace of God, King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, of Jerusalem, &c., Infant of Spain, Duke of Parma, Placentia, Castro, &c. &c., Hereditary Grand Prince of Tuscany, &c. &c.

The Congress of Vienna, in the solemn act to which Europe owes the re-establishment of justice and of peace, confirming the legitimacy of the rights of our Crown, has recognised us and our heirs and successors as King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Such an act having been ratified by all the Powers, we, wishing to carry it fully into effect in as far as regards ourselves, have determined to ordain and establish, as fixed and perpetual laws of our States, the following dispositions :—

ARTICLE I.

All our Royal dominions on this side of the Faro, and beyond it, shall constitute the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

ART. II.

The title which we assume till the time of the publication of the present law is the following: Ferdinand I., by the Grace of God, King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, of Jerusalem, &c., Infant of Spain, Duke of Parma, Placentia, Castro, &c. &c., Hereditary Grand Prince of Tuscany, &c. &c. &c.

ART. III.

All the Acts which shall emanate from us, or which shall be issued in our Royal name by the public functionaries in our Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, shall bear in the preamble the title which we have described in the preceding Article.

ART. IV.

The full powers and credentials which shall be given to our Ambassadors, Ministers, and Agents whomsoever, at the Courts of foreign Powers, shall be immediately withdrawn and exchanged at the same time for others which shall be issued according to the tenor of the second Article.

ART. V.

The succession in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be perpetually regulated by the law of our august father Charles III., published in Naples on the 6th of October, in the year 1759.

ART. VI.

We establish a General Chancery of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which shall always be in the place of our usual residence, and shall be presided over by one of our Ministers Secretaries of State, who shall have the title of Minister Chancellor of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

ART. VII.

In this General Chancery shall be kept the registry and the deposit of all the laws and decrees which shall be issued by us.

ART. VIII.

The Minister Chancellor shall affix our Royal seal to all our laws and decrees, and shall attest and countersign our signature in them. The same officer shall be charged with the issue of all our laws and decrees to all the constituted authorities in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and shall watch over their publication and enforcement.

ART. IX.

There shall be moreover in this General Chancery a Council for the discussion and preparation of the most important affairs of the State, previous to their being submitted by our Ministers for our Sovereign decision in our Council of State, and it shall be denominated the Supreme Council of Chancery. The Minister Chancellor shall be President of it.

ART. X.

One particular law issued by us shall fix the internal organization of the General Chancery, and shall determine more distinctly the attributes of the Minister Chancellor and of the Supreme Council of Chancery.

We will and command that this our law, subscribed by us, attested by our Councillor and Secretary of State the Minister of Grace and Justice, sealed with our great seal, and countersigned by our Councillor and Secretary of State the Minister Chancellor, and registered and deposited in the General Chancery of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, be published with the usual solemnities throughout all the said kingdom, by means of the proper authorities, whose duty it will become to make a particular registry of it, and assure its enforcement.

Our Minister Chancellor of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is specially charged to watch over its publication.

Given at Caserta the 8th December, 1816.

FERDINAND.

The Secretary of State, Minister of Grace and Justice,
THE MARQUIS TOMMASI.

The Secretary of State, Minister Chancellor,
TOMMASO DI SOMMA.

Published in Naples the 9th of December, 1816.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir C. Halkett.* [1121.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Cambrai, 10th Dec., 1816.

I assure you that it would give me the greatest satisfaction to be of use to you, and I have already and will still endeavour to forward your views, although I cannot do so in the mode you propose.

I thought it proper to make arrangements for appointing one

agent for the management of our prize concerns connected with the Dutch army, and I selected Tripp, because he had been aide-de-camp to the Prince of Orange during the campaign, and was thus in some manner belonging to them. You could not be considered so in any degree; and therefore when Tripp died, and before I received your letter, I had desired Fagel to ask the King whether he had any objection to my employing Baron Constant in this manner, to which he answered that he had none. I confess that even if I had received your letter before Fagel had spoken to the King, I should have found it difficult to propose you, as you were so entirely disconnected from the army of the Netherlands.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1122.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Cambrai, 10th Dec., 1816.

I have the honour to enclose a letter from Mr. Rosenhagen regarding the settlement of the accounts of claims of the Hanoverian army under the late treaty of subsidy, from which your Lordship will observe that the agent employed by the Hanoverian army objects to adopt the principle on which I proposed that the claims should be settled.

It is very desirable that this subject should be brought to a conclusion at an early period.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1123.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 10th Dec., 1816.

I have received your letter of the 5th, and I will advise Lord Combermere as you desire. At the same time I must mention that I think him the best General officer of cavalry we have, and by far the most satisfactory to do business with.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.* [1124.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 11th Dec., 1816.

I enclose a letter which I have received from the Conde de Toreno, who is at Paris, explaining his distresses, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take his case into consideration and let me know if government can do anything for him. You will recollect that he was the first person deputed to England from Spain as Vizconde de Matarosa. He was afterwards the most distinguished of the members of the Cortes after Arguelles; and although we had not much reason to be pleased with his conduct, we had none to be otherwise. He was always on good terms with my brother and me.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Conde de Toreno.* [1125.]

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, Cambrai, ce 11 Déc., 1816.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 2me, qui m'avait suivi à Bruxelles, et vous pouvez vous assurer que je ferai tout en mon pouvoir en toutes manières pour vous être utile. En conséquence j'écris aujourd'hui au Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique; mais vous ferez bien de me faire savoir sans perte de temps quel est l'état de vos dettes et de vos besoins en général, enfin que je puisse eur écrire avec plus de certitude.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir J. Lambert.* [1126.]

SIR, Cambrai, 11th Dec., 1816.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of ——— of the ———, and it is my duty to desire they would revise their sentence.

I object to the use of the term *most honourably* in the acquittal of the first charge. That charge is not proved; but the evidence upon the transaction to which it relates is not sufficiently clear, nor is the conduct of ——— in the subsequent part

of the transaction which has been the subject of investigation, in the opinion of the General Court Martial, sufficiently free from blame, to entitle him to the distinction of an honourable acquittal. This distinction ought to be conferred by a General Court Martial in general only in instances in which the conduct of an officer or soldier under trial has been not only free from blame on the whole transaction under inquiry, but praiseworthy, which cannot be stated in this instance.

I directed that ——— should be brought to trial on this occasion, because I wished to show to the government and people of this country that no officer, whatever his rank or merits, should be permitted to commit an act of this description with impunity; and I wished to mark my disapprobation of the mode but too common among the officers of the army lately of making use of their fists upon every occasion in which their anger might be excited. I believe it will be admitted that these are legitimate and important objects.

In the existing state of the administration of the justice of the country in which the army is stationed, and adverting to the notoriety of the number of cases in which justice has not been done by the French tribunals to the officers and soldiers of the army who have appealed to them, it is important that I should be able to show not only that I have done my duty in maintaining the discipline of the army, but that Courts Martial have done theirs in the trials which have come before them, without partiality to anybody, and above all, without adverting to the conduct of the French Courts of justice, to which their brother officers and soldiers have been obliged to appeal.

It is also important for the discipline and for the reputation of the army that the mode, recently too common, of each officer revenging his own cause by knocking down and beating him who may have offended him, should be checked and discontinued, and this can be done effectually only by the sentences of General Courts Martial.

I would now beg to appeal to the Court Martial whether their judgment, which is, I believe, unprecedented in a General Court Martial after a finding of guilty, is calculated to answer either of these objects. It exposes the justice of the army to all the imputations hitherto made with truth exclusively against the French Courts of justice, of which we complain; and as a punishment for an unofficerlike and military offence (for I must term it a

military offence for an officer to take the law into his own hands and beat a man with his fists), the sentence must ever be a matter of joke and mockery, and an encouragement rather than a preventive of the offence.

The Court having with reason acquitted ——— of the crime charged in the first instance, there may be, as there are, circumstances of extenuation in the case; but that consideration should be stated in the sentence; and the sentence should be such as to show the determination of British officers to do impartial justice, whatever may be the conduct of others, and to mark their sense of the military impropriety of an appeal to bodily strength and skill in the art of boxing on every occasion in which an officer may be offended.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1127.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 11th Dec., 1816.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Beresford, which contains some account of the Portuguese expedition in the Spanish colonies, and an account of the state of affairs in Portugal, which may be of use to you, although it is not improbable that you have the intelligence from other quarters.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Pozzo di Borgo, the copy of one from the Emperor to myself, and the copy of a memorandum which the Emperor has sent to Pozzo di Borgo on the question of the reduction of the Allied forces in France. I likewise enclose the copy of my answer to Pozzo di Borgo.

My opinion of the reduction as a practical measure is very much altered. When I was in England I thought it was practicable and desirable; but since that period I have observed a great change in the opinion of the people in this country on the measure of occupation itself. You will recollect that when we adopted that measure, not only the King and his Ministers and his friends, but the people of the country in general, were of opinion that the measure was absolutely necessary for the protection of the settlement then made: the general cry then was,

"Vous n'allez pas nous laisser dans les mains de ces bourreaux;" and although there was a difference of opinion regarding the amount of the force and of the burthens imposed upon France by the Allies, there was none among the friends of order and peace respecting the necessity of the occupation of a military position within the French frontier by an Allied military force. The measure has succeeded beyond our most sanguine expectations: not only are there no complaints, but I really believe that the common people of the departments occupied, particularly those occupied by us, are delighted to have the troops, and the money spent among them. But not so the gentry, particularly the Royalists; not so those employed by the government, and even the Ministers themselves; and there is a general cry throughout France against the occupation, and, as usual, particularly against England, of whom it is reported and supposed that her government insists upon the occupation by the whole force, against the wishes and inclination of the Emperor of Russia.

All this would be of little importance in the decision of the question of reduction if the King's government possessed any real authority and strength, and if the people of the country were not of a character easily disturbed and irritated and led to acts of violence and outrage wherever they find weakness. I believe that although *we* the English behave better than others, we are on that account the worst treated. There are constant broils between individuals of the middling and better classes and officers of the army, particularly at Valenciennes; we can get no justice from the authorities of the country; indeed that is a general complaint in each of the contingents; and in more than one instance it has happened that a mob has collected with impunity upon the occasion of an assault upon or broil with an officer.

Connecting these facts with the increasing dislike throughout France of the measure of occupation, with the total oblivion of the motives for it and of the opinions entertained upon it universally only last year when it was adopted, and with the weakness of the government and their incapacity or disinclination to give us protection, I confess that I think there is danger in the reduction of our force. If any of the broils to which I have above referred, respecting which and their impunity our officers are becoming with reason very angry, should collect a mob such as

to oblige me or the officers under me to collect the troops and proceed to military execution (an event by no means improbable, adverting to the disposition of the people of this country always to strike at the weak and to rise in proportion as their adversary is weak or manifests weakness, a disposition which they have uniformly shown since the first days of the Revolution), more harm would be done, and the cause of the King, and good government, and the world, would be thrown back further than can be imagined. This would be the case even if we the English were the parties concerned. But conceive what would be the consequence if there were anything of the kind in the Prussian cantonments: the whole Prussian army would be put in motion, and all Europe would resound with the alarm of the danger to be apprehended from the Jacobins in France.

My opinion, then, now is, that we ought to reduce only gradually and in proportion to our casualties; and I must find matters in a very different state at Paris from that in which I believe they are to alter this opinion. I rather think also that this is the real opinion of all the foreign Ministers, excepting of Pozzo di Borgo, and I know it is of all the Generals commanding corps.

There are some circumstances of a temporary nature which are likewise against the measure of reduction. One of these is the financial distress; as, whatever we may have done, there is no doubt that others, Prussia for instance, adopted the measure of occupation as a security for the payment of the contribution. Another is the temporary scarcity of provisions, or rather alarm of scarcity. We have all been nearly in want; none of our magazines are at all supplied; and each of the contingents has been on the point of being obliged to adopt military measures to obtain subsistence from the country. We should certainly be resisted in these measures if we should be obliged to adopt them after we should have reduced our force, and the consequences might be very serious.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take all this into consideration, and let me have your opinion as soon as you can.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1128.] *To General Pozzo di Borgo.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, Mont St. Martin, ce 11 Déc., 1816.

Je reçois votre paquet du 10me, et je m'empresse de vous répondre. J'ai cru jusqu'à présent tâcher de différer la discussion qui doit nécessairement avoir lieu sur la réduction de l'armée, parcequ'il m'a paru que jusqu'à ce que l'Assemblée avait énoncé sa conduite par des actes, ce seroit non seulement contraire aux instructions que les différens ministres avaient reçu, mais contraire aux intérêts et aux vœux de S.M. le Roi de France, en supposant même qu'il y eut divergence entre les deux, de discuter cette question: ainsi donc je ne me suis pas pressé de retourner à Paris; et je ne comptais y aller que sur la fin du mois, afin de pouvoir faire ma cour au Roi au premier de l'an.

Le mémoire que vous m'envoyez de la part de S.M.I., et surtout la lettre très gracieuse que S.M. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, me font croire que jusqu'à présent j'ai eu raison; et je crois que je ferai bien de suivre la même conduite sur les mêmes principes, au moins jusqu'au moment que j'avais fixé pour mon retour à Paris.

Ce n'est pas nécessaire que je vous assure du plaisir que j'aurais à vous voir à Mont St. Martin si vous voulez bien y venir. Les désirs de S.M.I. et la confiance que S.M. veut bien réposer en moi exigent que nous nous entendions bien sur toute cette question; et il y a bien des choses sur lesquelles c'est nécessaire que nous ayons des discussions. Vous jugerez vous-même si c'est plus important de venir causer un peu avec moi, ou de continuer votre attention à la marche des affaires à Paris. Je serai charmé de vous voir dans le premier cas; dans le dernier nous remettrons nos conversations jusqu'à mon arrivée à la fin du mois.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

## DECLARATION OF THE KING OF THE TWO SICILIES.

FERDINAND I. by the Grace of God, King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, &c., &c.

Desiring to confirm the privileges granted by Us, and the Monarchs our illustrious predecessors, to our well-beloved Sicilians, and to reconcile the inviolability of these privileges with the unity of the political institutions, We have by the present law sanctioned, and do sanction, as follows:—

### ARTICLE I.

All civil and ecclesiastical employments in Sicily beyond the Straits shall, conformably to the capitularies of the Monarchs our predecessors, be conferred exclusively on Sicilians, without the other subjects of our States on this side the Straits being ever entitled to pretend to them, in the same manner as the Sicilians cannot form any claim to civil and religious employments in our other dominions above mentioned. We place among the number of the places exclusively to be given to Sicilians the Archbishopric of Palermo, though our august father, Charles III., reserved the disposal of it to himself in the Great Charter which he granted to the Sicilians.

### ART. II.

Our Sicilian subjects beyond the Straits shall be admitted to all the great dignities of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in proportion to the population of the island.

The population being a quarter of that of all our dominions, the fourth part of our Council of State shall be composed of Sicilians, and the other three quarters of subjects of our other dominions.

The same proportion will be observed for the places of our Ministers and Secretaries of State, the first dignities of the Court, and the places of our representatives and agents at foreign Courts.

### ART. III.

Instead of two Sicilian Consultatori, who, according to the concession of our august father, were members of the ancient Junta of Sicily, there shall be always in the Supreme Council of the Chancery of the Two Sicilies a number of Sicilian counsellors, according to the proportion fixed in the preceding article.

### ART. IV.

Offices in our army and navy, and in our Royal household, will be conferred on all our subjects, without distinction of the part of our dominions of which they are natives.

### ART. V.

The government of the whole Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be always about our person. When we shall reside in Sicily, we shall have as Governor in our States on this side of our Straits a Prince of our family,

or another personage of distinction whom we shall choose among our subjects.

If it is a Prince of the Royal Family, he shall have with him one of our Ministers of State, who shall correspond with the Ministers and Secretaries of State who shall reside near our person, and who shall have with him, besides, two or more directors to preside in those sections of the offices of the Ministers and the Secretaries of State which we shall think fit to leave on the spot for the administration of that part of our dominions. If the Governor is not a Prince, he shall be himself invested with the character of Minister Secretary of State, shall correspond directly with the Ministers and Secretaries of State whom we have with us, and shall have two or more directors for that purpose.

ART. VI.

(Makes the same regulations as Art. V. in respect to the government of Sicily when the King resides on this side of the Straits.)

ART. VII.

These Directors in both cases shall be chosen promiscuously, among all our subjects, as was fixed relatively to Sicily for the ancient offices of Consultator, or Conservator, which are replaced by the said Directors.

ART. VIII.

The lawsuits of the Sicilians shall continue to be pledged even in the last resort by the Sicilian tribunals: in consequence, there shall be established in Sicily a Supreme Court of Justice, which shall be above all the tribunals of that island, and independent of the Supreme Court of our States on this side of the Straits, as the latter shall be independent of Sicily, when we shall reside in that island: the organisation of this Court shall be regulated by a particular law.

ART. IX.

The abolition of feudal rights shall be maintained in Sicily, as in our other States on this side of the Straits.

ART. X.

We shall fix every year the part of Sicily in the permanent expenses of the State, and we shall regulate the manner of its partition; but this annual part can never exceed the sum of 1,847,687 ounces and 20 tari, which was fixed in 1813 by the Parliament as the certain revenue of Sicily. No greater sum can by any means be imposed without the consent of Parliament.

ART. XI.

There shall be deducted every year from the said quota a sum which cannot be less than 150,000 ounces, which shall be applied to the payment of the debt bearing no interest, and of the arrear of interest of that which does bear interest, till the entire extinction of both. When these two debts are extinguished, this sum shall be annually employed in forming a sinking fund for the Sicilian debt.

ART. XII.

Till the general system of the civil and judicial administration of our Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be promulgated, all the branches of justice and administration shall continue on the same footing as heretofore.

We will and ordain that the present law, signed by Us, certified by our Council and our Minister of State for Affairs of Grace and Justice, countersigned by our Council and the Chancellor Minister Secretary of State, enrolled and preserved in our General Chancery of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, be published throughout the kingdom with the ordinary solemnities by the competent authorities, who shall draw up a procès verbal, and see to the execution of it. Our Chancellor Minister of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is specially charged with this publication.

FERDINAND.

Caserta, 12th Dec., 1816.

The Minister of Grace and Justice,
MARCHESE TOMMASI.

The Minister and Secretary of State, Chancellor,
TOMMASO DI SOMMA.

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*To Prince Metternich.* [1129.]

MON CHER PRINCE, Cambrai, ce 13 Déc., 1816.

Vous avez été sensible comme moi de la jalousie des Cours de l'Europe en général de l'union des quatres grandes Puissances quand nous étions à Paris; une jalousie qui ne s'est pas diminuée depuis, malgré qu'aucun gouvernement n'a eu raison de se plaindre de cette union, et que toutes les actes, tant du Congrès que de la Conférence de Paris, ont une marque de justice très rare, si elle n'est pas inconnue jusqu'à nos jours, et que l'union dont on se plaint est ce qui donne la paix à l'Europe. Je travaille toujours de mon mieux pour appaiser ce mauvais esprit; et j'en ai eu dernièrement une petite discussion à Bruxelles avec notre ami Binder, sur laquelle je voudrais vous dire un mot.

D'abord je suis d'opinion que la Conférence qui existe à Paris à présent est tout à fait différente de la nôtre. Nous étions là les représentans de tous les Souverains qui étaient sur la place, et du cabinet Britannique. La Conférence d'aujourd'hui a des objets spécifiés dans les instructions de leurs Cours respectives aux membres pour leurs délibérations; c'est à dire, les affaires

de finance entre l'Europe et la France, et les nouvelles pour moi.

Les Puissances peuvent leur en donner d'autres; mais jusqu'à ce qu'elles leur en donnent la Conférence de Paris même se mettrait dans une position fausse dès qu'elle voudrait se mêler comme Conférence d'autre chose. Je leur ai souvent inculqué ce principe, toujours jusqu'à présent avec succès; et plus d'une fois je les ai empêché de faire des choses qui auraient pu mener à des discussions désagréables.

Mais si la Conférence de Paris d'aujourd'hui n'est pas la Conférence de Paris de l'année passée, si il est sage de les persuader de ne pas outrepasser la ligne de leurs instructions, que dira-t-on d'une conférence des quatre Puissances dans chaque Cour de l'Europe, à Bruxelles, à Turin, à Madrid, etc.? Sûrement cela n'est pas nécessaire, et ne peut que rendre odieux l'union des quatre Puissances et l'autorité qui pourraient en résulter quand l'occasion l'exigerait.

Le Roi des Pays-Bas s'est en mon opinion conduit sottement en égard aux Français réfugiés: mais enfin il a adopté une ligne de conduite; et il est un de ceux pas très faciles à ébranler quand ils ont une fois adopté leurs mesures. Dernièrement le Général Vandamme avait été découvert caché à Gand, principalement par les mesures prises par le Roi lui-même; et le Roi ordonna qu'on le fasse partir de ses états. Une des gazettes du jour annonce qu'il va dans les provinces du Nord; et voilà Binder et les quatre Puissances qui veulent se mettre en bataille avec une note pour protester contre cette disposition. Binder m'a consulté; et je lui en dit à peu près ce que je vous dis dans cette lettre; et en addition je lui ai démontré l'irrégularité diplomatique de présenter une note de la part des quatre Puissances, fondée sur une paragraphe de gazette. Je lui ai persuadé. Mais d'après une conversation que j'ai eu avec lui la nuit avant mon départ, il paraît que le Prince de Hatzfeldt, le ministre de Prusse, avait eu dans la journée une dispute assez vive avec M. de Nagell au sujet de cette disposition de Vandamme; qu'il lui avait menacé d'une note de la part des quatre Puissances, et qu'ainsi la note serait présentée; mais qu'elle serait pour demander des informations sur la disposition qu'on ferait de Vandamme.

Ainsi donc voilà les quatre Puissances en bataille pour avoir

des informations que selon les formes ordinaires on a verbalement.

Si vous convenez en opinion avec moi, mon cher Prince, je crois que vous ferez bien de donner *a hint* à Binder. On a les meilleures dispositions pour votre Empereur à la Cour des Pays-Bas; et ce serait dommage de refroidir des amis par ces enfantillages.

J'espère que vous vous portez bien.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir C. Colville.* [1130.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Cambrai, 16th Dec., 1816.

I gave an order some time ago that officers should, whenever they appear out of their quarters, wear their side-arms, the particular object of which order was to put an end to the scuffles in the streets, which were before but too frequent. I certainly did not nor don't intend this order to apply to officers going out hunting or shooting; but upon recently passing through Valenciennes I was concerned to observe several officers walking about the streets *en bourgeois* without their side-arms, and some even of the Staff and aides-de-camp to General officers. I think they have known me long enough now to be very certain that I never trouble them with an order that is not necessary; and whatever the order is, I do expect that the officers on the Staff and the aides-de-camp to the General officers should give the example of obedience. If they don't, our business will become *up hill* work indeed.

I am very anxious to know whether Major Angelo had his side-arms on on the night he was illused at the Hôtel de la Poste.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1131. ] G. O. Cambrai, 18th Dec., 1816.

1. The Field Marshal receives constant complaints of officers riding over the corn, hunting, and of officers and soldiers passing over the corn from cantonment to cantonment, and from their cantonments to the places of exercise, particularly those cantoned in the Pas de Calais.

2. It is very easy to avoid doing this mischief, and the Field Marshal earnestly entreats the officers to pay attention to the requests he has particularly made verbally upon the subject; he will otherwise, very reluctantly, be under the necessity of forbidding them from hunting altogether.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1132. ] *To A. Bell, Esq.*

SIR, Cambrai, 21st Dec., 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 3rd August last, in which you enclosed a bill upon the Court of Directors for 7000*l.*, being the amount contributed at Bombay for the benefit of the families of those who fell or were disabled in the late campaign under my command, and an address from the gentlemen of the settlement to myself.

I have transmitted the bill to the Chairman of the Committee for the management of the Waterloo Fund in London, with a letter, of which I enclose a copy; as I am of opinion that the best mode of distributing the bounty of the subscribers for the benefit of its objects is through the medium of that Committee; and that I act as the subscribers would if they were on the spot, by leaving the distribution to their discretion.

I beg leave to return my thanks to the subscribers at Bombay for their humanity towards the families of their fellow-subjects, the brave officers and soldiers of the army, and particularly for the honour they have done me by their address and for their kindness to myself.

It is particularly gratifying to me to find that the attention which I had paid to my duties had attracted their notice, and was their motive for confiding to me the distribution of their bounty. I hope that I shall not forfeit their confidence by adopting the mode of executing the trust reposed in me above

pointed out; and it will be my earnest endeavour to merit their approbation on every occasion in which I may be employed in the public service.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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G. O. Cambrai, 21st Dec., 1816. [1133.]

1. The Field Marshal begs to recall to the recollection of the General officers of the army that the principle of the service is, that no officer can give leave to another to pass the limits of his own command without the permission of his superior.

2. The Field Marshal gives leave to officers to go to England only by authority of the General Orders from the Horse Guards, of the 16th September, 1815; and to foreign countries, by the special permission of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, and he cannot with propriety delegate this authority.

3. He begs, therefore, that the authority of the circular letter of the Adjutant-General of the 3rd April, 1816, may be considered to apply only to the limits of the command of each General officer, and that all applications for leave to quit the country occupied by the army may be made to the Adjutant-General in the usual manner.

4. The officers on the Staff of the Army of Occupation cannot quit their stations without the special permission of the Field Marshal.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1134.]

MY LORD, Cambrai, 22nd Dec., 1816.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 19th regarding the expenditure on works lately carrying on at Ostend.

Upon the breaking out of the late war, certain works were ordered to be constructed in the Netherlands by General His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, before I took the command of the army, at Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Tournay, and Mons, I believe upon communication with the Secretary

of State. I did not countermand these works, excepting so far as to take care that they should be constructed in conformity with the plan for the permanent fortification of the Netherlands at that period in contemplation, and I added to the places at which works were carrying on Ath and Ghent. I have not the means of ascertaining whether it was intended that the expense of these works, generally of a temporary nature, should be charged against the Fortification Fund, or was to be considered as incurred for the defence of His Majesty's troops serving in the Netherlands, as it certainly turned out to be, and as an aid to the King of the Netherlands in the war.

The work at Ostend, however, to which your Lordship's letter particularly relates, is of a permanent nature; and it was constructed under my directions after communication with the Earl Bathurst, and his permission given in a despatch, dated the 16th of June, 1815, to incur upon it an expense amounting to 21,000*l.*, which it was his Lordship's intention should be charged against the Fortification Fund.

The work has been but lately completed, and the accounts of its expense as well as the accounts of the expense of all the works constructed in the Netherlands during the war can be made up whenever called for.

The sum of 115*l.*, estimated to be incurred at Ostend for "labour, transport, and rations," has no relation to this work. When the army was broken up, a great proportion of the military stores were sent to Ostend, and there were at the same place a certain quantity of ordnance and stores which had been sent to the Netherlands under a requisition from the Prince of Orange for the purpose of arming the places above referred to, and I sent thither to be disposed of hereafter the ordnance captured at Paris and elsewhere in France.

This establishment has remained at Ostend in charge of this depôt of ordnance and stores. As, however, nothing remains now, or will shortly remain, excepting the captured ordnance, this establishment has been reduced to what is absolutely necessary to take care of it, and the expense will be very trifling, or will be discontinued altogether. This expense cannot be a charge against the King of the Netherlands.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1135.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 22nd Dec., 1816.

I am at last enabled to transmit you the Convention regarding the payments for the construction of the fortifications in the Netherlands. You are aware that the King wished to insert in the Convention certain articles, under which His Majesty would have been enabled to charge against the fund the ordnance and stores required and supplied for the places. In consequence of Lord Bathurst's instructions, I desired to insert an article under which we should have the same power. The King then, after some deliberation, decided that it was best to take no notice of the artillery in this Convention.

I send Lord Mulgrave a copy of the Convention, and request him to send out Lieutenant-Colonel Jones immediately; and I write to M. Fagel, to beg him to transmit me the documents required as soon as possible; and I hope, before Parliament meets, to be able to let you know exactly what sum will be required for next year for this service.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Afin de mettre S.A.R. le Prince Régent d'Angleterre à même d'avoir connaissance des dépenses pour les forteresses des Pays-Bas, et des progrès des différens travaux, il a été convenu entre S.A. le Duc de Wellington, Prince de Waterloo, et le Lieutenant-Général Baron Fagel :—

1. Que les estimatifs détaillés de la dépense des travaux convenus et ordonnés pour être mis en exécution sur chaque point ou station seront placés sous les yeux de Son Altesse.

2. Qu'il sera présenté au Prince de Waterloo un état des dépenses faites à chaque station depuis le commencement des travaux jusqu'à la fin du mois d'Octobre, 1816, et que rapport sera fait du travail effectué.

3. Qu'à la fin de chaque mois on indiquera ce qui a été exécuté pendant le mois à chaque station, ainsi que la somme employée à la fortification.

4. Qu'au mois de Novembre de chaque année il sera présenté à S.A. le Prince de Waterloo un estimatif des dépenses à faire, soit pour l'achat des matériaux ou la construction des ouvrages

et un projet des travaux à exécuter à chaque station, dans le cours de l'année à partir du premier de Janvier.

Les estimatifs et autres pièces dont il est parlé aux Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, seront recueillis par le département de la Guerre des Pays-Bas, et transmis au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, pour qu'il les fasse parvenir ensuite à S.A. le Prince de Waterloo.

5. S.A. le Prince de Waterloo ne pouvant avoir le loisir et l'occasion d'avoir l'œil sur les travaux autant que l'on pourrait le croire nécessaire pour juger des progrès du travail et du degré des forces des ouvrages, il a été convenu que S.A. aura la faculté d'envoyer des officiers supérieurs inspecter les différentes places, lesquels s'adresseront au Directeur des Fortifications, dont l'endroit à inspecter ressort, afin de s'y rendre de concert avec lui, pour effectuer l'examen en question, comme aussi pour recueillir toutes les informations nécessaires concernant l'emploi des travailleurs, et les dépenses qu'on y consacre.

6. Il a été convenu que l'argent requis sera délivré sur les fonds et dans les proportions suivantes :—

1. L'argent payé par mois par le gouvernement Français, c'est-à-dire, douze millions de francs par an.

2. Le reste en parts proportionnelles égales par le gouvernement Britannique et le gouvernement des Pays-Bas, jusqu'à concurrence de deux millions sterling par chacun en tout.

La somme requise pour la dépense de l'année étant déterminé, le gouvernement Britannique payera immédiatement sur le rapport du Prince de Waterloo au gouvernement des Pays-Bas la somme requise pour sa part proportionnelle pour un trimestre ; si la dépense a été égale à l'estimatif, avance sera faite du montant requis pour le trimestre suivant, et ainsi de suite de trimestre en trimestre à l'expiration de l'année.

Si la somme dépensée dans un trimestre excédait l'estimatif, le gouvernement Britannique, sur le rapport du Prince de Waterloo, payera à l'expiration du trimestre sa dûe part proportionnelle de la dépense effective excédant ci-dessus devoir être payée par la Grande Bretagne, pourvu que la somme totale à payer pour elle n'excède également pas deux millions sterling.

Fait double, à Bruxelles le 21 Déc., et à Paris le 20 Déc., 1816.

WELLINGTON, PRINCE DE WATERLOO.

*To the Earl of Mulgrave.* [1136.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 22nd Dec., 1816.

I enclose a copy of the Convention which I have at last concluded with the King of the Netherlands to provide for our superintendence over the expenditure of the money on the fortifications in the Netherlands, and over the execution of the works.

The mode in which I should wish to carry into execution this Convention on the part of the British government is to form an office for that object at head-quarters, at the head of which I should wish to place Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. At this office should be received and deposited all the plans, estimates, and accounts referred to in the four first Articles of the Convention, and reports should be made from thence occasionally to the British government. I would employ Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, or, if it should be inconvenient to employ him, any other superior officer of Engineers, in the inspections referred to in the 5th Article.

I mention Lieutenant-Colonel Jones as being an officer of superior rank, who, having been employed on this service, is acquainted with all its details, and because our head-quarters are already so overcharged with officers that we have no room for one of the rank of General; but if your Lordship should prefer to send General Bryce, I can have no objection except that above stated.

I don't believe it will be necessary to send any other officers of Engineers besides the officer to superintend this office, as we can employ in it those already with the army.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir Charles Stuart.* [1137.]

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 24th Dec., 1816.

I enclose the memorandum on the plan for the reduction of the expenses of the French government in the maintenance of the army, and for the general reduction of its numbers. It is not so complete as I should wish it to be, as I have not yet got the returns I wished to have from the Commission Mixte.

Lord Castlereagh has written to express the wish of the Ministers to have a conference with me, and I am therefore going to England this day. I request you to inform the

Ministers of the Allied Courts of this circumstance, and that I hope to return to Paris in the beginning of the week, as I propose to stay in London only one day.

Ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The army now consists of 5862 officers, and 152,024 soldiers, making a total of 157,886 men.

I would propose for the relief of the French government to reduce this number to 150,000 men, including officers and soldiers.

As a further measure for the relief of the French government I would propose that all reliefs of troops should be made as follows: that is to say, that the troops to be relieved should withdraw from the country before the relieving troops should enter. No contingent could then at any time require provisions for a greater number of officers and soldiers than the numbers stipulated for each in the protocols, making in the whole 150,000 men.

There will still, however, be an excess of demand for rations over that number, occasioned by the officers' rations and by the rations for servants and others belonging to the army not soldiers, and not appearing on the military returns.

I should think the amount of this excess cannot be less than 25,000, so that the whole demand for rations might be reduced from 200,000 to 175,000.

I cannot estimate the amount of the relief which these arrangements would give to the French government, because I have not received from the Commissions Mixtes the returns to enable me to know precisely what number of rations have been received by each of the contingents. It will be observed, however, that there will be a positive reduction of force to the amount of nearly 8000 men, and I think it probable that all the arrangements proposed in this paper will produce a diminution of expense to the amount of about ten millions of francs.

There can be no reduction of the demand for horses. The number stated in the treaty, say 50,000, is too small.

Each of the contingents might then be allowed to be reduced by the usual casualties of the service; that is to say, that men who may die or may desert shall not be replaced.

At the end of the year a report should be made to the French government of the exact numbers in each contingent, in order that, if necessary, there may be made a proportionate reduction of the payments on account of *solde* and equipment.

WELLINGTON.

II.

ARMÉE ALLIÉE D'OCCUPATION.—ETAT DE SITUATION.

19 Décembre, 1816.

| Contingens. | Nombre général de chaque Corps, à l'exception des Officiers. | Nombre des Officiers, y compris les Officiers Non-combattans ayant les rangs d'Officiers. | | | | | Chevaux. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Generaux et de l'Etat Major. | Officiers Supérieurs. | Officiers Militaires. | Officiers des Administrations. | Total. | |
| Autrichien .. | 30,876 | 51 | 591 | | 393 | 1035 | 9,942 |
| Russe .. .. | 35,963 | 17 | 96 | 725 | | 838 | 11,850 |
| Prussien .. .. | 26,145 | | 952 | | 182 | 1134 | 6,693 |
| Britannique .. | 30,191 | 23 | 225 | 1217 | 220 | 1685 | 9,196 |
| Bavarois .. .. | 9,616 | 3 | 320 | | .. | 323 | 2,974 |
| Danois .. .. | 4,737 | .. | 172 | | 66 | 238 | 1,667 |
| Saxon .. .. | 4,864 | 21 | 160 | | 43 | 224 | 1,827 |
| Wurtembergeois | 4,906 | 2 | 15 | 121 | .. | 138 | 621 |
| Hanovrien .. | 4,726 | 1 | 23 | 151 | 62 | 247 | 1,500 |
| | 152,024 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5862 | 46,271 |

III.

RETURN of the OFFICERS and of Number of Servants allowed to the different Contingents, according to the French Tariff.

| Contingents. | General Officers. | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | No. of Servants Allowed. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austrian .. | 10 | .. | 41 | .. | {591 / 393} | | 617 | Of these 393 are Civil Officers not classed according to their Army Rank. 617 servants "not soldiers" are returned. |
| Russian .. | 16 | 30 | 30 | 32 | 260 | 655 | 2584 | Of the Civil Departments, the Medical Officers only are included. |
| Prussian .. | 5 | 25 | 25 | 50 | 220 | 560 | 2207 | |
| Bavarian .. | 3 | 5 | 8 | 13 | 78 | 238 | 822 | Including the Civil Officers classed according to their Army Rank. |
| Danish .. | 2 | 3 | 4 | 17 | 56 | 178 | 622 | |
| Wurtemberg | 2 | 8 | 3 | 6 | 42 | 78 | 368 | |
| Saxon .. | 2 | 1 | 5 | 20 | 39 | 152 | 492 | |
| Hanoverian | 3 | 1 | 10 | 22 | 76 | 227 | 817 | |
| British .. | 22 | 22 | 103 | 100 | 267 | 950 | 2724 | |

IV.

*Horses of the British Contingent.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Officers .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3419 |
| Troop .. .. .. .. .. .. | 5561 |
| Bât .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 216 |
| | 9196 |

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*The Adjutant-General to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord Duke, Horse Guards, 24th Dec., 1816.

I have received the Commander-in-Chief's commands to apprise your Grace that the establishment of the different battalions of infantry of the line under your command will be immediately reduced to 800 rank and file.

His Royal Highness requests that your Grace will communicate to me the numbers of each regiment whom, under this circumstance, it will be necessary forthwith to send home for the purpose of being discharged, and the numbers whom, in consideration of their perfect efficiency, it may be expedient to retain as supernumeraries.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,
Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,
Harry Calvert.

[The Adjutant-General to circulate and to get the returns required for the numbers as soon as possible.
Wellington.]

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[1138.] *To Dr. Franck.*

My dear Sir, Paris, 1st Jan., 1817.

I received your letter of the 26th on my arrival here last night. I never recommended for the Order of the Tower and Sword any but military officers of the highest rank and distinction in the service, who had had an opportunity of serving the Portuguese government, and I have not recommended any since the army quitted the Portuguese territory.

Sir J. M'Grigor was not recommended by me, but by Beresford, I believe on account of their old acquaintance and friendship; and I could not well at this moment depart from old principles, and open a fresh list of recommendations to the King of Portugal.

Let me know whether you would wish me to apply to Lord

Beresford for a similar mark of distinction to yourself, or whether you will do it.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir Charles Stuart.* [1139.]

MEMORANDUM OF A NOTE ON THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Paris, 9th Jan., 1817.

Before I come to the consideration of the military topics connected with the reduction of the Army of Occupation, I think it necessary to advert to the circumstances which induced the Allies to adopt the measure of occupying with their forces a military position within the French frontier, and to the objects of that occupation.

Notwithstanding that His Majesty Louis XVIII., already the rightful heir, had been called to the throne of his ancestors in the month of April, 1814, by a decree of the Senate and by the unanimous voice of his people, the events of the months of March, April, May, and June, 1815, had shown that the revolutionary spirit in France was not extinct, that His Majesty could place no reliance on the fidelity of the French army, and that none could be placed on the efforts of the well-disposed in His Majesty's support against the army led by Bonaparte. Upon the restoration of 1815, therefore, the King not only had no army for the ordinary support of his authority as King of France, but that which had existed having been disbanded by His Majesty's ordonnance of* , the individuals composing it had retired to their several Departments, and were there the standard of discontent, and even of fresh revolt, whenever circumstances should appear to favour their objects.

The views of the Allied Powers in forming the Army of Occupation were founded upon this state of affairs in France. They conceived that they thereby provided for the temporary security of their ally the King of France against the evils and dangers to be apprehended from the revolutionary party in

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* Blank in manuscript.

France; and they trusted for the permanent security of His Majesty against the same dangers to the measures which His Most Christian Majesty would adopt to re-establish good order and government, to attach to his own person and family the affections of his subjects, and to secure his own authority by the formation of a well-disciplined and loyal army.

Besides these objects referable to the security of His Most Christian Majesty, the Allied Powers had in view in the formation of the Army of Occupation the temporary security of their own subjects and states against the same dangers resulting from the continued existence of a revolutionary spirit in France; they were anxious to avoid the necessity of incurring again the charges and waste of resources which the events of March 15th had occasioned, and to provide for the temporary defence of their own subjects and states until those permanent means of defence which they decreed should be constructed; and they preferred to derive their security on all these points and that of their ally from the temporary pacific occupation of a part of France to the demand of a permanent cession.

To these motives for this measure I must add that the Army of Occupation was calculated to give additional assurance of the due execution of the treaties by which the relations of France with the different Powers of Europe and those of other Powers between each other were regulated.

At the period of the negotiation and conclusion of the treaties by which the system of the Army of Occupation was adopted and regulated, the expediency of the measure was never doubted. The French Ministers lamented but did not deny its necessity, and there was little difference of opinion upon any of the points connected with this arrangement; and I consider myself founded in asserting that it was adopted and carried into execution with the unanimous approbation of all Europe, with the exception only of the party in France whose conduct had rendered its adoption necessary, and of their adherents and well-wishers elsewhere. The measure has been carried into execution in the spirit in which it was conceived by the Allied Sovereigns; and I am certain that I speak the language of the government of France in stating that, owing to the good sense and conduct of the General officers commanding the several corps of troops forming the Army of Occupation and of the General and other officers serving under them, the system has

produced all the benefits expected from it, and that none of the evils have yet resulted from it which its enemies foretold, and of which even its friends could not avoid feeling an apprehension. The measure of the occupation of a part of France by the Allied foreign force is no longer considered necessary for the interests of France herself, but is represented as a disgraceful condition imposed by the conquerors on the conquered, unjustifiable in its objects, and the expense of which is as intolerable as the measure is disgraceful to the French people. At the moment that I heard of this language as the expression of the public opinion of Paris upon this subject, I was aware of the injuries done to the harvest by the inclemencies of the season, and of the consequent probability that the armies might each be obliged to have recourse to military measures in the course of the next year to obtain its subsistence; and I was shortly afterwards informed that the French government had been obliged to request the Ministers of the four Allied Courts residing at Paris to suspend the negotiation of the *Bons* which had been issued for the payments to be received in December.

It became possible, therefore, that the system of occupation, however still necessary for all the objects for which it had first been adopted, might no longer be one of peace. The total oblivion of the cause of the occupation of a part of the French territory, of the beneficent views with which it had been adopted, and of the manner in which it had been carried into execution, and the language held upon this subject in all the societies in the capital, were calculated to irritate the minds of the people in general against the system; and it was not improbable that we should meet with resistance in the measures which it was possible each of the General officers commanding corps would find himself under the necessity of adopting to procure subsistence and money for the support of the corps under his command, and the probability of this resistance increased in proportion as the force should be reduced.

The confidence reposed in me by the several Sovereigns rendered it my duty to pause before I should give my consent to any reduction of the 150,000 men; and I therefore proposed other measures which would have reduced the charges of France to the amount of about ten millions of francs annually, at the same time that they would have kept the force complete to its numbers of 150,000 men.

Since my arrival at Paris, however, I have found that the instructions of the Ministers of the four Allied Courts, already very positive upon the principle of reduction, have not been altered since their respective Sovereigns have received intelligence of the suspension of the payments by the French government, and of the general financial difficulties of France, at the same time that their Imperial and Royal Majesties must have been aware of the probability that their armies might experience difficulties in finding subsistence throughout the year.

I find likewise that a loan has been negotiated in London which will relieve the financial difficulties of the government as well as those which were likely to affect the subsistence of the armies, and there does not appear at present any military objection to a reduction of the force.

It is not improbable, likewise, that the readiness which the Allied Sovereigns have manifested upon this occasion to relieve the French government, and the unanimity with which the measure of reduction has been adopted, and the relief which the finances of France have found in a foreign country, may have some effect upon the public opinion, may recall to the recollection of public men in France the obligations which they owe to the Allied Sovereigns, and may again reconcile them to measures which France herself, and not foreign Powers, rendered necessary.

But, at all events, I entreat the Ministers of the four Allied Courts, in laying this note before their Sovereigns, to state my opinion of the inconvenience which will attend any further reduction of the force before the expiration of the first term of three years.

It must be recollected that we occupy seventeen places, some of them of the first and second order, and all requiring considerable garrisons; and a country extending from Calais to Basle. If, unfortunately, the measure of reduction and the loan should not have the effect of again reconciling the people of France to the occupation and to the conduct of the Allies, any farther reduction might be attended by dangerous consequences, and any common event might have the effect of placing all Europe under arms to support a weak army of occupation.

Under these circumstances the Allied Sovereigns having been requested by the French government to take into consideration the expediency of reducing the force, and conse-

quently the charges which its support has imposed upon France, of which reduction a hope had been held out in the Protocol of the Conferences of Paris of the 13th October, 1815, the Cabinets of Vienna, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and London have each expressed their readiness to consent to a reduction, having each done me the honour to confide to me the decision on the military questions connected with the measure.

When the reduction was first mentioned, in June last, I was of opinion with others that the measure ought not to be even discussed till we should have had some experience of the conduct of the Chambers in their session of 1816-17, as it was generally thought that their conduct in their sessions of 1815-16 had not been calculated to re-establish in France good order and government, and to attach to His Majesty Louis XVIII. and his family the affections of his subjects in general. But in other respects I considered the state of the country to be such that the hopes held out in the Protocol of the 13th October, 1815, might be realised if the conduct of the Chambers in the session of 1816-17 should be what we all wished.

I confess, however, that since that period my opinion has altered; and as that alteration refers to our military situation, I think it proper to detail the reasons upon which it is founded.

As I have above shown, the system of occupation was adopted in conformity with the opinion of every person in France against whom it was not directed; and there can be no doubt that it has been carried into execution with the mildness and in the spirit in which it was conceived and intended by the Allied Sovereigns. Notwithstanding these circumstances, I have every reason to believe that a material change has taken place in the public opinion in Paris on this subject. The reduction now proposed is 30,000 men, or one-fifth of the whole force; that held out in prospect by the Protocol of the 13th October, 1815, was two successive reductions of 20,000 men each in the second and third years.

A reduction of 30,000 men in the second year affords to France all the relief which a reduction of 40,000 men would give in the second and third successive years. Nay, considering the advance in price at the present moment of some articles of subsistence for the armies, the relief is greater by the immediate reduction of 30,000 men than it would be by the successive reduction of 40,000.

I would propose, then:

1. That the reduction should be made.

2. That it should be of 30,000 men on the whole force.

3. That it should be made proportionably on each contingent; that is to say, one-fifth on each.

4. That it should be made from the 1st of April, 1817.

5. That from that period the French government should not be called upon to supply more than 160,000 rations for men. It will be necessary that the number for horses should continue at 50,000.

6. That from the same period the demand upon the French government for *solde* and *équipement* should be diminished to 40,000,000 of francs annually.*

7. That as soon as the budget shall have passed, and the measures for ensuring the loan shall have been definitively adopted, the Ministers of the four Allied Courts shall acquaint the French government of this reduction, if they should consider themselves authorised by their respective Sovereigns, and that the French government shall make it known to the public in the manner most likely to produce a favourable effect on the public mind.

WELLINGTON.

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[1140.] *To the Emperor of Russia.*

SIRE, Paris, ce 9 Jan., 1817.

La confiance que V.M.I. a daigné reposer en moi par sa lettre du 4 Nov. exige toute ma reconnaissance, et il m'a paru que je ne pouvois la démontrer d'une manière plus agréable à V.M. qu'en marchant strictement dans la ligne indiquée par V.M. selon le jugement que j'avois formé sur l'état actuel des affaires en France, surtout dans leurs relations avec l'Armée d'Occupation.

V.M. trouvera l'histoire de mes opinions sur la réduction de l'Armée d'Occupation dans le mémorandum d'une note que je compte placer au Protocole des conférences des Ministres à Paris quand on discutera cette question. Je l'envois à V.M. en Anglais, parceque je ne veux pas détenir le courrier du Général

* N.B. This 6th Article is omitted in the copy of the note which is placed on the Protocol of the Conferences.

Pozzo di Borgo le tems qui serait nécessaire de le traduire en Français, et je sais d'ailleurs que V.M. entend bien cette langue.

V.M. y verra que l'armée sera réduite à 120,000 hommes, et que la même sera annoncée au gouvernement Français aussitot que nous aurons débrouillée la question des finances.

Cette question est la plus importante du moment. Sur elle dépend tout le système Européen en égard à la France. Votre Ministre à Paris en aura fait connoître à V.M. tous les détails par lesquels V.M. aura vu que si la France ne peut pas réaliser un emprunt par les moyens des maisons de Hope et de Baring, les armées se trouveront dans le cas d'avoir recours à la force pour trouver des subsistances et la solde; et que les Puissances Alliées se trouvant forcées de prendre les contributions en rentes sur le grand livre, les vendront à une perte telle que les contributions ne vaudroient rien, en même tems que le crédit de la France sera détruite. Ainsi cette question résolue, tout le reste marche de suite.

Le gouvernement Britannique ayant consenti que la maison de Baring entreprenne cette affaire pour le gouvernement Français, elle, et celle de Hope, ont consenti à avancer au dernier un capital de 160 millions, qui seroit employé à la subsistance et la solde de l'Armée d'Occupation, pourvu que les Puissances Alliées les employent également pour réaliser les rentes que le gouvernement Français pourroit les remettre, sous l'Article 11 de la Convention financielle du 20 Nov. Il me paroît qu'il n'y a rien de plus raisonnable que cette condition. Il est clair que si chacun des Puissances qui ont part à la contribution vendoit par ses agens particuliers que devroient lui revenir, tout le mal sera produit que j'ai déjà indiqué à V.M.I. Dans le cas supposé qu'il n'y eut pas d'emprunt, aucune des Puissances ne recevroit la valeur que lui seroit dû, et les maisons de Hope et de Baring qui se seroient engagées dans l'avance de 160 millions au gouvernement Français sera ruinées. Ainsi mes efforts ont été dirigés à persuader aux Ministres des Puissances Alliées établis à Paris de consentir à employer ces maisons dans ces affaires, et V.M. verra qu'ils ont consenti avec la réserve de l'approbation de leurs Cours.

Je crois cependant que la Prusse ne pourra pas dans cette affaire marcher avec les autres Cours, puisque toutes ses affaires

des contributions sont déjà dans les mains des banquiers. Mais nous avons les moyens de remédier à cet inconvénient; et si V.M.I. et l'Empereur d'Autriche et le Prince Régent, et celles des autres Puissances dont les affaires ne se trouvent pas déjà dans les mains des banquiers, consentent à employer ces maisons dans cette affaire, elle marchera.

Nous procéderons de suite à la considération de la question de la réduction, dont la décision me paroît certaine, et je prie V.M. de donner les ordres qu'elle jugera convenable au Général Comte de Woronzow pour la mettre en exécution quand je lui annoncerai qu'elle est décidée.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1141.] *To Madame de Staël.*

MADAME, Paris, le 11 Jan., 1817.

Depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir hier j'ai lu le mémoire de M. Garat.

Ou M. Garat n'a pas vu ou il a oublié ma proclamation qu'il cite. C'est vrai qu'elle contenoit une promesse de payement, mais avec condition qu'il resteroit chez soi. Monsieur Garat n'y a pas resté, donc il ne peut rien dissimuler sous l'autorité de la proclamation.

Cependant je sais que M. Garat a souffert des opérations de la guerre dans les Pays Basques, et il m'avoit été recommandé par des personnes pour lesquelles j'ai de l'estime, et j'ai voulu outre-passer un règle pour lui faire du bien. J'ai donc envoyé ses demandes au Commissaire-Général de l'armée, avec ordre de le faire rapporter tout ce qui avoit été reçu de chez M. Garat, et de m'en envoyer l'évaluation enfin que je donne l'ordre pour la lui faire payer. Le Commissaire-Général m'a rapporté avoir reçu pour environ douze mille francs, laquelle somme j'ai ordonné qu'on payat à M. Garat.

Je peux bien concevoir que M. Garat n'est pas satisfait, mais à moins que je mette ma main dans ma poche, et que je lui donne l'argent de mes propres fonds, ce qui M. Garat ne voudroit pas, je ne peux pas lui payer plus que le Commissaire-

Général ne rapporte lui être dû. M. Garat criera à l'injustice comme il lui plaira. Il n'a aucune réclamation en justice sur moi. Ma proclamation qu'il cite a été donnée en Juillet, et nous sommes entré dans la commune d'Ustaritz en Novembre. Non seulement il n'étoit pas chez lui lui-même, mais il n'y avoit pas même un domestique pour se charger de ses intérêts. Comment voulez-vous que je m'en charge?

Pour ce qu'il dit en égard à Bassusarry, je peux vous assurer que nous connoissons cette commune aussi bien, si non mieux que M. Garat, et que le rapport que j'ai reçu, et sur lequel j'ai passé les ordres de payement, a eu égard à toutes ses demandes.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1142.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 13th Jan., 1817.

Sir Charles Stuart sent you last post the draft of a note which I had given to him to translate, and respecting which I had told him and the Allied ministers that I intended to place it on the Protocol when the question of reduction should be taken into consideration. I wrote it thus early because I found the question in part decided before I arrived here, because Pozzo di Borgo was anxious to despatch his courier to the Emperor, and he pressed me strongly to write to the Emperor by the same occasion; and because I saw daylight through the financial question, and that by making known my opinion and the grounds of it upon the reduction thus early, I could keep the official decision open until the financial question should be brought to a conclusion.

Sir Charles, however, I believe, imagined that I had placed the note on the Protocol even before it was translated, and transmitted it officially to you.

You will have seen how we stand upon the finance question. England, Austria, and Russia have adopted the principle of Baring's plan, liable to the approbation of their respective governments. The principle, I understand, goes no farther than to employ Baring and Co. in the sale of the scrip, and the

ministers have still to work the details of the plan with them and the French ministers.

There are two questions upon it, upon which it is desirable that you should send distinct instructions here. 1st. Are you willing to take the new description of scrip instead of the old, held out to you in the financial Treaty of the 20th November? 2ndly. Are you willing to take it at your risk, or will you make a bargain with Baring and Co. for a certain sum? There is a third question also which deserves attention, relating to the Fortification Fund. That is understood to be made over to Baring's management, besides the war contribution to Russia, Austria, and England, &c.; and it is desirable that you should instruct precisely in what manner that fund shall be received, whether in new scrip at the risk of the fund, or upon a special bargain with Baring.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1143. ] *To A. Rosenhagen, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, Paris, 17th Jan., 1817.

I have received your letter of the 14th, and I regret exceedingly that there should have been any difference of opinion between you and Mr. Bisset. I had before heard nothing of it. When I decided upon the apothecary's bill, I decided upon the principle, not upon the detail. The principle is clear, that nothing should be paid out of the hospital fund which had not been heretofore paid by the regimental surgeons. In respect to your private letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I am sorry to observe that the Treasury ever entertained a doubt respecting my wish to forward any measure which should tend to economy, and to the short settlement of accounts; and the knowledge of the existence of this doubt now explains to me many circumstances of their conduct towards me which I did not before understand. I hope likewise that now that you know me better than you did in August, 1815, you likewise are convinced that no act of mine could have been dictated by any jealousy of your authority or that of any other person. I know too well upon what my own authority and character

depend ever to be jealous of authority placed in the hands of others for the public good; and I only wish, as I have often told you, and as I have often advised elsewhere, that your authority was extended to that of the power of final audit, and that a system of accounts and management were adopted under your superintendence which should relieve the public and individuals from the intolerable extravagance and grievances of the existing system.

In regard to the orders of the 15th July, I certainly should have been very much surprised if the Comptrollers of Army Accounts had remonstrated against them. The first announced an enforcement of regulation which, if it had been previously concerted with the Comptrollers of Army Accounts, must have been in conformity with the principle of their appointment. I don't recollect the occasion of the last, No. 2; but it must have been some abuse which could be corrected only by the accounts being in the first instance submitted to me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, St. James's Square, 17th Jan., 1817.

I have received a despatch from Charles to-day, which acquaints me that Austria adheres to our proposition of giving the reversion of the Duchies to the Infanta, and that Baron Vincent will receive instructions and authority to treat the matter at Paris. Marie Louise resists, and threatens her father with the Emperor of Russia; but as His Imperial Majesty has forsaken her, I presume the business will be settled.

Sir C. Stuart writes me that Taticheff, whose intrigues we have not yet developed, wishes to remove the negotiation to Madrid. It appears that the Duke of San Carlos is equally desirous to draw it to Vienna. Lord Cathcart's last despatch intimated that the Emperor of Russia agreed to its being treated at Paris, and meant to send instructions accordingly. You may possibly find out from Pozzo whether any order has reached Paris. Labrador's impracticability is the alleged motive for removing the discussions from Paris.

I am very glad you took the initiative on the reductions.

I am, my dear Lord, ever yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Foreign Office, 17th Jan., 1817.

I have sent an instruction to Sir Charles Stuart, a copy of which is enclosed.

The Cabinet entirely approves of your having personally brought forward the proposition for the reduction of the Army of Occupation, with the reserve agreed upon as to our pecuniary relations for the year being placed previously to actual reduction upon a satisfactory footing, and I think there is now every prospect of this being speedily accomplished.

Lord Liverpool, Mr. Vansittart, and myself, had this morning a conversation with Mr. Baring, who proceeds to-morrow to Paris, considering the prospect of an arrangement sufficiently encouraging to warrant him in taking this trouble, but stating that nothing is yet finally settled. He distinctly intimated that his share and Mr. Hope's in the business was to be that of an agency to realise the scrip, on account of the French government or their contractors, upon a moderate commission; but that they were not to be contractors, or to take the profit or loss of the French stock upon themselves.

He represented that there was a number of individuals, at the head of whom was M. Ouvrard, who had made a contract for the supply of the Allied army, and that these contractors were to be paid in the French scrip, at the same price that the Allies were to receive it, but that in this contract he and Mr. Hope had no concern.

We asked his opinion as to the nature of the new scrip proposed to be created: he seemed to doubt about the expediency of the *bons supplémentaires;* he thought any distinct species of stock which might be considered as created for purposes of contribution, more especially upon a principle of deferred repayment, might, for obvious reasons, fall below its natural level in the market, and that to the Allies, who must all look to sell probably within the year, it would not produce its fair value.

With respect to the principle of the measure, although we should much have preferred that the whole transaction should have been conducted on account of the French government in conformity to the Treaty, yet as, under the Convention, a payment in inscriptions may be forced at the end of every six months, and as the sale of these inscriptions without previous concert might not only impede the French government in their contracts for the regular supply of the Allied army, but ultimately prove injurious to the realisation of the French inscriptions which might come into the hands of the Allies, there is every disposition here to concur in a fair arrangement upon a principle of common interest; but Prussia and the minor Powers ought in some mode or other to be called upon to bear their share of the risk, and *we* must be secured in having our full proportion of the produce of the inscriptions when turned into money. This is more essential to us than to any other Power, as the extra charge of our army in France is to be defrayed out of these funds. These receipts are also material for the purpose of assisting in the payments we shall be called upon to make to the King of the Netherlands on account of fortifications.

With regard to the proportion of the contributions applicable to the purposes of fortifications generally under the Treaty of Paris, I conceive

that the French government cannot be expected to make any separate arrangement for their liquidation. This appropriation of the fund was never recognised by France. The Allies assigned out of the seven hundred millions a fixed proportion to this service, and it is to be presumed they can only issue rateably for this head of service upon what they receive.

Mr. Baring seems to think favourably of the whole transaction, but professes his determination not to risk in the French funds beyond a very limited amount on his own immediate account. He thinks the amount of funds to be drawn from hence will not be considerable.

I shall be much obliged to you to send me any information you can collect upon the details and progress of the Treaty. We may presume that the other Powers, unless they are much altered, will look sharp enough after the terms upon which the inscriptions are to be taken by them. Our desire is to secure our fair share of disposable cash upon terms which shall afford no reasonable reproach for having consented to admit of a departure from the stipulations of the Convention.

Ever, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Viscount Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.*

SIR, Foreign Office, 17th Jan., 1817.

Your despatches of the * January have been laid before the Prince Regent.

There is not the smallest objection to your placing the instructions transmitted to you on the * upon the Protocol of the Allied Conferences. These instructions were communicated, immediately upon their being issued, to the Allied Courts.

His Royal Highness has fully approved of your acceding, in concurrence with the ministers of the two Imperial Courts, to the principle of the financial arrangement, as communicated to the Allied ministers by the French government, by which His Royal Highness understands—

1st. That an arrangement shall be made to accept a fixed amount of inscriptions, and of a description to be hereafter agreed upon, in discharge of the contributions of the ensuing year, as payable to the Allies under the Treaty of November, 1815; and

2ndly. That the realisation of this stock on account of the Allies shall be confided to Messrs. Baring and the other capitalists who are to be charged with the like operation on behalf of the French government.

With respect to the precise nature of the stock to be created for this purpose, and the rate at which it shall be valued to the Allies, the British government must reserve its decision for further information, and till the sentiments of the other Courts are ascertained; professing at the same time its perfect readiness, in concert with them, to agree to such an arrangement as shall best serve to combine the financial interests of the French government with those of the Allies, upon fair terms between the parties.

From the progress already made in this transaction, and from the great resources, credit, and character of the parties engaged in its execution, the

* Blank in manuscript.

Prince Regent flatters himself that the result cannot fail to prove successful, and that it may place the pecuniary arrangements between the French government and the Allies for the ensuing year upon such a footing as to admit of the early execution of the measure of reduction of the Allied troops, as proposed by the Duke of Wellington.

Upon the details of the proposed plan, I have already stated that I shall for the present abstain from sending you final instructions; but as the basis of the scheme is that the 160 millions for the charge of the Army of Occupation, and the 140 millions to be paid in discharge of the contributions, shall be realised, the former on account of the French government, the latter on account of the Allies, by the same agents, you will see the importance of providing that the whole 300 millions shall be turned into money, and that the proceeds shall then be rateably issued to the French government and the Allies, according to their respective shares in the transaction, by which all the confusion of sales on different days and at different prices will be avoided, and the whole will be melted down into one common stock of profit or loss, as well between the French government or their contractors and the Allies as between the several Allied Powers themselves.

It also deserves consideration whether a deferred stock of the description of the *bons supplémentaires*, distinguishable from the general mass of the French inscriptions, as a species of stock specially arising out of the contribution transactions, is not objectionable, and whether from its very nature a prejudice may not arise to the fair value of such stock in the market. It is not that one entertains an apprehension of bad faith, certainly not in the existing government; but the idea might easily be propagated, that this class of stockholders would be the first sacrifice of any possible convulsion, and this impression might strip it of a portion of its value, which would be so much immediate loss to the Allies, who must naturally look to realise the whole of their scrip in the course of the year.

Your Excellency will always hold it particularly in mind, that the arrangements made by this government upon the credit of contributions are such as to render it indispensable that the sales of scrip should not be retarded, but that they should be gradually effected within the year, and that the money arising therefrom should be paid over progressively and rateably to our Commissaries, according to the share the British government is entitled to receive under the Convention.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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[ 1144. ] *To M.* ———.

MONSIEUR, Paris, le 18 Jan., 1817.

J'ai reçu avant-hier votre lettre du 15. J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous faire savoir que je ne pouvois pas sans preuve mettre le ——— en conseil de guerre, même si sa conduite avoit été de nature qu'un conseil de guerre pourroit en prendre connoissance. Mais le temps qui s'est passé depuis la réception de votre première lettre m'a donné l'occasion d'avoir des renseignemens; et j'avoue que je crois que vous le trouverez

difficile de donner des preuves du défaut de courage que vous attribuez dans vos lettres au ————.

J'ai déjà eu pareillement l'honneur de vous faire savoir que si le ———— avoit offensé contre les loix, il y est subordonné et responsable comme tout autre habitant de Paris. En réponse vous me dites que vous lui "arracheriez la vie" ou que vous péririez; et il paroît, non-seulement par vos lettres, mais aussi par des renseignemens que j'en ai reçu, que ce n'est pas une affaire d'honneur dont il s'agit, de laquelle je ne me mêlerai nullement, mais d'un assassinat avec préméditation.

Je dois vous avertir que vos lettres adressées à moi, le Commandant en Chef du ————, deviennent diffamatoires, et que si elles seroient répétées, je me trouverois dans la nécessité de les mettre dans les mains du ————, enfin qu'il puisse procéder contre vous selon les loix; et que comme je ne peux pas être le confidant de vos desseins contre sa vie, j'envois celles que vous m'avez déjà écrit à S.E. Monsieur le Ministre de la Police, enfin qu'il prenne les mesures qu'il jugera à propos pour prévenir le crime qu'il paroît que vous méditez.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Comte de Cazes.* [1145.]

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, Paris, ce 18 Jan., 1817.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à V.E. les copies certifiées d'une correspondance que j'ai eu avec Monsieur ————, par laquelle il paroît qu'il pense qu'il a lieu de se plaindre du ———— de l'armée de S.M.B., qui se trouve ici en congé, et qu'il a l'intention de l'assassiner ou de le faire assassiner.

V.E. verra par cette correspondance que je n'ai aucun désir de protéger le ————, mais je ne peux pas être le confidant des desseins de Monsieur ————; et j'en avertis V.E. enfin que vous preniez les mesures que vous jugerez à propos.

WELLINGTON.

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[1146.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL, Paris, 19th Jan., 1817.

I was very sorry indeed to hear of your being unwell. I hope you are getting better. A change of air would probably do you good; and if you will come up to Paris, I could lodge you with great ease.

I have a ball on the 29th, and shall be glad to see you or any others who will come up for it.

I wish you would let the officers know that the G. O. recently given out regarding leaves of absence was not intended to prevent them from leaving our district, but to place their going on a more regular footing. I have not heard anything of our sport since I left Mont St. Martin.

Ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

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[1147.] G. O. Paris, 20th Jan., 1817.

5. The Field Marshal desires that the General Orders dated Horse Guards, 20th December, 1816, respecting the dress of General and Staff officers, may be strictly and immediately attended to.

6. He also begs to remind Field as well as other mounted officers of all infantry regiments, that the white buff leather shoulder belt with slings is that prescribed by His Majesty's regulations, and not the waist belt.

7. The officers of all infantry regiments are required to button the lapels of their jackets close across their breasts, without showing any part whatever of their facings.

8. The above orders apply as well to the Guards and Artillery as to other regiments of infantry.

WELLINGTON.

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*General Baron Vincent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, Paris, le 24 Jan., 1817.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire passer, my Lord, pour votre connoissance particulière, les quatre articles touchant l'affaire présomptive de Parme, dont j'ai donné lecture à la conférence de Mercredi dernier.

Agréez, my Lord, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

VINCENT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

1. Que Sa Majesté Impériale regarde les dispositions relatives aux Duchés de même qu'à la Principauté de Lucques, ainsi que toutes celles qui ont reçu leur sanction par les arrangements des derniers temps, comme étant immuablement fixées.

2. Que vu la réserve de l'Art. 99 de l'acte du Congrès, Sa Majesté Impériale admet que le mot de *réversibilité* s'entende comme établissant aux six Cours désignées dans ce même article le droit de prendre en considération le sort des Duchés et de la Principauté de Lucques après le décès de Madame l'Archiduchesse Marie-Louise.

3. Que malgré que l'époque à laquelle la discussion sur le sort de ces deux Etats doivent s'engager ne se trouve point préjugée par l'acte du Congrès, Sa Majesté Impériale est prête à prendre cet objet en considération dès ce moment, si tel est aussi l'assentiment des parties appelées à intervenir.

4. Que Sa Majesté Impériale ne procédera dans cette question, comme en toute autre, que dans le plus parfait accord avec ses hautes Alliés; et qu'en conséquence elle croit que le lieu le plus convenable pour établir les délibérations à ce sujet seroit la ville de Paris, où les arrangements ayant trait aux transactions politiques des années 1814 et 1815 se trouvent concentrées, à la seule exception de ceux qui ont été explicitement réservés pour les conférences à Francfort.

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*Alexander Baring, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Paris, 26th Jan., 1817.

His Excellency Count Corvetto confirmed to us this morning the information your Grace was pleased to give us this morning of the improved view which the government of France are disposed to take of the state of their budget. The diminution of charge is so important that we feel emboldened to meet the wishes expressed by the minister, that we should be interested in the stock by proposing an engagement for a large portion of the sum required.

With this view I have drawn up (rather hastily) the enclosed paper as a sketch for your Grace's inspection. Should you think it likely to answer the purpose, we shall send it in a more formal manner in French. In the mean time I shall be ready to wait upon your Grace if any alterations or corrections occur to you.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Your Grace's most obedient servant,

ALEXANDER BARING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Paris, 26th Jan., 1817.

The delay which has taken place in the settlement of the business with which we have been occupied has been in so far fortunate that we have now for the first time the facts of the case fairly before us; but as they have been this morning distinctly communicated to us by his Excellency the Count Corvetto, we have been able, without loss of time, to come to some conclusion on the subject.

In the first instance the magnitude of the sum required obliged us to confine ourselves to the simple proposition of realising, as agents, stock for 300 millions of money; and although we were convinced that the only chance of any satisfactory realisation was to be found in the plan of concentrated operation proposed by us, yet we were fully aware of the extraordinary confidence in us which such a plan supposed. We were, indeed, desirous of meeting the wishes of the Minister of Finance, that we should be interested in the value of French stock by engaging at a fixed price for a portion at least; yet we felt it to be our duty to decline such a mode of proceeding, not from any want of confidence, but from an apprehension that positive engagements at fixed periods would rather diminish our independence in operating for the general good.

The case is now essentially altered by a most material reduction of the amount required; and although we should still prefer acting in the manner originally proposed, we have no objection, as a proof of our confidence, to propose a plan upon a basis more agreeable to the government of France.

The following facts respecting the present state of the budget, communicated to me by Count Corvetto, are the foundation of the proposal which we shall now submit:—

1. The deficit for the year 1817 is reduced to 200 millions of money.

2. The minister reserves to himself, as a species of vote of credit, the faculty of requiring 20 or 30 millions more, to be provided for otherwise than by a sale of stock.

3. The amount of the sinking fund is to remain fixed at the sum stipulated in the budget, which is to be laid out regularly through the year.

4. The unfunded debt is to be diminished within the year to the extent of 23 millions, as contemplated in the budget, with the exception always of what may be required to supply the means for the vote of credit above referred to.

With this statement before us of the general position of the finances of the year, we proceed to consider the particular situation of the services to which the sum to be raised would be applicable.

We understand that it is much desired that the proportion of the contribution due to the Allies for the *four months* ending in March next should be discharged according to the existing engagement. This sum being provided for, the 200 millions to be raised would in round numbers be applicable: one half for the payment of the sum remaining on account of the 140 millions of war contributions; the remaining half for the general purposes of the French Treasury, comprising more particularly the fund requisite for the supply of the Allied army.

This last-mentioned service we consider to be the first in importance; and we are therefore disposed to apply towards it that part of the ways and means for which we are now willing really to engage, both for the purpose of placing that service beyond all doubt, and also to give to the Minister of Finance that pledge of our confidence and sincerity which he seems to desire. With these views we beg leave to submit the following proposal:—

1. For the sum of 100 millions of francs money we offer to take five per cent. stock at the price of 55 per cent., payable in equal monthly instalments during the twelve months following the delivery of the stock.

The details connected with this bargain would be settled with the Minister. We speak of 100 millions as forming the probable amount destined for the Treasury of France. When we come to accurate accounts, a few millions more or less will not be important.

2. For the other sum of 100 millions or thereabouts applicable to the contributions, we should propose that stock at the same price should be deposited, and that we should have the option of taking it in the same manner any time within six months after the conclusion of the first bargain. If we do not take it, it shall be realised for account of the French government, for the purpose of paying what may remain due on account of contributions to the Allies.

The Allies, being assured of the payments for the four months ending in March, should agree that they will give time for the remaining sum of 100 millions or thereabouts, until we are able to find the means by a further realisation of stock in the market. Of the probable period of such payment we cannot speak with certainty, nor can we undertake any engagement; but we feel a confident conviction that, according to the plan proposed, the whole of the service will be effected within a year. Although we have every reason to suppose that the bankers and capitalists of Paris will act with us with cordiality and good will, yet as some of them may be desirous of being more directly connected with the operation, which it seems evident cannot be executed by them alone, and as the French minister may be in some measure impressed with corresponding sentiments, we wish to add that we shall have no objection, should any number of respectable individuals of the description we have mentioned have made any applications on the subject which the Minister is disposed to receive favourably, to make the operation jointly with them in fixed proportions for Paris, London, and Amsterdam; but we beg to be understood that we make this proposal on a supposition that it may be acceptable to the French Minister, but that we are quite ready to undertake our engagements without any such concurrence, should it be preferred.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE FRENCH LOAN. [1148.]

Paris, 27 Jan., 1817.

Il me paroît que malgré que les Ministres des Puissances Alliées soient disposés à donner toutes les facilités au gouvernement pour l'exécution des arrangemens financiers à faire avec les maisons de Baring et Labouchere, il est important de tenir en vue et de mettre en exécution autant que possible les stipulations de la Convention du 20 Novembre, en conformité de l'Article 4 du Traité principal.

Je recommande donc que les Articles 2, 3, 4, et 5 de cette Convention soient mis en exécution comme jusqu'à présent; mais que pour ce qui regarde l'Article 6, les Ministres des Puissances Alliées s'engagent mutuellement de ne pas émettre les bons au porteur qu'ils recevront en vertu des Articles 3 et 4, mais les

feront présenter eux-mêmes au Trésor, à raison qu'ils seront échus, enfin d'en constater l'échéance et le non-payement.

Le bilan de chaque semestre seroit arrangé comme indiqué dans l'Article 11 ; mais le gouvernement François, au lieu d'en payer l'arrière en inscriptions, payera la Prusse en argent comptant, et fera faire avec les autres Puissances des arrangemens qui leur conviendront.*

L'intérêt sur les bons échus et non payés devra être payé par la France selon la manière indiquée dans l'Article 13.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1149. ] *To the Duc d'Orléans.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Paris, ce 27 Jan., 1817.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir avant hier la lettre de V.A.S. ; et comme il paroît que j'aurai bientôt l'honneur de vous voir ici, je ne ferai guère plus à cette occasion que d'en accuser la réception.

Je n'ai pas parlé au Roi ni à personne de l'indécision de V.A. si vous vous fixeriez ici ou non ; mais comme vous m'avez permis de vous parler ouvertement toujours, je vous conseille de n'y pas penser. Les affaires, quoique mieux, ne sont pas dans l'état où elles devroient être pour que V.A. puisse se fixer ici. La situation, la manière de penser, d'agir, d'être, et de parler de V.A., les espérances que la présence de V.A. fera naître, les projets dont elle donnera lieu à la discussion parmi des personnes justement suspectés au gouvernement, tout tendera à porter des soupçons sur vous, pas du Roi, ni des personnes, parceque je les crois incapables de vous faire injustice, mais des personnes de la Cour ; et V.A. sait que personne ne peut en prévoir les conséquences. Venez donc, Monseigneur, mais que ce ne soit que pour peu de jours, et décidez vous d'avance de ne pas rester ici jusqu'au temps où le gouvernement sera entièrement consolidé.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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* Altered thus :—" Et le gouvernement François payera l'arrière du premier semestre en effets à la satisfaction des Ministres Alliés, et l'arrière du second en inscriptions, comme indiquée dans le Traité, dont les Puissances pourront disposer si la France ne paye pas en argent."

*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1150.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 27th Jan., 1817.

I have received your letter of the 24th. You will have heard from Sir C. Stuart in what manner the question of the Duchies stands. Labrador is disposed to be very moderate in the settlement of it, and I will endeavour to keep him so.

I have been hard at work on the finances here. As you stated, Baring was very unwilling to act upon Ouvrard's romances; and upon conversing with him I found there would be so many difficulties in arranging the agency in his and Labouchere's hands for the sale of the scrip belonging to the Allies, and I should have been myself so much involved in it, that I thought it best to go into the whole question of the French Budget, and to see whether we could not bring the wants to such a sum as that Baring could undertake to supply them without the aid which he expected to derive from being the agent of the Allies for the disposal of their scrip, provided the Allies would afford the French government for this year the facilities which they would have consented to afford to Baring in realising the scrip if it had been necessary to have recourse to the 11th Article of the Convention.

After considering the subject, and discussing it with the Duc de Richelieu and M. Corvetto, we found that a loan of 200,000,000 instead of one of 300,000,000 would be sufficient. Upon this ground Baring wrote me the letters and made the proposition of which I enclose you the copy, and I have seen him and the Duc de Richelieu this morning upon them.

You will see that Baring's written proposition leaves the Allies upon rather loose grounds after the payments due and to be made on the 31st of March; but I have given him and the Duc de Richelieu a memorandum, of which I enclose the copy, and I have told them both that if the Allies consent to forego the execution of the 11th Article, they must have some certainty that they will be paid their money in a reasonable time, which shall enable them to realise it within the year. Baring and Labouchere are to meet upon this point to-night, and I am to see them to-morrow; but I would not allow this courier to go without letting you know how this matter stands.

You may consider then the following points provided for: 1st, the pay and subsistence of the army for the year; 2nd,

the payment of the contributions for all the Allies to the 31st of March; 3rd, the payment of Prussia to the 31st of May and the 30th of November. That which remains to be settled is the payment to the other Allies from the 31st of March to the 30th of November.

Till all these matters are quite settled here, there is an anxious desire that nothing should be known respecting them; and I beg you not to communicate this letter to more persons than it is absolutely necessary should see it.

I have said nothing upon what has passed between Baring and me since yesterday to the ministers, nor shall till they have freely settled with the Duc de Richelieu and Corvetto.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*George Harrison, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Treasury Chambers, 27th Jan., 1817.

I herewith transmit, by command of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, for your Grace's information, copy of a letter from Mr. Drummond, dated Paris, the 9th December, 1816, and of the minutes of proceedings of the Commissioners of the Allied Courts on the subject of the fortification money, No. LXXVII., of the 30th November.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most faithful humble servant,

GEORGE HARRISON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*James Drummond, Esq., to George Harrison, Esq.*

SIR, Paris, 9th Dec., 1816.

I have the honour to transmit enclosed, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, a copy of the minutes of proceedings of the Commissioners of the Allied Courts on the subject of the fortification money, No. LXXVII., of the 30th November.

I have, &c.,

JAMES DRUMMOND.

II.

*Procès-Verbal de la Séance du 20 Nov.*, 1816.

Séance 77.

La séance d'aujourd'hui a été ouverte par la lecture de la note ci-jointe des Ministres des quatre grandes Cours Alliées, en réponse à la note que les soussignés leur ont adressé le 20 Nov., 1816, touchant les payemens des différentes quote-parts des argents des fortifications qui reviennent à l'Espagne, au royaume des Pays-Bas, et à la Bavière.

Dans cette note les dits quatre Ministres informent les soussignés que la Grande Bretagne ayant à exercer la surveillance et la contrôle sur l'emploi des argents des fortifications à remettre à l'Espagne, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre avoit écrit à sa Cour pour demander des instructions à cet effet, et qu'aussitôt que la réponse du Cabinet Britannique sera arrivée, elle sera communiquée aux Commissaires soussignés.

Quant au royaume des Pays-Bas, le Duc de Wellington, avec lequel l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre s'étoit entendu, n'a trouvé aucune difficulté de laisser procéder au payement du quatrième quadrimestre aussitôt que le terme en sera échu.

Qu'enfin le Ministre de Prusse donne de même son adhésion au payement de la quote-part de la Bavière pour la bâtisse d'une forteresse sur le Rhin. Seulement les quatre Ministres croient devoir inviter les soussignés de vouloir en délivrant les bons pour les payemens faire observer à ceux qui sont munis des pleins-pouvoirs pour les toucher, que ces argents doivent être employés au but auquel ils sont destinés.

La Commission, après avoir pris connaissance de cette note, a résolu de la communiquer aux administrateurs de la caisse, et à les autoriser de délivrer les quote-parts pour la bâtisse des fortifications pour le quatrième quadrimestre au royaume des Pays-Bas et à la Bavière; et comme le Commissaire Autrichien a reçu en même temps la lettre ci-jointe de Monsieur le Baron de Binder, Conseiller de la Légation Autrichienne, dans laquelle il est chargé d'inviter les soussignés de ne plus rien payer dorénavant à quelque titre quel qu'il soit, ni à l'Espagne ni au Portugal, avant que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre n'ait reçu la réponse de sa Cour à ce sujet, la Commission est également convenue de suspendre jusqu'à autre disposition les payemens de l'indemnité de la guerre pour le quatrième quadrimestre qui reviennent aux dits royaumes.

*(Suivent les Signatures.)*

III.

Paris, ce 24 Nov., 1816.

Annexe A. de la 77e Séance.

Les soussignés, Ambassadeurs et Ministres, en réponse à la note que MM. les Commissaires Spéciaux des quatre Cours Alliées leur ont adressée le 20 de ce mois, touchant les payemens des différentes quote-parts des argents de fortifications qui reviennent à l'Espagne, au royaume des Pays-Bas, et à la Bavière, ont l'honneur d'informer MM. les Commissaires que quant à la première de ces Puissances, l'Angleterre ayant à exercer la surveillance et le contrôle sur l'emploi de ses argents, S.E. Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre vient d'écrire à sa Cour pour demander des instructions à cet effet. Aussitôt que la réponse du Cabinet Britannique sera arrivée, les soussignés auront l'honneur d'en faire part à MM. les Commissaires Spéciaux.

Quant au royaume des Pays-Bas, les soussignés s'étant entendus avec Mon-

sieur le Duc de Wellington sur le payement du 4e quadrimestre des dits argents qui vient d'être réclamé par M. de Fabricius, il n'y a aucune difficulté pour que ce payement se fasse aussitôt que le terme en sera échu.

Quant enfin à la Bavière, le Ministre de Prusse ayant adhéré au payement à faire à cette Puissance de ces mêmes argents, il n'y a plus d'obstacle pour qu'ils s'effectuent également entre les mains de qui de droit, seulement les soussignés croyent devoir inviter MM. les Commissaires Spéciaux de vouloir bien, en délivrant les bons de payement à la personne chargée de les recevoir, lui faire observer que ces bons doivent être employés au but auquel ils sont destinés, et qu'il faudra justifier en son temps de leur emploi.

Les soussignés ont l'honneur, &c.

LE BARON DE VINCENT. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.
CHARLES STUART. POZZO DI BORGO.

IV.

ANNEXE B. de la 77e Séance.

*The Baron de Binder to the Austrian Commissioner.*

M. LE BARON,

Une lettre adressée par la maison Baguenault et Cie. à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, relativement aux argents qu'elle doit toucher pour l'Espagne, à titre d'argents de fortification, ayant fait croire à la Conférence que cette maison se regarde comme assurée de pouvoir toucher les fonds qui reviennent à l'Espagne à titre d'indemnité de guerre, je suis chargé d'avoir l'honneur de rappeler à Votre Excellence une note intérieure des quatre Ministres à MM. les Commissaires Spéciaux, par laquelle ces derniers sont invités à ne plus rien payer dorénavant, sous quel titre que cela soit, ni à l'Espagne ni au Portugal (qui toutes les deux ont touché les trois premiers quadrimestres des argents de contribution), à moins d'en être formellement requis. En m'acquittant de cette commission, je prie V.E. etc.

BINDER.

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[1151.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 31st Jan., 1817, 6 A.M.

You will be anxious to know the state of the negotiation with Baring by this mail. The government is endeavouring to make a better bargain with him, at least in regard to the option of taking the second hundred millions at the end of six months, which they expect to close this day; and to-morrow the Duc de Richelieu hopes to be prepared to make a communication to the Allied Ministers. I am going to Fontainebleau, and write you these few lines that you may know how the matter stands.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duc d'Orléans to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

My Lord, Twickenham, ce 31 Jan., 1817.

Je reçois la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'écrire le 27 de ce mois, et je vous remercie infiniment de me dire franchement et ouvertement toute votre opinion sur ma position. J'attache toujours beaucoup de prix à la connoître. Vous avez dû voir par ma lettre précédente que je n'ai point encore le projet de me fixer immédiatement à Paris, mais que quant à présent j'ai seulement l'intention d'y faire une course, afin de vaquer à mes affaires et de m'assurer par mes propres yeux de ce que je pourrais faire pour le déplacement de ma famille que plusieurs circonstances me font désirer infiniment, ainsi que je vous l'ai mandé.

Vous pouvez vous rappeler, my Lord, que quand je vous vis l'été dernier, je vous dis que le principal motif de mon absence était que l'encouragement donné à un système qu'on n'ignore pas que je désapprouve, et l'esprit qui régnait alors dans les Chambres et à la Cour, me faisaient craindre qu'il ne fut impossible de ramener le gouvernement à la marche que je crois nécessaire pour sa consolidation, et même pour sa sûreté, et qu'il n'en résultât des conséquences funestes au milieu desquelles la différence de mes opinions devait me placer dans une position également pénible et embarrassante. Vous admettiez les torts du gouvernement à cet égard, et vous trouviez que toutes ces considérations étaient pour moi de justes motifs d'absence; mais vous ne partagiez point mon opinion sur l'impossibilité que je voyais à arrêter cette tendance. Vous étiez même persuadé que le gouvernement sentait la nécessité de l'arrêter, et qu'il en viendrait à bout. Je vous répondis à cela, my Lord, que je ne le croyais pas; mais que si votre espérance se réalisait, je n'aurais plus d'objections à retourner en France. Quoique ce fut au mois d'Août que j'ai eu cette conversation avec vous, je ne m'attendais pas alors à l'Ordonnance du 5 Septembre, ni à la formation de la nouvelle Chambre, qui ne peut pas inspirer les mêmes inquiétudes que l'ancienne. C'est par cette raison qu'il me paraît au moins inutile de m'astreindre à prolonger l'espèce d'exil que je m'étais imposé [1817] volontairement, pendant des circonstances qui ont changé de nature. J'avoue que quelle que soit la circonspection que j'aime à mettre dans ma conduite, je ne puis admettre que je doive attendre la parfaite consolidation du gouvernement actuel pour me fixer en France, et je croirais même devoir protester contre cette prétention, si elle était mise en avant. Je pense que dans plusieurs cas ma présence pourrait contribuer à cette consolidation et la faciliter; mais il est vrai que pour y parvenir je ne concourrais jamais à employer les moyens qui plaisent exclusivement aux personnes de la Cour dont vous me parlez dans votre lettre, et auxquels elles persistent toujours à recourir, malgré l'expérience qui devrait les en dégoûter. Je m'efforcerais au contraire de donner plus d'assurance au gouvernement dans la marche rigoureusement constitutionnelle que je voudrais lui voir adopter, et hors de laquelle il n'y aura, selon moi, ni consolidation pour le gouvernement ni satisfaction pour la nation. Lorsque cette marche sera suivie avec droiture et bonne foi, ni ma présence ni celle d'aucune autre personne professant ces opinions ne peut nuire au gouvernement ni exciter ses soupçons. Il me paraîtrait même essentiel que le gouvernement ne le

crut pas, et surtout qu'il fit en sorte qu'on ne pût lui supposer cette crainte. Mais ma lettre est déjà longue, et l'espérance que j'ai de pouvoir bientôt causer de tout cela avec vous, et d'entrer dans de plus grands développemens que ceux que comporte une lettre, me détermine à la conclure, en vous renouvelant, my Lord, l'assurance de ma très haute considération, et celle de tous les sentimens que vous m'inspirez, et avec lesquels je suis, my Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS PHILIPPE D'ORLÉANS.

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[ 1152.] *To Sir Charles Stuart.*

MEMORANDUM ON THE PECUNIARY INDEMNITY TO BE PAID BY FRANCE TO THE ALLIES.

Paris, Fév., 1817.

Par l'Article 4 du Traité principal du 20 Novembre, 1815, la France s'est engagée à fournir aux Puissances Alliées une indemnité pécuniaire fixée à sept cent millions de francs.

Par l'Article 5 il a été réglé qu'une partie du territoire Français seroit occupé par une armée Alliée forte de 150,000 hommes, dont il a été convenu par le même Article que l'entretien devoit être fourni par la France.

Par une Convention conclue en conformité de l'Article 4 du Traité principal, il a été convenu que la somme de sept cent millions d'indemnité pécuniaire susdite seroit acquittée jour par jour en portions égales dans le courant de cinq années, c'est-à-dire au tour de 140 millions par an.

Par l'Article 2 de la Convention conclue en conformité de l'Article 5 du même Traité le mode de l'entretien de l'armée a été convenu, et que le gouvernement François subviendroit à la dépense de la solde, l'équipement, l'habillement, et autres objets accessoires, moyennant le payement d'une somme de cinquante millions de francs par an; et les Puissances Alliées ont consenti à ce qu'il soit payé dans la première année que trente millions sur la solde, sauf à être remboursés dans les années subséquentes de l'occupation.

Par les Protocoles du 13 Octobre et les notes passées entre les négociateurs des Traités du 20 Novembre, on a donné lieu à espérer à la France une réduction progressive de la force de l'Armée d'O[redacted]on si les circonstances le permettoient.

Sur ces engagemens trois questions sont survenues dont il faut trouver la solution dans les Protocoles et les notes qui se sont passées de part et d'autre au moment de la négociation des Traités.

La première est si on devoit exiger de la France dans le courant de la seconde année de l'occupation la somme de vingt millions sur la solde non payée dans la première année, l'armée n'étant pas réduite.

La seconde est si on devoit exiger de la France ce même payement dans le courant de la seconde année de l'occupation, l'armée se trouvant réduite comme on avoit donné lieu à espérer par les Protocoles du 13 Octobre et les notes du 20 Novembre.

La troisième est si, après la réduction de l'armée, la somme de 50 millions étoit toujours exigible de la France en titre de solde, équipement, &c., soit immédiatement, soit dans les années subséquentes de l'occupation, soit après les cinq années dévolues.

Il paroît que la première question est déjà décidée par les Cabinets de Berlin et de Londres; et à la vérité il paroît par les Protocoles du 13 et 15 Octobre, et les pièces explicatives annexées, 1, que les Ministres François ayant déclaré l'incapacité de la France de faire face à un déboursement plus considérable que 270 millions par an, les Ministres Alliés avoient voulu limiter leurs demandes annuelles à cette somme; 2, qu'on avoit évalué la dépense de l'armée de 150,000 hommes à 150 millions, dont 50 millions pour solde et équipement, et 100 millions pour entretien; 3, qu'on avoit consenti, par les Protocoles du 13 et 15 Octobre, et par l'Article 2 de la Convention Militaire, de prendre que 30 millions sur la solde, sauf à être remboursé dans les années subséquentes, enfin de se trouver dans les limites de 270 millions indiqués par le Ministre François; et 4, les tableaux annexés aux Protocoles du 13 et 15 Octobre démontrent qu'on avoit toujours supposé possible un délai du remboursement de cette dette même jusqu'après la termination de l'occupation.

Ainsi je ne crois pas qu'il peut y avoir doute sur la première question.

Sur la seconde question il se trouve à présent que l'armée va être réduite d'un cinquième pendant deux tiers de la seconde année d'occupation; c'est-à-dire que si les calculs du mois d'Octobre se trouvent justes, les dépenses de la France pour la

seconde année, sous le titre d'entretien, seroient à peu près 87 millions au lieu d'être 100 millions.

Mais il faut observer aussi que le prix de toutes les denrées qui servent à l'entretien de l'armée s'est excessivement haussé, et il est probable que la France ne pourra pas avec 270 millions faire face au déboursement de 140 millions sous le titre d'indemnité pécuniaire, de 30 millions sous le titre de solde, et de la somme nécessaire à l'entretien de l'armée.

Il paroît même par le discours du Duc de Richelieu, dans lequel il annonce la réduction de l'armée, que les prix des denrées dans l'armée occasionnent une augmentation de dépense sur celle de l'année passée de 20 millions.

Cet état des choses n'a pas été anticipé dans les discussions au moment de la négociation des Traités ; mais il paroît que les mêmes principes qui ont permis aux Souverains Alliés de consentir à ce que l'arrière de la solde ne soit acquitté tant que les frais réels de l'armée ne seroient pas au dessous du niveau de 130 millions, pourront les persuader de consentir à ce qu'il soit fait une autre suspension de la demande de la dette sous le titre de solde de la première année de l'occupation.

Les Traités ne disent rien sur la troisième question, nommément si la somme de 50 millions comme solde étoit toujours exigible après la réduction de l'armée.

Il paroît cependant qu'on pourroit juger des intentions des Ministres qui ont négocié ces Traités par les Protocoles et les pièces annexées.

Dans le second article du Protocole du 13 Octobre on parle "des frais réels de l'entretien de l'armée."

Dans la pièce intitulée "Répartition de la charge provenant du corps de 150 mille hommes," il est dit :—

| | Nombre d'hommes. | Somme que coûtera l'entretien des troupes. | Somme à payer par la France. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1ère année .. | 150,000 .. | 150,000,000 fr. .. | 130,000,000 fr. |
| 2ème année .. | 130,000 .. | 130,000,000 fr. .. | 130,000,000 fr. |
| 3ème année .. | 110,000 .. | 110,000,000 fr. .. | 130,000,000 fr. |

Cette répartition offre le résultat suivant :—

| | Solde et Equipement. | Vivres et Provisions. | Déficit pour les Alliés. | Surplus. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1ère année .. | 50,000,000 .. | 100,000,000 .. | 20,000,000 .. | — |
| 2ème année .. | 43,000,000$\frac{1}{3}$ .. | 86,000,000$\frac{2}{3}$ .. | — .. | — |
| 3ème année .. | 36,666,666$\frac{2}{3}$ .. | 73,333,333$\frac{1}{3}$ .. | — .. | 20,000,000 |

De ces calculs il résulte que la première année la solde de

l'armée de 150,000 hommes est calculée à 50 millions; la solde d'une armée de 130 mille hommes est calculée à 43⅓ millions; et la solde d'une armée de 110 mille hommes est calculée à 36,666,666⅔; et à la fin de la troisième année la France, en supposant qu'elle n'eut déboursé qu'au taux calculé pour l'entretien de l'armée, et ayant en tout déboursé que 130 millions par an, auroit payé la dette de la première année de l'occupation et auroit couvert toutes les dépenses d'entretien et de solde.

Donc l'intention de ceux qui ont fait ce calcul étoit que la demande sous le titre de solde soit diminuée en proportion que l'armée seroit diminuée, c'est-à-dire, que la somme exigible pour 150 mille hommes seroit 50 millions; que celle exigible pour 130 mille hommes seroit 43 millions; et que la somme exigible pour 110 mille hommes seroit 36,666,666.

Cependant il me paroît que ni la seconde ni la troisième question exigent une décision immédiate; et je conseille aux Ministres de s'en remettre à leurs Cours respectives.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Chevalier de Pizarro.* [1153.]

EXCELENTÍSIMO SEÑOR, Paris, ce 1 Fév., 1817.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V.E., et le diplome du Grand Cordon de l'Ordre de St. Hermenegilde dont S.M. m'a honoré; et je prendrai une autre occasion d'en accuser officiellement la réception, et de prier V.E. de faire agréer à S.M. les expressions de ma reconnoissance.

Je peux assurer V.E. que je suis toujours très heureux quand il est en mon pouvoir de faire quelque chose qui puisse être agréable à S.M. Il me paroît que l'affaire des provinces du Rio de la Plata est dans le meilleur train d'être arrangé à l'honneur et à la satisfaction de S.M. D'abord le Prince Régent a annoncé qu'il se trouvera dégagé de la garantie des domaines Européennes de Portugal si S.M. Très Fidèle ne peut pas donner bonne raison pour la conduite du gouvernement du Brésil; et S.A.R. et les Empereurs d'Autriche et de Russie et le Roi de France ont accepté la médiation entre les deux Puissances. La cause de S.M. étant juste, et la conduite qu'elle a tenue sur cette affaire jusqu'à présent étant la plus mesurée et la plus sage, on ne peut pas avoir la moindre doute des ré-

sultats; et j'avoue à V.E. que je ne serois pas étonné si cette fâcheuse invasion de la part du gouvernement du Brésil sur les provinces du Rio de la Plata, en attirant l'attention des grandes Puissances à ces belles parties du monde, n'eut des suites encore plus avantageuses à S.M. et à l'Espagne. Mais pour recueillir ces avantages il faut avoir de la patience, et ne pas se laisser accélérer ses mesures par ceux qui n'ont que le désir de briller un peu au dépens des vrais intérêts de S.M. et de la famille auguste avec laquelle S.M. vient de s'allier.

En considérant cette affaire, il faut que les Ministres de S.M., et V.E. surtout, se persuadent bien que les Puissances de l'Europe ne consentiront jamais à ce que l'Espagne s'empare du Portugal. Une attaque sur ce pays, donc, même si la réussite en fut certaine, ce qui est fort douteux, ne pourroit qu'avoir des suites fâcheuses, en ruinant entièrement un pays le fidèle allié de l'Espagne pendant la guerre, l'asile des Espagnols durant les moments de leurs plus grands malheurs, et dont le gouvernement local et le peuple sont étrangères aux actes dont S.M. a raison de se plaindre. Ce seroit une pure vengeance, étrangère, j'en suis convaincu, au cœur de S.M., qui nuiroit à ses vrais intérêts, et qui serviroit à personne, excepté à ceux qui auroient la petite gloriole de conduire pour un moment les troupes de S.M. dans un pays qui pourroit se trouver comparativement sans défense.

Au contraire, la conduite sage et mesurée de S.M. jusqu'à présent doit nécessairement mener à son but, et peut être, comme je vous l'ai indiqué plus haut, à des résultats encore plus importans pour Sa Majesté, pour l'Espagne, et pour le monde.

Je désire vivement que l'affaire des nègres fut menée à sa termination entre l'Espagne et l'Angleterre. V.E. peut s'assurer que tant qu'elle existe ce n'est pas possible pour le gouvernement Britannique d'aider celui de S.M. des mille manières qui seroient autrement en son pouvoir. V.E. peut s'assurer de deux choses: 1, que le gouvernement du Prince Régent ne peut pas donner une somme plus forte à présent pour cet objet que celle qu'il a fait offrir; 2, qu'il ne peut donner sa garantie à un emprunt pour qui que ce soit. La chose a été tout récemment refusé au Roi de France, et il est certain que le Parlement ne voudroit pas en entendre parler.

Pour moi, je n'ai pas la moindre doute que les vrais intérêts des deux pays sont les mêmes, et qu'ils ont mille manières de

s'avantager et de se concilier mutuellement; mais on se trompe très fort si on croit que la seule ressource à tirer de l'amitié de l'Angleterre est de l'argent, et qu'on n'a qu'à le demander pour en avoir. Ceux qui adoptent cette idée n'ont ni une vraie ni une grande vue de l'intérêt de leur pays, et je suis loin de l'attribuer à V.E.; mais je vous prie de vous mettre en garde contre ceux qui l'ont, desquels les conseils ne peuvent qu'induire en erreur.

WELLINGTON, DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1154.]

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 3rd Feb., 1817.

There is nothing settled yet with Messrs. Baring and Labouchere. It appears that the question regarding the option at the end of six months was settled in a manner satisfactory to government; but then, when these gentlemen came to explain themselves further, it was discovered that they required the Rentes at 55, with the *jouissance* from September, which would have brought it to 52¾. The Rentes are now at 60!

The Duc de Richelieu would, however, have granted them this bargain if I would have consented to say that I considered it necessary in order to induce me to consent to the reduction. This I declined to do, first, because it is not true; secondly, it would have brought upon me and the British government all the odium of this bad financial bargain; thirdly, because it would have deprived the reduction of the only advantage it has to recommend it, viz., the prospect of gaining for the Allies and the King a moment of popularity.

I have been out hunting, and have not heard what has been done this morning; but I should have heard from the Duc de Richelieu if anything positive had been decided. I recommended him to insist upon the payments commencing on the 1st of December, if he was to pay the interest from September; or to consent to employ Baring, &c., as agents for the sale of scrip, instead of as contractors for the loan.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1155.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 4th Feb., 1817.

Understanding that a courier is passing from Madrid, I write to let you know that I learn from Baring this morning that the bargain for the 200,000,000 was settled last night with the French government. He has not, however, the official acceptance of his proposals, and he cannot consider himself certain till he has.

I believe that upon the second 100 millions he has reduced the term for his option to four months, and he is to take it at 55 if he chooses, if the Rentes do not rise above 60. If they do, he is to make a new bargain with government.

Ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

*M. Ouvrard to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 4 Fév., 1817.

Je désirois expliquer à Votre Excellence, et j'aurais l'honneur de me présenter pour cela chez elle demain matin, qu'au moyen de la réduction des besoins du gouvernement à environ 200 millions, on pourrait, en cas que la proposition de MM. Baring et Hope ne soit pas admise, revenir au plan adopté dans la conférence des Alliés sur la proposition de Votre Excellence, et prendre des rentes à 70, avec bons supplémentaires de 30, dans la proportion de 70 millions seulement par les Alliés, 70 millions par l'entrepreneur des fournitures de l'Armée d'Occupation, et 70 millions que le gouvernement remettrait pour son compte.

Avec ce système, je persiste à croire, Monsieur le Duc,

1. Que cette rente réunie dans les mains de MM. Baring et Hope se vendra dans le courant de cette année au dessus de 60.

2. Que les Puissances Alliées recevroient probablement la totalité de ce qui leur revient, ou ne seroient dans le cas d'attendre le payement des bons supplémentaires que pour une très petite somme d'autant qu'elle ne porteroit que sur la moitié de leur créance.

3. Que le crédit du gouvernement y gagnerait, et assurerait mieux la contribution de 1818.

4. Que l'entrepreneur et le service de l'armée s'en trouvèrent bien, et ma confiance est telle que je suis prêt à le cautionner.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec respect, Monsieur le Duc,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

P. OUVRARD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Si l'on admettait des rentes à 70 et le payement des bons supplémentaires à partir du 31 Décembre, 1822, au lieu du 31 Décembre, 1825, le résultat, pour 27 millions à recevoir par chaque grande Puissance, serait celui-ci :—

| | Francs. | |
|---|---|---|
| On a pour ces 27 millions 1,928,571 fr. de rentes, qui, vendues à 60, prix inférieur à celui qu'il est présumable qu'on obtiendrait dans ce système, donneraient .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 23,142,852 | |
| La perte serait donc de .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3,857,148 | |
| | | 27,000,000 |
| Mais on recevrait pour les bons supplémentaires .. | 7,100,000 | |
| A déduire .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3,857,148 | |
| Plus les intérêts à 5 pour cent. pendant 7½ ans, terme moyen .. .. .. .. .. | 1,446,430 | |
| | | 5,303,578 |
| Il y aurait donc un bénéfice de .. .. .. .. .. | | 1,796,422 |

Ou 6¾ pour cent., qui permettraient aux Alliés de faire vendre leurs rentes, sans perte, à environ 55.

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*To Viscount Palmerston.* [1156.]

MY LORD, Paris, 5th Feb., 1817.

In answer to your Lordship's letter, No. 4061, of the 17th January, I have the honour to inform you that I recollect perfectly that a ship was wrecked at Santoña in the winter of 1813-14, having on board stores belonging to different regiments of the army, some of which, which could not be used by the garrison, were recovered on paying a ransom. It is impossible for me at this distance of time, and having no papers by me to refer to, to state what stores were and what were not recovered or belonging to what regiment of the army. The officer employed in negotiating the ransom was one of the Commissariat under Sir Robert Kennedy; and he may be able to give your Lordship the information required.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1157. ] *To H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

SIR, Paris, 5th Feb., 1817.

I had the honour of receiving by the last post your Royal Highness's letter of the 31st January, from which I understand that your Royal Highness proposes to leave the corps in this country at the strength of 800 rank and file each, at which they are now fixed; and that being the case, I proceed to enumerate those which I should prefer to have withdrawn.

There are companies of artillery not attached to brigades, making about 300 men, which might be withdrawn likewise.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1st Foot .. .. .. .. .. | 3rd battalion |
| 21st .. .. .. .. .. .. | Ditto |
| 27th .. .. .. .. .. .. | Ditto |
| 81st .. .. .. .. .. .. | Ditto |
| 88th .. .. .. .. .. .. | Ditto |
| 40th .. .. .. .. .. .. | Ditto |

I have enumerated them in the order in which I should wish they might be withdrawn.

If your Royal Highness should think proper, instead of withdrawing whole battalions, to reduce the strength of those serving in this country, the arrangement might be made as follows. The rank and file of the infantry now consists of 21,086.

I would propose to keep at their present strength

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 battalions of Guards .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2,059 |
| 2 battalions of Rifle Brigade .. .. .. .. .. | 1,201 |
| 20 battalions of infantry, at 600 rank and file each | 12,000 |
| | 15,260 |

This reduction, with that of non-commissioned officers which would be the consequence of the reduction of the establishment and of the officers of the army lately ordered, would bring us as low as could be wished; and the battalions would all be in a very respectable state of strength, and we could keep up all our establishments, and the artillery not in brigades.

This scheme must, however, depend upon your Royal Highness's other arrangements; and I am ready to carry into execution whatever you may think proper.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Alexander Baring, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Paris, 5th Feb., 1817.

I had the honour of calling this morning on your Grace to have the satisfaction of communicating that we last night came to a final conclusion with the French Ministers on the subject of the loan. The Duc de Richelieu signified the King's consent to the terms proposed, and which are known to your Grace.

Some points, more of form than of substance, remain to be arranged; but we consider the business as essentially settled, and the papers connected with it will, in a day or two, be prepared.

We entertain a confident expectation that this operation will prove in its execution satisfactory to all parties whose interests are connected with it.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, my Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient servant,

ALEX. BARING.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, 6th Feb., 1817.

NOTE to be presented to the ALLIED MINISTERS respecting the PAYMENTS.

1. Les articles 2, 3, 4, et 5 continueront d'être exécutés, quant à la livraison des bons.

2. Les Puissances s'engagent à ne mettre en circulation aucune partie de ces bons, en modifiant ainsi l'exécution de l'article 6.

3. La Commission Mixte créée par l'article 11 constatera, conformément à cet article, la dette de la France et la forme des inscriptions à employer, au taux du jour, pour couvrir le déficit. Les rentes seront remises aux Commissaires des Puissances; mais elles ne seront pas aliénées. La garantie stipulée à l'art. 8 sera remise au complet.

4. La Prusse est exceptée de la disposition de l'article précédent. Elle sera payée en argent. On prendra avec la France des arrangemens convenables.

5. Les dispositions de la présente convention auront leur exécution pendant les deux semestres à finir le 30 Novembre prochain. Passé ce délai, la France devra se libérer, conformément au traité, et les rentes deviendront disponibles au profit des Puissances, dans le cas où leurs créances ne seroient pas soldées en numéraire.

Dans ce cas les rentes seront annullées de plein droit.

6. Les intérêts du retard seront payés par la France, conformément à l'article 13.

7. En cas d'aliénation de la rente au profit des Puissances, le prix leur en sera compté au taux du jour où elle deviendra disponible, ou bien au taux du jour où elle leur aura été remise en nantissement.

L'option entre ces deux modes sera déclarée par les Puissances à l'époque de la signature de la convention, et en deviendra partie explicite et intégrante.

[ 1158. ] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 7th Feb., 1817.

The Duc de Richelieu and Monsieur Corvetto have just been with me, and have informed me that their bargain with Baring, &c., is concluded as I before mentioned to you; that is, stock being at 60, they take 100,000,000 at 55, with an option of taking another 100,000,000 in four months, if the stock should not then be higher than 60. If it is, they are then to make a new bargain for the second 100,000,000. They are to have the interest of the current semestre. They give one-third of each part to certain Paris bankers.

I enclose a copy of the paper on which the French government propose to found a note to be delivered to-morrow to the Allied Ministers. It is a sort of contre-projet to the memorandum I gave to the Duc de Richelieu on the 27th of January, of which I sent you a copy.

That which this paper does is this: it delays the settlement for the two months, being the close of the first semestre of the second year, to the end of the second semestre of the second year, as you will observe that the settlement in money is to be made for the first four months of the first semestre in the end of March.

I have urged the Duc de Richelieu and Corvetto, before they bring this proposition before the Allies, to endeavour to prevail upon Baring, &c., to enable them to settle with the Allies in money or bills for the first semestre on the 30th of May; and then to stand upon their treaty for the second semestre, with the concession from the Allies of not negotiating the bons to be delivered to them under the 4th Article of the treaty. We should be certain then of getting our money in the end of November, as Baring and the government will of course be too happy to give it to us rather than allow us to go into the market with our inscriptions. If they cannot prevail upon Baring to give us money or securities for the payments of the two months at the end of the first semestre, I have told them that in my opinion the Allies ought to insist upon having the option of the price at which they would take the scrip for those two months, at the period at which they should be enabled to sell it.

I will endeavour to see Baring this day; and if I can settle the matter to my satisfaction, I will immediately consent to a reduction of the troops.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 7 Fév., 1817.

Nous nous sommes arrangés avec MM. Baring et Labouchere pour assurer le payement des deux derniers mois du 1er semestre au cas où les Cabinets ne consentiroient pas à nous accorder ce léger répit. Votre Excellence voudroit-elle bien provoquer une Conférence encore pour aujourd'hui, s'il est possible, de MM. les Ministres des quatre Puissances, afin que nous puissions leur proposer le plan sur les bases que nous vous avons soumises hier? Il nous importe tellement d'accélérer notre affaire de Budget, qu'un jour est très précieux pour nous.

Veuillez agréer l'hommage des sentimens respectueux

De votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

Veuillez me faire dire si la Conférence peut avoir lieu aujourd'hui?

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*To the Duc d'Orléans.* [1159.]

MONSEIGNEUR, Paris, ce 9 Fév., 1817.

J'ai reçu par la dernière poste la lettre de V.A. du 31 Janvier.

Dans toutes les conversations que j'ai eu avec V.A. j'ai fait une distinction entre le Roi et la Cour et le gouvernement et la Cour; et j'avoue que je ne me ressouviens pas d'avoir fait admission des torts du gouvernement dans sa marche vers sa consolidation ni pour sa sûreté ni même dans sa conduite envers V.A.S. J'ai toujours assuré V.A. que le Roi ne m'avait jamais dit que du bien de vous; je dois à Monsieur et aux Princes la justice de dire la même chose en égard à eux; et pour le Duc de Richelieu, le seul des Ministres avec lequel j'ai jamais parlé en égard de V.A., il m'a toujours parlé avec l'intérêt que V.A. mérite.

V.A. sait que sa position, ses opinions, et sa manière de parler le mettent mal dans l'esprit de la Cour en général, et il n'y a

pas de doute que quelques uns de ceux qui la composent voyent d'un mauvais œil le système sur lequel le gouvernement de la France se trouve placé. Cette Cour a nécessairement une influence; elle l'a partout; et elle l'a plus ici peut-être qu'ailleurs. Elle est un de ces maux dont on ne peut se défaire, et qu'on ne peut changer dans un moment; et c'est de l'influence de la Cour que j'ai toujours parlé à V.A.S., et dont j'ai toujours désiré que V.A. se tienne en garde.

Il est clair que tant que le gouvernement ne sera pas consolidé il y aura plus de jeu aux soupçons; et comme je connois la manière de penser, d'agir, et de parler de V.A., je ne suis pas sans crainte des suites de la résidence permanente de V.A. dans cette ville, malgré la bonne opinion de V.A. de S.M., et des Princes, et du gouvernement. Mais V.A., à son arrivée ici, aura occasion de voir les choses elle-même, et personne n'est plus capable d'en juger.

WELLINGTON.

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[1160.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 9th Feb., 1817.

The Duc de Richelieu came to a conference this morning, and communicated to the Ministers the projet which I sent you yesterday.

After some discussion, however, the projet which I had sent him on the 27th January was adopted, with the alteration of the third paragraph, as in the enclosed paper. The Ministers declared their intention to consult their financial advisers upon this scheme, and it appears they will adopt it "sauf l'approbation de leurs Cours."

I shall then insert in the Protocol my note for the reduction of the troops from the 1st of April.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Le bilan de chaque semestre seroit arrangé comme indiqué dans l'Article 11; et le gouvernement François payera l'arrière du premier semestre en effets à la satisfaction des Ministres

Alliés; et l'arrière du second en inscriptions, comme indiqué dans le Traité, dont les Puissances pouvaient disposer si la France ne paye pas en argent.

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CIRCULAR. [1161.]

*To the King of ———.*

SIRE, Paris, ce 11 Fév., 1817.

J'ai l'honneur d'annoncer à V.M. que les Ministres des quatre Puissances signataires du Traité de Paris de Nov., 1815, viennent par ordre de leurs Cours respectives d'annoncer à Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne une diminution de l'Armée d'Occupation, à avoir lieu à compter du 1er Avril prochain. Cette diminution doit être portée proportionnellement sur chaque contingent de l'armée; et se trouvant fixée à 30,000 hommes, ou à un cinquième de l'armée entière, elle sera d'un cinquième de chaque contingent.

Je supplie V.M. de faire donner des ordres qu'elle jugera à propos pour la diminution de 1000 hommes du contingent de V.M. Le Général aura des ordres pour faire marcher les troupes aussitôt qu'il recevra les ordres de V.M.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Marshal Lord Beresford.* [1162.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Paris, 11th Feb., 1817.

I have reserved for a separate letter what I have to say to you upon the state of affairs between Spain and Portugal.

Since I wrote last the Spanish government have asked and obtained the mediation of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and France, in her discussion with Portugal. Great Britain has also announced to the King that if he cannot explain his conduct in a satisfactory manner in regard to the attack of the provinces on the La Plata, she will withdraw her guarantee of his European dominions. Spain is not quite satisfied with all this, and still threatens to attack, unless the mediating Powers

or Great Britain will engage to obtain satisfaction for His Catholic Majesty.

I have, however, written to Pizarro, in answer to a letter which he wrote to me, to hint to him that the Powers of Europe will never consent to the possession of Portugal by Spain; that he is certain of succeeding in his object if he is moderate and patient; that success in an attack upon Portugal is not certain, in whatever defenceless state he may imagine Portugal to be; and that after all, as he will not be allowed to retain possession, he will only have ruined a country the best ally of Spain during the war, and the asylum for the unfortunate during the worst moments of the Spanish misfortunes: and I have hinted that even if the attack upon Portugal should be successful, the little glory resulting from it will belong to the General who conducts it.

All this and the Portuguese influence in the Court of Spain may prevent the attack. But you know the nation as well as I do. You know their hatred for the Portuguese; their thirst for military reputation; their disgust of their want of it; their jealousy of others who have acquired it, and particularly of the Portuguese; and their extreme jealousy of all that touches their colonies. I have never seen the Spaniards so animated as they are upon this subject, and I am convinced that an attack upon Portugal would be a most popular measure in the country and army.

I would recommend to you and to the Regency to get the militia by degrees into the fortresses, and in some degree disciplined, the Ordenanza organised, and the army complete, at least to the peace establishment, and all their measures taken for completing it entirely: they should likewise look to the lines on both sides of Lisbon.

The King of Portugal is in a bad scrape, not only with Spain, but with France. What do you think of his refusing to deliver up Cayenne, notwithstanding the Treaty of Vienna, until the boundaries shall be fixed? All Europe is disgusted with the conduct of Portugal, and I should not be at all surprised if a serious misfortune were to happen.

Among other things the Spanish government have remonstrated with the British government against your remaining in Portugal. If you leave them, I consider them as gone. I don't exactly know what answer has been given to this remonstrance.

I see no safety for Portugal excepting in satisfying Spain and France. We shall not allow Spain to take permanent possession of Portugal, nor will the great Continental Powers, or even France; but we shall not interfere to prevent the invasion and plunder of Portugal, you may depend upon it.

I heard yesterday that the French government were about to send an expedition to Cayenne. Things are going on tolerably well in this country. We have reduced the Army of Occupation to 120,000 men.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 13th Feb., 1817.

I have received and considered your Grace's letter of the 5th instant* with all the attention that must attend my disposition to accord with any proposal of yours; and I am sorry to acquaint you that it would entirely interfere with the arrangements made for the organisation and distribution of the whole army to reduce the regiments under the command of your Grace to 600 each, leaving the reduction in the whole force to be effected by withdrawing the difference between that and the existing establishment of 800 each. Even if this proposal were consistent with the general arrangements of the service, the government would not admit the reduction and discharge of effectives that would be consequent upon it, as they look to me for the reduction of the 2nd battalions in Ireland when the regiments expected from your army shall arrive.

I shall therefore proceed, when regularly authorised, to recall the regiments according to the order you have suggested, including the 300 artillery.

As it will be essential to equalise the several battalions of the Guards, leaving those in your army to take their share of the non-effectives, you must not reckon upon more than 1800 effectives in the brigade in France.

I remain, my dear Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

[It may be as well to intimate privately to the regiments referred to that they will probably at an early period receive orders to return to England.

WELLINGTON.]

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* See page 622.

[1163.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

Monsieur le Duc, Paris, le 16 Fév., 1817.

Vous vous conviendrez des objections que j'ai eu à la réduction de l'armée, et je vous envois à présent un rapport de ce qui est arrivé déjà dans le département de la France où les dispositions sont les meilleures, lequel mérite de l'attention en proportion qu'il paroît que celui qui l'a écrit est un homme modéré qui avoue jusqu'à présent on a rendu justice aux plaintes. Je dois assurer V.E. que la conduite, pas du peuple, mais de la supérieure et moyenne classe, exige la vigilance la plus exacte de la part des autorités dans les pays occupés, si on désire que l'occupation finisse de la manière paisible dont elle a été mise en exécution jusqu'à présent. C'est vraiment un objet de la dernière importance, qui demande l'attention sérieuse du gouvernement de S.M.; et j'espère que S.M. et son gouvernement auront la force de mépriser la petite popularité qu'en pourroit résulter de leur insouciance sur ces événemens, dans les vues de s'assurer le plus grand bien politique qui peut sous les circonstances actuelles arriver à l'Europe.

Wellington.

[Enclosure.]

*Colonel de Zezschwitz to Major de Schreiberhofer.*

Tourcoing, le 15 Fév., 1817.

Je le crois de mon devoir de vous charger d'informer M. le Général Sir G. Murray, chef de l'état-major-général de l'armée Alliée, et, si celui-ci le juge nécessaire, S.A. le Feld-Maréchal Duc de Wellington même, du mauvais esprit qui se montre parmi les habitans des cantonnemens Saxons depuis que le bruit s'est répandu que les troupes stationnées dans cette contrée quitteraient la France, ou au moins seraient considérablement diminuées. Il paroît que la haine contre les troupes Alliées n'a été retenue jusqu'à présent que par la conviction de la force et supériorité de notre part, et éclate d'une manière vraiment dangereuse aussitôt que la moindre fausse nouvelle encourage la classe inférieure du peuple. Un hussard Saxon a été blessé grièvement à la tête par un fermier; plusieurs artilleurs ont été attaqués et maltraités, près de Lannoy, par des paysans; avant-hier un chasseur qui rentra dans son quartier a reçu un coup d'épée dans le ventre, par son hôte, garde nationale, et cet homme en mourra probablement; un officier, en sortant de Lille, a été entouré d'une foule de populace, dont il a été insulté et presque maltraité; et même les autorités Françaises ont avoué que tous ces excès ont eu lieu sans la moindre raison ou provocation de la part de nos militaires.

Comme les individus qui se sont permis les violences et excès ont été mis en prison, et seront jugés par les tribunaux à Lille, qui jusqu'à présent ont toujours soutenu le droit, et nous ont donné plusieurs fois en de pareils cas toute la satisfaction que nous pouvions demander, je ne désire pas que S.A. le Duc de Wellington regarde le rapport que vous ferez de ces événemens comme une plainte officielle, et je vous engage de vouloir faire cette observation, parceque j'espère de ménager par ce procédé la bonne volonté des autorités locales, et d'entretenir la bonne intelligence qui jusqu'à présent a eu lieu entre elles et nos troupes.

Ces circonstances et ce changement dans l'esprit public parmi les habitans de cette contrée m'obligent en même tems d'observer respectueusement à M. le Lieutenant-Général Sir G. Murray, à l'égard des patrouilles de nuit, que maintenant je le crois dangereux de confier un service pareil aux gardes nationales, bourgeois, ou paysans, dans le district occupé par nos troupes, et qu'il serait même bien à désirer que la Garde Nationale fut désarmée.

Je me suis proposé de demander la permission de venir à Paris pour avoir l'honneur de demander verbalement les ordres de S.A. le Feld-Maréchal et de M. le Lieutenant-Général Sir G. Murray sur plusieurs de ces objets.

ZEZSCHWITZ, Colonel.

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*To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill.* [ 1164. ]

MY DEAR HILL, Paris, 17th Feb., 1817.

I intended to have gone to Cambrai on Thursday next, in order to hunt on Friday, if I had not received the letter of which the enclosed is a copy.

All hunting and coursing in the fields must, of course, have been discontinued on the 1st of March; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give orders to the General officers commanding divisions for discontinuing both in the fields immediately upon the receipt of this order.

Hunting in the woods may be continued as long as the proprietors of the woods will permit it, but there must be no riding over the fields. I regret this circumstance much, as it will prevent my seeing you; but I hear, and hope, you are getting quite well.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Prince Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Vienne, ce 17 Fév., 1817.

Je vous remercie, mon cher Duc, de votre dernière lettre. Les remarques qu'elle renferme sont toutes vraies, et je me suis empressé de donner des directions à M. de Binder. Si le principe de la Quadruple Alliance doit être présent à tous les agens des quatre Cours en quelque lieu qu'ils puissent se trouver placés, il n'est pas nécessaire assurément que son application les conduise à s'ériger en tribunal des Alliés. Ce qui se fait à Paris ne peut et ne doit se faire que là. Je me flatte que la suite ne prêtera plus à vos réclamations; et si le fait devait se présenter, soyez sûr, mon cher Duc, qu'il me suffira d'un mot de votre part pour que de notre côté on se range comme de droit. Je vous demande toutefois avec instance de tâcher d'influer vous même en bien sur les conseils des Pays-Bas. Ce pays va bien mal, et son gouvernement est loin à ce qu'il paroît de chercher à combler l'abîme qu'il creuse plutôt lui-même, et qui le fera tomber un jour ou l'autre, sans que ni lui ni nous ne puissions calculer les effets de cette chute.

Personne, j'ose le croire, ne voit moins noir que moi dans la position générale des choses. J'ai toujours été sur la scène des grandes révolutions des dernières décades. J'y ai été longtems comme observateur, et plus longtems encore comme acteur. Ce n'est donc pas moi qui puis admettre que l'on puisse passer d'un long état de maladie et de souffrances à celui d'une pleine santé; mais je vois les dangers là où ils se trouvent, et je cherche les moyens de les faire diminuer. Nous avons des moyens de contrôle très puissans, et je vous réponds que le royaume des Pays-Bas est aujourd'hui l'un des foyers, et peut être même le foyer le plus actif, de désordre de toute espèce.

Je crois pouvoir féliciter votre gouvernement des scènes de Spafields et du Parc. Les effets de crises aussi violentes tournent toujours en faveur du bon parti. L'Opposition, si j'en excepte les Burdett, et Kinnaird, et Co., en deviendra plus sage, et les indépendans se prononceront en faveur des amis de l'ordre. Si Dieu a toujours un fouet tout prêt pour tenir le monde en mouvement, il est sûr que ce sont les Ultra de tous les partis qui le manient; mais fouettant comme les enfans, le bruit est pour les hommes de bien et les coups leur reviennent. Vous, mon cher Duc, êtes un grand instrument de paix entre les mains de la Providence. Votre champ est vaste, et votre tête vaut votre bras. Je me flatte que vous nous rendiez la justice, et peut-être à moi personnellement, que nous ferons de notre côté ce qui se faire se peut pour le parti de la sagesse et de la modération. Vous en recevrez de nouvelles preuves par les instructions que reçoit aujourd'hui Vincent.

Je me flatte que l'année prochaine j'aurai le bonheur de vous rencontrer quelque part. Je compterai toujours les momens que nous passerons ensemble parmi les plus heureux de ma vie.

Je charge Lady Shelley, que je crois doit être à Paris, de vous donner de nos nouvelles. Elle aime beaucoup Vienne, et nous l'avons vu nous quitter avec de bien véritables regrets. Si vous rencontrez Lady Kinnaird, faites lui mes complimens. On nous a dit ici qu'elle se séparoit de son mari.

Adieu, mon cher Duc: conservez moi bontés et souvenir, et croyez à mon bien inviolable attachement.

METTERNICH.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Paris, 19th Feb., 1817. [1165.]

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 14th instant, enclosing a claim, on the part of General Hügel, of the Wurtemberg service, to share in any sum that may be granted, under the authority of the Protocol of the * 1815, to the army that served under my command in the campaign of that year.

By referring to the Protocol it will be seen that the British government are under the necessity of coming to certain arrangements regarding the sum of 25,000,000 francs with the Powers whose troops composed the army under my command; and I understand that those Powers have agreed upon a principle of distribution proposed in a memorandum given by me to Lord Castlereagh on the 6th November, 1815, of which I enclose your Lordship a copy. The question is whether General Hügel, not being in the service of any of those Powers, ought to be included in the distribution of the sum of money to the army when it will be granted, and the warrant directing it will be issued.

General Hügel calls himself and the officers who accompanied him Officers of the Staff of the army. They were never so considered in the army; were never so announced to the army; were never so employed: they were in a higher character, that of diplomatic agents.

General Hügel first came to head-quarters to arrange with me, on the part of the late King of Wurtemberg, a treaty of subsidy, and he brought with him his credentials. He afterwards remained under the same authority, and for the convenience of the King his master, to forward to His Majesty direct intelligence of the movements and operations of the army. He might have been present at the battle of Waterloo, and in the operations which ended in the capture of Paris; but he could not be considered in any manner part of the army engaged in those operations, or under my orders in any manner, excepting as far as that every person, whatever his quality, who attends an army is obliged to obey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in regard to discipline and conduct.

It is scarcely necessary that I should account for verbal com-

* Blank in manuscript.

munications between Colonel Hervey, my Military Secretary, and Captain Ramboul; but I must observe that before the grant should be made, or the warrant issued for the distribution of money to the army, it would be highly improper in me to give any positive opinion upon the claims of any person whatever, and for that reason it was that a positive answer was not given. But your Lordship will observe from this letter that I never had, nor never could have, any doubt upon this subject.

Indeed, considering the number of officers of rank employed at my head-quarters at the period of the battle of Waterloo, from all the Courts in Europe, it would be highly inexpedient to attend to this demand, even if there were a shadow of justice for it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1166.] *To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, Paris, 24th Feb., 1817.

The Duc de Richelieu called upon me a few days ago, to inform me that he found himself under the necessity of preventing M. de la Tour du Pin from returning to Bruxelles, and of calling away M. de Caux, the Chargé d'Affaires in M. de la Tour du Pin's absence, in consequence of the indecent libels published against them in the 'Libéral;' and he wished to have my opinion upon the subject. After reading the libel upon M. de la Tour du Pin, which is, I think, one of the most improper publications I have ever read on a foreign minister for the performance of his public duty, I told the Duc de Richelieu that I thought he had better commence his operation by writing himself to M. de Nagell, to request that protection might be given to the King's Minister in the performance of his duty; and that if this were refused or delayed, that he should then proceed as he should think proper. I must do the Duc de Richelieu the justice to say that he was very moderate in his expressions and notions on the whole subject, and stated repeatedly that in withdrawing his Minister he had no wish to commit any hostile act; that on the contrary, he wished that Fagel might remain here, and that all the business with the Nether-

lands should be transacted through his medium. He has proceeded as I have recommended, and we shall now see what will be done in the Netherlands.

You will have heard what passed upon this subject published in the Netherlands in the course of the last year, and of the difficulty we had in prevailing upon the King to adopt even the measure which he did recommend to the Legislature, and which, I believe, passed unanimously. I have since spoken to the King upon the state of his press, and I endeavoured to make him sensible that the libellous press of which the world complained was a foreign, and not a national press; that it was turned every day more and more against his system, his measures, his Allies and friends, the connexion with Holland, and his own person; that it had already done him the greatest injury; that I could see a great difference for the worse in the state of the public mind at Bruxelles from what it had been before the battle of Waterloo; that he might depend upon it he would soon be under the necessity of curbing its licentiousness; and that every day's delay, at the same time that it augmented the evil to such a degree as almost to render a remedy hopeless, would render it extremely difficult of attainment. The King listened to me with more attention and patience than he had before upon this subject, and I think what has passed since in the Netherlands is not ill-calculated to make him sensible of the inconvenience of the existing licentiousness of his press; and, as I know you have more influence over him than any body else, I write to you upon this subject, in order that you may talk to him upon it, and let him see to what point he is verging.

You may depend upon it that the whole Corps Diplomatique at Bruxelles and here will take up the subject very warmly; and if justice is not done to M. de la Tour du Pin, which I think very doubtful, as I believe that the King has made such a selection of judges, law officers, and prefects in the Netherlands, that justice cannot be expected in any case of libel, or by a loyal Frenchman, or by an Englishman, in any case whatever; that some measure will be adopted by all the Powers in Europe, excepting possibly ourselves, little short of discontinuing the diplomatic relation with the Court of the Netherlands.

You will see, therefore, how important it is that you should interest yourself in this matter; and, if you should not return to

Bruxelles shortly, I recommend that you should write upon it either to the King or to Nagell.

I have every reason to believe, indeed I think I have positive proof, that the 'Libéral' is the property of the Liberal party at Paris. This is the most dangerous party in France; that one which has done all the mischief throughout the Revolution, and are waiting only for an opportunity to do more; and, if they should succeed in their objects in France, their first operation would be, by revolutionary force of arms, to deprive the King of the Netherlands of his *provinces du Midi.*

Ever, my dear Clancarty, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Downing Street, 24th Feb., 1817.

I do myself the honour to enclose to your Grace a correspondence transmitted to this department by desire of Lord Viscount Castlereagh upon the subject of the expense incurred for the protection of Lisbon; and I have to request your Grace would favour me with your opinion whether the sums disbursed under this head ought to be charged against the Portuguese government in the subsidy accounts.*

I have the honour to be your Grace's most obedient servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*S. R. Lushington, Esq., to W. Hamilton, Esq.*

SIR, Treasury Chambers, 17th Feb., 1817.

I herewith transmit, by command of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copy of a letter of the 8th ult., from Sir Robert Kennedy at Lisbon, enclosing a statement of sums paid by the Commissariat for the expenses of the Lines from 11th June, 1810, to the end of the war, amounting to 255,793*l.* 9¾*d.*; and I am to desire that you will submit the same to the consideration of Viscount Castlereagh, and move him to favour my Lords with his opinion whether these sums should be charged against the Portuguese government in the subsidy accounts.

I am, &c.,

S. R. LUSHINGTON.

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* See page 638.

II.

*Sir R. H. Kennedy to George Harrison, Esq.*

SIR, Lisbon, 8th Jan., 1817.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of sums paid by the Commissariat for the expenses of the Lines from the 11th June, 1810, to the end of the Peninsula service, amounting to 255,793*l.* 9¾*d.*; and I beg the favour of knowing whether that sum is to be charged against the Portuguese subsidy accounts. The previous payments to June, 1810, were made by Commissary-General Murray, whose accounts, I believe, are in the Audit Office in London.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. H. KENNEDY.

III.

STATEMENT of Sums paid by the British Commissariat under the orders of Commissary-General Sir R. H. KENNEDY, for Labourers, Transport, Fascines, Palisades, Implements, &c., for the Works on the LINES OF LISBON, under the direction of British Officers of the Engineer Department.

| | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peniche .. .. .. .. .. .. | 13,467 | 14 | 3¾ |
| Fort St. Julian .. .. .. .. | 19,687 | 6 | 8 |
| Mafra .. .. .. .. .. .. | 132,949 | 6 | 6½ |
| Lisbon .. .. .. .. .. .. | 31,474 | 13 | 6 |
| Almada .. .. .. .. .. .. | 41,722 | 2 | 11¼ |
| Bucellas .. .. .. .. .. | 8,948 | 11 | 10 |
| Torres Vedras .. .. .. .. | 7,543 | 5 | 0½ |
| | £255,793 | 0 | 9¾ |

R. H. KENNEDY.

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G. O. Paris, 26th Feb., 1817. [1167.]

5. It appears by reports made to head quarters, that several instances have occurred of routes being issued by individual officers, which practice leads to a considerable degree of irregularity.

6. Routes are in future to be issued, therefore, from the Quartermaster-General's office only, or by the Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals attached to troops, and the Assistant-Quartermaster-General stationed at Calais.

7. The Quartermaster-General will communicate to his assistants the necessary instructions for their guidance in the issue of routes.

8. Such routes only as are above authorised are to be ac-

knowledged at any station, and are to entitle the bearers to receive rations, and be provided with quarters.

9. No detachment or party of any description, nor any individual going beyond the bounds of their own corps, so as to require quarters or provisions, should proceed without a route.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 28th Feb., 1817.

In reference to our correspondence relative to the return of a portion of the British troops under your Grace's command, I have now to intimate to you that His Majesty's government have communicated to me that this force is to be withdrawn on the 1st of April, and I have therefore to request that your Grace will have the following corps in readiness to embark as soon after that period as they can reach Calais, on board the tonnage which will by that time be prepared for their reception.

| | |
|---|---|
| Detachment of 200 men from each battalion of the Foot Guards. | |
| 1st Foot .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3rd Battalion. |
| 21st .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | ditto. |
| 27th .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | ditto. |
| 81st .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | ditto. |
| 88th .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | ditto. |
| 40th .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | ditto. |

I am, my Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

P.S.—It is left to your Grace to include or not the 300 artillery alluded to in your letter, in the force to be withdrawn.

[Give to the Quartermaster-General. I'll speak to him on this subject. These troops should be cantoned in the districts nearest to Calais.

WELLINGTON.]

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[ 1168.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Paris, 2nd March, 1817.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 24th February, No. 7.*

There is no doubt that the works to which your Lordship

* See page 636.

adverts were constructed for the defence of Lisbon; that they contributed to save the kingdom of Portugal from the enemy in the years 1810-11; and that the principal reason which induced me to order the construction of them, with the exception of those about St. Julian and Mafra to cover the embarkation of the British army, was that the Portuguese militia, and even the regular troops, were not at that time in a state of discipline and efficiency to be opposed to the enemy in the open field.

Yet I must add that the Portuguese government of that day disapproved not only of the construction of the works in question, but the system of operations which was connected with them; and I do not recollect that they ever consented to defray the whole or any part of the expense incurred upon them.

From these circumstances your Lordship will be the best judge whether the Portuguese government ought to be called upon to defray the expense of those works.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 4th March, 1817.

The Duke received your letter of the 27th, reminding him of the arrangements for withdrawing the troops; but the orders to this effect had been sent by the mail of Friday last. In fact, the government forgot to make any communication to His Royal Highness; and it was not until I asked the question on the morning of the day the Duke's letter had been despatched to you, that we knew of the 1st of April having been pitched upon for breaking up the portion of the contingent that is to be withdrawn.

I now send your Grace a letter stating that tonnage will be in readiness to receive the troops as soon as they can reach the coast after the 1st of April, and also stating their destinations.

I also send you an official letter, giving in more detail the order for sending home detachments of the Guards. This measure originates in the reduction of the whole establishment of the Guards, and the consequent necessity of the battalions in France bearing their proportion of the non-effectives. His Royal Highness desires me to express his hope that this diminution of 400 Guards may not embarrass you in regard to the amount of reduction.

I am pestered with questions by government regarding your reduction of Staff in proportion to the troops recalled; and at the Finance Committee of

the House of Commons, where I have been obliged to attend every day for the last week, I could only generally state that a proportionate reduction of Staff, probably to the extent of that of a division, would take effect, the details of which you would soon transmit.

Will you have the goodness to send me a return of those you propose to reduce?

The fright into which some of the gentlemen of this country have been thrown has tended to moderate the *fever* of retrenchment and reduction, and to bring the Houses of Parliament a little more into reason. With the hands of the Executive strengthened as they now are, I trust matters will go on better.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke,

Yours most faithfully and sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

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[1169.] *To H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief.*

SIR, Paris, 6th March, 1817.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's directions to send home certain corps of infantry belonging to this army, and orders are given that they should be so disposed as that they will be in readiness to embark at Calais as soon as the vessels will arrive for them. Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw will communicate on the subject with Lieutenant-Colonel Marley.

I beg leave to observe to your Royal Highness that they ought to quit the French territory before the 1st April. After that day the French government are not bound to provide for them; and if there should be a demand for more than the reduced number of rations, the troops demanding them will be obliged to pay for them.

It is very desirable that I should likewise receive your Royal Highness's commands whether there is to be any and what reduction of the General and other officers on the Staff of the army in consequence of this reduction of the troops.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Don G. Pizarro.* [1170.]

EXCELENTÍSIMO SEÑOR, Paris, ce 9 Mars, 1817.

La lettre de V.E. du 18 Fév. que j'ai reçu il y a peu de jours m'a fait le plus grand plaisir, parceque j'y vois la manifestation de l'esprit de modération et de sagesse qui a caractérisé le gouvernement de S.M.C. dans sa transaction avec le gouvernement du Brésil.

Cette affaire est sur le point d'être agitée ici, les Ministres des quatre Cours Alliées ayant déjà reçus leurs instructions, et ayant communiqués avec le Ministère Français; et aussitôt que le Général Pozzo di Borgo sera rétabli d'un accident qui lui est arrivé, les discussions commenceront. Il me paroît à présent qu'il n'y aura pas de difficulté à faire adopter une résolution forte sur la conduite du gouvernement du Brésil, en cas qu'il ne puisse pas donner des explications de cette conduite qui seraient satisfaisantes à S.M.C., et en même tems une approbation à la modération de S.M., et une prière de la part des Puissances médiatives de ne pas laisser troubler le repos de l'Europe sur une question sur laquelle jusqu'à présent toute l'Europe convient que le gouvernement du Brésil a tort.

Dans cette question, comme dans toute autre à être discutée par plus d'une Puissance, il faut tâcher que tout le monde marche d'accord, et que la justice forme la base de tout ce qu'on fait.

Une Puissance médiatrice se croit dans la nécessité d'entendre au moins les deux côtés avant de se décider positivement contre l'un ou l'autre, et je vois clairement qu'on ne pourra pas mener les Ministres des Puissances à Paris plus loin qu'à une décision forte contre l'acte, en cas qu'il ne puisse pas être expliqué. Je ne connois pas le part que l'Angleterre prendra dans cette question; mais il me paroît qu'il sera analogue à celui qu'elle a pris déjà en ce qui regarde la garantie, et l'opinion que je viens d'annoncer à V.E. suppose une conduite de la part des Puissances médiatrices en général qui y est entièrement analogue.

Comme tout ce qu'il sera nécessaire de faire dans cette affaire, toute opération qu'il faudroit entreprendre en cas que le gouvernement du Brésil ne vienne pas à la raison, tombera sur le gouvernement de S.M.B., il est raisonnable de croire que sa décision sur les points préalables de la médiation, aussi bien que sur ses résultats, sera la prépondérante.

Pour cette raison, aussi bien que pour beaucoup d'autres, je regrette que la question de l'abolition de la traite se trouve à présent si mal placée. On se trompe en croyant que l'Angleterre a de l'intérêt à l'abolition excepté celui de l'humanité, auquel toutes les nations participent également; et la question pour S.M.C. à décider est s'il veut sanctionner le renouvellement et la permanence d'un mal sur une partie de la côte d'Afrique d'où il a été chassé pendant toute la dernière guerre. Malgré qu'il n'y a vraiement point d'intérêt Britannique dans cette question, le gouvernement de S.M.B. consent à donner une somme aussi grande qu'il est possible de donner dans les circonstances actuelles, enfin de mettre à la disposition de S.M.C. les moyens de satisfaire à ceux de ses sujets dont les intérêts seroient lésés par ces arrangements, et le gouvernement de S.M.B. l'a en son pouvoir de donner cette somme seulement parceque le peuple prend un intérêt au sort des pays qui sont le siége de la traite.

Voilà où est la question. Elle tourne sur 400,000 livres ou 600,000, et pour avoir la dernière somme le gouvernement de S.M.C. perd tous les avantages qui pourroient résulter de la décision du gouvernement Britannique, non-seulement dans les discussions sur les actes du gouvernement du Brésil, mais dans d'autres affaires d'intérêt majeur pour l'Espagne, où l'influence Britannique pourroit vous être de la plus grande utilité.

Je prie V.E. de considérer la question de la traite sous le point de vue ci-dessus indiqué; et comme je peux vous assurer que malgré le désir du gouvernement de S.M.B. d'être utile à l'Espagne, ils ne peuvent rien faire pour vous hors de l'Europe tant que cette question n'est pas décidée, vous verrez que l'intérêt de l'Espagne sur sa décision est bien majeur à celui d'Angleterre.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON, DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

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*The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Horse Guards, 12th March, 1817.

I have received your Grace's letter of the 6th, and according to your intimation that the troops ought to quit the French territory before the 1st of April, I have taken means to urge the readiness of the tonnage to receive them at Calais as soon as possible previous to that date.

With regard to the reduction of General and Staff officers, I refrained from giving any instructions to your Grace until I should know your wishes regarding the formation of your remaining force, *i. e.*, whether you would retain your present number of divisions at a diminished strength in proportion to the troops withdrawn, or reduce one division altogether. Upon the supposition, however, that your Grace will concur with me in thinking the latter mode the most expedient (and indeed I believe it is the arrangement most desired by the government, as affording the greater reduction of Staff), it only remains for me to desire that your Grace will be pleased to strike off the Staff of one division, according to the numbers stated in the margin.*

Should your Grace have any wish to act upon a different principle, I request you will do so, and let me know your arrangement; and in effecting this reduction it appears expedient that it should fall on the junior ranks in each class, unless you should have any reason for making selections, which I leave entirely to the discretion of your Grace.

I am, my Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

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*General Baron Müffling to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Paris, le 12 Mars, 1817.

J'ai l'honneur de présenter à Votre Altesse le calcul sur la force de l'Armée d'Occupation d'après le principe qu'elle a donnée.

J'ai envoyé ce calcul au Général de Zieten, l'avertissant qu'il n'avait à demander du 1er Avril que 28,571 rations pour hommes, et logement avec le bois prescrit pour 3428 officiers, ce qui fait la somme de 31,000 têtes.

C'est avec le plus grand respect que j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Altesse le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

MÜFFLING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

CALCUL sur la Force de l'ARMÉE d'OCCUPATION (dans la supposition que le Ministère de la Guerre de France accède à la proposition de ne diminuer l'Abonnement des Rations d'Officiers que d'un septième).

200,000 rations pour hommes (Art. 2 de la Convention conclue en conformité de l'Article 5 du Traité principal, 1815).

20,000 rations de ces 200,000 sont supposés rations d'officiers (Art. 4 de la Convention du 23 Janvier, 1816).

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* 1 Lieutenant-General and 3 Major-Generals, with their Aides-de-Camp; 1 Assistant Adjutant-General, 2 Deputy Assistants ditto, 1 Assistant Quartermaster-General, 2 Deputy Assistants ditto, 3 Majors of Brigade, 1 Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, Physician, 3 Staff Surgeons, 5 Assistant-Surgeons, 1 Apothecary, 1 Dispenser of Medicines, 1 Deputy Purveyor, 1 Assistant Provost Marshal, 1 Assistant Baggage Master, 1 Chaplain.

Par la déclaration des Ministres Alliés du 10 Février, 1817, l'Armée d'Occupation sera réduite d'un cinquième, ou par l'Art. 5 à
160,000 rations pour hommes.
Si on déduit des 20,000 rations d'officiers 1-7, il en reste
17,142 rations, supposés rations d'officiers.

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L'Armée d'Occupation aurait donc à demander du gouvernement Français :
142,858 rations pour hommes, ce qui fait pour chacun des cinq contingens :
28,571 rations pour hommes, et
3,428 supposés officiers, à loger, &c.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Count Woronzow to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Maubeuge, 1st (13th) March, 1817.

The messenger that I have so long expected from Petersburg is not yet arrived, but one going to London has passed by here, and has left some papers for me, and others for General Pozzo, which have been immediately sent to him.

In those I have received there is not a word about the diminution; but in a private letter from a friend on the Emperor's Staff it is mentioned that His Imperial Majesty strongly objects to diminishing the Russian contingent, as on account of the distance and disorganization of our corps it would be attended with great inconvenience. The person who writes this adds that by the next messenger I shall receive decisive orders on that subject, and does not mention anything more, nor whether the Emperor reckons upon the Wurtemberg contingent, or any other means, instead of sending off a fifth of the Russians. All this, however, is not at all official, and I only mention it to your Grace, as I think myself bound by gratitude for your kindness and confidence towards me to communicate to you all I hear about our part of the army that has the honour and happiness of calling itself yours. At the same time I should wish to have your Grace's orders for the case of our not receiving any order whatever in time to begin a movement of diminution for the 1st of April. By what I heard from your Grace I don't despair of seeing you here next week; but in all cases, immediately after the Grand Duke's departure, I shall come to Paris, and it will be yet time to receive your decision.

I beg your Grace to look upon what I have here mentioned as quite a private information, on account of the source I have it from; and believe me to be, with the greatest respect,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

C. M. WORONZOW.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1171.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 15 Mars, 1817.

Je vous envois la copie d'un certificat d'un mariage fait par un pasteur de l'Eglise Réformée, de la commune d'Hargicourt, arrondissement de St. Quentin, département de l'Aisne, entre un soldat Anglois et une Anglaise attachée à la troupe.

Après des perquisitions à ce sujet, j'ai trouvé qu'il n'y a pas eu de permission de la part du capitaine de la troupe; et je crois pouvoir prouver que le pasteur le savait quand il a célébré ce mariage.

Mais je prie V.E. d'observer que si il y avait eu ou non permission de la part du capitaine, le pasteur, selon les loix de la France, n'avoit aucun droit de célébrer un mariage qui n'avoit pas déjà été contracté par devant le magistrat.

Je prie V.E. de prendre les mesures sur ce sujet qu'elle jugera convenable.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Major-General Sir John Keane.* [1172.]

SIR, Paris, 17th March, 1817.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court-Martial of which you are President on the trial of ——— of the ——— Regiment; and I beg that the Court will revise their sentence.

A sentry on his post is the depositary of the public authority, and is particularly charged with the execution of the orders of his superiors. He is respected accordingly both by the customs and usages of all countries, and under the provisions of the military laws and orders of all armies.

There is no crime of which the consequences may be so serious as that of using violence to a sentry on his post, of which the Court have found ——— guilty; none from which it is so much the duty of an officer to abstain; and there is no part of his duty more important than that he should set an example to the soldiers under his command of respect for the authority of a sentry and obedience to the orders which the sentry is bound to see carried into execution.

Yet for this crime, aggravated as it is by assumptions of

authority in various modes by ————, which I will notice in another manner, the Court have passed a sentence that ———— shall be reprimanded!

I beg that they will reconsider this sentence, with a view to pass one which shall be more equal to the magnitude of the offence of which ———— has been found guilty, and shall be better calculated to mark the sense of the Court of his crime.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1173. ]

MEMORANDUM.

*To Colonel Sir Colin Campbell.*

Upon examining the warrant for the distribution of 25 millions of livres, I observe that it is not drawn upon the principle agreed upon by the Allied Powers whose troops served in the army under my command.

That principle was stated in a memorandum drawn by me on the 6th November, 1815, and given to Lord Castlereagh; and it appears by a letter from Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, dated the * , "that the King of the Netherlands has approved the principle brought forward by the Duke, that the said sum of 25 millions shall be divided among the troops as one class, and the other Sovereigns concerned have likewise concurred in the same." The warrant, therefore, should direct the mode of division of the whole: that is, upon the principle of British prize-money among the whole Allied army.

If this is not done, I may, contrary to the intentions of the Sovereigns concerned, make one division to the troops of one nation, and another to the others. Indeed, I don't see how I could avoid this inconvenience with the best intentions.

I would propose, then, that the words "*proportion of the,*" and "*which shall come to the British army,*" in the second page, should be omitted, and the warrant will then contain orders in conformity with the original memorandum to which all the Sovereigns have agreed.

WELLINGTON.

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* Blank in manuscript.

*The Comptroller of Army Accounts to Colonel Hervey.*

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 27th March, 1817.

I should certainly have preferred waiting, as you suggest, till I could have an opportunity of speaking to the Duke of Wellington about the claims for supplies furnished to foreign troops, but it is so desirable that Mr. Coffin's establishment should be discontinued as early as possible, that I have been unwilling to run the risk of delay.

I hope, however, that the enclosed memorandum, to which I have annexed a further explanation from Mr. Coffin, will put his Grace distinctly in possession of the whole subject.

I return the former papers as requested, and remain,

Dear Sir, very truly yours,

A. ROSENHAGEN.

P.S.—I send the memorandum in duplicate, and shall be obliged by your returning one copy, with the Duke of Wellington's answers.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM.

Among the outstanding claims at present under examination are many for supplies furnished in different manners to foreign troops, that is, to French Royalists, Brunswickers, and Hanoverians.

*French Troops.*

1. The small force attached to the King of France having been regularly attended by a British Commissary, it is conceived that no doubt can exist of our liability (so far as respects the parties furnishing) for all supplies furnished to those troops through the intervention of our own Commissariat; but, previously to payment, the Duke of Wellington's opinion is requested whether any reference should be made to the French government, with a view to ascertain its disposition to take these claims upon itself.

Let me have a general statement of each different class of claim, and I will speak to the Duc de Feltre on the subject.—W.

2. Independently of the claims referred to in the preceding query there are others, for supplies furnished to detached parties of French Royalists not attended by an English Commissary, and without any intervention of our Commissariat. Some of these are understood to have been deserters, or others seeking to join the King, and in several instances the supplies have been furnished subsequently to the acknowledgment of the King on the frontier. Is the English government to be considered as in any way responsible for supplies of this nature?

*Brunswick Troops.*

These consisted of two distinct classes, namely, the contingent of 3000, and the extra corps of 4000 men.

3. With respect to the contingent of 3000, it is distinctly understood by the Duke of Wellington's Memorandum of the 28th August, 1815, that the Belgic government was obliged, by the Treaty of Congress, to supply them with rations, to be paid for at a fixed rate by the Brunswick government itself; and although, in consequence of the deficiency of the magazines of the Belgic government, it was agreed that these troops should receive rations from ours, it is conceived that we can in no way be responsible for supplies furnished to them otherwise than through the intervention of our Commissariat.

4. Is it to be understood that the same obligation, or any other, rested on the Belgic government with respect to the extra corps of 4000, which was by the Subsidiary Treaty to be maintained wholly at our charge from the 1st April, 1815?

5. If the same obligation did not rest upon the Belgic government with respect to this extra subsidiary corps, it is conceived that we must be responsible for all supplies furnished to it subsequently to the 1st April, but that we can have no responsibility for anything supplied prior to that date.

6. Was the Belgic government bound to supply transport for either of these corps, or both?

7. If not, it is presumed that we are liable for transport supplied to the extra subsidiary corps subsequently to the 1st of April, 1815, but that we are in no way responsible for such supplies to the regular contingent of 3000 men.

8. Many of the vouchers presented in support of these claims do not afford the means of judging whether the supplies were furnished for the contingent, or for the extra subsidiary corps; and if it should be decided that we are not in any manner to be responsible for the contingent, it is submitted that these vouchers should be rejected altogether, being in many instances in other respects so irregular as to evidence of delivery, that even if the troops on account of which the claims are made were clearly shown to be a part of those which were at our charge, they could only be admitted upon a very liberal principle of equity. It may be proper, however, to observe that Commissary-General Dunmore does not appear ever to have been informed of any distinction between these two corps (see annexed memorandum from Mr. Coffin, marked A.).

The difference between contingent and subsidiary corps does not exist on this subject.

The King of the Netherlands was bound to furnish, not only the contingent, but the whole army under my command, even the British army, at the rates specified by Congress. (See the Treaty of Congress.)

The supplies for the Brunswick corps must be paid for as ordered by my memorandum, and the amount forwarded to the King of the Netherlands.—W.

*Hanoverian Troops.*

These have likewise been understood to consist of a contingent corps of 10,000, and of an extra corps of about 16,000, the latter of which we were bound, by the Subsidiary Treaty, to maintain in all respects from the 25th of May, 1815. It appears by the accompanying memorandum (B.), received from Deputy Commissary-General Coffin, that the contingent or (as it seems to have been more usually denominated) the "reserved" corps of 10,000 men, has invariably been fed by the Belgic government; but that the troops forming the extra subsidiary corps had been at our charge previously to the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty being in force, and, in fact, from the moment of their entrance into Belgium, in the year 1814.

Great Britain had in the Netherlands at its charge before the war a Hanoverian corps. This Hanoverian corps afterwards formed the subsidiary corps of 16,000 men.

9. With respect, therefore, to the troops forming the extra subsidiary corps, it would appear that we must be considered as responsible for supplies furnished to them, whether before or after the date from which the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty were to take effect. The total amount is, however, stated to be very inconsiderable.

All supplies to this corps must be paid for.

10. The Duke of Wellington is requested to state whether, upon the principle stated in Query No. 8 of this paper, all vouchers may be rejected which do not afford the means of judging for which of the two corps the supplies may have been furnished. These doubtful vouchers are, however, stated to be much less numerous than with respect to the Brunswick troops, being in every instance for supplies furnished to detachments (apparently for the most part of various battalions) entering into or marching out of the country.

The denomination of the regiments composing this corps is known.

The supplies to these regiments must be paid; those to others not.—W.

A. ROSENHAGEN, Compir. A. A.

Cambrai, 27th March, 1817.

II.

MEMORANDUM FROM DEPUTY COMMISSARY-GENERAL COFFIN, REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING.

*Brunswick Troops.* (A.)

The distinction between the contingent and the extra subsidiary corps was entirely unknown to the Commissariat, and was consequently never adverted to in the arrangements for the supply of these troops.

*Hanoverian Troops.* (B.)

The only distinction known to the Commissariat was that which I have adverted to in my Query No. 8, addressed to the Comptroller of Army Accounts, and submitted by him to the Duke of Wellington on the 17th instant. The Hanoverian troops, commanded by Lieutenant-General Baron

Decken, consisting of the corps named in the margin,* which entered the Netherlands about the latter end of March, or beginning of April, 1815, were denominated the reserve, under which designation the officers of the British Commissariat were prohibited from providing in any way for their wants, it being understood that this obligation rested wholly on the Belgic government. I apprehend that this is the same body of troops described by the Comptroller as the contingent corps.

The Hanoverian troops incorporated in the divisions of the British army constitute, I imagine, what is called the extra subsidiary corps; and it would appear from the Comptroller's observation that these became at our charge only from the 25th of May, 1815.

This is not true: they were at our charge from the middle of 1814.—W.

On this point there seems to be some misunderstanding. Most of the battalions of which this corps consisted appear to have entered the Netherlands in the months of August and September, 1814, from which time up to the period of their being embodied with the British troops their subsistence was always at our charge. British Commissariat officers were sent by Lord Lynedoch's order to meet them and to provide for their wants on their first entrance into the territory of the Low Countries; and they were afterwards regularly supplied from the British magazines in the same manner and under the same regulations as the British troops. Such transport also as they required was furnished and paid for by the British Commissariat; and, with the exception of their pay and pecuniary allowances, which they received from their own military chest, they were treated in all respects as British troops up to the period at which they became entitled to be so considered under the Subsidiary Treaty.

The sole object, therefore, of my query with regard to the Hanoverian troops, was to know whether the distinction between the reserve or contingent corps and those troops which were at our charge should be so strictly observed as to exclude the claims founded on such documents as do not distinctly specify the corps for whose service the supplies or transport were furnished. This question is, besides, applicable only to periods subsequent to the arrival of the reserve or contingent corps, it being considered beyond a doubt that all the Hanoverian troops serving in the Low Countries pre-

I must observe generally upon these questions that they ought not to exist. There was no corps of the army supplied by the British government that had not, or ought not to

* Cumberland Hussars.—Artillery: 1st batt.; 2nd batt.—Infantry battalions: Mellor, Bremerlehe, Bothmer (Landwehr), Northeim, Alfeld, Springer, Otterndorf, Celle, Battzeberg, Luchen, Nieustadt, Drepholz, Uebzen, Hanover Jäger corps.

viously to that period were, without distinction, at our charge.

E. P. COFFIN, Dep. Com.-General.

Cambrai, 26th March, 1817.

have had, a British commissary attached to it; and he ought to have taken care to supply them, and that there should be no irregular vouchers in circulation.—W.

III.

MEMORANDUM.

28th Aug., 1815.

I have read the papers regarding the provisions for the Duke of Brunswick's corps.

The arrangement for the provisions of the Duke of Brunswick's corps was as follows:—

First. The Duke was entitled to receive them from the country of the King of the Netherlands, under an arrangement made by the Congress at Vienna, at the rate settled by the same paper, which forms one of the enclosures in Mr. Dunmore's letter.

Secondly. Owing to the difficulties found by the King's officers in getting these provisions, it was settled between the King of the Netherlands and me that they should be issued by the British Commissariat, the King paying for the same the real price which they cost the British government, and His Majesty recovering from the Duke of Brunswick that to which he was entitled by the arrangement of Congress.

There were several discussions between the Duke of Brunswick and me regarding the quantities to be issued to his troops as settled by Congress, His Highness always wishing to increase them. However, I told him I could not consent except that he should draw the highest allowance settled by the Congress of Vienna for all the horses of his corps, he paying the largest price settled; and

Thirdly. That if in any instance His Highness drew for more than they were entitled to, the amount should be paid and charged against His Highness's subsidy.

The account should be settled therefore accordingly. Mr. Dunmore should write out the amount of the rations issued to the Duke of Brunswick's corps before entering France. The amount cost should be charged to the King of the Netherlands.

If the Duke of Brunswick's troops have in any instance overdrawn, the amount must be charged against the subsidy.

WELLINGTON.

IV.

EXTRACT of QUERIES submitted by Deputy Commissary-General COFFIN respecting the Settlement of the Outstanding Claims of the late Service of the British Army in the Netherlands, together with the Answers proposed by the Comptroller of Army Accounts for the consideration of the Lords of the Treasury.

*Foreign Armies.*

6. Are all supplies indiscriminately furnished to them in the Netherlands to be paid for, or those only which were furnished with the intervention or sanction of the British Commissariat at Alost and Termonde?

6. It is conceived that reference must necessarily be made to the Duke of Wellington upon the whole of this class of query generally. There does not, however, under present circumstances appear to be any reason why the British government should make any payments for supplies furnished to the troops of the King of France otherwise than upon some guarantee, expressed or implied, on the part of an authorised British agent. In the commencement of the campaign the small force attached to the French King was regularly supplied upon British credit, and had an English Commissary; but it is believed that a considerable proportion of the claims here referred to are for supplies to troops not so attended, and after His Majesty's authority had been very extensively recognised in France.

[I can give no opinion upon Answer 6, as the two points, *foreign troops* and *French Royal troops*, are mixed together. —W.]

*French Royal Troops.*

7. Is any greater or less latitude to be allowed in the admission of proof than in the case of British troops?

7. The responsibility of the British government being for the present assumed, it is conceived that a greater latitude must necessarily be allowed as to points of mere form, provided no doubt remains as to the reality of the supply.

[I have no objection to give an opinion on this subject if I have the whole case before me.—W.]

8. Is the distinction between the army of reserve and the troops attached to the British army to be strictly observed, and are all claims which do not clearly appear to arise from the latter to be accordingly rejected?

8. Subject to the reference to be made to the Duke of Wellington, I am not aware that Great Britain can in any way be responsible for supplies furnished to the Hanoverian contingent of 10,000 men; but we were bound by treaty to provide for the extra subsidiary corps of 16,000 men, and there is reason to apprehend that great difficulty will be found in distinguishing to which the supplies may have been made.

[I do not understand to what this refers.—W.]

*Hanoverian Troops.*

9. Same as No. 7, particularly with regard to transport.

9. See answer to No. 7.

*Brunswick Troops.*

10. Referring to the second article of the Duke of Wellington's memorandum of the 28th August, 1815, should the supplies obtained by those troops without the intervention of the British Commissariat be paid for by the latter, or the claims be at once referred to the Belgic government, which, according to the arrangement, is the party really most interested in the settlement of them, and possesses the best means of ascertaining the validity of such as are doubtful?

10. The memorandum of the Duke of Wellington here referred to accompanies this paper. It would appear from it that, so far as these claims relate to the regular Brunswick contingent of 3000 men, they should be referred at once to the Belgic government, which was bound to supply these troops: a duty which was only undertaken by us in consequence of the alleged inability of that government, owing to the deficiency of its own magazines. With respect to the extra subsidiary corps (about 4000 men), the same obligation rested upon us as with respect to that of Hanover; and it is apprehended that the same difficulty of distinction will be found. A very general persuasion, I believe, existed that we were responsible for the whole, both of the Hanoverian and Brunswick troops; and as this was really the case with respect to so large a portion of them, special instructions are requested as to the admission of vouchers which do not afford the means of distinction. It is so probable that the greater part of these could at best be only admitted upon a very liberal extension of the principles of good faith, that it may be prudent to reject all those vouchers in which the respective corps are not distinguished.

[It appears to me that under my instruction there can be no doubt about the Brunswick corps: the whole of it falls under the Treaty of Congress.—W.]

11. Same as No. 9, referring particularly to the third article of the memorandum adverted to in No. 10.

11. See answer to No. 7.

EDWARD PINE COFFIN,
Dep. Com.-Gen.

A. ROSENHAGEN, Comptr. A. A.

Cambrai, 22nd Dec., 1816.

Cambrai, 13th Jan., 1817.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens.* [1174.]

MY DEAR TORRENS, Paris, 28th March, 1817.

In answer to your reference of the claim of Lieutenant-Colonel Sepulveda, which I return, I have to mention that by

some accident General Brito Mozinho, the Adjutant-General of the Portuguese army, was not in the field at the battle of Salamanca; and Lieutenant-Colonel Sepulveda, an assistant in the department, and attached to the brigade of cavalry under General D'Urban, became the senior officer present. He did not officiate, however, as such, but only with the troops to which he was attached, viz., D'Urban's brigade. The question is, whether an Assistant Adjutant-General with a brigade ought, under the rules, to receive a medal? It appears to me that he ought not.

I have frequently had Colonel Harvey's* case under consideration, and have always thought myself compelled to decide against it.

Marshal Beresford having been frequently absent from the army, Colonel Harvey was left at head-quarters to perform the duties of detail which I found it necessary to have performed there. When the Marshal was in the field, he had with him a Staff who always received medals according to the regulated proportion; and upon one or more occasions, when Colonel D'Urban was absent, Colonel Harvey received a medal as officiating for him. On all other occasions Colonel Harvey was situated as every other officer of the Staff not in charge of a department or of a division.

Colonel Sir G. Scovell received his medals as commanding the Cavalry Staff Corps, Colonel Sir C. Campbell under special orders from Secretaries; and neither his case nor the case of my aide-de-camp could be brought as a precedent for any others.

In my opinion, neither of these applications can be complied with under the regulation.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1175.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles Colville.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Paris, 28th March, 1817.

I have received your letter of the 21st, and I return the enclosures. I rather believe that you are misinformed regard-

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* Afterwards Sir Robert Harvey.

ing the case and conduct of M. Garat during the period of Bonaparte's last usurpation. I never understood that he had behaved ill at that time. This being the case, I thought it as well to give you an opportunity of reconsidering your answer to Madame de Staël.

I considered that M. Garat, having been absent from his dwelling, had no claim for any payment under my proclamation of August, 1813; but I paid him 12,000 francs, being what was estimated by the Commissariat to be due to him for what was taken from his house and property. The family claims an additional sum for what was taken from another house. I am not aware there was any house excepting that at which the 3rd Division had its post, and I imagine that it is upon this point that Madame de Staël and M. Garat wish for your testimony.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Stratford Canning, Esq.* [1176.]

MY DEAR SIR, Paris, 28th March, 1817.

I have received your letter of the 19th of February, with one from M. Roger, Capitaine du Génie. This person wrote me a letter some time ago on the subject of the Swiss boundaries, to which I wrote him an answer referring him to the Commissioners, and I never received the reply to which he alludes as having been written on the 12th December.

At all events there is no use in continuing this correspondence, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will mention to M. Monod that I have nothing to say to any concern whatever excepting the command of my own army, and that I conceive nothing more useless and inconvenient than a complimentary correspondence about nothing.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*General Fagel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, le 28 Mars, 1817.

Appelé comme membre de la Commission d'Arbitrage, instituée par l'Art. 8 de la Convention du 20 Novembre, 1815, à juger lequel des deux gouvernemens, de celui de la France ou du gouvernement des Pays-Bas, prenant pour base la disposition du Traité de Paris de 1814, sera tenu à payer les intérêts arriérés de la dette de la Hollande, je vais indiquer ce que j'entends par cette disposition.

Si par là l'on comprend le but et l'esprit dans lequel le Traité a été conclu, il n'y a aucun doute que son objet n'ait été de garantir également les intérêts des sujets des Puissances respectives : il est d'après cela difficile de supposer que de la teneur de ce Traité on ait voulu contester le payement des intérêts de la dette de la Hollande pour les dix premiers mois de 1813, là, où il avait été acquitté en 1810, 1811, et 1812 : cette contestation a donné lieu à la présente Commission d'Arbitrage sur le refus du gouvernement Français de reconnaître la réclamation du gouvernement des Pays-Bas relative au payement susdit, et sous le prétexte que le Traité de 1814 se taisait à cet égard ; et qu'en fixant ce que la France doit rembourser il ne faisait nullement mention du payement en question : l'Art. 21 du Traité fixe, il est vrai, l'époque où la France cesse d'être débitrice, mais ne la libère en rien de ce qu'elle devait aussi légitimement pour l'année 1813, qu'elle a reconnu par le payement l'avoir dû pour les années précédentes pendant lesquelles elle avait perçu les revenus de la Hollande, seule hypothèque des intérêts de sa dette.

Si donc l'Art. 21 ne contient aucun libération à cet égard, son silence ne peut pas écarter une réclamation qui est fondée sur l'existence d'une dette en partie acquittée. Le mode d'exécution fixé par la 2me partie de cet article, qui est une conséquence naturelle de la première, n'étant pas déterminé par le Traité, la Convention du 20 Novembre l'a fixé par les Arts. 6 et 7. Cette Convention ne fait qu'un ensemble avec le Traité qu'elle explique. Messieurs les Commissaires ont prêté serment de prononcer d'après cet ensemble. L'Art. 7 de la Convention établit positivement la compensation des intérêts non payés jusqu'au 22 Décembre, 1813. La dette Hollandaise n'est exceptée nullement de cette stipulation : donc elle doit être portée en compensation, ce qui complète le compte dont parle l'Art. 21.

Il ne semble pas non plus qu'on puisse conclure avec justice de ce que l'inscription matérielle sur le grand livre de la dette publique de France, évidemment dans les intentions publiées de son gouvernement, n'avait pas été effectuée, que cette dette en était séparée, tandis qu'il est suffisamment prouvé qu'elle était comprise dans le budget soumis successivement au corps législatif, année par année, et notamment dans la loi du 20 Mars, 1813, qui règle les recettes et dépenses des exercices 1810, 1811, 1812, et 1813, et comprend une somme de 151,000,000 pour le payement de la dette publique de France et de Hollande en 1813. Le payement des rentes était pris sur le fonds que les ministres du Trésor public de France avait assigné, et qui provenait de la totalité des revenus de l'empire Français.

La simplicité de ces observations est évidente. La disposition du Traité paraît avoir été appréciée dans le même sens par les Ministres des Puissances signataires, à en juger par la lettre qu'ils ont adressée à S.E. Monsieur

le Duc de Richelieu, en date du 11 Novembre, 1815, en ces termes: "Que le Traité de Paix n'a point voulu imposer aux possesseurs des pays cédés un remboursement à faire à la France, en les privant en même tems du droit d'en déduire ce dont la France se trouverait débitrice pour le même objet, et la séparation des deux grands livres de la Hollande et de la France, qui se fondait, ainsi que le montrent les décrets qui en ordonnèrent la réunion dans la suite, principalement sur des circonstances locales, ne paraît pas un motif suffisant pour libérer la France du payement des intérêts de la dette d'un pays dont elle tirait tous les revenus."

Les hautes parties contractantes ont voulu par la Convention du 20 Novembre assurer davantage les réclamations des sujets des Puissances Alliées, et prévenir toute contestation qui pouvait s'élever sur le sens du Traité de Mai, 1814. Si en même tems elles ont eu l'air de ne pas vouloir condamner la France à un remboursement que la stricte équité exigeait seule, elles n'ont pas osé admettre le refus de la France, mentionné à l'Art. 8 de la Convention, ni ne pas écouter les réclamations et les intérêts d'un peuple écrasé par vingt années de sacrifices continuels et inutiles; pourquoi en ont elles appelé à un arbitrage composé des Puissances intéressées, et de Puissances neutres, si ce n'est pour admettre la possibilité d'une compensation satisfaisante aux deux parties intéressées?

Considérant en outre que les revenus de la Hollande perçus sur l'exercice de 1813, et déduction faite des frais d'administration intérieure, se montent à une somme plus considérable que celle demandée pour l'acquittement de la dette arriérée, je vote pour que la France soit tenue au payement des intérêts de la dette de Hollande, qui n'auraient pas été acquittés pour les semestres de Mars et de Septembre, 1813.

[Keep among my papers from General Fagel.

WELLINGTON.]

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*To H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief.* [1177.]

SIR, Paris, 29th March, 1817.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's commands of the 12th instant; and the troops withdrawn from the British contingent being about to embark at Calais, I have issued the orders, of which I enclose a copy, for the reduction of the Staff.

The reduction, as your Royal Highness will observe, is of six battalions of infantry, or two brigades; and I have discontinued the 3rd Division and the Lieutenant-General commanding it, the Staff belonging to it, and the General Officers and Staff of two brigades of infantry.

In respect to the Medical Staff, having lately received a letter from Sir J. M'Grigor stating that the number of medical

officers, as per margin,* was to be sent home (I imagine in contemplation of the proposed reduction of the British contingent), I had already ordered their discontinuance from the Staff; and I now enclose the list of the remaining Medical Staff and their employment, and I beg to have your Royal Highness's orders whether I shall still send away the numbers ordered in your Royal Highness's letter of the 12th of March in addition to those already ordered to be discontinued.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1178.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 31st March, 1817.

I enclose some papers on the expenditure on the fortresses in the Netherlands, and I proceed to give you my opinion of the sum you ought to vote this year for that service.

The expenditure last year was 225,737*l.*, and there is an outstanding arrear amounting to 164,707*l.* for the same year. The estimated expense of this year is 1,397,885*l.*, making a total expense to the end of 1817 of 1,788,331*l.* The French government will in the end of the year 1817 have contributed 1,000,000*l.* sterling towards this expense, and there will remain a balance to be made good by the two governments upon this statement of 788,331*l.*

I must observe to you, however, that I have not yet got before me the detailed estimates of what it is intended to do at each place, and it is impossible for me, with the information I have before me, to judge whether work for so large a sum as 1,397,885*l.* can be completed in 1817. You will see in pencil in one of the papers what was the total of the Dutch estimates for some of the places, and the proportion which the sums estimated to be expended in this year bear to the total expense estimated.

From this comparison, and judging that there will be an outstanding balance at the end of 1817 in the same manner as there was in the end of 1816, I am of opinion that if you are

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* 2 Deputy Inspectors, 2 Staff Surgeons, 1 Deputy Purveyor, 2 Hospital Assistants, 1 Dispenser, 2 Clerks.

prepared to give 200,000*l.* for this service in the course of 1817, it is the utmost that will be required from you.

Some time has elapsed since I have requested M. de Nagell to furnish me with the information which could enable me to state to you with accuracy the sum which Great Britain would have to pay in the course of the year; and I should delay to make this report till I should receive it, only that I conclude you will wish to have some notions of the state of this concern for the meeting of Parliament after Easter.

Ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

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*To MM. Barbier, &c.* [1179.]

MESSIEURS, Paris, ce 31 Mars, 1817.

En conséquence de la réduction de la force de l'Armée d'Occupation, à avoir lieu du 1er Avril, j'ai eu des discussions avec S.E. le Ministre de la Guerre sur la réduction à avoir lieu sur les indemnités à recevoir pour les portions des officiers de l'Armée d'Occupation en vertu de l'Article * de la Convention du 23 Janvier, 1816, dont vous trouverez le résultat dans l'extrait inclus d'une lettre de S.E. le Ministre de la Guerre, et ma réponse d'aujourd'hui.

Vous aurez la bonté donc de recevoir chaque mois, à compter du 1er Avril, la somme de 925,715 fr., et d'en donner les quittances définitives.

Vous en ferez la distribution suivante, c'est-à-dire:—La cinquième partie, 185,143 fr., à la disposition du Général en Chef du contingent Autrichien, pour les officiers de cette armée; la cinquième partie à la disposition du Général en Chef du contingent Russe, pour les officiers de cette armée; la cinquième partie à la disposition du Général en Chef du contingent Prussien, pour les officiers de cette armée; et les deux cinquièmes parties, qui resteront à ma disposition, pour être distribuées aux officiers du contingent Britannique, Bavarois, Danois, Hanovrien, Saxon, et Wurtembergeois.

WELLINGTON.

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* Blank in manuscript.

[1180.] *To the Duc de Feltre.*

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, Paris, ce 31 Mars, 1817.

J'ai l'honneur d'annoncer la réception de la lettre de V.E. du 21, dans laquelle V.E. m'informe qu'elle est "autorisé par le Roi à consentir à ce que la réduction qui doit éprouver la somme de 1,080,000, payable tous les mois en remplacement des rations d'officiers, soit fixée à un septième; ce qui réduira cette somme à dater du 1er Avril, sauf le cas prévu par l'Article 6 de la Convention du 23 Janvier, 1816, à 925,715 francs par mois."

Je prie V.E. d'accepter l'expression de ma reconnoissance pour cette marque nouvelle du désir de S.M. et de son gouvernement d'adopter tous les arrangemens qui peuvent concilier les esprits des officiers de l'armée.

Cette disposition est acceptée; et je donne les ordres pour qu'à dater du 1er Avril elle soit mise en exécution par les Commissaires que j'ai nommés à cet effet le 8 Fév., 1816.

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cray Farm, 31st March, 1817.

In the hurry of our Parliamentary campaign I often wished to write to you upon the points in progress, but my whole mornings have passed in attending on the Finance and Poor Law Committees, which left me but few moments for correspondence. Though late in doing so, allow me to express how much satisfaction we all derived from the winding-up of your arrangements upon finance and reduction of force. I consider the loan which France has made as going further to consolidate the peace than, perhaps, any event that has occurred; and I know how much your exertions contributed, without compromising your government, to the completion of that loan.

We have had here a very critical session. The elements of mischief and of embarrassment were so much blended at the outset as to make it difficult to decompose them. To put down the treason under the mask of reform with a high hand, it was necessary to detach the country gentlemen, and enlist them with energy on our side. It was plain this depended on the line we took being such as they felt they could fight up to in their counties. It was clear from the experience of the former session and their avowed language that we must give them a case upon which they could hope to face their constituents at the general election. This, I think, we have managed, and without, as I am persuaded I can satisfy you when we meet, any injurious sacrifice of the just influence of the Crown. In fact, I believe we have taken the only course that could have saved it; for

had we not agreed to modify the sinecure system, we should have been beaten on the Admiralty question; this would have been followed by the loss of the second Postmaster's ditto; Pay-office; probably two Lords of the Treasury; one or two Commissioners of the India Board: in short, the political situations of the government would have been materially reduced in both Houses. It was plain that this would not appease but animate the attack upon sinecures, whilst by a concession upon sinecures there was some hope of saving political office. This has been the result: we conciliated the country gentlemen by our estimates, which were well considered; and by relieving them from the millstone of the sinecure system by a few days' previous explanation in the Finance Committee of the system on which we were disposed to act, we altogether changed their temper. We were then enabled to fight the Admiralty question high, and to contend avowedly for the constitutional power and patronage of the Crown without driving our friends against us. From that moment the game was ours; we separated the question of economy from that of seditious reform, and we became masters of both. Our Finance inquiry has gone on in good temper; no real mischief has been done: on the contrary, the prejudice which prevailed has abated, and there is at this moment a degree of confidence in the disposition of the government to put the expenditure and finance of the country upon a proper footing which will give us improved means to prevent the services from being improvidently broken down. There is much mischief in the country, aggravated by the distresses, but we have made valuable progress in counteracting it. I only hope we may manage our session after Easter with as much prudence, and not indulge an indiscreet confidence.

You have heard, of course, from your brother Henry where we stand in Spain. Cathcart asked Nesselrode whether the report was true that Spain had ceded to Russia the port of Mahon, &c. Nesselrode peremptorily denied it, adding that such an establishment was quite foreign to the Emperor's views and wishes. He admitted, however, that some commercial arrangement had been made; as he said, offered by Spain. There is nothing in Nesselrode's negative inconsistent with some engagement having been signed by Tatischeff concerning Minorca, but which the Emperor may have declined to sanction. If Russia means to go on well, she ought to recall that evil intriguer from Madrid.

Fernan Nuñez is ordered to Paris, and the Duke de San Carlos is to replace him. This will not be a popular appointment in this country. His mission to Valençay to engage Ferdinand to betray himself and us will afford an additional topic against the Spanish government, both in the newspapers and in Parliament. I should like to know your opinion, both of the individual and of the policy of suggesting a reconsideration of this choice. It certainly would have been more acceptable if they had sent us some person who had assisted you to save his country, and Alava, in this point of view, would have been perfectly suitable; but I don't know whether, in the untoward temper of the Spanish government at this moment, it is desirable for us to make to them a suggestion upon such a point, or whether a man like Alava, known to be attached to England, would be confided in by his own Court. I have heard very favourable reports from Charles of San Carlos's conduct at Vienna: at least, Metternich is satisfied with him.

I trouble you with some papers on Hanoverian claims, on which I shall be very thankful for your opinion. It strikes me that Hanover has no just claim to share for more than 20,000 men, and I do not believe she ever had more than that number, if so many, in France.

I am, my dear Lord, ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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[1181.] *To Major-Gen. Sir P. Maitland.*

SIR, Paris, 3rd April, 1817.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of ————, and I consider it my duty to request that the Court will revise their sentence.

They have found ———— guilty of the facts charged against him, with the exception of the arrest of Monsieur Bautroy, and of unofficerlike conduct; and I call upon the Court to maintain the discipline and character of the army by passing such a sentence upon him as shall deter others from following his example.

I beg that the Court will recollect that, according to the military laws of Great Britain, the regulations and orders of the army, and the known laws of every country in the world, ———— had no right to order a guard to revenge a private insult offered to him, not even in his quality of a British officer, still less in his individual capacity and in a mask. Neither had ———— any authority to confine in the guard-room any individual not military till he should make him an apology for a supposed insult, of which he should himself approve.

————, already guilty of a breach of order in appearing out of his quarters in Cambrai without his side-arms, which probably first gave occasion to his being insulted, had no warrant or authority to order the guard to protect him, or to put any person in confinement till he should make him an apology. The most serious consequences might have resulted from his conduct, and I beg the Court to mark their sense of it by a sentence which the officers of the army can consider adequate to the offence.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Prince Metternich.* [1182.]

MON PRINCE, Paris, ce 3 Avril, 1817.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir qu'en conséquence de la diminution de l'Armée d'Occupation il est devenu nécessaire de réduire la somme à payer par le gouvernement François à titre d'indemnité pour les portions des officiers de l'armée, en vertu d'une convention que j'avois fait le * Janvier, 1816, avec le Ministre de la Guerre, que j'ai communiqué à V.A. par ma lettre du 28 Mars de la même année. J'ai eu en conséquence des discussions avec S.E. le Ministre de la Guerre, dont V.A. trouvera le résultat dans l'extrait inclus d'une lettre de S.E. du 31 Mars dernier, où S.E. consent que cette réduction ne sera que d'un septième, vu que la réduction effectuée ne porte pas également sur officiers comme sur soldats.

WELLINGTON.

[The same to Prince Hardenberg, Comte de Nesselrode, Comte de Rechberg, Comte de Rosencrantz, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg.]

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*To Major-Gen. Sir John Keane.* [1183.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Paris, 5th April, 1817.

I have received your letter of the 2nd, and I assure you that it was with the greatest pain that I gave the order to remove you from the Staff of this army.

It will always give me the greatest pleasure to have your assistance again, and you may depend upon my doing every thing in my power to accomplish that object, or to do anything else which can be useful to you, or can forward your objects in the service.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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* Blank in manuscript.

[ 1184. ] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

My dear Lord, Paris, 6th April, 1817.

Before I had received your letter I was convinced that the government had found themselves under the necessity of giving way on the question of the sinecures, and what you say on the subject is unanswerable. I cannot, however, but think that the loss of this patronage is a misfortune to the Crown, for which no system of pension, however expensive, can be a remedy. People in England are ready enough to attend to reason, more particularly when it is obvious that no expense can be saved by a favourite measure; and I would earnestly recommend you to get some *hard-headed* friend to reason the whole question, to show how the sinecures have been employed, and in what manner the pensions would operate, and the expense of both systems. People would probably be inclined to pause before they should determine to destroy what is certainly good and cheap in order to establish what will be a bad substitute and more expensive, and without convicting yourselves you may in the end be able to retain for the Crown this valuable patronage.

I entertain no doubt that the treaty between Russia and Spain was really made by Tatischeff, as reported by Vaughan at the time; but that Russia could not carry into execution any of its stipulations, could neither send the frigates and naval stores, nor take possession of Minorca; and it is therefore probable it was never ratified by the Emperor. So far what Nesselrode says may be strictly true; but they certainly ought to recall Tatischeff. This is more necessary to them than to anybody else, excepting possibly to the corps diplomatique at Madrid, of whom he is the perpetual tormentor, as I understand he is universally disliked and despised at Madrid, and that even the King has shown symptoms of being tired of him.

I don't think San Carlos a bad man, or one with whom you will find it inconvenient to deal in London; but he is not exactly calculated to please there, and his conduct and the manner in which he was employed on the occasion of the signature of the treaty between Ferdinand and Napoleon will render him very disagreeable both to the Regent and the public. Alava would certainly be the best person you could have; and I will write to Pizarro, who has written to me twice lately, to recommend this arrangement, if you wish it. I was in hopes that I had pre-

vailed upon him to consent to the abolition; but I learn from my brother that they still hold out for 200,000*l.*, and in my opinion it is best to have no confidential communication with them till they will have given way upon that question.

I have looked over the Hanoverian papers. Hanover has no right to be considered for more than 10,000 men. She furnished 16,400 men, in addition to our army, for which number Count Münster omits to mention that Great Britain is under an engagement to defray the actual expense which shall appear to have been incurred over and above 11*l.* 2*s.* per man, and this will be found no light burthen. Great Britain being liable to defray all the expense of these 16,400 men, it is but fair that she should derive the profit. Great Britain having only 128,000 men, including Hanoverians and Brunswick troops, has nothing to say to the question, inasmuch as she not only subsidized the other three great Powers, but paid 30*l.* and 20*l.* per man for every man of cavalry and infantry wanting to complete the quota of 150,000 men, with a fund from which all the other Powers in Europe, including Hanover for 10,000 men, were subsidized.

The question standing in this manner, Hanover has no claim upon the justice of Great Britain. It has been considered, however, that she has upon her generosity. The war was short, and the burthen of the subsidiary treaty has been comparatively light upon Great Britain; and there is no doubt now that it would have been more advantageous to Hanover to have acceded to the great alliance at Vienna, with a force of 26,400 men, or even 20,000 men, than with a force of 10,000, leaving the 16,400 as a force subsidized by Great Britain. Hanover, then, may be fairly stated to have a claim upon the generosity of Great Britain for a share of the profits of the war, and nothing can be more fair than to put her on the same footing in respect to contributions as Wurtemberg.

I think that under the first and third heads of the calculation of Messrs. Harrison and Best, Hanover might have in the former 425,296 instead of 390,597; and in the latter 4,252,966 instead of 3,905,969. This advantage will place Hanover in respect to contributions exactly on the same footing with Wurtemberg.

It may, then, be a question whether Hanover ought not to relieve Great Britain from the burthens, at least the permanent

burthens, of the subsidiary treaty for the 16,400 men, or at all events for 10,000 men.

I think it would be fair, and not ungenerous, to insist upon being relieved from the permanent burthens of the subsidiary treaty upon 10,000 men. We can easily fix upon the corps composing those 10,000 men by drawing lots.

I return you the papers on this subject. You will have heard regularly from Sir Charles how things are going on here. I propose to go over for the Prince's birthday and Hervey's marriage; and as I shall be a few days in London, I shall have some opportunities of talking over this subject with you.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 9th April, 1817.

I avail myself of the return of a dragoon, who brought me a letter of Sir Charles Stuart, to acquaint you that I have not been idle since my return to Bruxelles in endeavouring to persuade the King into the necessity of at least placing his press under the same restrictive laws, if so they may be called, as lean upon the press in England; and though I have hitherto had no easy job of it, or yet succeeded, I have little doubt of ultimate success in the event of the laws here not being already of the same description as those in Great Britain: a fact which is now maintained by some of his advisers. The principal difficulty I had was to impress him with the necessity of a criminal as well as a civil proceeding in cases of libel, and that the truth of the publication should form no plea to the criminal prosecution. Both these circumstances, when first mentioned, startled him: they were not such as he had been taught; a double prosecution for the same offence; to be prosecuted for speaking truth, &c. However, as I said before, it is believed by some that the double prosecution already exists, and the prosecution of truth appears to the same persons nothing more than enforcing the adage "that truth is not to be spoken at all times." The points suggested by me have therefore been referred to a confidential committee of the Cabinet, composed of Nagell, Falcq, Van Maanen, and Corink; and this appears an earnest that our principle is approved; that if it *is* already law here, it will be enforced; if not, it will be proposed for law. I had hoped before this to have despatched a messenger with the result and detail of my proceedings, and shall do so whenever they are concluded.

In the mean time, without entering into further particulars, I have thought it necessary to say this much. Let me also add that the libel on La Tour du Pin is in the hands of the Minister of Justice, with orders to direct a prosecution upon it. Whatever may be the result of this, it shows the desire of the Court to give satisfaction, although not demanded at their

hands by that of the Tuileries, and ought to engage this last not to play the very game which the French rebels in this country desire, viz., to remove a man from the situation of being their envoy here, who of all others perhaps they most fear, because, from his knowledge of this country, and the friends he has in it, he of all others is the person who is best qualified to do the King of France's business by continuing to reside as his diplomatic agent at this Court. I shall write more at large upon this subject when I am enabled to write all the particulars and the conclusion of it.

CLANCARTY.

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G. O. Paris, 10th April, 1817. [ 1185. ]

4. The Field Marshal being desirous of giving the volunteers of the army every advantage in his power, will allow them to draw each the allowance for an officer's ration from the 17th September, 1816.

5. It is to be understood, however, that from the 1st of May next they are not to draw any other ration whatever.

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cray Farm, 15th April, 1817.

If this letter should find you still at Paris, I should be obliged to you to see Sir C. Stuart, before you set out, upon a subject concerning which I write to him by the present mail, and on which I desired he might confer with you.

As we shall so soon meet, I shall reserve much of what I have to say on our Sinecure Bills. I will only now observe that, happy as I should have been to keep things as they have long been, I am strongly of opinion that the greatest inconvenience would now arise if the Bills were thrown out in the Lords. We should have the storm session after session; the measure would acquire popularity from being so opposed; and it would be with these great offices as it has been with the reversions—the House of Commons might address against their being filled when vacant, and no Minister would venture to give them away. The Crown might thus lose one description of patronage without acquiring a substitute.

Your objection to the system of pensions as being more expensive you will find has been cured by limiting the number of pensions, which is, in fact, limiting the sum. The measure will work somewhat thus: Amount of offices to be abolished or regulated, 100,000*l.* a year; about one-half of this expense will continue to be incurred for the offices in their new shape. In lieu of the sinecures the Crown will be enabled to grant pensions to persons qualified to an extreme amount of 42,000*l.* per annum, and it will have the patronage of the efficient officers throughout the several depart-

ments, whereas the great officers now nominate their own deputies and clerks. This is an outline of the measure, and you will perceive the change is more nominal than substantive.

Ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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[1186.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Paris, 18th April, 1817.

After the passage of the Nivelle by the Allied army under my command in the month of November, 1813, I issued a proclamation,* a copy of which I transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch, No. 132, of the 19th December, 1813,† by which I directed that a duty of five per cent. on the value might be levied on all goods admitted into the ports of St. Jean de Luz and Socoa.

This measure having been carried into execution, the sum of 162,967 francs 30 cents. was received by the captain of the port, from the period of its adoption to the 16th May, 1814, when, in consequence of the re-establishment on the throne of France of His Majesty Louis XVIII., I thought proper to desire that this duty should cease to be raised on account of the British government.

In the course of that time I authorised by proclamation the issue of 53,771 francs 57 cents., which sums were employed in the payment of the officers employed in the Custom House at St. Jean de Luz, &c., and in affording compensation to a few of those who had suffered materially by the events of the war.

Finding afterwards that during the occupation of the country by our troops many of the churches in the neighbourhood had been damaged, that considerable damage occurred in several of the communes, and that the property of some of the persons, whose conduct I had reason to be satisfied with, and who had rendered essential service to the army, had been much injured, I caused a further sum of 88,000 francs to be disposed of, by which the balance remaining in the hands of the local authorities of St. Jean de Luz has been reduced to 21,195 francs 73 cents.

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* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 376. † Ibid., p. 379.

I have given directions that this sum may be paid into the office of the Commissary-General of the army now under my command, and I trust your Lordship will approve of the manner in which these funds have been applied.

I enclose the several accounts of receipt and expenditure to which I have referred in this despatch.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Chevalier de Salmon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Paris, le 27 Avril, 1817.

J'ai l'honneur de remettre ci-jointe à Votre Excellence copie de la lettre que je viens d'adresser à M. le Duc de Richelieu sur l'affaire relative à l'invasion des provinces Espagnoles de la Rivière de la Plata par les troupes Portugaises, et dans laquelle j'ai cru devoir présenter plusieurs observations en réponse à celles qui ont été avancées par un des agents diplomatiques de la Cour du Brésil dans l'étranger, à l'appui de la conduite de son gouvernement, et desquelles je crois que Votre Excellence se trouvera instruit.

L'intérêt que Votre Excellence veut bien prendre à tout ce qui regarde Sa Majesté Catholique me fait espérer qu'elle daignera accueillir avec bonté cette démarche que je me permets de faire pour le meilleur service du Roi mon maître; et je me flatte aussi que Votre Excellence daignera également se mettre au fait du contenu de ma lettre pour se convaincre entièrement, d'après les données et les réflexions qu'elle renferme, de la justice des réclamations du gouvernement Espagnol, et pouvoir au même tems quand l'occasion se présenterait combattre tous les argumens spécieux qu'on se plait à avancer en opposition de ces mêmes réclamations.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer l'assurance de la plus haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monseigneur,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE CHEVALIER DE SALMON,
Chargé d'Affaires d'Espagne.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Chevalier de Salmon to the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Paris, le 18 Avril, 1817.

Les dernières nouvelles qui me sont parvenues des rapides progrès que font les armes Portugaises dans les provinces Orientales de la Rivière de la Plata, qu'elles ont envahi sans le consentement de la Cour d'Espagne, et la certitude que j'ai acquise des démarches qu'employent les agents diplomatiques de la Cour du Brésil à l'étranger pour tâcher de fonder sur des raisons plausibles la conduite que leur gouvernement tient à ce sujet, m'engagent à mon tour à faire à Votre Excellence quelques observations pour présenter cette affaire dans

son vrai jour, et surtout pour détruire les raisonnements spécieux qu'on se plaît à avancer à l'appui de cette même conduite.

Les devoirs de la place que j'ai l'honneur de remplir en cette Cour comme Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté Catholique, et l'obligation où je suis, par cela même, de servir les intérêts du Roi mon maître avec tout le zèle et tout le dévouement d'un sujet fidèle et d'un employé attentif à remplir sa charge, sont un double motif qui me prescrit cette démarche.

Je me flatte que Votre Excellence ne verra en elle qu'une preuve de ce que j'ai l'honneur de lui avancer, et qu'ayant égard à cela elle voudra bien excuser les détails dans lesquels je vais entrer.

D'abord la conduite que le gouvernement Espagnol a adopté relativement à l'expédition que le Portugal a faite dans les provinces de la Rivière de la Plata ne peut pas moins d'assurer l'Europe entière des vifs désirs qu'animent Sa Majesté Catholique de vouloir maintenir la paix générale, qui est inséparable des principes sur lesquels se trouve basée l'indépendance des états et la dignité des trônes.

Le gouvernement Espagnol, dès qu'il eut connoissance de cette démarche de la Cour du Brésil, lui demanda des explications claires et précises sur l'objet d'une pareille entreprise; mais malheureusement jusqu'à présent on n'a obtenu de sa part que des éclaircissements très vagues, et qu'en aucune manière répondent à l'importance d'une telle affaire.

Le gouvernement Portugais n'a pas fait connoître antérieurement à sa détermination, comme il était juste qu'il le fit, les motifs qui l'ont porté à la suivre; et maintenant que c'était le moment d'en donner des éclaircissements, il ne détruit pas en aucune manière les soupçons qui fait naître sa conduite.

Il n'est pas à croire qu'on veuille établir en principe que l'occupation d'un pays quelconque faite par les moyens et de la manière dont celle des provinces de la Rivière de la Plata a eu lieu n'est pas contraire aux intérêts de son Souverain légitime, et qu'une telle démarche ne renferme en elle-même le droit de supposer que c'est une agression dans laquelle ne brille point la bonne foi qui toujours doit être le guide des opérations parmi les gouvernements unis par les liens de l'amitié et de l'alliance.

Il ne serait pas moins étrange vouloir supposer que l'occupation du territoire Espagnol au nom du Roi de Portugal, et sans le consentement préalable de Sa Majesté Catholique, soit une mesure indispensable pour assurer l'existence politique du Brésil. Si une pareille maxime venait à être reconnue parmi les principes qui constituent le droit public des nations, l'indépendance politique des états disparaîtrait, et aux principes de la justice se succéderaient le droit du plus fort, ou le simple prétexte des intérêts particuliers; la mauvaise foi trouverait place dans presque toutes les déterminations des gouvernements, et se serait le moyen de reproduire un système révolutionnaire qui ne peut jamais s'assurer aux principes de la légitimité, ni laisser d'attirer aux peuples les plus fâcheux résultats.

Tel est l'esprit des communications qui ont été faites, au nom de Sa Majesté Catholique, aux Puissances Alliées. Celles-ci doivent voir dans la conduite tenue par le Portugal envers l'Espagne une véritable agression, tandis que de la part du gouvernement Espagnol elles doivent être convaincues de la modération dont il agit d'après la franchise avec laquelle il présente ses explications tout à fait exemptes des mystères et des détours.

Les faits sont du côté du Portugal, et c'est à son gouvernement à les éclaircir et à désigner les soupçons que fait naître son silence. En attendant, il promet seulement de le faire à ces mêmes Puissances auxquelles il veut éclairer sur les motifs de cette expédition quand son véritable but sera atteint. Mais ce serait vouloir établir par là un système que malheureusement pour l'Europe n'a

été que trop souvent mis à exécution dans ces derniers tems, mais que jamais on n'a prétendu l'avancer ni le proclamer avec tout l'appareil de la légitimité et de la justice. Un pareil système est tout à fait étranger à l'ordre établie pour les rapports des nations entr'elles, et c'est uniquement par le moyen des explications franches et claires qu'il leur appartient d'arrêter les impulsions de l'ambition, et de rassurer les peuples qui croyent leur sûreté compromise et blessée la dignité de leur gouvernement.

La Cour du Brésil fonde sa démarche sur la nécessité dans laquelle elle prétend se trouver de pourvoir à la sûreté de son territoire, et tâcher de la préserver de l'esprit de révolte, de subversion, et d'anarchie, qui malheureusement s'est établi dans les pays voisins de ses frontières; mais un tel prétexte devient inadmissible quand il donne lieu à des entreprises aussi étendues que celles dont il s'agit.

Il est hors de doute que tout gouvernement doit veiller à la conservation de l'état et au maintien de sa tranquillité intérieure, mais cette obligation ne donne pas le droit d'attaquer la propriété d'un état voisin sous prétexte qu'il s'y est montré un esprit de sédition, et parceque des mouvements populaires y ayent éclaté. Par suite d'un pareil principe le système politique alors deviendrait tout-à-fait versatile, et nous verrions se renouveler les tems dans lesquels les nations ne reconnaissaient d'autres lois que celles du plus fort, et n'avaient, faute des conventions et des relations réciproques, aucune garantie contre les efforts du plus puissant.

La détermination qu'a prise la Cour de Portugal d'agir activement avec une armée sur le territoire Espagnol ne peut jamais être considérée comme une mesure de prévision pour renforcer le cordon militaire sur ses frontières. Il est vrai qu'en 1811 l'Espagne demandat son assistance à la Cour du Brésil, ce qui était une preuve de sa franchise et de sa confiance; et l'armistice signé le 20 Octobre de la même année avec les rebelles de Buenos Ayres par le gouverneur de Monte Video ne fut qu'un effet nécessaire des circonstances où se trouvait la nation Espagnole, tant en Europe qu'en Amérique, par suite de la malheureuse captivité qu'éprouvait pour lors son Souverain légitime. Après cela la Cour du Brésil signa aussi un armistice avec les insurgens le 26 Mai, 1812, lequel armistice ne fut ratifié, et ne reçut son entière exécution que jusqu'au mois d'Octobre de la même année. On donna aussi pour raison d'un pareil acte que c'était la nécessité et l'utilité publique qui l'avait commandé. Mais tous ces faits antérieurs à l'affaire dont il est question ne doivent influer en rien pour autoriser l'invasion actuelle sans le consentement de Sa Majesté Catholique.

On avoue que Sa Majesté Très Fidèle en faisant partir des trou[pes] d'Europe pour ceux de l'Amérique n'avait d'autres intentio[ns] s'opposer aux projets des anarchistes, objet qui était très [...] est bien différent de celui qu'on fait connoître aujourd'hui.

Le Cabinet Espagnol, quand il détermina de faire p[asser] employer dans le voisinage des frontières Portugaises [...] part au Cabinet du Brésil; car telle est la conduite [...] quand on veut éviter tout motif de soupçon et [...] imputations ne peuvent pas être faites, comme [...] Espagnol pour avoir changé la destinatio[n] rique. Ce changement dépendait absolu[ment] l'embrassant elle ne manquoit pas [...] celle qu'on avait eu l'idée de conclu[re] offensive et défensive n'avait pas [...] meraient les rebelles de cette [...] Actuellement cette crainte [...]

Portugal suit aujourd'hui d'attaquer ce pays de vive force, et d'une manière à faire croire que les véritables intentions de son gouvernement sont de vouloir le réunir à ses autres possessions.

Il est très juste qu'il employat la force pour punir les attentats des rebelles, mais pour cela il ne fallait pas méconnoître le véritable Souverain du territoire envahi, avoir négligé de l'en avertir préalablement, et surtout faire arborer le pavillon Portugais partout où ses troupes pénétraient.

On se plait à soutenir toujours ce qui dans le commencement fut dit au Chargé d'Affaires de l'Espagne à Rio Janeiro ; c'est-à-dire que l'expédition ne pouvoit pas moins d'être à l'avantage de Sa Majesté Catholique. Mais cela ne suffit pas, et c'est à tort qu'on veut accuser le gouvernement Espagnol de vouloir insister à demander des explications positives là-dessus. Quant il s'agit d'affaires aussi graves que celles-ci, on ne doit pas se contenter des réponses mystérieuses, qui, loin d'éclaircir le doute, ne font qu'augmenter la défiance naturelle qu'elles ont dû produire dès le commencement. D'ailleurs ce n'est pas la manière établie parmi les nations pour traiter les affaires entr'elles. Et pourquoi veut on attribuer à un parti anti-Portugais la conduite que tient à cette occasion l'Espagne quand elle est si digne de son gouvernement, et qu'elle est indiquée par les sentiments qu'il professe, et qui font le partage de tous les bons Espagnols? Des pareils faits ne sont-ils pas de nature à devoir les alarmer? Sa Majesté Catholique ne doit elle pas prendre des mesures pour maintenir ses droits, et pour tâcher de calmer le fâcheux état d'incertitude dans lequel se trouvent ses sujets, qui en tout tems se sont montrés si zélés défenseurs et les fermes soutiens des droits de leurs légitimes Souverains, de la dignité nationale, et de l'intégrité de la monarchie?

Le gouvernement Espagnol ayant eu recours dans cette affaire à l'intervention des Puissances Alliées, loin de prouver qu'il se trouve influencé par un parti qui aye le projet de troubler la tranquillité de la Péninsule, il fait voir au contraire par là que les vifs désirs de Sa Majesté Catholique sont toujours de maintenir la paix ; comme il fait connoître également combien est grande sa prudence et celle de la nation entière.

Quelqu'un des agents diplomatiques Portugais dans l'étranger a cru devoir présenter les raisonnements qu'il a jugé à propos de faire pour appuyer la manière d'agir de son gouvernement dans cette circonstance, et pour tâcher au même tems de rejeter sur celui de l'Espagne tout l'odieux de cette affaire. Dans ce sens il a présenté plusieurs observations, que je m'abstiendrais de reproduire ici, me [illegible] que Votre Excellence en est parfaitement au fait ; et je me bo[illegible] à les combattre ici sans les désigner, et d'après l'ordre dans [illegible] faites, dans la croyance où je suis de que Votre Excellence [illegible] application.

[illegible] observations il est aisé à répondre qu'il est constant que [illegible] Portugal lui imposait la nécessité d'employer tous les [illegible] pour s'assurer la tranquillité de ses états ; mais puisqu'il [illegible] faire envahir le territoire Espagnol par ses troupes, il [illegible] concerter sur cette affaire avec Sa Majesté Catholique, [illegible] qu'on arbora le pavillon Portugais dans les posses[illegible] qu'elles étaient occupées par l'armée Portugaise, et [illegible] les généraux de la dite armée méconnussent la [illegible] Catholique.

[illegible] de toute évidence si la Cour du Brésil eut agi [illegible] mois du droit des gens. Sa seule conduite est [illegible] qui aurait dû être une puissante raison pour [illegible] défiance parmi les deux Cours soit devenu un

La troisième observation présente deux sens, et il n'est pas facile de savoir lequel des deux adopter pour ne pas lui donner un autre tout-à-fait différent de celui que son auteur lui a assigné, et son obscurité justifierait la défiance qui doit inspirer la conduite du Portugal.

Si l'on veut établir qu'on n'a pas voulu faire mention de l'Espagne dans ces proclamations, sous le double objet de ne point aigrir les partisans de la rébellion, et pour entretenir parmi les insurgens un esprit de dissimulation politique, on ne comprend pas les raisons qu'aurait la Cour du Portugal pour avoir refusé de confier au gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique ses véritables intentions; mais si son vrai sens était de vouloir par là justifier la conquête, toute réponse à ce sujet deviendrait absolument inutile.

Voudrait-on peut-être légitimer cette conquête en disant qu'on avait eu grand soin d'adopter pour l'entreprendre tous les moyens qui étaient propres à la faire réussir ?

D'un autre côté, comment veut-on expliquer le raisonnement qu'on avance en disant que le Portugal fait la guerre en son propre nom pour éviter qu'elle ne devienne générale? Et en dernier lieu par quelle raison le Portugal a évité toujours avec le plus grand soin d'entrer en communications à ce sujet avec l'Espagne? Cette répugnance de la part du Cabinet Portugais est évidente, et il lui sera toujours impossible de s'en disculper.

Les justes réclamations du gouvernement Espagnol à ce sujet ne sont pas prématurées, comme on veut l'établir dans la quatrième observation. On n'y a eu recours qu'après avoir demandé à plusieurs reprises, mais toujours en vain, des explications claires et positives sur une telle conduite. Le Roi d'Espagne ne devait pas attendre que le Portugal voulut expliquer aux autres Puissances les véritables motifs de son expédition. Le manque d'explication avec le gouvernement Espagnol sur une telle affaire était à lui seul un motif très puissant pour lui faire prendre des promptes et énergiques mesures, et au même tems il en devait faire une manifestation qui ne laissa dans l'esprit de S.M. Catholique la moindre crainte.

C'est vrai que quand il a été question d'entreprendre des expéditions pareilles, jamais elles n'ont été annoncées ni concertées d'avance; mais les expéditions que de puissants motifs commandent, et qui doivent avoir lieu dans le pays d'un Souverain ami, elles ont toujours été préalablement annoncés, ne suffisant pas qu'on en fasse la communication, mais étant absolument indispensable d'obtenir la permission, et les faire de concert avec le Souverain du territoire que l'expédition regarde.

On suppose dans la cinquième observation que l'Espagne fait beaucoup d'éclat dans cette affaire par les démarches qu'elle a adoptées pour y remédier, tandis que le véritable éclat résulte de la conduite tenue par le Portugal, qu'à peine paraît croyable, et aucunement des démarches faites par le premier. Au reste, rien n'est plus naturel, toutefois qu'un Souverain se trouve dans la nécessité de défendre ses droits, qu'avoir recours à la médiation amicale des Puissances Alliées pour y chercher le remède.

Il est vrai qu'un autre moyen pourrait être également adopté, mais il serait aussi contraire aux véritables sentiments qui animent Sa Majesté Catholique, comme peu analogues à ces mêmes relations de famille et d'intérêts politiques de la plus grande importance qui sont réclamés par le gouvernement Portugais au même temps qu'il le blesse.

Si l'on trouve à redire sur ce que des Puissances étrangères prennent part dans l'affaire qui se discute, ces mêmes Puissances ne peuvent pas l'envisager sous le même point de vue. Elles trouveront dans la mesure adoptée par l'Espagne de la modération, de la confiance, et un vif et sincère désir de conserver la paix, qu'elles aiment tant, et au maintien de laquelle elles employent tous les moyens possibles pour conserver l'ordre et la tranquillité.

On ne conçoit pas pourquoi à cette occasion on parle de l'affaire d'Olivenza, qui est tout-à-fait étrangère à cette question, et dont l'acquisition fut faite par l'Espagne par suite d'une guerre, et confirmée par un traité.

La sixième observation est une attaque qu'on fait aux Puissances Alliées. Elles ne peuvent pas faire moins que d'en convenir d'après l'esprit qui anime le Cabinet du Brésil, quand il veut assimiler sa conduite dans cette invasion qu'il vient de faire aux généreux efforts des premières contre Napoléon, de même qu'elles reconnoîtront aussi son esprit d'ambition, puisqu'il prétend les rendre garantes de ses vues mystérieuses.

Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique ne peut pas demeurer d'accord sur des comparaisons de cette nature, et même il ne les croit pas compatibles avec le caractère religieux et de probité de Sa Majesté Très-Fidèle.

Je m'abstiendrais de faire aucune réflexion sur ce qu'on a aussi avancé relativement à dire que le Cabinet de Madrid pouvait adopter les mesures qu'il trouverait les plus convenables pour se rétablir dans la pleine et entière possession de ses colonies. Sur qui l'Espagne devra-t-elle conquérir celles que le Portugal vient d'envahir au nom de son Souverain? . . . . . Sur eux-mêmes? Serait cela ce qu'on a voulu faire entendre par cette réflexion. Telle paraît être la conséquence qui devrait découler des faits débattus, et de l'état actuel de la question.

En dernier lieu, je crois que tout ce que j'ai l'honneur d'avancer à Votre Excellence peut se réduire aux points suivants :—

1. L'armée Portugaise a envahie et occupée, au nom de son Souverain, une partie des possessions de Sa Majesté Catholique.

2. Une telle conduite a toutes les apparences d'une véritable agression, à cause qu'elle n'a pas été préparée par aucune convention particulière, ni même précédée des explications préliminaires parmi les deux gouvernements.

3. Le silence opiniâtre qu'observe la Cour du Brésil relativement à ses véritables intentions, et le système sur lequel il veut établir sa conduite, sont entièrement en opposition avec le droit des gens reconnu, et avec les principes admis par toutes les nations de l'Europe.

4. Le Cabinet Espagnol a fait preuve d'une manière évidente de sa modération, en faisant part à ses Alliés de l'état de cette affaire.

D'après cette légère exposition on peut se former une opinion sur la conduite des deux gouvernements, et sur la bonne foi de ses prétentions. Sa Majesté Catholique a désiré confier à l'examen de ses Alliés la justice de ses réclamations, et se repose sur ce que la franchise dans les explications, la probité dans les faits, et la vertu dans les résultats, pourront détruire tout soupçon, et fixer l'opinion des Alliés qui se sont si généreusement réunis pour mettre un terme aux égarements de la politique révolutionnaire, dont la destruction est nécessaire pour rétablir la sûreté des peuples, la dignité des trônes, et la gloire des Souverains.

Je me flatte que Votre Excellence voudra bien prendre en considération tout ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de lui exposer, et qu'elle en fera l'usage qu'elle jugera le plus convenable et le plus propre à l'objet que je me suis proposé pour le meilleur service du Roi mon maître, et en faveur de ses intérêts, comme j'ai déjà avancé dans le commencement.

J'ai l'honneur de renouveler à Votre Excellence à cette occasion l'assurance de la très haute considération avec laquelle j'ai celui d'être

Votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

LE CHEVALIER DE SALMON,
Chargé d'Affaires d'Espagne.

G. O. Paris, 30th April, 1817. [ 1187. ]

1. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, having been graciously pleased, by a warrant under his sign manual, dated the 30th ult., to grant to Field Marshal his Grace the Duke of Wellington, in trust for the British and Allied troops which served under his Grace's command, and were engaged in the battles of the 15th, 16th, 17th, or 18th days of June, 1815, or employed in blockades or sieges in France, or which had joined the army in France before the 7th day of July, 1815, the sum of 25 millions of livres, for the ordnance, arms, stores, magazines, and other booty captured by it from the enemy during that period; it is hereby ordered, that the prize lists, according to the forms and instructions which the agents appointed by his Grace on the part of the army to conduct and arrange the business are directed forthwith to furnish to the departments and corps concerned, be filled up and delivered with every possible despatch, so as to enable these agents to pay over the money to the different persons entitled to it with as little delay as possible.

2. Each officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier must (according to the provision of the said warrant) be returned according to the rank respectively held by them on the 15th day of June, 1815.

3. The departments and the corps which now compose the British contingent in France will transmit their prize lists as soon as completed to the Adjutant-General of that army, marking on the cover thereof "Prize List," and the department or corps to which it belongs.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 2nd May, 1817.

Since mine of the 9th, we have made some progress on the subject of our conferences at Paris respecting the state of the press here. Lord Castlereagh will have acquainted you with the particulars of the course pursued up to last Friday. In order, however, to enable you to understand precisely the result up to this date, it is requisite that you should be in possession of the piece referred to the Commission noticed in my letter of the 9th. This goes herewith: its form, by the King's suggestion, was the project of a letter to you, detailing the result of my conferences with His Majesty in the sense which they might, in our view, be desired to produce.

The Commission (in the enumeration of which, made in my letter of the 9th, you must read Molerus *vice* Falcq) made their report upon the suggestions contained in this piece while the King was absent. The report itself I have not seen; but immediately after his return to Bruxelles the King sent an instruction to this Commission, and afterwards desired that the accompanying extract of that instruction should be communicated to me in order to be conveyed to your Grace, and you will know best what use can be made of it consistently with the confidential terms in which it is couched.

I fear this result upon the subject of the press—although without the establishment of a previous censure I know not what further effectual means for its control could have been proposed—will not prove adequate in its consequences to all the views of the French government. Much, however, may be done through the means, coupled with the suggestions, of your Protocol No. 110, the proposals in which I have strongly urged; and these have already been referred to the same Commission; not, as Nagell informs me, for the purpose of determining whether they shall be followed, but for that of deciding how they can best be executed by this government. Upon the subject of this Protocol, which I am, however, rejoiced has issued, Lord Castlereagh will probably have put you in possession of some criticisms made by me. In truth, I wish that some part of its preface had been spared, more especially where it speaks of the faction here being tolerated by this King, and that he had not only withheld satisfaction for the libel against La Tour du Pin, but left totally unanswered the "plaintes officielles qui lui ont été adressées à ce sujet." In truth, up to this moment there has been no "plainte officielle" made to this government on the subject in question. It is indeed true that a *note verbale*, a copy of which I enclose, was presented to M. de Nagell by M. de Caux; but this the latter expressly negatived at the time of delivery as bearing the character in any respect of an official piece. The words scored under in this paper are certainly strong, and I think wisely have been left unnoticed; but if, even according to diplomatic usages, a paper of this kind required any answer whatever, which under the declarations attending its delivery I conceive not to be the case, I am the offending party, it having been through my recommendation that it was left unnoticed till at least I should have seen whether, through my efforts, the main desires of the French government and of the Allies could not be accomplished; and my reason for this recommendation was, that I knew not how this paper could be touched upon without noticing the offensive passage, and this would be to make what was already bad worse. I could much wish La Tour du Pin should be sent back at an early period to resume his functions here: his absence is a triumph to the disaffected French, and he certainly, abstracted from his excellent character, is perhaps the person best qualified in France, from the knowledge of this country, to do his master's business with effect; and as (without any "plainte officielle") a prosecution has been directed and is now in progress against his libellists, I should think the French government would do well for the present to take this for satisfaction for the moment, and send him back to his duty.

Referring you to my private letter of this date to Lord Castlereagh for further matters,

I remain, &c.,

CLANCARTY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 5th April, 1817.

I have privately communicated to the King the substance of the conversation which we recently had at Paris upon the subject of the press here, arising immediately out of the late libel on M. de la Tour du Pin, and found His Majesty perfectly well disposed to listen to every proposal which could be reasonably made for the purpose of checking the licence of the Belgic press, and if requisite and upon due consideration found feasible, consistently with the fair principles of free discussion among his subjects, to strengthen still further the existing laws upon the matter of libel.

The great difficulty upon this point is, to determine what can be fairly done or reasonably sought. A previous censorship you are of opinion, and in this I quite agree, cannot exist in any country pretending to the freedom of its press. His Majesty would, according to my view, be decidedly hostile to the establishment of such an institution within his dominions; and I should very much doubt, even if his opinions upon this subject were otherwise, whether the States General could ever be led to pass a law authorising the formation of such an effectual check upon the freedom of discussion.

The consequence of there being no previous censorship necessarily is that parties may publish whatever they please, however atrocious; and the guard against their licentious exercise of this right (tending, as all abuses do, to affect the existence of the right itself) can only be made to exist in the subsequent responsibility of the publisher, and its efficacy in the certainty and due apportionment of punishment to the offence. In this state of things consists the liberty, as contradistinguished from the licence, of the press. In England this responsibility is, and everywhere else ought to be, of two kinds, criminal and civil: responsibility to the Crown by indictment or criminal information for compromising the public peace, placed in jeopardy by the libellist; responsibility in a civil action to the individual libelled, for the private evil sustained by him in his reputation. The punishment on conviction in the first instance is by fine and imprisonment; in the second by damages to the party injured. In the first, the truth of the libel cannot be pleaded in excuse for the act, because the King's peace is equally, perhaps more, compromised by a true than by a false charge in a publication. In a civil action truth may be pleaded in bar. In this country I do not understand that this very plain and sensible distinction is taken. As I am informed, there can be no prosecution here for libel unless the party injured becomes the complainant, so that the injury to the Crown by hazarding the public peace is either entirely overlooked, or at best amalgamated with the private injury sustained by the individual. Here also, as I understand, and necessarily, because the injury to the Crown has not been sufficiently considered, truth is pleadable in all cases of libel.

His Majesty, after well weighing the above distinctions, which I had the honour of laying before him, has not hesitated to assure me of his readiness to adopt the British principle of vindicating the public peace by criminal prosecution as well as securing damages sufficient to the party libelled in a civil proceeding. Between the present period and the month of October next, when the States General are to reassemble, he will consider how these principles can be best made available by being placed in the form of a decree for proposal to his legislature, and will further take under his view the whole law of libel as at present existing in his dominions, for the purpose of examining

whether it may not be further strengthened, not only without detriment but with real advantage to the fair liberty of his press, in order to insure, as far as things of this nature are capable of being insured, the certainty and due apportionment of punishment to the libellist.

I have been induced, from the great interest which your Grace seemed to take upon this subject in our confidential conversation upon it at Paris, to write thus more fully than perhaps will well accord with your other avocations, and can well assure you that I find His Majesty upon this, as I ever have found him upon all other points in which I may have been concerned, anxiously willing to hear, consider, and ultimately desirous of adopting any reasonable proposition, from which the welfare of others or of his own subjects was likely to result.

Yours, my dear Duke,

CLANCARTY.

II.

*Note verbale ad Memorandum, delivered by M. de Caux to Baron de Nagell.**

S.M. T.C. s'était plue à trouver dans le soin que le gouvernement des Pays-Bas a pris de présenter aux deux Chambres le projet de loi, qui a été adopté relativement aux abus de la presse, une marque de déférence et une preuve de son désir sincère de faire cesser le motif de plaintes qu'elle avait été précédemment dans le cas de lui adresser. Cette considération l'avait même porté à de l'indulgence pour de nouvelles attaques dirigées par les gazettes Belges contre son gouvernement et sa personne, et qui, pour être habituellement couvertes d'un voile propre à dérober les auteurs à l'application de la loi, n'en étaient point moins évidentes. Mais il faudrait que S.M. poussait la modération jusqu'au point où elle cesse d'être une vertu, et qu'elle négligat même le soin de sa propre dignité pour ne pas témoigner qu'elle ressent vivement l'insulte qui lui a été faite dans la personne de son Ministre. Pleine du désir de maintenir ces rapports de paix qui unissent aujourd'hui les Puissances de l'Europe, elle doit en quelque sorte s'applaudir de ce que M. de la Tour du Pin ne s'étant point trouvé à Bruxelles au moment où a paru la diatribe dont il est l'objet, elle n'ait point été forcée de faire, en le rappelant sur-le-champ, un éclat que tout le monde eut approuvé, mais que l'opinion publique eut pu envisager avec crainte comme le premier germe de nouvelles discordes. Toutefois le gouvernement des Pays-Bas ne s'étonnera pas que S.M. T.C. lui fasse connaître *qu'elle ne donnera ordre à son Ministre de retourner à son poste que quand elle aura la certitude qu'il ne sera plus exposé à des outrages dont son caractère l'eut garanti, si la Cour près de laquelle il est accrédité eut mis quelque prix à faire respecter à son égard les principes du droit des gens.* D'après ces principes en effet l'agent politique accrédité dans un pays doit y jouir de l'inviolabilité attachée au caractère dont il est revêtu, et cette inviolabilité n'est attachée à son caractère que parcequ'il doit pouvoir remplir, de la manière la plus indépendante, et avec la liberté la plus complète, ces devoirs de la mission qui lui est confiée. Il est censé ailleurs représenter le Souverain dont il est le mandataire. Or cette inviolabilité n'existe plus de *fait*; et le Souverain est véritablement attaqué quand son mandataire est publiquement

* Enclosed in the Note of Baron de Nagell to the Earl of Clancarty, 31st March, 1817.

insulté, et quand l'insulte multipliée, pour ainsi dire, par le nombre de feuilles qui la propagent, ne peut être ignorée dans aucun lieu du pays où il réside. En vain citerait on ces abus comme une conséquence inévitable de la liberté de la presse. Dans le pays où la presse jouit d'une liberté qui en des occasions si nombreuses dégénère en licence absolu, en Angleterre, les agens politiques des Puissances en paix avec le pays ne sont jamais attaqués par les journalistes, et ceux-ci savent qu'ils ne pourraient les outrager impunément. On ne peut concevoir en effet qu'un agent qui par sa position doit, dans tous ses rapports avec les autorités ou les sujets du pays où il est accrédité, être garanti par le gouvernement qui le reçoit comme intermédiaire de paix et de bonne harmonie, de toute violence, de toute injure, de tout acte, même le plus indifférent, qui lui porterait le moindre dommage, soit exposé à se voir attaquer dans ce que l'homme a de plus précieux, sa considération, sa réputation, son honneur, et cela sans avoir pour se défendre d'autre moyen que de descendre dans une lice abjecte, et de lutter corps à corps avec des hommes dont le contact suffirait même pour le discréditer. Certes le gouvernement qui le met à l'abri de tout ce qui tendrait à troubler son repos, et qui ne permet pas qu'il soit exposé à aucune poursuite judiciaire, qui suspend à son égard l'action de ses propres voies, doit se regarder comme tombant dans une étrange contradiction, et comme étant encore loin de remplir les devoirs que le droit des gens lui impose quand il le laisse en butte à l'atteinte la plus dangereuse et la plus attentatoire à la dignité du Souverain qu'il représente.

DE CAUX.

III.

*The King of the Netherlands to the Commission.*

Bruxelles, ce 27 Avril, 1817.

Nous vous autorisons à adopter les ouvertures faites par my Lord Clancarty, à l'effet que le Prince de Waterloo soit informé sous main par son entremise, tant du désir que nous avons de limiter l'abus qui pourrait être fait de la presse pour offenser les Puissances étrangères, et nuire à la tranquillité actuelle de l'Europe, que de notre intention de proposer aux Etats Généraux lors de leur première assemblée ordinaire les mesures législatives qui, après l'examen ordonné par nous à cet égard, seront jugées les plus efficaces: bien entendu cependant que le Prince de Waterloo ne fera usage, soit auprès du gouvernement Français, soit ailleurs, où il le jugera convenable, que d'une manière confidentielle de la communication à lui faite.

GUILLAUME.

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*To Lord Burghersh.* [1188.]

MY DEAR BURGHERSH, Mont St. Martin, 14th May, 1817.

I have read your memoir with great satisfaction, and I now return it. I have marked some of the inaccuracies which I have observed in it, others I have not marked, and there are probably some which I did not observe. These inaccuracies, those which must be found in the style of a paper written with such haste, and, above all, the truth which must be told of some individuals, and even armies and nations, induce me to recom-

mend you neither to publish this memoir yourself, nor to give it to anybody who would publish it. I am quite certain that the time is not yet come in which a real history of these transactions can be written with advantage to the public or with satisfaction to the historian.

Give my best love to Priscilla, and

Believe me ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1189.] *To Marshal Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Cambrai, 15th May, 1817.

I received, when I was in London, your letter of the 29th March, and I had a good deal of conversation with Palmela and with the Ministers upon Portuguese affairs. The result is a decided opinion on my part, as well as on theirs, that the only effectual remedy for all Portuguese evils, as well in Europe as in America, is to bring home the King; and if that cannot be done, to bring home the Prince of Brazils. I believe they mean to endeavour to attain one of these objects, and to bring the Austrian government to co-operate with them. This is entirely, however, between ourselves.

I have heard nothing very positive or important lately respecting the Rio Plata concern. I believe the Spaniards are satisfied with the line which the Allied Ministers at Paris took upon this business, and that they will wait the result. Since the news of the capture of Monte Video has arrived, which certainly appears to have been, if not concerted with, at least unnoticed by the insurgents of Buenos Ayres, I have recommended the Spaniards to turn their minds to the mode of satisfaction they would require, and to that of settling the business. This will give you more time for your defensive plans.

In the mean time, however, all that I heard in London convinces me that, if the King or Prince does not return, Portugal will pass to the House of Spain, with the consent even of the principal Portuguese families. I doubt also whether, if Spain should lose her colonies, many of the Powers of Europe would feel disposed to oppose themselves to the transfer.

I heard from your brother that you had determined not to

quit Portugal at the present moment, in which you have acted quite right.

By the by, I wrote to Lord Castlereagh, not having been able to see him, respecting your brother's claim to permission to wear the Tower and Sword.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Chevalier de Pizarro.* [1190.]

EXCELENTÍSIMO SEÑOR, Cambrai, ce 15 Mai, 1817.

J'ai reçu à Londres il y a quelques jours la lettre de V.E. du 11 Avril, et je me suis prévalu de ma résidence momentanée dans cette capitale pour parler aux Ministres du Régent sur les affaires d'Espagne. V.E. peut s'assurer qu'il n'existe ni refroidissement ni tiédeur dans le Cabinet Britannique vis-à-vis de l'Espagne. Les Ministres ont ressenti les inconvéniens que résultoient de l'habitude de faire les affaires à Madrid aussi bien qu'à Londres; et aussitôt que l'Ambassadeur est retourné à son poste à Madrid, sentant que les négociations entre les deux gouvernements dépendoient essentiellement des résolutions du Cabinet de Madrid, ils ont préféré transiger les affaires dans cette capitale que dans celle de Londres.

Il est vrai que comme je l'ai déjà annoncé à V.E. les embarras de la négociation sur la traite des nègres arrêtent les négociations sur tout autre objet; mais il ne s'ensuit pas qu'il existe à Londres ou refroidissement ou tiédeur sur les intérêts de l'Espagne.

Si ces sentimens n'existent pas, ce n'est pas nécessaire d'en chercher la cause dans l'intimité supposée du Cabinet de Madrid avec d'autres Puissances. V.E. peut s'assurer qu'on sait en Angleterre à quoi s'en tenir sur ce sujet-là. Mais en même tems que je vous fais connoître mon opinion là-dessus, je ne peux pas m'empêcher de vous conseiller de vous adresser directement et exclusivement à l'Angleterre quand vous voulez vous prévaloir de la puissance ou de l'influence de l'Angleterre dans vos négociations ou dans vos affaires; car vous ne pouvez pas vous attendre que l'Angleterre peut se laisser forcer la main par les autres Puissances de l'Europe, ou qu'elle prendra un intérêt ou

fera des efforts exclusifs dans des affaires qui se trouvent négociées avec tout le monde.

Pour ce qui regarde les notes sur les affaires du Rio de la Plata, la chose s'est passé comme je vais vous indiquer. Les Ambassadeurs et Ministres ont eu une conférence avec le Duc de Richelieu, où j'ai assisté, où tout le monde étoit d'accord sur le principe et sur les détails de la marche qu'on avoit à suivre dans cette affaire; et les notes ont été rédigées et signées de suite par tous les Ministres présens, avec l'exception de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, qui avoit ordre de sa Cour de prendre ad referendum tout ce dont on conviendroit. Ces ordres sont le résultat du principe que je vous ai ci-dessus énoncé. Vous ne pouvez pas vous attendre que l'Angleterre, sur laquelle Puissance doit nécessairement tomber le poids des efforts à faire si la médiation générale manque, laissât décider par les Ministres de France, d'Autriche, de Russie, et de Prusse, rassemblés à Paris, quelle serait la marche de l'affaire. Même si les Ministres du Régent étoient assez foibles pour souffrir une telle indignité, la forme du gouvernement les en empêcheroit; et ils n'ont fait que leur devoir en témoignant le désir de voir ce que serait déterminé avant que leur Ambassadeur l'eut signé. L'envoi et le retour des pièces ont pris quelques jours, et voilà la cause du délai dont V.E. se plaint.

Pour le reste, je me suis déjà suffisamment expliqué dans des lettres antérieures. Rien ne pourra se faire en Angleterre sans l'arrangement de la question de la traite. Celle-là une fois arrangée, les difficultés sur les autres s'affoiblissent, et en tout cas celles de chacune restent sur ses propres bases; et les Ministres du Régent auront toujours un intérêt dans le bonheur de l'Espagne, qui sera subordonné seulement à celui que le Roi et les Ministres d'Espagne auront eux-mêmes; mais il faut voir les choses dans leur vrai jour.

L'intérêt de l'Espagne et de l'Angleterre dans les affaires d'Espagne est véritablement le même; mais il ne faut pas croire que l'intérêt de l'Angleterre y est majeur que celui d'Espagne, ou que, quelque soit le résultat des crises actuelles, l'Angleterre ne pourroit pas en tirer des avantages.

Pour cette raison, aussi bien que pour toutes autres, je désire ardemment voir la fin d'abord de la question de la *traite*, et puis un entendement général avec l'Angleterre sur *toutes les*

questions où l'Espagne est intéressée, comme la meilleure manière de les mener au résultat heureux où je désire les voir.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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ACCOUNT of INDEMNITY MONEY in lieu of Rations to Officers of the British Army of Occupation, and to the Saxon, Danish, Bavarian, Hanoverian, and Wurtemberg Contingents, showing the Surplus of the Compensation Fund. From the 1st October, 1816, to the 28th February, 1817, inclusive.

Cambrai, 15th May, 1817.

| CORPS OR DEPARTMENT. | AMOUNT FOR THE MONTHS OF | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL AMOUNT. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | October, 1816. | | November, 1816. | | December, 1816. | | January, 1817. | | February, 1817. | | | |
| | Frs. | Cts. | Frs. | Cts. | Frs. | Cts. | Frs. | Cts. | Frs. | Cts. | Frs. | Cts. |
| General Officers and Staff | 16,432 | 50 | 16,170 | 0 | 17,427 | 50 | 15,287 | 50 | 11,607 | 50 | 76,945 | 0 |
| Adjutant-General's Department | 4,102 | 50 | 4,280 | 0 | 4,185 | 0 | 4,185 | 0 | 3,780 | 0 | 20,532 | 50 |
| Quartermaster-General's Department | 5,347 | 50 | 4,645 | 0 | 4,585 | 0 | 4,670 | 0 | 4,410 | 0 | 23,657 | 50 |
| Majors of Brigade | 2,867 | 50 | 2,715 | 0 | 2,712 | 50 | 2,712 | 50 | 2,450 | 0 | 13,457 | 50 |
| Chaplains to the Forces | 2,625 | 0 | 2,647 | 50 | 2,557 | 50 | 2,850 | 0 | 2,542 | 50 | 13,222 | 50 |
| Assistant Provosts Marshal | 620 | 0 | 600 | 0 | 620 | 0 | 620 | 0 | 560 | 0 | 3,020 | 0 |
| Assistant Baggage-masters | 387 | 50 | 375 | 0 | 387 | 50 | 387 | 50 | 350 | 0 | 1,887 | 50 |
| 2nd Dragoon Guards | 3,887 | 50 | 3,840 | 0 | 3,720 | 0 | 3,450 | 0 | 2,835 | 0 | 17,732 | 50 |
| 3rd ditto | 3,515 | 0 | 3,590 | 0 | 3,405 | 0 | 3,385 | 0 | 2,780 | 0 | 16,675 | 0 |
| 7th Hussars | 2,947 | 50 | 2,820 | 0 | 3,225 | 0 | 3,345 | 0 | 2,865 | 0 | 15,202 | 50 |
| 14th Light Dragoons | 4,070 | 0 | 3,742 | 50 | 3,745 | 0 | 3,600 | 0 | 3,270 | 0 | 18,427 | 50 |
| 12th ditto | 3,665 | 0 | 3,565 | 0 | 3,272 | 50 | 3,350 | 0 | 2,845 | 0 | 16,697 | 50 |
| 18th Hussars | 4,410 | 0 | 4,035 | 0 | 3,980 | 0 | 3,885 | 0 | 3,222 | 50 | 19,532 | 50 |
| Judge Advocate's Department, Majors de place, Commandants, &c. | 2,325 | 0 | 2,250 | 0 | 2,315 | 0 | 2,325 | 0 | 2,100 | 0 | 11,315 | 0 |
| Royal Waggon Train | 2,910 | 0 | 2,652 | 50 | 2,637 | 50 | 2,635 | 0 | 2,417 | 50 | 13,252 | 50 |
| Staff Corps Cavalry | 1,860 | 0 | 1,875 | 0 | 1,935 | 0 | 2,065 | 0 | 1,880 | 0 | 9,615 | 0 |
| 3rd Batt. 1st Grenadier Guards | 4,002 | 50 | 3,945 | 0 | 3,812 | 50 | 3,750 | 0 | 3,460 | 0 | 18,970 | 0 |
| 2nd Batt. Coldstream Guards | 3,477 | 50 | 3,317 | 50 | 3,712 | 50 | 3,525 | 0 | 3,552 | 50 | 17,585 | 0 |
| 3rd Batt. 1st Royal Scots | 5,050 | 0 | 4,680 | 0 | 4,705 | 0 | 4,665 | 0 | 4,255 | 0 | 23,355 | 0 |
| 3rd Regiment Buffs | 4,907 | 50 | 4,800 | 0 | 5,062 | 50 | 5,037 | 50 | 4,090 | 0 | 23,897 | 50 |
| 4th ditto | 4,060 | 0 | 4,347 | 50 | 4,677 | 50 | 4,627 | 50 | 3,537 | 50 | 21,250 | 0 |
| 5th ditto | 5,532 | 50 | 5,352 | 50 | 5,205 | 0 | 5,390 | 0 | 4,585 | 0 | 26,065 | 0 |
| 6th ditto | 4,327 | 50 | 3,630 | 0 | 4,125 | 0 | 4,195 | 0 | 3,397 | 50 | 19,675 | 0 |
| 7th ditto | 4,405 | 0 | 4,192 | 50 | 4,457 | 50 | 4,417 | 50 | 3,265 | 0 | 20,737 | 50 |
| 9th ditto | 5,502 | 50 | 5,450 | 0 | 5,515 | 0 | 5,490 | 0 | 4,052 | 50 | 26,010 | 0 |
| 21st ditto | 4,565 | 0 | 4,232 | 50 | 4,645 | 0 | 4,725 | 0 | 3,985 | 0 | 22,152 | 50 |
| 23rd ditto | 4,790 | 0 | 4,577 | 50 | 4,422 | 50 | 4,257 | 50 | 3,410 | 0 | 21,457 | 50 |
| 27th ditto (1st Batt.) | 4,767 | 50 | 4,605 | 0 | 5,160 | 0 | 4,960 | 0 | 3,785 | 0 | 23,277 | 50 |
| 29th ditto | 4,322 | 50 | 4,362 | 50 | 4,520 | 0 | 4,660 | 0 | 3,842 | 50 | 21,707 | 50 |
| 39th ditto | 4,585 | 0 | 4,707 | 50 | 5,075 | 0 | 5,350 | 0 | 4,230 | 0 | 23,947 | 50 |
| 40th ditto | 4,960 | 0 | 4,717 | 50 | 4,885 | 0 | 4,852 | 50 | 4,065 | 0 | 23,480 | 0 |
| 43rd ditto | 4,710 | 0 | 4,515 | 0 | 4,582 | 50 | 4,572 | 50 | 3,737 | 50 | 22,117 | 50 |
| 52nd ditto | 4,037 | 50 | 4,062 | 50 | 4,087 | 50 | 3,905 | 0 | 3,285 | 0 | 19,377 | 50 |
| 57th ditto | 5,995 | 0 | 4,457 | 50 | 4,892 | 50 | 4,925 | 0 | 3,917 | 50 | 23,287 | 50 |
| 71st ditto | 4,512 | 50 | 4,512 | 50 | 4,960 | 0 | 4,815 | 0 | 4,297 | 50 | 23,097 | 50 |
| 79th ditto | 4,657 | 50 | 4,540 | 0 | 4,670 | 0 | 4,920 | 0 | 4,095 | 0 | 22,882 | 50 |
| 81st ditto | 4,732 | 50 | 4,287 | 50 | 5,057 | 50 | 5,210 | 0 | 4,110 | 0 | 23,397 | 50 |
| 88th ditto | 4,550 | 0 | 4,357 | 50 | 4,340 | 0 | 4,287 | 50 | 3,697 | 50 | 21,232 | 50 |
| 91st ditto | 4,800 | 0 | 4,872 | 50 | 4,945 | 0 | 4,685 | 0 | 3,662 | 50 | 22,965 | 0 |
| 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade | 3,432 | 50 | 3,067 | 50 | 3,312 | 50 | 3,607 | 50 | 2,930 | 0 | 16,350 | 0 |
| 2nd ditto | 3,552 | 50 | 3,427 | 50 | 3,465 | 0 | 3,750 | 0 | 3,292 | 50 | 17,487 | 50 |
| Royal Staff Corps | 2,015 | 0 | 1,950 | 0 | 1,765 | 0 | 1,722 | 50 | 1,620 | 0 | 9,072 | 50 |
| Ordnance Department (Civil and Military) | 22,641 | 25 | 22,332 | 50 | 22,952 | 50 | 22,482 | 50 | 20,460 | 0 | 110,868 | 75 |
| Commissariat ditto | 9,627 | 50 | 9,540 | 0 | 8,292 | 50 | 8,990 | 50 | 8,005 | 0 | 44,455 | 50 |
| Medical ditto | 4,572 | 50 | 4,350 | 0 | 4,417 | 50 | 4,307 | 50 | 3,850 | 0 | 21,497 | 50 |
| Comptroller-General's ditto | 1,860 | 0 | 1,772 | 50 | 1,385 | 0 | 1,705 | 0 | 1,540 | 0 | 8,562 | 50 |
| Paymaster-General's ditto | 930 | 0 | 875 | 0 | 852 | 50 | 877 | 50 | 840 | 0 | 4,375 | 0 |
| Storekeeper-General's ditto | 1,240 | 0 | 1,265 | 0 | 1,317 | 50 | 1,265 | 0 | 1,877 | 50 | 6,965 | 0 |
| | 218,213 | 75 | 210,905 | 0 | 216,285 | 0 | 214,683 | 0 | 182,645 | 0 | 1,042,731 | 75 |
| Foreign Contingents of the Allied Army | 154,767 | 50 | 149,775 | 0 | 154,767 | 50 | 154,767 | 50 | 139,790 | 0 | 753,867 | 50 |
| Total | 372,981 | 25 | 360,680 | 0 | 371,052 | 50 | 369,450 | 50 | 322,435 | 0 | 1,796,599 | 25 |

RECAPITULATION.

| | Frs. | Cts. | Frs. | Cts. | Frs. | Cts. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Received of the French Government for the British Army of Occupation in lieu of Rations to Officers .. .. .. .. | | | | | 2,460,000 | 0 |
| *Deduct.* | | | | | | |
| Amount of Returns for Compensation in lieu of Rations to Officers of the British Army, viz. :— | | | | | | |
| October .. .. .. | 218,213 | 75 | | | | |
| November .. .. .. | 210,905 | 0 | | | | |
| December .. .. .. | 216,285 | 0 | | | | |
| January .. .. .. | 214,683 | 0 | | | | |
| February .. .. .. | 182,645 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | 1,042,731 | 75 | | |
| Portion to the Saxon, Danish, Wurtemberg, Hanoverian, and Bavarian Contingents, viz. :— | | | | | | |
| October .. .. .. | 154,767 | 50 | | | | |
| November .. .. .. | 149,775 | 0 | | | | |
| December .. .. .. | 154,767 | 50 | | | | |
| January .. .. .. | 154,767 | 50 | | | | |
| February .. .. .. | 139,790 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | 753,867 | 50 | | |
| | | | | | 1,796,599 | 25 |
| Saving .. .. .. .. | | | | | 363,400 | 75 |
| Or .. .. .. .. £ | | | | | 15,141 | 13 11½ |

ROBERT GRINDLAY.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Fife House, 15th May, 1817.

I have had a further conversation with my colleagues on the subject of the intimation which you received from Mr. Baring before you left Paris, viz., that he was disposed (provided the British government saw no political ground on which to object to the measure) to open a negotiation with the French government for the purpose of completing within the year ending December, 1818, the remaining payments due by France to the Allies under the head of contributions, the Allies consenting to receive the sums that would fall due in the years 1819 and 1820 at a discount to be agreed upon.

We see no objection to your expressing to Mr. Baring, in consequence of this communication, the sense entertained by the Prince Regent's government of the propriety of his conduct upon this as upon the occasion of the former loan; and you may acquaint him that we have no desire in any way to discourage him from proceeding in the negotiation which he has had in contemplation.

As the decision of the Prince Regent upon the result of such a negotiation can only be taken upon conference with his Allies, and when the terms and nature of the proposal shall have been brought forward on the part of the French government, it seems unnecessary to do more at present than to remove through you any obstacle to such a discussion which considerations of duty or delicacy towards his own government may have hitherto imposed upon Mr. Baring's mind.

I am with sincere regard, my dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Foreign Office, 16th May, 1817.

As the question on which Baring spoke to you is a money concern, it has been deemed proper that Lord Liverpool should write to you upon it. I shall be glad to be informed when you have given Baring his answer, as I think it desirable to have no disguise either with our Allies or the French minister that such an overture has been received, and that we have interposed no obstacle to its being brought into deliberation. Subject to a fair discussion with our Allies, the impressions here are favourable to it.

Ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*To the Mayor of Bapaume.* [1191.]

MONSIEUR, Cambrai, ce 17 Mai, 1817.

Ayant fait des perquisitions au sujet de votre lettre du 3 Mai, il paraît que les officiers de l'Artillerie Royale cantonnés à Bapaume avouent leur tort, disent qu'ils sont extrêmement fâché de ce qui s'est passé, et qu'ils n'avoient pas le moindre intention de vous insulter. Quelques-uns d'entre eux partoient pour l'Angleterre, et ils avoient dîné ensemble, et le vin leur avoit échauffé. Ils offrent maintenant de vous faire les excuses que vous sont dûes, et de payer une amende aux pauvres de la ville de Bapaume. Il me paroît que l'affaire pouvoit terminer convenablement de cette manière; mais si la proposition de la part de ces Messieurs ne vous convient pas, je vous prie de me faire savoir ce que vous désirez que je fasse à leur égard.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 22nd May, 1817.

I send you the extract of the Paris Protocol 110, dated 11th April, as far as I conceive it contains demands upon this country. To this I have added under each Article its apposite observation, as resulting from the communications I have had with this government upon each separate point. Though these appear to me satisfactory to the extent of the Protocol, they may not, even to this extent, appear to be so to you; and both of us may possibly conceive that further measures may, if practicable, be looked to, with a view of counteracting the diabolical and active exertions of Jacobinism still prevalent in Europe, and especially in this country.

Abstracted from its being, as I am fully aware, my imperious duty to act under you, and with you, upon all matters relating to this object, believe me it will afford me the most sincere pleasure zealously to follow your suggestions, and actively to co-operate with you in endeavouring to attain an object which, I can well assure you, you have not more at heart than I have.

I can furnish you with a copy of the Protocol 110, if you wish it.

Yours most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Projet de Protocole dont il y aura six originaux signés.*

Leurs Excellences le Lieutenant-Général Baron de Vincent, Monsieur le Chevalier Stuart, le Lieutenant-Général Comte de Goltz, le Lieutenant-Général Pozzo di Borgo, Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu, et le Comte de Fernan Nuñez, Duc de Montellano, dûment autorisés par leurs Souverains respectifs, s'étant réunis en conférence pour convenir du mode d'accession pur et simple de la part de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne au Traité signé à Vienne le 9 Juin, 1815, et à celui de Paris du 20 Novembre de la dite année, et étant également munis d'instructions pour prendre en considération et fixer l'application de l'Article 99 du dit Traité de Vienne qui concerne la réversion des Duchés de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalla après la mort de Sa Majesté l'Archiduchesse Marie Louise, ont convenu de soumettre à leurs Cours respectives l'arrangement suivant:

1.—Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne accédera au Congrès de Vienne par un acte formel simplement et sans réserve.

2.—Sa dite Majesté répétera la même accession et de la même manière au Traité de Paris du 20 Novembre, 1815.

3.—L'application de l'Article 99 du Congrès de Vienne concernant la réversion des Duchés de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalla sera déterminée par un traité séparé de la teneur suivante:

Au nom de la Très Sainte et Indivisible Trinité.

Etant reconnu que le motif qui a porté Sa Majesté Catholique à différer son accession au Traité signé en Congrès à Vienne le 9 Juin, 1815, ainsi qu'à celui de Paris du 20 Novembre de la dite année, consistoit dans le désir de voir fixer par le consentement unanime des Puissances qui y étoient appelées l'appli-

cation de l'Article 99 du dit Traité du 9 Juin, et en conséquence de la réversion des Duchés de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalla après la mort de Sa Majesté l'Archiduchesse Marie Louise;

Que l'adhésion susmentionnée étoit nécessaire pour compléter l'assentiment général aux transactions sur lesquelles les intérêts politiques et la paix de l'Europe sont principalement fondés;

Que Sa Majesté Catholique, persuadée de cette vérité et animée des mêmes principes que les autres augustes Alliés, s'est décidée de sa pleine volonté à donner son accession au dit Traité en vertu d'actes solennels signés à cet effet le *

et ayant été en conséquence jugé convenable de satisfaire en même tems aux demandes de Sa Majesté Catholique qui concernent la réversion des dits Duchés d'une manière propre à contribuer encore davantage à l'affermissement de la paix et de la bonne intelligence heureusement rétablie et existante en Europe, Leurs Majestés ont nommé à cet effet, savoir: *

lesquels, munis de pleins pouvoirs suffisans, ont convenu et stipulé ce qui suit.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir W. Gordon.* [1192.]

MY DEAR SIR, Cambrai, 28th May, 1817.

I have received your letter of the 20th regarding the Military College; and although I have seen that my name has been introduced into the debate on the Military College, I assure you that nobody has any authority from me to state any opinion as mine on that institution, nor do I believe that that opinion is known.

I have never turned my attention to it, excepting in relation to the education of my own children; and for the reasons which, I believe, I stated in conversation to you in the Park, I prefer for them the education usually given to English gentlemen, notwithstanding that they will both serve the King. I may be wrong in this point; but whether right or wrong, I don't think that my sentiments upon it can fairly be used as an argument for or against the Military College.

In my opinion, the best test of all institutions of this description is experience. Look over the list of those who have been educated in the Military College and see how they have turned out, compared with others, either as military officers or as public or as private characters. I don't know what would be the result of this investigation; and whatever it might be, I think I should, as a father, prefer for my sons the system of

* Blank in manuscript.

education existing in the country for gentlemen of their class; but this preference on my part, even supposing my judgment deserves more confidence than it does, can afford no ground for a decision on the question whether a public institution should be maintained or suppressed. I don't think it would afford ground for my own vote upon it if I were called upon to give it, much less for that of anybody else.

Under these circumstances, it is useless to take up your time and mine by a discussion on the merits of the Military College. Perhaps I have not turned my mind to the institution as much as it deserves; and, at all events, you may depend upon it that I have too much confidence in those who have established it, and in those who superintend and patronize it, to venture to give, or to authorise others to give, any opinion from me against it, without being better informed and thoroughly convinced, not only that it is not a benefit, but really an evil.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1193.] *To Sir Charles Stuart, and the Ministers of the Allied Powers.*

NOTE TO BE PLACED ON THE PROTOCOL REGARDING THE FRENCH REFUGEES AT BRUXELLES.

Paris, ce 1 Juin, 1817.

Le Duc de Wellington a fait connoître à la Conférence qu'à son dernier voyage à Bruxelles il avoit eu occasion de recevoir des renseignemens sur les mesures qui avoient été prises par le gouvernement des Pays-Bas en égard aux réfugiés Français dans ce pays-là, et les autres objets sur lesquels les Ministres avoient désirés attirer l'attention de leurs Cours respectifs par leur protocole du 11 Avril, dont le résultat lui a paru être ce qui suit.

1. "L'expulsion de tous les individus Français compris dans les deux listes du Roi de France du 24 Juillet, 1815, conformément aux protocoles," &c., &c.*

Il est dit qu'il ne reste dans les Pays-Bas que le Comte de Lobau et Monsieur Arnaud. Les Ministres connoissent les cir-

* Demandes par le Protocole 110 du 11 Avril, 1817, au Roi des Pays-Bas.

constances qui ont occasionnées la permanence du Comte de Lobau. Il paroît qu'on croit dans les Pays-Bas que le gouvernement Français s'est intéressé à ce que Monsieur Arnaud soit permis d'y rester. S'il ne s'y intéresse pas, il seroit à désirer qu'il s'explique.

Le Duc observe qu'en général il seroit à désirer que les dispositions des protocoles sur les personnes dont les noms se trouvent dans les listes de l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet soient mises en exécution avec exactitude.

2. "D'éloigner de ses provinces méridionales les sujets Français qui se présenteroient sans être munis de passeports de leur Souverain." *

Il est dit que personne n'est admis dans les Pays-Bas sans passeport. Si les passeports qu'on a donné aux sujets Français pour rester dans les Pays-Bas fussent retirés, et qu'on en donne connoissance au gouvernement des Pays-Bas, on les donnera l'ordre de se retirer des provinces méridionales du royaume.

3. "De retirer sa protection à ceux de ces individus auxquels le gouvernement retireraît les passeports qui leur ont été donnés provisoirement." *

La réponse se trouve dans celle sur l'Article 2.

4. "Ainsi qu'à ceux qui par l'abus de la presse, ou de toute autre manière, travaillent ouvertement à compromettre la paix publique et le bon voisinage avec la France." *

Le gouvernement des Pays-Bas, par un décret du 12 Mai, a ordonné à quatre des personnes dont il est ici question de se retirer du pays. Il faut espérer que cet exemple aura un bon effet.

5. "Que dans le cas où il serait reconnu qu'il est nécessaire de modifier les loix existantes pour obtenir un but sans lequel aucune société civile ni aucun gouvernement pourrait répondre de sa sûreté et de sa propre conduite, il doit être invité à interposer son autorité et son influence Royale pour obtenir la faculté qui lui est nécessaire afin d'obtenir une juste réciprocité envers les autres états de l'Europe." *

L'intention des Ministres a paru être de faire inviter le Roi des Pays-Bas d'interposer son influence Royale avec ses Etats, enfin d'obtenir une autorité compétente sur la conduite des étrangers qui se trouvent dans les Pays-Bas, et pour les en faire sortir si le cas paroîssoit l'exiger.

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* Demandes par le Protocole 110 du 11 Avril, 1817, au Roi des Pays-Bas.

Le décret du 12 Mai montre que S.M. s'est déjà servi de l'autorité dont il est question.

Le Duc dit qu'il croit que sous les circonstances actuelles il y auroit grande difficulté à changer en perpétuité la loi qui regarde les étrangers dans les Pays-Bas, si un tel changement devenoit nécessaire. Ce seroit un changement de la loi fondamentale de l'état, lequel exige une double représentation de la Seconde Chambre, et on verra bien qu'une telle mesure ne peut pas s'effectuer sous les circonstances sans beaucoup d'inconvénients.

La question sur le décret du 12 Mai sera sûrement discutée dans les Etats Généraux, et il restera à savoir sous quel point de vue elle sera décidée. Mais jugeant par le désir que les Etats ont toujours manifesté d'appuyer l'autorité du Roi, et l'intérêt qu'ils ont à la tranquillité générale, et qu'elle ne soit pas lésée par des étrangers qui se sont établis dans les Pays-Bas pour cet objet seul, le Duc dit qu'il ne peut pas douter qu'ils ne seroient disposés de donner au Roi des facultés temporaires pour régler la conduite des étrangers dans son pays, ou pour les en faire sortir s'ils se conduisent mal, par une loi qui n'exigeroit pas les formalités qu'exige un changement permanent de la loi fondamentale du royaume.

Il faut observer cependant qu'il faut que toute loi de cette espèce soit basée non-seulement sur les intérêts des Puissances étrangères, mais sur celui du pays où elle doit être mise en action.

"6. Que de semblables représentations devraient lui être faites pour ce qui concerne la licence de la presse, même dans le cas où cet abus serait pratiqué par ses propres sujets." *

Le Duc dit que le Roi des Pays-Bas lui a fait connoître il y a quelque temps son désir de limiter l'abus qui pourroit être fait de la presse pour offenser les Puissances étrangères, et nuire à la tranquillité actuelle de l'Europe, et son intention de proposer aux Etats Généraux lors de leur première assemblée ordinaire les mesures législatives qui après l'examen ordonné par S.M. seroient jugés les plus efficaces.

Le Duc prie les Ministres de considérer cette communication comme en toute confiance.

Il les prie d'observer aussi que les mesures dont il pourroit être ici question ne pourront être dirigées qu'à faciliter et rendre

* Demandes par le Protocole 110 du 11 Avril, 1817, au Roi des Pays-Bas.

effective la responsabilité des auteurs, imprimeurs, &c., des écrits. Il ne pourroit exister de censure sur la presse dans les Pays-Bas sans changement de la loi fondamentale, de la difficulté de laquelle le Duc a déjà entretenu la Conférence.

WELLINGTON.

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G. O. Cambrai, 1st June, 1817. [1194.]

1. In order to relieve the country as much as possible in this season from the burthen of the support of so many horses of the cavalry and artillery, and so many belonging to officers of the army, the Field Marshal desires that the following arrangements may be made to reduce the ration of oats, and to put some horses upon green forage:

2. The ration of forage for all the horses of the army, with the exception of those of the General officers and of Field officers of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and of the officers of the General Staff, and of the horses of the Waggon Train, is till further orders to be daily 10 litres, or about 8 pounds, English, of oats; 14 pounds, *Poid de Marc*, of hay; and 3 pounds, *Poid de Marc*, of straw.

3. The horses of the cavalry and artillery, musket ball cartridge carts, pontoon train, &c., to the number for which it may be possible to procure green forage, are to receive it in lieu of hay; and in this case the ration is to be 60 pounds, *Poid de Marc*, of green forage, 6½ litres of oats, and 3 pounds of straw *per diem* for each horse.

4. In case any of the officers, excepted in paragraph No. 2, should be desirous of having the ration ordered in that paragraph in lieu of that hitherto received, or should wish to receive green forage, they will make it known to the Commissary attached to them, who will make arrangements accordingly with the French Commissaries.

5. The horses of the cavalry, artillery, &c., are to be sent the same distances to fetch the green forage that they are obliged to go to the magazine for the dry.

WELLINGTON.

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[1195.] *To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, Paris, 2nd June, 1817.

I received your letters of the 26th and 27th before I quitted Mont St. Martin, but thought it best to delay to reply to them till I should arrive here. I arrived on Saturday evening, and saw the Duc de Richelieu as well as the Ministers of the Allies in Conference yesterday.

I have explained fully what has been done by the King, and what he proposes farther to do, and I think there exists a more favourable impression here respecting him and his measures than there did before. But still I think it would be desirable that something should be done in order to restore the diplomatic relations between the two countries to the state in which they were previous to the attack upon Monsieur de la Tour du Pin.

The Duc de Richelieu says that no notice has been taken of the *note verbale*, not even one of common politeness; that till I told him yesterday of the King's intention to endeavour to amend the law of libel in the Netherlands, he had no information of such an intention, nor did he know that orders had been given to prosecute the rédacteurs of the 'Libéral.' He knew of the decree of the 12th May; but he knew also that the newspapers had been as libellous since the date of that decree as they had been before. He had real ground for complaint, in the opinion of all the world, when he prevented Monsieur de la Tour du Pin from returning to his station, and had authorized Monsieur de Caux to present the *note verbale*; and he said he did not think any effectual steps had been taken to prevent a repetition of the evil up to the present moment, notwithstanding the evidence which appeared of the King's wishes and intentions. He then expatiated upon the inconvenience which would result from a repetition of the insults to Monsieur de la Tour du Pin, supposing that he were to return without further explanation, whether confidential or official. There is a good deal in all this; and I must say that, under existing circumstances, I think it most probable that he would be insulted again. The Duc de Richelieu was more than usually moderate throughout the discussion.

In respect to your observations upon the Protocol of the 11th April, I have to tell you that it is denied here that all the

individuals on the two lists of the 24th July, 1815, have been sent out of the Netherlands; and the Duc de Richelieu particularly states that he has no knowledge of any interference of the French government in favour of Arnaud.

Since I left you I have turned over in my mind what passed between us respecting aliens, and I am quite certain that this subject must be discussed in the States-General, and that neither Nagell's reasoning nor De Thienne's, even though supported by your notion that the 4th Article was intended to apply only to alien proprietors, will stand for a moment. The only reasonable ground to stand upon is the King's; but as discussion upon the subject is certain, if I were in the King's situation I would anticipate it, and make known the act and the grounds of it by message to the States. I think that if he were to proceed in this manly way, he might get a temporary law to enable him to send out aliens without being under the necessity of going through the forms for an alteration of the Constitution. There can be no doubt of the mischief which aliens are doing in the Netherlands in these times, nor of the necessity of having some means to curb them; and the States-General must be too reasonable to refuse a power to enable the King to do so.

I am quite certain also that something very strong-willed must be done to insure the responsibility of the editors, &c., of libels. The Ministers here are strongly impressed with this notion. They see the inefficacy of the law of 500 florins; and they wish for something which will be beyond the reach of the *caisse de sustentation*.

There is nothing new here. There have been some riots in the country on account of the scarcity of bread, which is certainly very distressing in all parts of the country in which I have been; but they have not been of much importance.

Ever yours, my dear Clancarty, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[1196.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 4th June, 1817.

Since my arrival at Paris I have seen Mr. Baring, and have read to him your Lordship's letter to me of the 15th May, and he expressed himself much flattered and gratified by your approbation of his conduct.

He then explained to me that, owing to particular circumstances, the finances of France were not at this moment in quite so flourishing a state as they were when he spoke to me on this subject; and therefore, that though he did not abandon the idea altogether, he rather wished to postpone making any communication upon it to the Duc de Richelieu till a later period.

For this reason I have said nothing upon it either to the Duc de Richelieu or to any of the Allied Ministers; and it appears to me desirable that the same reserve should be observed in England.

I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate this letter to Lord Castlereagh.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1197.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 5th June, 1817.

Lord Clancarty will have informed your Lordship of our proceedings at Bruxelles while I was there, and you will see in the Protocol of the Allied Ministers in their conference on Sunday last the communication which I made to them. In my opinion we ought not to do too much to relieve the King of the Netherlands. He is certainly not now sufficiently strong for the purposes of government in these difficult times, and we should endeavour to force him to strengthen himself for a time against his Jacobin guests rather than to assume an illegal authority, and to trust for indemnity to false or forced constructions of the *loi fondamentale*, or to the forgetfulness of the States.

We must likewise contrive to curb his licentious press, which

is not the least improved since the banishment of the four French editors under the decree of the 12th May. He cannot establish a censorship without an alteration of the *loi fondamentale*, but he can take a law to facilitate the process for securing the responsibility of printers, and to render that responsibility more effectual, and less within the means of the Caisse de Sustentation.

Upon my arrival here I found the question of the Italian Duchies ripe for discussion: indeed, they had all waited for my arrival to open the discussions. Pozzo was evidently instructed to support the pretensions of Spain as against those of Austria, but for French reasons he wished that something should be done to conciliate the parties and to bring about an early settlement. The French government would naturally support the pretensions of Spain, but the Duc de Richelieu wished for an early settlement, with the object of giving another blow to the house of Napoleon, and showing the Jacobin world here that young Napoleon was not upheld by the house of Austria, and that he was not considered as a sovereign prince, but merely as an individual. I believe Goltz had no positive instructions, and he would of course have followed the motions of Pozzo. Great Britain and Austria would then have been left together and alone.

This state of affairs offered a fair opportunity of interfering with counsels of moderation, and I pointed out to Fernan Nuñez how impossible it was for him to get more from Austria for the Bohemian fiefs than the sum fixed by Congress; and I recommended him to be satisfied with the arrears of the fiefs from the date of the Treaty of Congress, and with the amount of the net revenue of Lucques from the same period. I brought Vincent to consent to give up these sums, taking the stipulation *ad referendum* to his Court; and the Duc de Richelieu and Pozzo privately having supported my view of the question in their discussions with Fernan Nuñez, he has consented to the whole arrangement, including the Austrian garrison in Plaisance, upon the payment to the Infanta of the arrears above mentioned.

The Treaty has been agreed to by all the ministers in conference here this day, the minutes of which will be transmitted to you of course by Sir Charles Stuart; and the Treaty will be signed as soon as copies can be made out. The Treaty will

be preceded by the Spanish acts of accession to the Treaties of Congress and of Paris of November 15, and the acceptance of the same by the several plenipotentiaries, according to the plan proposed in my memorandum of last year.

I have written to Lord Liverpool respecting Baring's affair.

There is a good deal of distress in the country here, and there have been some riots in different parts, but they have not been of much importance; and the Duc de Feltre told me yesterday that he had in general been able to support the Royal authority.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 7th June, 1817.

I have received yours of the 2nd from Paris.

The King set out yesterday on a tour to Maestricht, Liége, Namur, Philippeville, and Marienburg, from whence he is not expected to return for eight or nine days. As during his absence nothing effectual can be done upon the subjects upon which you write, this gives me time again to address you prior to action.

I must own I am not sorry for this delay, as I will freely confess to you that particularly the first part of your letter has occasioned to me considerable disappointment, almost amounting to dismay.

To find that after all which this King has been led actually to do; to pledge himself to do when the time shall arrive; which seemed to you while here so satisfactory, as a commencement at least; which, as far as regards his acts, appears to you to outstep his powers under the fundamental laws which he is sworn to maintain, so as to render his mode of defence questionable before the States, and which, both in acts and pledges, in no respect falls short of what was communicated to me while at Paris as the total expectation of the Ministers and of M. le Duc de Richelieu himself of the measures with which the King should be induced to comply—to find all this, I say, so coldly received by M. de Richelieu and the Ministers of the Allies at Paris as barely to create in you a belief that there exists there a more favourable impression respecting the King and his measures than there did before, is not, it must be admitted, very encouraging either to this Court to engage in, or consequently to the hopes of success in those whose duty it is to press the most efficient measures.

I am fully aware that neither this kingdom nor the present state of things in Europe can be accounted safe till this King shall possess both the means and the determination to prevent his States from being made the seat of intrigues and a nest for traitors and libellers to hatch their treasons, and thence to spread them over the world. I am also fully sensible that it is

my peculiar duty to struggle to obtain these desirable objects; but I am sure the mode to be pursued is to keep these reasonable, nay, necessary objects, constantly in view, and not to be diverted from them, and materially to hazard the very means of their attainment, by pressing demands not reasonable in themselves, humiliating to the party to whom they are proposed to be made, and who (with a disposition already known to you) will, in effect, have a sufficiently hard task upon his hands with his own people in complying with those points which are, nevertheless, in my mind essential to his own existence and to that of the present order of things in France and in the rest of Europe.

Your letter naturally divides itself into two, and, in my opinion, quite distinct subjects:

1. The restoration of diplomatic relations; your conference thereon with M. de Richelieu; and

2. Your communications with him and the other Ministers on the Protocol of 11th April as applicable to this Court.

At the risk of being tedious, I will fairly and freely comment on the whole of your letter as treating on each of these points, in order that, having such opinions as I am capable of forming under your consideration, you may send me your ultimate decision thereon at a period sufficiently early to act upon it on the King's return.

You think it would be advisable that something should be done in order to restore the diplomatic relations between the two countries to the state in which they were previous to the attack upon M. de la Tour du Pin. I am quite of that opinion: but you will pardon me when I state that whatever is to be done on this subject ought to be done at Paris; that it is the French government who are now in the wrong, and ought to be set right; that the evil lies now with them; that here all has already been done which time could admit, or which upon the subject of this libel could have been expected; and that in seeking to press things unreasonable, merely for the purpose of gratifying the French government, we may greatly hazard success in urging matters of considerable importance to the whole alliance.

This is my opinion. If you are of a different one, pray state to me specifically what that something is which you would wish to have done here; and, setting my own opinions completely aside, I will endeavour, in defiance of every risk, and with as much zeal as if the object were one of my own, to obtain the realisation of your views.

Let us now examine, for the purpose of explanation, what the Due de Richelieu urges in his late conference with your Grace upon this matter.

"His Excellency says that no notice has been taken of the *note verbale*, not even one of common politeness."

This is true, but the answer to it is not less conclusive.

No notice has been taken of this piece:

(*a*) Because, on its delivery to M. de Nagell, the French Chargé d'Affaires expressly negatived it as bearing the character of an official piece. According to my view, therefore, it required no answer; and happy it seems to me to have been that it did not, because a more exceptionable paper was never, I might almost venture to say, delivered from one independent government to another. Nay, it savours much of the character of those which Bonaparte, in all the plenitude of his usurped authority, might have directed

Caulaincourt or some other of his myrmidons to deliver to any of those Courts whom the melancholy state of circumstances had laid at his feet. Although in my letter of the 2nd of May last I sent you a copy of this document, I now enclose another, that you may have it immediately before you, and beg particularly to refer you to the passage scored under, as a proof of the effect likely to be produced by such a paper.*

From it you will perceive that the French government have begun at the wrong end in this business. Instead of in the first instance complaining of the evil and demanding redress, they take the law into their own hands, pass judgment in no very moderate or justifiable terms, and proceed to execute a sentence which, according to the very law of nations, which they quote and affect to sustain, could no otherwise be supported than after a demand for and refusal of justice. It is, indeed, unfortunate that the Duc de Richelieu did not at the commencement follow the very sensible line which your Grace advised him to pursue, by writing to M. de Nagell in the first instance upon this subject. Had this been done, much inconvenience, arising from the error of the French Cabinet, would have been spared.

(*b*) Although the *note verbale* required in my mind no answer, yet, conceiving it not improbable that this government would reply to it; that under the then state of things it could not have been noticed with even that common politeness of which the Duc de Richelieu speaks, or probably at all, without drawing on discussions upon the manner in which it was framed, out of which much evil and no good could have resulted, and which might have defeated those efforts which, with the Duc de Richelieu's cognizance and at his desire, I was engaged in making upon this subject, it was (as I wrote you word on the 2nd of May last) strongly recommended by me that no answer, at that time at least, should be made to it; if, therefore, wrong there has been in this instance, I am the offending party.

(*c*) Subsequently, in my conversations with M. de Nagell, I have understood from him that it was still the intention to notice this communication of M. de Caux, but that it was conceived more conciliatory by the French government, who had never even demanded justice upon this subject, to wait till the termination of the prosecution of the libellers on La Tour du Pin, and then to instruct their Minister at Paris to communicate the result of this proceeding to the French government.

If, however, it is rather desired that such notice should be taken now, instead of then, and that this shall be signified to me, I will endeavour to have an instruction now sent to M. de Fagel to the following effect: to notify to the French government that this Court had received with regret a communication from the French Chargé d'Affaires residing here, of the intention of his government to withhold the return of their Envoy in consequence of a libel appearing in the Belgic journals personally attacking his character; that had this communication been made in the shape of a complaint and demand of justice, according to the usual course of diplomatic proceedings, a sense of justice and the readiness with which this King is always disposed to maintain, protect, and strengthen his amicable relations

* See page 678.

with neighbouring States, and especially with France, would so have operated upon His Majesty as probably to have prevented the Court of the Tuileries from conceiving it necessary at once to have resort to such an extreme measure. Nevertheless the King had not failed, to the extent of his power, to vindicate the cause of those diplomatic relations properly established between independent States, and thus violated in the person of the French Envoy, by issuing orders for the rigorous prosecution of his libellers; that this prosecution was now pending, and that it had been the intention of His Majesty, when the same should be closed, to have communicated the results to the French government; but having heard circuitously that it was rather wished by the Cabinet of the Tuileries that some notice should now be taken of the communication made to his Minister for Foreign Affairs by the French Chargé d'Affaires, the King had not hesitated to give instruction to his Envoy at Paris in this sense, that the communication of the French Chargé d'Affaires requires the certitude and the guarantee that the French Envoy shall experience no similar insult. But the Cabinet of the Tuileries are too wise not to know that beyond the existing laws of a State it would be impossible to afford such security. These His Majesty has been, as he ever will be, ready to put in rigorous execution against those in his kingdom who shall dare to violate the sanctity of the diplomatic character; that had the government of France complained of the libel and sought redress against the libellers in the present instance, they would have found the King most anxious to afford it to the utmost extent in his power. Without such complaint, for his own sake, in justice to his own character, which he holds equally insulted by insults offered to those so immediately under his protection, he had issued orders for the rigorous prosecution of those libellers.

That subsequently, and upon further grounds, His Majesty has thought proper to issue orders for the banishment from his territories of certain libellous journalists, subjects of His Most Christian Majesty, which act he now thinks proper to have thus notified to the French government. The King having nothing more at heart than the most intimate relations with the Court of France, has directed General Fagel to communicate the despatch containing this instruction to the Cabinet of the Tuileries.

If a matter of this sort will be sufficient for the French government, to this extent I think it might be reasonably pressed.

I doubt, however, this being deemed sufficient. The French Minister seeks security and assurance, knowing well that neither of these can be efficiently given; but he means by them that an apology shall be made for the erroneous line which he himself has pursued in this business. This we ought not to seek: neither if we should, shall we attain it. But of this more presently.

The Duc de Richelieu next says (I know not whether by way of complaint or not) that till you told him the day before the date of your letter "of the King's intention to endeavour to amend the law of libel in the Netherlands, he had no information of such intention." It is true he had not any absolute communication to this effect, neither was any due to him. But having himself interrupted the diplomatic relations between the two countries, it would be a little too much if he were now to complain of the natural consequences of such an act; and the Duc de Richelieu himself will probably admit that a communication

of such importance, so necessary to be kept secret with a view to the success of the measure, could not be expected to be made to his Chargé d'Affaires resident here. The intention, as you will see by the King's note, is made known to you expressly for confidential communication to the French government; and it being, for obvious reasons, desirable that as few as possible of the people of this kingdom should be acquainted with it before the project shall be ripe and placed before the States-General, without any want of confidence in General Fagel, it was conceived that your becoming the medium on this occasion would be quite sufficient.

Le Duc then says that he did not know that orders had been given to prosecute the *rédacteurs* of the 'Libéral.' I nevertheless wrote this fact immediately upon my return from England in March last. It has, since the receipt of your letter acquainting me that M. de Caux (who, by-the-bye, must have been asleep on his post if he did not know it before) pleaded ignorance of the fact, been verbally stated to him. Such further explanation as is requisite on this head has already above been given. But in strictness M. de Richelieu was entitled to no such communication, for he has never to this moment required such prosecution; but, taking the law into his own hands, has executed what he conceives justice, not against, but in the sense of the libellers, and upon the Court which conceives itself to have been equally with his own injured by the libel.

His Excellency proceeds to state "that he knew of the decree of the 12th May, but he knew also that the newspapers had been as libellous since the date of that decree as they had been before."

I certainly never did expect that the late order of banishment, or any other exertion in the sense of an Alien Act, could totally, or even to any great extent partially, purify the Belgic press; but with regard to this allegation of M. de Richelieu, I must take the liberty of stating it to be incorrect. Two of the *ci-devant* most libellous papers, the 'Vrai Libéral' and the 'Journal de la Flandre,' I daily take in and daily read, with no other view than that of seeking for libellous matter; and most certainly I have not been able to find a single libellous paragraph in which France is concerned subsequently to the banishment of the three Frenchmen concerned in them. If M. de Caux writes otherwise to the Duke, it should be recollected that he has a strong interest in preventing the return of an Envoy here from his Court, because then his consequence ceases by the supersession; and though I believe this gentleman to be a very worthy person, yet, where temptation is very strong, he may colour highly without even the consciousness of doing so. That libels have appeared since in the 'Vrai Libéral' I do not deny. There was a very strong one the other day against the Pope and Popery, and I rejoice at its appearance, inasmuch as it tends to give this King the powerful aid of the clergy and of the religious laity of these provinces against the licence of the press. There have also been some very scurrilous paragraphs against Great Britain, but with these M. de Richelieu and the Court of France individually have nothing to do. The Duc de Richelieu then states that "he had real ground for complaint in the opinion of all the world when he prevented M. de la Tour du Pin from returning to his station," &c.

No doubt he had; and much inconvenience would have been avoided if he had complained and sought justice in the regular course. Had this been

refused, he would also have done right in acting in the way he has; but by the line he has taken he has not only lost all right of complaint, but transferred legitimate ground of complaint to this Court, which I can assure you, though most properly not acted upon, has been sufficiently felt.

He then says "he does not think any effectual steps had been taken to prevent a repetition of the evil up to the present moment, notwithstanding the evidences which appeared of the King's wishes and intentions." That nothing effectual has or can be done to insure the non-publication of libels in this country or to protect a foreign Minister from murder, beyond the existing laws, strengthened by the evidence which it is admitted appears of the King's wishes and intentions of executing them—nay, of rendering them more strong, cannot be denied. What further security could M. de Richelieu wish? Why, he tells us, and curious it is, that it would not render the security already in his hands one jot more secure. His panacea is that some further explanation, whether confidential or official, should be made. The former he already has, to every fair and reasonable intent; the latter he cannot have till the official relations which he has unnecessarily interrupted shall have been restored, and then whatever he requires officially will, of course, be answered officially. But M. de Richelieu well knows that this further explanation which he seeks would not afford the most trifling additional security to his Envoy beyond what has been already afforded, and what it is in contemplation to obtain laws further to afford. What, then, is the meaning of this further explanation? Why, merely that M. de Richelieu, like every other Frenchman, having obtained an inch, wishes to take an ell; and having made a false step at the outset of this business, wishes now to have it carried over by placing this Court as a suppliant at his feet, acknowledging offences which they have not committed, and praying the return of the French Envoy to his post, who ought never to have been removed, except under a refusal of justice, which the French government have never yet condescended to demand. If this be the object, whatever little influence I may possess here, although if you desire it it shall be zealously exerted to this effect, will be found inadequate to its accomplishment; while I am very sure the bare attempt will render that influence so nugatory as to deprive me of the means of serving on more essential and more important occasions of general interest.

I think the limit of my exertions on the first point, concerning the restoration of diplomatic intercourse with France, if you should think they should ever be carried so far, should be circumscribed by that of obtaining the instruction concerning M. de Caux's communication, in terms similar to those set forth in the earlier part of this letter.

Upon the second division of yours to me, viz., that relating to the Protocol of 11th April, you state, "That it is denied here that all the individuals in the two lists of 27th July, 1815, have been sent out of the Netherlands; and the Duc de Richelieu particularly states that he has no knowledge of any interference of the French government in favour of Arnaud."

In my letter of the 2nd of May you will have seen that besides Arnaud and Lobau (with whose residence here you acquainted me subsequently to my writing the remarks on the Protocol), Merlin, another of the persons named in the lists, is also in this kingdom, residing out of harm's way, at Haarlem. If there are any others known to the French government, or to

the Ministers, of this description, residing in this kingdom, I should wish to be informed of their names.

As the Duc de Richelieu is unacquainted with any acquiescence of the French government in Arnaud's stay here, I suppose I must have been misinformed.

Is it now his wish that he should be sent away? Is it the wish that Lobau should also be sent off? Is it the wish that Merlin should likewise be expelled? Are there any other persons, and who, within these lists, residing in the Netherlands, and is it desired that they, and which of them, should also be expelled? I can have no doubt that upon the private signification, through me, of the wish of the Court of France, or of the Allied Ministers, in the affirmative upon the subject of any or all of these persons, it will be immediately complied with; and I shall, with the most entire inclination and utmost zeal, immediately press so reasonable a desire.

The other point mentioned in your letter, as connected with the Protocol, is the opinion of the Ministers that the power of fining for libel beyond the 500 florins should be enlarged, and to an extent which will go beyond the reach of the *caisse de sustentation*.

I am so much of this opinion, that one of the principles I have been endeavouring to infuse has been the propriety of following our example in England, of rendering fines, and indeed the term of imprisonment, in the case of libel, discretional in the breast of the judges; to proportion them to the magnitude of the offence and the fortune of the offender: besides the advantage of this in other particulars, the very uncertainty of the nature and extent of the punishment, of the quantum of fine, and quantum of imprisonment, has its operation. The first is not, however, without much difficulty here. The tribunals are not looked up to here as they are with us; the judges neither so respectable nor commanding universal respect from public opinion. It is feared that the placing so large a discretion in such hands might be subject to abuse. With us, in addition to the high character of the individuals, the country have the additional assurance of the responsibility, though scarcely ever called into action, of all public functionaries; while here no such guarantee exists, or is likely to be acknowledged by the government; or if even made to exist, would it be considered or understood by the public. I shall, however, endeavour to press the principle, which may, perhaps, be modified by the adoption of a minimum and maximum, within which the discretion may be made to range.

Any other hints you can give of practicable measures for strengthening the King's hands upon the subject of the press will be most acceptable. The question in itself is, perhaps, the most difficult of all others to deal with.

You will pardon me when I state that however near our opinions may in effect approach relative to the late act of this King in sending away the French journalists, I cannot agree with your Grace in the mode of managing this subject.

The ministers who advised this act of power are fully convinced that such a power exists under the Constitution. They are not at all inclined to admit they have been wrong in law, and state themselves as fully prepared, if attacked, to defend the power, as already vested in the King, of sending away obnoxious aliens.

In the name of God, then, let them do it; and happily the act itself is so very popular through all the northern provinces, and hitherto so little questioned even here, that I have little doubt of their success, if at all attacked, in establishing the principle as already existing. The King himself, as he told me three days since, is of the same opinion.

If, then, the power exists, we have already the benefit of it; and from time to time, when necessary, can call for its exercise. But your proposal would give up the principle at once, and throw us entirely on the mercy of the States-General; nay, on the States-General with a double representation. To this proposal there are also other objections.

The sending such a message as you suggest presupposes responsibility, and responsibility is a subject upon which this King is absolutely deaf.

But your suggestion (as, in order to be at all advantageous, must be expected) goes further, and seeks the proposal of a temporary law to enable His Majesty to send out aliens. Now, such temporary law would equally be a change, though temporary, in the *loi fondamentale*, with one perpetual, and consequently would equally require a double representation, or a majority of two-thirds of the increased representation, otherwise the whole of this provision for changes might for ever be obviated by temporary laws. This is the opinion here: it seems to me a sound one. The evil arises from having written constitutions instead of, as with us, a constitution handed down on unwritten principles, and by statute, any part of which an Act of Parliament can at any time modify, suspend, or repeal.

Farewell, my dear Duke. Pardon me for giving you such a pamphlet to read; and let me hear from you quickly.

Yours ever most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

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*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [1198.]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 10th June, 1817.

Upon reading over Sir Charles Stuart's despatches I see that he has misunderstood the intentions of the ministers in conference at Paris upon the affairs of the Netherlands. They have determined to refer to their colleagues at Bruxelles that part of their Protocol of 11th April which relates to persons still residing there whose names are in the lists of 24th July, 1815, and to request them to urge the King to send them all from the Netherlands, with the exception of Comte Lobau, and to leave the matters of the aliens and the press to me. I will settle them as I can with Clancarty.

I shall be in London the end of the week, when I will explain to you how the Portuguese question stands.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1199.] *To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, Cambrai, 10th June, 1817.

I received last night your letter of the 7th June, on my return from Paris.

I don't think you and I differ in opinion much as to our objects, and probably not a great deal as to our means of attaining them, when we come to explain them.

I think a note such as you propose will answer the purpose of restoring the diplomatic relations between France and the Netherlands. The note would be improved if at the close it contained a declaration of the King's intentions to improve the law of libel in his country, as stated to me; or even if Fagel were to be authorised to state it verbally.

After I had written to you on the 2nd, we had another Conference at Paris regarding affairs in the Netherlands, at which the Duc de Richelieu was present; the result of which after a good deal of storm was that the Ministers of the Four Allied Courts should communicate to their colleagues at Bruxelles that part of the Protocol of the 11th April which relates to the persons whose names are included in the lists attached to the Ordonnance of July, 1815, and should request them to urge the King to send all those persons out of his dominions, with the exception of the Comte de Lobau only.

It appears that the Ministers of the Four Courts at Paris, with the exception, I believe, of Stuart, are authorised to consult together respecting the measures to be adopted in consequence of the Protocol of the 11th April, and to send directions in concert to their colleagues at Bruxelles and elsewhere, as may be necessary. They are about to carry into execution all the measures decreed by the Allied Sovereigns and their Ministers in Conference at Paris, in 1815, against

the persons whose names are included in the lists attached to the Ordonnance of the 24th July, 1815; and they were inclined to go still farther, and to instruct their colleagues at Bruxelles to urge the King respecting an Alien Act and the press. I prevailed upon them, however, to leave these two points in my hands; and you will see the view which I have taken of them in what I stated to the Conference on the first day we met.

In regard to aliens, I confess that I don't think any foreign Power has much right to interfere in the internal policy of any state upon this subject. Our law in England is founded upon principles of internal policy and security; and in all the discussions upon it, it has always been denied that it was ever put in execution upon the requisition of a foreign Power. Neither do I think that the possession of the greatest power over the persons of aliens in the Netherlands would do the French government or the Allies much good. Still, however, it is right that the King should have the power that every other sovereign in the world has, to send strangers out of his dominions. I am certain that neither the Ministers nor the King have any ground to stand upon to justify their decree of the 12th May. It does very well to applaud their firmness; and if their decree is not questioned, or, being questioned, the States-General should be satisfied with their bad arguments to justify it, I shall be perfectly satisfied, and will agree with all my heart that, in spite of the *loi fondamentale*, the King has the power to send strangers out of his country. But, as it is not improbable that the States will not be satisfied with arguments of which we saw the fallacy at the first glance, is it not well to be prepared with some ideas on measures to be recommended to the King, in case his decree of the 12th May should be disapproved of as unconstitutional? You will observe that he will then be weaker in relation to Jacobin strangers than he has ever been. He will have struck a blow which will have been pronounced illegal, and it will be known to the whole world that he possesses no power whatever over strangers resorting to his country.

The King and his Ministers are certainly the persons who ought to understand best the *loi fondamentale* in all its relations and bearings; but it certainly appears extraordinary that the ordinary States should not have the power of altering

or suspending for a limited period the operation of any Article, and that the King should be able either to obey the law or not, as it may suit his own pleasure or convenience. However, I am not at all disposed to press the King upon aliens until it will be known how his States view his decree of the 12th May, and I think I can keep the Conference at Paris quiet upon this point. If the States don't approve of the decree, I believe all will agree that it is necessary to do something; and I think the King's Ministers will then be of opinion that the ordinary States can suspend for a limited period of time the operation of any Article of the *loi fondamentale*.

In respect to the press, the notions at Paris are rather extravagant, and at first nothing would satisfy the Conference but a previous censure on all paragraphs reflecting upon foreign States or their Ministers accredited to the King of the Netherlands. This I have stated to be quite unattainable; and the Ministers and the Duc de Richelieu appeared to be convinced that even the Dutch Deputies would object to such a measure. The next thing is to get as good a law as we can to render effectual the responsibility of authors, &c., and to facilitate the attainment of it. The first thing of all, in my opinion, is to define exactly what a libel is, and what calumny is. If you will read the Code Civil upon these crimes, you will see that a man may do a great deal in the way of both before the law can touch him at all; and the reason is that this Code Civil, although bearing the name of Napoleon, was compiled by the philosophers of the Revolution, who made use of libel and calumny as instruments to attain power, with a determination to silence both, as well as all fair discussion, by the police as soon as power should be attained. Nothing, therefore, can be more loose than the legal definitions of libel and calumny, nor more weak than the law to punish these crimes. Having once defined what they are according to our notions of both, it appears that it would not be difficult to reach them by punishments sufficiently severe to deter persons from committing them as readily as they do now.

For the reason you state, viz., the want of respectability in, and the want of respect for, the Judges, I doubt your being able to leave the discretion in their hands which is left in the hands of the Judges in England.

I am going to London on Thursday, for a few days; and I expect to return here between the 25th and 30th. You shall hear from me from thence, if I should have anything to trouble you with.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I have not heard from the Prince of Orange. I am very happy to learn, however, that he has opened himself to his father.

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*To Baron Nagell.* [1200.]

MONSIEUR LE BARON, Cambrai, ce 11 Juin, 1817.

Some time has elapsed since I had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 25th November, in which you enclosed certain demands from the town of Bruxelles, amounting to 11,750 francs 11 centimes; and the inquiries which I have been under the necessity of making into these demands have taken so much time that I am only at this moment enabled to give you an answer.

The result of these inquiries is very unfavourable to all these demands.

I would beg to remind your Excellency that I have already had paid to the town of Bruxelles two demands, one amounting to 84,898 francs, on account of damage to bedding and other articles of hospitals there, and another, amounting to 8298 francs, on account of hospitals at St. Elizabeth, notwithstanding that the result of my inquiries into the justice of these demands was very unfavourable to them. I ordered the payment of these demands because it was my opinion that the British medical officers, who ought to have been able to test them if they had done their duty, could produce no satisfactory evidence against them.

But this is not the case with the demands now under my consideration. Of many of them there is no voucher whatever; and upon the claims for the damages done to the church of the Minimes, that of the Rogaerds, and that of the Augustins, amounting in the whole to 3150 francs, I have to inform you that on the 20th of March, 1816, Monsieur Gautier, Inspecteur

des Casernes, wrote Mr. Deputy-Commissary-General Hagenau as follows:—

"Je partage entièrement votre opinion, Monsieur, en ce qui concerne les Rogaerds et les Minimes. Déjà j'avois eu l'honneur d'en écrire dans le même sens à Monsieur le Maire et à Monsieur le Commandant-Général Anglais, par ma lettre du 21 Février dernier, pièce à laquelle il vous sera sans doute facile de recourir.

"Mais je ne suis pas tout-à-fait de votre avis relativement aux Augustins; et je pense, Monsieur, que d'après l'inspection que j'ai fait des lieux avant et après l'occupation, qu'on pourroit en toute partie évaluer à 700 ou 800 francs la quote part des frais à payer par votre administration pour le dit objet; et j'entretiendrai particulièrement la ville de la différence de cette dernière somme à celle du devis que présentent tous les dégâts existant dans cette église."

Thus it appears that six months before your Excellency wrote to me, Monsieur Gautier, the officer of the town, had admitted that for the Minimes and the Rogaerds nothing is really due, although 1800 francs are demanded; and upon the demand for the church of the Augustins, upon which a demand is made amounting to 1350 francs, and upon which Mr. Hagenau thought 500 might be due, Monsieur Gautier, the officer of the town, was of opinion that 700 or 800 would cover the expense of all the damage.

After this statement, and after I have already paid the town of Bruxelles 93,146 francs upon very doubtful vouchers, and that, in point of fact, it is impossible for me to admit the claim of the town to the greater part of this last demand of 11,750 francs, I would beg leave to suggest to your Excellency that the whole demand should be withdrawn, and that the 93,146 francs already paid should be considered as full payment of all the demands of the town of Bruxelles upon the British army.

I have the honour to enclose the bills which you sent to me in your letter of the 25th Nov., 1816.

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 12th June, 1817.

Your Grace's of the 10th, from Cambrai, reached me late last night, and I heartily rejoice at finding that we are so near to each other in opinion, both as to our objects and to the mode of obtaining them, as appears from your letter.

The King will return to-morrow evening from his tour, and I shall lose no time after his arrival to press for an instruction to Fagel in the nature of that set forth in mine of the 7th. I should hope that this will (according to your opinion) answer the purpose of restoring the diplomatic relations between France and the Netherlands. I am sure it ought. To go further at present, or indeed at all, could not, in my mind, be done without risk, as operating to wound, and, as I think, unnecessarily, the pride of this Court. After you have been made the medium of a confidential communication of this King's decided intention to propose the amendment of the laws relating to the press at the next ordinary meeting of his States, to the Duc de Richelieu individually, and also to the Duc de Richelieu in conjunction with the other ministers at Paris, and this immediately under this King's authority, I know not what legitimate expectation could be gratified, or indeed what further object could be obtained, by having a communication precisely to the same effect made by Fagel, but that of what I conceive to be an unreasonable gratification of French vanity placed in jeopardy by French misconduct.

I heartily congratulate, not only your Grace, but all of us, on your success in obtaining at the Conference that the two points relating to the Alien Act and Press should be left in your hands. It is of the greatest consequence, now that we have the King in good train, I trust, upon all subjects, that he should not be spurred forward towards absolutely unattainable censorships of the press, &c., according to the foolish violence of the Parisian Excellencies, and thus our task here become more difficult by inducing restiveness rather than progress towards our attainable objects.

I should rather the resolution of the ministers of the four Allied Courts, relative to the official communication of that part of the Protocol of 11th April which relates to the residence here of persons named in the lists of July, 1815, should be postponed for some days till I should have seen the King after his return; because I have no doubt that without any joint remonstrance whatever, the King will do all that is right on this subject, by sending them all away except Lobau, and thus afford another instance of his opinion and that of his ministers of his powers under the existing Constitution.

Since I wrote on the 7th, two others, as I hear, of the persons noticed in the Ordonnance of July, 1815, are supposed to have entered into these territories: the one, a most exceptionable person, Mehée de la Touche, has, as I understand, actually presented himself at Bruxelles on the 9th instant; and, according to my information, the object of his coming here is that of replacing Le Maire and Guyot in the *rédaction* of the 'Vrai Libéral.' From certain publications in this journal during the last two days, it appears that some new Jacobinical impulse has been given to this paper. I shall not fail, without waiting for the official notification from Paris, to

urge the expulsion of all, except Lobau, though I must own with some regret at disturbing Merlin, who could not, in my opinion, be less harmlessly circumstanced anywhere than he is at Haarlem.

It will be somewhat difficult accurately to define libel and calumny, and I beg you will press them in England to afford us the best lights they can upon this subject. Your description of the Code Napoléon in this respect, is most correct; but out of it grows not only one of the reasonings here in defence of the King's late act, but the ground they will take in the event (which by the by they do not in the slightest degree apprehend) of their being beat upon the question. The subjects of aliens and of the press, say they, appear as they do in the Constitution; but both were subject to the new code then in contemplation, and actually in progress, or, till this should be adopted, to the Code Napoléon, with its consequences. What were those consequences? Why, the execution of the *haute police*, modified certainly in its execution by the known liberality of the King, but still in his immediate power to execute when sufficient occasion should arise. If then this power is to be taken away, they are fully sensible, and on this ground will reason, to the establishment of some other sufficiently adequate to the purpose.

Adieu. I refer you to Lord Castlereagh for all further matters.

Yours, &c.,

CLANCARTY.

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*The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 16th June, 1817.

I enclose a copy of my private letter to Lord Castlereagh of this day's date, which will show you how we are going on here respecting the slave trade. I think the last proposal is fair enough: at least, I do not think we shall get any better terms, and our government ought to close with them, if they are still anxious for the abolition. If you are of my opinion, I dare say a letter from you to Lord Castlereagh would be of use.

Tatistcheff has changed his note about the Italian Duchies, as you will see by the enclosed.

Lady G. is going on as well as possible. She desires her kindest love to you.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Madrid, 15th June, 1817.

Notwithstanding the interest expressed here for the fate of the King of Portugal's dominions in Brazil, I suspect that this government, and indeed the bulk of the nation, would lament any circumstance which should compel His Most Faithful Majesty to return to Europe. The incorporation of Portugal with

Spain is, as your Lordship knows, a favourite object of this nation; and in order to secure it, I believe there are few Spaniards who would not willingly relinquish the whole continent of America. Any project for the invasion of Portugal would be supported throughout the nation. I believe that any such attempt in the present state of the Spanish army would be attended with defeat and disgrace; but our best security against such an attempt is the inability of the government to carry it into effect without foreign assistance.

M. Pizarro has just sent me an official note, offering to abolish the slave trade in 1820 for the sum of 400,000*l*. He has not stated the details of this new proposal: therefore his note requires explanation before I can send it to your Lordship. I must observe, likewise, that although I think these are the best terms we are likely to obtain, yet I have not given M. Pizarro the least reason to expect that the British government will consent to any alterations of the terms which they have already signified their readiness to accept. The terms of the new proposal, as stated to me in conversation by M. Pizarro, should be as follows:

That the trade should be abolished north of the Line immediately, a term of eight months from the signature of the convention being allowed for completing voyages, &c.

That the total abolition should take place in May, 1820.

That England should pay 200,000*l*. upon the signature of the convention, and 200,000*l*. more in six months, or a year say, upon the abolition having actually taken place north of the Line.

It does not appear that the late events in America have rendered this government more desirous of bringing their negotiations with Great Britain to a conclusion.

I believe that the only person in the government who thinks it of any importance to be on good terms with Great Britain, or who thinks at all upon the subject, is M. Pizarro himself. Upon this question of the slave trade he has great difficulties to encounter. All the Havannah interest is against him, besides the opposition of his colleagues; and one conversation which I had with M. Garay upon the subject satisfied me that no concession was to be expected from him excepting on the most exorbitant terms. I have as little hope that this government will ever consent to the modification of their original offer, as stated in your Lordship's despatches of January last.

They may possibly agree to the final abolition in 1819 upon the 400,000*l*. being paid down; but this I look upon as extremely doubtful. We must keep in view the possibility of changes here; and if anything were to happen to remove Pizarro from his present situation, we should have all the work to do over again.

There has lately been a revival of a report of a negotiation being on foot for the cession of Minorca to Russia. I mentioned it to M. Pizarro, who said that the same report had reached him, and that he had mentioned it to the King, who had positively denied it.

M. Tatistcheff has of late taken up a different tone with respect to the Italian Duchies. He observed to me that Spain owed entirely to the good offices of England the disposition which the Emperor of Austria had manifested to allow the reversion of those Duchies to go to the Queen of Etruria. He continues to see the King, and receives and despatches couriers occasionally, but nothing transpires as to the nature of his communications.

The King's accession to the Sainte Alliance has lately been formally notified to the Austrian Chargé des Affaires.

I have, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

*Chevalier de Pizarro to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

EXMO. SEÑOR, Palacio, ce 26 Juin, 1817.

J'ai été peiné de n'avoir pu répondre à votre lettre du 15 Mai, et à présent j'y pais encore ma dette pour celle du 8 Juin.

Puisque V.E. aime la franchise, elle ne sera pas fâchée que je lui avoue que je n'ai rien compris à l'espèce de plainte qu'annonce votre lettre sur le recours que l'Espagne a eu aux Puissances.

V.E. veut bien me conseiller de m'adresser directement à l'Angleterre quand nous en voudrons pour nos négociations. J'ose vous prier, My Lord, de me dire en quoi est ce que l'Espagne ne s'est pas directement adressée à l'Angleterre, que cela n'aie pas été par insinuation de l'Angleterre elle-même. Rappelez vous, My Lord, que nous avons toujours voulu traiter directement l'affaire des nègres, et que c'est l'Angleterre qui y a voulu faire intervenir les autres Puissances; et pour ce qui regarde l'affaire du Rio de la Plata, c'était bien le système de l'Angleterre de le porter devant la réunion des Ministres; et cela n'a été qu'après une réponse gelée et peu attendue que nous y avons recouru; et ce n'est que l'Angleterre qu'y a apporté des délais, de la circonspection. J'avoue que l'Angleterre n'est pas dans le cas de se laisser forcer la main dans toutes les affaires, mais précisément dans celles qui d'un commun accord sont portées devant d'autres Puissances elle se trouve liée tout comme une autre par des liens volontaires, et puisés dans les principes de la justice et du droit public: et d'ailleurs, je ne vois pas à quoi peut avoir trait cette expression. J'avoue que je n'y comprends rien du tout. Mais je sais qu'en tout cela je ne vois de notre côté qu'une marche claire et très naturelle, et que du côté d'Angleterre il y a un je ne sais quoi qu'elle même ne sait pas trop ou ne veut pas expliquer.

De notre côté nous n'avons eu recours aux Puissances que pour les affaires de Parme, et pour celles du Rio de la Plata. Si à présent l'affaire des nègres est traitée en commun, ce n'est pas nous qui le désirons assurément. Veuillez donc m'expliquer en quoi est ce que nous avons mérité cette plainte.

Pour l'affaire du Janeiro il est curieux que l'Angleterre, qui s'est montrée si circonspecte, ait été la première à essuyer l'insolence embrouillée du Ministère Portugais. Votre chargé d'affaires a vu de ses propres yeux quels sont les réponses et les intentions des Portugais; il en a été scandalisé; et il a vu qu'il n'y a aucun espoir de ramener ce Cabinet aux voies de la justice. La malheureuse affaire de Pernambuco ne les corrige pas: plaise à Dieu qu'elle donne une conviction salutaire aux Puissances: en attendant, les insurgés faibles et fatigués demandent à l'Empereur d'Autriche d'être Protecteur de l'Amérique en titre! Pauvre humanité, que tu est vaine dans tes plus sublimes conceptions!

Enfin, je dois dire à V.E. combien il m'est pénible de voir l'Angleterre assurer que tant que l'affaire des nègres ne sera pas terminée l'Espagne n'a rien à espérer d'elle. Jamais je n'aurais cru ni pu m'attendre à une telle alternative; mais puisque la chose est elle il sera en vain d'y plus songer, et nous nous verrons dans la nécessité d'adopter les moyens qui seront à notre portée. J'en suis peiné vraiment; car il y a de quoi faire de très belles choses entre les deux Puissances, et que l'Angleterre pourra

bien se repentir de ne pas nous donner la main; il pourrait bien se faire qu'elle essuya encore plus des pertes que nous dans cette politique retenue. Cependant dirigé par le meilleur esprit, je viens de faire deux tentatives: l'une de faire une proposition nouvelle sur les nègres, très modérée comme toutes les autres; et l'autre de faire une longue communication sur nos limites avec les Américains. Si cela ne réussit point, je serais obligé de ne plus fatiguer l'Angleterre inutilement; mais il faut me rendre la justice que cela n'a été que forcé par l'Angleterre elle-même, et après avoir épuisé de ma part tous les moyens de réussir avec elle.

Je n'ai pas su si ma réponse aux Puissances vous a plu: il m'a paru qu'elle était dirigée d'après les sentimens mêmes des Puissances, et avec délicatesse. Personne ne m'en a rien dit, et j'ambitionnais votre approbation.

Pour ce qui regarde l'affaire des Duchés, comme le résultat n'est que le même annoncé dans les articles du Congrès, il me semble que nous n'en devons pas être très flattés. Je sais que cette affaire a été misérablement traitée; mais enfin on nous avait fait concevoir des espérances d'avoir un million pour l'Infante. Le Roi n'en est pas content.

J'aurai soin pour les officiers que V.E. veut bien recommander; et je suis avec le plus parfait dévouement votre très humble et obéissant serviteur,

CHEVALIER DE PIZARRO.

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*The King of the Netherlands to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON COUSIN, Lacken, 27 Juin, 1817.

Pendant le voyage que je viens de faire dans quelques unes des provinces du royaume j'ai eu occasion d'apprendre, et depuis cette nouvelle m'a été confirmée, que des travaux de fortification s'effectuaient dans plusieurs des places fortes Françaises, limitrophes des Pays-Bas. Vous en serez probablement informé, et à même de juger de leur importance, des desseins auxquels ils pourraient se rattacher, et jusqu'à quel point on devrait, dans l'intérêt de la tranquillité de l'avenir, avoir à s'en alarmer. J'avoue qu'en les combinant avec d'autres circonstances ils me paraissent devoir faire naître le soupçon d'arrières-pensées, auxquelles l'époque de l'évacuation de l'Armée d'Occupation pourrait peut être donner un entier développement; c'est là le motif pour lequel j'ai cru, mon Cousin, pouvoir vous entretenir de cet objet, vous priant de me donner quelques informations, tant sur le fait même de ces travaux, que sur le but dans lequel ils pourraient être entrepris. Le Général Fagel, qui vous remettra cette lettre, vous communiquera d'ailleurs plus particulièrement les considérations qui l'ont dictée.

Je suis, avec une haute considération, mon Cousin,

Votre affectionné

GUILLAUME.

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*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 27th June, 1817.

I cannot let R. Fagel go without troubling you with whatever occurs to say from hence. You probably saw my last to Lord Castlereagh, written the 20th. I therefore now send you my private letter of this date to the same address, referring you to the bearer for all other matters.

Is it not strange that the King, with such aversion to the guidance of others, should take the very means to render his dependence upon the greater Powers of Europe the most apparent? R. Fagel will tell you of the settlement with the Pope—a great point for this country.

Adieu. Let me have your counsels when you conceive them requisite.

Yours most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*The Earl of Clancarty to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Bruxelles, 27th June, 1817.

As I mentioned to you in my last private letter of the 20th, I the next day communicated to Sir Charles Stuart the message received from the King, through M. de Nagell, respecting the banishment hence of the French exiles.

I have since received a letter from Sir Charles, dated 19th instant, relative to the restoration of the diplomatic relations between this country and France, which was answered by me on the 22nd. Copies of these papers go herewith for your information. Happily the apprehensions expressed in that letter have not been realized: for though the ministers here have received the communication referred to in Sir Charles's letter, Binder alone has, as I believe, taken any step upon it; and as this was only in private conference with M. de Nagell, I have reason to think it has not found its way to the King. R. Fagel, therefore, will set out to-night for Cambrai and Paris, with the instruction unaltered, as notified in my last, and which I should trust will be sufficient to restore the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

It is most true, as stated in my letter to Sir Charles, that one of the greatest difficulties we have here in engaging the King to do anything in the sense of the alliance is the fear (sometimes even expressed by him) he entertains of being supposed to act, in a state of independence, under the influence of the other Courts, and especially under the decrees of the ministers at Paris. One of the principal arguments used by me in opposition to this feeling has been that it must be apparent, unless all the Powers of Europe shall act in the same sense and make common cause, all that has been done will be put in hazard, and that the way for His Majesty the most effectually to avoid the appearance of being guided by others would be for him to take the lead in doing as from himself all that was necessary for the establishment and confirmation of the general peace; that thus by going before the wishes of his Allies in the measures he should pursue, and in which his own interests are so vitally concerned, it could never be supposed that he acted under the dictates of others, or from other counsels than those of his own Cabinet. This line of reasoning (and which really appears to me incontrovertible) has not been altogether inoperative: to it is chiefly to be attributed the resolution to propose some stronger

laws to the States-General for the control of the tyrannical licence of the press, the banishment of the four French journalists, and the instruction to R. Fagel framed with a view of restoring the diplomatic relations with France. It has been my policy to act in the sense of this reasoning, flattering the feelings of the King by holding out that these acts emanated solely from himself, and sufficiently marked his desire to act from his own counsels in the sense of the alliance. I fear, however, that the operation of this reasoning upon His Majesty's mind is now exhausted, and that as the business of the Allies must be done in this country, I shall be obliged to take a line less conciliatory to the King's feelings than that which for his real interests well understood, and those of the alliance, I have hitherto conceived it my duty to adopt. The reluctance expressed by him to carry the Protocol of August, 1815, to which he is an acceding party, into execution, in the case of Arnaud; his direct assertion to me in our very last conversation, that being no party to the counsels of his Allies, of much of which he disapproved, he could not be called upon to carry them into execution; his repeating this with some acrimony to those who, from their attachment and residence with him in his misfortunes, may be supposed (if any persons can) to be in his most intimate confidence; all shew that he is far from entertaining that determination to act cordially to the extent of his power in the sense of the alliance, which, as I have taken the liberty of telling him, is so essential to his very existence.

I shall still endeavour to bring him to a sense of his true interests and to the only course by which it is possible for him to avoid the appearance of being dependent upon the dictates of others; but I should grossly deceive both myself and you if I should entertain or hold out much hope of influencing him further in this respect. Things must soon be pushed to a crisis. The libels of this press are recommencing in the 'Vrai Libéral,' published in this town, with renewed vigour. That of the 21st instant, herewith enclosed, contains an attack upon the King of Prussia, on which Prince Hatzfeld has addressed a very strong note to M. de Nagell, stating the positive instruction he had received from the King his master to demand immediate and adequate redress, not from the laws, but from the King of the Netherlands, for the insult thus offered to his Sovereign. Prince Hatzfeld hastily read me this note, which was delivered in on Tuesday last. I have not yet heard whether it has been answered.

There have been partial disturbances within these few days at Ghent, Antwerp, and other towns, the apparent object of which has been the dearness of provision. I cannot, however, help thinking, more especially as articles of provision, though still dear, have been yet dearer, that the people have been excited for the purpose of feeling the pulse of government and determining whether the troops would act cordially in its support; and that the disaffected have been induced to hasten these their experiments, fearful that from the continuance of fine weather and the prospect thereby afforded of an early and most productive harvest, a main opportunity might be lost for making them. Such is not only mine, but the opinion of those ministers with whom I am in the habit of conversing here. I am happy to be able to state that the troops have shown the best disposition, so that on this part of their experiment, at least, the Jacobins have no great cause for exultation.

The settlement of the question with the Pope relative to the oath exacted by the *loi fondamentale* is a great point for this government. On this subject I refer you to my despatch, No. 20, sent by this conveyance.

CLANCARTY.

I have sent a few libels on England to Hamilton by this post. There are abundance of them published here daily.

II.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR LORD, Paris, 19th June, 1817.

The communications I have already transmitted to you, detailing what has passed here respecting the refugee French in Belgium and their influence over the press of that country, together with the information you have the means of obtaining upon the spot, will have so far put you in possession of the question, that I am very confident you are a better judge of the measures it is expedient to adopt than the members of the Conference which assembles regularly in Paris; it is therefore with some reluctance that I venture to mention to you a suggestion they have addressed to their colleagues at Bruxelles, and which they have requested me to submit to your consideration, in the conviction that your opinion will materially contribute to fix the King's determination upon the subject. They are desirous that the *note verbale*, addressed by M. de Richelieu to Baron Nagell, some months since, complaining of the language held by the 'Libéral' respecting M. de La Tour du Pin, should be answered in terms which may sufficiently save the credit of the French government to enable His Most Christian Majesty to send M. de La Tour du Pin to his post, or rather, I believe, to replace that minister by M. Olivier de Verac, who has long solicited the appointment.

In complying with their request, I must repeat that your better knowledge of the feelings entertained by the King and his ministers upon the subject will enable you to judge how far it is advisable that this suggestion should be followed.

CHARLES STUART.

III.

*The Earl of Clancarty to Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES, Bruxelles, 22nd June, 1817.

My letter of yesterday, with its enclosure, will sufficiently put you in possession of my sentiments upon your communications of the 16th, and of the line which has been pursued here in the sense of those communications.

Yours of the 19th, however, received late last night, opens another subject, by no means new to me, but which I think their Excellencies at Paris would have done better to have left as it was in the Duke of Wellington's and my hands, where, according to my view, it was going on most prosperously. I will fairly own to you that I do not well understand your letter upon this subject. If already the ministers at Paris have thought fit to address to their colleagues at Bruxelles the expression of their desires upon the matter to which your letter relates, surely it is too late to submit their wishes to my consideration. If, as it is probable, some of them shall act upon the suggestion, I very much fear their doing so will destroy all that has already been done. One of the greatest difficulties I have to encounter at this Court (and it is not to be wondered at) is to combat the idea of its conduct being made subservient to the mandates of your Commission at Paris.

In communication with the Duke of Wellington, with our own government, and in pursuance of my anxious wishes to restore the diplomatic relations between the two countries, an instruction to Robert Fagel has already at my instance been some days since approved of by the King, and in my mind to the full extent of all that the French government can have any right to expect for

the salvation of their credit, considerably hazarded by their own irregular conduct in this business. But this I state to you in the most entire confidence. R. Fagel, whose return to Paris will take place upon the arrival of the Duke of Wellington at Cambrai, will be the bearer of this instruction, which, framed in communication through me with the Duke, will be communicated to his Grace, *en passant*, and the arrival of Fagel at Paris ought to be the first intimation to the French Court and to your colleagues at Paris of the fact itself.

I sincerely hope the suggestion announced by your letter, as conveyed from the ministers at Paris to their colleagues here, may not defeat all this. I shall do my best to prevent so evil an effect. As the instruction is framed in the most conciliatory language, I can scarcely doubt that the French government will act as they ought upon it. If, however, this should not be the case, the consequence I should much apprehend will be that the Envoy of this Court will be withdrawn from Paris. I very much regret to find from your letter that it is in the contemplation of the Court of France to send any Envoy here other than La Tour du Pin. Some time since we had rumours of this, and I send you enclosed the extract of a private letter, addressed by me to Lord Castlereagh on the 30th of May last, which will sufficiently put you in possession of my opinion on this point. For a time at least, however short, I should think it desirable on both the grounds stated in that extract that La Tour du Pin should resume his functions here.

Yours most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

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*The Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, ce 30 Juin, 1817.

Je joins ici une lettre du Comte Fernan Nuñez, par laquelle Votre Excellence verra les difficultés que la Cour d'Espagne fait naître pour l'admission des principes adoptés dans le traité pour la réversibilité du Duché de Parme. Nous étions loin de nous attendre à un tel résultat, et le pauvre ambassadeur se trouve dans un embarras difficile à décrire. La principale objection de la Cour de Madrid s'applique à l'indemnité du million, que son ambassadeur n'aurait dû, dit-elle, abandonner sous aucun prétexte; et elle en prend occasion d'attribuer le défaut de succès sur ce point à une trop grande condescendance de sa part. On ne peut que gémir de voir qu'on s'expose à manquer une affaire de cette importance pour deux ou trois cent mille francs. Une autre objection que l'on met en avant est de ne pas avoir énoncé positivement et nominativement que le fils de l'Archiduchesse Marie Louise était exclu de tout droit à la souveraineté de Parme. Il me semble que cette exclusion est comprise implicitement dans le traité, et d'une manière infiniment préférable en évitant de le nommer, pour ne pas rappeler son existence, et lui donner une sorte d'importance qu'il est à désirer de lui faire perdre entièrement. Notre situation sur ce point devient tout à fait fâcheuse; et je regrette vivement que Votre Excellence se trouve absente dans un moment où elle pourrait nous aider de ses conseils, et trouver peut-être un expédient pour nous tirer d'embarras. M. le Général Vincent est heureusement trop ami de la paix

et animé de trop bons principes pour se prévaloir de ces difficultés inattendues, et les présenter à sa Cour de manière à faire rompre toute cette affaire que Votre Excellence avait si heureusement terminé. Il me semble qu'on ne veut pas à Madrid envisager sa position sous son véritable point de vue, et concevoir qu'avec les difficultés contre lesquelles ce gouvernement a à lutter, il est d'un grand intérêt pour lui de se remettre en communion, pour ainsi dire, avec l'Europe.

Veuillez, Monsieur le Duc, agréer l'hommage de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

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*Baron Vincent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, 1 Juillet, 1817.

En rendant compte à ma Cour des dernières négociations relatives à la succession dans les Duchés de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalla, négociations qui ont eu pour suite le traité que nous avons signé le 10 du mois dernier, je ne lui ai point laisser ignorer ce que je devais dans cette circonstance à l'influence et à l'appui que Votre Excellence a bien voulu me prêter. Quelque convaincu que l'on était de la part de mon Cabinet que vous voudriez bien, My Lord, soutenir notre cause de toute votre influence, parcequ'elle est juste, parcequ'il est dans l'intérêt de nos deux gouvernemens d'en assurer le succès, et parcequ'enfin cette transaction était nécessaire pour compléter et pour consolider la grande œuvre de la paix, je ne suis pas moins expressément chargé de vous en exprimer, Monsieur le Maréchal, tous les sentimens de reconnaissance de la part de mon Cabinet; et je m'empresse avec d'autant plus de plaisir de m'acquitter de cet ordre, que je me félicite de pouvoir être auprès de Votre Excellence l'interprète de ces sentimens de ma Cour.

A cette occasion je crois ne point devoir vous laisser ignorer, My Lord, qu'un courrier que M. le Comte de Fernan Nuñez a reçu de son Cabinet Dimanche dernier lui a fait connaître l'improbation de sa Cour de la conduite qu'il a tenu dans cette affaire, et que la Cour d'Espagne se propose d'ouvrir de nouvelles négociations sur différens points qui se trouvent déterminés et réglés contre son gré. Il serait inutile de relever vis-à-vis de Votre Excellence l'inexplicable conduite du Cabinet de Madrid. Elle mieux que personne sait si les conditions dont on est convenus lui ont été imposées, ou si elles sont contraire à son véritable et premier intérêt. Elle partagera, sans doute, avec moi l'opinion qu'il est de l'honneur de tous les autres Cabinets de ne pas souffrir qu'un arrangement Européen, si solennellement conclu et sanctionné, soit infirmé par les fausses vues ou le caprice d'un seul Cabinet.

Ma Cour, qui seule ait des sacrifices à porter à la cause commune dans cette occurrence, n'ayant consulté dans cette occasion, comme dans toutes celles qui sont d'un intérêt général, que les considérations d'une haute et

sage politique, a accédé avec empressement à cet arrangement; votre gouvernement, My Lord, y a également donné son agrément; la France l'a approuvé; et les Cabinets de Berlin et de Pétersbourg se prononceront sans nul doute de la même manière. Permettra-t-on donc que la Cour de Madrid, par des raisons que je me contente d'indiquer ici, invalide tout ce qui a été fait après de si longues négociations, ou bien impose d'autres conditions au reste de l'Europe? Je pense que non. Dans cet état des choses il me semble qu'une réunion ferme et franche des grandes Cours, et un langage fort qu'elles tiendront, est le seul moyen d'engager l'Espagne à ne point céder à des insinuations contraires à son véritable intérêt, et à sanctionner de son côté ce que les autres Cours doivent être résolus de maintenir.

Personne plus que vous, My Lord, ne saurait servir la cause commune avec plus d'espoir de succès; c'est donc aux bons offices de Votre Excellence que j'en appelle avec confiance pour qu'elle veuille bien user de tout son pouvoir sur le Cabinet de Madrid et sur la personne du premier ministre même, afin de le faire revenir d'une opposition si contraire au bien général, et à celui de l'Espagne en particulier, en l'engageant à confirmer de son côté le traité du 10 Juin dernier.

Vous aurez par là, My Lord, acquis un nouveau titre à la reconnaissance générale, en contribuant efficacement à compléter et à consolider le grand système Européen.

Agréez, je vous prie, Monsieur le Duc, les assurances de la très haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, My Lord,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

VINCENT.

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*To Colonel Sir William Robe.* [1201.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, London, 2nd July, 1817.

I have received your letter of the 28th, and return the enclosure.

I have no objection, on the contrary, I should be happy, to see a mark of distinction conferred upon the gallant artillerymen who fought in the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro, and I authorise you to inform the Master-General.

It is deserving of consideration, however, that if they should be rewarded as proposed, other companies and detachments will claim for other actions, and these measures may eventually lead to important alterations of appointments, and affect the uniformity of the corps. It may be a question, therefore, whether for the Artillery it would be best to distinguish all who served

in the Peninsula by marking that word upon their appointments.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1202.] *To Count Fernan Nuñez.*

MI QUERIDO PRIMO, Cambrai, ce 8 Juillet, 1817.

J'ai reçu à Londres vos deux lettres du 30 Juin, et aujourd'hui celle du 7. Je ne suis arrivé à Mont St. Martin que hier. Si j'avois été à temps, j'aurois fait le voyage de Paris pour tâcher d'arranger votre affaire, quoique je crois vraiment qu'il n'y a rien qui puisse être fait pour changer ce que vous avez déjà signé.

Je viens de lire le protocole de votre conférence du 5 avec les cinq Ministres, et je conviens entièrement avec le Duc de Richelieu que ce n'est pas possible de changer l'article qui regarde la succession sans revenir sur le Traité de Vienne et les traités de 63 et de 48, et qu'il ne convient nullement à qui que ce soit de nommer le jeune Napoléon dans un acte public quelconque.

Pour ce qui regarde l'argent je ne peux pas croire que Monsieur Labrador aye dit que je lui avois annoncé que l'Espagne pouvoit compter sur un million de francs pour les fiefs, puisque les Puissances, et même l'Autriche, y avoient consenti.

Je savois bien que les Puissances s'étoient convenues à Vienne sur 500,000 francs, et que l'Autriche pas plus qu'une autre veut donner 1,000,000 quand elle étoit obligée par traité pour la moitié seulement. Je vous ai dit à Paris de quelle manière j'envisagerai cette question, et je vous assure que je crois que vous avez fait le meilleur arrangement qu'il étoit possible de faire, et que si je ne vous eusse pas appuyé auprès du Ministre d'Autriche, vous ne l'eussiez pas fait. L'Autriche gagne par l'arrangement l'occupation de Placentia après le décès de l'Archiduchesse, et l'accession de l'Espagne à tous les arrangemens Européens du Congrès, et du Traité de Paris: mais les intérêts de l'Espagne elle-même lui avoient donné ce dernier; et pour le premier, considérant que l'Archiduchesse pourra vivre probablement trente ans, il ne vaut pas l'argent qu'on vous a sacrifié pour l'obtenir.

Je ne peux pas croire que votre Cour ne donnera pas sa ratification; mais en attendant vous perdez non seulement de la considération, mais des avantages, par les délais sur chaque question qui puisse arriver.

J'écrirai une réponse au Chevalier Pizarro que je vous enverrai. Il me dit peu de mots sur le dernier arrangement, et il se plaint seulement que l'Espagne ne gagne rien que ce qui est annoncé dans les articles du Congrès, comme si c'étoit possible de les changer, ou même de les modifier.

Toujours, &c.,

WELLINGTON, DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1203.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 8 Juillet, 1817.

J'ai reçu à Londres votre lettre du 30 Juin, et celles de l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne, sur les objections du gouvernement Espagnol aux traités signés à Paris dans le mois de Juin; et j'ai fait écrire à Madrid des instructions, lesquelles j'espère feront quelque impression sur M. Pizarro. En attendant, j'ai lu le protocole de votre conférence du 5 avec l'Ambassadeur, et je vois avec plaisir que le gouvernement de S.M.B. a pris les mêmes vues que V.E.

Je vous envois à présent une lettre pour l'Ambassadeur, que je prie V.E. de lui faire passer.

J'espère que vous serez satisfait des instructions que l'Ambassadeur de l'Angleterre va recevoir sur les réclamations Allemandes et sur la construction à donner à la Convention No. 20, du 20 Novembre. Vous pouvez vous assurer que le gouvernement de S.M.B. n'est pas disposé à appuyer ce qui pourra être déraisonnable.

Il me semble qu'après que vous aurez fait une classification des demandes sur vous, il seroit possible de faire un arrangement qui pourroit satisfaire à tous les intéressés, parceque il faut observer que la France est intéressée pour son crédit publique, aussi bien que ceux qui font les réclamations, que tout le monde soit à un certain degré satisfait.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 1204. ] *To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, Mont St. Martin, 9th July, 1817.

I send you a letter for the King, which relates to the work going on in the French fortresses; and one for Nagell, under flying seal, regarding the orders to Comte de Lobau to quit the Netherlands. I shall be obliged to you if you will peruse the last, and urge Nagell to obtain permission for him to remain, unless he should have conducted himself in such a manner as to draw upon himself the King's displeasure. I likewise enclose a letter for Madame de Lobau, which I beg you to have sent to the post.

I received in London your letter of the 27th. Lord Castlereagh had already shown me the enclosures, and I concur with you in thinking that it is much better that the thing should be left to you, and that the gentlemen at Paris, and their colleagues at Bruxelles, should remain quiet.

I see that Binder has taken to himself and the Four Powers the credit of having prevailed upon the King to take the steps which it appears have already produced the re-establishment of the political relations with France.

In general I think this kind of assumption of merit where none exists is very little deserving of attention; but in this case it is more important, as it may induce the Four Powers to act together in other instances in which I am certain that their interference will do more harm than good.

I will therefore take an opportunity when I go to Paris again of letting the gentlemen know the truth, which is, that the note was actually written, and I believe despatched, before Binder even dreamt of the subject.

I see that the four are going to have a grand conference with the Duc de Richelieu regarding Frenchmen of all descriptions in foreign countries. Between ourselves, Sir Charles does not take the lead sufficiently in these conferences. The Three Powers and France are in a very different situation from ourselves, and they can do and say particularly a great deal more than we can. Their Ministers are instructed very highly, I know, upon all these points of foreign police; but I think it would be possible for the British Minister to induce them to hold their hands a little, more particularly as the want of unanimity upon any one of these arrangements would be fatal to it.

I know I have always found it very practicable to keep them quiet, but Sir Charles lets them go on, says nothing, and then signs with the majority. I must endeavour, however, to stop them in these new schemes.

I don't think I did much for you in England on your law of libel. The difficulty of restraining a press is thought to be insurmountable, and it is pretty generally agreed that no free press can exist on the Continent.

One measure was suggested by Lord Liverpool, half in joke, half in earnest, which I think may deserve attention, and that is, that the press should be free only in the language of the country, that is, in Dutch or in Flemish; and that the French, German, and English press should be subject to a previous censure. What do you say to this? As the King has decreed that these are the languages of the country, he cannot complain of this measure as a violation of its freedom. I enclose you a paper with a libel upon the French government, and one upon me, which I have marked. I should be very glad to know if I could prosecute the editor.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Baron Nagell.* [1205.]

MONSIEUR LE BARON, Cambrai, ce 9 Juillet, 1817.

Je reçois une lettre de Madame la Comtesse de Lobau, dans laquelle elle m'annonce que le gouverneur de la province de Hainault venoit d'envoyer l'ordre au Comte de Lobau de sortir au royaume des Pays-Bas.

V.E. se souviendra que c'est moi qui avoit demandé permission à S.M. pour que le Comte de Lobau puisse rester dans les Pays-Bays sur les terres de Madame son épouse. J'en ai fait la demande de concert avec les Ministres des Alliés en conférence à Paris, et par le consentement de S.M. le Roi de France; et dans toutes les demandes qu'on a fait jusqu'à présent à S.M. de mettre en exécution les stipulations des protocoles auxquelles S.M. avoit donné son consentement, on a toujours fait exception au Comte de Lobau.

Je prie V.E. de faire connoître ces circonstances à S.M. Il se peut que le Comte de Lobau ait par sa conduite donné occa-

sion à ce que Sa Majesté lui retire la permission de rester dans les Pays-Bas, qu'il avoit eu la grâce de lui donner; mais s'il y a lieu de croire qu'il s'est bien conduit comme je l'espère, je prie S.M. de prendre en considération les circonstances ci-dessus énoncées, et la triste situation de cette famille, et de lui donner encore la permission de rester sur les terres de sa femme dans les Pays-Bas.

WELLINGTON, PRINCE DE WATERLOO.

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[1206.] *To General Baron Vincent.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, Mont St. Martin, ce 9 Juillet, 1817.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 1, et je vous en suis bien obligé, et très flatté de l'approbation de votre gouvernement. Vous voyez le résultat de votre négociation en ce qui s'est passé à Madrid; et malgré qu'on ne peut guère compter sur la marche de cette Cour, vous pouvez vous assurer que si vous n'aviez pas cédé un peu, la chose auroit été pire qu'elle n'a été.

J'ai lu hier le protocole de votre conférence du 5 sur cette affaire. J'avois pris la chose en considération sous le même point de vue que le Duc de Richelieu; et avant de quitter Londres j'avois fait envoyer une instruction à Madrid pour faire presser le gouvernement de donner sa ratification. J'écrirai aussi par cette occasion à Monsieur Pizarro, qui me paraît par une lettre que j'ai reçu de lui hier ne pas entendre la question. Mon frère annonce, dans une dépêche qui m'a passé par les mains hier, qu'il croit que le traité sera ratifié, et il dit que Tatistcheff y travaille dans le bon sens.

Adieu.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[1207.] *To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 9 Juillet, 1817.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V.E. du 25 Juin, qui m'avoit suivi en Angleterre.

Selon toutes les apparences et les nouvelles que j'ai, j'espère qu'il n'y a plus de raison de s'attendre aux rassemblemens et

aux désordres dans le département du Pas de Calais qui font le sujet de cette lettre.

Tenant en vue les rixes qui ordinairement sont les suites de la mélange de militaires de différentes nations, et les mauvaises conséquences qui pourroient en résulter en égard aux rassemblemens et aux désordres auxquels on voudroit remédier, j'aurois des objections à la permanence de militaires Français dans les départemens occupés, avec exception toujours des places; et je crois que V.E. conviendra avec moi sur ce point, surtout quand vous prendrez en considération le nombre des places dans le département du Pas de Calais qui se trouvent occupées par les troupes Françaises.

Si le mal continue qui a causé la demande que V.E. m'a fait dans sa lettre du 25, je vous propose donc que jusqu'à la fin de Septembre les autorités se servent des troupes qui se trouvent dans les places, en avertissant en même temps de leur marche les commandans des troupes étrangères qui pourroient se trouver sur leur route, enfin que celles-ci pourroient en être ôtées si cela devenoit nécessaire pendant la même période.

V.E. pouvoit aussi faire renforcer les garnisons à tel degré que vous jugeriez à propos.

Si V.E. adopte cette proposition, je vous prie de me le faire savoir, enfin que je l'annonce aux officiers sous mes ordres.

Il seroit très à désirer que le Ministre de la Guerre me fisse connoître en détail toutes les mesures que V.E. aura ou qu'il pourra adopter en conséquence de cet arrangement, ou de celui convenu pour l'occupation temporaire des districts voisins des départemens occupés par les troupes étrangères.

Toutes ces mesures, quoique nécessaires, sont contraires aux traités, et elles deviennent l'objet d'attention et de discussion générale si je ne me trouve pas dans le cas de le prévenir en avertissant d'avance les Généraux commandant les troupes qui se trouvent dans le voisinage.

WELLINGTON.

[1208.] *To M. La Tour.*

MONSIEUR, Mont St. Martin, ce 9 Juillet, 1817.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 22me Juin, sur une plainte portée par Monsieur Rodriguez Richard de la conduite du Capitaine Bligh, qui se trouve logé chez lui.

Avant de quitter Cambrai dernièrement j'avois pris connoissance des faits dont se plaint Monsieur Richard, et j'ai eu la preuve la plus claire que c'étoit Monsieur Richard lui-même qui en avoit été la cause en apostrophant le Capitaine Bligh *d'insolent.* Un officier qui étoit présent l'a entendu, et il n'y a rien dans le procès verbal que vous m'envoyez qui le nie.

Cependant, j'ai très fort désapprouvé la conduite du Capitaine Bligh de ce qu'il a pris sur lui de se venger en frappant Monsieur Richard; et je l'aurois traduit devant un Conseil de Guerre, pour être jugé, si la justice avoit été rendue par les tribunaux de Cambrai envers les officiers ou soldats de l'armée sur une seule plainte qui leur avoit été porté, et si je n'avois pas vu que le ci-devant maire de la ville, de qui j'ai tant de raison de me plaindre, avoit été dernièrement nommé par le Roi le chef du tribunal.

Quand la justice ne se rend pas à ceux qui la demandent, et que les loix ne protègent pas, il faut s'attendre que les hommes se protègeront eux-mêmes, et surtout que des militaires injuriés et offensés se serviront de leurs armes ou de la force de corps que Dieu leur a donné pour se protéger contre les insultes et les injures.

J'ai souvent protesté envers les Ministres du Roi sur la manière dont la justice se rend envers les militaires de l'Armée d'Occupation de toutes les nations, mais jusqu'à présent sans remède; et par la dernière nomination la cause de leur plainte est empirée.

Je vous prie d'observer que Monsieur Richard a laissé passer près de quinze jours avant de vous faire passer sa plainte.

WELLINGTON.

*To the King of the Netherlands.* [1209.]

SIRE, Cambrai, ce 9 Juillet, 1817.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V.M. sur les travaux qui se font dans les forteresses Françaises; et ayant fait les perquisitions là-dessus que le temps m'a permis depuis mon retour de Londres, le résultat en est ce qui suit :—

Toutes les forteresses de la frontière se trouvent dans un état excessivement délabré. Celles occupées par les troupes alliées reçoivent les réparations qui leur sont nécessaires, en vertu des traités et des conventions avec le gouvernement Français, et on y travaille avec assez d'activité dans le moment. On travaille aussi, et même avec plus d'activité, à Lille, Dunkerque, et autres forteresses occupées par les troupes Françaises; mais je crois que la cause en est l'état de délabrement où elles se sont trouvées, qui a été empiré par les pluies de la dernière saison, et le désir d'employer le peuple dans cette saison de disette et de défaut de leur emploi ordinaire.

On ne peut nullement douter de la nécessité de ces travaux à toutes les places de la France, et que s'ils n'eussent pas été entrepris dans le moment actuel, il auroit été nécessaire de les entreprendre plus tard. Je n'ai nulle raison de croire qu'on a l'idée de toucher à la moindre chose arrangée par les derniers traités de paix.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON, PRINCE DE WATERLOO.

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*To Chevalier Pizarro.* [1210.]

EX. SEÑOR Y DE MI MEJOR APRECIO, Cambrai, ce 10 Juillet, 1817.

L'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris m'a envoyé la lettre que V.E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 26 du mois dernier, et je suis bien flatté de cette marque additionnelle de votre confiance.

La correspondance que V.E. veut bien entretenir avec moi est d'une nature tout-à-fait confidentielle, et en vous écrivant sur les affaires du jour, où vous êtes intéressé, j'écris sans autorité quelconque, et je ne vous dis que ce que je sais moi-même, et je ne vous communique que mes propres sentimens. Quand

j'ai dit à V.E. dans une lettre antérieure qu'on ne pouvoit pas s'attendre que l'Angleterre se laisseroit forcer la main, c'étoit pour vous expliquer la cause du délai de la dépêche sur la médiation sur les affaires du Rio de la Plata. Je vous ai expliqué que puisque c'étoit probable que les mesures à prendre tomberoient en dernier résultat sur l'Angleterre, c'étoit tout naturel que les Ministres de S.M.B. ne voudroient pas et même ne pourroient pas déléguer à d'autres la décision sur les démarches qui seroient le résultat des Conférences de Paris. L'Ambassadeur de S.M.B. dans la Conférence a donc été dans la nécessité de prendre la décision de la Conférence *ad referendum*, ce qui a causé le délai de quelques jours dont V.E. se plaignoit. C'est pour justifier ce délai que je me suis servi de l'expression, je l'avoue pas trop élégante, qu'on ne pouvoit pas s'attendre que le gouvernement de S.M.B. se laisseroit forcer la main.

Je n'ai pas voulu blâmer l'appel que V.E. fit sur cette affaire à toutes les Puissances de l'Europe. Au contraire, comme le désir de S.M.C., aussi bien que de tout le monde, étoit de conserver la paix générale, les Puissances de l'Europe en général pouvoient parler sur ce sujet avec beaucoup plus de force qu'une seule. Mais V.E. ne s'est pas ressouvenu de la conduite du gouvernement de S.M.B. quand elle m'a dit que l'appel à toutes Puissances sur cette médiation avoit été occasionné par la tiédeur de l'Angleterre, et une réponse gelée de la part de son gouvernement. Vous avez oublié sûrement les remontrances que fit le Chargé d'Affaires Britannique au Rio Janéiro quand il étoit question de l'expédition au Rio de la Plata ; et qu'au moment que le gouvernement Britannique a pu prendre en considération cette mesure, *il a retiré la garantie au Portugal*, si le gouvernement du Rio Janéiro ne se trouvoit pas dans le cas de s'expliquer d'une manière satisfaisante. Je ne sais pas ce qu'un gouvernement impartial, neutre, ami des deux partis, eut pu faire de plus ; et moi, je crois que le Roi de Portugal en a plus de raison de se plaindre que le Roi d'Espagne.

Je vous ai plusieurs fois communiqué mon opinion que sans l'arrangement de la question de la traite vous ne pouvez vous attendre à rien de la part de l'Angleterre, surtout dans les affaires de vos colonies, &c. Je connais l'opinion publique, et je sais que les Ministres ne peuvent pas marcher contre s'ils le vouloient. Ainsi c'est à l'Espagne à voir si elle peut céder sur la traite, ou s'il lui vaut mieux de continuer la traite au-dessus

de toutes les autres questions qui existent sur les colonies, &c., ou de cesser la traite et de poser toutes les autres questions sur leurs propres bases. C'est à V.E. à décider cette question; mais je serois indigne de sa confiance si, dans une correspondance confidentielle de cette nature, je ne lui disois pas ce qui me paraît être exactement vrai.

Mais malgré que la question de la traite influe nécessairement sur la conduite du gouvernement de S.M.B. en tout ce qui regarde les colonies Espagnoles, &c., elle n'a eu rien à faire avec sa conduite sur les questions des Duchés Italiennes, et de la médiation du Rio de la Plata. Je viens de discuter la seconde; et pour la première, je n'ai qu'à référer V.E. à Monsieur Labrador et au Comte de Fernan Nuñez pour savoir par quelle entremise cette affaire a été mise en avant, et après portée à sa conclusion.

Je regrette beaucoup que V.E. n'en approuve pas la conclusion, et surtout puisque elle est la même annoncée dans les articles du Congrès. Le Congrès a fait un arrangement pour la possession des Duchés pour la vie de l'Archiduchesse, et par l'article * en a donné la disposition après la mort de l'Archiduchesse à certaines Puissances qui s'y trouvent nommés. Les bases du travail à faire se trouvoient dans cet article; et après avoir persuadé aux Puissances nommées de faire la disposition en faveur de l'Infanta et sa famille, dont elles étoient autorisées, les termes se trouvoient naturellement dans le traité du Congrès et ceux antérieurs qui s'y trouvent confirmés. On ne pouvoit pas départir des arrangemens du traité du Congrès en ce qui regarde la reversion après le decès de la branche Espagnolle de Parme, ni on ne pouvoit pas demander à l'Empereur d'Autriche de payer une somme plus forte pour les fiefs Bohémiens que celle à laquelle ces mêmes possessions avoient été taxées par le Congrès. On a pu lui demander un sacrifice pour sa demande du droit de garnison à Plaisance; et connoissant comme j'ai connu les intentions de chacune des Puissances intéressées, je suis parfaitement assuré que ce sacrifice pécuniaire de la part de l'Autriche a été porté aussi loin que c'étoit possible. Le résultat d'une demande plus forte auroit été que l'Autriche s'y seroit refusé; qu'elle n'auroit pas consentie à la disposition de la succession des Duchés, sans que sa demande du droit de garnison

* Blank in manuscript.

à Plaisance eut été prise en considération, et satisfaite; et les choses auroient restées comme elles ont été jusqu'à présent, c'est-à-dire les autres Puissances de l'Europe dans la possession de tous les avantages de leurs traités entr'elles, et l'Espagne n'en ayant aucun.

En vérité tout l'avantage du traité du 10 Juin est comme il devroit être du côté de l'Espagne; et je vous avoue que je n'ai jamais été si étonné de ma vie que quand j'ai reçu à Londres la nouvelle que S.M. y avoit refusé sa ratification.

Je ne sais pas si votre ambassadeur à Paris vous a bien expliqué les détails de sa négociation, mais je peux vous assurer que ce n'est pas possible de s'être mieux conduit que lui, et j'attribue son succès en grande partie aux manières conciliantes qu'il y a mis.

Pour ce qui regarde le jeune Napoléon, on a spécialement exclu son nom du traité exprès pour éviter d'en faire un personnage public. Si votre ambassadeur a eu tort là dedans, c'est un tort qu'il a de commun avec toute l'Europe.

Je crois que si vous réfléchissez mûrement sur cette question, vous serez d'opinion avec nous tous, qu'il vaut mieux le laisser tomber de lui-même dans l'obscurité de la vie particulière que d'en faire l'objet d'une stipulation parmi les grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Je suis bien reconnoissant à V.E. de la protection qu'elle veut bien accorder aux officiers que j'ai recommandé à S.M.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON, DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

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*J. Petty Muspratt, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD, Waterloo Subscription Office, Cornhill, 10th July, 1817.

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for the favour of your Grace's consideration, the copy of the Resolutions of the Joint Committee for Distribution, held on the 8th instant, detailing the particulars of the sums appropriated to the Allied troops; and I have to assure your Grace that it will afford the Committee the highest satisfaction to be honoured with the opinion of your Grace on this important and interesting subject.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

J. PETTY MUSPRATT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Waterloo Subscription Office, Cornhill, Tuesday, 8th July, 1817.

At a Meeting of the Joint Sub-Committee for Distribution held this day,

J. P. MUSPRATT, Esq., in the Chair,

John Wray, Esq., Chairman of the Meeting held on Saturday the 5th instant, when his Grace the Duke of Wellington honoured the Committee with his presence, having reported the conversation with his Grace relative to the sums voted to the sufferers in the Allied army in the campaign of 1815:

Resolved,—

That his Grace be respectfully informed that although the votes to the foreign troops were passed at a period when the collections under the letter of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent had not attained their full amount, the Committee had considered the number of casualties in the foreign troops, and had anticipated the probable amount of the collections.

That the Committee, who had no express directions in the King's letter for the division of the expected produce, had used their best judgment under a consideration of all the circumstances.

That in discussing the subject previously to decision, the Committee could not, but consider that the amount of the collection under the letter of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent should be, in the results, of proportionate benefit to all the parties interested.

That although the casualties in the Allied troops were in number greater than those in the British army, yet, the value of money on the Continent being much greater than in England, due regard was had to a circumstance of such manifest importance.

That the King's German Legion was considered by the Committee to be a part of the British army, because it received its pay and support from the British nation. These therefore would have no claim on the sums voted to the Allies, and that Legion, as to its casualties, has been treated as British, although from the circumstance of the soldiers being disbanded, and residing in Germany, and the value of money there, they will benefit more materially than the British soldiers in England.

That the subscription, independent of what had been raised under the Royal letter, has been considered by the Committee as applicable to British objects exclusively; and it was only from the collection raised for the joint benefit of the British and Allied forces that the Committee deemed that they could, under the authority vested in them, make any remittances to the latter.

That the collections under that letter, applicable to joint purposes, amounted in the whole to 136,492*l.* 1*s.* 11*d.*

That the Committee appropriated so early as October, 1815, to the foreign troops 45,000*l.*, and since the vote of that sum they had also granted 17,500*l.* for the benefit of the orphans of those troops; making together 62,500*l.*, which, on the Continent, will procure for the various individuals to whom it is applicable, relief far beyond what the entire sum collected for the joint uses would have procured in England.

That in appropriating these sums to the respective Allies, the Committee voted,

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| To the Prussians .. .. .. .. .. .. | Rix dollars | 200,000 |
| To the Brunswick troops .. .. .. .. | ditto | 20,000 |
| To the subsidiary Hanoverian troops .. | ditto | 25,000 |
| To the Netherlands troops .. .. .. | Florins | 50,000 |

And that for the education of their orphan children, the Committee had allotted,

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| To the Prussian troops .. .. .. .. | Pounds sterling | 10,000 |
| To the Brunswick ditto .. .. .. .. | ditto | 2,500 |
| To the Hanoverian ditto .. .. .. .. | ditto | 2,500 |
| To the Netherlands ditto .. .. .. | ditto | 2,500 |

Resolved,—

That a copy of the foregoing Resolutions, explanatory of the principle upon which the Committee have acted, both as to the aggregate amount voted and the allotments made to the Allies respectively, be signed by the Chairman, and transmitted to his Grace the Duke of Wellington; the Committee being most desirous to be favoured with his Grace's enlightened judgment on this subject, well aware that it is of great importance, involving in no slight degree the national honour, and to which they assure his Grace they will pay the most early and serious attention.

J. PETTY MUSPRATT.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 10th July, 1817.

As one of my communications to Lord Castlereagh of this date adverts to the information I have lately received from Mr. Rose at Berlin respecting the instructions transmitted from hence to the French Ministers at Berlin and Petersburg, it is necessary to explain the subject by sending you the enclosed copy of Mr. Rose's letter.

Faithfully yours,
CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*G. H. Rose, Esq., to Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR STUART, Berlin, 21st June, 1817.

About three weeks since, a report reached me that the French government had sounded that of Prussia on a project of paying off the contributions due on the spot, or shortly, on the condition that the Allied army should be withdrawn from France. The matter and the manner of communication, stated through General von Zieten, prevented me from giving the least attention to this report. Nine days ago a friend of mine, whose authenticity is deserving of the highest respect, told me he had no doubt but that such a proposal has been made at Petersburg, and has been favourably received by General Pozzo di Borgo. Strange and incredible as this appeared to me, considering my source of information, I did not allow myself to treat the matter, on the ground of the utter improbabilities presenting themselves, but that same day asked Prince Hardenberg if he had heard anything on the subject, telling him why I asked him, and what was my opinion on the improbabilities of such a project being seriously brought forward. He assured me what I then said was the first he ever heard of it; that it seemed equally impossible that France should be able to pay the Allies off, or that they should conceive that in receiving their quotas of contributions at once they had fulfilled the duties which they had thought it necessary to impose upon themselves in forming the existing system for maintaining the peace of

Europe by insuring the tranquillity of France; that he considered the report as a positive fabrication. I should say that first, before I mentioned it to him, I learned from M. de Tordorn, who acts under him in the foreign affairs and possesses his entire confidence, that he (M. de Tordorn) had just learned the same rumour. There is no question whatever that it had not reached the Prince.

I have since learned confidentially that a Count Charles Richery, brother to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Munich, and to the Bavarian Envoy here (but which latter is absent), passing through Berlin from Petersburg on the 12th instant, told the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires here that at a dinner, in a very small society there, just before he left it, Count Capo d'Istrias being at table, it was stated that the French Envoy, Count Noailles, had instructions to make the proposal in question.

The Russian Envoy here, when questioned by a friend of mine, said such a proposal would accord with the spirit of M. Pozzo di Borgo's instructions; and the Marquis de Bonney expressed himself to him on the subject as if aware of its being brought forward, and as if he deemed it one on which success might be well attainable. M. de Humboldt has no doubt but that something has passed upon it.

All this may be old and known to you, or you may most naturally have lights on the matter, on which I have as it were but conjectures; but it is my duty, having this opportunity, to send them to you. If the Russian or French Envoys know anything on this subject, they would of course conceal it as yet from Prince Hardenberg and their English and Austrian colleagues.

Yours, &c.,
G. H. Rose.

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*To Chevalier Pizarro.* [1211.]

Cambrai, ce 13 Juillet, 1817.

Ex. Señor y de mi mejor aprecio,

J'ai omis dans la lettre que je vous ai écrit le 10 de répondre à cette partie de celle que vous m'aviez fait l'honneur de m'écrire dans laquelle V.E. se réfère à sa réponse aux Ministres des Puissances médiatrices dans l'affaire du Rio de la Plata.

Il me paraît que cette réponse est dictée par l'esprit de modération qui a guidé toutes les démarches de S.M. dans cette affaire.

Depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire le 10 j'ai vu la note du Comte de Fernan Nuñez, adressée aux Ministres des quatre Puissances à Paris et au Ministre de France sur les affaires de Pernambuco et l'Amérique Espagnolle en général, et pour demander leur médiation pour les arranger. Vous savez déjà ce qu'on pense en Angleterre sur ce sujet, et que le Ministre n'a pas cru pouvoir s'en mêler tant que la question de la traite restoit indécise; et je ne crois pas qu'il se prêtera à des mesures

de concert avec d'autres Puissances, qu'il n'a pas cru devoir conseiller au Régent d'entreprendre tout seul.

Tout le monde est certainement intéressé à voir le rétablissement de la tranquillité dans les vastes contrées qui forment les colonies Espagnolles; mais je vous avoue que même si l'Angleterre voulut prendre part à la médiation proposée, je la crois très peu calculée à produire l'effet désiré.

Il y a guère lieu à espérer que cinq commissaires employés par cinq Puissances différentes marcheroient de concert dans les questions qu'ils auroient à discuter dans une affaire aussi vaste que celle dont il s'agit.

Il faut observer que pour qu'une médiation quelconque entre l'Espagne et ses colonies puisse réussir, il faut que les Puissances médiatrices possèdent la confiance des colonies et une influence dans ces pays. Cette influence ne peut résulter que des relations de commerce ou autres entre les colonies et ces Puissances ou de la force dont ces Puissances pourroient se servir. Or, trois des Puissances appelées à la médiation n'ont presque pas les moyens de communiquer avec les colonies; les points de contact entr'elles et les colonies n'existent pas; et malgré que leur force est d'une prépondérance énorme, elle n'est pas de nature ni placée de manière à leur donner une influence quelconque dans les pays. Pour ce qui regarde la France, la quatrième de ces Puissances, elle se trouve plus avantageusement placée en égard aux colonies que les autres grandes Puissances continentales; mais il existe en Espagne et dans les colonies tant de préjugés sur le compte de la France que vous ne pouvez pas vous attendre que son influence pourroit vous être d'une grande utilité pour accomplir votre objet.

Je vous dis mon opinion sur ce plan, lequel je suis presque certain ne réussira pas, et V.E. sait mieux que personne si elle peut adopter les seules mesures qui puissent faire entrer le gouvernement Britannique dans ses vues. La conduite qu'il a tenu sur ce sujet jusqu'à présent a été si désintéressé que V.E. verra que je ne peux avoir autre objet que l'avantage de l'Espagne en lui conseillant de faire un effort de tâcher d'y intéresser l'Angleterre.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON, DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.* [ 1212. ]

MY DEAR LORD, Cambrai, 14th July, 1817.

Since my return here I have conversed with Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the Engineers, regarding his late tour in the Netherlands, and I am happy to tell you that he is of opinion that the Dutch engineers are performing the work excessively well, and with great spirit.

Lord Liverpool appeared anxious to know what the Prussians were about, and, having made inquiries, I find that they are constructing a great work, which will have no less than thirteen fronts, at Cologne, on the Rhine. I know that this work is calculated to contain 30,000 men. They are also fortifying Coblentz on the same principle of a great entrenched camp, Ehrenbreitstein being one of the detached works of this system at Coblentz. They are doing nothing at Trèves, or between Trèves and Saar Louis. I shall go to Sédan, however, in August, to meet the King, when I shall have an opportunity of knowing not only what they are doing, but what they intend to do.

Finding that things were come to a stand at Paris respecting the Parma question, I did not go there, nor shall I go, if I should find that the Duc de Richelieu becomes at all more moderate respecting the German claims, upon which subject I have written to him.

You will have observed the Spanish and Russian trick to get you into the mediation with the colonies, in spite of you. I conclude you will not allow it. It is really time that the Conference at Paris should be kept strictly to their own business, that of sending me news, and that of superintending the money concerns of the Allies with the French government.

I have missed some of Sir Charles Stuart's despatches, and have seen nothing from him respecting the late conspiracy at Lyons, which I hear was very serious.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1213. ] *To J. Petty Muspratt, Esq., Chairman of the Waterloo Committee.*

SIR, Cambrai, 14th July, 1817.

I had the honour of receiving last night your letter of the 10th instant, and I have perused with attention the resolutions of the Committee of the 8th instant.

It is very painful to me to state any shade of difference of opinion with the Committee on any part of their proceedings, which appear to me to have been well calculated to provide for the comfort of the brave officers and soldiers who served under my command, and for the widows and orphans of those who fell in the service of their country; but having frequently observed the inclination of public writers on the Continent to depreciate the character of the people of Great Britain, to attribute to them selfish motives, and to attack all their acts on such grounds, I am anxious that in the distribution of that part of the money at their disposal, amounting to 136,492*l.* 1*s.* 11*d.*, raised by subscriptions under the King's letter, the Committee should proceed in such a manner as to afford no ground whatever for such imputations, and that the country should enjoy the reputation which it really deserves for its feelings for the sufferings of the soldiers of other nations, and its munificence towards them.

I am the more anxious on this subject, because if the Committee were to go the whole length which I am about to propose to their consideration, it appears to me that they would still have at their disposal a fund sufficient to provide for all the claimants of the British army upon the scale proposed and adopted.

I would then propose to the Committee that they should allot the whole of the fund raised by subscriptions collected under the King's letter, and amounting to 136,492*l.* 1*s.* 11*d.*, to the foreign troops, not including the King's German Legion.

If they should not think themselves authorised to do this, I should then propose that, without adverting to calculations of the value of money in different countries, they should allot to the troops of each nation, British and foreign, the exact sum which would be due to them, according to the proportion of their casualties, as these appear upon the returns in their possession.

I would beg the Committee to observe that although it may be true that a specific sum would go farther in any country on the Continent than in England—which, however, is not quite true in respect to all, and is not true in the same degree in any two countries—it must be recollected that the British officers

and soldiers, besides their proportion of the 136,492*l.* 1*s.* 11*d.* raised by subscriptions under the King's letter, enjoy the advantage of a much larger subscription raised voluntarily throughout the empire; and that to give the British army, including the King's German Legion, more than its due proportion, founded on the proportion of its casualties, of the subscription under the King's letter, would expose the Committee to the very imputations to which I have above adverted.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.* [1214.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Cambrai, ce 14 Juillet, 1817.

J'ai l'honneur de passer à V.E. une lettre que je reçois du Général Gablenz, commandant le contingent Saxon, qui se plaint de défaut de justice dans un procès qu'il avoit fait entendre dans la Cour de Douai contre un nommé Le Marie, pour avoir frappé un soldat du contingent Saxon.

J'ai si souvent molesté V.E. de pareilles plaintes que j'ai vous demander pardon de vous en entretenir encore; mais je peux vous assurer que soit que les loix de la France ne sont pas assez fortes pour punir ces délits, soit mauvaise volonté de la part des Tribunaux, et je crois qu'il y a de l'une et de l'autre cause, nous nous trouvons en France quasi sans la protection des loix. Nous punissons de la manière la plus sévère, même par la mort, tout délit qui se commet par les militaires contre les habitans; mais je peux vous prouver que les insultes, les injures, les voies de fait, et même les meurtres qui se commettent journalièrement par les habitans envers les militaires restent ou sans punition ou ces crimes sont punis de manière à en encourager la répétition, et à rendre ridicules la justice et ceux qui y ont appelés.

Les loix en France ne sont pas calculées pour protéger l'habitant paisible toutes seules: c'est nécessaire qu'elles reçoivent l'aide d'une police excessivement forte et active; et malheureusement nous ne jouissons pas de cet avantage. Il faut que j'ajoute aussi que j'ai la preuve la plus convaincante qu'elles ne nous sont pas administrées avec impartialité.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 14th July, 1817.

I have had communication with the Minister of Justice relative to the libel upon you in the 'Journal des deux Flandres' of the 14th June. He has had the publication before him for a day, and then being ill, sent his first Commis, a M. Asser, to me, to state that he scarcely thought it would be worth your while to prosecute for it, the effect of which, he conceived, would be to give a degree of consequence to that paper beyond what it possesses or deserves. I protest I do not quite agree with the Chief Justice, and so told his Commis. For, 1st. The paper itself has considerable currency, and is therefore already of much consequence. 2ndly. If, under these circumstances, an editor is enabled to say whatever he pleases, and spit his venom forth with entire impunity, his malignity cannot fail ultimately to mislead the public, and make impressions the most distant from truth. M. Asser told me, that foreseeing this might be my opinion, he was charged by the Minister of Justice to assure me of every assistance he could afford; and recommended that a M. Jouhaud and a M. Tarte should be employed as your avocats. As, however, little time will be lost in referring to you the Minister of Justice's opinion prior to any interview with the lawyers, I shall wait your answer before I shall take any further steps.

I send you herewith a copy of the Mémoire which I have prepared for the purpose of being considered by this government, and which conveys such suggestions (feeble enough, I confess) as have struck me for the amelioration of this press. My object is to obtain from you such further suggestions as you may conceive practicable, and calculated to restrain the publication of offensive writings. With the same view, I sent a copy home by the last messenger, and forward one now also to Sir C. Stuart. The early part of this Mémoire is taken up in pointing out the inadequacy of the law of 500 florins for the accomplishment of the object in view. This law forms the annexe to the paper; the latter part proposes certain enactments to render the law of libel more effectual.

As the Corps Diplomatique here have received notice that after the 25th August the bureaus of government will be removed hence to the Hague; that this removal will probably take up several weeks of September, during which month also we have reason to suppose that the King may proceed to Loo, and to make excursions through Groningen, Friesland, &c.; and that he will not take up his residence at the Hague till the first week in October, it seems clear that whatever projets of laws for the amelioration of the press are to be framed by the Commission appointed here for that purpose, must so be framed prior to our breaking up hence, and consequently prior to the 25th August. I shall therefore be much obliged to you to send me back the Mémoire as early as possible, accompanied by such observations and additions as you may think fit confidentially to communicate to me upon it. His Majesty, you know, is not very rapid in decision, and this makes the question of time more important.

For the reasons stated in my last, viz. our reliance almost exclusively on the Dutch deputies for any restrictive amendments in the laws relating to the press, I fear it will be impossible to make anything of Lord Liver-

pool's ingenious suggestion. As far as the French language is concerned, this is by no means yet negatived as a national language in this country: the two languages are concurrent, the laws published in both, and the government Gazette also printed in each; the only difference being that the Dutch or Flemish occupies the dexter column in this official journal. In Holland there are several daily journals, and among others the 'Leyden Gazette,' published in French. Besides this, the Dutch press derives considerable emolument from the issue of cheap editions of foreign authors. Under these circumstances we could scarcely expect that our Dutch friends should consent to lay themselves under the restrictions of a previous censorship, not arising out of any want of discretion in them, but in effect binding them for the outrageous conduct of others.

Be so good as to forward the packets for Sir Charles Stuart, and send back my messenger as soon as possible.

Believe me, &c.,

CLANCARTY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

## MEMOIR ON THE NETHERLANDS PRESS.

1. *Observations on the Law of the 13th September*, 1816.

The law of the 13th September is a criminal law, and, having for its object the vindication of foreign princes, ought to be sufficiently comprehensive in the enumeration of the evils to be prevented, and precise in the terms by which its enactments are framed; and, above all, the whole of the guilty parties should be made responsible, and the punishment awarded to the convicted ought to be of such a nature as to hold out a fair prospect of preventing the recommission of the crime.

These requisites are not generally found in the law in question.

The enumeration of the crime is much too confined, if, as with us, the criminal law is construed strictly in this country: "ceux qui dans leurs écrits auront offensé ou outragé le caractère, &c., auront contesté ou revoqué en doute la légitimité de leurs dynasties et de leurs gouvernemens, ou auront représenté les actes de leurs administrations sous un jour odieux, seront pour la première fois," &c.

To a stranger unacquainted with the mode of construing laws in this kingdom, it cannot be clear to what extent these terms so far describe the nature of the crime, as by them alone to obtain the object of His Majesty and of his Allies, which it is hoped are, and may ever continue, identified. For instance, do these terms afford the power of prosecuting under this law for those writings which assume the style of ridicule, for those which through all the little sarcastic paragraphs to be frequently found of late in the Macedoine of the 'Vrai Libéral' and in the body of this and other papers, tend, and perhaps more successfully than by the adoption of any other style, to place the King and government of France in a ridiculous and contemptible light?

The law, as it at present stands, applies only, as it should seem, to the preservation of the personal character of sovereigns and foreign princes, to defend the legitimacy of their government from being called in question, and the acts of their government from being placed in an odious light. But it seems at least doubtful whether its protection extends to the persons engaged in

the administrative service of such sovereigns and foreign princes, whether as accredited ministers abroad or conducting the affairs of their states within their dominions; and yet it would be obvious, if recent experience had not demonstrated it, that the foreign sovereign may feel himself equally, perhaps more, insulted by a libellous attack on these than if the libel were immediately directed against his own person.

Again, by this law there is an express negative eventually placed to the parties equally implicated in the crime becoming liable to the punishment, such as it is, inflicted by this law. The author alone of the libel is looked to, and if he shall be delivered up and found guilty, all appears to be done. But surely this is not correct, more especially in the instance of daily journalists. If there is no previous censure of the press in this country prescribed by law on the part of the Crown, at least there ought to exist such previous censorship in the parties engaged in such publications by rendering them strictly responsible to the public for the matter thus by them placed in daily circulation. If, indeed, in matters of this kind, there are parties who ought to be more responsible than others, these are the editors and printers of newspapers. The author could do no mischief without them; they are, in fact, the persons who strike the blow; and though the author ought also to be made responsible, as framing a work with the express view to mischief, yet in other respects it would seem as absurd to visit the sword cutler with punishment for a murder committed by a weapon honestly sold by him, to the exemption of the individual who strikes the deadly blow, as to absolve the editors and printers of daily papers from their responsibility for libellous publications on giving up the author, far less guilty than they.

It is not denied, that giving up the author by the printer or publisher affords evidence in these of a desire to make some reparation for the evil created; but the value of this ought to be solely judged of by the Crown, who may, upon due consideration, and in the exercise of its prerogative of mercy, either decline to proceed further against these parties, or, if already convicted, by mitigating or altogether absolving them from punishment.

The penalty awarded by this law is also altogether inadequate (and this has been found to be the case from experience) to prevent, or even to check the evil.

What is the amount of punishment to which a party shall be subjected by the law? Why, a fine of 500 florins, a sum which would probably make but very little impression upon those caisses de sustentation which we know to exist, and of the large amount of the funds of which some idea may be formed from the fact that one, and by no means the only subscription of a single individual to this Jacobin treasury at Antwerp, amounted to no less a sum than 200*l.* sterling. But the fixture of a precise fine and punishment in all cases of libel is at once both unjust and inoperative; unjust, because if ever there was a crime which admitted of gradation or distinction in degree, that crime is libel. Is it just then to visit the same quantum of punishment upon the head of him who has been guilty of a trifling deviation from the law in this respect, and on him who has poured forth all the malignity of his corrupted heart in some atrocious diatribe against the person, the title, or measures of a foreign sovereign? Is not this holding forth as it were a bounty to the libellist to go roundly to work in the first instance, and not to spare the object of his calumny? assured that, whether guilty in a greater or less degree, his punishment will be precisely the same.

As to the punishment awarded by this law to the second offence, whether as applicable to the author or printer, &c., this appears to be quite nugatory: with common ingenuity there will never be a second conviction against the

same party under this law. The printers, publishers, &c., are guaranteed in all cases from its influence on giving up their author. This, there is no doubt, they will do in all cases; and what can be more easy, with or without the caisses de sustentation at their back, than to give up a different name as the author upon every different occasion?

This country must be very different from all others, if, for a very trifling reward, persons may not be readily found to lend their names for this purpose, and thus evade the penalty to the guilty party, awarded on a second conviction.

To deter from this offence, all the parties to it should be rendered responsible. His Majesty's mercy should alone be interposed, and on valid grounds, to soften the rigour of the law where it might be supposed to press too severely.

The punishment, to be rendered really operative, should be rendered uncertain in amount. Besides the justice of making distinctions between the different degrees of calumny, there is no control found more powerful to prevent the commission of evil than the uncertain amount of punishment with which the perpetration of crime may be visited: a man will think a second time before he will run the risk of involving his fortune in ruin, and his person in an unascertained imprisonment.

In England the punishment of libel is in the discretion of the judge, who awards the quantum of fine and quantum of imprisonment proportionably to the degree of guilt, and the former also with reference to the degree of fortune, of the individual. It must be obvious that a fine of 500 florins is no punishment to a person if backed by a caisse de sustentation, and a mere trifle, even without such aid, to a rich man. Imprisonment, it should appear, ought almost in every case to form a part at least of the punishment, because the punishment is then personally felt by the offender, and cannot be relieved by the pecuniary contributions of others, or diminished by the wealth of the offender.

It may be said that the lodgment of so large a discretion in the tribunals here as that vested in the judges in England, with reference to the apportionment of punishment in cases of libel, might be attended with the inconveniences of abuse. It is hoped, for the honour of the Netherland benches of justice, that they are free from the insinuation thus conveyed. But though, if true, this consideration might perhaps deter from placing in their hands an unlimited discretion, it ought not to prevent the exercise of a large discretion by them upon this subject, more particularly as the Crown will always be ready to mitigate its effects, if carried too far, by the interposition of its popular prerogative of mercy, altogether to pardon or to diminish the quantum of fine or imprisonment, or both, in favour of the convict.

It should seem that with the exercise of this prerogative duly applied, little danger could be apprehended from the abuse of an unlimited discretion upon this subject. But if this should appear otherwise to those possessing superior lights on the administration of public justice in this kingdom, it will only require to limit the discretion, within, however, a sufficient minimum and maximum, to render the object of uncertainty still available and still subject to the merciful interference of the Crown. Suppose, for instance, all persons convicted criminally as authors, printers, or publishers of libel were to be subject to a penalty of not less than 50 florins and three months' imprisonment, or more than 50,000 florins and five years' imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, according to the nature of the offence, and with reference to the state of the party, this would sufficiently save the influence of uncertainty of punishment in prevention of the crime, while the fine would be apportioned to the ability of the convict, by making the pauper pay in his person rather than in

his purse, and at the same time visiting the rich libellist with a shameful imprisonment, though, perhaps, of shorter duration, in consequence of his greater infliction by way of fine.

Such are some of the reflections which have presented themselves on reading attentively the law of 500 florins.

But does the question concerning the amelioration of the press in this country rest solely here? Are there no others than foreign sovereigns and princes who justly claim protection from His Majesty against the tyranny of this press? Have not all His Majesty's subjects, all strangers resident within his dominions, nay, all those who appeal to his tribunals, also a right to protection from the libels of a licentious and perverted press?

Is not His Majesty himself interested to prevent the operation of false impression upon the public opinion of his subjects through the powerful operation of malicious and unprincipled publications?

Nay, is not His Majesty sworn to it, as to a duty, to maintain the press pure and untainted for the purposes of powerfully aiding to promote public instruction under the *loi fondamentale*, instead of suffering it, as unfortunately has been the case, to be debased to the vilest and most pernicious purposes? Considering the matter merely as operating subsequently to publication, or the responsibility of the libellist, it is submitted, that instead of being limited parsimoniously to the protection of a few, the operation of the late law, or of any future laws of libel, ought to be liberally extended to the protection of all, and any distinction taken only in the application of punishment.

It is true that libels which tend to insult foreign sovereigns are of a more atrocious nature, as tending to promote wars, with all their direful train of consequences, between otherwise friendly states: but this only appears to render them on prosecution different in degree of guilt, not different in principle; and consequently, though proper to visit them with heavy, perhaps the heaviest, punishments, they still remain of the same character with other libels, and consequently to be met in prosecution by the same laws and the same proceedings.

This, then, leads to take some general considerations on the law of libel.

The first reflection upon this subject appears to be the necessity of defining what libel is, the definition contained in the compilation styled 'The Code Napoléon' being manifestly confused. But to do this correctly it must first be recollected that libel should be placed under the law in a double point of view:

1. As a public wrong, by inducing a breach of the public peace, and, as such, to be visited criminally.

2. As a private injury, whereby the private character of an individual may be affected to his detriment, and for which he is consequently entitled to redress by compensation in damages in a civil action.

Such is the distinction taken in England, and it will scarcely be contended that any country can desire greater latitude in matters of publication than is there to be found.

In a criminal sense, or as a public wrong, libel may be defined to be the printing or publishing maliciously of any matter which may tend to provoke the disturbance of the public peace, either interiorly or exteriorly; and it is not requisite that the malice should be displayed by having the object of disturbing the peace of the community in view, but it is sufficient that, being shown to exist generally as an inference from the libel itself even as against an individual, the tendency of the publication is such as might induce a breach of the peace.

As a private injury, libel may be said to be the publication of any false

matter, which, if true, would subject the party to a prosecution, affect his credit, or otherwise tend to injure him in his person, property, or character. A very strong distinction appears between these two, in many instances, concurrent modes of procedure, viz., that to the criminal prosecution it is not permitted to the party accused to plead that the matter alleged in his publication is true, and this because the public peace is equally, perhaps more, put in jeopardy by the libellous matter being founded in fact than by its being altogether false; whereas in a civil proceeding, for the recovery of a pecuniary compensation for the evil sustained by the party spoken or written against, it is permitted to plead the truth of the libel, and, if proved, this will be a sufficient answer to the action, because it shall not be permitted to a person to recover compensation from another for a publication, grounded on an act of his own, fairly represented.

This double proceeding, both before the criminal and civil tribunal, appears to be founded in good sense; and unless inapplicable to the laws and customs of this kingdom, is strongly recommended for consideration.

On the criminal proceeding it should seem desirable—

1. To have the law of libel extended to the protection of all.

2. To have the crime clearly defined.

3. To render all the parties to the publication, when in writing or in print equally responsible for their conduct, leaving it to His Majesty to interfere, by his highest prerogative (that of mercy), under the special circumstances of the case—if there shall be found sufficient motives to induce his royal interposition, to mitigate, or altogether to exempt from punishment, any one or more of the parties who shall have incurred the penalties of the law.

4. To render the amount and duration of fine and imprisonment, or conviction, altogether open to the discretion of the tribunal, subject only to the responsibility of every public functionary for his acts; or, at least, to allow that discretion so large a range as to answer the view of intimidating the libellist, inducing him to think a second time before he shall present his acrid poison to the public, affording him the certainty of adequate punishment if he shall do so, and this proportioned to and measured by the atrocity of his offence, and the evil consequences which may be naturally supposed to flow from it.

In the case of printers and publishers, the penalties contained in the law of the 13th September, 1816, would be well devised, if, under that law, they could be rendered efficient against the parties, which, as has been already shown, is not the case.

5. The suppression of their patent, therefore, as referable to printers and publishers, and the deprivation of their privileges of printing and publishing for an unlimited time, proportioned to the magnitude of their offence, would well enter into the discretion to be vested in the tribunals in awarding punishment on the convicted libellist.

6. To these in all cases should be added, the certain confiscation of all the copies of the libellous work, and discretionally, in cases of a graver description, the absolute confiscation of the presses, types, and all other the implements and materials of printing, belonging to the convicted printer, to the use of the Crown.

7. Perhaps a measure of a financial nature might well be brought in aid of these, and such other checks as it may be deemed expedient to interpose against the licentious tyranny of the press, by placing the stamps on periodical publications at a far higher rate, and requiring all clubs, coffee-houses, cabarets, and other places of resort where daily journals and periodical publications are placed for the amusement of the guests, to take out licences, on

which a payment to the State should be required, in some degree proportioned to the ordinary resort of persons to these places, for the purpose of countervailing the loss which would otherwise by their means accrue to the State from the lesser number of periodical publications consequently purchased by individuals.

Such are some of the suggestions which it has occurred to submit for placing the press of the Netherlands under some degree of legitimate control.

It is not pretended that, as operating to punish, and not to prevent, the measures hereinbefore immediately submitted will alone be effectual in these southern provinces (where the privileges of printing and publishing are abusively carried to the extreme), so as to prevent all future complaint: it is hoped, however, that they may operate something towards their desirable object, and that in conjunction with those more efficient measures resulting from the wisdom of His Majesty's councils, and, above all, in addition to the active determination of the King finally to put a stop to the intolerable tyranny and perversion of his press, and to remove all grounds of complaint upon the subject, and all causes of difference thereon with his Allies, that His Majesty may enable himself to place this the most potent engine for the formation of public opinion under his own direction, and render it, as, according to the *loi fondamentale*, it ought to be, the support, instead of its bane, as it is, the bane of public instruction rightly understood.

## II.

## Loi du 13 Septembre, 1816, relative à la Répression de la Licence de la Presse.

Nous Guillaume, &c., ayant pris en considération qu'en vertu de l'Article 227 de la Loi Fondamentale, tout auteur, imprimeur, éditeur, ou distributeur, est responsable des écrits qui blesseraient les droits, soit de la société, soit d'un individu; que ceux qui offensent les Puissances étrangères se rendent principalement responsables envers la société dont ils font partie; que la législation actuelle n'offre pas de moyens suffisans pour réprimer l'abus qu'on peut faire à cet égard de la liberté de la presse; voulant que dans une matière dont les circonstances augmentent encore la gravité, il n'y ait lieu à aucune fluctuation ou incertitude au sujet de nos intentions, et des devoirs de tous ceux qui habitent ce royaume: à ces causes notre Conseil d'Etat entendu et de commun accord avec les Etats Généraux avons statué comme nous statuons par ces présentes.

Art. 1. Ceux qui dans leurs écrits auront offensé ou outragé le caractère personnel des Souverains et Princes étrangers avec lesquels nous vivons en paix et en bonne intelligence, auront contesté ou révoqué en doute la légitimité de leur dynastie et de leur gouvernement, ou auront représenté les actes de leur administration sous un jour odieux, seront pour la première fois punis d'une amende de 500 florins, ou s'ils se trouvent hors d'état de l'acquitter d'un emprisonnement de six mois; et en cas de nouvelle contravention d'un à trois ans.

2. Les mêmes peines seront applicables aux imprimeurs, éditeurs, et libraires qui auront imprimé ou distribué ou fait imprimer ou distribuer les susdits écrits pour autant qu'ils seront hors d'état d'indiquer l'auteur de manière qu'il puisse non seulement être poursuivi en justice, mais aussi convaincu du délit et puni en conséquence. Et sera la peine à infliger aux imprimeurs, éditeurs, et libraires accompagné de la suppression de leur patente, et de la défense d'imprimer ou de publier aucun ouvrage pendant trois ans pour la première con-

travention, et pendant six ans en cas de contravention nouvelle, avec confiscation dans les deux cas des exemplaires de l'ouvrage imprimé ou publié non obstant telle défense.

3. Ni les auteurs ou rédacteurs, ni les imprimeurs, éditeurs, ou libraires, ne seront admis à alléguer comme moyen d'excuse que les écrits ou les articles d'iceux qui donnent lieu à la poursuite sont copiés, extraits, ou traduits de papiers étrangers ou d'autres écrits imprimés.

4. Toute plainte et résolution officielle d'un gouvernement étranger, motivée par les écrits de l'espèce mentionnée en l'Article 1, sera directement transmise par notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à notre Ministre de la Justice, afin que l'auteur, le rédacteur, l'imprimeur, ou le libraire qu'elle concerne soit, si il y a lieu, poursuivi en justice réglée à la diligence du Procureur-Général ou de l'officier du Ministère Public dans le ressort duquel il est domicilié.

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*To Marshal Lord Beresford.* [1215.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Cambrai, 15th July, 1817.

I was in England lately, and received your letter of June 17. The conspiracy at Lisbon appears a most extraordinary event; and it proves that the French Revolution has left in the world heaps of dangerous and unquiet characters, who were kept down for a while by the force of Bonaparte's character, and by the vigour and strength of his government, and were stimulated to objects apparently praiseworthy by the baits he held out to their ambition, but who, being now thrown aside, having no object to look forward to, and their respective governments being little calculated to keep them in awe, are become a focus of mischief, of conspiracy, and rebellion, in nearly every country of Europe. I take this to be the clue of Gomez Freire's conduct. As for Eben, he was never anything but an adventurer. He attached himself to the Prince, and by his influence was sent to Portugal. His conduct there was that of an intriguant, and during the war he was anything but an officer. It appears that the Prince has thrown him overboard, probably having found him out, and he is become in consequence a conspirator. You should take care of yourself among these villains, and act as I do at Paris. I never go into any blackguard mob or place in which a fellow might insult me with impunity. In other respects, I ride or walk alone, and unattended, and go to the theatres and everywhere as other people do.

I spoke to Lord Castlereagh before I left London respecting sending D'Urban to you for a few months, and he promised me to speak to Lord Liverpool on the subject, with whom it appears

that D'Urban had communicated principally. I did not see Lord Liverpool in the last days I was in town, as he was in the country, which was the reason of my speaking to Lord Castlereagh.

Your account of the state of your military affairs is not flattering. However, you are in for it now, and you must stay till you see the result of the existing discussion with Spain, and do the best you can.

I wish you would send me a list of the Portuguese officers you would wish to have recommended for the Order of St. Ferdinand.

I have recommended the British officers in the Portuguese service. The principle on which I have gone is to recommend for actions and sieges in Spain on the same principle as to the British government for medals, with this difference, that no officer can be recommended for more than one action, or, in other words, can get the Order more than once. But observe that this will not give his second or third in command a claim unless he should have actually commanded. I might possibly have taken a list from our medal list, but I preferred to ask you for it, as I shall have it more correct, and shall be sure not to include in it any one who may have behaved ill in the late concerns.

I rather believe the Austrian Princess is not going to the Brazils, but is going to Lisbon. The object of this manœuvre is, if possible, to bring the young Prince home, if the King should not come himself.

There is nothing new here. The great question of the day is the harvest. If it should turn out well, it will probably put people in better temper with themselves and their situation than they have been yet; if ill, we shall have another stormy year.

Ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

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[1216.] *To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, Cambrai, 15th July, 1817.

I have received your letters of the 11th and 14th inst., and I will consider your memorandum on the state of the press in

the Netherlands, and will return it with my remarks upon it by a messenger of my own on Friday.

You will have seen that their Excellencies of Paris have been a little more moderate lately than they had been. In a recent Protocol they have excepted the King of the Netherlands from a sweeping measure to be carried into execution in the whole neighbourhood regarding French emigrants.

In answer to that part of your letter of the 11th relating to Lobau, you will see that he is formally excepted by the Allied Ministers in their recent Protocol; and I have to inform you that in a letter which I wrote to the King on the 20th January, 1816, in which I requested him to allow Lobau to remain in the Netherlands, I transmitted him a copy of a letter which I had received from the Duc de Richelieu, promising me the King's pardon of Lobau at a future period, "*si sa conduite dans les Pays Bas ne fournissoit pas matière d'ici-là à de nouveaux reproches.*" Let me know how this matter succeeds, as I find the 15th August is fixed as the day for him to quit the country unless the order is recalled; and I must lose no time in getting the Ministers at Paris to take a more formal step.

In respect to the libel upon me in the 'Journal de Gand,' it always appeared to me to be a libel upon the King and government of France rather than upon me, though, according to our sense of the law of libel, it does hold me up to odium in stating that I recommended an unworthy person to the King of France from unworthy motives. I differ, likewise, in opinion with all those who think that this kind of libel ought to be passed unnoticed. It has lately been the fashion in England, and it was strongly inculcated and recommended by the late Attorney-General Garrow, and it was necessary to do as others did; but we see to what we have come in England.

The question is whether the paragraph is a libel upon me or is not. If it is, and the editor is likely to be punished, let it be prosecuted. If there are any doubts upon the subject, it need not be prosecuted, particularly if the government do not prosecute for the King of France; but I should think that they ought under the law of the 500 florins; and in that case, *coûte qui coûte*, I will prosecute also.

Ever, my dear Clancarty, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[1217.] *To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY, Mont St. Martin, 16th July, 1817.

I have perused your memoir on the Netherlands Press, and I have but little to observe upon it. It is most important to obtain some better definition of what is calumny and libel than is given in the Code Pénal. I recollect an instance at Paris of a fellow having in a letter to me accused a British officer of sodomitical practices. The officer had marched from Paris, and I made him return, that I might have the charge inquired into; and upon the inquiry it was made clear not only that there was no foundation whatever for the charge, but that the man who accused the officer to me, his commanding officer, knew that the charge was false when he made it. I wanted to prosecute him for calumny; but it appeared that, according to the law, what he had done was not calumny, and there the matter dropped. I have not got by me the Code Pénal; but it is necessary that you should examine it very closely, and take care to have a good definition of what calumny is.

I concur entirely with you that the amendment of the law ought not to be directed solely to protect foreign Sovereigns and governments, and even their diplomatic agents, but the government of the country itself, and the people of the country and individuals of all descriptions.

I think you will experience some difficulty in prevailing upon the King to adopt this principle. He is not disposed to admit that abuse in print is a provocation to a breach of the peace, at least equal to abuse by word of mouth; and he will not see that the consequences of permitting the former must be that those upon whom this licentiousness of the press is exercised will end by committing breaches of the peace; or, in other words, by horsewhipping authors, editors, and printers. I have been witness to this result of the licentiousness of the press in Spain, and I think we are coming fast to it in England; and then it will be seen how necessary it is to protect individuals effectually from this evil. What would be said of a law in any country which should permit one individual to say what he pleased of another, either before his face or behind his back? Yet what is there more preposterous in such a law than in having such an absence of law to prevent the licentiousness of the press as that

any man may with impunity print what he pleases of any individual?

But it is important that the government and individuals should be protected from this licentiousness, not only for their own sakes, but for the general interest of Europe. Foreign Sovereigns and governments don't like to meet an author or a printer in a court of justice, and they would prefer to pass unnoticed many libels rather than come forward to prosecute; but it must not be supposed that, because these libels are not prosecuted, they do not give offence, and do not indispose the Sovereigns and governments who are the objects of them towards the King of the Netherlands and his country.

That, then, to which the King and his government should direct their attention, and should make the object of their legislation, should be to put down the spirit of libelling, and to get rid of the nest of libellers who have established themselves in their country; and it appears to me that one of the best modes of effecting this object is to attack libels of all descriptions, whether directed against foreigners or subjects, against foreign governments or that of the King himself.

I concur with you also entirely in thinking that it is desirable to make all persons responsible concerned in the publication of a libel, whether editors, publishers, printers, hawkers, &c., &c. I enclose Benjamin Constant's last pamphlet on the press in France, in which you will see the effect produced at Paris by a return of the Procureur du Roi against printers. All will tend to the same good end of checking the spirit of libel, which is the great desideratum in the Netherlands.

I don't think your memoir explains sufficiently clearly your principle on confinement as well as fine. You mean that every one convicted of a libel should be both confined and fined, according to the discretion of the Court, within certain limits to be guided by the nature and degree of the offence, and the latter by the situation of the party. For instance, you don't mean that a man fined 50,000 florins should be confined only a month, or a man fined 50 florins should be confined for five years. I would confine them all according to the nature and degree of the offence, and fine them besides according to their means of paying.

Ever, my dear Clancarty, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*General Pozzo di Borgo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Paris, le 19 Juillet, 1817.

Je m'empresse de vous transmettre une lettre de l'Empereur. Les nouvelles que j'ai reçues par le courrier qui me l'a apportée sont parfaites. Les sentimens du bien et les principes de sagesse et de modération qui dirigent le cabinet ne laissent rien à désirer. Nous allons terminer à l'amiable, et j'ai lieu de croire très promptement, des petits différends avec les Turcs. M. de Tatistcheff reçoit des instructions propres à le convaincre que l'Empereur n'aime à faire de bien qu'avec la coopération, l'agrément, et les convenances de vous. Sa Majesté approuve les communications et les démarches qui ont été concertés avec vous, Monsieur le Duc, soit à l'égard de Monsieur, soit sur les différentes affaires auxquelles vous avez pris part. Elle me répète l'ordre de ne rien entreprendre ni statuer sans votre intervention.

Le courrier porteur du traité concernant Parme n'était pas encore arrivé à la date de l'expédition de St. Pétersbourg; mais je prévois par la teneur générale de mes dépêches que notre ouvrage rencontrera l'approbation la plus entière. Vous avez dû être étonné de la conduite de la Cour d'Espagne à cette occasion: sachant que le Baron de Vincent et le Comte Fernan Nuñez vous en convoient, je n'ai pas voulu rien ajouter de ma part; mais j'ai mandé à M. de Tatistcheff tout ce qui fallait pour démontrer l'absurdité d'une pareille démarche; au reste, M. de Tatistcheff travaille sincèrement à obtenir la ratification: il paraît même qu'il l'espère fortement: cette opinion est également partagée par Sir Henry Wellesley.

Vous aurez reçu, sans doute, notre dernier Protocole à l'égard des réfugiés: le Roi des Pays-Bas lui même ne devrait trouver rien à redire.

Nous sommes tourmentés par les affaires de liquidation: cet objet est d'une importance infinie, et ne peut être long-tems indécis. M. de Richelieu se propose d'envoyer le Comte Caraman à Carlsbad, où Metternich, Hardenberg, et Capo d'Istrias se trouveront réunis au commencement du mois prochain, pour en conférer avec eux: je suppose qu'il communiquera à Londres ce qu'il compte de proposer. Lord Castlereagh vient de faire insérer au Protocole la note de votre Cour sur la question du double intérêt: il est non seulement juste, mais très équitable; c'était en vérité l'opinion que j'aurais voulu émettre personnellement; mais les médecins m'en ont empiré; et les égards pour nos amis Vincent et Golta, qui les craignent un peu trop.

Les Ultras commencent à se persuader que leurs imprudences, dont néanmoins ils se gardent de convenir, les rendent odieux et foibles tous les jours davantage: quelques uns d'entr'eux m'ont parlé de rapprochement: j'ai répondu, puisqu'on voulait bien m'interpeller, que le rapprochement devait commencer dans les Chambres, c'est à dire, en soutenant le ministère, et qu'alors les bonnes conséquences viendraient d'elles mêmes. Cette marche ne paraît pas leur plaire, parcequ'elle n'admet ni esprit d'antichambre ni d'intrigue, deux élémens sans lesquels des chefs de ces messieurs ne savent pas vivre.

Blacas a signé un traité avec le Pape; le Roi l'a ratifié; les conditions en sont assez raisonnables en considérant les hommes et la nature de ces affaires. Il y aura une promotion d'environ cinquante évêques, qui seront en général des abbés de Cour, ou d'autres indiqués par eux; s'ils prêchent l'Evangile ils feront du bien; mais s'ils déclament contre la révolution

qui est déjà faite, c'est à dire, contre la fortune et la conduite de presque tout le monde dans ce pays, ce sera un incendie.

Nous avons tous été *disappointed*, de ce que Madame la Duchesse de Berri ne nous a pas fait présent d'un garçon. Le Roi, qui en a eu le premier mot de l'accoucheur, a dit aux autres, "Elles se portent toutes les deux très bien:" c'est une manière détournée d'annoncer une désagréable nouvelle.

Voilà une bien longue lettre pour vous dire, Monsieur le Duc, ce que vous savez déjà. S'il vous convenait de venir à Paris, ce serait pour le mieux: en attendant veuillez bien agréer la continuation de mes sentimens respectueux, et de l'attachement le plus sincère.

Votre très humble et très dévoué serviteur,

POZZO DI BORGO.

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*Lieut.-Col. Heise to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Hamburgh, 19th July, 1817.

I have the honour to report to your Grace that I arrived here on the 10th instant, in hopes of meeting with Mr. C. M. Rothschild, which was agreed upon with Mr. Rothschild in London, so as to be enabled to commence my payments on the 15th. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Rothschild was absent at Berlin on business with the Prussian Court, and did not arrive here until the day before yesterday. This circumstance has necessarily retarded the commencement of the payments for a few days, and I trust that your Grace will be pleased to approve of my reasons for having consented to postpone them for several days longer.

The money being deposited at Paris in francs, which are neither current in Hanover nor Brunswick, it was agreed upon with Mr. Rothschild in London that the same amount was to be paid here in pistoles (pieces of 5 rixdollars gold), according to the Hamburgh course of exchange with Paris on a stated day, without the parties having to pay the usual commission for the transaction. The day whose course of exchange is fixed upon I propose to state in the public advertisement, and shall do myself the honour of submitting it to your Grace in an official document from the Chamber of Commerce; but Mr. C. M. Rothschild has represented to me that, unless he is allowed a few days longer to purchase pistoles in private, before a public advertisement is made that the money is to be paid in that specie, the rise on pistoles (from the very considerable number required) would immediately be so great as to make it impossible for him to furnish them at the advertised course of exchange; or Mr. Rothschild would be under the necessity to produce a rise in the exchange previous to its being noted, by demanding in the market the very considerable number of pistoles at once, which of course I must guard against for the interest of the parties concerned.

Mr. Rothschild is of opinion that another week will be sufficient for completing his purchases in pistoles; and as this short delay will be of a very considerable advantage to the parties who are to share, I trust your Grace

will be pleased to approve of my having agreed to it. I am in hopes of being able to make my public advertisement on Tuesday next, taking the Hamburgh course of exchange on Paris and of pistoles on that day, and to commence my payments on Friday, the 25th instant.

Before I conclude, I trust your Grace will permit me to observe that I have every reason to think no other banking-house in this city would be able to transact this business on such advantageous terms for the parties concerned, as Messrs. Rothschild and Co. will do it without the usual commission, and, having the money already at Paris, will pay it here without previously drawing for the same sum on Paris, which every other house must have done, prejudicial for the moment to the course of exchange on that place.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect and gratitude,
My Lord Duke,
Your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,
AUG. HEISE.

[Tell him that I approve of the delay of the advertisement which he reports in his letter of the 19th July, which appears to me to be necessary.

WELLINGTON.]

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*The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Bruxelles, 20th July, 1817.

I have received yours of the 16th. It reached me only last night.

I very well feel all you say on the advantage of well defining libel. The great difficulty is, however, in what manner to do so. If a definition, especially in a penal law, is too precise, it necessarily excludes from the operation of the Act all that does not fall within it. Of necessity, therefore, it seems to me that the description of the offence, whatever it may be, should be general. The definition adopted in the 'Mémoire' (with which, I will admit, I am not well satisfied) is taken from that used in our law for the description of the same offence, but somewhat extended in order to embrace more than our law does. I shall not fail to look into the Code Pénal as you have recommended, a copy of which will be on my table this morning, but not early enough to comment on it by your messenger. I, however, much more rely on your assistance in furnishing me with a proper definition than on my own labours, which, after much employment, have only produced the unsatisfactory one appearing on the face of the 'Mémoire.'

I am well aware that considerable difficulty will occur in prevailing upon the King to adopt even the principles and practicable remedies recommended in the 'Mémoire:' at no time very *coulant*, he is particularly wayward at the present moment. As nothing, however, appears in the paper but what is essentially connected with the advancement of the general cause and with his own interests and tranquillity, whenever the work shall have received its finishing-stroke by the receipt of your final

observations upon it, and those which I have also canvassed for from our government and Sir Charles Stuart, I shall deliver it in and urge its maxims and recommendations to the utmost of my power, and the reasoning of your letter will very much fortify me in pressing them.

Upon the subject of fine and imprisonment for libel, as proposed in the 'Mémoire,' it had been my intention to have left the quantum of each altogether at the discretion of the Court, and this even to the full extent of the cases you put, of 50,000 florins and three months' imprisonment, or 50 florins fine and five years' imprisonment, as I can well foresee circumstances which, in certain cases, might require even such an extreme partition. I should, however, be disposed, on this as on all other matters connected with the subject, to forego my own in favour of your opinions, if on reconsideration such shall be your opinion.

The French Chargé d'Affaires here has announced that the King of France's protection is withdrawn from ten individuals, contained in a list, a copy of which was furnished me by Sir Charles Stuart, and reached me last night with yours. The subject has, therefore, been before the King without the interference of any person whatever; and I do not believe the slightest difficulty will exist in expelling all these persons from these territories, with the exception of Chambure, to whom you already know that the King incautiously gave letters of naturalization during the first days of his reign. I have recommended M. de Nagell to communicate privately through R. Fagel with the Duc de Richelieu on the subject of this person, representing the difficulty in which the King is placed on this point, and seeking to be released from the same by having Chambure excepted, who will, I hope, however, be placed here under surveillance.

After various disguises, feigned names, &c., M. Mehée de la Touche was at length seized here yesterday, is now in durance vile, and will be sent off under the Protocol of August, 1815.

Nagell will probably settle with the King on Monday respecting le Comte Lobau, and, I have no doubt, in the manner you wish. Whenever this takes place, I will send you word of it immediately by one of my messengers.

Yours, my dear Duke, most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

END OF VOL. XI.

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
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

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